Comparing verification results of a cryptographic protocol, BAN Kerberos, through Isabelle and SPIN
Cryptographic protocols are sets of rules controlling an exchange of messages between two or more entities, using cryptographic primitives to establish some security objectives. Although many cryptographic protocols may seem simple because they involve only a few messages, it is hard in general to check their correctness. In this thesis, we concentrate on two approaches to formal verification of protocols. One is based on inductive reasoning and the other on state exploration. Specifically, we consider the use of Isabelle, a theorem prover, for the inductive reasoning approach and the use of SPIN, a model checker, for the state exploration approach. We consider two cryptographic protocols for authentication: the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol and the BAN Kerberos protocol. We review previous work where researchers verified the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol using both systems, and where they verified the BAN Kerberos protocol using Isabelle. We proceed to explain how we used SPIN to verify the BAN Kerberos protocol, which had not been done before.
Kim, Myoung Yee, "Comparing verification results of a cryptographic protocol, BAN Kerberos, through Isabelle and SPIN" (2004). ETD Collection for University of Texas, El Paso. AAIEP10571.