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Arming Development: Measuring The Effects Of Development Aid On Armed Conflict. An Analysis On West Africa, 1990-2020

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ARMING DEVELOPMENT: MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT AID ON

ARMED CONFLICT. AN ANALYSIS ON

WEST AFRICA, 1990-2020

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Dedication

To my daughter, Kandyce

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by

ALYK XAVIER COLLINS, BBA

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Abstract

Did the securitization of the development aid to West Africa lead to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence? The goal of this research is to provide evidence that development aid allocation following the September 11th terror attacks had undergone securitization that led to an increase in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa. I argue the Global War on Terror shifted development aid allocation from development projects to security projects in countries that were geostrategic partners. My approach is based on the Security Complex theory conceptualization of development aid in West African countries. Using both a PCSE and fixed effects regression estimators with pooled time-series data taken from 15 West African countries between 1990-2020, I find that individual bilateral and multilateral development aid has little effect on the increase of casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence. Alternatively, the combined bilateral and multilateral development aid does have an effect on casualties.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Security concerns following the September 11th terror attacks have transformed development aid to include security issues beyond state actors. As a result, the international community identified terrorism to be the forefront of their national security agenda ultimately leading to the declaration of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). With the pursuit of national security, development was made a coequal component to diplomacy and defense and with it, an increase of development aid allocated to strategic and security objectives. Top development donors have systematically increased Official Development Assistance (ODA)[1] allocation to countries that address terrorism that are security threats. The purpose of this research is to investigate if that shift in development aid policy (securitization) away from development goals and restructured towards security issues led to an increase in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence.

Various reports and studies have shown after the September 11th terror attacks (post-9/11), foreign aid allocation shifted. For example "the top priority in this budget is addressing terrorism by providing aid to key foreign partners and allies, including $2.3 billion to states on the front lines of the war against terrorism" (US Department of State and International Assistance Program, 2004, p. 208). Foreign aid, especially development aid, plays an important role in US national security where the need for a national security strategy that deploys foreign aid as a key instrument of American soft power[2] and elevates development alongside defense and diplomacy (Brainerd 2007). Securitization of development aid transformed policies to target security goals with a

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[1] Government aid provided by donor countries to promote economic and welfare of developing countries and comes in the form of grants, loans, and various types of monetary concessions (OECD, "What is ODA?" Fact sheet, April 2019). Also, for the purpose of this study, in this paper, ODA is interchangeable with development aid.

[2] The ability to co-opt rather than coerce where shaping preferences of others is done through appeal and attraction.

growing consensus of 'there can be no development without security, and no security without development' (Simpson 2007). Further rationale for securitizing development aid has been if increased security creates the conditions for development, then spending development money on security is justified (Petrik 2012). Securitizing development aid first started during the Bush administration where countries at risk from terrorist operations, violent non-state actors, or were failed or failing states became an essential aspect of national security (Prins and Wilford 2013). Later, it expanded under the Obama administration, labeling these threats and changing development aid continued, but were renamed to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The existing policies that securitized development aid, however, remained the same.

Development aid policy and doctrine post-9/11 clearly states terrorism was an issue to be classified as an existential threat and must be addressed outside the normal processes, including security projects. From these policy changes, West Africa[3] was viewed under a security context by donors. Justified using the securitization approach, US and other ODA countries increased their presence and development aid allocation throughout West Africa, focusing on terrorism in failed/failing states. "The GWOT has been relatively successful in mobilizing a number of allies, and generally the main allies have all adopted the rhetoric of 'terrorism as our main security problem' and to some extent participated in the GWOT as a foreign policy orientation" (Buzan and Wæver 2009: p. 274). While development aid is often intended to lower poverty and economic inequality, it can have unintended consequences including increasing casualties from conflict and violence. Focusing on short-term goals addressing terrorism rather than long-term development goals for government and economic sustainability often leads to militarization[4] of the aid (Brown

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[3] For the purpose of this study, West Arica will consist of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
[4] For the purpose of this paper, militarization and securitization of aid is referred to as the same practice.

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and Gravingholt 2016). Donors use the aid as a foreign policy tool rather than an effort to support recipient countries, unevenly distributing aid to quick fix solutions over any type of long term sustainable solutions.

Securitization of development aid is the practice of framing and addressing development issues, such as poverty and economic inequality, in such a way in which they can only be solved through a security-oriented approach. It is used as a justification to allocation resources that would otherwise be used for development towards security concerns instead. This securitization process was used to support national security mainly due to most transnational terror organizations not being affiliated with any one country. Terror organizations often originate and operate in multiple weak and failed states, taking advantage of the lack of government enforcement and poverty (Bortolleto 2010). Countries such as Mali and Niger have brought about the emergence of violent non-state actors in the region, such as al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (*AQIM*) and Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa (*TWJWA*). These countries received billions of dollars of development aid through ODA after 9/11 (Brown and Gravingholt 2016) and within this securitization, West African countries changed their policies to improve security and abandoned the projects related to development (Eizenga 2019 West African Papers, No. 25, p. 21). Using securitization to address these growing threats from the region, casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence began to increase post-9/11. One-sided violence is when a state or non-state actor commits violence including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and torture towards a non-combatant victim who is significantly disadvantaged in terms of small arms, resources, and capabilities. One-sided violence is often used to assert control over a targeted group or area (Bortolleto 2010).

This research investigates if securitizing development aid post 9/11 led to a rise in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa. Furthermore, did increasing securitized development aid to geostrategic partners[5] led to an increase in armed conflict or one-sided violence? I argue countries that took part in this partnership saw an increase in conflict and one-sided violence. My research question stems from Howell and Lind (2009) where they argue the GWOT countries contributed to the increasing securitization of aid policy and practice. I take an additional step and expand that ODA was used as a form of military funding in the GWOT geostrategic partnership countries as donors assist countries affected by terrorism in order to achieve their own strategic security objectives (Lis 2018). Furthermore, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) later renamed Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSTCP) brought diplomatic and development resources to "bear in the fight" against Saharan terrorism by the use of the US State Department, US Department of Defense and USAID (Harmon 2015)[6].

The rationale for my research is based on an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence being caused by development aid funding security infrastructure instead of development infrastructure. Additionally, one-sided violence is increasing due to specifically funding known repressive regimes. This is argued in two stages: the first stage is development aid being shifted from focusing on poverty and development to addressing terrorism and security threats (Buzan 2006; Brown and Gravingholt 2016). The second stage argues securitized language used in development aid policy allowed donors to make ad hoc allocation policies towards countries they deemed a threat from potential terrorism activities or the recipients supporting the GWOT

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[5] Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, expanded to Nigeria, Senegal, and then Burkina Faso. This partnership is later defined, beginning with the Pan Sahel Initiative then renamed the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

[6] It should be noted the Pentagon defines counterterrorism as "actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terror networks" (Federation of American Scientists 2010) Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

(Marchesin 2016). At the same time, I recognize the militancy and violence in West Africa existed prior to the securitized development aid increases and often an increase in violence can lead to an increase in development aid. The casual relationship between aid and conflict can be influenced by a number of factors, including the recipient country's political condition. I address this by defining the development aid policy from the donor country and the increase in recipient country's aid without any indication of the need for the substantial increase of aid.

Furthermore, I seek to demonstrate the rise in armed conflict and one-sided violence across the region is unique to those labeled geostrategic partners. The observed increase in foreign aid and armed conflict trends post-9/11 can be associated with the increase in military operations in the GWOT front of West Africa. Furthermore, while there were other security concerns that were addressed in the security agenda, terrorism was stated in almost all current literature on security (Tome 2010). This study is based upon a quantitative approach using a PCSE and fixed effects regression techniques followed by two case study analyses using data from the OECD reports to ensure the results are reliable and consistent.

Why study the effects of securitizing development aid and why study West Africa? The significance of this study can be defined with a number of important factors. The first are the implications of securitized development aid policy on recipient countries. Foreign aid allocation is motivated and guided by the same factors that drive both national security and foreign policy, which, in turn, may lead to development aid programs and partnerships changing their allocation policies to better fit donor security interests. The second is the geographical location of West Africa and its influence on global stability. The third is the growing population projections of 2050 in the region. The fourth and final is the growing natural resource importance in the region (Carmody 2005). Misdiagnosing the problems in West Africa will not only lead to further loss of life in the

region, but will drain resources from the international community into a potential 'never-ending war'. The presence of development aid in conflict zones has long been a part of international relations, but has been understudied quantitatively. Focusing on solely ODA as oppose to all foreign aid better captures the effect development aid has on armed conflict and one-sided violence. It also better illustrates development aid specifically targeted towards projects that were usually for a more traditional military aid role. In addition to public statements suggesting the US conducts limited "advise and assist" missions with other donor countries (Morgan 2018), I argue these limited programs included development aid as an alternative to military and security operations. I also limit the study to the top six ODA donors to better capture a real change in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence due to securitized development aid. Not all ODA countries followed suit to this securitized policy change, although the top six donors share similar security policies and make up the majority of global aid.

In this introductory chapter, I have defined the outlines for my project and stated the parameters of my research. The paper will proceed as follows. In the next chapter, I provide a literature review on the Securitization Theory, and how development aid allocation transformed post-9/11. I present my theoretical framework and expand on the Security Complex Theory brought forth by (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998) on the securitization of development aid. I explain how this school of thought was used to set in place the policies of US and ODA development aid allocations. I elaborate on securitization of both the bilateral and multilateral aid allocations as well as the top donors and contributors to the GWOT. My six hypotheses to test and the explanations of what I expect will conclude this chapter. Chapter Three will include the empirical analysis using an OLS and fixed effects regression techniques first using a 9/11 dummy variable followed by a geostrategic partnership dummy variable. I examine bilateral development

aid allocations first followed by the multilateral development aid on armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa and discuss the results from these tests. In Chapter Four, I provide a case study regarding securitized development aid allocation focusing on Cote d'Ivoire of the Mano River Crisis for pre-9/11 and Mali and Niger of the Liptako-Gourma region for post-9/11 case. This case study illustrates further evidence of the relationship between securitized development aid on armed conflict and one-sided violence. Finally, Chapter Five has the concluding remarks of the study.

Chapter 2: Theory

In this chapter, I explain my theory on how two approaches of the GWOT securitized development aid led to an increase in casualties that resulted from armed conflict and one-sided violence across West Africa. I explain this process with two approaches that donor countries implemented towards recipient countries. The first approach is the overall increase of securitized development aid and the pressure from donor countries to prioritize security issues over development goals, and the second is the substantial increase of securitized development aid targeted directly to geostrategic partners. I provide a basis that, in response to the September 11th terror attacks, Securitization Theory was applied to development aid policy that altered aid allocation towards security goals. While development aid aims to address humanitarian assistance, international development policies were part of a long-term project that included reducing armed conflict (Williams 2016). Donors have begun to focus on building recipient government capabilities recognizing that development requires an effective government (World Bank, World Development Report p. 169, 174). My goal in this chapter is to connect the characteristics of securitization theory and its application to development aid policy to West Africa, especially in the post-9/11 years.

Securitization of development aid policy was driven by the Cold-War era doctrine of "active defense" in which the US needed to strike first by applying armed forces at a distance (Bachmann 2010; Vine 2020). I argue the US and ODA donors implemented Securitization Theory to justify that terrorism was an urgent national security threat that needed to be handled above the constraints of political debate, therefore leading to a transformation of development aid policy. The US and ODA donors also overlooked human right abuse from recipient countries as long as the recipients addressed the terror threat in their country. Due to the limited existing research on

development aid as a substitution to military aid, I aim to fill the gap in the literature both with a case study comparison and a quantitative approach.

SECTION 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section provides a review of the existing literature on Security Complex Theory and the securitization of development aid following the September 11th attacks, development and security concerns. There has been a growing body of literature that suggests the development industry was transformed to address the rising threat of terrorism and other security concerns. With this, a broad consensus among the remaining literature can be made between development and security where scholars argue development needs security and security needs development. The purpose of this section is to introduce the literature from which I derived the framework of my theory and also explain my contribution.

Securitization Theory was developed by the Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan, Ole Wœver, Jaap de Wilde in the early 1990s. It is the overarching theory of my research and I use it to argue development aid allocation shifted towards security concerns. Sethi (2015) an issue becomes a security issue based on the subjective understanding of security of the audience and from the context in which political actors frame an issue. I derive my theory based on their argument and continue into the specific framing of terrorism as a threat that was to be addressed using development aid. However, one of the most prominent shortcomings of the Copenhagen School of Securitization Theory is that it does not explain why the choice to securitize an entity is made. McSweeney (1996) argues that constructing a security issue by solely a political issue is too narrow; instead, the issue must be examined in the context of both social and historical contexts in which the securitization is made. Furthermore, McDonald (2008) also argues by not explaining why the choice was made to securitize can lead to ignoring the contexts in which security is

understood by different actors. I address this shortcoming by providing evidence from numerous government documents and national security strategies reports from all bilateral donors in my study. Outlined in these documents, the words 'prevent terrorism, combat poverty, provide security' can be seen in reoccurrence. This language alone, is enough to address the 'why securitize' question and the changed objectives of development aid.

My theoretical framework stems from Simpson (2007) who argues the security-development nexus has shifted the relationship between development and security. This shift is what led ODA donors to fund security projects arguing if security is necessary for development, then where there is no security, development resources must aid security objectives. Woods (2005), Moss et al. (2005), Aning (2010) and Shahzad et al. (2020) argue that a shift in foreign aid allocation to target security related issues became a priority in the international security agenda. The linkage between ODA and terrorism has been broadened and classified it as a strategic importance, including funding numerous projects outside of its traditional purpose. This trend had spread among major donors in prioritizing foreign aid to pursue their own domestic security objectives, and even increase aid as a reward for countries who cooperated in the GWOT (Rudolf 2002).

When development was elevated among the three core instruments of development policy in the context of the GWOT, it further contributed to the convergence of development with security, and security with development (Petrik 2012). Among this convergence of development with security, state-building[7] projects were often used to strengthen military and security infrastructure in weak, failing or failed states. With counterterrorism policy, development aid has taken on a more traditionally military approach such as military personnel delivering development

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[7] Includes a blend of conflict prevention, political, security, humanitarian and development projects tailored to the particular recipient (Policy Development and Studies Branch 2011).

aid for reconstruction and development projects on the battlefield, with the goal of winning the hearts and minds of the local population (Gilbert 2015). Following this reclassification of development with diplomacy and defense, the military's involvement in development projects has significantly increased and foreign aid is being dispersed through the Department of Defense. For example, USAID, US State and Defense Department partnered together and conducted joint operations while utilizing embassies as command posts in counterterrorism operations (Miles 2012).

Furthermore, USAID was restructured as an additional security agency shifting focus from long-term development goals to more short-term policy objectives[8] (Hills 2006; Patrick and Brown 2007). With the restructuring of these development agencies to handle conflict independently from security agencies, this allows development aid to be utilized on security operations. Development was rebranded similarly to diplomacy and defense; foreign aid allocation was distributed alongside other non-traditional aid. Furthermore, the number of military personnel and Department of Defense operations in non-combat countries has increased significantly. Bortolleto (2010) found trends in foreign aid that suggest foreign aid is used as a soft-power tool for strategic objectives and development aid had been allocated to countries contributing to the both the GWOT and other global threats to US interest.

As the GWOT became the forefront in international political agenda, development infrastructure had been heavily influenced by the international security agenda. Security considerations were being prioritized as key in the allocation of development aid, either in selecting programs of recipients or in the military or quasi-military assistance as development aid (Tujan, Gaughran, and Mollett 2004). Along with the interagency of development and security

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[8] It should be noted that United States Agency for International Development is the largest distributor of US ODA.

agencies, Owusu (2007) explained the Millennium Challenge Program (MCA) was a development aid tool originally designed to address global poverty, but it was expanded to address international terrorism after the September 11th attacks. However, ODA can have unintended consequences by enabling recipient states to shift resources away from activities now funded by ODA to other spending categories, including military activities (Tian and Silva 2020).

It has been argued that poverty and terrorism are interlocked, and therefore addressing poverty would help alleviate the spread of terrorism. Fleck and Kilby (2008) found a connection between bilateral foreign aid and the geopolitical location of recipient states stating that US aid flows increased in response to the GWOT. The relationship between international terrorism and foreign aid allocation is conditional on whether terrorist activity in a recipient country directly threatens US interests. This suggests that US development aid used to fight terrorism and political violence is narrowly changed to assist countries that directly threaten its own security. ODA bilateral donors of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) changed aid policy allocation due to international terror attacks. Dreher and Fuchs (2011); Boutton and Carter (2014) found that countries where terror groups originate are not more likely to receive aid, but if a recipient is selected, they receive larger amounts of aid.

Foreign aid policy is driven by national security policy where allocation of aid reflects the donor country's security and military objectives. Military intervention by DAC members has a significant impact on the development aid given to target states following the military intervention (Kisangani and Pickering 2015). Evidence also suggests that the dispatch of military personnel from a donor state will often lead to a substantial increase in aid. Heinrich, Machain, and Oestman (2017) argue as terror attacks increase in a recipient's territory, aid towards that country will be utilized for counterterrorism objectives. These processes have in turn affected the way aid donor

agencies engage with recipient's countries. Howell and Lind (2009) argue governments generate fear using terror threats and, in addition, they have introduced numerous counterterrorism policies, measures and practices. In terms of development aid policy, the GWOT conflict has highlighted the strategic relevance of aid in the pursuit of security interests.

Kevlihan et al. (2014) found evidence that US humanitarian aid was dispersed based on the self-interests of donors. Driven by the September 11th attacks, the US tended to provide aid to nations that were not closely aligned to its foreign policy objectives. Their findings indicate that US decision to provide humanitarian assistance were driven by post-9/11 doctrine. Alternatively, neither recipient need nor donor self-interest appears to strongly influence the amount of aid countries receive pre-9/11, but both self-interest and need influence how much a country received post-9/11.

Collier and Hoeffler (2007) suggests that ODA has a positive effect on military spending, which indicates the higher the ODA allocation, the higher military spending will be for the recipient country and vice versa. Furthermore, they noted ODA and military spending move in the same direction, which also suggests that when ODA allocation to a regime decreases, the military expenditure of that recipient country also decreases. Between 2013 and 2018, eight countries in the Sahel saw combat operations by US forces, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (Turse 2018, Bergamaschi 2014).

The above scholarly literature shows that overall, development aid has undergone policy changes to address more security related issues, particularly in the era after 9/11. In this study, I divide development aid into bilateral and multilateral aid, similar to Lis (2018), who argues that the two types of aid (bilateral and multilateral) responded differently to security challenges because of donor's objectives and foreign aid policy. The authors' results suggests that armed conflict

reduces the amount of aid from both types, if the country was an aid recipient. Multilateral donors are also less likely to include a conflict-ridden country on a recipient list. Similar to Lis, I agree that bilateral and multilateral aid will respond differently to security challenges due to donors' different objectives. However, I disagree that armed conflict reduces aid to recipient countries. Empirical data indicates the opposite: where conflict arises, the amount of aid tends to increase (Collier and Hoeffler 2007).

My research makes three distinct contributions that diverges from the existing literature in the following ways. First, it provides quantitative evidence through regression techniques that there is a causal relationship between development aid increases and armed conflicts and one-sided violence increases across West Africa. Currently, the majority of the literature only suggest this relationship to be true through a variety of case studies listed above. The second, suggests an increase in securitized development aid to specific countries labelled geostrategic partners in the GWOT, instead of measuring all ODA recipient countries. Measuring this relationship in a given region instead of the world shows a more specific relationship between the increase in securitized development aid and an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence in that region. Third, OECD DAC Development mandate states "military aid falls outside the scope of ODA and is classified as other official flows[9]." Where other scholars have measured military aid separately from development aid (Bapat 2011; Gilbert 2015; Sullivan et al. 2011; Tian and Lopes da Silva 2020), I examine securitized development aid as an unspoken and unofficial "substitutable" military aid given the language of development aid policy and doctrine post-9/11. This is reflected by the systematic increase in development aid without an indication there is a need for the increase

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[9] OECD DAC, "The Development Assistance Committee's Mandate"; however, it should be noted that in 2016 the OECD revised its ODA eligibility criteria and allows the use of military personnel to deliver development services and humanitarian aid to prevent violent extremism ("The scope and nature of the 2016 HLM decision regarding the ODA eligibility of peace and security-related expenditures, DAC Secretariat, March 2016).

in development aid, to countries labeled geostrategic partners. My research focuses on the securitized aspect of development aid that is spent on security infrastructure, in turn, led to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties. Based on the review of the literature, I expect that these policy changes are associated with the increase of casualties.

The purpose of this literature review was to demonstrate the trends in foreign aid allocation and policy change in response to the GWOT over the past twenty years. The scholarly literature appears to have a consensus regarding the convergence of security and development and using development agencies for security objectives. However, the argument remains: on the one hand, if armed conflict is to be directly addressed, it should be expected that development aid will be used on the security sector. Furthermore, if increased security allows for development to occur, then spending development aid on security is justified.

SECTION 2. THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework of my study intends to provide a basis that, in response to the September 11th attacks, Securitization Theory was applied to development aid policy, which changed aid allocation to target security issues. Similar to Brown and Gravingholt (2016), I argue that securitization of development aid can be seen through the policy language and aid allocation post-9/11. Since donor countries prioritized their own security interests, they applied pressure to the recipient countries to do the same. This securitization of development aid led to the increase of casualties from in armed conflict and one-sided violence by providing recipient countries the means to fight terror organizations and to maintain a control over the population so terror organizations do not operate within the recipient's country. Often overlooking human right abuses, donor countries have increased securitized development aid to countries that had a history of abuse in the name of the GWOT.

I start with Securitization Theory[10], which is defined by three components. The first is speech act, second is the securitizing actor and third is the audience. To prevent every issue from becoming a security issue, a successful securitization must consist of the following steps. The first is the identification of the existential threat. The political actor must be able to have the capability to define a threat as a threat[11]. The second is the emergency action that would be taken to remove said threat. The third step is effect on an audience from breaking the rules, or in other words why must the rules be broken (Buzan et al. 1998). Through securitization, the government reserves the right to use law of the jungle should it deem it necessary at any stage. Once accepted by the audience, the political actor then moves the issue into a designated sector and thereby claims the right to use whatever means necessary to eliminate the threat. This includes legitimizing any and all practices necessary to combat the emergent risk (Eroukhmanoff 2018). By definition, an issue becomes a security issue when the political actor declares it to be so. This implies that there is a choice in deciding which issues are to be labelled as security threats and, in doing so, an issue becomes a security issue as a result of what different political actors and audiences subjectively identify as security threats (Sethi 2015). Securitization is largely based on having the means and capability to both politically and socially construct a threat. Following the 9/11 attacks, I argue development aid was then securitized in this manner and used to towards security objectives[12] (Howell and Lind 2009).

Preventing terror organizations from establishing footholds in West Africa has been one of the primary objectives of the GWOT in the region. There has been two approaches in achieving

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[10] Also known as Security Complex Theory, securitization, macro-securitization, or simply, a securitizing act.
[11] It should be noted there are two distinct features that classify urgent threats into a security framing by political actors. First, the threats go beyond the territories of just one country and the second, threats are interconnected in the globalization process. For example, an American oil tanker shipping crude oil to Canada is attacked off the coast of Senegal from a terror group operating out of Mali.
[12] This is later developed using the case study of Chapter four.

these objectives. First, the increase in development aid that has been securitized to address security objectives and second, the support of repressive regimes (labeled geostrategic partners) in support for the GWOT. These two approaches marked a change for security and development based on the assumptions that poverty is one of the major causes of terrorism and failed and failing countries provide a safe haven for recruitment and terror organization operations (Marclay 2008). Poor countries need and receive substantial amounts of development aid that is an essential part of the government's budget to address conflict (Szavo 2022). Furthermore, "Fragile states lag behind other developing countries. This group of countries poses particular development challenges, as many are dealing with conflict or post-conflict environments that make the delivery of development finance and services especially problematic" (World Bank 2008, p. 22). The first approach is discussed by providing examples that the US and ODA policy transformed development aid to address 'security-first' issues while the second approach is discussed by providing examples that demonstrate development aid allocation to specific geostrategic countries in West Africa.

The First Approach

The first approach reshaped development aid policies and strategies from targeting development issues into targeting security issues using Securitization Theory as a justification. Development aid is allocated on the basis of donors' national interests with countries having pursued development assistance allocation, depending on their strategic objectives (Massie and Roussel 2014; Tian and Lopes Da Silva 2020). The 2006 Reality of Aid Report states that development aid towards development goals is becoming sidelined to donor national security priorities. In addition to being sidelined, the allocation towards development has decreased at the expense of security goals with short-term quick fixes being prioritized over sustainable long-term

solutions (The Reality of Aid 2006, 2006). Donor countries would then apply pressure to recipient countries to prioritize fighting terror originations rather than pursue development goals. For example, in Egypt and the Persian Gulf, the US influence is largely due to its aid allocation; in turn, any changes to US foreign aid allocation could be used to apply pressure on recipient governments to initiate political and economic reforms in their countries.

Rather than direct military action, securitized development aid was structured toward policies of containment and policing where justification for such actions are made easier by references to 'national security'(Woods 2006). Natsios stated at a House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations April 2004, "a shift in development assistance funds to an account that could be used for efficient, short-term assistance to "fragile" states that are vulnerable to crisis or in the process of recovering from crisis" (Natsios 2004). The securitization of West Africa has been made an international effort with countries deploying different types of personnel such as police, military, developmental, diplomatic, and informal to help provide training and support. Price (2014) often times, non-government organization (NGOs) have even provided humanitarian assistance with military personnel labeled 'conflict zone humanitarian aid' to further or complete military objectives.

Development aid is also being coupled with military force to support security objectives in conflict and post-conflict zones. It is conceived as an integrated component to military operations which further reinforces joint development and security policies (Massie and Roussel 2014). For example is the multinational US-led Flintlock exercise, held in Niger in 2014; this exercise, which was originally developed to provide military and security training, has incorporated humanitarian objectives in the training such as medical evacuation and refugee support (Frowd and Sandor 2018). An example is the justification for the French-led Operation Barkhane, which suggests

France supports the security-development nexus by reshaping armed conflict intervention as humanitarian work (Gilbert 2015). The operation remains a security operation, however; it has been loosely coupled with policies aimed toward development goals, such as digging wells or providing medical assistance (Frowd and Sandor 2018). All of these actors introduced some form of security-related projects and/or contributed to state building operations. Unlike peacekeeping operations that focus on preventing armed conflict, government reconstruction focuses on restoring the government's ability to maintain security control over the population (Englebert and Tull 2008). In other words, arm and train security infrastructure of recipient country to address conflict issues. To summarize, donor countries would supply an increase in development aid, based on their domestic security concerns, to recipient countries and told them to fight terror organizations. In turn, the recipient country would then use the aid to buy small arms and other military equipment to combat these organizations that led to the increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence.

The Second Approach

The second approach authorized development aid to be allocated to repressive regimes, who were labeled as geostrategic partners in the GWOT. The geostrategic partnership is an unofficial alliance between donor countries and certain recipient countries aimed at counterterrorism operations and other security threats. These operations typically include military cooperation and capacity building to strengthen the security and stability in the region (Williams 2016). The conditions for these recipients to be labeled geostrategic partners are as follows: the first is they must share a common security concern as the donor country. The mutual recognition of the urgency and severity is a key condition for entering into the partnership. The second is the strategy alignment that includes an agreement on the underlying causes and motivation of terrorism

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and how to address the problem. The third is the willingness to cooperate with US and other donors and conduct joint operations that includes intelligence sharing and logistics support. The last condition is the willingness to commit longer-term to the partnership. Given the nature of terror threats, partners must be prepared to maintain these roles for long term.

Donor country's labeled the countries with the highest risk of terrorism operations to develop and formed this partnership with them. The majority of countries in this region are authoritarian based on harsh practices that often violate human and political rights. However, as of 2005, only twelve countries in sub-Saharan Africa were democratic by one measure (Marshall and Gurr 2005; Freedom House, "Freedom in Africa Today," 2006). These partnership regimes were known human rights abusers and oppressive governments, but because they provided support in the fight against terrorism, the US overlooked these abuses in the name of security (Savell 2021). Recipient countries throughout West Africa who were deemed high terror producing countries formed partnerships with the US and thus allowed development aid to combat terror organizations. Countries that joined this partnership were Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2003; in 2005, the PSI became the TSTCP and expanded to Nigeria and Senegal; joining last in 2009, Burkina Faso joined despite having no terror threat in the country (Turse 2009). In his article "Corruption and Foreign Aid in Africa" (Werlin 2005), Robert Werlin argues that, "poor countries suffer not so much from insufficient aid as from poor quality of their governance" (pg.517). He argues that even if the US and other donors such as the United Nations would increase aid to poor countries, it would not make a difference because these countries suffer with high levels of corruption.

A component of securitization is a policy referred to as 'repression', where at the expense of liberal care values, policies are derived to 'take the fight to the terrorists' by police and/or military force (Buzan 2006). Restructuring development aid policy under this securitization

framework allowed the US to provide aid to these countries. Furthermore, for their support in the GWOT, they have received billions of dollars in foreign aid from the US, regardless of if they use oppressive tactics that violate of human rights against their population. A DAC report states concerns that OECD governments often overlook severe human right abuses because they need cooperation from the country's government[13]. One example of this is the support for the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) from West African governments, joining more-so for the increase in aid and new military equipment and less from their commitment to fighting terrorism. Harmon (2015) found that these countries were willing to use the training and resources to combat secular-nationalists' organizations and other domestic political opponents. For an ODA recipient, an increase in development aid could influence their budget and allow for a shift in allocation of financial resources (Tian and Lopes da Silva 2020). An example is the Ivorian President Gbagbo, where he had the ability to retain power as through the access of government funds, with which he paid out the civil service, security services, and the police, which was estimated roughly $120 million USD per month (Milam and Jones 2011).

Many geostrategic partners had utilized the GWOT to justify human rights abuses and political repression while using abusive practices in their counterterrorism strategy (Tujan, Gaughran, Mollett 2004). These practices include arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention without trial, the detention of "terrorist suspects" without trial, the right to be informed of the reason for detention, and sometimes armed violence against civilians on behalf of state forces (Fjelde et al. 2021). It has also allowed for discrimination based on national identity and ethnicity. Egyptian President Mubarak stated that the US decision to ignore and disregard repressive tactics in the name of security "proves that we were right from the beginning in using all means, including

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[13]OECD (2005), A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: key entry points for action.

military tribunals" (Human Rights Watch, "In the name of counterterrorism: human rights abuses worldwide: A Human Rights Watch briefing paper for the 59th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 2003). It should be noted that Egypt has received a substantial increase of US development aid following the September 11th attacks. (Tujan, Gaughran, Mollett 2004). Furthermore, many countries use the US narrative of terrorism and counterterrorism (including the financial, political and institutional support) given to them by the US to repress minority groups and justify authoritarianism (Savell 2021).

Not only did the US support repressive regimes labeled geostrategic partners, but has also ignored the violence in pursuit of national security interests. For example, in 2002, a Human Rights Watch report, 'Dangerous dealings: changes in US military assistance after September 11', noted concerns that the US was extending assistance to governments responsible for serious human right abuses. They claim the US State Department stated Uzbekistan was reforming their human rights commitments, required by aid legislation, allowing military and security assistance of $16 million - despite its being guilty of serious human rights violations. It was later investigated that these reports were greatly exaggerated and critics claimed it was due to their willingness to host US bases and seen as a strategic partner in the GWOT (Human Rights Watch, In the name of counterterrorism: human rights abuses worldwide: A Human Rights Watch briefing paper for the 59th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 2003). To summarize, donor countries would identify recipient countries as geostrategic partners and supply an increase in development aid, based on their domestic security concerns. In turn, the geostrategic recipient country would then use the aid to buy small arms and other military equipment to combat these organizations that led to the increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence.

After conducting my literature review, I formulated six hypotheses to test. The first hypothesis is H1a: **An increase in bilateral development aid in West Africa, Post-9/11, led to an increase in armed conflict.** Bilateral development aid is dispersed between one donor country and one recipient country, giving the donor country more leeway in how the aid is allocated. I argue this arrangement will allow the donor country to apply pressure to recipients to invest in security infrastructure over development goals. As stated in the previous sections, donors allocate aid to align with their interests, including the security aspects. Post-9/11 donor countries are prioritizing development aid for their own domestic security, the pressure applied will be to combat terrorism over "fighting" poverty. Recipient countries will then use development aid to purchase small arms and other military equipment used to fight terror groups or expand their security forces used to maintain control. Since the development aid is a security priority, to show additional cooperation, the recipient country may also adopt harsh counterterrorism tactics that exacerbates armed conflict. If the recipient countries wish to keep receiving aid, they will more often than not comply with the demands from the donor. Security-first policies often undermine the development objectives and, in turn, short-term security goals are prioritized over long-term transformational objectives (Hills 2006). For these reasons, I expect to see an increase in casualties of armed conflict.

The next hypothesis is H1b: **An increase in multilateral development aid in West Africa Post-9/11 led to an increase in armed conflict.** Multilateral development aid is dispersed between multitudes of donor countries to one recipient country. The priority granted to each concern or threat and the use of security may vary from donor to donor (Tome 2010). With the aid allocation being grouped, the donor countries must agree on how the aid is disbursed and with most of the

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multilateral funding coming from bilateral funding I argue the aid would be allocated for a more securitized development or humanitarian projects. The reason for the *increase* in armed conflict is an unintended consequence of the multilateral institution's goals and projects. UN peacekeeping operations set out to stabilize a conflict region, protecting civilians as one of the most important aspect of the mission (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). This is argued because regardless of the UN missions, the local population will judge the peacekeepers on their ability to protect the civilians. Protecting civilians may require a direct armed conflict with a terror organization or rebel groups that support these organizations. Additionally, the recipient country may want to keep the multilateral aid flowing so they are going to confront (through combat) these terror groups to show their donors they are taking a proactive approach to handle the threats in their country. For these reasons, I predict that multilateral development aid will increase casualties from armed conflict.

The second hypothesis is H2a: **The increase in bilateral development aid in West Africa, Post-9/11 led to an increase in one-sided violence.** Carmody (2005) and Savell (2021) argue the increase of foreign aid and the further violation of human rights in those aid recipient countries has disconnected the donor society from African states, ultimately decreasing long-term relations and stability. Countries the US deems geostrategic partners utilize the narrative of terrorism and counterterrorism to gain financial and political support. Often times, these resources are used to repress minority groups and target political adversaries while justifying authoritarianism. These recipient countries are going to work alongside donor countries to combat terror groups that includes harsh tactics to satisfy the security objectives for donors, even if that leads to an increase in one-sided violence. Framing development issues as merely terrorist problems provides an excuse for recipient governments to target who they wish in the name of the GWOT. Furthermore, it has be argued (Tian and Lopes da Silva 2020) that development aid affects

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a recipient country's budget, where the recipient may increase military expenditures with aid funding. Similar to the H1a, bilateral aid allocation would have a greater impact because of the ability to directly fund security issues disguised as development projects. As mentioned above, the US and other donors have ignored repressive regimes to continue their practice so long as they contribute to the GWOT. One-sided violence casualties from these types of regimes will not influence bilateral aid allocation.

The next hypothesis H2b: **The increase in multilateral development aid in West Africa, Post-9/11 led to an increase in one-sided violence.** Similar to the H1b, it would be difficult to convince an international organization, such as the international development association to allocate security related projects, especially to repressive regimes. Therefore, if recipient countries were to commit one-sided violence, it would influence multilateral aid allocation. However, due to the nature of multilateral aid funding, the bilateral donors could apply pressure to these institutions to help address the terror problem in the region. For example, in 2020 roughly 21 percent of the EU's total development budget came from Germany (OECDilibrary 2023). Also, the US allocated 15.9 percent of total ODA to multilateral organizations (OECDilibrary 2023).

In addition, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations have access to peace keeping troops who would be deployed alongside with providing the development aid. The deployment of peacekeeping troops would be their primary tool used to address terror organizations from committing one-sided violence; therefore, development aid provided by these institutions should increase casualties in one-sided violence.

The next hypothesis H3a: **The increase in bilateral development aid to geostrategic partners in West Africa led to an increase in both armed conflict and one-sided violence.** As mentioned in H2a, repressive regimes use the narrative of terrorism and counterterrorism to gain

financial and political support from donors that may be used to repress minority groups and target political advisories. These recipient countries have an incentive to remain in the partnership, which means they will also prioritize addressing security concerns over development issues to satisfy the donor objectives. They will show donors they are actively fighting terror organizations by increasing armed conflict. Furthermore, prior to donors allocating securitized development aid to the geostrategic partner, donors must first label the recipient as a geostrategic partner, which, in turn, the aid allocation is already being sent on the premise that it will prioritize fighting terrorism. Terrorism is already a threat in the geostrategic recipient country and weak institutions exists in this type of environment; it is understood by the donor that the terror problem must first be dealt with before development can take root. I also argue the recipient country will have an incentive to stay a geostrategic partner to continue to receive the additional aid used to fight terrorism; thus the recipient will create or aggravate existing conflict or over label any opposing political group as a terror organization. Additionally, it has been argued that countries who become US allies for counter-terrorism suffer more terrorism (Savun and Phillips 2009). For these reasons, I expect to see casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence to increase in these geostrategic partner countries. Additionally, for the one-sided violence, the narrative of the armed versus the unarmed is considered one of the reasons for external aid (Leuthauser 2012).

The final hypothesis H3b: **the increase in multilateral development aid to geostrategic partners in West Africa led to an increase in both armed conflict and one-sided violence.** Similar to H3a, in order for a recipient country to be a geostrategic partner, it must first be labeled as one by the donor countries. Terror organizations already have a foothold in these countries, corruption is already a common practice and most government institutions have already began to deteriorate. The multilateral institutions are aware of these conditions that exist in these types of

countries, because they are the ones who, historically, have conducted humanitarian, peacekeeping, and stability operations in these countries prior to 9/11. They understand in its entirety that development aid allocated to untrustworthy and repressive regimes comes with the territory of the possibility of increasing one-sided violence casualties. Counteractively, multilateral institutions do not share the same security objectives as the bilateral donors; therefore they had no securitization of their policy nor doctrine to label these types of countries as geostrategic countries. However, the nature of the bilateral donors to multilateral institutions will play a role in the aid flow from these multilateral institutions. The same way donors apply pressure to recipients to combat terror organizations could be the same way donors influence these multilateral institutions to address security issues. For these reasons, I expect multilateral aid to increase casualties from one-sided violence in geostrategic countries.

To summarize, bilateral development aid will directly increase the number of casualties due to securitizing development aid targeted towards security infrastructure, whereas multilateral aid will increase the number of casualties from the pressure applied from bilateral donors to address conflict issues.

SECTION 4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I provided a literature review outlining the parameters of my theory. The current debate has relied on official policy documents and speeches where quantitative evidence of a change in donor aid allocation has been limited (Brown and Gravingholt 2016). This research serves to fill that gap and provide a quantitative approach in measuring the effect of development aid on the casualty count from armed conflict and one-sided violence. I developed my theory and explained the causal mechanisms of these two variables, and argued the US and other ODA donors implemented Securitization Theory to justify that terrorism was an urgent national security threat.

This threat needed to be handled above the constraints of political debate, therefore leading to a transformation of development aid allocation. This transformation was the securitization of development aid to West Africa, which led to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence casualty count. The two approaches donors implemented was the overall securitization of development aid through the language depicted from policy changes and the increase of this development aid towards geostrategic partners. In the next chapter, I develop my research design and test the six hypotheses using quantitative analysis.

Chapter 3: Quantitative

In this chapter, I present the quantitative analysis used to determine if there is a causal relationship between an increase of development aid that led to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties. To test for all six hypotheses, I analyze panel data on a country-year level aid allocations for 15 West African countries over the time period 1990-2020. To identify the changes in development aid allocation from both bilateral and multilateral donors, I examine the yearly aid allocation budget from the OECD databases (OECD 2021). More specifically, I examine the top six ODA member bilateral donors that includes the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany and Canada. For the multilateral aid, I examine the top four international organizations of development aid donors, which includes the European Union, United Nations, International Development Association, and the International Monetary Funds. Although other bilateral and multilateral donors can influence casualties among armed conflict and one-sided violence, I focus on these top bilateral and multilateral donors for a number of reasons. The first is the top donors comprise the majority of the development aid disbursement year after year. In 2019, the US development aid alone made up 22.5 percent of total net development aid by donors world-wide (OECD 2019). The second is the top bilateral and multilateral donors have remained as the top donors and not varied in over a decade; and the last reason is the shared common security interests of the top six bilateral donors.

The chapter's empirical results consist of two parts: following the explanation and operationalization of my variables, the first part consists of presenting models estimating panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and fixed effects regression techniques for my models using the 9/11-dummy to test for hypotheses H1a/b and H2a/b. The second consists of the PCSE and fixed effects regression techniques using the GSP-dummy to test for hypotheses H3a/b. The discussion

for both results will follow the results section of part two. Furthermore, an additional section will follow the results to demonstrate other tests that were conducted. The section below discusses the dependent variables, variables of interest, and the control variables, where the data was pulled and how they were operationalized.

SECTION 1. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION

Dependent Variable

Armed conflict is my first dependent variable for hypothesis H1a, H1b, and H3a and measures the number of casualties in a state per year in armed conflict. Armed conflict is defined as a disputed incompatibility (the replacement of the central government or the change of the state in control of a certain territory) between a government, state (internationally recognized government controlling a specific territory) and/or any opposition organization (any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence outcomes) who strive to acquire a set of scarce resources at the same time, which can be either material or immaterial (Pettersson 2022). Each conflict is listed in the database and is given a unique ID code.

One-sided violence is my dependent variable for hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H3b and measures non-battle related casualties in a state per year. It is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group (any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group) against civilians (unarmed people who are not active members of security forces of the state nor members of an organized armed militia or opposing group (Petterson 2022). Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded in this database.

I use a count variable of the number of casualties aggregated across all conflicts per country, per year to measure both armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties. Measuring the

variables this way gives a broad idea in the severity of the conflicts that could lead to call for foreign assistance (Williams 2016). For both dependent variables, I use data compiled by the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson et al. 2021); and the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset. Both are joint projects at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research Institute, Uppsala University. I chose these two datasets because they consist of the most reliable conflict-related data dating back to the 1990s.

Variable of Interest

OECD ODA bilateral and multilateral development aid are my two theoretical variables of interest and the geostrategic partnership dummy variable. Bilateral agreements are direct transfers of money or other assets by one donor country to a recipient country Multilateral aid is distributed by bilateral donors to multilateral organizations (often from various sources) where the organization coordinates the delivery of the aid. The OECD report provides a geographical breakdown by donor, recipient, and the types of aid for the West African countries and covers all bilateral and multilateral donors. In OECD DAC publications, development aid data are expressed in total net and constant US dollars 2020.

I chose to utilize ODA/OECD to measure development aid for a number of reasons. The first is the fungibility of development aid. Since non-military aid tends to be a substantial part of a country's aid allocation, it allows the recipient country to redistribute aid to other military programs. It has been argued that it has enabled recipient countries to shift "freed up" resources away from activities funded by ODA to other spending categories (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Tian and Lopes da Silva 2020). Second, the foreign policy drives the allocation of development aid; in other words, although ODA does not directly include military aid, the distribution of development aid has shifted by the domestic security policies of said donor countries. Third, the category foreign

aid has a broad range and is used to cover projects such as funding foreign militaries, aircraft surveillance, logistics, etc. (Savell 2021). Therefore, I limit my aid variable to simply ODA to capture the effects of only development aid.

I separate development aid into bilateral and multilateral because aid allocation may contribute differently to armed conflict and one-sided violence due to the different aid objectives (Lis 2018). First, bilateral aid consists of development aid provided by the United States, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and Canada. I examine bilateral effect separately to measure the effect of each donor with respect to their individual securitized aid. For example, the US bilateral aid flow will be far more heavily securitized than Canadian aid. I also include the total sum to test for the total effect of all development aid on casualties. The second, multilateral development aid consists of aid provided by the European Union Institutions, United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund. I also include the total sum to test for the total effect similar to bilateral aid.

Separating bilateral and multilateral ODA comes from the framework behind the bureaucracy of disbursement for the two types of aid. Because bilateral aid is one country to another, one could argue the bureaucracy of this type of aid is more simple and flexible whereas multilateral aid is a multitude of countries, which inherently is going to include more bureaucratic steps. This multistep process could make development aid disbursement difficult to deliver or it could be slower to reach the recipient country. I also include multiple multilateral institutions due to no single organization having the capability to address conflict in West Africa alone, and these are the largest foreign institutions that address conflict in West Africa. Although these institutions did not directly change or restructure development aid policy around the GWOT, the funding they

received came from countries whose policies did change; I expect to see a shift in allocation, but only a limited one.

All bilateral, multilateral, and combined aid data is OECD ODA and is measured in constant US dollars, logged and denoted as *log[aid]* in Table 3.1. I take the natural log of each bilateral and multilateral aid variable to address the skewedness and make the data more normally distributed; this gives it an equal amount of variability among each other. All aid data is lagged by one-year to account for the time dependency and temporal patterns aid tends to display (Boutton and Carter 2014; Lis 2018; Dreher and Fuchs 2011) and control for serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1996). This lag also addresses the endogeneity issues between conflict and aid and reduces the bias caused by simultaneous causalities.

Control Variables

The model includes several control variables that are suggested to influence armed conflict (Dixon 2009). The first variable is *Arms Sales* denoted as Arms sales on Table 3.1. Young (1996: 179) makes the point that military factors often determine the ultimate outcome of modern African domestic insurgencies. In addition, others suggest one of the strongest indicators of armed conflict prevention is the government's capability to prevent said conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I limit arms sales over military expenditure due to the nature of what military expenditure measures. Military expenditure includes conventional military equipment such as munitions, tanks, troop transports for large scale war while armed conflict and one-sided violence across West Africa are primarily low intensity conflict. The dataset consists of financial data for arms companies based on public sources, such as company annual reports, and articles in both journals and newspapers; however, it does exclude the manufacturing or maintenance of the armed services. Data are

compiled from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database for the years 1949–2022 and is measured in constant US dollars 2020.

The second variable is *US Past Aid* denoted as US past aid on Table 3.1. Foreign aid allocation policy is the outcome of government processes that often causes delayed incremental change for allocation. This process makes aid relatively stable from year to year and allows for an accurate gauge of the following year's aid allocation by the previous year's amount. Past aid dependence is also seen as justifying continued aid disbursements (Bergamaschi 2014) and with the US having the world's largest economic and military influence, I expect the US past aid flow holds some influence over other donors' ODA aid flow year after year. I also expect bilateral aid allocation from other donors will partially be determined by how much aid the US has contributed in the previous year. Data is the previous year US bilateral aid compiled from the same OECD dataset as aid, in constant US dollars 2020.

The third variable is the *Neighboring Countries in Conflict* denoted as # of neighborsConf on Table 3.1. Several studies (Most and Starr 1980; Enterline 1998; Gleditsch 2007; Kathman 2010) have shown that this is one of the most consistent predictors of conflict from neighboring countries. West Africa suffers from a lack of resources in border enforcement and security, which allows terror organizations to freely cross borders to evade local security forces (Fafore 2019). I operationalized this variable by mapping out West African countries' bordering neighbors, then counted the number of borders that shared a country in conflict. For example, in the year 2015 Burkina Faso had three neighbors that were in conflict, so it is coded a '3' for that year. I understand this data has limitations, but at the very least, it serves as a proxy for existing conflicts that could spill over to neighbors. This data is a count variable.

The fourth variable is *US Military Presence* denoted as US military pres. on Table 3.1, which serves as a proxy that indicates a recipient's strategic importance to US security interests. The US is the world's largest humanitarian partner and provided almost half of all bilateral aid to 'fragile contexts' in 2020, amongst the highest across the DAC (OECD 2023). It is quantified by the number of military personnel stationed in said country (Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Data are taken from the Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area Report annual publication, Defense Manpower Data Center. This dataset contains summary data on the worldwide distribution of DOD active-duty military and civilian personnel and their dependents by country and DOD Component. This data is a count variable.

The fifth is *Oil Exporter* denoted as such on Table 3.1 one of the largest commodities that are exported from a recipient country. According to studies, the risk of interrupted oil supply is a strong indicator that international involvement will shortly follow suit (Barnes 2004; Klare and Volman 2006). According to studies (Barnes 2004; Klare and Volman 2006), disrupted oil supply is a strong indicator that international involvement will soon follow. I measured this variable as a dichotomous oil export variable with "1" indicating that oil has been the largest exported commodity in a consistent five-year period and "0" indicating oil is not the largest export. Some analyses conclude the resources themselves are not worrisome, but it is the dependence on that resource that leads to problems (Dixon 2009). Because of this, I include a five-year period to indicate the possibility that the government is reliant on this resource. Data are from Trading Economics database compiled by their official sources.

The sixth and final variable is *Population Size* denoted as such on Table 3.1. Several studies and one widely recognized cause of conflict is the simple presence of more people in a state (Collier and Hoeffler 2002a, 2004b). Another study shows a large population could be difficult in

controlling what goes on at the local level and increases the number of potential rebels that could

be recruited by the insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Data are from the United Nations

Population Division including census reports and other statistical publications from national

statistical offices.

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Armed Conflict	465	100.372	427.6731	0	4639
One-sided Violence	465	67.29247	272.9198	0	2062
LogUS	464	17.27653	1.441004	11.8494	20.71507
LogUK	422	14.87729	2.389924	9.21034	21.82398
LogFrance	464	16.99213	2.039992	10.59663	21.49698
LogGermany	456	16.78127	1.396125	9.21034	21.38032
LogJapan	454	16.26699	1.60463	9.21034	21.28679
LogCanada	462	15.52406	1.72997	10.59663	18.68158
LogEU	460	17.73542	0.9493605	14.28551	19.50249
LogUN	465	17.07494	0.582723	15.60226	18.68374
LogIDA	434	18.02872	1.23453	11.0021	20.90394
LogIMF	245	16.84114	1.370097	11.0021	20.65994
9/11 dummy	465	0.612903	0.487610	0	1
GSP dummy	465	0.227957	0.419965	0	1
Arms sales	375	2505287	7595375	0	50400000
US Past Aid	449	75600000	121000000	140000	992000000
#of NeighborsConf.	465	1.15914	0.914707	0	4
US Military pres.	435	9.225287	28.9934	0	554
Oil exporter	441	0.1609977	0.3679463	0	1
Population	465	18400000	35100000	955595	206000000

Method of analysis

In models that includes the 9/11 dummy variable, I account for the increase in development

aid leading to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence. For the models where I include

the GSP dummy variable, I account for the development aid leading to an increase in armed

conflict and one-sided violence in geostrategic partner countries. I use a panel corrected standard

error (PCSE) regression estimator to show a systemic linear increase in armed conflict and one-

sided violence given the level of development aid. I use a fixed effects regression estimator to

account for the variables that do not change over time but do vary across entities, such as the GSP dummy variable.

Since I am testing for the effects of the change of development aid policy post-9/11, I divide the time period into two groups. The first group is the Pre-9/11 ranging from 1990-2002 and the second is post-9/11 ranging from 2003-2020. By setting my start date just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am able to capture the decline in development aid that took place in the 1990s. The second group captures the period in which development aid was securitized through changes in aid policy. I end my time period in 2020 for the most recent available data.

SECTION 3. RESULTS FROM PCSE REGRESSION ESTIMATORS

Table 3.2 Interaction Term Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	std.	z	P>|z|	obs.	R-square
Bilateral Aid	-88.55994	28.9847	-3.06	0.002	390	0.2148
9/11dummy	-1834.758	663.6336	-2.76	0.006		
9/11dummyBilateral Aid	97.40031	34.87835	2.79	0.005		
Oil exporter	-228.698	55.21638	-4.14	0.000		
Population	0.00000681	0.00000156	4.36	0.000		
# of NeighborsConf.	14.58575	19.47004	0.75	0.454		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**obs.**	**R-square**
Multilateral Aid	-15.20596	23.82438	-0.64	0.523	355	0.021
9/11dummy	-797.1701	443.7158	-1.80	0.072		
9/11dummyMultilateral Aid	39.58079	23.57922	1.68	0.093		
Oil exporter	-26.10346	21.15281	-1.23	0.217		
Population	0.00000021	0.00000113	0.19	0.847		
# of NeighborsConf.	-3.949557	13.34359	-0.30	0.767		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**obs.**	**R-square**
Total Aid	-41.31172	21.23958	-1.95	0.052	328	0.0299
9/11dummy	-1372.355	461.1683	-2.98	0.003		
9/11dummyTotal Aid	67.41157	23.27646	2.90	0.004		
Oil exporter	-34.42338	21.78488	-1.58	0.114		
Population	0.00000040	0.00000116	0.35	0.727		
# of NeighborsConf.	-6.641646	14.38287	-0.46	0.644		

Discussion for 9/11 dummy

Table 3.2 shows the PCSE results with the interaction term of the total bilateral and multilateral aid and the 9/11 dummy variable. The three models presented in Table 3.2 were the only three that had any statistical significance when interacting aid with 9/11 dummy variable. Models for individual bilateral aid and the interaction with 9/11 were statistically insignificant. The interaction term (9/11 dummy and total bilateral aid) has a positive and statistically significant relationship with armed conflict, with a coefficient of 97.40. The interaction term 9/11 and total multilateral aid is positive but statistically weak with a coefficient of 39.58; the p-value, however, is 0.93. Each bilateral and multilateral aggregate suggests that as aid increases, the casualty count from armed conflict increases. My results above indicate that individually, the bilateral and multilateral aid low alone does not increase casualty counts, but combined, the hypotheses H1a is supported. The interaction term 9/11 dummy and the total aid is positive and statistically significant with a coefficient of 67.41. Again, this indicates that bilateral and multilateral alone do not influence casualties alone, but the aggregate holds influence.

As an additional test, table 3.4 shows the PCSE results with aid measured as gross national income. I used the aid as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) pulled from the World Bank Indicators database to measure the economy size with respect to the aid allocation. The GNI quantifies the amount of development aid a recipient receives relative to its overall national income, which provides a rough estimate of recipient's dependency on aid and how much aid contributes to the economy. When interacting GNI with the 9/11 dummy variable, the relationship with armed conflict is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -7.566. Without the interaction, the GNI relationship to armed conflict is positive and statistically significant, although weak, with a coefficient of 2.939.

Table 3.3 Interaction Terms Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	std.	z	P>|z|	Obs.	R-square
United States	-9.492	13.001	-0.73	0.465	426	0.2289
GSP dummy	-294.061	58.795	-3.40	0.001		
GSP dummyUnited States	165.721	48.686	3.40	0.001		
Oil exporter	-109.801	35.124	-3.13	0.002		
Population	4.44E-06	1.55E-06	2.87	0.004		
# of neighborsConf	3.918	17.981	0.22	0.828		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Canada	-26.736	9.739	-2.75	0.006	425	0.2106
GSP dummy	-546.121	253.835	-2.15	0.031		
GSP dummyCanada	37.906	15.174	2.50	0.013		
Oil exporter	-170.387	44.138	-3.86	0.000		
Population	6.42E-06	1.52E-06	4.22	0.000		
# of neighborsConf	18.539	17.740	1.05	0.296		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**obs.**	**R-square**
Total Bilateral Aid	-49.58248	17.43114	-2.84	0.004	390	0.2219
GSP dummy	-3366.87	1981.754	-1.70	0.089		
GSP dummyBilateral Aid	177.0878	102.7955	1.72	0.085		
Oil exporter	-141.7361	48.78254	-2.91	0.004		
Population	0.00000546	0.00000176	3.10	0.002		
# of NeighborsConf.	21.01147	19.68715	1.07	0.286		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Total Multilateral Aid	-3.865081	15.97263	-0.24	0.809	355	0.0201
GSP dummy	-2103.922	413.3948	-5.09	0.000		
GSP dummyMultilateral Aid	110.3999	21.53767	5.13	0.000		
Oil exporter	-14.95388	17.32448	-0.86	0.388		
Population	-0.000000667	0.0000011	-0.60	0.545		
# of NeighborsConf.	-1.707282	13.7099	-0.12	0.901		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**std.**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Total Aid	-7.433386	15.21048	-0.49	0.625	328	0.02
GSP dummy	-2544.426	482.3859	-5.27	0.000		
GSP dummyTotal Aid	128.111	24.31627	5.27	0.000		
Oil exporter	-10.94399	18.44773	-0.59	0.553		
Population	-0.000000759	0.00000103	-0.74	0.461		
# of neighborsConf	-0.1633089	14.79668	-0.01	0.991		

Table 3.4 PCSE Total Aid Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	std.	z	P>|z|	obs.	R-square
Net ODA of GNI	6.957232	2.446229	2.84	0.004	440	0.2124
9/11dummy	92.93063	66.87612	1.39	0.165		
9/11dummyNetODAofGNI	-7.566713	3.964486	-1.91	0.056		
Population	0.00000676	0.00000143	4.71	0.000		
Oil exporter	-184.0679	46.91137	-3.92	0.000		
# of NeighborsConf.	9.848225	16.17694	0.61	0.543		

Table 3.5 PCSE Total aid Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	std.	z	P>|z|	obs.	R-square
Net ODA of GNI	3.261144	1.65462	1.97	0.049	440	0.2336
GSP dummy	481.2338	188.8741	2.55	0.011		
NetODAofGNIgspdummy	-49.96512	20.1807	-2.48	0.013		
Population	0.00000503	0.0000014	3.60	0.000		
Oil exporter	-167.5973	37.31997	-4.49	0.000		
# of NeighborsConf.	13.55402	16.3816	0.83	0.408		

SECTION 4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Discussion for GSP dummy

Table 3.3 shows the PCSE results with the interaction term of total bilateral and multilateral aid and the GSP dummy variable. The only bilateral aid flow that had statistical significance is the US and Canada aid flow. The interaction term (GSP dummy and bilateral US) coefficient is positive (165.72). The interaction term GSP dummy and bilateral Canadian coefficient is also positive (37.90).

The interaction term GSP dummy and total bilateral aid has a positive and statistically weak relationship with armed conflict, with a coefficient of 177.08. The interaction term GSP and total multilateral aid is positive and statistically significant, with a coefficient of 110.39. Bilateral and Multilateral increased casualty counts in GSP countries, which theoretically make sense. Given how GSP countries were labeled GSP to begin with, the need to address terrorism was urgent and took priority. It is expected that these two aid flows have such a large coefficient on the casualty

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count of armed conflict. The interaction term (GSP dummy and the total aid) is positive and statistically significant, with a coefficient of 128.11.

Table 3.5 shows the PCSE result when interacting GNI with the GSP dummy variable, the relationship with armed conflict is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -49.965. As you increase the ratio of aid to income in a GSP country, the armed conflict casualties decrease, suggesting this securitized aid is doing what it is intended to do, which is to alleviate terror organizations and prevent them from establishing a base.

What to expect in the appendix

Due to the extent of how many types of regression models were conducted between bilateral, multilateral, PCSE and fixed effects, remaining models that could not be included in text will be in the appendix. This includes models with an interaction term between the individual bilateral and multilateral aid and casualties from both armed conflict and one-sided violence with limited control variables. It also includes a variety of models with limited control variables, lagged and unlagged independent variables, and multiple aid variables within the same model to demonstrate the different types of interactions and relationships outcome. Any models that are not in the appendix will be available upon request.

SECTION 5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

My analysis set out to investigate how bilateral and multilateral aid effects armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties. In this chapter, I presented the method of analysis where I used both a PCSE and fixed effect regression technique to test my four hypotheses, if securitized development aid led to an increase in armed conflict or one-sided violence casualties; then the last two hypotheses of securitized development aid to GSP countries led to an increase in one-sided violence casualties. Next, I discussed the dependent variable of armed conflict and one-sided

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violence casualty count, the independent of bilateral and multilateral development aid, and a list of the control variables. The models containing the combined bilateral and multilateral aid proved the best in supporting the hypotheses when including the interaction dummy variables. Furthermore, the results of the PCSE and fixed effects regression models using the 9/11 dummy variable indicated that my hypotheses H1a/b and H2a/b had mixed results depending on the donor. The results of the PCSE and fixed effects regression models using the geostrategic partnership dummy indicated that my hypothesis H3a/b was partially incorrect. Although my hypotheses were testing for one-sided violence, I found that bilateral US and Canadian aid increased the casualties from armed conflict. The US was to be expected, given its leading role in the GWOT, but Canada was interesting. I speculate the Canadians provide more securitized aid than the European counterparts when combating terrorism in West Africa. Other individual bilateral donors had little to no effect on the casualty counts for armed conflict and one-sided violence but the sum of bilateral and multilateral had a positive and significant effect. This suggests that the more aid is given post-9/11, the casualty count did increase. In the next chapter, I present two case study comparisons that provide further evidence that not only was development aid securitized, but it increased armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties.

Chapter 4: Case Studies

In this chapter, I present a case study comparison of multiple states of development aid allocations from pre and post 9/11 and the increase of the casualty count following development aid increases. In the previous chapter, total bilateral multilateral aid, provided evidence that supported my hypotheses. Here, I provide a qualitative analysis in an attempt to fill the gaps where the quantitative analysis does not allow us to zoom in to specific countries and their internal conflicts. I start by demonstrating the language used in the US National Security Strategy, official statements from policymakers, and supporting documents made by ODA donors. I argue these changes in policies and doctrine are the securitization of development aid, which was used as a form "unspoken substitution" for military aid in West Africa. What follows after the securitization discussion are two case studies: the first discusses Cote d'Ivoire of the Mano River crisis[14] and the second discusses Mali and Niger of the Liptako-Gourma region[15]. For each example, I analyze conflict pre and post-9/11 because securitization of development aid for the US and ODA donors did not take effect until after 9/11. Therefore, I infer that ODA prior to 9/11 was focused on development goals that specifically targeted countries on a need-to-need basis and post-9/11 focused on security issues.

SECTION 1. SECURITIZING ACTS OF US DEVELOPMENT AID

The speech "step" of securitization started the days following the September 11th attacks when the Bush Administration signed the 'Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Terrorists' into law. This authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11th terror attacks, or harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent any

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[14] Countries that consist of the Mano River Crisis were Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
[15] Countries that consist of this region are Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or individuals (Public Law 107-40, 107th Congress SEPT. 18, 2001). The Bush administration later indicated the enemy of the GWOT was a radical network of terrorists and every government that provided support to them (Transcript of President Bush's address, September 21, 2001).

Under the Bush Administration, the doctrine of preventive war was used as the guiding doctrine for the US to justify preemption operations. The characteristics of this doctrine expanded national 'self-defense' to 'anticipatory self-defense', where the US has claimed the right to conduct a preventive war against countries or violent non-state actors that are now or could be in the future, a potential security threat. Since 2001, U.S. Presidents have interpreted their authority under the AUMF to extend beyond al Qaeda and the Taliban and applied it to other groups as well as other geographic locations. By designating the issue (threat of terrorism) as a security entity, this allows the use of unconventional means to address this new threat, including the allocation of development aid. In 2002, the Bush administration adopted a new National Security Strategy (NSS) and formally recognized development as an additional pillar of national security, alongside with national defense and diplomacy. The new strategy outlined a plan where the US would assist nations in combating terror organizations and hold countries accountable that are both compromised by terror organizations or harbor terrorists.

The 2002 USNSS states "The events of [9/11] taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states […] poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorists' networks" (P. 4). Furthermore, "An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones […] Provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of national reform. We propose a 50 percent increase in the core development assistance

given by the United States" (P. 21). "When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability […] forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats" (P. 11).

Additionally, according to a Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, "the GWOT has expanded the strategic allocation on foreign aid to directly reward allies and strengthen frontline states" (p. 68). The Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan released a statement saying they will build "effective cooperation with allies, friends, partners, and regional and international organizations in resolving conflicts" (p.6). Using distinct labels between allies and partners allowed the US government to justify supporting regimes that may not uphold democratic beliefs or often committed human rights violations.

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "…it is impossible to draw clear lines between security and development efforts while furthering our democratic ideals" (Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 2006). Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Generals over-seeing military operations across different parts of the world "Go out and find terrorists" (p. 31). The US and top ODA donors implemented new 'security-first policies' towards 'front-line countries'[16] combating global terrorism; renaming them geostrategic partners. Identifying these countries who are geostrategic partners under the new security-first policies shifted aid allocation regardless of development criteria such as need, commitment, and performance, – particularly in geostrategic countries deemed important to the US. Under this security-first policy, foreign aid was allocated to these countries who inadvertently provided a safe haven for terror organizations.

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[16] Also referred to as geostrategic partners discussed in the previous chapters.

Addressing and maintaining security issues were no longer addressed solely by foreign and military action, but also social, economic, environmental, and moral/cultural issues (Tuchman 1989). Shortly after military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, other foreign assistance would be allocated to bordering countries who held geostrategic importance in the GWOT. The ideas and language expressed in this strategy form a new reality, and by verbally labelling development as a security issue, it becomes one.

The Bush Administration's 2004 budget provided $2.3 billion to countries that joined the US on the war on terror (US Foreign Aid Report, January 2004). This aid allocation involved grants for development and economic growth, and the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) that provided equipment along with security training. An addition to this, the Bush administration also authorized the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), where the legislative branch granted $200 million towards funding for State Department and Defense Department to 'jointly formulate' any program that would be implemented with foreign aid.

Later amended under the Obama administration, the FY2014 NDAA had no overall spending limitation towards an urgent crisis. According to a 2006 OECD report, the Department of Defense accounted for more than 20 percent of US development assistance in 2005[17]. The Department of Defense engaged in ODA-eligible projects such as providing humanitarian relief to training and equipping border customs services and technical assistance and counternarcotic programs. In March 2002, the Bush administration announced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) was designed to increase development aid to poor and high-risk countries by $5 billion over 3 years, beginning in 2004. Six West African countries were eligible for MCA funding 2004-2006, Benin, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Gambia, and Burkina Faso. As Patrick and Brown (2007)

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[17] OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Peer Review of the United States, 2006.

stated, "between 2002 and 2005, the share of US official development assistance channeled through the Department of Defense budget surged from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent" (Patrick and Brown 2007: 1). The Bush Administration increased aid by $1.7 billion in 2004 to $3.3 billion in 2005 citing that combating poverty is part of the war on terrorism.

Shortly after, some Department of Defense officials argued they needed new authority for time-sensitive and urgent threats to the US and allies that could not wait for the normal budget process of the existing programs under State Department authority. The Bush Administration has sought to broaden the existing section 1206 authority with an amendment that moves final approval authority to combat terrorism from the President to the secretary level in the hopes of shortened timelines and using section 1206 in the fast and flexible manner for which it was intended. An unnamed DOD official during a briefing claimed the ultimate goal of 1206 is to provide a fast and flexible tool for use in the GWOT (briefing on State and Defense Department cooperation overseas, (before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 2006). The Bush Administration's approval and support for new authorities under section 1206 acknowledges that the traditional, deliberate processes are only partially suited to address the current national security environment, and time sensitive urgent threats were common with this enemy. The section 1206 expansion led to funding that supported both the Gulf of Guinea initiative and the TSCTP. Although these funds were not used for urgent issues, they were utilized as a new source of funding and past programs that were underfunded were revisited and justified for a request of new funding. Officials in the embassies saw these programs as proactive efforts as well as an investing in existing bilateral and regional integration platforms.

Interagency cooperation between the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID was introduced and pioneered for programs such as the TSCTP, which aims to target

violent non-state actors in the Pan-Sahel region (including Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) using a combination of military programs and development aid projects (Patrick and Brown 2007). A substantial part of the TSCTP budget was spent on development projects, including efforts to improve health and education, build community centers, etc. An acting coordinator for Counter-terrorism testified March 2005 "The TSCTP concept would look beyond simply the provision of training and equipment for counterterrorism units, but also would consider development assistance, expand public diplomacy, and other elements as part of an overall counterterrorism strategy" (statement of William Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, before the Committee on International Relations, subcommittee on International Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Human Rights of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 10, 2005). This initiative expanded from the PSI that began in 2003 to provide funding to the Department of State to conduct training and state building- capacity in Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad[18] (Donna Miles, "New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa", American Forces Press Service, May 2005).

The Department of Defense alone accounted for over 20 percent of US Official Development Assistance (Miles 2012). They found that the overwhelming bulk of ODA allocation provided directly by the Department of Defense goes to Iraq and Afghanistan, which require the military to take a leading role in aid dispersion due to the insecure, hostile environments. From 2002 to 2005, ODA funding that was used by the Department of Defense had gone from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent.

The Department of Defense created the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which were small teams consisting of both military and civilian personnel that provides security while

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[18] Although Chad is not part of West Africa and excluded from this study, it is included to reflect the statement from Donna Miles.

conducting humanitarian quick-impact projects (QIPs). Doctrine and policy defined these military and civilian actors were equals; however, PRTs consisted predominantly of military personnel, some eighty to one-hundred soldiers with only a handful of civilian counterparts from the Department of State, USAID, and other civilian agencies. According to the US interagency assessment of PRTs, this led to circumstances where "schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors" (United States Government, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment June 2006: p. 10). A Government Accountability Office report stated "…the [development] projects are determined by the tactical need to obtain the support of the populace and are primarily tools for achieving US security objectives" (United States Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievements of US Goals, Report No. 05-742, July 2005).

Securitization requires the audience to accept and agree to the securitizing act in order for the political actor to successful implement security changes. In doing so, the Obama administration officials avoided using the term GWOT and changed the name of operations to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This shifted the discussion between the political actor and audience and framed the GWOT as an ongoing contingency operation instead of a war. In May 2010, the Obama administration published a new National Security Strategy with the changes of dropping the Bush-era phrase "global war on terror" stating "This is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism, or a religion—Islam; we are at war with a specific network of al-Qaeda, and its affiliates." In 2011, the Obama administration created a joint State and Defense Department funding program to assist in urgent security and stabilization needs. It stated the purpose was to enable the United States to "better address rapidly changing, transnational, asymmetric threats,

and emergent opportunities" (State Department FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification, February 2011, p. 161). As enacted, Section 1207 contained two transnational authorities for counterterrorism operations in Africa. The Defense department argues this funding provides a means to address critical needs in an effort to protect US troops and minimize military operations. Origins of Section 1206 & 1207 is to provide the US government with a flexible funding account to respond to emerging needs and crises situations.

The White House also released a new security sector policy that defines the use of foreign aid allocation. The policy first labels partner governments and international organizations as having the authority to use force to protect both the state and the citizens. Second, the policy outline for the security sector includes being responsive to urgent crises, emergent opportunities, and changes in partner security environments as well as anticipating partner capacity, sustainment and oversight needs, coordinating with partner governments. Lastly, it defines security sector assistance as referring to the policies, programs, and activities the US uses to help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security. Some of the Obama administration officials argued the US should have the ability to allocate foreign aid to respond to short-notice requirements and help build sustainable partner capacity across all current and future strategies. By fiscal year 2012, the aid budget of the Department of Defense increased to US $17 billion, exceeding the aid budget of the Department of State by nearly US $10 billion (Gilbert 2015).

In the next section, I provide evidence that securitization took place from ODA donors through policy changes and systematic increases in development aid without any indication of development needs.

SECTION 2. SECURITIZING ACTS OF THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Securitization requires a political actor to enhance a threat through speech, in this case policy. ODA policies have changed to reflect the foreign policies of major donors in addressing terrorism and the support of donor security interests (Reality of Aid report, pg. 8). DAC released two statements, 'A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention' (OECD 2003) and 'Helping Prevent Violent Conflict' (OECD 2001), explaining the role of development aid in the GWOT for programs such as education campaigns to help combat the spread of terrorism. According to the OECD DAC (2003: p. 11) the donor "can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to violent conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular". The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has stated combating terrorism is now categorized under the development sector, citing more than 90 percent of terrorist activity occurs in weak governing and poor human rights countries (Mason, R 2016, February 20) OECD redefines foreign aid to include some military spending.

The bilateral donor countries listed in my research are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, and Canada. Section one already discussed the US development aid policy, so I exclude it from this section. Multilateral aid is distributed by bilateral donors to multilateral organizations (often from various sources) where the multilateral organization coordinates the delivery of the aid. The multilateral donor organizations listed are the European Union, United Nations, International Development Association, and the International Monetary Fund.

The first bilateral donor is the United Kingdom, where development assistance has increased significantly in the years following the September 11th attacks. Bilateral aid to Sub-

Saharan Africa was €528 million in 2001-2002 and increased to €1 billion by 2005-2006 (Amos 2002). In May 2003, the UK changed their policies to match the US by creating similar counterterrorism programs, which developed the counterterrorism and security capacity of weak and failed states to support them in protecting our shared interests (Abrahamsen 2004). The UK's development policies are also expanded to include a security sector, where development resources were used to train and equip recipient police and military personnel. For example, in Sierra Leone, the British Department for International Development (DIFD) cooperates with the UK Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office in an effort to build the country's security infrastructure. According to a DFID report, some development officials worry that working with a security counterpart risks diverting aid for political reasons (DFID report, p. 14 March 2005). Since 2001, the DFID, the Ministry of Defense, and the Foreign Commonwealth Office have been working together on the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools.

The second bilateral donor is France, which is unique in my study for a number of reasons. The first is France was the colonial power over West Africa for decades. It has always maintained strong ties and held a soft power over the region. For example, France has responded to a number of armed interventions in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Somalia and in 2014 they helped create the 'Sahel Brigade[19]' in Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (Marchesin 2015). Another reason is the majority of countries in West Africa speak French as an official language. When countries share a language, they tend to also share a culture set of values they want to maintain (Thomas and McDonagh 2013). The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Development Agency sponsored a report in 2007 that aimed to prevent the international debate on security from being monopolized by Anglo-Saxon think tanks and universities (Marchesin 2007).

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[19] A security force of 3000 personnel to help establish order.

With France having such a heavy influence over the region, their policy and doctrine is going to have a profound effect on West Africa.

In 2004, DAC stated "France is highly interested in an integrated approach to development, encompassing the notions of peace and security" (OECD, 2004, p. 22). French ODA reports later added the 'Fragile States and Conflict Resolution section in 2005 to the annual reports of the French Development Agency (AFD) which is France's ODA institution. Also, a 2008 OECD report focused and highlighted the 'Conflict, Peace, Security and Fragile States' (OECD 2008: 71-86). Programme 209 'Solidarity with developing countries', which is France's largest ODA sector, allocated €2billion per year for recipient countries in West Africa. Furthermore, the director of the Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed, "ODA falls mainly under program 209 […] I have activities that are eligible under 209…I have anti-terrorism programs funded under 209 to help our partner countries establish anti-terrorism coordination centers" (quoted in Leconte 2013, p. 58-59). Programme 209 also provides grants to various countries labeled 'primarily poor countries'. This list includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. However, in 2000 this fund was primarily used for humanitarian goals while security projects only being 4 percent of funding, by 2013 it had increased to 13 percent (Marchesin 2007).

The third bilateral donor is Japan. In 2003, Japanese aid policies introduced "prevention of terrorism" in their ODA implementation, which referenced promoting both domestic security as well as combating international terrorism (Reality of Aid, p. 10). The aid policy is based on 'peace diplomacy', which involves the use of their ODA funds for conflict resolution, expanding the global role of its Self Defense Forces (SDF) after 9/11 (Tujan, and Gaughran, and Mollett 2004). The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated "Since the terrorist attacks in the United States

on 11 September 2001, there has been a greater international awareness of the possibility of poverty [zones] becoming hotbeds of terrorism and the role of ODA is being reconsidered" (Shetler-Jones, 2010 p. 10). Japan later deployed SDF to Iraq to help support stability operations and also provided ODA funds to convince the Iraqis to support the SDF (Reality of Aid, p. 308). Within the official 2004 ODA budget, the funds allocated for peace building and conflict prevention has risen dramatically from 12 billion yen to 16.5 billion yen (Reality of Aid report).

The fourth bilateral donor is Germany. It is the second largest ODA donor in terms of the amount of financial resources that the government provides and has also expressed its interest in remaining the world's second largest donor (Zaritskiy 2021). Germany's foreign and development aid policies not only promote its political and economic interests, but address new security threats such as terrorism, conflicts and recently, illegal migration. Their ODA is allocated primarily through bilateral agreements and allows cooperation for both a better control of aid and better promotes donors interests (Brown and Gravingholt 2016).

Dreher and Fuchs (2001) show shortly after the September 11th attacks, an official objective of Germany's development aid was aimed towards the GWOT. For example, Senegal and Germany created a joint operation with the primary focus on conflict transformation and agreed to rank 'promotion of peace and crisis prevention' as a priority for development (Reality of Aid, p. 289). Another example is the German chancellor meeting with government officials in Kenya, and shortly after, the "development aid doubled for their support in fighting terrorism, and not for poverty related projects" (Reality of Aid, p. 291). With Germany having a significant influence on the formation and financing of the EU, German ODA policy has a heavy influence over allocation policy among its European counterparts.

The fifth and final bilateral donor is Canada. Canadian securitized policies followed the international community goals of conflict prevention after the September 11th attacks. In 2002, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) outlined aid policies, stating "to support international efforts to reduce threats to Canadian security" (Reality of Aid, p. 10). Later, in 2004, Former Prime Minister Paul Martin released a national security strategy labelling countries where donors could alleviate poverty as failing and failed states and further argued these countries could "be a haven for both terrorists and organized crime groups that exploit the weak or corrupt government structures" (Canada 2004, p. 7). Argued by Brown (2015), Canada used a whole-of-government approach to justify allocating Canadian ODA funds to projects that were not primarily motivated by development (p. 113).

According to this securitization concept, supporters of these changes argued that international security and ODA became part of the same pillar. A government report in 2012 to Canadian parliament on ODA emphasizes "ensuring security and stability" as one of Canada's five foreign aid objectives (Canada 2013, p. 5 and 12). Although Canada reduced its ODA to conflict affected zones after 2012, Canada mirrored most of their conflict prevention strategy to the US, the UK, and France, and also actively participated in UN and NATO-led peace operations (Massie and Roussel 2014). For this reason, I include it as a final bilateral donor, to reflect the decrease in ODA while maintaining the securitized allocation policy.

All members of the European Union promised to increase their aid at an average of 0.39 percent of GNP by 2006 (Lancaster, p. 58). The US and EU announced they "will target [their] external relations actions towards priority third world countries where counter-terrorism capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced […] will mainstream counter-terror objectives into external assistance programs" (Council of European Union 2004: p. 7). The

European Union's development assistance will increasingly prioritize security-led development policy initiatives focused on active conflict rather than long-term development cooperation (Olsen and Alden and Smith 2003[20]).

Given the language in the donor policy and the systematic increase of development aid across West Africa post-9/11, I infer that securitization was successful for the US and bilateral ODA donors: therefore, development aid in the post-9/11 years was used to target security issues. The following section provides graphical representation to illustrate the changes in development aid pre- and post-9/11.

SECTION 3. PRE-SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT AID - MANO RIVER CRISIS

This first case study explores the Mano River Region, which includes Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Since securitization started post-9/11, I assume pre-9/11 the majority of development aid was targeted towards humanitarian and development projects. Donors at the 1992 High Level Meeting "stressed the importance which they attach to the respect of human rights, democratic development and reduction in excessive military expenditures" (OECD 1996 report, p.60). From the 1990s to early 2000s, this region was identified as the "Mano River Basin Conflict System" by the World Bank (Allouche, Benson, and M'Cormack 2016) where multiple civil wars occurred throughout the region. Most of West Africa was shunned by the US because of the undemocratic political environment and/or socialist economic policies (Harmon 2010[5]). In some cases, humanitarian projects were cut because of the 1993 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Somalia (Savell 2021). During this time, West Africa had been referred to as a "backwater[21]" region among the international community; however, following the September 11th attacks, the

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[20] Presentation 'Strengthening democratic structures and processes in Africa: a commentary on the role of the EU' at an IISS seminar in Lisbon, November 2003.

[21] A place or region in which no development or progress has taken place.

US has taken a greater interest in Africa for potential terrorists (Carmody 2005; Savell 2021). I argue much of the international community had a "hands off approach" throughout the majority of the conflict pre-9/11, therefore development aid was relatively low as shown below in the figures that follow.

To better contextualize development aid allocation pre- and post-9/11 in this section, the following pages will consist of graphical representation of casualty counts from both armed conflict and one-sided violence, the bilateral and multilateral aid to Cote d'Ivoire in the Mano River Crisis from the years 1990-2020. Furthermore, the nature of the securitization of development aid is inferred by the increase of bilateral development aid in the post-9/11 years. I use the country's GDP per Capita, life expectancy, and government expenditure data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators dataset to help illustrate the recipient's need for development aid. I also include the military expenditure as a proxy to show the increase in military spending pre- and post-9/11 and around development aid spikes. Additionally, military expenditure tends to increase in recipient countries when their donors increase ODA allocation (Tian and Silva 2020). I use these common points between the two cases to help demonstrate different aid allocation, responsiveness to aid flow pre and post high casualty count years (conflict), and how development aid increased despite no indication of economic need in the recipient country.

Cote d'Ivoire

Figure 4.1: Cote d'Ivoire Armed Conflict and One-sided Violence. *Source*: authors calculations
using data obtained from UCDP/PRIO, accessible at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/

Figure 4.1 illustrates armed conflict and the one-sided violence casualty count in Cote

d'Ivoire from 1990 to 2020. The first high casualty count in 2002 comes from a civil war that

started from a failed coup[22] launched by disgruntled Ivorian military officials between Ivorian

President Laurent Gbagbo and a domestic insurgency named *Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire* (Momodu

2018). In 2003, after the United Nations intervened, a cease-fire was declared that resulted in a

division in the country between *Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire* in the north, the government forces in

the south, and the UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire, UNOIC)

holding a buffer zone between the two zones (CIA Fact book, 2023). From this cease-fire, peace

accords were agreed upon but were not enforced; thus Ivorian President Gbagbo was able to remain

in power (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014).

The second and more severe casualty count in 2010-11 comes from a second civil war that

started over the results of the 2010 Ivorian presidential election (Schiel, Faulkner and Powell 2017)

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[22] Muslim northerners felt they were being discriminated against by the politically dominant and mostly Christian
southerners (Momdu 2018).

during which Ivorian President Gbagdo was unwilling to accept defeat and conduct a transfer of power to the incoming president. Claiming the election was fraudulent, he ordered the closure of the borders and imposed a state wide curfew on civilians (Nossiter 2010 p.2). He distributed small arms to his supporters and retreated to the president's palace in Abidjan where he was protected by two hundred fighters with antiaircraft guns and tanks (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014). It was reported that his security forces were responsible for assassinations, beatings, abductions, and human rights violations directed against supporters of the incumbent President Ouattara (Smith 2010). In one of the deadliest attacks, up to 30 civilians were killed from a single rocket attack in March 2011 launched by these security forces (BBC News report, March 2011). Numerous mass graves by loyal forces, mercenaries, and militias of President Gbagbo were found in the cities of "Toulepleu, Blolequin and Guigio" (Blandy 2011). Later, the *Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire,* supported by French and UN troops, would be responsible for bringing Gbagdo into custody, effectively ending the political crisis.


Figure 4.2: Cote d'Ivoire US Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.2 above illustrates the bilateral US development aid to Cote d'Ivoire from the years 1990 to 2020. There are three noteworthy points I want to discuss from this graph. The first

point is the development aid spike in 2009 before the 2010 election that led to the high casualty count of one-sided violence in 2011. Due to the unstable political environment throughout the 2000s, the US, France, and Japan said they would allocate aid in 2009 to cover election costs and resolve funding related to the disarmament agreement (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014). This aid was disbursed in the form of budget support directly allocated to the government to use for such projects. However, after losing the 2010 election, the Ivorian President Gbagbo ignored the loss and refused to step down, claiming it was a fraudulent election. Using government funds to pay for military resistance while buying supporters, he remained in power with harsh repercussions to those who opposed him (Milam and Jones 2011). Although donors increased development aid to subsidize election costs, the Cote d'Ivoire spent the aid on security forces instead and was able to hold onto power with military equipment purchased illustrated below.

Figure 4.3 below illustrates the military expenditure of Cote d'Ivoire 1990 to 2014, excluding 1995 and 2002 due to no data available for those years. I argue securitized development aid shifted its goal of long-term development to short-term security concerns. As shown below in figure 4.3, military expenditure overall saw a dramatic increase in the post-9/11 time period. Furthermore, the trend in military expenditure loosely follows the trend in US development aid. US development aid drastically increased in 2002 and 2003 and military expenditure followed with an increase in 2003 and 2004. Development aid dropped in 2004, 2005, 2006, and military expenditure roughly remained the same in 2004, 2005, 2006; US development aid increased in 2008 and spiked in 2009, where military expenditure increased in 2009. Recall this aid was used to provide funding for the presidential election that took place in 2010. Part of that agreement was to provide security and ensure free and fair elections were conducted (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014). US development aid dropped in 2010, 2011 and in turn military expenditure dropped the same two

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years. Following the second spike in US development with funds for post-conflict reconstruction, military expenditure peaked in 2014.

Figure 4.3: Cote d'Ivoire Military Expenditure, 1990 – 2014. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

The second point is the development aid responsiveness following the two high casualty counts of 2002 and 2011. After the first civil war in 2002 to 2004, the US development aid levels were low in the following years of 2005 and 2006. Following the second civil war in 2011, US development aid had a drastic increase in 2012 and nearly doubled in 2013. I speculate this could be from the two profound changes in development aid. The first is the infrastructure of development aid allocation becoming more efficient over time; thus, disbursement is made quicker. The second is the securitization of development aid being used for conflict purposes. In Cote d'Ivoire, the government supported and funded local militias and other non-state actors to fight their opponents. However, these proxy forces would turn on the government and further eroded the government's control over the country (Englebert and Tull 2008). Had the US and France limited their development aid in 2008 and 2009 respectively, perhaps the Ivorian President may not have had the security structure to commit one-sided violence.

The third point is the systematic increase of development aid to Cote d'Ivoire from 2002 onward (post-9/11). Development aid specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries…it is not military aid and promotion of donors' security interests (OECD 2021). Development aid is set out to target three sectors illustrated below in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 which are Cote d'Ivoire's GDP per capita, life expectancy, and government spending on education. Despite Cote d'Ivoire's GDP per capita dropping from 1990 to 1994, and falling again 1998 to 2003, US development aid remained low 1990-2001. The average GDP per-capita pre-9/11 was $1803 (US dollars) and the development aid average was $27 million (US dollars). In comparison, post-9/11, the average GDP per-capita was $1815 (US dollars) with US development aid averaging $123 million (US dollars)[23]. US Development aid allocation was not responsive to GDP/pc change in the 1990s; however, it did substantially increase during the post-9/11 years with no indication of development need from Cote d'Ivoire. Life expectancy was 52 in 1990, slightly decreased to 50 until 2003, then dramatically increased and peaked at 59 in 2019. Government spending on education remained constant around 23 percent from 1990 to 2016 before substantially decreasing to 15 percent in 2020. The three indicators for development aid showed no indication there was a need for the overall increase in development aid post-9/11 nor the specific development aid increase in 2009 and 2013. I infer that the US development aid increase post-9/11 and spike were motivated by US security concerns rather than the development needs of Cote d'Ivoire.

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[23] Figures calculated using OECD data.

Figure 4.4: Cote d'Ivoire GDP/pc, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators


Figure 4.5: Cote d'Ivoire Life Expectancy, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators


Figure 4.6: Cote d'Ivoire Government Expenditure, 1996-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

In comparison to US development aid, Figure 4.7 below depicts the bilateral French development aid to Cote d'Ivoire from the years 1990 to 2020. French development aid had a different approach to allocation than the US to Cote d'Ivoire post-9/11. Other than the same 2009 spike to fund the 2010 presidential election and 2012 spike for post-conflict reconstruction, French development aid showed the opposite trend from the US.

To further suggest that development aid was securitized post-9/11, French development aid from 1991 to 1994, with levels higher than 2002, this aid did not lead to any casualties from armed conflict nor one-sided violence that followed the aid amount in the post conflict years of 1996, 1997, and 1998. In 2002, French aid spiked within the same year casualties in armed conflict causalities spiked, followed by casualties from one-sided violence in 2003 and 2004. Although I can only speculate this argument due to the limited data in Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s, it should be noted the French development aid peaked in 1994 and was not followed by armed conflict nor one-sided violence casualties. However, the two spikes in 2002 and 2009 were followed by casualties, loosely suggesting securitized development aid leads to an increase in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence.

Figure 4.7: Cote d'Ivoire French Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.8: Cote d'Ivoire UN Multilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.8 above, illustrates the UN multilateral development aid to Cote d'Ivoire from the years 1990 to 2020. It is shown to remain constant for both pre- and post-9/11 even with the two high casualty accounts in 2002-04 and 2011. It has higher levels of aid in the post-9/11 time period, but not until 2015 which does not provide enough evidence that 9/11 was the cause of this increase. The trend of UN Multilateral aid does not indicate that it has been securitized nor does it indicate that it influenced the number of casualties.

Development aid promotes and specifically targets economic development and welfare of developing nations (OECD 2021). Given the constant trends of GDP/pc, life expectancy, and government spending on education, US bilateral aid did not respond to the need for development in Cote d'Ivoire, but rather indicates it responded to the US security concerns post-9/11. This increase in US development aid in 2009 that helped fund the presidential election unintentionally led to the spike in one-sided violence casualties in 2011 when the Ivorian president refused to surrender his power and ability to fund a military resistance (El-Khawas and Anyu 2014).

SECTION 4. POST-SECURITIZATION OF THE LIPTAKO-GOURMA REGION

I argue development aid became securitized and was aimed towards conflict influenced projects post-9/11. This second case study explores the Liptako-Gourma region, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and is a joint cooperation organization that coordinates the development in the region. The region has a steady trend of increasing violence since the beginning of the conflict in Northern Mali with a growing spread of violence into Burkina Faso and Niger (Deb and baudais 2022). Development policies being allocated towards security projects in the Liptako-Gourma region did not provide stable governments, but in turn, increased armed conflict and one-sided violence. Framing this crisis as a security crisis drove donors to invest in the security infrastructure and in some cases, to donors deploying troops. Starting in 2002, the US along with France began to expand and build relationships to West African countries (Warner 2014). Contrary to section 3, I argue the international community framed development issues as conflict issues post-9/11; therefore, development aid increased and led to high casualty counts.

I address a few points from the US bilateral development aid figures to help demonstrate the drastic development aid flow predating high casualty count events, the drop in casualty counts when development aid is suspended, and the systematic increase in aid with no indication for the need. The similar three metrics to measure development needs will be used in this section as well. To better contextualize development aid allocation for both pre- and post-9/11 in this section, the following paragraphs will consist of graphical representation of armed conflict, one-sided violence, bilateral and multilateral aid to Mali and Niger from the Liptako-Gourma region.

Mali

Figure 4.9: Mali Armed Conflict and One-sided Violence. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from UCDP/PRIO, accessible at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/

Figure 4.10: Niger Armed Conflict. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from UCDP/PRIO, accessible at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/

Figure 4.11: Niger One-sided Violence. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from UCDP/PRIO, accessible at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/

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Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 above illustrate armed conflict and one-sided violence casualties for Mali and Niger from the years 1990 to 2020. The high casualty counts between Mali and Niger originate from the same conflicts, which is why these two are grouped together. Major Tuareg[24] domestic insurgencies have taken place between 1990 and 1995, 2006 and 2009, and 2012 and 2013 across Mali and Niger (Williams 2016). Violence in Mali from 1990 to 1995 is from the Tuareg rebellion against the Malian government for the marginalization of the Azawad region in the North, while Niger suffered Tuareg rebellions from 1991 to 1997 for the same reasons. Ambush-like attacks from the Tuareg group caused the Malian government to respond harshly, leading to the repression of the Tuareg people. Violence stopped with peace agreements in 1995 shortly after a call from the Tuareg group demanding a federal system where ethnic groups received greater autonomy over the northern and eastern region of Mali and Niger.

In 2007 a new Tuareg-led insurgency named the *National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad* (MNLA) and rebel group *Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice* (MNJ), attacked an army post killing soldiers and civilians because the government did not include Tuareg leaders in governance, mishandled the 2005 food crisis, and did not redistribute a share of resources gained from uranium mined in the Tuareg region. Violence stopped in both countries in 2009 with Libyan-led peace agreements that negotiated a ceasefire; defections and splinter groups broke out and weakened the MNJ (Bekoe 2012).

In 2012 an uprising turned violent when Malian armed forces ousted President Amadou Toumani Toure in a coup claiming he mishandled the Tuareg rebellion and neglected to maintain

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[24] The Tuareg people spread across northwest Mali, northern Burkina Faso, eastern Niger, and northern Nigeria and are a family of Nomadic Berber people (Englebert 2009). The bulk of Tuaregs are in Mali and Niger with the current estimate of 1.7 million in Mali and 1.4 million in Niger (Bekoe 2012). Much of the land they inhabit is thought to house oil and other significant resources.

the army (Nossiter 2012). Taking advantage of the turmoil from the unstable and weak governments in the region, al-Qaeda, and other local Islamic terror groups formed Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (*AQIM)*; aided by the Tuaregs, these groups quickly became a major contributor in terror operations across Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. These groups strengthened their foothold in the region by gaining control over the northern and central half of Mali, including three regional capital cities of Tombouctou, Kidal and Gao - a city in which the northern headquarters of the Malian military base operates (Planetary Security Initiative, 2019). The international community raised concerns that the region was becoming a haven for terror groups and offered options to assist Mali in reclaiming the territory. The first was bolstering Mali's military capabilities through training and support and the second was to deploy a joint international military force.

However, many members of Mali's military, including those responsible for the coup, opposed foreign soldiers on Malian soil. By the end of 2012, there were at least three distinct strands on conflict in Mali and Niger. The first was the Tuareg insurgency fighting for autonomy, second were the terror groups fighting for areas to conduct operations, and the last were local militias and self-defense groups formed in opposition to the first two groups.

In early 2013 when AQIM and the Tuareg captured the city of Konna, near the center of Mali, Malian officials asked for international assistance fearing the advancement of the fighters into government-held territory. French military intervention named Operation Serval which started in 2013 and UN stabilizing mission (MINUSMA) which was aimed at rebuilding a competent government in the south while fighting rebellions in the north. Further south in Mali, attacks such as the two on hotels in Sevare and Bamako, killed at least a dozen people in Sevare and more than twenty in Bamako.

Casualties from armed conflict drastically increased in 2013 as the government fought

these insurgent groups for control. At the same time, reports about abuse on civilians and fighting

between various ethnic groups by Malian troops further exacerbated the conflict (Global Center

for the Responsibility to Protect, 2023).

For the last nine years terror groups across the Liptako-Gourma region have systematically

conducted kidnappings and sieges against civilians to pressure local governments and communities

into cooperation; they imposed their own unofficial rule of law which levees "taxes" from the local

population. They use improvised explosive devices and landmines to target government forces and

also strategically destroy and loot health centers, food reserves, water services and bridges (Global

Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 2023).

Figure 4.12: Mali US Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD
ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.12 above illustrates the US development aid to Mali from the years 1990 to 2020.

There are a few noteworthy points I want to discuss from this graph. The first point is the trend

between US development aid and casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence from 2009

to 2019. Comparing figures 4.9 and 4.12, there appears to be a trend between US development aid

and the fluctuation in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence in Mali. The

substantial increase in US development aid started in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, while armed conflict casualties began to rise in 2012, and peaked in 2013. US development aid dropped substantially in 2013 due to an aid suspension to Mali as a result of the 2012 coup (Staff 2012), and remained low through 2014 and 2015 while, in turn, casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence dropped 2014, 2015, and 2016. US development aid had a slight increase in 2016, 2017, and 2018 while casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence increased in 2017, peaking in 2019.

The second point is that US development aid consistently increased in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 with respect to the increase in military expenditure. Denoted in figure 4.13 below, military expenditure was low from 2009 to 2012 before the causality spike in 2013 and increased in 2014, 2015, and 2016 while casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence decreased during this time. This suggests military expenditure did not influence the casualty spike in 2013, but the increase in 2012 US development aid could have contributed to the increase in military expenditure in 2014, 2015, and 2016.

Figure 4.13: Mali Military Expenditure, 1990 – 2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

The final point is the overall increase in development aid and peaking aid spikes despite no economic indication needing the increase. Recall the previous section where development aid

promotes and specifically targets economic development and welfare of developing nations. Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 below illustrates the GDP/pc, life expectancy, and government expenditure on education for Mali. As shown, Mali's GDP/pc held a consistent upward trend until 2011, with only a slight decrease from 2012 to 2013. Life expectancy remained at a steady increase starting at 48 in 1990 and increased to 54 in 2020. Government expenditure on education peaked in 2012, then had a downward trend until 2016, then held constant until 2020. I infer that the US development aid increase in 2009, 2010 and arguably 2011 was not motivated by development objectives, but instead, was securitized and responded to the political turmoil that was developing. Furthermore, because this development aid targeted security objectives over development objectives, this motivated the 2012 coup that took place in 2012. This, in turn, led to the substantial increase in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence in the years after 2012.

Figure 4.14: Mali GDP per capita, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

Figure 4.15: Mali Life Expectancy, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

Figure 4.16: Mali Govt. Exp. On Education % of Total Govt. Spending. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

Figure 4.17: Mali French Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.17 above illustrates the French development aid to Mali from the years 1990 to 2020. The substantial increase in French development aid in 2007 that predates the increase in casualties from armed conflict 2007, 2008, 2009 and the low aid in 2008, 2009 led to the drop in casualties 2010 and 2011. As mentioned earlier, the French took the most active role in Mali from the nature of their relationship. I want to focus on the French development aid spikes in 1990 and 2000 and compare it to the spikes in 2007 and 2015. The 1990 spike pre-9/11 was in response to the first Tuareg rebellion mentioned in earlier paragraphs. The two spikes post-9/11 were from security concerns reform that allocated development aid to security sectors before and after political crisis (Vircoulon 2007 p. 172). Recall from the previous chapter that the quantitative analysis indicated that France was the only bilateral donor who increased conflict as development aid increased. Shown above, the aid spike in 1990 was followed by an increase in casualties from 1991 to 1994; the spike in 2007 is followed by an increase in casualties 2007 to 2012; and the spike in 2015 is followed by an increase in casualties 2017 to 2019. The only spike that does not fit that narrative is the spike in 2000, however, there are remnants of casualties 2001 to 2005 but very few. It is difficult to infer that this spike caused those spurs of conflict and violence. Because France is the ex-colonial power over Mali, they contributed most to West Africa through the creation of the Sahel brigade (Marchesin 2016). French development aid indicates three high foreign aid accounts that were followed by casualties from both armed conflict and one-sided violence.

Figure 4.18: Mali EU Multilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.18 above illustrates the EU multilateral aid to Mali from the years 1990 to 2020. When armed conflict broke out in Mali, a French-led, UN approved peacekeeping mission with the Malian government responded quickly to help combat terror groups in Northern Mali[25].

Despite casualties from armed conflict being low in 2014, 2015, and 2016, EU multilateral aid had a drastic increase in 2016 that predates the spike in casualties in 2017. This suggests the EU multilateral aid was using development funds to target security concerns, in other words, securitizing development aid.

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[25] United Nations Peacekeeping, 'MINUSMA fact sheet: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali' March 2020.

Niger

Figure 4.19: Niger US Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figure 4.17 above illustrates the US bilateral aid to Niger from the years 1990 to 2020. There are three noteworthy points I want to discuss from this graph. The first point is the trend between US development aid and armed conflict causalities in the post-9/11 time. US Development aid was at its highest in 2015 since 1990, then slightly decreased in 2016 then again in 2017; in turn, armed conflict casualties peaked in 2015 then dropped in 2016 and again in 2017. Development aid increased drastically in 2018, and, in turn, armed conflict casualties increased drastically in 2019 then 2020.

The second point is there appears to be a substantial increase and trend that aligns with the US development aid. Figure 4.18 below illustrates Niger's military expenditures from the years 1990 to 2020. As noted in the literature review, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) stated recipient countries' military expenditure tends to follow donor ODA funds. US development aid increased in 2010, 2011, and 2012, where Niger's military expenditure followed suit in 2012, 2013, and 2014. US Development aid increased 2015 and 2016 respectively, then Niger's military expenditure increased in 2016 and 2017, US development aid then increased in 2018 and 2019, followed by an increase in military expenditure in 2018 and 2019. Niger was labelled a geostrategic

partner, so it is not unrealistic to assume US development aid was securitized used for military expenditure (Massie and Roussel 2014). Additionally, casualties from armed conflict did not trend as well with military expenditure as it did with US development aid allocation. Military expenditure increased from 2009 to 2014 with a slight drop in 2013; no data was reported for 2015, then from 2016 to 2020 there was a systematic increase with a slight drop in 2020. Casualties from armed conflict fluctuated as US development aid fluctuated in 2015 to 2019; however, it decreased when military expenditure increased 2016, 2017, 2018. This further suggests that US bilateral aid was not only securitized, but directly impacted conflict in Niger.

Figure 4.20: Military Expenditure, 1990 – 2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

The third point is derived from figures 4.19, 4.20, and 4.21, shown below, which are Niger's GDP/pc, life expectancy, and the government expenditure on education as a percentage of total spending. Recall that US development aid remained low from 2005 to 2009, then more than doubled in 2010, where it stayed consistently high until 2016, slightly dropping in 2017 then increased and peaked in 2020. GDP/pc has a consistent upward trend starting in 2004 onward; however, US development aid increased drastically in 2010, 2011, and 2012 then remained high until 2017, increased again in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Life expectancy in Niger remained in an

upward trend from 1990 to 2020; and government expenditure on education remained relatively consistent from 2006 to 2013, peaked in 2014, then dropped drastically until 2017. US development aid peaked in 2015, then decreased 2016, and 2017. Despite Niger's GDP/pc, life expectancy, and government expenditure remaining relatively consistent over the time frame, US development aid had a substantial increase post-9/11 and the four years predating the height of armed conflict casualties. The US doubled its development aid allocation following the years after an increase in casualties from armed conflict in 2007 and 2008, no indication that development was or had dropped. Again, this suggests development aid was motivated by the increase in casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence and not from development indicators.

Figure 4.21: Niger GDP per capita 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

Figure 4.22: Niger Life Expectancy, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators


Figure 4.23: Niger Govt. Exp. On Education % of total Govt. Spending, 1990-2020. *Source*: authors calculations using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, accessible at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

Figure 4.24: Niger French Bilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figures 4.23 above illustrates the French development aid to Niger, 1990 to 2020. Recall that development aid allocation is driven by donor domestic policy (Miles 2012), and through securitization donors shifted their development aid allocation to prioritize their own security concerns. French development aid had its two highest peaks in the study's timeline in 2003 and 2004, which corresponds to the start of securitization of development aid. Although French development aid spiked in 2003 and 2004 three years prior to the increase in casualties in 2007, I argue that the increase in amount was so drastic and monumental that it had an influence in the casualties from armed conflict 2007-08. I support this claim by discussing GDP/pc, life expectancy, government expenditure on education, and military expenditure in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. This development aid did not have a single impact on either the development indicators or military expenditure. French development aid in 2016, 2017, 2018 shares a similar trend to armed conflict casualties as the US development aid, and given how the French have the same security objectives and goals as the US, I infer this decrease, corresponding with the decrease in US development aid, led to this decrease in casualties in the same time period.

Figure 4.25: Niger UN Multilateral Aid. *Source*: authors calculations using data obtained from
OECD ilibrary database, accessible at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

Figures 4.25 above illustrates the EU multilateral development aid to Niger from 1990 to
2020. As stated in hypothesis H1b, H2b, and H3b, multilateral development gets their funding
from bilateral donors. The overall systematic increase in development aid post-9/11 suggests
securitization of development aid. Recall the GDP/pc, life expectancy, and government
expenditure on education in Niger on figures 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23 listed above; if the economic
indicators do not suggest a need for an increase in development aid, I infer the systematic increase
is securitization.

The Liptako-Gourma region coalition was established to maintain government stability
over the region. Framing the conflicts that erupt as a security issue and addressing them as such
calls for shifting development intervention while prioritizing security goals. The systematic
increase in US bilateral aid to Mali 2009 to 2012 ultimately led to the increase of casualties in
2013. Following the aid suspension, casualties dramatically decreased and when aid continued
onward, the casualties increased. Niger suffered a similar effect when US development aid
increased substantially in 2010, 2011, and 2012, followed by Niger's military expenditure increase
2012, 2013, and 2014 that predates the spike in casualties in 2015 onward.

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SECTION 5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Comparing Cote d'Ivoire and Mali and Niger in a case study investigating the impact development aid has on the casualty count of armed conflict and one-sided violence illustrated partial support for my hypotheses. First is the evidence that Securitization Theory was applied to the US and other ODA donors' policy after the September 11th attacks. Furthermore, under the Bush and Obama administrations, similar policies and goals in the GWOT shifted development aid from primarily development goals to more security issues. I have highlighted the major donors and institutions who are involved in the ODA policy implementations and briefly gave examples of their involvement. Second, I have provided a case study representing how pre-securitization development aid was allocated to Cote d'Ivoire in the Mano River Conflict, as well as post-securitization of development aid to Mali and Niger in the Liptako-Gourma Region. Recall that development aid was systematically increased post-9/11 across all the case study countries and the different bilateral aid flows following high casualty events.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this study, I began with the question: did securitized development aid post-9/11 lead to a rise in armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa? I argue development aid (ODA) was securitized following the September 11th terror attacks in two ways: one by the language of development policy and doctrine and two, by the systematic increase of allocation based on security needs from the donor countries over the development needs of the recipient countries. I show in chapter four that much of the aid from individual countries was securitized, and then I examined whether ODA increased armed conflicts and one-sided violence in chapters three and four.

Securitized development aid increased the casualty count from both armed conflict and one-sided violence. I demonstrated the relationship by using a PCSE and fixed effects regression analysis, accounting for pre- and post-9/11 timeframe, and a geostrategic country indicator. I examined the top six OECD bilateral donors and the top four multilateral donors to the 15 countries in West Africa from the years 1990 and 2020. My hypotheses expectations were bilateral development aid increased casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence, and multilateral development aid increased casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence. In addition, an increase of securitized development aid to geostrategic partners for both types of donors led to an increase of casualties from armed conflict and one-sided violence.

I began by discussing how the declaration of the GWOT changed the development aid policy in both allocation and concentration of development aid. Prior to the GWOT, development aid was primarily used in poverty reduction and humanitarian missions, but a change in terror threats led to a reform in development allocation policy. I asked the research question, did an increase in securitized development aid led to an increase in armed conflict and one-sided violence

in West Africa. I provide a literature review on the existing literature. Currently, there is a consensus on the impacts of foreign aid on armed conflict and one-sided violence, how aid allocation transformed during the GWOT, and how security-oriented goals shifted aid allocation to countries that participate in the GWOT. This literature, however, only provides case study analysis on policy changes of development aid and how policy makers utilize development agents to address security concerns. A few studies focus on military aid and argues for a clear distinction between other types of aid, rather than securitized ODA. The literature falls short when it comes to providing quantitative results. My research on the effects of securitized development aid on armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa fills a gap in the literature in two distinct ways. The first is utilizing securitized development aid towards geostrategic countries and the second is running a quantitative analysis on this relationship. I present a case study between both Cote d'Ivoire from the Mano River basin and Mali and Niger from the Liptako-Gourma region, both pre and post-9/11. The graphical illustrations provided show an increase in ODA post-9/11 and an increase in responsive time of aid allocation following the years of high casualty counts from both armed conflict and one-sided violence.

My results suggest that out of the top six bilateral donors of development aid, only the bilateral French development aid has an influence on the casualty count of armed conflict. All other bilateral donors decreased the casualty count from both armed conflict and one-sided violence. The multilateral aid results indicated that this type of aid also increased the casualty count from armed conflict and one-sided violence, with only the EU and IMF decreasing casualties from one-sided violence. In addition, I did find there were systematic changes in development aid allocation during the GWOT that were of higher levels than pre-9/11.

When measuring aid as a percentage of gross national income, I found that an increase in total bilateral and multilateral aid flow does have an effect on the casualty count from armed conflict. Perhaps, when measuring the individual effects from bilateral aid as a total dollar amount does not adequately capture the effects of aid. Which leads me to believe that measuring the absolute amount of aid was not the best way to capture and measure aid allocation. However, taking the aggregate of aid does not fully capture the effect of each individual bilateral donor. Theoretically, it made sense to separate bilateral and multilateral for securitization purposes, but it limited my ability to produce statistically significant results. For future studies, I hope to develop further measure the individual recipient's percentage of aid any one donor contributes relative to the GNI.

Although development components are important factors in armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa, my findings suggest that securitized development aid did not affect the casualties from armed conflict nor one-sided violence as much as I had anticipated. My results do, however, coincide with extant literature (Abramovici 2004; Carmody 2005; Woods 2005; Aning 2010; Dreher and Fuchs 2011) that securitization of development aid in West Africa, while using the poverty-terrorism linkage to increase development aid, is problematic and will only prolong the severity of armed conflicts. Alternatively, not providing securitized development aid can have its own consequences given how this aid is designed to improve the recipient's security infrastructure.

To conclude, I have developed a framework for the study of securitized bilateral and multilateral development aid and its effect on the casualty counts from armed conflict and one-sided violence in West Africa. Limitations on the study include missing data from control variables due to the lack of reporting from government agencies across West Africa, especially in the 1990s.

Recommendations for future studies could be to include more development goals as control variables or operationalize armed conflict and one-sided violence as events instead of a casualty count. Also, to include aid has a percentage of the recipient's overall budget relative to the GDP.

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No.2 pp. 178-195

Fixed Effects Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	Std.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
France	55.091	23.704	2.320	0.021	326	0.231
9/11 dummy	-194.343	53.512	-3.630	0.000		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-0.600	0.546		
# of NeighborsConf.	-7.760	30.049	-0.260	0.796		
US Mil. Presence	0.864	0.664	1.300	0.194		
Oil exporter	-71.341	86.342	-0.830	0.409		
Population	0.000	0.000	10.710	0.000		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Japan	-48.281	16.919	-2.850	0.005	321	0.2611
9/11 dummy	-212.893	53.367	-3.990	0.000		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-0.510	0.610		
# of NeighborsConf.	-15.685	30.475	-0.510	0.607		
US Mil. Presence	0.871	0.665	1.310	0.191		
Oil exporter	-87.367	86.942	-1.000	0.316		
Population	0.000	0.000	11.180	0.000		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Germany	-117.362	33.067	-3.550	0.000	320	0.2571
9/11 dummy	-256.043	52.347	-4.890	0.000		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-0.830	0.410		
# of NeighborsConf.	11.810	29.555	0.400	0.690		
US Mil. Presence	0.745	0.640	1.160	0.246		
Oil exporter	-52.306	82.806	-0.630	0.528		
Population	0.000	0.000	12.490	0.000		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Japan	-13.232	7.157	-1.850	0.065	321	0.6556
9/11 dummy	-38.887	22.575	-1.720	0.086		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	3.810	0.000		
# of NeighborsConf.	-18.992	12.891	-1.470	0.142		
US Mil. Presence	-0.071	0.281	-0.250	0.800		
Oil exporter	-14.076	36.778	-0.380	0.702		
Population	0.000	0.000	2.410	0.017		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
EU	-0.000001	0.000000552	-1.94	0.054	327	0.2332
9/11 dummy	-192.1501	54.08629	-3.55	0.000		
Arm sales	-0.000002	0.00000347	-0.78	0.437		
# of NeighborsConf.	-1.857779	30.33731	-0.06	0.951		
US Mil. Presence	1.129023	0.6756071	1.67	0.096		
Oil exporter	-61.1685	86.23562	-0.71	0.479		
Population	0.0000362	0.00000329	11	0.000		

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	Std.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
UN	-0.000005	0.0000026	-2.11	0.036	327	0.2321
9/11 dummy	-217.1374	52.75317	-4.12	0.000		
Arm sales	-0.000028	0.00000347	-0.82	0.412		
# of NeighborsConf.	-2.790479	30.20925	-0.09	0.926		
US Mil. Presence	1.059169	0.6684264	1.58	0.114		
Oil exporter	-41.64153	86.41643	-0.48	0.630		
Population	0.0000373	0.0000035	10.65	0.000		
One-sided violence	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
IMF	-6.77E-08	2.54E-08	-2.67	0.008	291	0.0786
9/11 dummy	-1.376086	4.401592	-0.31	0.755		
Arm sales	-0.0000001	0.000000295	-0.35	0.725		
# of NeighborsConf.	-4.985012	2.170292	-2.3	0.022		
US Mil. Presence	0.0123196	0.0455478	0.27	0.787		
Oil exporter	-6.120835	6.428282	-0.95	0.342		
Population	0.00000224	0.000000895	2.5	0.013		

Fixed Effects Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coeff.	Std.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
France	67.818	23.916	2.840	0.005	326	0.2286
GSP dummy	-71.548	82.192	-0.870	0.385		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-0.800	0.424		
# of NeighborsConf.	13.589	30.055	0.450	0.651		
US Mil. Presence	0.872	0.679	1.280	0.200		
Oil exporter	-135.313	86.195	-1.570	0.117		
Population	0.000	0.000	9.410	0.000		
Armed Conflict	**Coeff.**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Japan	-48.367	17.330	-2.790	0.006	321	0.2615
GSP dummy	-88.388	82.455	-1.070	0.285		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-0.780	0.436		
# of NeighborsConf.	7.653	30.627	0.250	0.803		
US Mil. Presence	0.898	0.684	1.310	0.190		
Oil exporter	-154.058	87.317	-1.760	0.079		
Population	0.000	0.000	9.930	0.000		
Armed Conflict	**Coeff.**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Germany	-88.359	33.672	-2.620	0.009	320	0.2557
GSP dummy	-104.471	80.863	-1.290	0.197		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	-1.080	0.279		
# of NeighborsConf.	31.264	30.375	1.030	0.304		
US Mil. Presence	0.765	0.666	1.150	0.251		
Oil exporter	-130.224	84.119	-1.550	0.123		
Population	0.000	0.000	10.69	0.000		
One-sided Violence	**Coeff.**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**

Japan	-13.230	7.131	-1.860	0.065	321	0.641
GSP dummy	-77.095	33.930	-2.270	0.024		
Arm sales	0.000	0.000	4.000	0.000		
# of NeighborsConf.	-14.830	12.603	-1.180	0.240		
US Mil. Presence	-0.026	0.281	-0.090	0.928		
Oil exporter	-19.959	35.930	-0.560	0.579		
Population	0.000	0.000	2.630	0.009		

Fixed Effects Regression Results

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	Std.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
EU	-0.000001	0.000000561	-2.56	0.011	327	0.2322
GSP dummy	-47.69022	83.61465	-0.57	0.569		
Arm sales	-0.000003	0.00000359	-1.05	0.295		
# of NeighborsConf.	21.32039	30.20023	0.71	0.481		
US Mil. Presence	1.209291	0.6895225	1.75	0.080		
Oil exporter	-123.817	86.18672	-1.44	0.152		
Population	0.0000343	0.00000339	10.1	0.000		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
UN	-0.000005	0.00000269	-1.86	0.063	327	0.2326
GSP dummy	-72.27458	82.92632	-0.87	0.384		
Arm sales	-0.000004	0.0000036	-1.11	0.267		
# of NeighborsConf.	20.65545	30.42331	0.68	0.498		
US Mil. Presence	1.055212	0.6873249	1.54	0.126		
Oil exporter	-113.3253	86.83116	-1.31	0.193		
Population	0.0000338	0.00000356	9.49	0.000		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Std.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
IMF	-6.58E-08	2.54E-08	-2.59	0.010	291	0.0846
GSP dummy	5.529805	6.209835	0.89	0.374		
Arm sales	-0.0000001	0.000000297	-0.49	0.624		
# of NeighborsConf.	-4.663844	2.061291	-2.26	0.024		
US Mil. Presence	0.0120869	0.0454063	0.27	0.790		
Oil exporter	-5.495834	6.442746	-0.85	0.394		
Population	0.00000172	0.000000814	2.11	0.036		

Fixed Effects Interaction Term Regression Results

One-sided Violence	Coefficient	Rob std. err.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
United States	26.9245	9.974966	2.7	0.007	375	0.1933
9/11dummy	-65.20602	40.75807	-1.6	0.11		
9/11dummylnUS	-1.72957	1.461014	-1.18	0.237		
Arms Sales	0.0000139	0.00000449	3.1	0.002		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
United States	69.21396	19.6253	3.53	0	375	0.0861

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	Rob std. err.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
9/11dummy	-57.94548	77.72189	-0.75	0.456		
9/11dummylnUS	-2.665832	3.695638	-0.72	0.471		
Arms Sales	0.00000986	0.00000466	2.12	0.035		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
United Kingdom	41.67921	13.68873	3.04	0.003	335	0.0889
9/11dummy	-68.20319	68.05511	-1	0.317		
9/11dummylnUK	1.413462	5.261165	0.27	0.788		
Arms Sales	0.0000102	0.0000047	2.17	0.031		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
United Kingdom	29.01194	6.569424	4.42	0	335	0.2312
9/11dummy	-47.67155	33.30119	-1.43	0.153		
9/11dummylnUK	-2.232298	2.659309	-0.84	0.402		
Arms Sales	0.0000137	0.00000429	3.2	0.002		

Armed Conflict	Coefficient	Rob std. err.	t	P>|t|	Obs	R-square
European Union	0.00000116	0.000000371	3.12	0.002	370	0.0701
9/11dummy	-74.25546	78.8795	-0.94	0.347		
9/11dummylnEU	-1.246183	3.302341	-0.38	0.706		
Arms Sales	0.0000127	0.00000547	2.32	0.021		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs**	**R-square**
United Nations	0.0000101	0.00000267	3.79	0	375	0.1812
9/11dummy	-28.46619	93.98505	-0.3	0.762		
9/11dummylnUN	-1.414144	4.416505	-0.32	0.749		
Arms Sales	0.00000297	0.00000358	0.83	0.407		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs**	**R-square**
United Nations	0.0000071	0.00000146	4.88	0	375	0.367
9/11dummy	-19.37855	41.92478	-0.46	0.644		
9/11dummylnUN	-3.550573	2.043997	-1.74	0.083		
Arms Sales	0.00000805	0.00000446	1.8	0.072		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs**	**R-square**
International Dev. Assoc.	0.00000142	0.000000406	3.5	0.001	352	0.2327
9/11dummy	-34.78818	87.25253	-0.4	0.69		
9/11dummylnIDA	-4.487609	3.501268	-1.28	0.201		
Arms Sales	0.00000225	0.0000031	0.73	0.468		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Robu std. err**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs**	**R-square**
International Dev. Assoc.	0.000000552	0.000000185	2.99	0.003	352	0.2877
9/11dummy	-15.3309	45.13051	-0.34	0.734		
9/11dummylnIDA	-3.576415	1.754512	-2.04	0.042		
Arms Sales	0.000011	0.00000481	2.28	0.023		

One-sided Violence	Coefficient	Rob std. err.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
United Kingdom	7.674217	3.898907	1.97	0.05	335	0.2853
gspdummy	-889.9431	270.2017	-3.29	0.001		
gspdummylnUK	64.17152	20.65646	3.11	0.002		
Arm Sales	0.00000901	0.00000521	1.73	0.085		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Japan	-34.96819	16.25617	-2.15	0.032	365	0.0748
gspdummy	-511.6071	1721.797	-0.3	0.767		
gspdummylnJapan	40.84041	103.6282	0.39	0.694		
Arm Sales	0.0000096	0.00000515	1.86	0.063		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Japan	-8.195888	4.305147	-1.9	0.058	365	0.2355
gspdummy	1474.273	982.8992	1.5	0.135		
gspdummylnJapan	-84.90601	58.34485	-1.46	0.146		
Arm Sales	0.0000156	0.00000502	3.11	0.002		

One-sided Violence	Coefficient	Rob std. err.	t	P>|t|	Obs.	R-square
European Union	-0.00000119	0.000000457	-2.6	0.01	375	0.1856
gspdummy	-54.71875	90.83095	-0.6	0.547		
gspdummylnEU	0.00000132	0.000000796	1.65	0.099		
Arm Sales	0.000014	0.00000473	2.96	0.003		
One-sided Violence	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
United Nations	0.00000606	0.00000274	2.21	0.028	375	0.3692
gspdummy	-157.3219	76.52717	-2.06	0.041		
gspdummylnUN	0.00000268	0.00000335	0.8	0.425		
Arm Sales	0.00000786	0.00000492	1.6	0.111		
Armed Conflict	**Coefficient**	**Rob std. err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**Obs.**	**R-square**
Inter. Monetary Fund	-0.000000183	8.35E-08	-2.19	0.029	328	0.0177
gspdummy	23.1845	24.89164	0.93	0.352		
gspdummylnIMF	0.00000153	0.000000917	1.67	0.096		
Arm Sales	0.000000697	0.00000159	0.44	0.661		

Vita

Alyk Collins was born on Fort Carson, Colorado. He attended grade schools in Europe and across multiple US Army installations until he moved to El Paso and graduated from Andress High School in June of 2010. After serving twelve years in the Army Reserves, he entered school at the University of Texas at El Paso and in May of 2017 received a Bachelor of Business Administration in Economics. While pursuing his undergraduate, he was treasurer for the Regional Economic Development Association and an active member of the Financial Management Association. He later returned to the University of Texas at El Paso to pursue a Master of Arts in Political Science and graduated with honors in May of 2023. During this Program, he was awarded a National Science Foundation Aspire Fellowship, and inducted into the Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society.

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