Authoritarian Regimes And Public Goods Structure And Survival

Benjamin Torres
University of Texas at El Paso

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AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND PUBLIC GOODS

STRUCTURE AND SURVIVAL

BENJAMIN. E. TORRES

Master’s Program in Political Science

APPROVED:

__________________________________________________________________
Joseph Zhou, Ph.D., Chair

__________________________________________________________________
Taeko Hiroi, Ph.D.

__________________________________________________________________
Danielle Xiaodan Morales, Ph.D.

__________________________________________________________________
Stephen L. Crites, Jr., Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND PUBLIC GOODS

STRUCTURE AND SURVIVAL

by

BENJAMIN E. TORRES, B.A.

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

What explains the variance in the level of public goods provision in authoritarian regimes? Naturally, there are differences in the capabilities of states, however, there is a noticeable trend in the level of output from certain authoritarian states. Democracies have a clear causal mechanism for public goods provision, which is the electoral mandate, but dictatorships lack this feature. Hence the question is posed, why do some authoritarian states put so much effort into the provision of public goods? Singapore is considered one of the most developed states in the world, (outperforming some of the most democratic states.) yet it is deeply authoritarian. The argument I make is that consolidation and survival strategies focused on “calibrated coercion” (George, 2007) are key in public goods provision. George (2007) refers to calibrated coercion as the use of a wide range of tools used by the state to influence the behavior of people within the regime. This combination of consolidation and coercive strategies are best expressed when a regime maintains a dominant political party. Finally, this research presents a mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative methods to answer this question. Provided are cross-sectional statistical analyses comparing indicators of consolidation and structure to indicators of public good provision and case studies that demonstrate the phenomenon. The findings of my empirical research support my theory that consolidated dominant-party regimes do have a positive relationship with the provision of public goods. However, this effect is not as pronounced as it should be, in the category of dominant-party regimes, because not enough is done to delineate the types of dominant-party regimes and their institutional makeup. This weak empirical support is reinforced through the use of case studies I have selected that demonstrate my theory.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a healthy field of discussion in comparative politics analyzing the differences in the provision of public goods amongst democratic states. Per Selway (2016), the difference in public goods outcomes is attributed to the electoral structure of these states and the demographic makeup of the citizens within them. I am approaching this concept and applying it to the study of authoritarian regimes. There is much variance in the provision of public goods in authoritarian regimes, and I argue that this is attributed to how consolidated a regime is, and the coercive methods the regime invests in. While the study of authoritarian regimes has had less attention than that of democracies, it is widely agreed upon that party regimes are the most durable and longest-lasting. I argue that it is the nature and structure inherent to party regimes that make them best suited to the provision of public goods owing to the theory I will put forth.

The criteria and explanation I will use resonates with and adds nuance to mainstream theories explaining public goods provision. Simply put, authoritarian regimes lack an electoral mandate, which is the primary mechanism in democracies that precipitates public goods provision, yet they still provide them. To illustrate the differences among these regimes, I present my theory of public goods provision in authoritarian regimes. In this, the primary mechanisms are regime consolidation and coercive tactics, and the reasoning is explained using selectorate theory. To test my theory, I use a mixed-methods approach using both quantitative and qualitative data. Beginning with my quantitative modeling, My primary indicator of public goods will be the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a measure of public goods provision and economic health of a state created by the United Nations, this will serve as my dependent variable throughout my analyses. My primary causal mechanism is consolidation, and
an agreed-upon measure of this feature is regime tenure, which will be my primary independent variable. For regime type I will be using two authoritarian regime datasets, these are the Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell, *Pathways From Authoritarianism*, and the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, *Autocratic Regimes* dataset. These will serve as my independent variables. I will also be controlling for oil rents and personalism, as these are regime traits that have been identified as features that can potentially affect the outcome of public goods provision within a state.

The theory of this research states effective public goods provision comes from consolidation and coercive methodology. The regime must be able to physically produce public goods and have a reason to provide them. These conditions are achieved when a regime can ensure its long-term survival and efficiently project nonviolent political power (consolidate). Selectorate theory explains why party regimes have the desire to provide public goods, and will be the best in their provision. A base premise of selectorate theory is that political elites are logical and rationally motivated to continue their political survival. To succeed in this, they must leverage the tools and resources they have at their disposal in a manner that will best please the winning coalition and maintain their seat. Given the tools and the context that dominant-party regimes (from here on, dominant-party regimes refers to any regime with a party that is the de facto ruler of the regime, as defined by law or informally) find themselves in and with, it is the most logical for the regime to avoid rule by violence and direct repression. The tools that these regimes have that others do not are the use of procedural, responsive, legitimate strategies that George (2007) refers to as calibrated coercion. Among these tools lies economic opportunities, access to healthcare, and access to education, which are the public goods I am considering in my theory.
The knowledge I seek to contribute to this academic subfield, in part, seeks to unravel the riddle as to why regimes that are seen as brutal and repressive seem to genuinely care for, and provide for their people despite the absence of genuinely democratic institutions. This work seeks to reach a high level of generalizability, providing a lens that can provide a deeper understanding of authoritarian resilience. The generalizability of this research will come from the framework it provides which can analyze the level of responsiveness in an authoritarian regime. This will in turn provide an even more detailed look at the way these states survive and claim legitimacy.

This research also seeks to weigh in on the factors that are commonly associated with regime type and how these regime types perform differently in the provision of public goods provision. Determinants such as regime consolidation, regime survival strategies, personalism, culture, and resource dependency will be discussed concerning the theory I have put forth. The course of this work follows a review of the literature relevant to the study of regime theory and the provision of public goods, a thorough explanation of the theoretical argument this research is attempting to make, quantitative evidence based on a statistical model, qualitative evidence, interpretation of results, ending with concluding remarks and paths forward for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of the provision of public goods among varying regime types is a common inquiry in comparative politics. This inquiry has typically taken the form of comparing democracies with different structures and institutional makeups, or by comparing democracies and autocracies. Less common is comparing different types of authoritarian regimes against one another, and this will be my contribution to this body of literature.

Joel Selway’s (2015) *Coalitions of the Well-Being* was one of the inspirations for the pursuit of this research. Their book analyzes the health policy outcomes in developing democracies in Africa and parts of Asia. Selway makes the case that electoral structures and ethnic relations are the defining factors in the outcome of health policy in these developing democracies. The independent variable Selway used is electoral structure, and the dependent variable is the Human Development Index. The HDI is an aggregate score of life expectancy, education, and GNI per capita income. This is a dataset created by the United Nations Development Program and serves as an indicator of the quality of life the citizens of a state enjoy, as well as an indicator of how well a state provides public goods.

In *Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy's Impact on Primary School Enrollment*, David Brown (1999) examines the effects of regime type on primary school enrollment. The research question that Brown proposes is whether or not there is a relationship between democracy and the accumulation of human capital. The general theory of Brown’s work is that the effective provision of education should have a positive relationship with democracy, and a negative relationship with autocracies. Brown finds that while some autocratic states perform very well in the provision of primary education, ultimately democracies are more exhaustive in their investment in education. Brown attributes this to the difference in survival
strategies a politician in an authoritarian regime has to employ as opposed to a politician in a democracy who has an electorate, they are responsible for and has a desire to be reelected. This is a trend that remains constant until Brown (1999) controls for GDP. After which, he finds very little difference between the rates of education provision between authoritarian and democratic states.

Research that is theoretically closest to my own, Why Do Different Types Of Authoritarian Regimes Provide Different Levels Of Public Goods? by Moises Diaz (2016). Diaz asks the nearly same research question as I do; however, our theoretical and analytical approaches have slight but important differences. The first difference is in the scale of analysis, Diaz poses his theory while analyzing two central African states, Chad and Gabon. Diaz classifies Gabon as a single-party regime and Chad as a personalist regime. Diaz’s theory is summed up in the following, “…personalist regimes, like those in Chad since independence, that rely principally on coercive survival strategies are less likely to prioritize public goods distribution. By contrast, party regimes can use a wider array of survival strategies, including public goods provision, to remain in power.” (Diaz, 2020. P.47) My approach differs in that, while I also attribute survival strategies to public goods provision, I also consider the level of party consolidation, and institutional structure are the most powerful indicators of public goods provision.

There is also a difference in the breadth of our analysis. The theoretical comparison Diaz makes pits one-party regimes and personalist regimes, attributing the differences in outcomes to the different survival strategies in a personalist regime versus a one-party regime. Diaz makes this comparison through the lens of the GWF authoritarian regime index. I hand ve found that while there is a notable outcome of personalism, effective part institutions and high personalism
are not mutually exclusive, which does slightly disagree with Daiz’s theory but does not denigrate his findings.

Where the GWF authoritarian regime index labels Gabon a party regime and Chad a personalist regime, the Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism” (2007) (PFA) dataset labels Gabon a one-party or limited multiparty (depending on the period used when analyzing the regime), and Chad is coded as a limited multiparty regime. If Diaz were to conduct their research using this dataset, they would be comparing two regimes of the same type to each other.

*In Buying Support and Buying Time: The Effect of Regime Consolidation on Public Goods Provision* (2011) by Curtis Bell, the author looks at the level of regime consolidation concerning how well the regime outputs public goods. In their research design, for independent variables demonstrating causal mechanisms of these regimes, Bell uses the size of the winning coalition of the regime, regime tenure. For their dependent variable, the public goods considered by the author are political rights, civil liberties, health expenditure, education expenditure, welfare expenditure, educational attainment, human capital stock, adult illiteracy, hospital beds, life expectancy, physicians, death rate, measles immunizations, diphtheria pertussis tetanus immunizations, and infant mortality. Bell finds support for his hypothesis that states that there is a positive relationship between coalition size, level of consolidation measured by regime tenure, and the provision of public goods.
Indirect Determinants of Public Goods

Also within my analytical considerations are factors that determine the provision of public goods that are not always inherently political. Upon reviewing relevant literature, the factors being considered in my quantitative modeling are personalism and resource dependency. Culture and religion are also commonly cited as factors that can affect the output of public goods provision. However, as I will elaborate upon further in this literature review, the common consensus in academic literature is that the empirical relationship between culture, religion, and public goods provision is marginal because of the presence of regime institutions that are the primary providers of public goods. The effects of these factors have all been analyzed at previous points and have been found to be relevant to aspects of governance.

Personalism refers to practices in authoritarian regimes where power remains in the hands of a very select few that are close to and fiercely loyal to the supreme leader of the regime. A very characteristic practice and indicator of increased personalism is the extrajudicial incarceration of members of potential opposition to the current leadership. A recent example of this was the “anti-corruption” campaign led by the Chinese head of state, Xi Jinping in 2012. This was titled an anti-corruption campaign but was a thinly veiled move to purge his opposition. The officials removed were “army generals, 35 members of the party’s influential Central Committee, nine members of the party’s internal disciplinary body, as well as senior officials, such as a former Chinese president’s chief of staff. Most telling, though, is the two highest-ranking officials prosecuted: Xi’s main political rivals, Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang.” (Fiolemahan, 2018). As was alluded to in the literature review of this work, this is a concept that has been studied at length since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 with the rise of the Putin regime.
Discussing the weight of personalism in an authoritarian regime, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (GWF) have written on this subject at length. A section of their book How Dictatorships Work is titled “A Measure of Personalism in Dictatorships” and discusses exactly this subject. GWF uses eight criteria to indicate the level of latent personalism within a regime. These are 1. Does access to high office depend on personal loyalty to the regime leader? (high office) 2. Did the regime leader create a new support political party after seizing power? (create a new party) 3. Does the regime leader control appointments to the party executive committee? (party executive committee) 4. Is the party executive committee absent or simply a rubber stamp for the regime leader's decisions (rubber stamp party) 5. Does the regime leader personally control the security apparatus? (security apparatus) 6. Does the regime leader promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or partisan group, or is there widespread forced retirement of officers from other groups? (military promotion) 7. Does the regime leader create paramilitary forces, a president's guard, or the regime leader imprison/kill officers from groups other than his own without a reasonably fair trial? (Military purge). After conducting their analysis, GWF finds that over time, there is an increase in personalism in every type save for monarchies, which stay stable throughout the duration of their regime. Military and personalist regimes have the strongest positive relationship with personalism, and party regimes have a weak but positive relationship with personalism.

I could not locate research that explicitly states that personalism has a negative or positive relationship with the provision of public goods because of x. Observing personalist regimes through the lens of selectorate theory provides an answer. A highly personalized regime means that the winning coalition of that regime is very small, and a leader who is only held accountable to a small group of individuals is most likely to only provide goods for those people
and their respective followers. Meaning, that public goods provision would not be essential to their survival and is therefore not prioritized.

Culture and religion are commonly referred to in politics as determinants as to whether a state is predisposed to be compatible with democracy or not. How does this hold up concerning the provision of public goods? This was slightly acknowledged in Selway’s work when they posed the question relating ethnic homogeneity and health policy, stating that certain structures of government performed better with homogenous and heterogenous demographic makeups. Not always, but culture is often associated with ethnicity. How does this look in an authoritarian state? Warner, et al., (2015) write about the influence religion has on the provision of public goods. Their work concludes that the religions they study generally have an empirically observable, positive relationship with public goods by the way of the teaching of charity in the religions they study (Christianity and Islam). The outcome of the level of effectiveness is determined by the institutional structure of the state the studied demographic resides. Two of the most successful states in my consideration are in east Asia and are dominated by Confucian culture in their societies, they are also nondemocracies. Hence the question should be asked, does Confucian culture promote social welfare (public goods)?

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has been espousing Neo-Confucian values using “political rhetoric dealing with ethical humanism, virtuous rule, people-oriented governance, and so on.” (Kai, 2014). Singapore is, demographically speaking, majority ethnic Chinese and thoroughly Confucian in its culture. Where does that leave us in the way that Confucianism interacts with public goods in authoritarian regimes? While this question is difficult to observe empirically, a similar concept was explored by Victor Cha (2020). Cha examined the differences in the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic between eastern and
western states. The author compared the states along the lines of regime type, culture, and pandemic context. The East Asian states that Cha used in his analysis were Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, comparing them to the United States. Cha concludes the section on culture stating that Confucian was not a causal force in the quick and decisive responses these states had to the pandemic. Rather, in the closing statements, Cha states that it is the competency of and confidence in a responsive national government with transparent institutions that is the causal force in the response to the pandemic that facilitated these successful responses.

Cha’s findings support the overall theme and tone of my research. Public goods outcomes are largely precipitated by institutions and their behavior. If there is a relationship between culture and the provision of public goods in a state, the relationship will be weak at best. As this relationship is strongly shaped by the institutions within a regime.

Of the minor factors affecting the provision of public goods, I posit that resource dependency will have the strongest effect on the provision of public goods. Resource dependency is often associated with most of the state revenue coming from an external source and not from domestically provisioned taxes. It is logical to assume that this would be detrimental to the provision of public goods within a state. This is because a state is not reliant on the people to provide revenue and thus, responsiveness is not an agenda priority for the regime. To add to this, an abundance of revenue of this type reduces the social desire for economic diversification and education. This was the case made by Aljarallah (2020) who conducted research using human capital as his dependent variable and “natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP as a proxy of natural resource dependency and corruption as a proxy of institutional quality.”. Aljarallah’s research suggests that resource dependency does have a
negative relationship with the provision of public goods. However, his research design does differ from previous work in this line of inquiry. He uses Human Capital instead of using the Human Development Index which has been the precedent for data in asking questions along these lines.

While there is data to support the claims by Aljarallah (2020), like with personalism, I argue that institutionalism will offset the negative effects of strong oil revenue. As was the case with the Chavista regime in Venezuela (1999-2013) the regime used oil revenue to directly support very strong social programs that greatly increased the level of public goods provision in Venezuela during the tenure of Hugo Chavez as president. Chavez felt he had a strong mandate for poverty elimination and the provision of education and health and created institutions to this end with the use of oil revenue. In sum, regimes with strong institutional backing will make better use of oil rents than those without, and institutions such as these are almost always in dominant-party regimes.

Public Goods to Build Regime Support

To close the literature review I would also like to discuss literature relevant to the more pragmatic provision of public goods. Influence of effective education and health policies. The fostering of popular support and ideological indoctrination are the two most prominent reasons. Early research on the relationship between authoritarian support and education shows that higher education has a negative relationship with the level of support for an authoritarian regime an individual has. Geddes and Zaller (1989) make the case that a majority of regime support comes from “better-informed members of the working class, who are both heavily exposed to government-controlled communications and lack the education and other internal resources for resisting them.” (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). In sum, people who are educated enough to consume
political propaganda, but lack the agency to challenge it, also do not question it or seek alternative means of media. The educational policy for the public in these environments is typically state-controlled. Giving the state total control over what is relayed in the classroom. Kennedy (2009), in a fashion like Geddes and Zaller (1989) asks a similar research question but changes the unit of analysis from Brazil to China, which is a one-party authoritarian regime. Throughout the research, Kennedy discusses the high level of support the Chinese Communist Party enjoys, and how the control of the media and education by the state likely has a heavy hand in ensuring this outcome. Kennedy (2009) states “Thus, the CCP clearly views education as an important component of regime support. As Key (1961) points out, indoctrination in the classrooms is one of the main elements of support for any regime. The high level of political support among citizens who have completed compulsory education may reflect the success of the Communist regime and its education policies.” (Kennedy, 2009. P.532-533)

Dickson, et al., (2016) also writes about the use of the effective provision of public goods as a means of garnering support for the regime. As opposed to where Kennedy (2009) asks a similar research question, Dickson, et al., pose the question at more broad public goods (specifically healthcare, education, and social welfare subsidies.) Dickson, et al., conclude that the provision of public goods is an effective measure for building popular support and trust with the local administration. This is in turn, a way to establish a form of legitimacy without a democratic mandate.
THEORY

Returning to Selway’s (2015) *Coalitions of the Well-Being*, the author explains the difference in outcomes of health policy by stating that the variation is caused by different combinations of electoral structures in democracies and the stability of ethnic relations. His approach is analyzing health policy outcomes relative to the electoral system, ethnic salience, and ethno-geographically isolated/intermixed developing democracies.

There is a clear linkage between democracies and the provision of public goods. A leader seeking reelection will campaign on issues and make campaign promises that will curry the favor of their electorate to ensure their political survival. Per Selway’s theory, the winning coalition leaders need to please to survive varies based on the electoral structure of the government. These leaders will leverage the provision of public and private goods to gain the support of a winning coalition within their electorate. This is the causal relationship between elections and the provision of public goods.

My research question is: Why is there a difference in the outcome of public goods in authoritarian regimes? To answer this question, I have constructed a theory using research on various traits of authoritarian regimes, and how certain authoritarian regime types are better able to express these traits than other authoritarian regimes. My theory is that consolidation is the central causal mechanism in the provision of public goods in authoritarian regimes. Presence and control at all levels of government along with economic growth (per the argument of Gobel (2010)) are required for the efficient provision of public goods. Given the tools this level of consolidation affords the regime, along with the political and physical costs of control and power-sharing, dominant-party regimes will be the aptest and able to provide public goods. The logic explaining the motivation for the regimes to provide public goods is demonstrated using
selectorate theory. This theory states that political elites have a desire to survive politically (stay in power) and make the most logical and rational decisions to do that. Given that violence and overt repression have high costs associated with them and invite possible challengers to the regime, it is more logical for the regime to invest in a wider array of less violent forms of coercion. Closing on this, these traits are best expressed in regimes that are centered around a party. Both Svolik (2013) and Geddes (1999) have stated that party regimes excel in survival and durability, owing to the depersonalization and institutions provided by the vehicle of the party. In short, dominant-party regimes will have the highest output in the provision of public goods.

Authoritarian Survival and Consolidation

The capacity to provide public goods is essential to their effective provision. To meet this threshold, authoritarian regimes must survive and consolidate. This provides the context for the first part of my theory. In Milan Svolik’s “The Politics of Authoritarian Rule” (2013), Svolik identifies the two main internal existential threats that every authoritarian regime must contend with to ensure its continued existence. These threats are the problem of authoritarian control and the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. The problem of authoritarian control demonstrates that one of the biggest challenges an autocracy faces is the people it rules over. Totalitarian control has an extremely high cost and risk associated with it, and too little control invites many challenges to the regime both internal and external. This makes the level and form of control an autocratic regime uses a delicate balancing act. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing discusses the structure in which an autocratic regime disperses power amongst the ruling elites. Too little dispersion results in a personal autocracy, and too much dispersresultsting in a contested autocracy.
In the penultimate chapter of his book, Svolik states that the institutional structure of authoritarian states with party regimes allows them to best deal with the issues of authoritarian control and power sharing. Svolik (2013) states that the party is used as a vehicle for cooptation and control of its citizens. Svolik (2013) explains “(1) How and which organizational of authoritarian parties contribute to authoritarian resilience, (2) why these beneficial functions cannot be carried out without the institution of the party, and (3) why some dictatorships establish and maintain a regime-sanctioned party whereas others do not.” (P.163)

Svolik (2013) and others typically agree upon the concept that party regimes are among the most durable of authoritarian regimes. This is largely attributed to the vehicle the party provides for issues such as the peaceful transfer of power, cooptation, etc. I add that this longevity and stability lays the groundwork for the regime to competently consolidate. In his research, “Authoritarian Consolidation,” Christian Gobel discusses his theory on this subject. Gobel defines his conception of authoritarian consolidation as follows: “authoritarian consolidation is understood to be a deliberate state project driven by political elites seeking to secure their ruling position.” (Gobel, 2010) Following this, Gobel enumerates the level and scales of authoritarian consolidation between micro, meso, and macro consolidation. He then discusses how state power and influence are expressed at each level, at the micro level, the state uses discursive power (which Gobel defines as “the power to make people want what the government wants them to want”)(Gobel, 2010, P.177)), and at the meso and macro levels, the regime expresses infrastructural power, which Gobel defines as “the power inherent in regulating society through institutions and organizations” (Gobel, 2010, P.177). It is in the macro-level of consolidation that we see the provision of public goods come into play. The establishment of institutions at the macro level creates incentives for citizens to comply and behave in a manner
desired by the state, this “reduces complexity and improves predictability.” (Gobel, 2010, P.184)

The author provides two dimensions (macro and meso) on which the regime builds infrastructural power, but only the first is relevant to the provision of public goods. In sum, Gobel states that infrastructural power is how the state expresses the resources at its disposal to gain control over the state. The examples that the author uses are the size of state revenues as a percentage of GDP, defense expenditures, internal security, administration, capital, construction, infrastructure building, rural development, and welfare.

Survival strategies and consolidation work in tandem in dominant-party regimes, Svolik (2013) illustrates that the party maintains vehicles to ensure survival, stability, and consolidation. These vehicles take the form of institutions, an example of this is a feature of dominant-party regimes (that functions as a guarantor of stability) is the peaceful transfer of power without a major change to the regime and ruling coalition (Svolik, 2013. P. 185). A major talking point of Svolik’s (2013) entire research is cooptation, he further states that the party is the best equipped, per its institutional structure to successfully coopt the population. This both incentivizes cooperation with the regime and disincentivizes any potential defectors (Svolik, 2013. P. 166). When the party is at the highest stages of consolidation and can effectively provide public goods, it can further extend its ability to coopt and coerce.
Calibrated Coercion and Selectorate Theory

Mainstream literature (specifically, Svolik (2013)) about authoritarian regimes states that the two primary tools of the regime to maintain control are coercion and cooptation. Coercion in the authoritarian context is often viewed as violent, exclusive, and repressive. George (2007) challenges this notion with their concept of calibrated coercion. Simply put, calibrated coercion is the addition of nonviolent means of coercion to the toolbox of the regime. These practices can range from incentivizing self-censorship in mainstream media, to quality, and responsiveness of governance, economic growth, and wealth creation. This is in stark contrast to the common conception of forced, violent coercive methods such as imprisonment without trial and extrajudicial killings. When deciding policy options, a key consideration in calibrated coercion is the political cost the regime has to pay when making a decision. Violence and heavy-handed measures are often associated with high costs to legitimacy and moral outrage that can very realistically result in mass mobilization. Rather than risk this, the regime takes measures to find less violent alternatives to express political power while reducing political costs and creating long-term benefits for itself and the people. At many points, Svolik (2013) notes the dangers of over-reliance on violence, which invites challengers and directly erodes regime legitimacy. This happens through the strengthening of the military and the unpopularity of violence as a means of political control. Given the tools available to the regime along with the political and financial costs associated with repression and violence, calibrated coercion is a more logical approach to the problem of authoritarian control. To conclude this, George (2007, P.143) states the benefits of calibrated coercion “First, calibrated coercion minimizes the sense of moral outrage that could be used to mobilize the public against the state. Second, calibration reduces the salience of coercion, making consensus seem like the sole basis for stability and thus strengthening
hegemony. Third, calibrated coercion preserves incentives for economic production and wealth creation, which rulers need as much as do the ruled”.

This section will briefly explain selectorate theory and apply it to my theoretical context. There is a clear incentive for responsiveness in democratic states (electoral mandates), but how does this play out in an authoritarian setting? Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow coauthored the book known as “The Logic of Political Survival” (2003). In this work, Bueno de Mesquita, et al. provide the layout for their version of the theory known as selectorate theory. It is primarily concerned with the survival of political leaders regardless of regime types (notwithstanding autocratic regimes). In autocratic states, there is no such thing as a single dictator that oversees every aspect of life within a state, making public policy, and managing the economy, it is a coalition of autocrats working in tandem. Selectorate theory divides the people of the regime by how politically affluent they are into three categories. Descending by overall size, the parts that make up a selectorate are defined as “The group of members or residents (n) can be subdivided along a critical dimension: those in the selectorate... and those not in the selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003, P.41), or the unenfranchised. The next group, which has some form of political influence, is the selectorate (s), to continue to survive politically, a leader has to find, and keep satisfied, the winning coalition (w) which is the most important group relative to staying in power.
Selectorate Theory Diagram (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003)

Bueno de Mesquita, et al. further discuss the provision of both public and private goods as means for challengers and incumbent leaders to leverage support and build a winning coalition. Depending on the resources available to them, the size of the winning coalition, and the nominal selectorate, finding a stable balancing point in the distribution of public and private goods may prove a challenge for many potential leaders.

Survival, growth, and stability are policy priorities at the forefront of every regime, and this is especially prevalent in the preferences of the winning coalition \( w \) which the incumbent leader has to satisfy to survive politically. In highly consolidated party regimes, executive elites can leverage the political influence and power of the party to pursue a wide range of nonviolent coercive methods of control. When weighing the costs associated with different methods of coercion, quality of governance and public goods provision have high financial costs associated with them but bring political and economic benefits with them that violence and repressive coercion do not. For example, arming and training a police force for political dissidents is relatively inexpensive when compared to the implementation of universal healthcare and education systems within a state. However, an educated population brings the benefits of a
highly diversified economy, and success in both the economy provides the benefits of genuine
regime support and economic growth. This stands, in contrast, to control through violence, which
is inexpensive in economic terms but in political terms, it has a high cost in terms of legitimacy
and regime support. Put simply, violence is extremely unpopular and quickly building-lasting
resentment towards the regime.

Closing on this section, selectorate theory also explains the willingness of these regimes
to provide these public goods. Including ordinary citizenry in the selectorate creates a degree of a
symbiotic relationship between the regime and ordinary citizens. A wider, more balanced
approach to coercion links the survival of the winning coalition to the survival of the selectorate.
The regime will survive, develop, and expand by using institutions to provide healthcare,
education, and a healthy economy to its citizens. By strengthening its people, the regime
strengthens itself, tying the success of the people to the success of the regime.
Hypothesis

Based on the theory I have created and other factors I have determined are relevant, I have created hypotheses regarding what to expect in the outcome of my statistical model.

H1: There will be a positive and statistically significant relationship between regime tenure and HDI score. Regime tenure is typically associated with regime consolidation and consolidation is associated with a higher output of public goods, translating into higher HDI scores.

Given that the causal mechanism for my research is consolidation, existing research indicates that the most direct indicator of consolidation is regime tenure. I expect this to coincide with the findings of Bell (2011), while my hypothesis is very similar to theirs, the indicator of public goods I will be using is an aggregate score of public goods and includes an economic component. In Bell’s (2011) research, an array of wider, disaggregated public goods are used to indicate the relationship. I expect my findings to be like the results found in the prior research that consolidation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the output of public goods.

H2: Dominant-party regimes will have a positive relationship with public goods provision.

Per the existing research that indicates the strengths of party regimes and the theory I have constructed, party regimes maintain the tools, logic, and motivation to provide public goods efficiently. The context these regimes find themselves in creates the situation which makes public goods provision more beneficial to the regime than violent methods of coercion.
H3: Factors such as oil dependence and personalism have been identified as variables that can affect the provision of public goods. Existing literature on these subjects is either unclear or indicates a negative relationship. There will be no discernable relationship between oil dependence and public goods, and there will be a negative relationship between personalism and the provision of public goods.

Data and research on the relationship between oil rents and the provision of public goods is mixed. By some measures, a negative relationship has been indicated between the two because heavy reliance on oil rents invites a poorly diversified economy. The external revenue from oil rents removes the need for the government to tax the people, effectively severing the government’s reliance on the ordinary citizen. This results in very poor public goods provision; such is the case in Angola. In contrast, the regime can tie the provision of public goods directly to oil rents and invest heavily in social welfare, such was the case in Venezuela.

Personalism, per the theoretical lens of selectorate theory, should in practice have a negative relationship with the provision of public goods. The more personalized a regime is, the smaller the winning coalition the leader needs to satisfy to survive. Depending on the typology being used, personalism can either be a feature within a regime, or it can be a structural defining component of it. My research falls in with personalism as a feature of the regime. Depending on the level of personalism and how it is expressed in the regime, it may or may not affect the provision of public goods.
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

Research Design and Methodology

The purpose of this section is to establish the relationships between key variables and explain trends in public goods outcomes in authoritarian states. Given the theory and evidence I have presented, I predicted that there will be a positive relationship between regime tenure and HDI. I have presented a “who” a “why” and a “how” of how dominant party regimes are better at the provision of public goods. Using quantitative analysis, I will use empirical data to demonstrate this relationship in the real world.

For the general theory of this research, regime tenure will be the independent variable and the dependent variable will be the outcome of public goods provision. I will be conducting three different analyses, all of which will be using HDI as the dependent variable, but using two different regime typologies, and regime tenure. The datasets defining regime typology will be the Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism” (PFA) dataset, and the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, Autocratic Regimes dataset (commonly referred to as GWF). Relevant observations to my model from the PFA dataset cover 79 states from the year 2014, from this dataset I will be using the Regime type variable, which has 5 different primary types of regimes. This includes observations for democracy (which I will not be including in my analytical consideration) and the regime type that I will be using for my analysis. These are one-party and limited-multiparty regimes. I will be comparing these to the other authoritarian regime types in the dataset which are Limited Multiparty, Partyless, No-Party, Military No-Party, and One-Party. The GWF dataset covers 59 states from the year 2010 and the primary variables used are party, personalist, monarchy, and military.
An important difference between the two datasets is the way they account for personalism. Hadenius, et al., state “we feel hesitant to designate “personalism” as a regime type. A better approach, I shall argue, is to treat personalism as a continuous trait that may be more or less present in a regime.” (Hadenius, Et al., 2013). The intensity of personalism in a regime makes a significant difference in whether the limited multiparty regime is closer to a personal autocracy. There are various manners in which high degrees of personalism interacts with public goods outcomes, and the way personalism is measured in regime typology can put different states in different categories, ultimately affecting the outcome of the model I am using.

For an indicator of public goods, I have chosen to follow suit with other research in this line of inquiry. I will be using the Human Development Index created by the United Nations. The website for the UN Development Program states the following about the HDI, “The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living.” In a statistical context, these are life expectancy at birth, expected year of schooling and mean years of schooling, and gross national income per capita. The index is based on a numerical scale from 0.00 to 1.0, with numbers closer to zero meaning a state is less developed, and numbers closer to one being more developed. E.G., in 2019 Niger had an HDI score of .394, putting the state in the “low human development” classification, and Norway had an HDI score of .957 putting the state in the “very high human development”.
Data

Returning to Selway’s theory, among developing democracies, there is a wide range in the outcome of the state’s effort to provide its citizens with public goods. In Selway’s case, he uses health policy. His theoretical approach begins by observing developing democracies that are in similar stages of their political and economic development, meaning that they should have similar economic and public good outcomes, but do not. Selway’s causal argument is that this is precipitated by electoral rules, rather than the popular theory that it is caused by ethnic fractionalization. Further explaining this concept, Selway breaks down electoral rules between consensus (an example being proportional representation) and majoritarian (an example being First-Past-The-Post) democracies. Selway states that the failure to adequately provide public goods occurs when a state has electoral rules that are not considerate of the level of ethnic salience within the state. Consensus democracies are better for states with high levels of ethnic salience and majoritarian states are better for states that are more homogenous in their ethnic composition (ex. Japan). Following this framework, I will look at the outcomes of Human Development Index Scores using the authoritarian regime type dataset used by Hadenius, et al.

Authoritarian Regime Typologies

To compare authoritarian regimes, a typology has to be selected, there have been several attempts to do exactly this. Three predominant datasets provide typologies relevant to this study. The Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, E., *Autocratic regimes data set*, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, *Democracy and dictatorship revisited* dataset, and Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism* dataset, there are many common themes in these typologies. Specifically, reoccurring types are Party, Personalist, Military, and Monarchic regimes. For this research, I will be using the Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell dataset. This dataset, while similar to
Geddes, et al. and Cheibub, et al., best delineates the types of party regimes for the context of my research. It has better explanatory power for the research question I have presented in this work. Cheibub, et al., is more concerned with the democracy-dictatorship spectrum, hence it was the least likely candidate for use as an independent variable in my statistical model since my focus is largely on authoritarian states. The following figure illustrates the regime typologies used by the GWF and the PFA datasets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GWF</th>
<th>PFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>One Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Limited Multiparty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns Displaying Differences in Categorization Between PFA and GWF Datasets

Hadenius et al. chose a wider approach to the phenomenon of the party regime by creating multiple subtypes of party regimes, including one-party, no-party, and dominant limited multiparty. This is of great relevance to my theory because, among the subtypes of party regimes, the primary types I am observing for this research are the one-party regime and the limited multiparty regime. Hadenius et al. provide the following definitions of these regimes, “In one-party regimes, all parties but one are forbidden (whether formally or de facto) from taking part in elections... A small number of nonparty candidates may also be allowed to take part and
get elected (as was the case in Iraq under Saddam Hussein). There also may be satellite parties that are autonomous in name but cannot take an independent position (as in China)” (2007, P.26), “In no-party regimes elections are held, but no parties are allowed to participate in those elections. The category is rare throughout the whole period captured in the dataset.” (2007, P.26) “Limited multiparty regimes hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) independent or opposition candidates can participate. “The regime is a dominant limited multiparty when there is a single party that continually dominates the state’s electoral affairs, and nondominant when there is not a definite dominant party.”

The dummy variables provided with the PFA dataset will be the primary independent variables for my regression, coded 1 if they are the indicated regime type and 0 if they are not. E.G., China would be coded as a 1 for a one-party state and would be coded 0 as a monarchy. These are all mutually exclusive categories except for the case of military regimes, however, all of the observations for military regimes were also coded as multiparty regimes, and in those cases, they were recoded to only be military regimes to prevent overlap. For my theory, when conducting the regression analysis, all of the regime subtypes will be combined into a single category denoted as “Party”, using limited multiparty regimes as a baseline since that is the most abundant type of party regime.

Indicators of Regime Consolidation

The most agreed upon and generalizable indicator of regime consolidation is regime tenure. The definition of regime tenure used in the dataset by Hadenius, et al. (2017), is that the variable “Indicates the number of years that the current regime, according to the classification of..(regime type).., has been in place in a country”, this is expressed as a numeric variable with the lowest observation being 1 and highest observation being 55. Gobel (2011) illustrated that
consolidation is paramount to the projection of political power for the regime. Building on this, Bell (2011) links regime tenure to a respective level of consolidation. Bell (2011) then demonstrates the relationship between consolidation and the provision of public goods. This supports my overarching theory that party regimes are the best equipped to meet these standards of consolidation, and this is supported by Geddes (1999) and Svolik (2013).

Indicators of Public Goods

Two commonly used indicators of how well states provide these public goods are the Human Development Index (HDI, as used by Selway and Diaz) and the Human Capital Index (HCI, as used by Aljarallah). The level of human development of a state is a composite score of life expectancy, education, and per capita income, it is a set of data created by the United Nations Development Program. The values of the score go from .0 to 1, the closer to one indicates the more developed a state is. Per the official UNDP website, “The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes.” (UNDP, 2020). Based on this description, this dataset was created as an aggregate of the outcomes of health and education policy, while also considering the level of economic development in a state.

The UNDP creates the HDI dataset as an aggregate of three separate datasets that apply to the aforementioned issue areas. Life expectancy at birth is a dataset created by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). Per the UNDESA website, “Life expectancy, a basic indicator, is closely connected with health conditions, which are in turn an integral part of development.” This is an indicator of the policy priority of a state and shows
the relationship between the provision of health services as a public good and the use of this indicator as an indicator of that. The second part of the aggregate is the expected year of schooling and mean years of schooling are taken from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2020), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This reflects the success of compulsory education in a state and is a good indicator of education policy and policy implementations in a state. The final part of the aggregate is GNI or Gross National Income. GNI is an indicator created by the world bank “GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (fewer subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.” (databank.worldbank.org, 2021) the relevance of this as an indicator is also discussed because development encompasses many factors - economic, environmental, cultural, educational, and institutional - no single measure gives a complete picture. However, the total earnings of the residents of an economy, measured by its gross national income (GNI), is a good measure of its capacity to provide for the well-being of its people.”.

Personalism and Oil Dependence

Two variables external to public goods provision that have been deemed relevant to discuss are oil dependence and personalism. The relevance of personalism can be explained through the lens of selectorate theory. In highly personalized regimes, there is less of a need/motivation for public goods provision. This is because in regimes such as these, the winning coalition is very small, and the executive need only leverage resources to please a very select group of political elites. For a personalist variable, I turn to the GWF Autocratic Regimes
dataset, within this a binary variable for if a regime is personalist is contained, the regime is coded as a 1 if it is a personalist regime, and 0 if it is not. Geddes, et al., (2014) define personalist as “autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military or civilian”. Using the logic and classification of these authors, I will consider regimes deemed in their data as “personalized” to be highly personalized. The temporal range of this data only goes to the year 2010. When conducting the regression, I will be using the appropriate year for HDI (2010).

For oil dependence, I will be using data collected from the World Bank that identifies oil rents as a percentage of GDP. WorldBank (2022) describes Oil Rents as a percentage of GDP as “Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at regional prices and total costs of production.”. This is given as a percentage of the state Gross Domestic Product. E.G., In 2014, Algeria, which is a state commonly associated with resource dependency, had an oil rent percentage of GDP of 20.5% whereas China, who is not associated with oil dependence, had an oil rent percentage of 0.9%.

For the first regression, I will be using the “regime tenure” variable from the PFA dataset as my independent variable, and HDI will be the main dependent variable. I will also be controlling for regime type and oil rents. For the variables of regime type, I will be using the binary variables of multiparty, one-party, no-party, military, and monarchies from the PFA dataset. For oil rents, I use data from the World Bank which records oil rents as a percentage of GDP. Finally, for personalism due to a lack of more current data, the most recent observation available is from the year 2010, thus this variable will have its own regression.

Table 1 Predictors of HDI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI 2014</th>
<th>HDI 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Tenure</td>
<td>.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>.001 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Party)One-party</td>
<td>.115 (.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchies</td>
<td>-0.001 (.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regimes</td>
<td>-.084 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Rents</td>
<td>.003* (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regimes</td>
<td>-0.074* (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>78 57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates p-value < 0.1, **<0.05, standard errors in parentheses

Interpretation of Results

The results of the regression using cross-sectional data lend support to my first hypothesis, that there is a positive and significant relationship between regime tenure and the provision of public goods. However, the control variables for hypotheses two and three have not found support from the empirical analysis I have conducted. The data indicates that there is a positive relationship between party regimes and the provision of public goods, but the relationship lacks statistical significance. All three of the dominant party subtypes within the PFA dataset were combined within my regression using limited-multiparty regimes (denoted as
Party) as a baseline since this was the variable with the most observations among the party regime subtypes. The output shows a positive relationship across the board, especially in the case of one-party states, but lacks significance. The control variables of personalism and oil rents also fell within expectations, as they had negative and positive relationships with HDI. To close, while there is data that represents one of my main causal mechanisms, “calibrated coercion” is difficult to quantify and this data is therefore lacking. To bridge this gap, the next section of this research is dedicated to supporting my second hypothesis through qualitative research.
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Upon reviewing the output of my regression analysis, my variables did not produce as strong of a relationship as I had theorized in my second hypothesis. This hypothesis was that party regimes will be the most consolidated and will be logically inclined to provide public goods, more so than authoritarian regimes of other types. In short, party regimes will have the strongest relationship with public goods outcomes. To further support this hypothesis, I have selected two authoritarian party states that are indicative of this relationship. My case selection focused on regimes that went through an internal transition and following this transition, observable changes came to consolidation and coercive tactics. These shifts result in both the increase and decrease of public goods provision as (respectively) coercive tactics change, and the regime begins to consolidate. The states I have chosen that demonstrate these trends are Venezuela in the transition from the Chavez regime, and Russia, during the transitions from the USSR to the Yeltsin time, to the Putin regime.

Providing more context for this, as of 2019, Singapore maintains an HDI score of .938, placing it at 11th place internationally, Russia maintained a score of .824 earning it 52nd place, and China has a score of .761 earning it 85th place. All three of these authoritarian states are either the “high” or “very high” designators of Human Development. Providing context, “HDI classifications are based on HDI fixed cutoff points, which are derived from the quartiles of distributions of the component indicators. The cutoff points are HDI of less than 0.550 for low human development, 0.550–0.699 for medium human development, 0.700–0.799 for high human development, and 0.800 or greater for very high human development...” (hdr.undp.org, 2022). For further context, the United States sat at 17th place at .926 in 2019, Finland sat at 1st place...
with a score of .938, Tunisia was at 95th place with a score of .740, and Niger was 189th (last) place with a score of .394.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

The period from 2013-2014 were pivotal transitional events in Venezuela’s recent history. The death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 and the collapse of oil prices in 2014 greatly changed the structural capabilities of the state. The regime invested a vast sum of capital from oil revenue in its social programs, which were a key claim to legitimacy and regime support. The loss of this source of income meant the regime could no longer afford to provide public goods and coerce nonviolently. The only options left for the regime are violence and repression. The graph below shows trends in Venezuela’s HDI scores and their indices since the beginning of the index being recorded in the year 1990. Which are reflective of this shift in regime priorities.

There are two points on the above graph in time that present noticeable trends and these can be attributed to two pivotal moments in Venezuelan history in the last thirty years. The first is a positive spike in the year 2000 (especially in the education index), in which the Chavista regime succeeded in gaining control of the state after the election of Hugo Chávez in 1999. The second major trend begins in the year 2015, marking the beginning tenure of the Maduro regime.

Chavez’s regime was markedly personalized, known for its, extrajudicial killings, confinement without trial, personalized consolidation, and international antagonism with the United States and the wider international community. In this case, per my third hypothesis, personalism has a negative relationship with the provision of public goods. However, the Chavez regime was invested in a very wide range of coercive tactics as defined by George (2007). The party had a very strong and popular mandate for public goods provision and poverty elimination. As time went on, the regime continued to consolidate and use oil revenue as the driving force for social programs and public goods provision. These are shown by Chavez’s constant restructuring of the government around his party and the party’s continued investment in public goods provision.

Indicative of calibrated coercion, the regime had a very strong ideologic mandate known as Bolivarianism. This is a far-left, Pan-Hispanic, nationalist, and populist ideology, it focused on anti-imperialism, state intervention in the economy, and social programs (de la Torre, 2017). The most salient concepts of the Chavista regime align with survival strategies that aim at consolidation and calibrated coercion. After the election, Chavez started with a strong anti-poverty/social program campaign mission (Plan Bolivar 2000, and the Bolivarian Missions, beginning in 2003). The longer Chavez was in power, the more personalist and consolidated the Chavista regime became. There were many instances where Chavez manipulated the Venezuelan
national assembly to further consolidate the government around his regime (a specific example being the consolidation of leftist parties into a single leftist party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)). Much of this was accomplished through Chavez’s use of mechanisms of participatory authoritarianism, specifically the National Referendum and Communal Councils.

These reforms and consolidation were much more than lip service, as there was a substantive increase in the state’s HDI score. The United Nations began recording HDI in the year 1990. From 1990-1999 the administrations before Venezuela had seen an improvement in their HDI score from .644 to .674 (a net increase of +.03), in ten years, the Chavez regime would increase its human development score from .676 (2000) to .756 (2009) (net gain of +.08) more than doubling the progress made during the same amount of time as the previous regime. The regime would hit its highest level of development the year of the death of Chavez by cancer in the year 2013, at .777. This segues to the downward slope in HDI after the death of Chavez with the beginning of the reign of Nicolas Maduro.

Following the death of Chavez and a narrow electoral victory, Nicolas Maduro, a candidate widely considered to be an ideological successor to Chavez wins the presidency in 2013. Venezuela’s economic power was largely tied to it being an oil economy, and oil prices crashed in the year 2014. Having a sweeping impact on the health of the Venezuelan economy and the states ability to provide social programs and public goods.

While the government was victimized by the crashing of oil prices in the international community, the Maduro regime responded by cutting funding for social programs and further consolidating the government around Nicolas Maduro. In 2009, Venezuela reported a 6.9% of GDP expenditure on education (due to a lack of data), the next available data regarding this is a 1.9% GDP expenditure on education in the year 2015. (World Bank, 2022). Accompanying this,
the state’s HDI rating has decreased from a high in 2013 of .777, to a low of .711 in 2019. Facing severe backlash for mismanaging the economic crisis the state is facing, the Maduro regime has continually lost support, culminating in the loss of the majority for the PSUV in the 2015 Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections. In response to this, Maduro made use of a regime-friendly supreme court to effectively nullify the victory of the opposition party, also shifting legislative functions to the supreme court. (Reuters, 2020).

Having lost the ability to produce public goods effectively, the Maduro regime was no longer able to afford the wide range of coercive tactics that the party once had access to. Upon this shift, the party could no longer guarantee its survival, and shifted to violent, repressive coercion. The loss of popular support, and decline in education and healthcare are very salient outcomes of this (as seen in the above figure, after the year 2015).
The Russian Federation

Russia follows a similar story to Venezuela, but in the opposite direction, where the incumbent party implemented policy shifts towards calibrated coercion and public goods, and the state’s human development benefited as a result. A very brief but intense desire to shift towards democracy led to the incumbency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1998). While there was growth in the economy and public goods provision during this time, this administration’s policies are largely considered failures, as its economic policy is attributed to the rise of the Russian oligarchs. It was not until the Putin Regime came to power that consolidation and calibrated coercion were able to be implemented.

As indicated in the above graph, there are three trends in the selected period. The first trend is a sharp negative, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second trend, during the tenure of Boris Yeltsin, was positive but slow (the economic reforms of the Yeltsin administration are widely considered to be failures.). Finally, the third and strongest positive trend of development is marked by the election of Vladimir Putin.

The first president of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was Boris Yeltsin, the most important issue-item of the Yeltsin administration was the revival of the Russian economy. Yeltsin chose to pursue this end aggressively through what is known as economic “shock therapy.” This term “Is an economic theory that says that sudden, dramatic changes in national economic policy can turn a state-controlled economy into a free-market economy. Shock therapy is intended to boost economic production, increase the rate of employment, and improve living conditions” (Investopedia.com, 2022). Despite good intentions, shock therapy has widely been regarded as a resounding failure for economic development.

Vladimir Putin became the acting president of Russia immediately following the resignation of Boris Yeltsin at the end of the year 1999. Subsequently, Putin won the Russian presidential election in the year 2000. In the first year of the Putin regime, Russian GDP was at 259 billion USD, after ten years, state GDP sat at 1.22 trillion USD in 2009.

Putin’s tenure began immediately with government and economic consolidation around his party. Implementing extremely coercive measures geared at controlling the financial oligarchs that rose under the Yeltsin administration. The oligarchs were forced to either submit to state authority or face some form of extra-judicial punishment (Goldman, 2004). From here, using calibrated coercion to garner support and legitimacy, Putin gradually began to open aspects of the government up to civilian participation. The best example of this is the Civic Chamber of
the Russian Federation, which is an institution created at the behest of Putin himself. This is an example of what Owen and Bindman (2017) refer to as a public consultative body (PCB). These bodies allow citizens to air grievances with the Russian state while allowing itself to decide what individuals and what issue items it will respond to. The regime is typically responsive to issues regarding conservation, historical preservation, sports, education, and health care, as well as other issue areas that do not challenge regime supremacy. Control over these institutions allowed for the state to selectively provide for the people and allocate resources in a manner that would strengthen its economy and build popular support. A consolidated party is essential to control institutions such as PCBs and a strong economy is essential to the provision of public goods. This series of events falls in line with the logic of consolidation and nonviolent coercion.
CONCLUDING REMARKS/FUTURE WORK

This research sought to answer the question of whether there is an observable relationship between regime type and the provision of public goods. To answer this question, I theorized that states need to be both consolidated and had to be responsive with institutions and practices appropriate to that end. Dependent on these factors, the state would then provide an appropriate level of public goods. Using the regime typologies I had available to me, I used the Hadenius, Axel, and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism*, and the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, *Autocratic Regimes* datasets.

The outcome of my empirical model fell in line with my expectations, regime tenure has a positive and significant relationship with public goods provision. Dominant-party regimes also had a positive relationship with HDI, however, they lacked statistical significance in the relationship. In future research, I can interact regime type with regime tenure, and I would expect this relationship to be much more pronounced and lend further support to my theory. I can also add nuance to my empirical model by breaking down aspects of personalism and seeing what components of it may interact more with public goods provision than others.

This field of study has the potential to make many contributions both academic and real world. Studying the institutional strengths and weaknesses of authoritarian states could provide the democratic world with a peak at the policy preferences and agendas of the authoritarian world.
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At the time of the publication of this thesis, Benjamin Torres is a Graduate Student at the University of Texas at El Paso in pursuit of a master’s degree in Political Science. His research interests are in comparative politics and international relations. Within these subfields, he studies regime resilience in different types of authoritarian governments and he studies the relationship between international organizations and state governments in relation to conflict and cooperation.

Benjamin comes from a military family and is an El Paso native, having graduated from Eastwood High School in 2011. Shortly after high school, Benjamin enlisted in the United States Army as a Geospatial Analyst. Completing basic training in Fort Jackson, South Carolina, advanced training in Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and joining his permanent party unit in Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he would remain for the duration of his enlistment until receiving an honorable discharge in January of 2015.

Benjamin began his pursuit of higher education the following fall after his discharge at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). His major field of study being political science, and minor field of study being philosophy, and after four years, he was awarded his B.A. in Political Science in the Spring of 2019. After graduating, Benjamin remained on the job market for a year before returning to UTEP for a master’s degree in political science, where he has been assisting as a teaching assistant to introductory level political science classes. His degree is expected to be conferred in the fall of 2022 following a successful thesis defense.