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The Impact Of Rule Of Law And Property Rights On Development And Economic Growth: A Comparative Analysis Of Cameroon And Côte D'ivoire

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THE IMPACT OF RULE OF LAW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ON DEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF CAMEROON AND CÔTE
D'IVOIRE

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Dedication

To Mr. & Mrs. Kengwoung

THE IMPACT OF RULE OF LAW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ON DEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF CAMEROON AND CÔTE
D'IVOIRE.

by

RAOUL TAYOU TAYOU, MS

THESIS

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The University of Texas at El Paso

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of the Requirements

for the Degree of

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In this introductory chapter, I briefly discuss the objectives and context of my thesis and the reasons why studying the relationship of institutions to development and growth in sub-Saharan Africa, and more precisely in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire is important. I also address the organization of the thesis and provide brief descriptions of each chapter for the benefit of the reader.

SECTION 1- THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

While the gap is increasing over the years among poor or developing countries i.e., those of the “Bottom Billion” (Collier 2007) and the developed or rich countries, economic growth has become one of the key issues of research in political economy. Academics and other field workers have long debated the causes of underdevelopment and poverty around the world, while positing solutions they believe would help solve the problem. Different approaches have been discussed in this context. For some scholars like Lacoste (1965), Arrous et al. (2009), Trionfetti (1997), Dell et al. (2008) and Roson & Van der Mensbrugge (2012), geography or climate influences development trajectories. For others, among those Acemoglu et al. (2001), Mizuno & Okazawa (2009), Khemraj (2015), and Franck (2018), history, colonization, or slavery has affected the failure or success of states in promoting development. In addition, culture and institutions have figured prominently in studies of development and economic growth. In this thesis, I focus on the rule of law and land law to tackle the causes of under-development in two sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Extensively elaborated and theorized by North (1990, 1991 and 1993) and Acemoglu (2012), institutions became essential variables in understanding the development of countries. Furthermore, macro-economic policies, as defended by Blair Henry and Miller (2006) and Evans

(2005), have shown to be particularly useful in understanding why certain countries advance economically, while others stagnate and struggle to develop. Because it influences production, consumption, investment, employment, income, or inflation, the macroeconomic policy of a state helps lower the unemployment rate and therefore contributes to improving the living conditions of the populations. This last objective constitutes the primary aim of any government, and when it is achieved, the Human Development Index (HDI) of this state increases.

Growth alone cannot *ipso facto* guarantee the improvement of the living conditions of populations in terms of health, life expectancy, and education. This would require that the fruits of this growth be redistributed in such a way that they benefit all populations and not just the elite. The orientation of the economic policy must be rigorous to act in short, middle, and long term.

Rule of law and property rights controlled and guaranteed by the government are essential conditions for the economic growth of countries because they create a climate of trust that is attractive to local and foreign investors. Public policies that safeguard land rights ensure the protection of economic operators by facilitating their access to exploitable land while protecting them against abuses, including illegal expropriation. This protection comes in the form of codes established and known by everyone, formal laws, and authorities to enforce them. I address, in this thesis, the issue of economic public policies and the land law framework, i.e., the orientation of investments and the distribution of state resources. A state that uses its revenues to diversify its economy, promote education, training, and professionalization, build infrastructure (roads, hospitals, water, and electricity), and create businesses is more likely to achieve development goals and economic growth than a state in which political leaders focus

only on the retention of power, or the promotion of an extractive political economy, desperately relying on the exploitation of natural resources.

My comparative study of the two different economic system of Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire is an effective way to understand the impact of not only the rule of law, but also of the land law on development and growth. In fact, at the time of their independence (1960), Cameroon and Ivory Coast were neck and neck in terms of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (118.64 current USD for Cameroon and 155.9 current USD for Ivory Coast). These two former French colonies inherited the same colonial institutions and the same mode of administration except for the fact that Cameroon at the same time inherited the institutions and the same mode of British colonial administration in the regions of North-West and South-West. Indeed, Cameroon, which was under German domination, was divided into two parts during the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, after Germany lost World War I. The League of Nations, predecessor to the United Nations, had placed Cameroon under a dual French and British mandate. The latter has imported their legal system, the Common Law which, unlike the French Civil Law system, consists of a set of rules established by previous court decisions, that case law is one of the essential bases of the law. The English have therefore also applied in the two regions (North-West and South-West) which have been entrusted to them by the League of Nations, the principle of indirect rule, allowing the local authorities to govern the populations according to their own traditions. These local authorities were also in charge of collecting taxes which they then handed over to the British authorities who were focused on trade and the exploitation of local mineral resources.

One could expect that Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, which share the same demographics as demonstrated in the following chapters, would experience the same economic trajectory, with

an advantage for Cameroon which enjoys a larger territory, a larger population and especially from richer natural resources and soil. However, 62 years after their independence, according to the World Bank, Côte d'Ivoire shows much better economic performance than Cameroon in terms of GDP per capita (2578.8 USD for Côte d'Ivoire and only 1661.7 USD for Cameroon, in 2021) as well as in terms of GDP (only 45.24 billion USD for Cameroon and 69.67 for Côte d'Ivoire). Nevertheless, Cameroon has a little more success in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures life expectancy and education as well as wealth, when compared to Côte d'Ivoire. Their respective rank worldwide in 2020 placed Côte d'Ivoire at 150/184 countries and Cameroon at 148/184 countries.

Scholars and political leaders have provided many explanations for the underdevelopment of some countries or at least their slow growth. The most popular explanations point to the nature of the political regime (democracy or autocracy) or the role of institutions while relying exclusively on the GDP to explain development and economic growth. In addition, most of the previous studies perceived development only through the Western prism and tried to replicate identically the approaches that have worked in the great modern democracies in the other states. I suggest considering the particularities of the people in each county, the structure of each nation, and the historical trajectory of each country. The analysis I propose provides new perspectives and is relevant because it examines the impact of the variable mentioned above (rule of law and land law) on the economic growth and development of these two African countries.

I focus on a South-South study and share a new opportunity to inspire political leaders, analysts, and economic academics to set up viable, effective, and efficient policies to meet the challenge of development and economic growth not only in the countries concerned but

generalize these best practices in other underdeveloped or developing countries. This work could reorient the framework of the North-South partnership, so that far from aid policies that have repeatedly demonstrated their inefficiency, we turn resolutely towards a win-win cooperation and partnership. Boosting growth, drastically reducing inequalities, and ensuring social justice can be a clever way to contribute to fighting rampant poverty in the global south.

SECTION 2- AN OVERVIEW OF MY THESIS

According to Basedau (2000), who presented the four challenges of African studies, “At the 2019 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in San Francisco, [...] Participants agreed that most works on African politics come from non-African authors....¹” This research is my contribution to solving this issue.

My thesis proceeds as follows. After the introductory chapter, the second chapter deals with the review of the literature and the theoretical inking. Through an analysis of the main scholarly writings addressing my research question, I construct my theory and provide analyses. The third chapter focuses on the impact of rule of law and land law on the economic growth of Côte d’Ivoire. It is this chapter; I delve deeper into the discussion to demonstrate what effects these two variables have had on this French-speaking West African country over the decades.

The fourth chapter consists of the same analytical movement but this time, oriented on the specific case of Cameroon to detect any points of concordance or divergence with the Ivorian case. The fifth chapter analyzes the impact that the respective growth of each country had on its own human development, i.e., how successful were the redistributive policies set up by the authorities allowing the populations to enjoy the fruits of growth. Finally, chapter six summarizes the results of my research, exposes any shortcomings or limitations and opens new research perspectives, concluding my thesis.

¹ According to him, “The African Politics Conference Group (APCG) – now a fully-fledged chapter of APSA called “African Politics” – organized a round table, chaired by Zachariah Mampilly. The objective was to discuss how to promote the inclusion of African scholars.”

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

In this second chapter, I present the main research on institutions in general and the rule of law and property rights. I then place this pioneering work within the framework of research on the factors of economic growth and development. Based on this, I build a theory that exposes the expected effect of my two variables on the economic growth of underdeveloped countries. I fill in the gaps in the scholarly literature, particularly regarding the analysis of the mechanisms and processes which confer on the states of sub-Saharan Africa the capacities to work in favor of the improvement of the living conditions of their populations, beyond the economic growth rates.

Section 1: Conceptualization and operationalization of institutions in relation to their effects on economic growth

It is almost impossible to do meaningful research in economics, economic policy, or political economy without mentioning the names of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, especially when dealing with questions relating to institutions. Indeed, their theory is centered on the idea that the implementation of economic and political institutions is the fundamental cause of inequalities across the planet. Through their research they make major distinctions between extractive institutions and inclusive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

According to the two scholars, inclusive institutions are those that best promote economic growth and development because they are favorable to greater participation of the population in the management of state affairs and ensure better redistribution of accumulated gains while promoting fair economic incentives for all citizens. Conversely, extractive institutions are those that are set up for the benefit of a small corrupt elite and controlled by it, all of which contributes to the underdevelopment of the country and therefore to the impoverishment of most of the population because the thin fruits of growth are confiscated by the ruling elite.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, in their article titled “The role of institutions in growth and development” published in 2010, present institutions as a determining factor in development. Moreover, as stated by Olson (1996), for a country to develop, viable economic institutions must be implemented, supported by an adequate policy necessary to raise the standard of living of the populations. Acemoglu (2006) describes the link between economic policy and political stability by showing that stable institutions which reduce social inequalities and promote inclusive development reduce the inclination of the population to revolt and therefore help to increase confidence in the state that we know is favorable to the influx of investors. The question of the valuation of human and technological capital is constantly addressed by researchers, but the answer is often vaguely given as to the implementation of such requirements. Economist Douglas North has provided some remarkable insights to address these concerns.

For North (1991), institutions are “human constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions.” According to him, these constraints are formal rules (the constitution or property rights, for example) and informal rules (rules of conduct, tradition, or customs) which structure life in society and consequently influence political and economic life of the country. For this famous American economist, the strength of institutions, presented as necessary for the development and economic growth of states, depends on the capacity of the government to put them in place or even on the form of the state; secular or religious, democratic, or autocratic etc. In his 1992 article "Transaction costs, institutions and economic performance", North presents two main obstacles to the development of viable and competitive institutions, namely the reluctance of political leaders to changes that would go against their selfish and personal interests to the detriment of the national interest, and the natural resistance of informal institutions to

change. Because the latter is made up of routine practices that have imposed themselves over many years as innate and transcendent cultures, their changes are terribly slow. Changing material institutions is much easier than changing mentalities.

As part of my analysis, I will demonstrate that institutions such as rule of law play a fundamental role in promoting development in Africa and that the land law framework also participates in the promotion of economic growth. However, as Freeland (2012) shows, authoritarian regimes, particularly in Africa, unless they have extraordinary natural resources such as Saudi Arabia or Russia to a certain extent, are resistant to the emergence of these institutions.

Similarly, Rodrick et al. (2004) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) reject the commonly accepted idea that development factors reside in predetermined dimensions such as geography, climate, or natural resources (Diamond, 1997). These deterministic theories push states that have such favorable resources towards extractive political economies. For Rodrick et al (2004), when institutions are strong and stable, geography or even trade have at best an indirect effect. Through their positive theory, Acemoglu and Robinson call on states to implement Schumpeterian "creative destruction" (1942) which allows states to develop through innovation and the perpetual renewal of technologies, of the very structures of the production system, and institutions created by capitalism.

However, while it is true that the former colonial powers undoubtedly bear a considerable share of responsibility for the stunted growth of the underdeveloped countries (Acemoglu et al. 2001), I question that deterministic perspective in understanding why countries are undeveloped more than a half century after their independence. Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon were under the yoke of the same metropolis, namely France, and consequently were subject to the

same institutions and colonial mode of government; unfortunately, six decades after their independence, the development trajectories of the two states are quite different. Cameroon's GDP/per capita in 2021 was \$1,661.7, and Côte d'Ivoire \$2,578.8. Côte d'Ivoire does better in GDP/per capita.²

Miller and Henry, (2009) challenge the theory of institutions (legal framework and property rights) as development factors and insist on macroeconomic policies to explain the growth gap between Jamaica and Barbados. In the same vein, Larsen (2006) analyzes the case of Norway in the context of a study on the tendency of commodity-producing countries to suffer from the Dutch disease. The author explains that it was not institutions but the implementation of specially adapted macroeconomic policies that enabled the country to resist this scourge of the Dutch disease or the resource curse and get ahead of its Scandinavian neighbors (Denmark and Sweden) who had nevertheless taken a long lead. In the Norwegian case, the macro-economic policies implemented were centered on wages, factors of production, education, or the labor market, etc.

I will undertake in my analysis an approach which consists of reconciling the rule of law and property rights which influence the results of growth and divergent development in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. Institutions, under the two angles of the rule of law and the land law are the core of my thesis. This different undertaking is particularly important in analyzing my variables, knowing that the human development index (HDI) is helpful to tackle the required conditions to improve economic growth and development in Africa. A change in basic assumptions has become necessary to improve the living conditions of populations in the face of the failure of the policies previously implemented to achieve these objectives. Now, in the following section, I present my theory.

² <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/ivory-coast/cameroon>

Section 2: Theorizing the Rule of Law and Property Rights as Determinants of Economic Growth and Development




Figure 2.1: The Theoretical Chart. Source: Author.

The question of institutions as a structuring factor has often been at the heart of the analysis of the causes and solutions of underdevelopment. In this thesis, I examine the roles that the rule of law and property rights play in economic development. The operationalization of my second variable, the protection of property rights, will be done through the evaluation of land rights. It will be particularly interesting to analyze the impact of public land policies on development and economic growth. Indeed, I argue that we should not consider institutional reforms and neglect the improvement of adequate public policies, but both should be implemented together, to achieve the best results in terms of economic growth and development.

The early implementation of proactive agrarian policies reduces social tensions and encourages investment. Trust in government and in the institutions thus created is a key factor in addressing the issue of economic growth and development. Economic growth is difficult to achieve in the context of insecure private property, where the private property is not regulated and protected by law. Development is almost impossible in an environment where each citizen is at the mercy of injustices of all kinds: groundless expropriation, administrative delays in the procedures for the acquisition or sale of private property or related assets.

I maintain that in countries whose economy is based on agriculture, the exploitation of raw materials and natural resources, the proper management of agrarian and land issues seems essential to boost the economy. Also, an insufficient guarantee of property rights as well as the rule of law have as a direct consequence the flight of investors in the sense that no one wants to invest in an environment where they do not feel protected by clear laws and by independent authorities knowing that at any time, they can arbitrarily lose their capital.

My theory is therefore that a state where all citizens feel protected by formal laws and authorities, where property rights are secured in terms of land governance and redistributive policies are enforced by the government, has every chance of achieving development and growth objectives. Undeveloped countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, must reform their institutions, enunciate, and publish laws that are accessible to all citizens. Obviously, economic growth and human development is hindered in a context where justice is dependent on the executive and subject to all kinds of pressure and influence peddling. Judges should not be exposed to disciplinary sanctions or to breaks and blockages in the evolution and development of their career. The above-mentioned institutions (rule of law and land law) shape the confidence of investors and therefore the productive capacity of the states.

Hypothesis

To test my theory, I propose two hypotheses.

H-1: The improvement of rule of law and property rights (land law) increases confidence in institutions and protects investors and investments, thus leading to economic growth.

H-2: Economic growth has an indirect effect on human development conditional on the implementation of efficient redistributive social policies.

The comparative case analysis

My thesis uses a most similar system research design by analyzing two countries that are remarkably similar in terms of their demographics and pre-independence political history. Whether in political science or economics, John Stuart-Mill is considered one of the pioneers of comparative studies. Presented as the method of differences, the comparative method of the famous philosopher and economic political scientist Mill is used to understand the causes of social or political phenomena. Mill (1889) subsequently elaborated and analyzed five methods of experimental research, which are the method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the method of residues and the method of concomitant variation method. The one I use in this research is the most similar system method which is very practical in the demonstration of causal mechanisms.

The most similar system method consists in comparing pre-selected cases that are very similar from the start in order to see subsequently which variable can act on these similar cases but produce different results (Anckar, 2008; Levy, 2008). The advantage of such a method is that it improves and facilitates the isolation of causal mechanisms by immediately eliminating unnecessary variables.

In this case, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon share many characteristics. By controlling for these common characteristics through most similar systems design, I analyze the relationship between two dependent variables (economic growth and human development), and two independent variables (the rule of law and property rights). At the end of my analysis, I expect that despite their similar political histories and demographics, under the influences of these independent variables, these two sub-Saharan African countries have experienced different growth and development trajectories.

In fact, this comparison holds because I chose two former French colonies, which earned their independence the same year, on January 1, 1960, for Cameroon and on July 11, 1960, for Ivory Coast. In addition, their economies are based on the exploitation of the same raw materials or agricultural products, namely cash crops such as coffee, cocoa and bananas to list a few.

Both Côte d'Ivoire (West Africa) and Cameroon (Central Africa) are French speaking countries. I chose these two countries because of their shared demographics, which are terribly similar in many respects. Regarding population, the respective numbers diverged at the time of independence in 1960. Cameroon had 5,176,920 inhabitants with an area of 475,442 square kilometers (about the area of California) and Côte d'Ivoire had 3,503,559 inhabitants with an area of 322,463 square kilometers (about half the area of Texas) according to World Bank. According to the same source, the two sovereign states have the same characteristics today. The total population in 2022 is approximately 27,053,629 for Côte d'Ivoire and 27,224,262 for Cameroon.

Knowing that the population is the first factor of economic production, it is important to note that the Ivorian population supplanted that of Cameroon in 1988 (11,075,423 for Cameroon against 11,094,740 for Côte d'Ivoire) and continued to do so until the mid-2010s when

Cameroon regained its numerical population advantage around 2015. Furthermore, in both countries, more than 60% of the population is young (under 25 years old). Having a young population is a guarantee of labor, even if this abundant labor must be skilled. Indeed, the size of the population is not the only characteristic a population must have to bring about economic production. These people must be educated, in good health and live in a peaceful environment.

In the 1960s, the economy of both countries was at about the same level of GDP/per capita with a little advantage in favor of Ivory Coast but data changed for a decade (1984- 1995), when Cameroon experienced better economic performances. However, from 1995 until now, Côte d'Ivoire showed higher growth and the gap widened with Cameroon according to the World Bank, although throughout the past 15 years the curve has not been linear because of efforts and improvements made in both countries. Regarding confidence or trust in institutions, I will use the Corruption Perceptions Index developed by Transparency International and the World Bank as an indicator. The more corrupt is a country, the less the population and investors have confidence in the institutions to secure their rights and protect their assets.

Using a qualitative approach, I analyze through which processes my independent variables (rule of law and property right) influence and affect my dependent variable (economic growth and development).

Chapter 3: The Impact of Rule of Law and Land Law on the Economic Growth of Côte d'Ivoire

In this chapter, I discuss the effects of the rule of law and land rights on the economic growth of Cote d'Ivoire. In the first part, I demonstrate the significant impact of the establishment of an agrarian policy that guarantees and protects private property on economic development. In the second part I present the evolution of Ivorian economic growth according to the implementation of a reassuring institutional framework for investors.

SECTION 1- IMPACT OF LAND LAW ON ECONOMIC GROWTH OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE

In terms of property rights, Côte d'Ivoire enjoys better performance than Cameroon. In 2022, according to the International Property Right Index report (from the Property Right Alliance, PRA), Cote d'Ivoire IPRI score is 3.81, placing it 16th/30 in the Africa region and 109th/129 in the world. Indeed, the legal and political sub-index score for Côte d'Ivoire is 2.761 in judicial independence, 3.801 in rule of law, 3.278 in political stability and 3.947 in control of corruption. Ivory Coast's physical property rights score is 4.906 in the perception of protection of property rights, 4.829 in the registration process and 2.438 in access to finance.³

The Ivorian economy is based on agriculture. Since agriculture is done on the land, having an agrarian policy that contributes to improving the investment and business environment is essential if we want to achieve aimed growth objectives (Barrows & Roth, 1989).

For decades, many issues have plagued Ivorian land rights and land tenure, among these issues, an absence of legislation or a vague legislation when it was available. By that I mean texts that are difficult to interpret, and therefore to apply. This is, for example, the case of

³ <https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/cote-divoire#:~:text=C%C3%B4te%20D'Ivoire's%20Physical%20Property,2.438%20in%20Access%20to%20Financing.>

conflicts of authority between the various administrations in charge of certain land matters, (Chauveau, 2002).

1-1: Geography and Agrarian Cartography of Cote d'Ivoire

The land map of Côte d'Ivoire displays a flat relief on all the national territory. The country borders five other countries which are Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Also, Côte d'Ivoire has a long maritime border of more than 500 km (about 310.69 mi). The country is divided into two distinct agricultural-pastoral areas. Beyond a small mountain range in the west of the country, the southern region of Côte d'Ivoire is where the capital Abidjan is located, bordering the Atlantic Ocean. The south is a forest area with a humid and tropical climate. This is the area where cash crop agriculture is both practiced and dominated by coffee, cocoa, and bananas.



Figure 3-1: Land map of Cote d'Ivoire. *Source:* WorldAtlas.com, accessible at <https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/cote-d-ivoire>

The north of Côte d'Ivoire is dominated by livestock due to its Sudanese climate. Some food crops thrive there like sorghum, corn, and cotton.

1-2: Role of Agriculture in the Economy of Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 3.2: Agriculture share in Cote d'Ivoire economy 2010-2020. *Source:* Statista, accessible at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/452068/share-of-economic-sectors-in-the-gdp-in-ivory-coast/>

Agriculture is at the center of the Ivorian economic activity, which is booming. With an amount of 7.6 billion dollars of income for the GNI of the country in 2015, agricultural exports represented 68% of the country's total exports.⁴ Since its independence in 1960, the unbridled production and exports of cash crops that were mentioned in the previous sub-section allowed the country to experience a period of great prosperity. International demand was strong and prices stable, if not increasing. As a result, Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny, called the "father of the Ivorian Nation", centers his economic policy on agriculture and in doing so, opened the borders to many local and foreign migrants who all wanted to participate and take advantage of the "Ivorian miracle", (Raphaël-Leygues, 1977).

⁴ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/publication/cote-divoire-economic-outlook-why-the-time-has-come-to-produce-cocoa-in-a-responsible-manner#:~:text=While%20agricultural%20activity%20is%20declining,economic%20situation%20starting%20in%202012.>

<https://h2gconsulting.com/ivory-coast/export-your-agricultural-products-and-services-to-ivory-coast/?lang=en>

From the 1960s, Côte d'Ivoire experienced considerable growth rates with a GDP which increases by 7% on average each year.⁵ Half a century later in 2012 agricultural exports, which amounted to 5.9 billion dollars, constituted 49% of the country's total exports (Paul-Alfred, 2020). When we know that agriculture therefore represents a quarter of the GDP of Côte d'Ivoire, any agrarian or land problem inevitably has repercussions on national production (Widner, 1993). Still, agriculture is not the only area related to land issues. Industry, which also represents another quarter of Ivorian GDP, requires for its full development the implementation of land rights ensuring the safeguard of the interests of all potential investors, foreign or local.

1-3: Miracle Turned Mirage, Economic Crisis, and Land Crisis

Originally, a land policy clumsily modeled on the colonial heritage was already poorly thought out in its time. Decades before independence, the Ivorian economy had been designed by the French metropolis to serve only to produce foodstuffs intended for export under the control of France. Côte d'Ivoire, being a champion of cocoa production and this crop being cultivated in the south, the authorities of the time encouraged national or foreign populations to migrate in large colonies to this agricultural zone.

⁵ https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/frd/frdcstdy/co/cotedivoirecount00hand_0/cotedivoirecount00hand_0.pdf




Figure 3.3: World ranking of top 8 cocoa producers in the world. *Source:* World Population Review, accessible at <https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/sweet-nothings-what-west-africas-copec-plan-means-for-cocoa-farmers>.

This policy was pursued by President Houphouët-Boigny at the time of independence. Due to the low demography of the time (in 1960, the total population of the country was 3,700 million), this situation did not constitute a problem. The land was abundant and underpopulated. Without renouncing their customary rights to the land, the local or indigenous populations allowed non-natives and foreigners (Maliens, Burkinabe etc.) to exploit those lands. In doing so, the newcomers looking for better life conditions settled there permanently by founding families (Beauchemin, 2011).

According to the law, or at least the secular customary practice, the land belongs to the natives as the first occupants. An extremely popular slogan of President Houphouët who endorsed the change in land policy and created the first seeds of conflicts to come is: "the land belongs to the one who exploits it, develops it."⁶ In a context of dazzling economic growth and great prosperity, everyone finds their account, but when the economic crisis begins to hit in the early 1980s, voices were raised which constituted the first signs of conflicts that raged for

⁶ <https://reporterre.net/La-terre-a-ceux-qui-la-travaillent>

decades. The decrease of raw materials price on a global scale causes the recession in the country.

Indeed, with an economy that depends exclusively on the export of products that does not set the price itself, Côte d'Ivoire is facing strong economic, social, and political tensions. The situation was exacerbated by a bad government policy which failed to anticipate such a situation. A more diversified economy with a broader tax base would no doubt have helped to better cushion exogenous shocks.

The galloping unemployment rate leads certain populations to return to their regions of origin, others in the same regions to leave the urban areas to return to the rural areas in their villages. However, the lands left vacant (for some for many years even decades) were no longer available, according to the formula of the President, new people have developed them and therefore, by exploiting them, claim to be the new owners. This social and economic crisis of the return to the origins of the populations was accentuated because the country was under the structural adjustment program of the IMF which required that the state reduce its payroll and privatize companies causing huge layoffs. All these newly unemployed people were obliged to return to their villages of origin, which were already occupied. The indigenous populations therefore demand the departure of the non-natives who, in return, turned to the government to demand arbitration because their own lands of origin were already occupied by other populations. This is how tensions increasingly spread until they end in civil war (Dabalén, Kebede & Paul, 2012; Allouche & Zadi Zadi, 2013). Economic growth cannot be maintained in such an environment where preserving the achievements is compromised by consistent social movements, and attracting new investors becomes a challenging task because investing in permanently disputed land is a risk that no investor wants to take.

1-4: The Reform of the Land Law and the Recovery of the Economic Growth in Côte d'Ivoire

While the various social and political crises that the country was experiencing led to an economic crisis, the Ivorian authorities have decided to reform the land tenure framework. This is how Law No. 98-750 of December 23, 1998, relating to rural land was passed.

Given that the populations complained increasingly about their marginalization and the grabbing of land by multinationals, this law aimed to formalize customary rights, and register the land so that individuals can have access to it legally and legitimately (Feder & Noronha, 1987; Ensminger, 1997). This law was in fact the first successful effort to legislate on the Ivorian terrestrial heritage in the contemporary era.

The African Institute for Economic and Social Development (INADES) through its Secretary General Francis Ngang, piloted in 2013 in West Africa research under the theme “Do not touch my land, it is my life”. According to the results obtained: "about 2,313,400 hectares of land were acquired between 2000 and 2012" in Togo, Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso, by national and foreign investors. However, these acquisitions were made in contexts that did not always preserve the interests of local populations. The new law of 1998 aimed to simplify land acquisition or cession procedures with the focal point of safeguarding and respecting citizens' rights. To do this, the once tedious procedures have been reduced to two stages.

The process of formalizing land ownership includes these two phases: obtaining a land certificate, then within three years, proceeding with the transfer of the certificate into a private property title, the final land title. This land title is to date the only document that definitively confers the right of use of land to an individual either by exploiting it himself or by selling or renting it to a third party (Kone, 2002). On a case-by-case basis, the former owners of land have been dispossessed of all or part of their assets, in particular the large multinationals owning thousands of hectares. In other contexts, mechanisms for compensating former owners have been

established. The principle is now that only Ivorians can be permanent owners of land and foreigners are only short-, medium- or long-term tenants. However, in practice, this is not always the case. The law was vague on this subject because it was given in a general framework while waiting for the decrees of application which will come to bring more precisions. Even between indigenous and non-native Ivorians (Ivoirian coming from another region to settle in a new one), the practice remains that the land is never definitively ceded, at any time the former indigenous owner can come and claim assistance from the new owner on a happy or unhappy event that he might experience. It was an unofficial practice, informal but deeply rooted in habits and customs. So, if according to strict legal terms the transfer of property is official, in practice, the two contractors (buyer and seller) behave according to customs as the buyer still owes at least symbolically assistance to the seller and his family.

Law No. 98-750 of December 23, 1998, relating to rural land is a real revolution compared to the previous practice implemented by Houphouët-Boigny because now, contrary to the old doctrine, the land belongs only to its legal and legitimate owner, not to the one who valued or exploits it. This law therefore concedes the legitimacy of the land to the natives in priority, who are the de facto owners because they are the first or at least the oldest occupants. Then, they are the legal occupants because the law recognizes these attributes to them either by the legislative recognition of their customary rights, or through the granting of land titles. It is no longer a question of knowing who exploits the land to know who owns it, but who was the first occupant. The notion of legitimacy is even more important here as there are many people or companies who, because they hold joint financial resources, have appropriated huge plots of land (sometimes at ridiculously cheap cost) to the detriment of impoverished local populations having no choice but to give up their land.

After its report of September 7, 2010 on the issue of land grabbing and the conflicts it creates, a new World Bank report of July 2013 entitled "Securing Africa's Land for Shared Prosperity" informs that the ten largest land acquirers in Africa were (in millions of hectares): United Arab Emirates (1.9), India (1.8), United Kingdom (1.5), USA (1.4), South Africa (1.3),

Italy (0.6), Germany (0.5), Sudan (0.5), Ethiopia (0.4) and Portugal (0.4). All these powers that deploy agricultural and land projects in Africa unfortunately most often invest in export-related commodities that their national economies need to the detriment of the needs of local populations. Moreover, being far from their national borders, they often pay little heed to environmental issues (Awan, 2013). Land grabbing is a phenomenon that affects all African countries in general, but the case of sub-Saharan Africa is even more alarming as the populations are increasingly mobilizing to convey their grievances to the competent authorities. When they are not heard, the despoiled populations no longer hesitate to take justice into their own hands in a violent way through sit-ins or destruction of property and acts of vandalism (Reynolds, Waddington, Anderson, Chew, True, & Cullen, 2015; Grajales, 2018; 2020).⁷

Also, another major problem was the non-respect of contractual clauses by some buyers. Indeed, many are the companies which promised at the time of the acquisition of the lands to recruit according to pre-negotiated quotas the local populations to work in the companies to be created. Unfortunately, this was very often not the case, or at least, indigenous people only benefited from menial positions, without qualifications. Another problem that often arises is the preservation of the environment, the protection of fauna and flora. Foreign companies have multiplied cases of destruction of the ecosystem of the areas where they were established.

Therefore, the new law strengthens the rights of citizens, those who are the holders of Ivorian nationality. At the same time, it denies foreigners--, non-Ivorians--this ability to become landowners on Ivorian soil. Those who wish to settle in Côte d'Ivoire or to do business there can obtain an emphyteutic lease, consisting of a long-term real estate lease. This legislative provision was enshrined in the Constitution in 2016. Indeed, if this revolutionary law on Ivorian land has been passed since 1998, its implementation will be done in a staggered manner through the signing of implementing decrees. The combined effects of the late implementation of this law on Ivorian land and its slow enforcement according to the signing of implementing decrees

⁷ For more Cote d'Ivoire-focused details, read the mixed African Union-European Union report: Large-scale Land Acquisition in Africa: Impacts, Conflicts and Human Rights Violations of June 2022.

contributed to the continuing crises in Côte d'Ivoire until the stabilization at the beginning of the 2010 decade, until today.

However, the reform was not limited to the modification of rural land legislation because, as I said, the problem of Ivorian land concerns the whole country. Achieving the growth and development objectives of Cote d'Ivoire also required reviewing the legislation in urban areas because if it is in the countryside and in rural areas that the large agricultural areas are located, the headquarters of the companies owning these plantations and farms are in urban areas. Similarly, the main public and private administrations, as well as the multitude of other companies and enterprises that do not necessarily work in the agricultural field, are urban. Better still, the places of residence of most civil servants or even people living in the informal sector are also in urban areas in the main Ivorian cities, like Yamoussoukro or Abidjan, because they are by far more developed than rural areas. Consequently, they offer better employment opportunities in a context where the provision of goods and services (water, electricity, health care etc.) is much better ensured.

The non-regulation of land in urban areas or at least the poor regulation has for years been the cause of many conflicts that negatively impacted economic growth. Indeed, some major state real estate projects have been postponed, canceled, or delivered late by weak land law security. The reforms made in 2019 included the establishment of clear legislation that was sufficiently communicated to the populations. Also, the simplification of procedures for registering land, obtaining land titles, or building permits are all markers that have been facilitated by the reduction of checkpoints (many administrations involved in procedures which could be covered by a single person), which are bottlenecks that instituted a bed of corruption. The implementation of digital administration has played a leading role in this improvement.

The World Bank through its Doing Business ranking for 2019 confirmed this trend by conceding the progression of 17 places of Côte d'Ivoire on a global scale.⁸ These appreciable efforts have continued to be implemented until 2022 with the government reforms carried out by the Minister Bruno Kone of Construction, Housing and Urban Planning. As a matter of facts, even if since 2013 legislation was already trying to establish order in this land capharnaum,⁹ the many biases that I have already mentioned above tainted its implementation and therefore undermine its effectiveness.

Many points were on the agenda of these new reforms which included the following: housing (construction of social housing) and urban development (implementation of modern land subdivision plans). The urban land sector is the issue linked to this research. Indeed, a decree implementing the project to delimit the territories of the villages of Greater Abidjan has been signed. This one was eagerly awaited because it helped curb the many, and sometimes fatal, territorial disputes. Of greater significance, the borders would finally be well defined between the different constituencies. The Ivorian government has also adopted texts relating to the Integrated Urban Land Management System (SIGFU) which undoubtedly, by simplifying all administrative processes and procedures, effectively improves the business environment. This consists, for the state, of titling in its name and delimiting immense land in urban areas, registering them in a single digital directory easily accessible online. Once done, the government returns these lands formally and legally parceled out to the populations justifying a right of traditional ownership, or when the lands are not claimed, the government put them up for sale or quite simply use them within the framework of the sovereign prerogatives for the general interest of all citizens.

⁸ For more details, check DB2019-report_webversion, https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_webversion.pdf

⁹ This was the purpose of Ordinance No. 2013-481 of July 2, 2013, establishing the rules for the ownership acquisition of urban land.

Improving the land administration in Côte d'Ivoire was needed to promote economic growth and development. The clarifications provided by the law of 98, with the various implementing decrees, eased community tensions. Doing business in a context of civil war is often beneficial only for the arms dealers. Yet, in this case it is a question of easing the tensions which caused the deaths of thousands of individuals, many of which were often-skilled labor; this created labor issues and shortages. The land market is a real economic hub (Weber, 1999; Colin & Ayouz, 2005) that generates large sums of money, unfortunately, in the absence of legislation many people were ripped off. The implementation of the rule of law has most certainly contributed to this general stabilization of the country, politically, economically, and socially.

SECTION 2- THE CONNECTION BETWEEN IVORIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RULE OF LAW

2,549.04 USD (2021)




Figure 3.4: Cote d'Ivoire GDP/Capita 1960-2020. *Source:* World Bank, 2021, In 2021, constant US dollars; accessible at datacatalog.worldbank.org

Before French colonization, the Ivorian economy was based on subsistence farming, intended for self-consumption. There was no question of producing to transform or store, nor of exporting. The production, which was not very abundant, was only used to cover local consumption needs. At the time of its independence on August 7, 1960, the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, a former French colony since March 10, 1893, had an estimated population of 3,708,661 inhabitants (about twice the population of the US state of New Mexico).¹⁰ Its economy was during the colonial period mainly centered on the production and exportation of agricultural products such as cocoa (of which the country is today the leading producer in the world, coffee), cotton and other goods. The GDP per capita of Cote d'Ivoire in 1960 was \$147.3 current US dollars, the country now has much higher economic growth than its neighbors as we can see in Figure 3-2 above. In fact, almost all former French colonies were at the same level of development at the time of their independence. Thanks to the agrarian policy implemented by Houphouët-Boigny, the first Ivorian president, people from Mali and Burkina Faso crossed the borders to settle in Cote d'Ivoire and enjoy the “Ivoirian Miracle” (Bamba, 2020).

Today, Cote d'Ivoire is a developing country whose achievement of the threshold of emerging countries was programmed by the government for the year 2020. With already three years of delay, the objective has not yet been formally reached in 2023 but considerable efforts have been made in this direction, the country being officially a middle-income country of lower category, member of the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries. Indeed, on July 1 of each year, based on gross national income per capita (GNI/capita) adjusted for inflation, exchange rate variations and demography, the World Bank updates its taxonomy of countries of the world according to their income. This classification in 2020 incorporated four distinct categories, namely: From top to bottom, high-income countries (GNI/capita > \$12,535 US dollars), those

¹⁰ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CI>

with upper middle income (GNI/capita between 4,046 and 12,535 US dollars), lower-middle-income countries (GNI/capita between \$1036 and \$4045), and low-income countries (GNI/capita < \$1035). The GNI/capita of Côte d'Ivoire in 2020 was \$2,240 current US dollars, which therefore makes the country a lower-middle-income state.¹¹

This performance, although below the expectations of the government, is quite remarkable when considering that Côte d'Ivoire has experienced a succession of political, institutional, and military crises over the past twenty years. How then has Côte d'Ivoire managed to climb back up the slope in barely two decades while other countries, even after half a century, cannot manage to get rid of the scourge of endemic underdevelopment? To answer this, one must go back to the country's independence. In 1960 the GDP per capita of Cote d'Ivoire was \$147.3 current US dollars according to the World Bank database.¹²

2-1: From the Post-Independence Period to the Beginning of the 1990s: The "Ivorian Miracle" under Colonial Institutions

Côte d'Ivoire experienced exponential economic growth after its independence with annual growth rates of 7% on average. This growth can be justified by the global international context conducive to the purchase of raw materials and agricultural products from Côte d'Ivoire at soaring prices.

Labor being abundant, coming from all the countries of West Africa, Ivorian agriculture was flourishing as we have shown above and industrialization, although embryonic, already allowed the country to rise among the best in the sub region. However, if the international situation has played a non-negligible role in Ivorian economic growth, it must be recognized that the domestic political and institutional context was not left out (Calipel & Guillaumont, 1996; Koffi, Ouattara, Ballet, & Mahieu, 2014).

¹¹https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/examen-multidimensionnel-de-la-cote-d-ivoire/vers-l-emergence-de-la-cote-d-ivoire-evaluation-et-recommandations_9789264251670-4-fr#page20

¹²<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CI>

Indeed, the Ivorian authorities have inherited the political and administrative framework left by the former metropolis, marked by a not highly organized civil society, bearing the stigmata of colonization, and not knowing how to claim their rights. Moreover, as the country is under a single party regime (President Houphouet-Boigny's PDCI), individual rights and freedoms receive little or no promotion. The rule of law, which makes it possible to prevent the native or foreign populations from abuses of power, is masked or stifled by the abundance of the wealth of the country.

The legal codification of well-defined regulations and laws guaranteeing the protection of citizens against the dictatorship of the authorities only appeared on the agenda thanks to the economic crisis of the 1980s. Without specific law bidding everybody in society, the government can abuse their power sending the people back to the state of nature (Hobbes, 1967). Indeed, the fall in the price of raw materials on the international scene will cause the fall in growth and the starving populations will engage in a series of strikes in order to demand from the leaders the democratic opening which alone would allow them to set up inclusive institutions where each citizen can choose their leaders and demand the establishment of laws that protect them and their business, otherwise peace and social stability would be constantly threatened. The GDP/capita which in 1960 was 147.3 current US dollars will reach its peak in 1980 with an amount of 1,225.4 current US dollars, before falling by half in five years to end up at 700.3 current US dollars (World Bank report, 2020).

Faced with national popular uprisings and under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions, Côte d'Ivoire, after taking part in the La Baule conference in France on June 20, 1990, initiated its democratization process. This was the consecration of the establishment of a multi-party system and elections by direct universal suffrage, thus begins a period of learning and consolidation of the rule of law (Faure, 1990; Mundt, 2018).

2-2: Economic and Social Crisis: The Reform of the Rule of Law to Revive Economic Growth

Reforming agrarian policy and legislation was an absolute necessity to ease social and political tensions but also to revive the Ivorian economy. However, this effective reform had to be framed or accompanied by the rule of law. Indeed, the postcolonial legislation had become detrimental to the populations and the mode of administration based on the single-party system and the exacerbated centralization of the power accommodated less and less rights and public freedoms. The populations of the far north of the country, mostly Muslim, was marginalized and treated as non-Ivorians or "sub-Ivorians" by those of the far south, mostly Christians and benefiting from all government support. While the rule of law is defined by its general, impersonal, and obligatory characteristics, the marginalization of a segment of the Ivorian population was institutionalized. The northern populations suffered from injustice and police barbarity, extra-jurisdictional trials, and summary executions under the complicit gaze of the authorities. This policy of double standards was justified by the fact that the borders were deliberately porous in that northern part of the country to bring in populations from bordering countries that were used as cheap labor to boost the economy, but which prohibited any possibility of complaining or demanding the improvement of their living or working conditions.

Moreover, to hide this denial of law and justice, President Houphouet-Boigny launched a vast campaign to distribute national identity cards to grant Ivorian nationality to these populations, to facilitate their integration into Ivorian society. However, because of their family name and their Muslim culture, these populations were constantly stigmatized without any sanctions by the complaisant authorities. In fact, to be recognized as Muslim was very risky as it exposed them to many discriminations (Bredeloup, 2003; Bamba, 2015). In addition, the state invested most of its resources in the southern regions where they were concentrated: the political capital Yamoussoukro, the vast agricultural agglomerations where cocoa, the country's main resource, was produced, but also the port of Abidjan (capital economic) and the entire maritime

coastal zone. Ivorian society was fragmented between populations along north/south geographic lines; religious Christians/Muslims; ethnic or racist native Ivorians/sub-Ivorians etc. (Dembele, 2003) and according to these subjective criteria, the laws applied differently to the populations. Such an environment was not conducive to the country's economic growth. Economic growth is achieved through the introduction that it is dependent on investment and human labor. However, to do this you need to be in a secure environment. Unfortunately, this is not the case when populations are decimated by civil wars, draining the economy of labor. Likewise, property is destroyed because it is often the occasion for bandits to loot shops and businesses, which slows down or prevents economic growth.

The economic crisis that set in in the 1980s led to the emergence of a more politicized population, aware of its rights. It was no longer a question for the authorities of looking for cosmetic solutions that would exacerbate tensions by hiding behind the country's economic successes, but of thinking in depth to strengthen the rule of law. While the demands of intellectuals and national populations reinforced by pressure from the international community weighed on the country, President Henri Konan Bédié, successor to Houphouët-Boigny who had died in power, opted instead in 1995 for the establishment of a new concept, that of "Ivorian" which suggested that one can be translated by ivoirianness or ivoirity. This tribalist and segregationist conception consisted in excluding if not expelling all non-natives (nationals or foreigners) not only from the geographical areas where they were, but also from the economic activity of Côte d'Ivoire, to allow the natives to enjoy full of their land for farming or business.

While the population boom was reducing the land available for agriculture, livestock or simply settling, this concept of "ivoirité" was put on the political and economic agenda by President Henri Konan Bédié in 1993. It was all about defining according to which criteria or under which conditions a person would be Ivorian and therefore, have the privilege of acquiring or keeping land and by extension, a business. This institutionalized xenophobia stipulates that one can only be Ivorian if both parents (the father and the mother) and four grandparents (two parents of the father and two parents of the mother) were born in Côte d'Ivoire. This negative

discrimination taken up a few years later by President Laurent Bagbo had disastrous consequences for the political and social stability of the country (Verte, 2003).

The numerous civil wars and coups that followed from 2002 to 2010 led to successive waves of departure by foreign investors. In 2003, for example, the GDP growth rate was negative at -4.7% and in 2011 it was negative at -5.4%. The implementation and gradual enforcement of the land reform of 1998 made it possible to resolve the crisis and relaunch the economy but also the improvement of rule of law (Bassett, 2003).

After the election of President Alassane Ouattara in a context of armed conflict against a backdrop of post-electoral crisis in 2010, many changes were made to improve the rule of law. These improvements, if they improved the living conditions of the populations, both reassured and attracted investors and donors who had left the country in large numbers during the years of fire (Mahamoudou, 2018).

The reforms relate to equality between men and women, the administration of justice, the protection of vulnerable populations (the elderly, handicapped and children), and protection and security of persons and property. For example, women's access to the same jobs and positions of responsibility as men, while protecting them from domestic violence and discrimination, was achieved by updating Ivorian legislation to bring it into line with the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women in the United Nations (CEDAW) of 1979, which Cote d'Ivoire ratified in 1995. Failure to integrate all these vulnerable sections of society (women, the disabled and the elderly) into the economy is to amputate a non-negligible part of a workforce which the country nevertheless needs to boost production.

Over the past 15 years, Cote d'Ivoire has improved its performance in terms of the fight against corruption. The confidence created by these improvements made it possible to attract more investors, who know that they can count on the state to protect their properties.

Table 3.1: Evolution of level of corruption from 2006 to 2021 in Cote d'Ivoire. The closer to 0 the country is, the better it performs.

| Ivory Coast - Corruption Perceptions Index | | |
|--|--------------------|------------------|
| Date | Corruption Ranking | Corruption Index |
| 2021 | 105° | 36 |
| 2020 | 104° | 36 |
| 2019 | 106° | 35 |
| 2018 | 105° | 35 |
| 2017 | 103° | 36 |
| 2016 | 108° | 34 |
| 2015 | 106° | 32 |
| 2014 | 115° | 32 |
| 2013 | 136° | 27 |
| 2012 | 130° | 29 |
| 2011 | 154° | 22 |
| 2010 | 146° | 22 |
| 2009 | 154° | 21 |
| 2008 | 151° | 20 |
| 2007 | 150° | 21 |
| 2006 | 151° | 21 |

Source: Table obtained from The Global Economy, accessible at <https://countryeconomy.com/government/corruption-perceptions-index/cameroon>




Figure 3.5: Graph and Diagram of the evolution of corruption over the past 20 years in Cote d'Ivoire. Source: Figure obtained from The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>.

As this chapter concludes, it is important to recall that economic growth in Ivory Coast has been boosted by the political will of President Ouattara, a former international official of the

IMF. This desire has been materialized by reforms driven to restore the rule of law, put an end to the impunity that prevailed during the war years and reform the land and agrarian policy.

Chapter 4: The Impact of Rule of Law and Land Law on the Economic Growth in Cameroon

According to the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook database of October 2022, in terms of growth rate Cameroon occupied the 15th place out of 54 African countries while in the 1970s the country was in the top 10 African nations and the top 5 countries of sub-Saharan Africa with a growth rate of 17.89% between 1971 and 1972.

The main point, however, is not to note these failures and counter-performances but to reflect on the means of catching up with the delay in growth suffered by Cameroon. In this chapter I address the economic growth of Cameroon since independence to date by analyzing how the implementation of measures related to the rule of law and the right to land have either favored or hindered this growth.




Figure 4-1- Cameroon GDP/Capita and annual growth rate indicator. *Source:* World Bank data base, accessible at <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CMR/cameroon/gdp-per-capita>.

SECTION 1- THE IMPACT OF THE RULE OF LAW ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CAMEROON

To address this question, I provide a political and economic analysis of Cameroon while investigating the actual impact of government measures to improve the rule of law.

1-1: Political and Economic Framework of Cameroon




Figure 4.2: Localization of anglophone crisis in Cameroon. *Source:* Bang & Balgah, (2022),¹³ accessible at <https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/article/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1>

On February 13, 2023, Cameroonian President Paul Biya celebrated his 90th birthday, which marked 41 consecutive years as head of state. Three days earlier, during his traditional message to the nation on the National Youth Day celebrated every year on February 11 in Cameroon, he took stock of the implementation of the growth and development policies promoted in the country. It emerges from the speech of the President of the Republic that the

¹³ Bang, H. N., & Balgah, R. A. (2022). The ramification of Cameroon's Anglophone crisis: conceptual analysis of a looming "Complex Disaster Emergency". *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 7(1), 6.

international context marked by the war in Ukraine with soaring food prices and the instability of the price of raw materials may have played a negative role on growth, in the same way as the many internal crises facing the country (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, PRC, 2023).

Indeed, in the Far North, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has been committing repeated attacks for ten years. In the East the country has suffered repeated incursions by Central African rebels who engage in kidnappings or cattle theft and more seriously still, the civil war waged by English-speaking separatist groups has hit the northwest and southwest of the country hard, two regions of the country that are very fertile for agriculture and very rich in natural resources, especially oil (Funteh, 2019; Lekunze, 2019; Lekunze & Page, 2023). It is important to note here that the company which was until then the second largest employer in the country after the State, the Cameroon Development Cooperation (CDC) founded in 1947, is in the commune of Limbé, capital of the Southwest region (Kimengsi, Lambi & Gwan, 2016; Chung, 2020).

However, since the beginning of the 'Anglophone crisis' in 2017, the ghost towns instituted by the separatists as well as the numerous murders and kidnappings that have been perpetrated there have very considerably reduced the activities of this company, resulting in a significant impact on the employment and of course national production. In their Africa Report N°272, of May 2, 2019, the NGO Crisis Group recorded 1,850 dead, 530,000 internally displaced persons and 35,000 refugees in Nigeria after only 20 months of conflict (Wolter, 2023). This constitutes a major loss of workforce and labor. More recently, on February 10, 2023, five people returning from work were shot dead and dozens of others injured by the separatists for not respecting the curfew instructions imposed by these militiamen (Ketzmerick, 2023).




Figure 4.3: Cameroon security threats index 2015-2022.

Source: The International Fund for Peace.

https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Cameroon/security_threats_index/#:~:text=The%20average%20value%20for%20Cameroon,2022%20is%208.4%20index%20points.

Figure 4.3 presents the index of Cameroon's security apparatus. It represents the risks of rebel or separatist movements to occur, the probability of coups, and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, it can influence perceptions that the populations hold regarding their security institutions (law enforcement forces) and its ability to protect people from violence and crimes. The world average of this index in 2022 was 5.09 points. The lower the score, the better the country is perceived internationally. Cameroon during the last 10 years had an average of 7.97 points, with a peak of 8.5 index points in 2019. This mediocre performance is a bad signal to potential investors because, as I theorized, an environment that is attractive to local or foreign investors and therefore conducive to economic growth is one where they feel protected by the laws and competent authorities to enforce them. However, with the constant risk of coups and terrorist attacks, the opposite was happening.

From 2014 to 2015, when tensions began in the two separatist regions of the country, the GDP per capita of Cameroon, which was already not high, fell from \$1632 current US dollars to \$1400 current US dollars, which constitutes a drop in economic growth by -14.22% (cf. the World Bank's 2021 report on Cameroon's economy). Many investors left these conflict-prone areas with great economic potential to take refuge in other regions of the country with far fewer opportunities but where the rule of law is assured to protect their people, property and

investments (“Invest in Cameroun” newspaper: N° 89 of September 2019). A strong implementation of the rule of law should be enforced by competent authorities, namely the police, the gendarmerie, and the judiciary to judge and punish the culprits.

1-2: Implementation of the Rule of Law and Economic Growth of Cameroon

Cameroon, which was under German domination, was divided into two parts during the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, after Germany lost the First World War. The League of Nations had placed Cameroon under a dual French and British mandate (Ardener, 1962; Ngoh, 1979; Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). The latter have imported their legal system, the Common Law which, unlike the French system of Civil Law, consists of a set of rules established by previous court decisions, that case law is one of the essential bases of the law enforced (Enonchong, 1967; Bringer, 1981; Fombad, 1997). The English have therefore also applied in the two regions (North-West and South-West) which have been entrusted to them by the League of Nations, the principle of indirect rule. This allows local authorities to direct the populations according to their own traditions (Lee & Schultz, 2011). Local authorities were also in charge of collecting taxes which they then handed over to the British authorities who were focused on trade and the exploitation of local mineral resources (Geschiere, 1993; Dissake, 2021).

One of the common denominators, with a few exceptions, of rich and developed countries is that they set up conditions favorable to the development of the rule of law. In this case, the vote for clear and impersonal laws, which apply to all populations without distinction of race, gender, social status or tribe. Everyone is required to comply with the law. Failing to do so would expose one to the penalties provided for by the regulations in force. The case of President Donald Trump in the United States now charged and facing jail time illustrates the popular phrase "no one is above the law" (Conklin, 2021; Schmidt, 2023).

In Cameroon, the situation is quite different. The country is classified by Freedom House's 2023 annual report on rights and freedoms as a "not free" country. This was already the

case in 2022, and the year before. In fact, it is a trend that has been going on for a long time. The country even regressed from 2017 (score of 24/100) to 2023 (score of 15/100). One can frequently read in their reports on the rule of law without being exhaustive:

The judiciary is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, with corruption and political influence, including by the executive, weakening courts. The president appoints judges and can dismiss them at will. Prosecutors have been pressured to stop pursuing corruption cases against some high-profile officials. Due process rights are poorly upheld. Lengthy pretrial detentions are commonplace. Prison conditions are harsh, marked by “extreme overcrowding” and poor sanitation. [...] Discrimination against Anglophone Cameroonians and individuals from certain ethnic groups, including the Bamileke, is common. The government imposes the French language in Anglophone regions, and Anglophone Cameroonians are frequently denied senior jobs in the civil service.¹⁴ (Freedom House report, 2022)

This non-exhaustive string of grievances perfectly illustrates the state of the rule of law in the country with the palpable consequences on the growth which decreases or stagnates in the best cases. Concerning the rule of law, Cameroon has unfortunately been conspicuous by its inability to put in place real reforms to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens and others living on the national territory (Mfewou, 2018; Kah, 2019; Kemedjo, 2020). This situation has created a sense of mistrust in the regime which prevents potential investors from committing funds to the economy. However, without investment, employment stagnates and consequently production and consumption also, which slows down the country's economic growth (Trebilcock & Daniels, 2009; Agwenjang, 2020).

Table 4.1: Evolution of level of corruption from 2006 to 2021 in Cameroon. The closer to 0 the country is, the better it performs.

¹⁴ Accessible at <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cameroon/freedom-world/2022>, under the subtitle F. Rule of Law

| Cameroon - Corruption Perceptions Index | | |
|---|--------------------|------------------|
| Date | Corruption Ranking | Corruption Index |
| 2021 | 144° | 27 |
| 2020 | 149° | 25 |
| 2019 | 153° | 25 |
| 2018 | 152° | 25 |
| 2017 | 153° | 25 |
| 2016 | 145° | 26 |
| 2015 | 130° | 27 |
| 2014 | 136° | 27 |
| 2013 | 144° | 25 |
| 2012 | 144° | 26 |
| 2011 | 134° | 25 |
| 2010 | 146° | 22 |
| 2009 | 146° | 22 |
| 2008 | 141° | 20 |
| 2007 | 138° | 24 |
| 2006 | 138° | 23 |

Source: Table obtained from The Global Economy accessible at <https://countryeconomy.com/government/corruption-perceptions-index/cameroon>

From the table 4.1, it appears that over the past 15 years, Cameroon corruption ranking decreased, becoming worst.




Figure 4.4: Graph and Diagram of the evolution of corruption over the past 20 years in Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. Source: Figure obtained from The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>.

To come back to the Cameroon Development Company (CDC) mentioned above, according to the figures available on the official website of the company (<https://cdc->

cameroon.net), before the so-called Anglophone crisis, the company employed more than 22,000 people, but in 2019 the company let go 11,000 people which constituted half of its workforce. The security problems, which are at the origin of this crisis, have caused the turnover of the company that produces coconut, rubber, bananas, palm oil and tea.

At the pinnacle of the crisis, the general management had to consider the pure and simple cessation of activities and the closure of the company. Indeed, faced with the deleterious security situation, the CDC was forced to reduce its activities. In November 2018, the company revealed that only four out of eleven rubber fields were operating at around 50% capacity, and two out of seven palm oil fields remained in operation. As for the banana sector, the most seriously affected, activities had been completely stopped since the end of August. As of the end of 2018, the company ceased its banana exports, leading to a drop of 15,000 tons of bananas in the country's exports, according to figures available from the Cameroonian Banana Association (Assobacam) (Agwanda, Nyadera & Asal, 2020).

Furthermore, since agrarian and land issues are at the heart of my investigation, it should be noted that the CDC plantations cover vast areas of land. With a total of approximately 42,000 hectares of land, of which 38,000 hectares are mature and in the process of production. The acquisition of new spaces is in progress accompanied by land reform issues. As this obviously involves land that once belonged to native populations, the expropriation procedures do not always respect legal channels, which leads to frustration among the populations who often end up threatening peace and social cohesion essential to the good development of economic growth (Chung, opcit).

Section 2: The reform of the Cameroonian land legal framework as a catalyst for economic growth

"Time bomb" or "volcano in turmoil" are the expressions that come up the most when discussing the land issue in Cameroon. This defines with sufficiency the negative atmosphere

which reigns in this country of central Africa relative to this extremely sensitive question of land management.

In 2022, according to the International Property Right Index report (from the Property Right Alliance, PRA), Cameroon's score decreased by -0.472 to 3.516 placing it 21st among the 30 countries in the Africa region and 117th among the 129 countries in the world. Cameroon is classified by the IMF as part of the Sub-Saharan Africa group and by the World Bank as lower middle-income country. Cameroon's Legal and Political Sub-index increased by 0.003 to 2.727 with scores of 3.248 in Judicial Independence; 2.707 in Rule of Law; 2.214 in Political Stability, and 2.737 in Control of Corruption. According to this same report, Cameroon's Physical Property Rights Sub-index decreased by 1.419 to 3.906 with scores of 4.888 in perception of Property Rights Protection, 3.191 in Registering Process, and 3.64 in Access to Financing.¹⁵

Cameroon's lands and natural resources are governed by national legislation dating from 1974 and since 1996, the right to access to property has been enshrined in the country's Constitution. Thus, property rights are backed by law, but private land must be registered. However, if on the formal and legal level the property right and land rights seem assured, in practice, these rights are a source of social tension and a brake on the emergence of entrepreneurship. Indeed, the laws are outdated and unsuited to the contemporary needs of populations, economic operators, and investors.

Around thirty people, most of them women and children, were killed, beheaded, or burned alive in the south-west of Cameroon during a punitive raid led by a rival ethnic group against the backdrop of a land dispute, reports the French Press Agency (AFP) on June 27, 2022.

¹⁵ All data available at <https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/cameroon#:~:text=Cameroon's%20IPRI%20score%20decreased%20by,and%20117th%20in%20the%20world.>

According to the official report of what is now called the "Massacre of Bakinjaw", "It all started with a land dispute between the Oliti and the Messaga Ekol of Akwaya (...) on the 29 April, the Oliti attacked and killed several Messaga Ekol in their farms, the Oliti then mobilized and received the support of armed men they had hired and they launched very violent, inhumane and destructive attacks against the Messaga Ekol".

Human Rights Watch reported that another even more deadly toll took place in the far north of the country in late December 2021. Indeed, at least 44 people had been killed and 111 injured in two weeks in the Far North region of Cameroon where the populations of the neighboring countries Chad and Nigeria meet. The tensions between populations are real and palpable, whether local populations among themselves, or local populations against foreigners.

Land crisis

At the center of the recrimination are a certain number of problems, including expropriation, border conflicts between local communities due to the non-materialization of the land boundaries of certain villages (Nkankeu, 2008). The expropriations here represent several cases; that of indigenous populations relocated from their lands for reasons of public utility, or populations who have legally purchased land or real estate but who, due to corruption and the decay of the rule of law, see these assets confiscated or ripped off for the benefit of other people.

The agrarian problem is more threatening for the political and economic stability of the country as certain intellectuals are already calling on the media for the "chasing out" of the non-native populations, so that "everyone returns home, to his village". These remarks from Pr. Claude Abe were relayed and had undergone a general outcry in Cameroon.¹⁶ The pretext found by the latter is that "the republic will have to go through the land reform", so that the native populations of western Cameroon who, according to Pr. Abe monopolize all the land of the country are expelled because they are installed in the center and the littoral to carry out the very

¹⁶ The sociologist Claude Abe held those comments on April 16, 2023, on the Cameroonian private television channel "Vision 4".

flourishing economic activities. Unfortunately, these genocidal remarks which recall Rwanda with the "Radio miles collines" (which served the propaganda calling for the massacre of Tutsis by the Hutus) are more and more frequent in Cameroon, and the laws yet passed to combat tribalism, hate speech and stigmatization are not applied, encouraging other people to follow this dangerous path. However, the Cameroonian legislator has provided that "the State guarantees to all natural and legal persons owning land, the right to enjoy and dispose of it freely."¹⁷

Xenophobia and violation of human rights

There are many cases where people found themselves chased away and their businesses vandalized because their private property was not sufficiently guaranteed. If one is in a region other than that of his/her origins practicing an economic activity there, this entrepreneur is never spared from the violence of the natives who are under the complicit and complacent gaze of the local authorities and elites.

Indeed, in 2019 a chase had been launched against the Bamoun and Bamileke populations originating from the west, but settled in the south of the country, the region of origin of the head of state. Many shops and businesses were looted and vandalized, none of those responsible were arrested. Populations who contributed to the improvement of the national economy found themselves impoverished overnight and forced to return to their regions of origin where they had no investment for their subsistence. "What have I done to these people? Am I not also a son of Sangmelima? More than 20 years that I live here?" lamented Mr. Mbouobouo Aboubakar whose supermarket was just opposite a police station, but it was not spared.¹⁸ Even the Minister of Higher Education, Grand Chancellor of Academic Orders, Professor Jacques Fame Ndongho has called for foreigners to be pushed back from his region of origin, which he presents as the "granite base" of the ruling party, an "impregnable bastion " of the President of the Republic.

¹⁷ See Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974, on the country's land tenure system.

¹⁸ <https://www.journalducameroun.com/emeutes-de-sangmelima-des-ressortissants-du-noun-annonce-une-marche-pour-le-23-octobre/>
<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CAMEROON-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>

This is unfortunately tolerated but illegal because according to the terms of the Constitution, Cameroon is a united and indivisible democratic state (The Preamble of the Constitution of January 18, 1996). Populations indoctrinated into identity withdrawals are the first victims of this scourge. The State should encourage each Cameroonian to feel at home everywhere and strengthen their property rights, instead, land management is politicized for the benefit of a minority.




Figure 4.5: Fractionalized Elites chart of Cameroon. Source: The Global Economy.com, 2023. Accessible at

https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Cameroon/factionalized_elites_index/

Figure 4.4 set up by the Fund for Peace helps to analyze the fragmentation of state elites according to ethnic, class and clan, race, or religion criteria. Thus, the higher the value, the more the country's elites are fragmented, and, in this case, Cameroon's average is above 9 while the world average is 6.5.¹⁹ This index is based on 4 criteria: Identity, Representative Leadership, Resource Distribution and Equality and Equity. It clearly identifies the degree of marginalization or stigmatization that a segment of the population may suffer, for instance by analyzing the speeches of those elites. In case of hatred discourse, how the government reacts. In the state the elites are supposed to play a role of peacemaker, trainer because they structure the socialization

¹⁹ More details available on <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/c2/>.

or the civic politicization of populations. They often act as a transmission channel between authorities and citizens, they help build a civil society strong enough to advocate for the improvement of law (Schmitter, 2018). They encourage debate and participate in the formation of critical thinking in society, but in failed states (Rotberg, 2003), they rather promote hatred and division. These hateful speeches when they are not severely reprimanded but rather explicitly or tacitly encouraged by the government most often lead to civil wars which can lead to genocide (Nazi Germany, Rwanda). Even within the framework of the development of the states, the elites have a major role, in particular the intellectual elites who contribute their knowledge and their know-how to find solutions to the problems of the populations, unemployment, poverty, crime etc. (Amsden, DiCaprio, Robinson, 2012).

The fragmentation of institutions is one of the specific characteristics of underdeveloped regimes because it fosters corruption in a context where the laws do not apply fairly to all citizens. Land disputes are also largely the result of these social exclusions which, in turn, generate economic exclusions. When individuals do not have equitable access to state resources like land, it is part of the workforce, human capital that is ostracized from the economy. They are investors and providers of foreign or national funds that are hesitant because they do not trust the institutions to secure their property and assets (Naciri, 2019, iyekekpolo, 2020).

To improve land governance in Cameroon, certain areas must be addressed, including equal access to land regarding gender. In the current state of the legislature and practice, a woman who wants to buy land in Cameroon without being accompanied by a man is much frowned upon (Liba'a, 2019). This is due to the weight of habits and customs, of tradition. Indeed, another axis which deserves the attention of the authorities is that of finding a balance between the application of contemporary laws and the safeguarding of the customary heritage (Cameroun, 1958; Simo & Bitondo, 2010; Fonjong, Sama-Lang & Fombe, 2011). While women represent more than 50% of the Cameroonian population, the management of land affairs is reserved for men. Women only hold less than 10% of the land in Cameroon according to a 2018 report by the Ministry of Lands, Cadastral and Land Affairs of Cameroon. Contrary to the

colonial period when the role of women was almost limited to cooking and procreation, contemporary women participate more and more in economic activities of production. In all sectors of activity, education, construction, astronomy, security forces and armies, or even in the field of business, there are women who are often business owners. Their financial empowerment is an undeniable reality; however, they are still marginalized in terms of access to land resources. Moreover, their access to bank loans, in particular real estate loans, is a real 'pain in the neck'. A woman who wants to open a business, for example, and who needs land for that, or who simply wants space to build her house, will have more difficulty acquiring that land than a man, under the same conditions. These restrictions have an undeniable negative role on economic growth because these are potential investments that are lost each year. If women had the same facilities as men, the companies created could participate in reducing unemployment and the construction equipment purchased for instance would contribute to drive the country's economy (Nana-Fabu, 2006).

These outdated practices are in contradiction with Decree No. 76/165 of April 27, 1976, which set the conditions for obtaining a land title, conferring the right of ownership to a natural or legal person on a plot of land. Thirty years later, this decree was supplemented and reinforced by decree no. 2005/481 of December 16, 2005, which, in its ninth article stipulates that "customary communities, their members or any other person of Cameroonian nationality..." are entitled to obtain a land title. In the light of these two decrees, there should be no marginalization of women or any other Cameroonian who, incidentally, contributes to the economic growth of the country through their investments.

Finally, a loophole in the present legislation which has given pride of place to foreign companies and multinationals, but which today is the source of many tensions concerns this overlap between official decrees and traditional laws on land ownership. In this case, Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974, establishing the rules applicable to land tenure and the management of state lands in its first article states that "the State is guardian of all land, it can use this title to intervene to ensure rational use or to take into account the imperatives of defense or the

economic options of the nation” to make any change necessary. This unclear statement opened the way to all sorts of manipulations and interpretations. Saying that the state is the 'guardian' of the land has often been the pretext for illegal expropriations on the grounds of the general interest, while these lands have sometimes been used for private interests or investments (Moupou, 2010).

Also, the state which is the sole expert in the definition of "rational use" has often stripped many families of their rights. Indeed, centuries before 1974 there were already populations living on these lands but governed by other methods, in particular tradition and their customs, the lands had known owners, even if they did not have official documents, in particular the land title, since they did not exist. As a result, when the legislator ratified Decree No. 2005/481 of December 16, 2005, which states that "the land title is the official certification of real estate ownership", this provision opened the way to tensions which affected the economy. The indigenous communities thus feel threatened because for them the land has always been their property and it has been transmitted for generations by family inheritance subject to customary rights. The state has become a true 'predator' of national lands (Lado, 1017). Consequently, when families or sometimes entire villages are expropriated for the benefit of multinationals or national projects, when they are not properly compensated, which is very often the case (Binele, 2020), they come back to sit-in and in some cases vandalize the exploited sites.

These social movements create brakes or delays in construction and the realization of ongoing projects, sometime these strikes cause definitive cessation of work, all of which constitutes losses for investors and a significant shortfall for the national economy. It is understandable why according to official figures from the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Lands, Cadastral, and Land Affairs, more than 65% of all cases enlisted in Cameroonian civil courts are related to land issues, and this percentage has risen to more than 80% in the administrative courts over the past ten years.

Thus, it is because of the early implementation of these measures aimed at reforming their land administration and improving the state and the rule of law that Cote d'Ivoire has been

able to supplant Cameroon and experience one of the best economic growths in Africa. However, is strong economic growth enough to guarantee the improvement of people's living conditions? Far from it, the authorities would still have to agree to implement distributive policies that benefit all the people. This reality is the subject of my next chapter.

Chapter 5: The Impact of Economic Growth on Human Development in Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire




Figure 5.1: Human Development Index comparison between Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, 1994-2021, UNDP Report he GlobalEconomy.com, 2023). *Source:* The GlobalEconomy.com. <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/ivory-coast/cameroon?sc=XE21>

In this chapter I make a comparative analysis of the level of human development of Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon. It is good to boost economic growth, but it is better to act in the sense that the fruits of growth benefit the populations. According to Peter Drucker, “the final goal of economic development is individuals, populations, not the capital or raw materials,” (Drucker, 1959). The human development index (HDI) is an indicator of the level of development of countries but which, unlike economic growth measured by the GDP/Capita and focused on economic data relating to production, the HDI analyzes the quality of life and living conditions of the people (Hopkins, 1991; Swain & Yang-Wallentin, 2020).

Developed and updated each year by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Human Development Index is measured based on two main criteria, life expectancy and level

of education. The relationship or connection between economic growth and human development is not automatic; each country must implement social and redistributive policies, without which the transition from economic growth to human development is not certain (Roshaniza, Selvaratnam 2015; Akindes, 2017). In the following sections I address the potential reasons why Côte d'Ivoire has a better GDP/Capita, Cameroon has a better HDI.

SECTION 1- LIFE EXPECTANCY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN CAMEROON AND COTE D'IVOIRE

The analysis of life expectancy at birth is relevant for understanding the level of human development in a country because it captures factors such as access to basic social goods and services to satisfy the primary individual needs that are food, decent housing, and access to drinking water. Thus, despite the debates and controversies as to its accuracy (McGillivray & White, 1993; bagolin, 2004; Kovacevic, 2010), it has been established by the UNDP that one can objectively establish a correlation between the longevity of populations and their access to these goods and services. Thus, the better the state ensures their access to individuals, the longer they live and conversely, populations that do not have access to these resources will tend to live for a shorter time (Roser, Ortiz-Ospina & Hannah Ritchie, 2013; MackenBach, Valberde, Bopp, Bronnum-Hansen, Deboosere, Kalediene & Nusselder, 2019).

In my two specific cases, it is interesting to note that Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire have life expectancy curves which evolve in a synchronized way, that apart from a few slight differences, when the curve of a state increases or decreases, that of the other reacted simultaneously. However, despite Ivoirian's economic growth has been highly superior to that of Cameroon for the last ten years, Cameroonians are enjoying a better life expectancy than

Ivoirians for more than two decades now. This life expectancy in 2019 according to World Bank data was 61.58 years for Cameroonians and 59.32 years for Ivoirians (World Bank, World Atlas, 2002; Nkemgha, Tekam, Belek, 2021).




Figure 5.2: Life Expectancy in Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 1990-2020; *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

Cameroonian redistributive policies can explain this encouraging performance. Following the death of Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and its other kingdoms and territories on September 8, 2022, Cameroonian President Paul Biya became the world's longest serving leader in a country where more than three quarters of the population are under 25 years old (Djounguep & Felix-Tchicaya, 2023). In his traditional message to young people of February 10, 2023, as on every occasion, the Cameroonian President has consistently noted that young people are at the center of his emergence policy slated for 2035. President Paul Biya, after welcoming the revival albeit timid of national production, specified: “The recovery of our economy must last and be consolidated to lead to emergence. In any case, our young people will continue to enjoy it.” This quote constitutes the heart of the official desire to distribute the

fruits of growth in such a way that it benefits all fringe of society. This desire of President Biya to set up social policies in favor of education and vocational training has been constant for several decades through his speeches and tangible achievements (Towo, 2015).

Volume 10 of the President's Speeches and Messages published in 2020 by the Presidency of the Republic attests to this observation.²⁰ We can read the president's message in the 54th edition of the Youth Day: "The Ministry of Youth and Civic Education will continue its activities for the benefit of young people in areas of civic education, national integration, their economic insertion and the application of the Three-Year Youth Special Plan. This is the case with the Youth Connekt initiative Cameroon, recently launched in Yaoundé.²¹"

Indeed, the Youth Connekt initiative was launched on December 9, 2019, by Pr. Jacques Fame Ndongo, Minister of Higher Education as the representative of the President of the Republic, in the presence of Jean Luc Stalon, Resident Representative of the UNDP in Cameroon. Mr. Stalon said the platform aimed to create 5,000 jobs, train 1 million leaders in civic education and interconnect 1 million young people through the implementation and popularization of new communication and internet technologies.²²

In addition, to promote social policies related to gender and equality, the program planned to train 100,000 young girls in reproductive health and engage 3,000 other young girls to reduce gaps between the genders.²³ This presidential will is therefore manifested concretely by the creation, outside the dedicated ministries, of several organizations and projects intended to work to strengthen the intellectual and professional capacities of the populations, and finally insert them more easily into the world of employment. Without being exhaustive, we can also

²⁰ https://www.prc.cm/fr/multimedia/documents/8729-discours-fr-2020-ok?category_id=123

²¹ The Facebook page of the program is <https://www.facebook.com/YouthConnektCameroon/>

²² <https://cameroon.un.org/en/29995-cameroon-launches-youth-connekt>

²³ <https://cameroon.un.org/en/29995-cameroon-launches-youth-connekt>

cite the Support Program for Informal Sector Actors (PIAASI). Created in 2004, it is a program attached to the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training. Its mission is to financially support young Cameroonian entrepreneurs by granting them credit at extremely low interest rates or at zero interest. The Rural and Urban Youth Support Program (PAJER-U) was created in 2007 and implemented by the Ministry of Youth and Civic Education. Among its objectives is the social and professional integration of young people in or out of school through the financing of micro projects.²⁴ The Youth Social and Economic Integration Project (PIFMAS) contributes to the population's training and integration by supporting the creation of micro-enterprises for sports equipment.²⁵ Also created in 2007, it aims to effectively combat unemployment and precariousness among young people by promoting self-employment in sports.

These few projects are examples of policies carried out to improve the quality of life of the population through education and employment.²⁶ In terms of results, the report followed by the evaluation of a project like PIAASI in 2020 reported 20,000 jobs already created, including 5,012 direct and 15,530 indirect jobs, according to official data available on the National Employment Fund (FNE) website (<https://fnecm.org>).²⁷

The integral fulfillment of human beings, the first factor of production, is the principal objective of any economic policy or the political economy of states (Mengistu & Mahesh, 2022; Modgil, Singh & Agrawal 2023). Improving the living conditions of populations is the objective assigned to leaders in democratic regimes so that they can live longer and healthier. When these aims are not achieved, the rulers enjoying the popular mandate may lose the confidence of the

²⁴ <https://kamerpower.com/fr/pajer-u-financement-des-projets-au-cameroun/>

²⁵ https://www.facebook.com/people/Pifmas/100077650063656/?_rdr

²⁶ For more programs, see <https://www.crtv.cm/2018/02/cameroon-empowers-youth-specialised-projects/>

²⁷ <https://actucameroun.com/2020/03/02/piaasi-plus-de-20-000-emplois-offerts-aux-jeunes/>

voters and get sanctioned during the next elections. Through elections people can choose a new team, one they believe will better represent the interests of the people.

The health provision contributes to improving the life expectancy of the population as the percentages of the national budget reserved for investments in the field of health reflect the interest that governments give to the provision of quality health care to the sick, and to the prevention of pandemics in healthy people (Douglas, Schultz, 2004; Leung & Wang, 2010). These investments cover the training of doctors, health administrators and nurses, in short, health personnel, as well as the construction of health centers and hospitals with high quality furniture, the organization of vaccination or awareness campaigns on certain diseases, as well as the allocation of funds to subsidize certain expensive treatments or chronic diseases as diabetes, HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc. (Bunyaminu, Mohammed, Yakubu, Shani & Abukari, 2022). Failure to integrate all these vulnerable sections of society (women, the disabled and the elderly) into the economy is to amputate a non-negligible part of a workforce which the country nevertheless needs to boost production.

The Expanded Vaccination Program (EPI) is a concrete example of the measure taken by the Cameroonian government to improve the health of Cameroonians. "This program was set up in 1976 as part of a pilot project in the city of Yaoundé with the support of the Coordination Organization for the Fight against Endemics in Central Africa (O.C.E.A.C).²⁸"

The complete eradication of wild poliovirus in Cameroon has been one of the great successes of this program. The EPI in general aims to control, eradicate or reduce morbidity and mortality due to vaccine-preventable diseases (VPD). Increasing the vaccination coverage of the population is also one of the objectives. I have personally participated in at least two of these

²⁸ <https://pevcameroon.cm/apropos/histories>

social programs, in this case the vaccination campaigns organized within the framework of the Expanded Vaccination Programs (EPI) in 2020 and 2021 as secretary.




Figure 5.3: Health spending per year as percent of GDP in Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, 2000 – 2019; *Source: The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>*

For the last decade, while Cote d'Ivoire has experienced better economic growth than Cameroon, the Cameroonian government has invested a greater percentage of its budget in the Ministry of Public Health. While Cote d'Ivoire has a better coverage rate of doctors per 1,000 people in 2018, its infant mortality rate is far higher than Cameroon's. Indeed, according to data from the World Bank, Cameroon had a rate of doctors of 0.1/1000 inhabitants while that of Côte d'Ivoire was 0.2/1000. At the same time, the infant mortality rate was curiously much higher in Côte d'Ivoire (62.6 deaths/1,000 normal births (2018)) than in Cameroon (49.8 deaths/1,000 normal births (2018)). The quantity of the health offer is great (number of doctors, beds, hospitals) but it is not a panacea. Instead, the quality of the health offer improves the life expectancy because without competent doctors, health problems will not be solved and worse,

incompetent personnel can lead to real dramas (death of patients or wrong treatments leading to worse illness).

Now, I am going to analyze two indices which also make it possible to understand the quality of life and therefore life expectancy in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, the cost-of-living index, and the food price index. The global average level for these two entities is set on a scale of 100. Higher values for one country indicate higher food prices compared to other countries. From the outset, the cost-of-living index compiled by the World Bank analyzes the average level of prices paid by households and non-profit organizations that provide services to households. It incorporates all the goods and services of the average consumer basket with appropriate weights. The data below comes from the World Bank's International Comparison Program and only concerns one year, 2017, but we can see that the cost of living is much higher in Côte d'Ivoire than in Cameroon.





Figure 5.4: Cost of living difference between Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, 2017; *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>



Measure: index points
 Source: World Bank International Comparison Program

Figure 5.5: Food price difference between Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, 2017.
Source: The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

Quality of food play a key role in life expectancy (Fadne, Okland, Haaland & Johansson (2022) as the healthier people eat, the better their health is. Literacy rate constitutes the other side of Human Development that now requires discussion and analysis.

SECTION 2- LITERACY RATE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN CAMEROON AND COTE D'IVOIRE

States are purveyors of education, public health, goods, and services, and general regulators of private enterprises. Authorities must put in place policies that contribute to transforming the fruits of growth into tangible advantages for the people. The following graphs focus on Côte d'Ivoire investments policies. These graphs show that Cote d'Ivoire has roads, ports, and airports assets of better quality than Cameroon because the Ivoirian government has concentrated a greater part of the budget on these infrastructures for many years as well as in the fields of construction and energy (Totouom, 2018; Tsambou & Kamga, 2021).

According to official government data available on their website (www.gouv.ci), the global illiteracy rate, which was 51% in 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire declined to 43.8% in 2015, to stand at 43.70% in 2019.




Figure 5.6: Education spending/GDP difference between Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire, 2000-2020. *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

Still in the context of his message to youth on February 10, 2023, in line with his previous speeches available on the website of the Presidency of the Republic (www.prc.cm), President Paul Biya of Cameroon urged them to educate themselves, to train themselves because for him: "Our schools, our colleges and our high schools, our universities and colleges, must constantly adapting to the changing world. In our quest for development, let us be guided by the imperative of training young people capable of building our country." The president also mentioned the shortcomings or weaknesses to be overcome, the late professionalization of teaching which, for decades, was oriented towards theoretical courses. However, the new deal consists of putting forward technical and practical teaching which will enable people to find jobs more easily or to self-employ, this includes engineering or artisanship. It should be noted here

that in 2001, President Biya signed a decree establishing free public primary school for schoolchildren (Kamga, 2011). Knowing that many parents were keeping their children home claiming that they could not afford the school fees, this measure was intended to promote basic education among populations who should at least be able to read and write in at least one of the two official languages, French and English (Kouega, 2005).

All these incentive measures therefore clearly appear as a desire to promote the human development of Cameroonians through education. This is only possible in a proactive context where the fruits of growth are adequately redistributed. The state works constantly in the creation and construction of schools and extracurricular infrastructures. Knowing that at the base of education there are teachers, the Higher Teacher Training College (HTTC), the structure in charge of training teachers and counselors for high schools and colleges have always been the first suppliers of civil servants to the Cameroonian state.






Figure 5.7: Youth literacy rate (age 15-24) difference between Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 2000-2020; *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

The limited amount of available data reveals that the youth literacy rate is higher in Cameroon compared to Côte d’Ivoire. This rate defines the percentage of people aged 15 to 24 who can express themselves decently in reading and writing while understanding a short simple statement about their daily life. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data shows that 83% of young Cameroonians were literate in the year 2000 and 86% in 2020 while 61% of young Ivoirians were literate in 2000 and this percentage rose to 83.5% in 2020 (Jasinska, Zinszer, Xu, Hannon, Seri, Tanoh & AKPE, 2022).



Measure: points
Source: World Economic Forum


Figure 5.8: Quality of road differences between Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 2008-2019;
Source: The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>



Measure: points
Source: World Economic Forum

Figure 5.9: Quality of port differences between Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 2008-2019; *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

As presented above, the share of health in the budget of the state decreases in a persistent way while the sector of industry and public works is geared up.



Measure: points
Source: World Economic Forum

Figure 5.10: Quality of airport differences between Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 2008-2019; *Source:* The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

It is clear at this point in the study, that Cameroonian and Ivorian governments have quite different objectives in terms of development and, consequently, redistributive policies. While the Cameroonian authorities focus on improving the living conditions of the people by focusing on human development, the Ivorian government has set objectives in terms of improving the environment of the people in terms of infrastructure constructions (road, airports, and seaports). The fruits of growth in Côte d'Ivoire are therefore reinvested in the production circuits to further boost growth, while in Cameroon the funds resulting from the satisfactory performance of economic growth are more directly invested in the improvement of health and education related public goods and services.

Investing in infrastructure is not a bad idea; public policies are done in a sectoral way, and the development of the state requires that each sector be included in the planning. However, the problem arises, particularly in the Ivorian context, when sectors directly linked to the well-being of the populations are neglected. As we have seen above, the share of health in the state budget is steadily decreasing (less than 4% of GDP between 2015 and 2018) while the industry and public works sector are booming (almost 1/3 of the budget of the state according to the Minister of Budget Abdourahmane Cisse in 2016). Even if the GDP/capita has increased considerably in recent years, the demographic growth mitigates the expected benefits because the population is growing by around 2.5%/year according to recent data from the World Bank.²⁹

President Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire welcomed the development of the port of Abidjan, the construction or rehabilitation of more than 40,000 kilometers (about 24854.85 mi) of roads in the two terms he had already served as head of state, " but you cannot eat tar" replied sociologist Francis Akindes in an op-ed published in the magazine "Jeune Afrique" on October 28, 2019.

²⁹ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=CI>.

According to official figures from the Ivorian government, there is a deficit of 500,000 housing units in the country and more than one million people gather in the slums of Abidjan. Social inequalities are pronounced based on data from the National Institute of Statistics of Cote d'Ivoire (NSI), which shows that 46% of the population live under the threshold of poverty.³⁰

Discussions on social policies and HDI in Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire

A common factor that captivates the researcher upon observing Figures 5.3 and 5.6 relating respectively to the percentage of public expenditure on health and education in the Budget of Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire is that since over the past twenty years the Ivorian government has spent more than the Cameroonian government.

When we know that the Human Development Index depends on these two parameters (health/education) with wealth being the third, it is quite intriguing that since 1990, Cameroonians have a better life expectancy (Figure 5.2) and, since the beginning of the 2000s, a better human development index. (Figure 5.1).

Clearly, expenditure per se is not a sufficient criterion for predicting the results of government action in the areas of health and education, at least not for influencing the Human Development Index. "Every single year...the results have been the same. There is no correlation between what people pay and the quality of healthcare they get."³¹ These comments by former US President Bill Clinton, collected during an interview at the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) in 2013, immediately causes one to consider possible correlations between expenditure and the quality of services rendered in the health field.

However, much research has been carried out in this direction and the following works show that there is no direct correlation between health expenditure and the quality of service

³⁰ Cote d'Ivoire NSI Activity Report of March 31st, 2015.

³¹ <https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/clinton-urges-it-pros-help-healthcare>

(Trusko, Pexton, Gupta, & Harrington, 2003; Mitton, Dionne, Peacock, & Sheps, 2006; Spurgeon, Cooper & Burke, 2012; Hussey, Wertheimer & Mehrotra, 2013). Many other factors play a part in favoring the adequacy between the expenditure made and the services received, such as the quality of health personnel or the managerial measures implemented to improve the working environment. The American platform “Talon Healthtech³²” was created in 2014 with an objective of bringing transparency to health administrations and proposing solutions for better patient care. Its researchers produced an article on the question of the relationship between investments in health services and arrived at the same conclusion by offering the table below confirming my observation.

To transpose these data to the macro level, focusing more on the public policies implemented than on the expenditure granted could be a good starting point. Indeed, beyond the infrastructures in terms of buildings and medical equipment, improving the health offer requires that the state invest in the recruitment and the good training of the medical personnel (administrators, doctors, nurses). Similarly, investing in the field of education is not just about building schools or making tables and benches, but working to improve the training of future teachers so that they can in return transmit quality knowledge to their learner.

However, after the decades of civil war and political crisis in the country, the Ivorian government as soon as President Ouattara came to power in 2011 started a vast program of investment in infrastructure and industry under the control of donors. Orientation of expenses more in infrastructure than Health or Teaching personnel in Cote d'Ivoire compared to Cameroon. This is because since their independences in 1960, even if Cameroon only had two presidents Ahidjo (1960-1982); Paul Biya (1982 until now 2023) and Cote d'Ivoire had four

³² <https://talonhealthtech.com/>

leaders, most of them used coups or military violence to get to power. So, most of the time each new government in Cote d'Ivoire was busy re-building destroyed infrastructures.




Figure 5.12: Compared external intervention in Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, 1997-2020;
Source: The Global Economy, accessible at <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/>

Figure 5.12 addresses the level of influence of foreign actors (states, NGO, International Institutions) in the organization and functioning of states. The higher value indicates a higher level of intervention of external actors in the economy for instance. Ivoirian external debt, and Foreign Direct Investments are higher than for Cameroon, making Cote d'Ivoire more dependent to the IMF and World Bank. The country’s debt was 51.4% of the GDP according to the IMF in 2021 and 45.61% in 2010³³. In fact, to boost their economic growth after each military crisis (Cogneau & Mesplé-Somps, 2003), Ivoirian authorities relied on the debts, which came with

³³ <https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/CI/situation-economique-et-financiere#:~:text=La%20dette%20publique%20a%20fortement,8%25%20du%20PIB%20en%202022.>

conditionalities in terms of deciding what the priorities are.³⁴ So, the Ivoirian Government was asked to invest in industries and infrastructures directly connected to production, in the way that they can refund their debts in a relatively short or medium period. Investing in education or health in terms of personnel was a long-term plan, that does not have the consent of IMF or World Bank.³⁵ The Ivoirian Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan presented the second term of their National Development Plan, 2016-2020 (NDP) to donors and partners at the World Bank headquarters of Paris, on May 11– 18, 2016, expecting more than 20 billion dollars.³⁶ Once they received those funds, it served at building more infrastructures or financing industries instead of implementing social policies like providing healthcare or increasing the wages of medical or school personnel, (Conte, 2005).

On the other hand, Cameroon enjoyed more freedom to apply social policies that Bretton Woods's institutions and donors do not like. The external debt was 41.02% of the GDP in 2021 and 13.99% in 2010, but most of the Cameroonian's fund for social investments came from "self-development" policies.³⁷

The major difference between Cote d'Ivoire, which depended mainly on international donors (Boone, 1993; Boka-Mene & Whyche-Shaw, 2009) and Cameroon is that, according to statistics from the Cameroonian public treasury, Cameroon raised around \$5.6 billion on the financial markets, between 2010 and 2019. This source of financing is effective because it makes the country quite free as to the destination of these funds. Apart from the single Eurobond which made it possible to raise \$810 million, the rest of the funds were mobilized on the sub-regional and local financial markets without major counterparties and above all the possibility of

³⁴ <https://www.lemoci.com/cote-divoire-les-bailleurs-de-fonds-apportent-un-soutien-massif/>

³⁵ <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1434122/economie/pourquoi-le-fmi-sest-engage-plus-fortement-en-cote-divoire/>

³⁶ https://www.gouv.ci/_actualite-article.php?d=2&recordID=6618&p=488

³⁷ https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-operations/cameroun_-_environnement_de_linvestissement_privé.pdf

investing these funds directly in social policies, without the dictate of the IMF or the World Bank. It is the theory of 'self-financed development' that has been chosen as a means of redistributive policy in Cameroon, the funds coming from domestic or sub-regional financial markets (Pobric, 2020; Smith, 2021). Many social projects have been created under the cover of the Ministry of Public Health (Ntangsi, 1998), the National Employment Fund, the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation or the Ministries of Basic Education, Secondary or even Higher, without forgetting the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training, some of which were listed above.

Alongside these policies implemented in Cameroon but not in Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon has better redistributive policies, because a very large part of its economy is owned by nationals who, investing locally, employ a local workforce trained for the most part locally (Tiemeni, 2017; Nina, 2021). The liberalization of education, for example, has favored a flowering of private establishments, which now train more students than the state (Amin & Awung, 2008). Reflections on the reform of the health system in Cameroon was initiated since the end of the 80s, and the beginning of the 90s (Essomba, Bryant & Bodart, 1993). Moreover, Cameroon's lead over Cote d'Ivoire in terms of HDI is also due to a better distribution of the fruits of growth throughout the territory by its nationals. In the 10 regions of the country, local elites or political leaders are investing while "in Côte d'Ivoire, greatest or most of signs of development are rather concentrated in few cities as Abidjan, the economical capital where almost 80% of formal jobs are located or Yamoussoukro the political capital of the country."³⁸

³⁸ <https://www.investiraucameroun.com/economie/1201-18922-le-match-cameroun-cote-d-ivoire-la-realite-des-chiffres-en-30-indicateurs>

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The main objective of my thesis was to analyze the impact of the rule of law and property rights on economic growth and development. Using a comparative case study of two sub-Saharan African countries, Cameroon, and Cote d'Ivoire, I demonstrated that the rule of law and land law significantly impacted economic growth and development trajectories.

The choice of such an approach proved to be appropriate as it helped highlight the reasons that can explain the delays in growth of one country (Cameroon) compared to another (Cote d'Ivoire) with both having the same demographics and the nearly identical backgrounds. Despite the various institutional and armed crises that their country has experienced, the Ivorian authorities have inexorably established an institutional framework, that sufficiently protects the rights of citizens, all of whom are subject to justice, and protected by clearly defined and published laws. At the same time, given that the colonial administrative legacy has finally shown its limits regarding the management of the land, land reforms became urgent. It was necessary to curb social movements and the various civil wars in contexts where habitable or economically exploitable land was becoming increasingly rare due to galloping demography.

On the other hand, my thesis helped the reader to understand that growth alone is not enough to improve the living conditions of populations; the fruits of this growth would still need to be well redistributed to serve the general interest of the people. Despite their weak economic growth, Cameroon reaches that objective better than Cote d'Ivoire. Social redistributive policies are better implemented by the regime of Yaoundé. Opting for a comparative case study allowed me to gain different, nuanced, and more objective perspectives on the impact of land law and the rule of law on development and economic growth.

Improving the rule of law is a necessity and a permanent struggle even in the most developed countries in the world. My analysis of land policy as a catalyst for economic growth helped to better understand the needs of populations as part of their contribution to optimizing the productivity of the national economy. In any case, questioning the factors and determinants

of economic growth and development in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire was a good pretext to revisit studies and public policies carried out, to find solutions to underdevelopment and poverty in the world in general, and in the sub-Saharan Africa countries particularly.

Policy makers, economists and political science scholars could consider the extent to which the results of this research should be generalized or at least applied to other developing countries in Africa and hence to other continents. Furthermore, by integrating quantitative analysis methods, future research could contribute to establishing the causal relationship between economic growth and human development. Other factors besides land legislation and the rule of law contribute to slowing down the economic development of poor countries. The endemic corruption which prevents the funds destined for many development projects from reaching their objectives, but ending up in the bank accounts of unscrupulous leaders, the scourge of illegal immigration which empties a continent like Africa each year of thousands of people (the brain drain), or the resources curse which still afflicts countries enjoying many raw materials and natural resources, are potential subjects that could enrich knowledge of the causes and solutions to underdevelopment.

One of the main problems I encountered while writing this thesis concerned data. It revolved around either the absence or rarity of the data, as well as its quality. Regarding the absence of data, it is much easier to do research on the economies or policies of advanced or financially wealthy countries because the state and the statistical or polling organizations compile and save data to inform a sufficiently politicized public opinion. It is quite the opposite in poor countries because of the lack of interest they arouse due to the lack of funding, researchers are not interested and consequently states are sometimes the only providers of information. Obviously, due to technological backwardness, available data sets are not computerized nor stored digitally, hence, those available are frequently destroyed or lost.

The other aspect concerned the quality of the data found. Those data often tended to be different depending on each source i.e., whether the data came from corrupt governments and agencies which tend to exaggerate its figures or some internationally reliable institutions (IMF,

World Bank, Transparency International). On several occasions, the data available were only those provided by governments, and when we see a state like Cameroon declare in 2021 to have a lower unemployment rate than that of the United States or Japan, we are forced to look at that data suspiciously and to not use sources that lack verification.

The absence of financial means did not allow me to conduct field studies to collect the data I needed, which should qualitatively ameliorate the results of my research. Without calling into question the efforts made by my work, I think that future research with allotted funding, should focus on the production of more reliable and usable data.

In the end, in-depth investigations can help predict the future of these two countries. Despite the results of this research, I think it would be appropriate to observe the trend over the next decade before definitively confirming the conclusions presented here. Indeed, Cote d'Ivoire is characterized by the constant resurgence of coups or military uprisings since its independence. No transition of regime has yet been made peacefully, and consequently, after each coup it was necessary to rebuild the social base and reconstruct infrastructures. Will the current strong economic growth survive the departure of President Alassane Ouattara? On the other side, even if for 41 years of President Paul Biya's regime, Cameroon has not experienced a real coup except the failed one of 1984, even if the country lived in relative peace in the middle of Central Africa tormented by political and military crises,³⁹ this last decade has been plagued by conflicts on all sides. These conflicts include wars against Boko Haram in the north, antagonisms against the separatists in the northwest, and southwest regions and fighting against the rebels of the Central African Republic in the east. Which Cameroon will survive after the aging President Paul Biya? Time will tell.

³⁹ Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, and Democratic Republic of Congo.

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Vita

Raoul Tayou Tayou was born in Bamenda, Cameroon. He lived and studied in various places due to his father's employment, a state agent, and obtained a A4 Spanish High Degree in a suburb of Yaounde, at the Essazok High School.

In 2006 he obtained his associate degree in law at the University of Yaounde II soa, Cameroon, and obtained his bachelor's degree in law with a concentration in Political Science. He then received a master's degree (no thesis) in 2008, and a Master of Science (with thesis) in 2009. His research focused on good governance and the processes of democratization in Cameroon. He was selected for a PhD program in Political Science, Doctoral School of Electoral Sociology. Unfortunately, he was forced to leave the program because of his political convictions.

After serving as an Assistant at the University of Yaoundé II, Soa, Cameroon, he pursued a Master of Arts in Political Science at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), Texas, USA, where he also worked as a Teaching Assistant.

Highly interested in further research, he will embark on a new endeavor and has committed to begin his doctoral studies in Sociology and Anthropology from UTEP, Texas, USA.