Date of Award

2011-01-01

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Philosophy

Advisor(s)

John Symons

Abstract

In this thesis, I try to spell out what it is to be a human agent. I start by defending an account of agency which I call the cognitive account. The cognitive account of agency holds that there are certain mental capabilities that are required to determine what is an action of the agent and what is not. This then leads into a discussion of intentionality, where I defend a functionalist account of intentional realism. After this I discuss how actions and events are individuated leading into a discussion of what it is to do something intentionally. This relies heavily on the role of act plans, which I believe are better represented by the componential view of actions that I defend earlier.

Language

en

Provenance

Received from ProQuest

File Size

74 pages

File Format

application/pdf

Rights Holder

Gareth Fuller

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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