Violent Radicalization In Support For Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders, Collective Action For White Nationalism, And Voting Restrictions

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VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN SUPPORT FOR RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS, COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR WHITE NATIONALISM, AND VOTING RESTRICTIONS

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VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN SUPPORT FOR RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS, COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR WHITE NATIONALISM, AND VOTING RESTRICTIONS

by

ANGEL DAVID ARMENTA, M.A., B.A.

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Abstract

Framing cultural and demographic change as abrupt or continuous is theorized to respectively worsen and reduce intergroup hostility (e.g., anti-immigrant policy endorsement, prejudice, discrimination). Psychological anchors and propellors are theorized to respectively exacerbate and lessen negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change. Two experiments applied the Cultural Inertia Model to 1) identify methods through which majority groups attempt to maintain the status quo as a function of demographic change (i.e., support toward right-wing authoritarian leaders, collective action for White nationalism, and voting restrictions), 2) identify who is more likely (i.e., high levels of national nostalgia) or less likely (i.e., high levels of national prostalgia) to support those methods, 3) identify solutions for reducing those methods, and 4) identify explanations (i.e., group status threat and violent radicalization) for those relationships. The findings were mixed. The results demonstrated that those high in national nostalgia who were presented with abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos reported significantly higher ideological radicalization (Experiment 1) and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (Experiment 1). Contrary to what was predicted, presenting demographic change as continuous (Experiment 2) led to higher violent radicalization among those high in national nostalgia. National prostalgia did not moderate any of the relationships. Group status threat and violent radicalization did not mediate any of the predicted relationships. National nostalgia and prostalgia predicted higher levels in the outcome variables via increases in violent radicalization. Implications of the findings were discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“You end up having … change happening very rapidly, too rapidly for a big portion of the population” – Barack Obama, October 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2021

Around the world (e.g., the United States, Brazil, Europe), there has been a rise in right-wing authoritarian leaders in powerful political spaces. Many of these far-right demagogues go into their respective professions with the goal of undermining democratic institutions and norms (Diamond, 2021). Similarly, there have been multiple instances of collective action by White nationalists. Their common objective: to unite against “outside” threats; Gamboa, 2019; McEldowney, 2018; Robertson et al., 2018). These attempts to “restore” law and order are broadly an attempt to maintain (or return to) the status quo. President Trump’s political slogan, “Make America Great Again”, is one recent example in the US of political campaigns intentionally attempting to revert back to the “good ol’ days” – a time where it was perceived that American conservatism was not facing extinction (Kydd, 2021), and White individuals were the clear majority group within the U.S (Cohn & Caumont, 2016; Zárate et al., 2019).

The perceived decline of White supremacy is a function of racial demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019). By 2055 it is expected that the White population will become a minority group within the US (if all racial/ethnic minorities are considered as one group; Cohn & Caumont, 2016). These demographic shifts are theorized to incite a variety of negative and often extreme and radical reactions (e.g., prejudice, outgroup derogation; Cohn & Caumont, 2016; Zárate et al., 2004; Zárate et al., 2019). The literature on demographic change (i.e., changes to the composition of a population) has generally focused on “what” is produced by change (e.g., mental health, social mobility; Chan et al., 2021; Infurna et al., 2021), and “why” change occurs (e.g., increases in individualism, openness; Gotz et al., 2021; Kusano & Kemmelmeier, 2021).
Although it is important for researchers to study the interpersonal and intergroup reactions and explanations of demographic change, not much research has focused on the methods through which majority groups actively attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of demographic change (apart from policy endorsement).

Political campaigns, collective action, and voting practices are great generators of change and/or stability. Thus, three ways in which groups can maintain the status quo is by supporting right-wing authoritarian leaders, engaging in collective protest, and limiting voting rights. Given the rise in right-wing authoritarian leaders, demonstrations of White nationalism, and policies that make it more difficult to vote, as well as the simultaneously increasing diverse demographics in the US and abroad, it is important to investigate how demographic shifts may influence support for radical leaders, collective action, and voting right restrictions. Thus, this paper investigates violent radicalization in authoritarian leadership support, collective action for White nationalism, and support for voting right restrictions as a function of demographic change. The research questions that were investigated are: 1) how does framing demographic change as abrupt (produced by foreign-born or US-born Latinos) impact right-wing authoritarian leadership support, collective action for White nationalism, and support for voting right restrictions? 2) Does presenting demographic change as continuous reduce conservative reactions? 3) What individual difference variables facilitate or reduce support toward right-wing authoritarian leaders, collective action, and voting restrictions? And 4) What are potential explanations of the effects?

THE CULTURAL INERTIA MODEL

The Cultural Inertia Model (CIM) provides an organizing theory to study reactions toward societal shifts, including demographic change. The CIM has four tenets (in no particular
order) that are analogous to Newton’s laws of motion. First, the CIM argues that *cultures at rest* (i.e., *static cultures*), *desire to stay at rest*. Thus, static cultures (i.e., environments where cultural and demographic stability is generally the norm) are predicted to embrace cultural stability, including demographic stability, and react negatively toward cultural and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019).

Research utilizing the CIM has primarily utilized samples from demographically static cultures to test the CIM tenets, and population characteristics are generally used to label a group or geographical location as static. According to the CIM, the Midwest in the US is an example of a static culture (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2019). The Midwest in the US (e.g., Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois, etc.) is primarily comprised of White conservative individuals (i.e., approximately 70% of residents in the Midwest identify as White and approximately 85% of those White individuals identify as politically conservative). Those demographics have not changed significantly in over a century (Pew Research Center, 2014). In 1890, most residents in Iowa (83%; Durand, 1913a), Michigan (74%; Durand, 1913b), Indiana (91%; Durand, 1913c), Illinois (76%; Durand, 1913d), and Kansas (89%; Durand, 1913e) identified as native-born White. In 2021, most residents in Iowa (90%; United States Census Bureau, 2021c), Michigan (79%; United States Census Bureau, 2021e), Indiana (85%; United States Census Bureau, 2021b), Illinois (77%; United States Census Bureau, 2021a), and Kansas (86%; United States Census Bureau, 2021d) identified as White. The demographic census data between 1890 to 2021 corroborate the findings from the Pew Research Center (2014).

Cultural and demographic change/stability are distinct constructs and processes. However, per the CIM, demographic stability over time suggests that there may also be relatively little variation in local norms, cultural tapestries, and social interactions (Zárate et al., 2019).
Nevertheless, there are multiple examples showcasing that no culture is purely static. For example, around the US, including in the US’s Midwest, individualism has increased (Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Oghihara et al., 2015), conformity in the US has decreased (Bond & Smith, 1996), narcissism among US college students has increased (Roberts & Helson, 1997; Twenge & Foster, 2008), and support for gender equality has increased (Thornton, & Young-DeMarco, 2001).

Second, CIM argues that cultures in motion (i.e., dynamic cultures) desire to stay in motion. Dynamic cultures (i.e., environments where cultural and demographic change is the norm) are predicted to embrace cultural change, including demographic change, and reject cultural and demographic stability. Third, the CIM argues that for every action, there is an opposite reaction (this applies to both the first and second tenets). When changes are introduced into static and dynamic environments that go against their existing norms, individuals who reside in those environments fight back with the motive of maintaining their respective status quo. For instance, Armenta and colleagues (2022) reported that White populations in the Midwest respond with prejudice, threat, and outgroup derogation toward those who are believed to be enacting demographic and cultural change. Other research utilizing the CIM found similar findings (Zárate et al., 2012). Different laboratories have also found that the group prototype (i.e., qualities or characteristics presumed to be typically held by a group; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is important for understanding reactions toward demographic change. For example, when demographic change is made salient to Whites who equate American with White (i.e., the group prototype), these individuals were more likely to support cultural assimilation than White individuals who equate American with all racial/ethnic groups (Danbold and Huo, 2015).
The CIM posits that dynamic and static cultures react negatively toward changes that threaten their respective status quo because the change threatens their identity (Zárate et al., 2012; 2019). In other words, the places people frequent, the individuals people engage with, and the customs people follow all become integrated into the self-concept over time. When demographic and cultural change occurs, those cultural objects, people, and spaces that have become a part of one’s identity, are perceived to be at risk of being lost (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012; 2019).

In line with that hypothesis, social identity theory predicts that individuals and groups are motivated to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and individuals maintain a positive social identity via downward social comparisons. However, when individuals believe that their group status is diminishing relative to other groups, groups experience group status threat (i.e., one’s perceived group status or influence is threatened). Group status threat has been linked to intergroup hostility (e.g., prejudice, discrimination, conservative political positions; Blalock, 1967; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Craig & Richeson, 2014) and has been found to explain the relationship between demographic change and intergroup hostility (Major et al., 2016; Craig & Richeson, 2014).

A driving force of increased group status threat as a result of demographic change is the perception that negative attitudes toward White individuals and positive attitudes toward minority groups are increasing (Norton & Sommers, 2011). However, there is very little evidence to support that belief. In fact, the opposite might be true. Whereas negative attitudes toward White individuals have remained unchanged following the 2016 presidential US election, there have been noticeable increases in negative attitudes toward minority groups (sexual minorities, immigrants, etc.; Crandall et al., 2018).
Not everyone is expected to react negatively toward cultural and demographic change. The psychology of this provides caveats or moderators. Thus, the fourth tenet of the CIM argues that there are *individual difference measures that exacerbate* (i.e., *psychological anchors*) or *reduce* (i.e., *psychological propellors*) negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019). Psychological anchors (i.e., individual difference variables that increase one’s need for stability) and propellors (i.e., individual difference variables that increases one’s need for change) will be further discussed below. Despite there being very limited research on the second tenet of the CIM (Zárate et al., 2019), for the remainder of this paper, the emphasis will be on static cultures and how they react in the face of demographic change.

**Types of Change**

Unlike other research (e.g., Major et al., 2016; Craig & Richeson, 2014), the CIM argues that types of cultural and demographic changes are significant for understanding reactions toward those societal shifts. Past research, for example, demonstrates that presenting cultural and demographic changes as *abrupt* (i.e., sudden, unexpected cultural and demographic changes) produce more negative reactions (e.g., prejudice, anti-immigrant policy endorsements; Armenta et al., 2022) in comparison to presenting the cultural and demographic landscape as *stable*. One explanation is that abrupt cultural and demographic changes are perceived as more difficult to adapt to because abrupt cultural and demographic changes risk a sudden and unexpected loss to one’s identity. Supporting that explanation, collective identity continuity (i.e., the historical representation of a group’s identity is like current representations of a group’s identity) predicts higher support toward leaders who promote past and present collective identity (Syfers et al., 2021).
If identity is important for understanding negative reactions toward perceived abrupt demographic and cultural changes, then keeping one’s identity intact despite demographic and cultural change occurring should reduce negative reactions produced by change. In line with that hypothesis, presenting current cultural or demographic changes as continuous (i.e., changes that are consistent with past patterns of cultural or demographic changes) has been found to be a useful tool for reducing negative reactions toward societal shifts (i.e., reduces fear toward immigrants, ingroup protection, and outgroup derogation; Armenta et al., 2022). However, considering that conservatism is positively linked to intergroup hostility (Armenta et al., 2021; Reyna et al., 2021), socially politically conservative individuals are predicted to react the most negatively toward cultural and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019), and research has yet to control for political ideology in many of the aforementioned experiments (e.g., Armenta et al., 2022), it remains unclear whether social political ideology is a driving force of the demographic and cultural change effects. Thus, the current experiments control for social political ideology to distinguish the effect of demographic change on the outcome variables from their common association with social political ideology.

**METHODS THROUGH WHICH MAJORITY GROUPS MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO**

As the US and abroad become increasingly diverse, it is important to investigate how demographic changes influence politics, especially right-wing authoritarian leadership support. Research demonstrates that there is currently a democratic regression around the world, including in the US. For the first time since the post-cold war era, countries with populations over one million have enacted more right-wing authoritarian (i.e., an extreme inclination and submission toward aggressive and conventional authority figures; Altemeyer, 1988) regimes in
comparison to past years (Diamond, 2021). Altemeyer (1988) argues that right-wing authoritarians value social stability and prejudice toward dissimilar members. More recent research on right-wing authoritarianism corroborates earlier findings of right-wing authoritarianism by demonstrating that those who endorse right-wing authoritarianism are more likely to support prejudice toward outgroup members (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), perceived “dangerous groups” (e.g., gang members, drug dealers), dissident groups, (e.g., protestors, atheists; Asbrock et al., 2010) and ethnic persecution of and aggression toward immigrants (Thomsen et al., 2008). These findings are important given that the US has one of the highest levels of right-wing authoritarianism compared to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Australia, and Canada (Venaglia & Maxwell, 2021).

Because cultural and demographic changes produce social instability and promote multicultural practices (Zárate et al., 2019), opponents of change may turn to leaders who aim to produce social stability such as right-wing authoritarian leaders (Major et al., 2016). Thus, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders and regimes may be a function of perceived abrupt demographic change. Research demonstrates that people become more conservative on a variety of political issues such as anti-immigrant policy endorsement, housing issues, and diversity initiatives as a function of cultural and/or demographic change (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014). These effects are often mediated by group status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major et al., 2016). For many White individuals, especially President Donald Trump supporters (De Jonge, 2016), demographic shifts are viewed as “zero-sum”; Racial/ethnic minorities are perceived to gain status at the expense of White individual’s group status in society (Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014).
Similarly, research regarding the 2016 presidential election demonstrates that “cultural anxiety” (i.e., feelings of being a stranger in one’s own land and feeling like one needs protection from foreign threats) produced by shifts to US demographics was one of the best predictors (above and beyond economic anxiety) of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election (Cox, 2017). Experimental studies support those findings. For example, Major and colleagues (2016) found that if demographic changes (i.e., Whites in the US will become a minority by 2042) are made salient to highly identifying White individuals, they are more likely to support Donald Trump, and less likely to support political correctness and left-leaning presidential candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton in comparison to when demographic changes are not made salient. Group status threat mediated those findings. Those effects have yet to be tested within a CIM framework and solutions using the CIM have not been proposed.

**Collective action**

Collective action is an additional method of facilitating cultural and demographic stability or change. Collective action refers to behaviors that are perceived to improve the well-being/conditions of a group. When individuals believe that they are disadvantaged and their ingroup status is threatened or unstable, they fight to facilitate their well-being of their group (Wright, 1997). Historically, collective action has been used by minority groups as a vehicle to create a more sustainable and equitable world. Recently, however, there has been a significant increase in public displays of collective action for the support of White nationalist beliefs. The US Capitol riot is one example of a highly visible event showcasing support for far-right extremist groups and ideologies (Kydd, 2021).
According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2020), White nationalist groups in the US has increased by 55% since 2017. The rise in White nationalist groups is problematic because pro-White ideologies are associated with increases in domestic terrorism. Many cities in the US (e.g., Charlottesville, VA, El Paso, TX, Pittsburgh, PA, etc.; Gamboa, 2019; McEldowney, 2018; Robertson et al., 2018) have already experienced several displays of White nationalism. In El Paso, TX, for example, a White nationalist drove to El Paso with the motive of stopping a “Hispanic invasion of Texas”. Once the White nationalist reached El Paso, he entered a nearby Walmart supercenter and killed several Latinos (Arango et al., 2019). The event devastated the community.

A common theme among White nationalist dialogue is that they are experiencing a significant amount of collective angst (i.e., anxiety toward the future of one’s group; Wohl et al., 2010) produced by changing demographics (Hawkins & Saleem, 2021). For example, during the Charlottesville riot (a public protest event in support for White nationalist beliefs), many White nationalists expressed their anxiety by shouting that they refuse to be replaced by Jews and other groups. During the riot, White nationalists held tiki torches, carried rifles, and one person who was counter-protesting the event was killed (McEldowney, 2018).

Those feelings of collective angst have been empirically investigated and supported. Across three experiments, Armenta and colleagues (2022) found that abrupt cultural and demographic changes lead to increases in collective angst. In their experiments, the researchers presented information regarding immigration trends in the US, but what was manipulated across the three experiments was how the information was presented. In experiment one, the researchers presented information to White participants from Iowa regarding what immigrant groups are coming into the US and what areas in the US they are immigrating to. What changed across the
groups was whether the immigration surges would lead to abrupt changes to American culture or no changes. In experiment two, Latino participants received vignettes with information regarding Donald Trump’s proposed anti-immigration policies. What changed across two conditions was whether Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant policies were expected to be an abrupt change to (but continue being harsh anti-immigrant policies) or a continuation of harsh anti-immigrant policies proposed by the republican party.

In experiment three (Armenta et al., 2022), White participants from Minnesota were presented with data, graphs, and figures that framed the US to be predominantly White. What changed across the two conditions was whether the foreign-born Latino population was stable then abruptly increasing (i.e., the foreign-born Latino population was stable in the 1900s, but then there was a sudden increase in the foreign-born Latino population in the 2000s) or whether the foreign-born Latino population was continuously changing (i.e., there were increases and decreases in the foreign-born Latino population across time). Both conditions expected the White population to become a minority group by 2030 due to similar increases in the foreign-born Latino population in the 2000s. Thus, the future remained constant across the two conditions. Across all three experiments, participants who were presented with abrupt changes to US demographics and/or abrupt changes to US culture reported significantly higher collective angst on items such as, “I feel anxious about the future survival of the United States if the rate of immigration due to Latino immigrants continues at its present rate” (for Whites), and “I think the future of the Latino-American way of life is under threat from immigration laws” (for Latinos) in comparison to the stability (Experiment 1) and continuous change conditions (Experiments 2 and 3; Armenta et al., 2022).

Voting Restrictions
Voting serves as one of the greatest vehicles to change or stabilize a society. As such, it is no surprise that decisions regarding which US citizens should be allowed to vote (e.g., people with felony convictions, immigrants; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022), how they should be allowed to vote (e.g., mail in ballots, online voting; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022), and through what methods should they be allowed to vote (e.g., 24-hour voting, drive-in voting; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022) have become hot topics in American politics. Whereas proponents of voting rights desire to expand voting rights, opponents of voting rights (generally conservative individuals; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022) strive to limit voting rights. Despite winning the house, senate, and presidency, Democrats, for instance, have failed to pass the John Lewis Voting Rights acts, which aimed to expand voting rights in many of the aforementioned ways (Reimann, 2021). In contrast, conservatives across 49 US states have enacted or proposed over 400 bills aimed at making it more difficult for US citizens to vote (Brennan Center for Justice, 2022).

Restricting voting rights may be a function of increasing diversity. Recent election cycles have been largely determined by minority turnout, and increased minority turnout generally benefits Democrats (Igielnik & Budiman, 2020). Similarly, local demographic change produced by increases in US-born minorities can impact elections. For example, during the 2016 presidential election, demographic changes (i.e., increases in Hispanics in Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington) were associated with increased support toward Donald Trump’s opponents, not Donald Trump, among those who voted during the 2016 presidential election (Hill et al., 2019). In other words, as places become more diverse, those who vote, tend to lean toward democratic candidates. Similarly, research that simulates and predicts how future elections will conclude while considering demographic changes in
generational status, race/ethnicity, and age, have consistently found that future election models favor democrats (American Progress, 2020). Thus, it is no surprise that conservatives have mobilized to strategically suppress minorities from voting.

Endorsement of conservative policies have already been studied within a CIM framework. Past studies have demonstrated that framing demographic change as abrupt to White individuals causes them to be significantly more likely to support conservative policies such as anti-immigrant bills and less likely to support bills that benefit racial/ethnic minority groups (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012). Ultimately, research demonstrates that demographic changes increase voting practices in White individuals for conservative policies. However, not much research has investigated whether types of demographic changes lead to increased support in restricting voting rights. Given that demographic change in the US implies increasing diversity (because demographic change is primarily driven by increases in minority groups such as foreign-born and US-born Latinos), then it is possible that making demographic change salient, to White individuals will increase their support for restricting voting rights, especially when the demographic change is presented as abrupt.

**VIOLENT RADICALIZATION: A NEW MEDIATOR?**

There is a growing body of literature that has investigated violent radicalization – and it is a serious issue in the US (National Institute of Justice, 2015; Swan, 2020). Despite the growing body of research on violent radicalization, there is very little consensus on what violent radicalization is (Borum, 2011). In the literature, most operationalizations of violent radicalization differ in their definitions, but acceptance of physical violence is a central and common theme among all definitions (Borum, 2011). Much of the research on violent radicalization has focused on violent international terrorism. However, some research is now
focused on explaining White nationalism (the number one domestic terrorist threat in the US; Swan, 2020) via violent radicalization.

Recently, Ozer and Bertelsen (2018) have developed their own operationalization of violent radicalization (i.e., a process through which severe intolerance and violent physical aggression toward dissimilar others is adopted). Based on the aforementioned operationalization, previous research has found that violent radicalization is negatively linked to agreeableness and conscientiousness (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). Additionally, research has demonstrated that deficient life skills positively predict extremism (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2020). The National Institute of Justice (2015) has also outlined other predictors of violent radicalization such as: bad mental health, trauma, identity conflict, lack of meaning in life, societal injustice, and strong religious beliefs. Though, there is not much research directly testing whether increasing diversity and/or demographic change leads to increases in violent radicalization.

Violent radicalization has been theorized to explain recent White nationalism demonstrations (Kydd, 2021), however, violent radicalization has yet to be directly studied empirically as a potential mediator. Considering that mass right-wing radicalization is increasing in the US (Smith, 2018), and the CIM proposes that people react against cultural and demographic change with the motive of maintaining the status quo (Zárate et al., 2019), it is possible that violent radicalization is a function of demographic change that also explains increased support toward far-right political leaders (including President Donald Trump), collective action for White nationalism, and support for restricting voting rights.

Additionally, one risk factor for violent radicalization according to the National Institute of Justice is feeling under threat (2015). Given that demographic change has been found to lead to higher levels of group status threat (Major et al., 2016; Craig and Richeson, 2014), and it is
theorized that violent radicalization may also be a function of demographic change, it could be the case that demographic change may effect support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action for White nationalism, and support for voting restrictions through increases in group status threat and violent radicalization.

**US-BORN VERSUS FOREIGN-BORN LATINOS**

The Latino population in the US has grown substantially since the last decade. There are now 62.1 million Latinos living in the US, which accounts for 18.7% of the total population. Among this population, about 67% are US-born and the rest are immigrants (i.e., 33% of Latinos are foreign-born; Passel et al., 2022). Whereas the principal driver of Latino growth in the US has historically been immigration (Stepler & Hugo Lopez, 2016), the primary driver of Latino growth in the US is now increased US births. In fact, it is now the case that there are more Latino immigrants (specifically Mexicans) leaving the US, than coming to the US (Gonzales-Barrera, 2015).

Despite the facts, White Americans continue to overestimate the percentage of unauthorized foreign-born Latinos living in the US and underestimate the percentage of US-born Latinos living in the US (Latino Donor Collaborative, 2021). For example, White Americans report that unauthorized Latinos comprise about 32% of the Latino population (the actual percentage is 13%) and report that only about 34% of Latinos are US-born (the actual percentage is 67%). These numbers might be driven by increases in the dissemination of misinformation.

On the 2016 campaign trail, Donald Trump focused his rhetoric on Latino immigrants. During one of his rallies, Mr. Trump stated:

“*When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you . . .,*” he said. "They’re sending people that have lots of problems,
and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” (as cited in Kopan, 2016).

Mr. Trump’s rhetoric is in line with White American’s favorability toward authorized Latinos (which includes authorized foreign-born immigrants and US-born Latinos) and their unfavourability toward unauthorized Latino immigrants. The majority of White Americans (89%) report favorable attitudes toward authorized Latinos versus a majority of White Americans (67%) report unfavorable attitudes toward unauthorized foreign-born Latinos. In line with those findings, foreign-born Latinos (41%) report more discrimination than third or higher generation of US-born Latinos (27%; Lopez et al., 2018). As a result of increases in prejudice and, in turn, anti-Latino hate crimes (Campbell et al., 2018), more foreign-born Latinos (57%) than US-born Latinos (42%) report having serious concerns about their place in the US (Lopez et al., 2018).

The heightened negative immigrant socio-political climate suggests that perceived increases in foreign-born Latinos should illicit significantly higher negative reactions in comparison to perceived increases in US-born Latinos. While this has yet to be studied via a CIM framework, the CIM does predict that prejudice is not directed equally to all outgroups. Per the CIM, prejudice is heightened and focused on those who are believed to be changing cultural norms, tapestries, and like previous research, the group prototype (e.g., non-English speaking immigrants; Danbold and Huo, 2015; Hopkins et al., 2014; Zárate et al., 2019). Thus, it is predicted that presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt should illicit higher group status threat, violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action for White nationalism, and voting restrictions.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL ANCHORS**
Considering that cultural and demographic change is stressful (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) and inevitable, it is important to investigate who is more likely to react toward change, especially change that is theorized to challenge the self-concept. Thus, the CIM identifies individual difference variables that exacerbate negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change. Those individual difference measures are termed psychological anchors (i.e., an individual difference variable that facilitates one’s need for cultural and demographic stability). A psychological anchor is like a regular anchor. An anchor prevents a vessel from moving forward and onward. Similarly, a psychological anchor prevents an individual from moving forward and onward, and ultimately prevents individuals from accepting change. Thus, those higher in psychological anchors are theorized to react the most negatively toward cultural and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019).

Racial identity is a psychological anchor, among White individuals. Research demonstrates that those higher in racial/ethnic identity react the most negatively toward outgroup members that threaten to change group norms and group dynamics (Quezada et al., 2011). Additionally, highly identifying White individuals report the most support toward President Donald Trump (Major et al., 2016) and the most support toward White nationalism, even after controlling for political ideology (Reyna et al., 2022).

Similarly, national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a past state of one’s country) is theorized to be a psychological anchor because it motivates individuals to idealize the past, ignore current improvements in the present, and derogate those responsible for the perceived current worsening conditions (Armenta et al., 2022; Smeekes et al., 2014). For example, minority groups are often viewed as perpetual agents of change and are often scapegoated for introducing cultural and demographic change to relatively static environments (Armenta et al.,
2022; Zárate et al., 2019). Those higher in national nostalgia are more likely to report prejudice toward ethnic/racial minorities (Armenta et al., 2019; 2022) as well as less support toward social movements and the creation of new social norms (Armenta et al., 2021). This last effect, however, disappeared once political ideology was included, suggesting that nostalgia and political ideology might be testing similar constructs. For the current experiments, it is proposed that national nostalgia will act as a moderator of the relationship between demographic change, such that those high in national nostalgia who believe that abrupt demographic change is occurring will be significantly more likely to report support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency), collective action for White nationalism, voting right restrictions, violent radicalization, and group status threat.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPELLORS**

The CIM also identifies individual difference variables that reduce negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change, or potentially produce a desire for more change. Those individual difference variables are termed psychological propellors (i.e., individual difference variables that facilitate one’s need for cultural and demographic change). A psychological propellor is like a regular propellor. A propellor allows a vessel to move forward and onward. Similarly, a psychological propellor allows an individual to move forward and onward, and ultimately allows individuals to accept or desire change. Thus, those higher in psychological propellors are theorized to react the least negatively toward cultural and demographic change or even react positively toward change (Zárate et al., 2019).

National nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a future state of one’s country) is a new construct that is theorized to act as a psychological propellor because it fosters a sense of pragmaticism that motivates individuals to make better present decisions as a collective to
increase the likelihood of a better future national context (Armenta et al., 2021). Research demonstrates that those who score higher on national prostalgia report more support toward the Black Lives Matter movement and the creation of new social norms, even after controlling for social political ideology (Armenta et al., 2021). Additionally, national prostalgia has been linked to lower negative attitudes toward Latino immigrants, outgroup derogation, and ingroup protection (Armenta et al., 2019). Thus, it is proposed that national prostalgia will act as a moderator of the relationship between demographic change such that those high in national prostalgia who believe that abrupt demographic change is occurring will be significantly less likely to report support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency), collective action for White nationalism, voting right restrictions, violent radicalization, and group status threat.

THE CURRENT EXPERIMENTS

Drawing from the literature above, two experiments investigated methods through which majority groups maintain the status quo. In both experiments, it was predicted that presenting demographic change as abrupt would lead to higher violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, and collective action for White nationalism. In Experiment 2, presenting demographic change as abrupt (compared to presenting demographic change as continuous) was predicted to lead to higher group status threat and support for restricting voting rights. Increases in violent radicalization (Experiment 1 and 2) and group status threat (Experiment 2) was predicted to mediate those effects. National nostalgia and prostalgia were investigated as potential psychological anchors and propellors of the predicted effects (Experiments 1 and 2). Data, code, and materials corresponding to Experiment 1 and 2 can be found here: https://osf.io/fpm8c/?view_only=ae6026ccb6e94ac5ab4082ec114dd82f
Chapter 2: Experiment 1

Whereas outside forces, such as immigrants are perceived as a push from outside, internal motivators, like those born in the host country, might be perceived as natural change and thus produce less reactivity. Thus, Experiment 1 investigated whether presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt would lead to higher violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency), and collective action for White nationalism. It was predicted that those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition would report more support for the outcomes than those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and the control conditions. Those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition were predicted to report higher support for the outcome variables than those in the control condition.

Additionally, those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition who were higher on national nostalgia and national prostalgia were predicted to respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the outcome variables in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and control conditions. Additionally, it was predicted that those high in national nostalgia and national prostalgia in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition would respectively report higher and lower support for the outcomes in comparison to those in the control condition. It was predicted that there would be a significant indirect effect of demographic change on the outcomes through increased violent radicalization, such that those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition would report higher support for the outcome variables than those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and control conditions.
conditions through increases in violent radicalization. Those in the demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition were predicted to report higher support for the outcome variables in comparison to those in the control condition through increases in violent radicalization. Lastly, it was predicted that the effects would persist (i.e., remain significant) after controlling for social political ideology. The conceptual model for Experiment 1 is in Figure 1 below.

![Figure 1: Full Conceptual Model for Experiment 1.](image)

**METHODS**

**Participants**

G*Power computer software was used to determine an appropriate sample size. The analysis utilized the effect size for the relationship between demographic change and group status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014) to try to sufficiently power the relationship between demographic change and violent radicalization. The findings from the power analysis
demonstrated that to detect an effect of $f = .17$ with 80% power (numerator degrees of freedom = 2, number of groups = 3) for a fixed effects model, 315 participants will need to be recruited. I collected 385 participants to account for missing data and outliers. Data collection was restricted only to White individuals from the Mid-West (i.e., White individuals from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, or Wisconsin). Like in previous studies utilizing the CIM, the Mid-West in the US is conceptualized as a static culture because the racial and political demographics in the Mid-West have not changed significantly in over a century (i.e., over 70% of its’ residents identify as White; over 80% of White Mid-West US residents identify as politically conservative; Pew Research Center, 2014).

Data were collected via Amazon Mturk. Cloud Research (i.e., an Amazon Mturk participant-sourcing platform; Litman et al., 2017) was utilized to restrict data collection only to White individuals residing within the Mid-West and to recruit a politically conservative majority. Participants who did not meet the data collection criterion were not allowed to participate in the study. Amazon Mturk and Cloud Research have been utilized in various studies (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020; Litman et al., 2017) and Amazon Mturk has been found to face data quality collection issues. However, recent research demonstrates that there are methods of mitigating poor data quality issues (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020). To prevent low-quality responses, several verification questions were integrated into the survey that were worded similarly to the rest of the items. For example, “What our country needs most is select “somewhat agree” if you are paying attention.” If the participant did not select the option specified in the item, they were kicked out of the survey. Thus, all participants in the final sample passed the attention checks. A total of 2 individuals did not complete the questionnaires at all (and thus were excluded from the
sample) and 63 people were kicked out the survey for failing the attention checks. Thus, the final sample was comprised of 320 White participants from the Midwest. There was a similar number of people between the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos ($n = 105$), abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos ($n = 110$), and no-narrative ($n = 105$) conditions. Most participants identified as female (53%), reported currently living in a somewhat to very urban community (52%) with no to very little demographic change happening in their community (63%), and reported making between $10,000 to $59,999 a year (65%). As expected, all participants identified as White (100%), and most identified as slightly to very conservative (58%) with an average age of 43 ($SD = 12.62$).

**Procedure and Design**

After consenting to participate, participants were asked to complete national nostalgia, national prostalgia, White identity (for exploratory purposes), and social political ideology measures. Afterward, participants were assigned to one of three conditions – Abrupt Demographic Change produced by foreign-born Latinos, Abrupt Demographic Change produced by US-born Latinos, or the control condition. Participants then answered the manipulation checks and violent radicalization measures (in this exact order), followed by the support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for white nationalism questionnaires presented in a random order. Exploratory questions and demographics (e.g., sex, age, income, etc.) were asked at the end of the experiment. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and granted $1.50 for their participation. The average time it took to complete the study was 17 minutes. All materials, including the manipulations and how the variables were measured can be found in Appendices A-D. All items were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant higher support for the construct.
MATERIALS

National Nostalgia

Participants first read a definition of national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a past state of one’s country). Participants then responded to a total of 6 items regarding national nostalgia (Routledge et al., 2008; Batcho, 1995; Smeekes et al., 2014). All items were rated on a 7-point likert scale (1 = not all, 7 = very much). An example item is, “How nostalgic do you feel about the way American society was in the past?” The national nostalgia measure in this sample was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .94$). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 4.59). No other factors were retained.

National Prostalgia

Participants first read a definition of national prostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a future state of one’s country). A total of 6 items were used to measure national prostalgia (Armenta et al., 2021). All items were rated on a 7-point likert scale (1 = not all, 7 = very much). An example item is, “How prostalgic do you feel about the way American society will be in the future?” The national prostalgia measure in this sample was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .94$). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 4.61). No other factors were retained.

White Identity

Participants rated how strongly they identified with their racial group on a 4-item racial identity measure adapted from Phinney (1992). The White identity scale was included for exploratory purposes only and only used 4 items to limit the number of items the participants completed. The items were measured on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is, “I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group.” The
White identity measure in this sample was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .86$). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.81). No other factors were retained.

**Social Political Ideology**

One item measured participant’s social political ideology. The item was as follows: “Here is a 7-point scale on which the social views that people might hold are arranged from extremely socially liberal (left) to extremely socially conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on this scale?” The response options ranged from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).

**Perception of Demographic Change manipulations**

Participants were randomly assigned to either the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition, the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition, or the control condition. In the abrupt demographic change conditions, participants were presented with a series of PowerPoint slides that contained a combination of factual (e.g., White individuals have historically been the majority group in the US; the birth rate of Latinas surpasses the birth rate of White women) and non-factual Latino information (e.g., framing the percentage of Latinos as abruptly increasing in the 2000s) in the US stemming from the 1900s to the present 2020s. The information presented in both the abrupt demographic change conditions was manipulated so that the information corresponded to either Foreign-born Latinos or US-born Latinos.

In both the abrupt demographic change conditions, the US was described as “a nation that thrives on stability.” Participants received a timeline stemming from the 1900s to the present 2020s. The timeline showcased a consistently White America across time. To manipulate abrupt
demographic change, participants received a graph depicting the foreign-born or the US-born Latino population ranging from 1920 to 2020. The data were presented so that the foreign-born (or the US-born) Latino population was stable across time, with a large and sudden increase in the foreign-born (or the US-born) Latino population from 2011-2021. To make the information personal to the participants, participants also received slides with information showcasing that just like the US, the mid-west has been predominantly White, but there has been an abrupt increase in the foreign-born (or US-born) Latino population, which threatened the majority group standing of White individuals in the mid-west. At the end of the PowerPoint presentation, participants were shown a slide demonstrating that the US’s demographics, including the mid-west, are expected to change dramatically as a result of abrupt increases to either the Foreign-born or US-born Latino populations, and that the White population will no longer be the majority group in the US by 2042. Those in the control condition did not receive a presentation and were only asked to complete the measures. For the remainder of the paper, the control condition in Experiment 1 will be referred to as the “no-narrative” condition.

**Manipulation checks**

Participants were asked to complete three manipulation checks. The first two manipulation checks were: “The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US” and “the current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside (i.e., US-born Latinos) the US”. These two items were measured via a 7-point likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The purpose of the first two manipulation checks was to determine whether the presentation successfully manipulated the perception that the demographic changes in the US were a product of either Foreign-born or US-born Latinos. The
third manipulation check was “Do you believe the White American population in the US to be:”. The response choices were 1 (Greatly decreasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly increasing in the future). The response options were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant that the White population was greatly decreasing. The purpose of the third manipulation check was to determine whether those in the abrupt demographic change conditions believed that the White population would decrease in the future more so than those in the no-narrative condition.

**Violent radicalization**

Violent radicalization was measured via 10 items (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). The items were measured via a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is, “In the end, there must be a confrontation – one can’t forever live peacefully, side by side with people who live a completely different life than they are obligated to live.” Another example is, “Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of preventing repression and assault of my people.” The violent radicalization measure in this sample was found to be reliable (α = .94). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 6.63). No other factors were retained.

**Support for Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders**

Eight items measured support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (Rattazzi et al., 2007). All items were measured via a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is, “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leader in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.” The right-wing authoritarianism measure in this sample was found to be reliable (α = .93). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 5.38). No other factors were retained.
Support for Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency

A 4-item measure of support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency was created for the purposes of this study. All items were on 7-point likert-type scales. Those items were: “If Donald Trump runs for president in 2024, I intend to fully support him” (1 – strongly agree to 7 – strongly disagree), “How likely are you to vote for Donald Trump in 2024?” (1 – Extremely likely to 7 – Extremely unlikely), “How warm do you feel toward Donald Trump?” (1 – not at all to 7 – totally), and “How much do you like Donald Trump?” (1 – Dislike a great deal to 7 – Like a great deal). The support for Donald Trump measure was found to be reliable (α = .96). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 3.62). No other factors were retained.

Support for Collective Action for White Nationalism

Collective action for White nationalism was adapted from the White nationalism beliefs scale (Reyna et al., 2022) and measured via 5 items. All items were measured via a 7-point likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is, “Whites should take to the streets to protest demographic changes happening in the America”. The support for collective action for White nationalism scale was found to be reliable (α = .88) in this sample. Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 3.39). No other factors were retained.

Exploratory Items

Participants also answered 2 items regarding their support for the Black Lives Matter movement and their support for the alternative right movement. Those items were “Support for the Black Lives Matter movement” and “Support for Alternative Right movement” (1 – Strongly oppose and 7 – Strongly support). Participants then answered 3 items regarding their beliefs in
minority collusion. Those items were: “Minorities may disagree about some things, one thing they agree on is that they don’t like White people”, Despite their differences, different minority groups regard White people as a common enemy”, and “Different minority groups are willing to cooperate with each other in order to take power away from White people.” The last three items ($\alpha = .88$) had a 7-point response format that ranged from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree) and loaded onto 1 factor (Eigenvalue = 2.59).

Demographics

Lastly, participants answered questions regarding their sex, age, race/ethnicity, income, how urban/rural (1 = Very Urban, 7 = Very Rural) their community is, and the amount of demographic change (1 = Not at all, 7 = Totally) happening in their community.

RESULTS

Primary Analyses

Manipulation Checks

General linear models were utilized to assess the manipulation checks. For the first manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US”), the findings demonstrated a significant main effect, $F(2, 317) = 61.24, p < .0001, \eta_p^2 = .28$. As expected, participants in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change happening in the US was a function of increases in Foreign-born Latinos ($M = 5.11; SD = 1.42$) compared to those who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos ($M = 2.71; SD = 1.76$), $F(1, 317) = 122.48, p < .0001, \eta_p^2 = .28$, and no-narrative conditions ($M = 3.87; SD = 1.54$), $F(1, 317) = 31.96, p < .0001, \eta_p^2 = .09$. Those in the no-narrative condition reported
significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic changes in the US were due to foreign-born Latinos in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition, $F(1, 337) = 28.61, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .08$.

For the second manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside (i.e., US-born Latinos) the US”), there was a significant main effect, $F(2, 317) = 30.76, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .16$. The results demonstrated that participants in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change happening in the US was a function of increases in US-born Latinos ($M = 5.62; SD = 1.45$) compared to those who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos ($M = 4.20; SD = 1.74$), $F(1, 317) = 43.95, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .12$, and the no-narrative conditions ($M = 4.14; SD = 1.52$), $F(1, 317) = 47.54, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .12$. There were no significant differences between those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos and no-narrative conditions, $F(1, 317) = .07, p = .793, \eta^2_p = .0002$.

Finally, there was a significant main effect for the third manipulation check (i.e., “Do you believe the White American population in the US to be:”). The response choices were 1 (Greatly increasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly decreasing in the future) after being reverse coded, $F(2, 317) = 30.76, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .02$. Those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the White population would be decreasing in the future ($M = 3.98; SD = .88$) in comparison to those in the no-narrative condition ($M = 3.66; SD = .92$), $F(1, 317) = 6.28, p = .012, \eta^2_p = .01$. There was no difference between those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos and those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos conditions, $F(1, 317)$
There was also no difference between those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos and no-narrative conditions, $F(1, 317) = .36, p = .549, \eta^2_p = .001$.

**Analytical Approach**

A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to test the effects of type of demographic change on violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism. The analyses were conducted via separate models. Abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos was coded as 1, no-narrative was coded as 2, and abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos was coded as 3. The moderators were mean-centered. In step 1, condition, and national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) were entered into the models. In step 2, condition, national nostalgia (or national prostalgia), and the condition by national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) interaction were entered into the models. If a finding was significant, then in step 3, social political ideology was entered into the model in addition to the aforementioned predictors. One standard deviation above the mean was conceptualized as high national nostalgia and prostalgia. All beta coefficients corresponding to Experiment 1 are unstandardized. Correlations between all variables of interest and means and standard deviations for each variable are reported in Table 1 below. Below are the conceptual models (Figures 2 and 3) corresponding to the interactions between condition and national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) on the dependent variables.
Figure 2: Conceptual Model for the Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables.

Figure 3: Conceptual Model for the Interaction Between Condition and National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables.
Table 1: Correlations Between All Variables of Interest for Experiment 1

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<th>Variable</th>
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<td>3. White Identity</td>
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<td>5. Violent Radicalization</td>
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<td>6. Right-Wing Leaders</td>
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<td>7. Donald Trump</td>
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<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Effects with Demographic Change and National Nostalgia as Predictors

There were no significant main effects of condition predicting violent radicalization, $t(317) = -0.18, p = .860$, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, $t(317) = 0.49, p = .627$, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $t(316) = -1.01, p = .313$, or collective action for White nationalism, $t(317) = 0.17, p = .866$. Despite being a single factor construct, post-hoc review of the violent radicalization measure demonstrated that participants were scoring qualitatively higher on the first five items of the violent radicalization measure regarding ideological extremism and radicalization (e.g., “In the end there must be confrontation – one cannot forever live peacefully, side by side with people who live a completely different life than they are obligated to live”; $M = 3.07; SD = 1.34$) in comparison to the last five items of the measure regarding physical violence (e.g., “Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating proper conditions for those whom one feels a solidarity.”; $M = 2.09; SD = 1.43$). This is consistent with other studies that have studied violent radicalization (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). Given the low variance in the second set of items, for the next set of analyses, a new composite (which was conceptualized as ideological radicalization, i.e., a process through which severe ideological intolerance for dissimilar others is adopted) utilizing the first five items was created and analyzed via post-hoc analyses. This new set of items was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .87$). The post-hoc analyses revealed that there was not a significant main effect of condition predicting ideological radicalization, $t(317) = 0.07, p = .942$.

There were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia for violent radicalization utilizing the original scale (i.e., all 10 items), $t(316) = -1.34, p = .18$, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, $t(316) = -2.03, p = .103$, or collective action for White nationalism, $t(316) = -1.53, p = .126$. Post-hoc analyses revealed that when utilizing the
ideological radicalization measure, the findings demonstrated that there was a marginal overall interaction between condition and national nostalgia on ideological radicalization, $b = -.10$, $t(316) = -1.87, p = .062$. Those high in national nostalgia who were in the no-narrative condition reported significantly lower ideological radicalization, $b = -.508, t(314) = -2.20, p = .028$, compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition. There were no significant differences in ideological radicalization between those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition compared to those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition, $t(314) = -1.24, p = .213$, or those high in national nostalgia and in the no-narrative condition, $t(314) = .867, p = .386$. The relationship between national nostalgia and ideological radicalization was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition compared to all other conditions. These effects are illustrated in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Ideological Radicalization. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting ideological radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

There was also a significant interaction between condition and national nostalgia on support for Donald Trump, $b = -0.20$, $t(316) = -2.34$, $p = .020$. As predicted, those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition reported significantly lower support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition, $b = -0.99$, $t(314) = -2.45$, $p = .015$. There was not a significant difference in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency support between those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition compared to those high in national nostalgia and in the no-narrative condition, $t(314) = -0.639$, $p = .522$. Additionally, there was not a significant difference in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency support between those high in national nostalgia and in the no-narrative condition and those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change conditions.
produced by US-born Latinos condition, $t(314) = .649$, $p = .517$. The relationship between national nostalgia and support for Donald Trump was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition compared to all other conditions. These effects are illustrated in Figure 5 below.

![Figure 5: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Support for Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting violent radicalization by condition. *$p \leq .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.](image)

Next, it was investigated whether the significant interactions found in step 2 of the hierarchical regression analyses would hold even after including social political ideology as a covariate in the model. The findings demonstrated that there were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia on ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses), $t(315) = -1.56$, $p = .120$, or support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $t(315) = -.96$, $p = .339$.

**Effects with Demographic Change and National Nostalgia as Predictors**
There were no significant main effects of condition predicting violent radicalization, \( t(317) = 0.15, p = .881 \), ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses), \( t(317) = 0.24, p = .808 \), support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, \( t(317) = 0.55, p = .580 \), Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( t(317) = -0.96, p = .339 \), or collective action for White nationalism, \( t(317) = 0.15, p = .882 \). There were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia predicting violent radicalization, \( t(316) = 0.05, p = .957 \), ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses), \( t(316) = 0.09, p = .926 \), support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, \( t(316) = -0.07, p = .943 \), Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( t(316) = -0.15, p = .882 \), or collective action for White nationalism, \( t(316) = -0.10, p = .919 \). Since none of the effects were significant, social political ideology was not tested as a covariate.

**Mediation Analyses**

To test the direct and indirect effects of the manipulation on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism through violent radicalization (with all 10 items) via separate models, model 4 from Hayes (2012) PROCESS SPSS macro was used. The models utilized 5,000 bootstrapping resamples to produce 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The first set of models did not control for social political ideology. If the results yielded significant findings, then a second set of models controlling for social political ideology would be run. Figure 6 below corresponds to the conceptual mediation model being tested. The models (See table 2 for full results) where right-wing authoritarian leadership support, \( F(2, 316) = 134.68, p < .001, R^2 = .46 \), support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( F(2, 317) = 25.18, p < .001, R^2 = .14 \), and collective action for White nationalism, \( F(2, 317) = 109.14, p < .001, R^2 = .41 \), were the dependent variables were...
significant. However, the total, direct, and indirect effects in each the models were nonsignificant.¹

Figure 6: Conceptual Model of Condition on the Dependent Variables through Violent Radicalization

¹ An additional post-hoc analysis was conducted to determine whether there was an indirect effect of the manipulation onto support for Donald Trump among those high in national nostalgia through ideological radicalization. This analysis was conducted via SPSS process macro using similar model specifications as those in previous mediation analyses. This analysis, however, utilized model 8. The findings demonstrated that there was not a significant indirect effect of the manipulation onto Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency through ideological radicalization among those high in national nostalgia, $b = -.07$, 95% CI [-.20, .05].
### Table 2: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Condition on the Dependent Variables Through Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (Condition on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Condition on dependent variables through ideological radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>.03 [-.12, .19]</td>
<td>.003 [-.21, .20]</td>
<td>-.03 [-.17, .11]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>-.20 [-.49, .10]</td>
<td>-.17 [-.45, .11]</td>
<td>-.03 [-.13, .08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action for White Nationalism</td>
<td>-.02 [-.14, .11]</td>
<td>-.003 [-.09, .10]</td>
<td>-.02 [-.10, .06]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
Additional Post-hoc Analyses

Since national nostalgia and prostalgia were significantly correlated with the dependent variables, additional analyses were conducted to test the direct and indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the dependent variables through violent radicalization while controlling for social political ideology. Condition was also added as a covariate in order to control for any effects the manipulations may have had on the outcome variables. The analyses were conducted via SPSS process macro and had similar model specifications as those in previous mediation analyses. Model 4 was utilized (See Figures 7 and 8 for conceptual models). Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported below.

![Figure 7: Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables Through Violent Radicalization.](image-url)
Figure 8: Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Violent Radicalization.

**Mediation Models with National Nostalgia as the Focal Predictor**

The models with support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, $F(4, 314) = 134.94, p < .0001, R^2 = .63$, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $F(4, 315) = 91.32, p < .0001, R^2 = .54$, and collective action for White nationalism, $F(4, 315) = 75.03, p < .0001, R^2 = .49$, as dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there was a significant total effect of national nostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism, such that increases in national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome variables. There were also significant direct effects for national nostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (i.e., national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome variables), but not for collective action for White nationalism. Lastly, there were several
significant indirect effects. National nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s presidency, and collective action for White nationalism, through increases in violent radicalization. See Table 3 for a summary of the results.
Table 3: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables Through Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (National nostalgia on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (National nostalgia on dependent variables through violent radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>.33 [.24, .42]</td>
<td>.15 [.07, .23]</td>
<td>.18 [.10, .25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>.28 [.16, .40]</td>
<td>.20 [.08, .33]</td>
<td>.07 [.02, .13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action for White Nationalism</td>
<td>.14 [.08, .20]</td>
<td>.03 [.03, .08]</td>
<td>.11 [.07, .16]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
Mediation Models with National Prostalgia as the Focal Predictor

The models with support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, $F(4, 313) = 126.89, p < .0001, R^2 = .62$, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $F(4, 314) = 85.55, p < .0001, R^2 = .52$, and collective action for White nationalism, $F(4, 314) = 76.78, p < .0001, R^2 = .49$, as dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there was a significant total effect of national prostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, such that national prostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders and Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency. However, there was not a significant total effect of national prostalgia on collective action for White nationalism. There were no significant direct effects of national prostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, or for collective action for White nationalism. Lastly, there were several significant indirect effects. National prostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism, through increases in violent radicalization. See table 4 for a summary of the results.
Table 4: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables Through Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (National prostalgia on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (National prostalgia on dependent variables through violent radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>.21 [.11, .30]</td>
<td>-.06 [-.02, .13]</td>
<td>.15 [.07, .22]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>.13 [.01, .25]</td>
<td>.06 [-.06, .18]</td>
<td>.07 [.03, .13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action for White Nationalism</td>
<td>.03 [-.03, .10]</td>
<td>-.06 [-.11, -.009]</td>
<td>.09 [.05, .14]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
DISCUSSION

The findings from Experiment 1 were mixed. While there were no significant main effects and the majority of the predicted interactions were nonsignificant, there were two significant interactions between the experimental manipulations and national nostalgia on ideological radicalization and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency. Specifically, those high in national nostalgia who believed that abrupt demographic change was being produced by foreign-born Latinos reported significantly higher ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses) and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (as predicted). These findings extend previous findings utilizing the CIM (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012). In addition, there were several indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome variables through increases in violent radicalization. Like in previous collective nostalgia studies (Armenta et al., 2022; Reyna et al., 2022), increases in collective nostalgia led to increased intergroup hostility. However, these findings are unique in that violent radicalization was directly observed as the vehicle that produces systematic intergroup hostility. Further, the national prostalgia findings are inconsistent with previous research (Armenta et al., 2021). National prostalgia predicted higher support for the outcomes via increases in violent radicalization. The findings from Experiment 1 will be further discussed in the general discussion.
Chapter 3: Experiment 2

The purpose of Experiment 2 was to conceptually replicate the effects in Experiment 1 and extend them by investigating whether presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as continuous serves as a solution for reducing hostile reactions. It was predicted that those in the abrupt demographic change condition would report more support for group status threat, violent radicalization, right-wing authoritarian leadership support, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and support for voting right restrictions than those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions. Those in the continuous demographic change condition were predicted to report higher support for the outcome variables than those in the control condition. Additionally, those in the abrupt demographic change condition who were higher on national nostalgia and national prostalgia were predicted to respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the outcome variables in comparison to those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions. It was also predicted that those in the continuous demographic change condition who were higher on national nostalgia and national prostalgia would respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the outcome variables in comparison to those in the control condition.

It was also predicted that there would be a significant indirect effect of demographic change on the outcomes through increased group status threat and/or violent radicalization, such that those in the abrupt demographic change condition would report higher support for the outcome variables than those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions through increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. Those in the continuous demographic change condition were predicted to report higher levels of support for the outcome...
variables than those in the control condition through increased group status threat and/or violent radicalization. The conceptual model for Experiment 2 is in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9: Full Conceptual Model Being Hypothesized for Experiment 2.

METHODS

Participants

G*Power computer software was used to determine an appropriate sample size. The analysis utilized the effect size for the relationship between abrupt demographic change versus continuous demographic change and threat found in previous studies utilizing the CIM (Armenta et al., 2022) to sufficiently power the relationship between demographic change (abrupt versus continuous) and violent radicalization. It should be noted that the effect size ($\eta^2_p = .0297$) found in previous CIM studies (Armenta et al., 2022) was similar to the effect size between demographic change and ideological radicalization found for the simple effects in Experiment 1 ($\eta^2_p = .0299$). The findings from the power analysis demonstrated that to detect an effect of $f =$
.1749 with 80% power (numerator degrees of freedom = 2, number of groups = 3) for a fixed effects model, 318 participants will need to be recruited. I collected 402 participants to account for missing data and outliers.

Like in Experiment 1, Amazon Mturk and Cloud Research (Litman et al., 2017) was utilized to restrict data collection to only White individuals residing in the Mid-west and to ensure a politically conservative majority. Additionally, like in Experiment 1, in order to prevent low-quality responses, several verification questions were integrated into the survey that were worded similarly to the rest of the items. For example, “Attend public protests where if you are paying attention select ‘disagree’.” If the participant did not select the option specified in the item, they were kicked out of the survey. Thus, all participants in the final sample successfully passed all the attention checks. A total of 8 people did not complete any of the questionnaires (and thus were excluded) and 56 participants were booted out the survey, resulting in a final sample of 340 White participants from the Midwest. There was a similar number of participants in the perceived abrupt demographic change ($n = 117$), perceived continuous demographic change ($n = 114$), and control ($n = 109$) conditions. Most participants identified as female (55%), reported currently living in a somewhat to very urban community (57%) with no to very little demographic change happening in their community (57%), and reported making between $10,000 to $59,999 a year (67%). As expected, all participants identified as White (100%), and most identified as slightly to very conservative (52%) with an average age of 41 ($SD = 12.96$).

**Procedure and Design**

After consenting to participate, participants completed the national nostalgia, national nostalgia, White identity (for exploratory purposes), and social political ideology measures. Afterward, participants were assigned to one of three conditions – Abrupt Demographic Change,
Continuous Demographic Change, or the control condition. Participants then answered manipulation checks, the group status threat and violent radicalization items (in this exact order), followed by the support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and expanding voting rights measures presented in a random order. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and granted $1.75 for their participation. The average time it took to complete the survey was 19 minutes. All materials, including the manipulations and the items utilized in Experiment 2 can be found in Appendices A-D.

MATERIALS

Perception of Demographic Change manipulations

Participants were randomly assigned to either the abrupt demographic change, the continuous demographic change, or the control condition. Similar to the manipulations used in Experiment 1, those in the abrupt and continuous demographic change conditions were presented with a series of PowerPoint slides that contained a combination of factual (e.g., White individuals have historically been the majority group in the US; the birth rate of Latinas surpasses the birth rate of White women) and non-factual Latino information (e.g., framing the percentage of Latinos as stable in the 1900s then abruptly increasing in the 2000s or continuously changing across time with increases in the 2000s) in the US stemming from the 1900s to the present 2020s. However, there were noticeable differences between the conditions.

Those in the abrupt demographic change condition received a similar presentation as the foreign-born Latino manipulation described in Experiment 1. In the continuous demographic change condition, the US was described as a “nation that is always changing, always growing.” To further manipulate continuous demographic change, participants received a timeline stemming from the 1900s to the present 2020s. Contrary to the timeline in the abrupt
demographic change condition which illustrated the US as a White country, those in the continuous demographic change condition were shown a diverse US population with pictures of foreign-born Latinos and Latinas who are currently residing in the US. To further manipulate continuous demographic change, participants received a graph depicting the foreign-born Latino population ranging from 1920 to 2020. The data were presented so that the foreign-born population was constantly changing across time. This was illustrated by presenting the foreign-born population as constantly fluctuating with large dips and increases. To make the information personal to the participants, participants also received slides with information showcasing that just like the US, the Mid-west has been predominantly White, and that both the White population and the foreign-born Latino population have increased and decreased across time since the late 1800s. Both the abrupt and continuous demographic change conditions expected a racially diverse America in the 2020s where White individuals are the minority.

Unlike those in the abrupt and continuous change conditions, participants in the Nintendo games condition served as a control group. The purpose here was to control for possible confounding variables that were not controlled for in the no-narrative control condition in Experiment 1 (e.g., receiving a presentation, reading, etc.). The participants received a presentation with a similar structure as the abrupt and continuous demographic change presentations. The information in the Nintendo games presentation was factual and neutral. For example, those in the Nintendo games condition first reviewed a brief history of Nintendo since the 1900s. They then received key points about Nintendo as well as a timeline illustrating the evolution of Nintendo up to the 2020s. Participants also received a graph showcasing factual Nintendo game sales from the 1900s to the 2020s. Finally, the participants received a slide
showcasing the future of Nintendo (i.e., upcoming games and new Nintendo amusement park attractions).

**MEASURES**

The national nostalgia ($\alpha = .92$), national prostalgia ($\alpha = .93$), White identity ($\alpha = .81$), social political ideology, violent radicalization ($\alpha = .94$), support for right-wing authoritarian leaders ($\alpha = .93$), and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency ($\alpha = .97$) items were measured via the same scales as those reported in Experiment 1 and were found to have high internal consistency. Based on principle component analyses, and just like in Experiment 1, the findings revealed that the items loaded strongly onto one factor for each of the scales: national nostalgia (Eigenvalue = 4.39), national prostalgia (Eigenvalue = 4.49), White identity (Eigenvalue = 2.57), violent radicalization (Eigenvalue = 6.78), right-wing authoritarian leadership support (Eigenvalue = 5.26), and Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (Eigenvalue = 3.64). Below are the new items that were used after the manipulation in Experiment 2. All items were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant higher support for the construct.

**Manipulation Checks**

There were three manipulation checks. The first two manipulation checks were: “The current demographic changes happening in the US are drastically different from past patterns of demographic change” and “The current demographic changes happening in the US are consistent with past patterns of demographic change.” The purpose of the first two manipulation checks was to determine whether the manipulations successfully made the participants believe that the current demographic changes occurring in the US were different (i.e., abrupt) or similar (i.e., continuous) compared to past patterns of change, depending on the condition they were in. The third manipulation was the same third manipulation check described in Experiment 1.
**Collective Action**

Collective action was measured via 9-items (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). This collective action scale was different and more subtle than the collective action scale presented in Experiment 1. The reason for changing the collective action scale in Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the predicted effects would be supported if the collective action was framed as behaviors that challenged discrimination toward their racial group, rather than hostile behaviors such as the hostile items presented in the collective action for White nationalism scale in Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they would be willing to engage in different types of action to challenge discrimination toward people of their racial group. Examples of collective action items are: “Attend demonstrations, protests, rallies” and “Contact media to express my opinion.” All items were on a 7-point likert response format that ranged from 1 – Extremely unlikely to 7 – Extremely likely. This collective action scale was found to be reliable (α = .89) in this sample. Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 4.91). No other factors were retained.

**Group Status Threat**

Perceived threat produced by increasing diversity was measured via 4 items. These items were adapted from Outten et al. (2012). An example item is: “My racial group should be threatened by growing ethnic diversity in the US”. All items were on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7). The group status threat scale was found to have poor reliability (α = .53) in this sample. However, based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 1.69). No other factors were retained. Since all items loaded onto one factor and removing items would lower the internal reliability of the scale, all 4 items were included in the scale.
Support for Restricting Voting Rights

A six-item measure of support for restricting voting rights was created for the purposes of this experiment. The items were based on real-world policy and social issues surrounding voting rights in the US. All items were rated on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Response choices were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant more support for restricting voting rights. The items were: “The government should make same-day voter registration legal”, “The government should expand the number of voting locations in each US county”, “All American US election ballots should be in English”, “If elected officials suspect that the results of an election are fraudulent, they should have the authority to reject those results”, “US citizens with past criminal convictions should be allowed to vote in US elections”, and “The government should make it easier for US citizens in jail to vote in US elections.” The support for expanding voting rights scale was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .73$) in this sample. Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.61). No other factors were retained.

Exploratory Items

Participants also answered 1 item regarding their support for the Black Lives Matter movement. The item was the same item as Experiment 1. Participants then answered 3 items regarding their beliefs in minority collusion. The minority collusion items were the same items as those in Experiment 1. Lastly, participants answered 3 items regarding rumination regarding demographic change. The items were: “I keep thinking about how upset I feel about my racial group being replaced by minorities.”, “I keep wishing that demographic change would end in the U.S.”, and “I keep thinking about the negative consequences that increasing diversity in the U.S. will have against Whites.” The last three items had a 7-point response format that ranged from 1
(Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree), had high internal consistency ($\alpha = .92$), and loaded onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.57).

Demographics

Participants answered questions regarding their sex, age, race/ethnicity, income, how urban/rural (1 = Very Urban, 7 = Very Rural) their community is, and the amount of demographic change (1 = Not at all, 7 = Totally) happening in their community.

RESULTS

Primary Analyses

Manipulation Checks

General linear models were utilized to assess the manipulation checks. For the first manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are drastically different from past patterns of demographic change.”), the findings demonstrated a significant main effect, $F(2, 337) = 29.64, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .15$. As expected, participants in the abrupt demographic change condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change rate happening in the US was drastically different from past patterns of demographic change ($M = 5.36; SD = 1.34$) compared to those who were in the continuous demographic change condition ($M = 3.86; SD = 1.73$), $F(1, 337) = 56.60, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .14$, and Nintendo games conditions ($M = 4.33; SD = 1.43$), $F(1, 337) = 29.04, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .07$. Participants in the Nintendo games condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the current demographic change occurring in the US was drastically different than past patterns of demographic change in comparison to those in the continuous demographic change condition, $F(1, 337) = 5.38, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .01$. 
For the second manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are consistent with past patterns of demographic change”), there was a significant main effect, \( F(2, 337) = 33.40, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .16 \). The results demonstrated that participants in the continuous demographic change condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change happening in the US was consistent with past patterns of demographic change \((M = 5.13; SD = 1.32)\) compared to those who were in the abrupt demographic change \((M = 3.52; SD = 1.69)\), \( F(1, 337) = 66.74, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .16 \), and Nintendo games \((M = 4.27; SD = 1.43)\), \( F(1, 337) = 14.30, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04 \), conditions. Additionally, participants in the Nintendo games condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that demographic change currently happening in the US is consistent with past patterns of demographic change in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change condition, \( F(1, 337) = 18.22, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .05 \).

Finally, there was not a significant main effect for the third manipulation check (i.e., “Do you believe the White American population in the US to be:”). The response choices were 1 (Greatly increasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly decreasing in the future) after being reverse coded, \( F(2, 337) = 1.74, p = .176, \eta^2_p = .01 \). Participants, regardless of condition had high support for the belief that the White population would be decreasing greatly in the future \((M = 3.69; SD = 1.02)\).

**Analytical Approach**

A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to test the effects of type of demographic change on group status threat, violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions. The analyses were conducted via separate models. Abrupt demographic change was coded as 1, Nintendo games
was coded as 2, and continuous demographic change was coded as 3. The moderators were mean-centered. In step 1, condition, and national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) were entered into the models. In step 2, condition, national nostalgia (or national prostalgia), and the condition by national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) interaction were entered into the models. If the results yielded a significant finding, in step 3, social political ideology was entered into the model in addition to the aforementioned predictors (See figures 10 and 11 for an illustration of the conceptual models). One standard deviation above the mean in national nostalgia and prostalgia was conceptualized as high national nostalgia and prostalgia. All beta coefficients corresponding to Experiment 2 are unstandardized. Correlations between all variables of interest and means and standard deviations for each variable are reported in Table 5 below.

Figure 10: Conceptual Model Being Tested for the Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables.
Figure 11. Conceptual Model Being Tested for the Interaction Between Condition and National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables.
### Table 5: Correlations Between all Variables of Interest for Experiment 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Nostalgia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Prostalgia</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>White Identity</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Status Threat</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Radicalization</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Leaders</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.72***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>68***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>16**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Restrictions</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>48***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.59</td>
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<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
**Effects with Demographic Change and National Nostalgia as Predictors**

There were no significant main effects of condition predicting group status threat, \( t(337) = -1.43, p = .153\), violent radicalization, \( t(337) = -1.43, p = .153\), support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, \( t(337) = -.16, p = .872\), Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( t(337) = -0.70, p = .482\), collective action for White nationalism, \( t(337) = -0.38, p = .706\), or voting restrictions, \( t(337) = -0.48, p = .630\). Additionally, there were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia for group status threat, \( t(336) = .22, p = .826\), support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, \( t(337) = .07, p = .945\), support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( t(337) = 1.02, p = .310\), collective action, \( t(337) = 1.57, p = .081\), or voting restrictions, \( t(337) = 0.46, p = .646\).

There was, however, a significant interaction between condition and national nostalgia for violent radicalization (utilizing all 10 items), \( t(337) = 2.15, p = .032\) (See Figure 12). Contrary to what was predicted, those who were high in national nostalgia and who were in the continuous demographic change condition reported significantly more violent radicalization in comparison to those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change condition, \( b = .58, t(333) = 2.539, p = .011\). Additionally, those high in national nostalgia who were in the continuous demographic change condition reported significantly higher violent radicalization compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the Nintendo Games condition, \( b = .65, t(333) = 2.426, p = .015\). There was no difference in violent radicalization between those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change condition compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the Nintendo Games condition, \( b = .006, t(333) = .03, p = 980\). The relationship between national nostalgia and violent radicalization
was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the continuous demographic change condition compared to all other conditions (See Figure 12 below).

![Figure 12: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Violent Radicalization. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting violent radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.](image)

Next, the predicted effects were tested while adding social political ideology as a covariate in the model. The findings demonstrated that there continued to be a significant interaction between condition and national nostalgia, $t(335) = 2.26, p = .024$. Contrary to what was predicted, those high in national nostalgia who were in the continuous demographic change condition reported significantly higher violent radicalization in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change condition who were high in national nostalgia, $b = .57, t(332) = 2.529, p = .011$. Like in Figure 12, the relationship between national nostalgia and violent radicalization was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the continuous demographic
change condition compared to all other conditions. Those effects are illustrated below in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Violent Radicalization while Controlling for Social Political Ideology. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting violent radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

**Effects with Demographic Change and National Prostalgia as Predictors**

There were no significant main effects of condition predicting group status threat, t(337) = -1.78, p = .076, violent radicalization, t(337) = 0.65, p = .518, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(337) = -1.05, p = .294, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(337) = -1.22, p = .224, collective action, t(337) = -1.05, p = .296, or voting restrictions, t(337) = -0.67, p = .505. Additionally, there were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia predicting group status threat, t(336) = 0.04, p = .971, violent radicalization, t(336) = 1.10, p = .270, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(336) = -0.26, p = .797, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(336) = 0.93, p = .352, collective action, t(336) = 0.25, p = .800, or
voting restrictions, \( t(336) = -0.67, p = .505 \). Since no significant effects were found, social political ideology was not added as a covariate.

**Mediation Analyses**

To test the direct and indirect effects of the manipulation on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions through group status threat and violent radicalization via separate models, model 6 from Hayes (2012) PROCESS SPSS macro was used. The models utilized 5,000 bootstrapping resamples to produce 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The first set of analyses did not control for social political ideology. If the analyses yielded a significant effect, a second set of analyses controlling for social political ideology were run. The conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 14 below. The models (See table 6 for full results) where right-wing authoritarian leaders, \( F(3, 335) = 116.63, p < .0001, R^2 = .51 \), support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, \( F(3, 335) = 31.62, p < .0001, R^2 = .22 \), collective action, \( F(3, 334) = 26.66, p < .0001, R^2 = .19 \), and voting restrictions, \( F(3, 335) = 43.66, p < .0001, R^2 = .28 \), were the outcome variables were significant. However, there were no significant total, direct, or indirect effects.
Figure 14: Conceptual Model Illustrating the Effect of Condition on the Dependent Variables Through Group Status threat and Violent Radicalization
Table 6. Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of Condition on the Dependent Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (Condition on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through violent radicalization)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat and violent radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>-.05 [-.26, .14]</td>
<td>-.08 [-.23, .06]</td>
<td>-.03 [-.08, .006]</td>
<td>.09 [-.03, .21]</td>
<td>-.04 [-.08, .008]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>-.14 [-.43, .15]</td>
<td>-.11 [-.37, .06]</td>
<td>-.07 [-.18, .01]</td>
<td>.06 [-.01, .14]</td>
<td>-.02 [-.06, .005]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>-.05 [-.23, .13]</td>
<td>-.09 [-.26, .07]</td>
<td>.009 [-.01, .04]</td>
<td>.06 [-.02, .15]</td>
<td>-.02 [-.06, .007]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Restrictions</td>
<td>-.07 [-.19, .05]</td>
<td>-.03 [-.13, .07]</td>
<td>-.04 [-.10, .02]</td>
<td>.01 [-.002, .03]</td>
<td>-.004 [-.01, .0008]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
**Post-hoc Analyses**

Additional analyses were conducted to investigate whether the post-hoc findings from Experiment 1 replicate. Thus, new analyses were conducted via SPSS process macro and had similar specifications as those in previous mediation analyses. Model 6 was utilized (See Figure 15 and 16 for an illustration of the conceptual models). Social political ideology was added as a covariate in the models. Additionally, condition was added as a covariate to account for any effects of condition on the outcome measures. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported below.

![Conceptual Model](image)

**Figure 15.** Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.
Figure 16. Conceptual Mediation Model for the Effect of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.

**Mediation Models with National Nostalgia as the Focal Predictor**

The models (See Table 7 for full results) with support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, $F(5, 333) = 108.78, p < .0001, R^2 = .62$, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $F(5, 333) = 67.96, p < .0001, R^2 = .50$, collective Action, $F(5, 332) = 16.90, p < .0001, R^2 = .20$, and voting restrictions as the dependent variables were significant. All total effects were significant such that national nostalgia predicted higher support for all the outcome variables. Additionally, there was only one significant direct effect. The findings demonstrated that national nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders. There were two significant indirect effects via group status threat, such that national nostalgia predicted increases in support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency and voting restrictions via increases in group status threat, but not support for right-wing authoritarian leaders or collective action. There were several
indirect effects via violent radicalization, such that national nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action via increases in violent radicalization, but not voting restrictions. Lastly, there were several indirect effects via group status threat and violent radicalization, such that national nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action via increases in group status threat and violent radicalization, but not voting restrictions.
Table 7: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (National nostalgia on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through violent radicalization)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat and violent radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>.42 [.33, .52]</td>
<td>.21 [.13, .30]</td>
<td>.02 [-.007, .04]</td>
<td>.17 [.10, .25]</td>
<td>.02 [.008, .04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>.13 [.00, .26]</td>
<td>.01 [-.13, .15]</td>
<td>.04 [.001, .08]</td>
<td>.07 [.02, .14]</td>
<td>.01 [.002, .02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>.25 [.14, .36]</td>
<td>.11 [-.005, .22]</td>
<td>-.02 [-.05, .02]</td>
<td>.14 [.08, .21]</td>
<td>.02 [.007, .04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Restrictions</td>
<td>.09 [.03, .15]</td>
<td>.03 [-.03, .09]</td>
<td>.05 [.02, .08]</td>
<td>.005 [-.02, .03]</td>
<td>.0007 [-.003, .004]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
Mediation Models with National Prostalgia as the Focal Predictor

The model (See Table 8 for full results) with support for right-wing authoritarian leadership, $F(5, 333) = 98.34, p < .0001, R^2 = .59$, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, $F(5, 333) = 68.08, p < .0001, R^2 = .50$, collective action, $F(5, 332) = 20.44, p < .0001, R^2 = .23$, and voting restrictions as the dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there were significant total effects, such that national prostalgia predicted higher support for right-wing authoritarian leaders and collective action, and less support for voting restrictions. Additionally, there were significant direct effects, such that national prostalgia predicted increases in collective action and less support for voting restrictions. There were no significant indirect effects of national prostalgia on the outcome variables via group status threat. There were several significant indirect effects via violent radicalization such that national prostalgia predicted higher support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action via increases in violent radicalization, but not voting restrictions. Lastly, there were no significant indirect effects of national prostalgia on the outcome variables via group status threat and violent radicalization.
Table 8: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Effect</th>
<th>Direct Effect (National prostalgia on dependent variables)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through violent radicalization)</th>
<th>Indirect Effect (Through group status threat and violent radicalization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders</td>
<td>.23 [.14, .33]</td>
<td>.07 [-.008, .15]</td>
<td>.002 [-.009, .02]</td>
<td>.16 [.09, .23]</td>
<td>.003 [-.01, .01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency</td>
<td>.10 [-.02, .22]</td>
<td>.04 [-.09, .16]</td>
<td>.002 [-.02, .02]</td>
<td>.06 [.02, .12]</td>
<td>.001 [-.006, .007]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>.32 [.22, .42]</td>
<td>.21 [.11, .31]</td>
<td>-.0007 [-.01, .008]</td>
<td>.11 [.06, .17]</td>
<td>.002 [-.009, .01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Restrictions</td>
<td>-.06 [-.11, -.002]</td>
<td>-.08 [-.13, -.02]</td>
<td>.004 [-.02, .03]</td>
<td>.01 [-.005, .03]</td>
<td>.0002 [-.002, .002]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
**DISCUSSION**

The findings from Experiment 2 were mixed. While there were no significant main effects and the majority of the predicted interactions were nonsignificant, there was a significant interaction between the experimental manipulations and national nostalgia on violent radicalization. Contrary to what was predicted, those high in national nostalgia who believed that the demographic change in the US was continuous reported significantly higher violent radicalization. These findings are not consistent with other findings that have investigated continuous demographic and cultural change (Armenta et al., 2022). Additionally, there were several indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome variables through increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. Generally, the indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome measures via increases in violent radicalization were larger than any of the other indirect effects. The national nostalgia indirect effects, but not the national prostalgia indirect effects are consistent with previous research (Armenta et al., 2022; Reyna et al., 2022). The findings from Experiment 2 will be further discussed in the general discussion.
Chapter 4: General Discussion

The CIM posits that individuals and groups attempt to remain at rest (i.e., static cultures want to maintain cultural and demographic stability). When external forces challenge cultural and demographic stability (i.e., individuals or groups introduce cultural and/or demographic change), the residents of those static cultures fight back against those impending changes in order to maintain their status quo (Zárate et al, 2012; Zárate et al, 2019). However, not much research has investigated the methods through which individuals and groups push back against demographic change. To fill this gap in the literature, the purpose of the current experiments was to apply the CIM in order to: 1) identify methods through which majority groups attempt to maintain the status quo as a function of demographic change, 2) identify who is more likely to support those methods, 3) identify solutions for reducing those methods, and 4) identify explanations for those relationships.

In Experiment 1, it was first predicted that White participants who were presented with information suggesting that the current demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos was abrupt would report significantly higher support for violent radicalization, right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate solutions for reducing those negative reactions. Experiment 2 also had similar predictions, however, in Experiment 2 it was predicted that presenting demographic change as continuous would reduce group status threat, support for violent radicalization, right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions. The predictions were not supported. Across both experiments and all conditions, participants were equally likely to support the outcome measures.
The null main effects in Experiments 1 and 2 are inconsistent with the CIM and what has been found in the literature. For example, research demonstrates that in the face of cultural and demographic change, individuals are more likely to support conservative policies that limit immigration (Armenta et al., 2022; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Zárate et al., 2012), react with heightened prejudice and derogation toward those who are believed to be enacting cultural and demographic change (Armenta et al., 2022), report more group status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major et al., 2016), and are more likely to support radical leaders such as Donald Trump (Major et al., 2016). It has also been theorized that increasing diversity (e.g., increases in foreign-born and US-born Latinos) often helps democratic US candidates win elections (Hill et al., 2019; American Progress, 2020). Thus, conservatives across the US are making it more difficult for individuals, especially racial/ethnic minorities to vote (Brennan Center for Justice, 2022). Experiment 2’s findings regarding support for voting restrictions are inconsistent with the aforementioned literature. Experiment 2’s findings are also inconsistent with other work regarding framing demographic and cultural change as continuous (Armenta et al., 2022).

One explanation for the null effects might be that the manipulations were successful in making participants believe that 1) the demographic change in the US was a function of foreign-born Latinos (in Experiment 1) or US-born Latinos (in Experiment 1) and 2) the demographic change in the US was abrupt (in Experiment 2) or continuous (in Experiment 2). However, in general, the manipulations were not successful in making those in the experimental conditions believe that the White population would be significantly decreasing in the future more so compared to the control conditions. Ideally, participants who received the experimental manipulations would be reporting stronger support for the belief that the White population is decreasing in the future compared to those in the control conditions. This is problematic because
if demographic change is theorized to incite extreme and negative reactions, but the manipulations are not inciting observable differences (compared to control conditions) in the belief that demographic change is occurring, then it makes logical sense why overall there were no observable differences in the outcome variables. Given that the findings are inconsistent with CIM, the findings could mean that the CIM needs to be revisited and should make the case that not all societal shifts that are theorized to challenge the self-concept incite extreme reactions. Prior research, for example, has demonstrated that people react more negatively toward cultural change in comparison to cultural stability, even when demographic change is made salient in both conditions (Armenta et al., 2022). Thus, perceived cultural change might be inciting hostility, not demographic change. However, more research should be conducted before that is concluded.

The main effects of demographic change found in the literature are often qualified by individual difference measures. In the context of the CIM, individual difference measures that exacerbate or reduce negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change are respectively termed psychological anchors (e.g., national nostalgia) and propellors (e.g., national prostalgia). Recently, there has been increased attention in collective nostalgia and collective nostalgia’s various forms. National nostalgia has been linked to higher negative attitudes toward immigrants (Armenta et al., 2022; Smeekes et al., 2014) and lower support for social movements and the creation of new social norms (Armenta et al., 2021). Similarly, racial nostalgia has been linked to increased support for harsh anti-immigrant policies and White nationalism (Reyna et al., 2022). Thus, focusing on the past, leads to intergroup hostility in the present. In contrast, focusing on the future may benefit the present. Research demonstrates that those higher in national prostalgia report higher support for the BLM movement, the creation of new social norms, and lower
negative attitudes toward immigrants (Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al., 2022). Thus, the second prediction was that national nostalgia would interact with the experimental manipulations, such that those high in national nostalgia and national prostalgia would respectively report increased and reduced support for the outcome variables when demographic change is presented as abrupt.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL ANCHORS**

**National Nostalgia**

The findings were mixed. Despite being positively correlated with the outcome measures, national nostalgia (in Experiments 1 and 2) did not interact with the manipulations to produce differences in group status threat (in Experiment 2) or support for right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (in Experiment 2), collective action for White nationalism, or voting restrictions (in Experiment 2). It was true, however, that in Experiment 1 those higher in national nostalgia who believed that abrupt demographic change was produced by foreign-born Latinos reported higher ideological radicalization compared to those who were in the no-narrative condition. Additionally, higher support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency was reported when highly nostalgic White individuals believed that abrupt demographic change was being produced by foreign-born Latinos in comparison to those high in nostalgia who believed that abrupt demographic change was being introduced by US-born Latinos. The significant interactions from Experiment 1 disappeared after including social political ideology as a covariate in the models. Contrary to what was predicted, Experiment 2 demonstrated that framing demographic change as continuous produced more violent radicalization among those high in national nostalgia compared to when demographic change was framed as abrupt and compared to those who were in the Nintendo games condition. The effects in Experiment 2 were
relatively robust, such that they remained significant even after including social political ideology as a covariate. Given that social political ideology was driving the effects in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2, more research should be conducted to determine which variable (national nostalgia or social political ideology) is a better predictor of intergroup hostility.

Additionally, ideological radicalization did not explain the significant interaction findings mentioned in Experiment 1, and in contrast to what was predicted, there were no significant effects of the condition on the outcome variables through increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. There were, however, several significant post-hoc findings. Independent of social political ideology and the experimental manipulations, across both experiments, increases in national nostalgia predicted higher support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and restricting voting rights through increases in group status threat (in Experiment 2) and/or violent radicalization.

These findings are consistent and somewhat inconsistent with what has been found in the literature. Research demonstrates that collective nostalgia facilitates social connectedness with individuals with whom one shares common memories, cultures, and experiences (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2016). According to the discontinuity hypothesis, collective nostalgia allows individuals to gain a sense of self-continuity (i.e., one’s past self is consistent with one’s present and future self) during periods of disruption that challenge one’s identity (e.g., cultural, and demographic change; Sedikides et al., 2016). In other words, experiencing collective nostalgia offers benefits at the interpersonal and intragroup level (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2016). However, as has been noted above and consistent with the CIM, national nostalgia exacerbates ideological and violent radicalization in the face of
demographic change, especially if the demographic change is framed as continuous and if the demographic change is being produced by foreign-born Latinos. Broadly, the findings from Experiment 1 may suggest that demographic changes produced by outside forces may produce more negative reactions than changes produced by inside forces. Though, more research will need to be conducted to support that hypothesis.

The national nostalgia findings extend findings in the literature by showcasing, for the first time, that those higher in national nostalgia are more likely to support actual physical violence against those who are believed to be enacting demographic change. However, given that social political ideology was driving ideological radicalization in Experiment 1 (but not driving violent radicalization in Experiment 2), more research should be conducted in order to replicate the effects. What remains unclear was why framing demographic change as continuous exacerbated violent radicalization in those high in national nostalgia. This is in contrast with previous literature that demonstrated that framing demographic change as continuous lead to less fear, ingroup protection motives, outgroup derogation motives, and collective angst (Armenta et al., 2022) and higher polycultural ideology (Aguilera, 2022). However, this is consistent with unpublished research from Aguilera (2022) where they find that those who were high in national nostalgia and believed that the demographic change occurring in the US was continuous reported less support for liberal policy positions such as changing the US constitution. Thus, it seems as if the average person is benefiting from framing demographic and cultural change as continuous, but it is exacerbating negative reactions from those high in national nostalgia.

An explanation for why those high in national nostalgia are reacting more negatively toward continuous demographic change may be that it is challenging their view on how the US used to be. Research on toxic forms of collective nostalgia (e.g., racial nostalgia) argues that one
reason for why collective nostalgia leads to intergroup hostility is that it facilitates an idealized world view of a monolithic US (presumably an entirely White US; Reyna et al., 2022). By presenting the demographic landscape in the US as continuous, this might suggest to those high in national nostalgia that the safe and prosperous US that they idealize may have never actually existed and may never exist. What is the result of being challenged? Violent radicalization.

Additionally, across both experiments and independent of social political ideology and the manipulations, national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome variables via increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. These findings are consistent with what the National Institute of Justice (2015) reports on risk factors for violent radicalization (i.e., feelings of threat leading to violent radicalization). However, these findings extend the findings from the National Institute of Justice by demonstrating that high national nostalgia may also be a risk factor for violent radicalization, especially since the beta coefficients of the indirect effects of national nostalgia on the outcome measures via violent radicalization were qualitatively larger and consistently significant compared to the other indirect effects. In addition, these findings suggest that those high in national nostalgia may be supporting right-wing authoritarian leaders, including Donald Trump, and collective action for White nationalism, in order to make the present US more like their idealized version of the US’s past. Lastly, these findings demonstrate that violent radicalization does not only lead to physical intergroup violence, support for violent radicalization also leads to support for radical hostility that systematically targets racial/ethnic minorities.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPELLORS**

National Prostalgia
The CIM posits that there are individual difference measures that facilitate one’s acceptance of change (i.e., psychological propellors such as national prostalgia; Armenta et al., 2021; Zárate et al, 2019). Thus, national prostalgia was predicted to lead to reduced support for the outcome variables in the face of demographic change. However, unlike the national nostalgia findings, national prostalgia did not interact with the manipulations in any of the models. This was somewhat surprising since there is a growing body of research that demonstrates that national prostalgia predicted higher support for agents of change (Armenta et al., 2021; Armenta et al., 2019). Given that national prostalgia produced consistently smaller correlations with the outcome measures compared to national nostalgia, it could be the case that the study was not sufficiently powered to detect the interaction between condition and national prostalgia.

What was most surprising was that national prostalgia was positively correlated with increases in violent radicalization (in Experiment 2) and support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism. This is inconsistent with has been reported by research regarding national prostalgia (Armenta et al., 2021; Armenta et al., 2019). Additionally, whereas national nostalgia is consistently correlated with social political ideology (i.e., in Experiment 1 and 2 and other research; Armenta et al., 2021; Armenta et al., 2022), national prostalgia is not typically correlated with social political ideology (though it was positively correlated with social political ideology in Experiment 2; Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al., 2021).

Previous research on national prostalgia has primarily used liberal samples (e.g., college students, White liberal samples from Amazon Mturk; Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al., 2021). However, in the current experiments, national prostalgia was investigated utilizing two primarily White conservative samples. If national prostalgia isn’t correlated with social political...
ideology, it could be that conservatives and liberals are both reporting similar levels of national prostalgia, but the future they envision is different which, in turn, is driving the direction of the correlations.

In line with the correlational findings, post-hoc analyses demonstrated that independent of social political ideology and the experimental manipulations, national prostalgia indirectly lead to increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism via increases in violent radicalization (Experiments 1 and 2). The findings for national prostalgia on the outcome variables via group status threat were nonsignificant. Though, this could have been due to group status threat having poor internal reliability.

While not consistent with other research investigating national prostalgia (Armenta et al., 2021), these findings may be consistent with other research regarding future-orientation. Research demonstrates that future thinking is linked to motivation and goal planning, which may also influence subsequent behavior (Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Robbins & Bryan, 2004; Nurmi, 2005; Rothspan & Read, 1996). Thus, it is possible that while those high in national nostalgia want to return back to their idealized version of the past, those who are high in national prostalgia are preparing and organizing to achieve an idealized version of the future. And violent radicalization may be the primary driving force that in turn leads to intergroup hostility.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS/LIMITATIONS**

It would behoove future researchers to conceptually replicate the results in these experiments for various reasons. First, the experimental manipulations did not produce observable differences in the belief that the White population would be decreasing the future. For future studies, scientists should either produce stronger demographic change experimental
manipulations and/or identify more appropriate control conditions. Second, the significant findings in Experiment 1 were no longer significant after controlling for social political ideology. While this is consistent with previous research regarding national nostalgia (Armenta et al., 2021), other studies have found that national nostalgia and racial nostalgia effects continue to be significant even after controlling for social political ideology (Lammers & Baldwin, 2018; Reyna et al., 2022). Thus, it is important for future studies to conceptually replicate the findings in order to determine whether presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt produces higher ideological/violent radicalization and support for Donald Trump. Third, future research should replicate the collective action for White nationalism findings utilizing a similar measure as the one administered in Experiment 1. Since the collective action measure was changed in Experiment 2 and was significantly more subtle, it is possible that the collective action being reported in Experiment 2 is different than the collective action being measured in Experiment 1 (despite similar findings being reported).

Fourth, future studies should investigate the relationship between national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome measures via violent radicalization in an apriori fashion and experimentally manipulate national nostalgia and prostalgia to determine whether those variables cause increases in the outcome variables. Like in previous research (Reyna et al., 2022), it might be useful to use writing tasks to manipulate national nostalgia and prostalgia so that the content of what the participants are writing about can be further analyzed. Through this type of design, researchers may be able to observe what exact versions of the past and future those high in national nostalgia and prostalgia are thinking about. Fifth, if demographic change leads to violent radicalization among those high in national nostalgia, then it is important to investigate possible methods for deradicalization.
Lastly, an additional future direction may be to study additional methods that majority groups attempt to maintain the status quo. One method of maintaining the status quo may be participating directly in careers designed to maintain social stability. For example, research demonstrates that students with high anti-egalitarian attitudes are more likely to choose hierarchy-enhancing careers such as being involved in the criminal justice system (Sidanius et al., 2003), presumably as a way to actively maintain social hierarchies in the US (i.e., White individuals at the top of the hierarchy and racial/ethnic minorities at the bottom of the hierarchy).

Similarly, in the face of demographic change, nationally nostalgic White individuals may actively seek roles where they can control the amount of cultural and demographic change occurring, such as joining the Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

**IMPLICATIONS**

In addition to the implications already mentioned, the findings from the current experiments suggest that the way in which information is presented could be fueling the political division in the US and abroad. Thus, political campaigns, news outlets, leaders, etc. need to be careful of the messages they disseminate and who they are disseminating it to. The latest US capitol riot, which led to one person being killed, for example, is argued to have been incited by misinformation propagated by President Donald Trump (Kydd, 2021). The findings from the current experiment suggest that Mr. Trump’s rhetoric may have violently radicalized his supporters, motivated the political violence during the storming of the US capitol, and may have caused several other displays of White nationalism (Arango et al., 2019; Gamboa, 2019; McEldowney, 2018; Robertson et al., 2018). If messages propagated by authority figures are causing radicalization, then policies should be enacted to prevent messages that violently radicalize individuals from reaching fastidious populations such as those high in national
nostalgia – and there should be swift legal and social consequences for those who purposely choose to violent radicalize the masses with their messaging.

CONCLUSION

As the US becomes increasingly diverse, it is important for social scientists to investigate the negative consequences of increasing diversity on intergroup relations. Additionally, it is important for social scientists to study how to reduce those negative consequences. Thus, the purpose of the current experiments was to apply the CIM to study how majority groups attempt to maintain the status quo and solutions for reducing those negative reactions. The findings demonstrated that framing demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt or continuous produced significantly more ideological/violent radicalization among those high in national nostalgia. These findings are telling, given that the US has some of the highest levels of national nostalgia around the world (IPSOS, 2020). For future studies, it is important to study how to successfully reduce violent radicalization in the face of inevitable demographic change in order to facilitate intergroup peace.
References


McEldowney, M. (2018, August 12). What Charlottesville changed: We asked 16 of the most thoughtful people we know to describe the impact of the violence – and how we should think about it a year later. Politico Magazine. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/12/charlottesville-anniversary


Appendices

Appendix A: Moderators (Experiments 1 and 2)
Appendix B: Manipulations (Experiments 1 and 2)
Appendix C: Outcome Variables (Experiments 1 and 2)
Appendix D: Demographics (Experiments 1 and 2)
APPENDIX A: MODERATORS (EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2)

National Nostalgia

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you think about the following questions.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, “nostalgia” is defined as a “sentimental longing for the past.”

1 = Not at all 2 = A Little 3 = Sometimes Moderate 4 = A Lot 5 = A Good 6 = A Much Good

1. How often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way the United States was in the past?

2. How important is it for you to bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way the United States was in the past?

3. How significant is it for you to feel nostalgic about the way the United States was in the past?

4. The way Americans were in the past.

5. The way American society was in the past.

6. The way the American landscape (i.e. surroundings) looked like in the past.

National Prostalgia

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you think about the following questions.

According to our definition, prostalgia is defined as "a sentimental longing for a future."

1 = Not at all 2 = A Little 3 = Sometimes Moderate 4 = A Lot 5 = A Good 6 = A Much Good

Deal
1. How often do you bring to mind possible prostalgic experiences related to the way the United States will be in the future?

2. How important is it for you to bring to mind possible prostalgic experiences related to the way the United States will be in the future?

3. How significant is it for you to feel prostalgic about the way the United States will be in the future?

4. The way Americans will be in the future.

5. The way American society will be in the future.

6. The way the American landscape (i.e. surroundings) will look like in the future.

White Identity Scale

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1 = Strongly agree

2 = Agree

3 = Somewhat

4 = Neither agree nor disagree

5 = Somewhat disagree

6 = Disagree

7 = Strongly disagree

1. I feel good about my racial background. (Reverse coded)

2. I feel a strong attachment towards my own racial group.

3. I have a lot of pride in my racial group. (Reverse coded)

4. I am happy that I am a member of the racial group I belong to.

Social Political Ideology
Instructions: Here is a 7-point scale on which the social views that people might hold are arranged from extremely socially liberal (left) to extremely socially conservative (right). Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1 = Very liberal

2 = Moderately liberal

3 = Slightly liberal

4 = Neither liberal nor conservative

5 = Slightly conservative

6 = Moderately conservative

7 = Very Conservative
APPENDIX B: MANIPULATIONS

Experiment 1 Manipulations

*Foreign-Born Slides*

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Instructions:
Please read the information below carefully as you will be asked to interpret the information in the next slides at the end of the presentation. Before you move forward, read the text below for an overview of this study. If you are viewing this on a phone, it is recommended you view the slides in landscape mode so that the information is easier to read.
```

United States History: A nation that has historically thrived on stability

Overview: American history is marked by stable demographics, despite attempts to change it from Latinos born and raised outside the US. American population has been mapped and traced for many years. The U.S. Census gathers a wealth of demographic data, providing a basic sketch of the American population. This information allows scientist to investigate American society.

In the following slides you will learn a brief history of the foreign-born Latino trends in the United States and how it has not affected American demographics. By using General Social Survey (GSS) data, we have summarized in pictures and graphs the consistent history of the United States. The consistency in American society has been unaffected by foreign-born Latino trends, such that the white majority has had a reliable spotlight in American history.
Key Points about Foreign-born Latinos and change happening from outside the United States:

- Foreign-born Latinos are a racial minority group that are new residents of the US. Because these individuals were born outside the US, they are often raised alongside other Latinos.

- Latino population growth is often driven by increased immigration. Thus, much of the demographic change happening in the US is due to increases in Latino groups coming from outside the US.

- White Americans have been the largest and most consistent group in the United States.

- Historically, the foreign-born Latinos in the US have not impacted the demographic makeup of small and large cities in the United States.

- Recent demographic changes brought on by increased foreign-born Latino birth rates that surpass the birth rates among White American women. For example, White women have a birth rate of 1.6 children per woman, while foreign-born Latinas have a birth rate of 2.0 children per woman.

Historically, American demographics have been stable and White. Latinos born and raised outside the US become small pockets of the population that do not affect local demographics. The timeline below is an illustration of past demographic continuity in the US despite foreign-born Latinos.
Now that you know Latino immigration in the US, here are some noteworthy points about Latino immigration in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

The largest group that has shaped the Mid-West’s demographics have been Latinos born and raised outside the US. Thus, most of the change is produced from outside the US.

Historically, the Mid-West’s demographics have not changed much. In 1890, 8/10 of the population in the Mid-West (~81%) was Native-born White, and 16% of the Mid-West’s residents were foreign-born. In 1910, approximately 9/10 of the population (~86%) was Native-born White, and 15% of Mid-West residents were foreign-born.

In 2018, the Native-born White population in the Mid-West was 82.7%, while the foreign-born population was 9% of the Mid-West’s population, suggesting that the Mid-West’s White population has been relatively stable across time.
Here are more noteworthy points about Foreign-born Latinos in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

Recently, Latino immigration to the MidWest has increased unexpectedly and abruptly. These changes are drastically different compared to past patterns of immigration changes. Since the 2020s, Latino residents, most of which are immigrants, have risen by 142%. Like across the US, Latino birth rates per foreignborn Latina in the MidWest significantly surpasses the birth rates per White American woman. This is likely underestimated because it is difficult for the census to accurately count the number of Latino immigrants in the MidWest.

In line with those changing demographics, in 2018, an average of 495,500 people across the Mid-West were native-born Americans who had at least one immigrant parent. Most of those immigrants were Latino, suggesting that Midwest families are becoming abruptly Latino due to increases in Latinos born and raised outside the US.

A peek into the future...

The Washington DC committee on Race in America released its latest report describing the influence Latinos born and raised outside the US will have on American demographics’ the year 2042.

Projections indicate that in the next 20 years the U.S. will experience drastic demographic change that will impact all Americans. Based on these projections and similar to the future timeline to the right, it is expected that Whites will no longer be the majority in the United States by the year 2042.

Altogether, at this rate, the United States will look quite different in 2042. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin will look drastically different as well due to abrupt increases in Latinos born and raised outside of America.
Instructions:
Please read the information below carefully as you will be asked to interpret the information in the next slides at the end of the presentation. Before you move forward, read the text below for an overview of this study. If you are viewing this on a phone, it is recommended you view the slides in landscape mode so that the information is easier to read.

United States History: A nation that has historically thrived on stability

Overview: American history is marked by stable demographics, despite attempts to change it from Latinos born and raised within the US. American population has been mapped and traced for many years. The U.S. Census gathers a wealth of demographic data, providing a basic sketch of the American population. This information allows scientists to investigate American society.

In the following slides you will learn a brief history of the US-born Latino trends in the United States and how it has not affected American demographics. By using General Social Survey (GSS) data, we have summarized in pictures and graphs the consistent history of the United States. The consistency in American society has been unaffected by US-born Latino trends, such that the white majority has had a reliable spotlight in American history.
Key Points about USborn Latinos and change happening from within the United States

- US-born Latinos are a racial minority group that has been in the US for centuries. Because this group was born in the US, they are often raised along side White Americans.

- The Latino population growth is often perceived as coming from immigration, but in fact much of the US population demographic changes are from population changes happening within the US such as increases in US-born Latino American groups.

- White Americans have been the largest and most consistent group in the United States, despite living along side US-born Latinos.

- Historically, the US-born Latinos in the US have not impacted the demographic makeup of small and large cities in the United States.

- Recent demographic changes brought on by increased US-born Latino birth rates that surpass the birth rates among White American women. For example, White women have a birth rate of 1.6 children per women, while US-born Latinas have a birth rate of 2.0 children per women.

Historically, American demographics have been stable and White. Latinos born and raised inside the US become small pockets of the population that do not affect local demographics. The timeline below is an illustration of past demographic continuity in the US despite US-born Latinos.
PLEASE READ: The bar graph below depicts the historical growth of the US-born Latino population in the United States. Collectively, this is what change in US-born Latinos looked like in the past.

**GRAPH 1: PERCENTAGE OF US-BORN LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1920 TO 2020**

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Now that you know US-born Latinos in the US, here are some noteworthy points about US-born Latinos in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

The largest group that has shaped the MidWest’s demographics have been Latinos born and raised inside the US. Thus, most of the change is produced from within the US.

Historically, the MidWest’s demographics have not changed much. In 1890, 8/10 of the population in the MidWest (~81%) was Native-born White. In 1910, approximately 9/10 of the population (~86%) was Native-born White.

In 2018, the Native-born White population in the MidWest was 82.7%, suggesting that the Mid-West’s White population has been relatively stable across time.
Here are more noteworthy points about US-born Latinos in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

Recently, US-born Latinos in the Mid-West have increased unexpectedly and abruptly. These changes are drastically different compared to past patterns of US-born Latino changes. Since the 2020s, US-Latino residents have risen by 142%. Like across the US, Latino birth rates per US-born Latina in the Mid-West significantly surpasses the birth rates per White American woman. This is likely underestimated because it is difficult for the census to accurately count the number of US-born Latinos in the Mid-West.

In line with those changing demographics, in 2018, an average of 495,500 people across the Mid-West were native-born Americans who had at least one non-White parent. Most of those non-White parents were Latino, suggesting that the Mid-West families are becoming abruptly Latino due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside the US.

A peek into the future...

The Washington DC committee on Race in America released its latest report describing the influence Latinos born and raised within the US will have on American demographics by the year 2042.

Projections indicate that in the next 20 years the U.S. will experience drastic demographic change that will impact all Americans. Based on these projections and similar to the future timeline to the right, it is expected that Whites will no longer be the majority in the United States by the year 2042.

Altogether, at this rate, the United States will look quite different in 2042. Altogether, at this rate, the United States will look quite different in 2042. **Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin** will look drastically different as well due to abrupt increases in Latinos born and raised inside of America.
Experiment 2 Manipulations

**Continuous Demographic Change Slides:**

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**Instructions:**
Please read the information below carefully as you will be asked to interpret the information in the next slides at the end of the presentation. Before you move forward, read the text below for an overview of this study. If you are viewing this on a phone, it is recommended you view the slides in landscape mode so that the information is easier to read.

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**United States History:**

**Always growing, always changing**

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**Overview:** American history is marked by continuous demographic changes brought on by Latino immigration. American population has been mapped and traced for many years. The U.S. Census gathers a wealth of demographic data, providing a basic sketch of the American population. This information allows scientists to investigate American society.

In the following slides you will learn a brief history of the changes in Latino migration trends in the United States and how it has greatly impacted American demographics. By using General Social Survey (GSS) data, we have summarized in pictures and graphs the continuous changes the United States. These changes have been largely caused by shifting demographics caused by Latino immigration trends. The consistency in American society has been affected by Latino immigration trends, such that the White majority has struggled to remain in the spotlight in American history.
Key Points about Latino immigration and change in the United States

- Latino immigrants are foreignborn people who were born and raised outside of the US, alongside other Latinos such as Mexicans.

- Historically, the Latino immigrant groups in the US have impacted the demographic makeup of small and large cities in the United States.

- Latino immigrants have been the largest and most consistent immigrant group in the United States.

- Inter-ethnic families have been increasing over the last 10 decades.

Historically, the change of American demographics is due increases in Latino immigration. Latino immigrants became large pockets of the population that changed the local demographics. The timeline below is an illustration of past demographic change due to Latino immigration.
PLEASE READ: The bar graph below depicts the population in the United States per decade by group. Collectively, this is what Latino immigration change in the past looked like.

![Graph 1: Percentage of Foreign-Born Latinos in the United States: 1920 to 2020](image)

Now that you know Latino immigration in the US, here are some noteworthy points about Latino immigration in the Mid-West (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

The largest group that has shaped the Mid-West’s demographics have been Foreign-born Latinos.

Historically, the Mid-West’s demographics have had continuous changes. In 1890, 8/10 of the population (~81%) was Native-born White, and 16% of Mid-West residents were foreign-born. In 1910, approximately 9/10 of the population (~86%) was Native-born White, and 15% of the Mid-West’s residents were foreign-born.

In 2018, the Native-born White population in the Mid-West was 82.7%, while the foreign-born population was 9% of the Mid-West’s population, suggesting increases and decreases across time to both the White and immigrant populations, including the foreign-born Latino population.
Here are more noteworthy points about Latino immigration in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin):

Recently, Latino immigration to the Mid-West has continued to change like it has in past years. In other words, these immigration trends are consistent with past patterns of change. Since the 2020s, Latino residents, most of which are immigrants, are now 10% of the population across the Mid West.

In line with those changing demographics, in 2018, an average of 495,500 people across the Mid-West were native-born Americans who had at least one immigrant parent. Most of those immigrants were Latino, suggesting that some Mid-West families are becoming Latino (like how past families were becoming Latino) due to recent increases in foreign-born Latinos.

A peek into the future...

The Washington DC committee on Race in America released its latest report describing the influence Latino immigrants will have on American demographics by the year 2042.

Projections indicate that in the next 20 years the U.S. will experience continued demographic change that will impact all Americans. Based on these projections and similar to the future timeline to the right, it is expected that Whites will no longer be the majority in the United States by the year 2042.

Altogether, at this rate, the United States will look quite different in 2042. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin will look different as well due to continuous changes in Latino immigration.
**Instructions:**
Please read the information below carefully as you will be asked to interpret the information in the next slides at the end of the presentation. Before you move forward, read the text below for an overview of this study.

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**Nintendo History:**
Play anywhere, anytime, with anyone

**Overview:** Nintendo has been around for over 100 years. It was originally founded in 1889, but started off as a company that made card games. In 1985, Nintendo released their first gaming console in the United States. The release was met with success due to the Super Mario game which helped video games regain their popularity.

In the following slides you will learn a brief history of Nintendo within the United States and how the gaming console has evolved over the years. By using the Nintendo corporation data, we have summarized in pictures and graphs the history Nintendo has in the United States.
Key Points about the evolution of Nintendo in the United States:

- In 1959, Nintendo allowed the use of Disney's characters on Nintendo's playing cards. This deal sold at least 600,000 card packs in a single year.

- In 1962, Yamauchi made Nintendo public and the company was listed in Osaka Stock Exchange Second division.

- Over time, there was a shift in the market. Nintendo and Sega began exporting to America and were the major competitors in the market.

- Nintendo has sold more than 5.1 billion video games and over 800 million hardware units globally.

Below is a timeline highlighting the evolution that Nintendo gaming consoles have gone through over the years.
Here are some facts about Nintendo and some of its consoles:

Nintendo is made of three Kanji characters: にん, とう, and ど. If you were to translate Nintendo, you would get the phrase “leave luck to heaven.”

The Switch has remained the world’s bestselling gaming console with 101.9 million devices shipped since early 2017, according to VGChartz. Sony and Microsoft have shipped 17.3 million and 11.5 million PS5s and Xbox Series consoles, since late 2020.
Here are more facts about Nintendo and some of its consoles:

Gunpei Yokoi was a janitor at Nintendo. Believe it or not, he would go on to create Donkey Kong, Metroid, and the Game Boy. Over the next twenty years, Yokoi eventually served as Nintendo’s general manager.

While Nintendo is largely a gaming company, Nintendo has thought about making a smartphone in the past.

The NES had over 700 games.

The Wii U was not as successful as the original Wii.

A peek into Nintendo’s future...

Nintendo’s stock has lost a quarter of its value over the past 12 months due to concern over the Japanese gaming giant’s decelerating growth and competitive challenges. However, the Switch’s longevity, which has surpassed other gaming consoles, suggests it can easily withstand the competitive pressure.

APPENDIX C: OUTCOME VARIABLES

Manipulation Checks (Experiment 1)

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1. The current demographic changes happening in the US are mostly due to increases in Latinos born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US.

   1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Disagree  3 = Somewhat Agree nor  4 = Neither  5 = Somewhat Agree  6 = Agree  7 = Strongly Agree

2. The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside (i.e., US-born Latinos) the US.

   1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Disagree  3 = Somewhat Agree nor  4 = Neither  5 = Somewhat Agree  6 = Agree  7 = Strongly Agree

3. Do you believe the White American population in the U.S. to be: (Reverse coded)

   1 = Greatly decreasing  2 = Slightly decreasing  3 = Slightly staying  4 = Slightly increasing  5 = Greatly increasing

   in the future  in the future  the same  in the future  in the future

Manipulation Checks for Experiment 2
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1. The current demographics changes happening in the US are drastically different from past patterns of demographic change.

   1 =        2 =        3 =        4 = Neither        5 =        6 =        7 =
   Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

2. The current demographic changes happening in the US are consistent with past patterns of demographic change.

   1 =        2 =        3 =        4 = Neither        5 =        6 =        7 =
   Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

3. Do you believe the White American population in the U.S. to be:

   1 = Greatly  2 = Slightly  3 =        4 = Slightly  5 = Greatly
   decreasing decreasing staying increasing increasing
   in the future in the future the same in the future in the future

**Group Status Threat**

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1. My racial group should be threatened by growing ethnic diversity.

2. My racial group will benefit from increasing diversity in the U.S.

3. How much influence will ethnic minorities have over the U.S. in the future?

4. How much influence will White Americans have over the U.S. in the future?

**Violent Radicalization (Experiments 1 and 2)**

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1. Those groups in the society that do not support the good and correct life should be deprived of their rights.

2. It is a waste of time to try to find common solutions with those whose thoughts about life are completely different than ours.

3. It is wrong to make compromises with what oneself stands for.

4. It is wrong and immoral to live peacefully side by side with people who do not live the good and correct life.
5. In the end, there must be a confrontation – one cannot forever live peacefully, side by side with people who live a completely different life than they are obligated to live.

6. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating proper conditions for those with whom one feels a solidarity.

7. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating a new and better society.

8. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating proper conditions for those one is closely connected to.

9. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating respect for one’s own rights and security.

10. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of preventing repression and assault of my people.

**Right-Wing Authoritarian Leadership Support (Experiments 1 and 2)**

**Instructions:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Somewhat Disagree  3 = Neither  4 = Somewhat Agree  5 = Strongly Agree

1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

2. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create useless doubts in people’s mind.
3. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest method would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.

4. What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order.

5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn.

6. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity.

7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leader in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

8. Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

**Collective Action for White Nationalism (Experiment 1)**

**Instructions:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1 = Strongly Disagree  2 = Somewhat Disagree  3 = Neither  4 = Somewhat Agree  5 = Strongly Disagree  6 = Agree  7 = Strongly Agree

1. I am supportive of organizations/groups that bring attention to White concerns.

2. I support public protests where concerns regarding Whites in the US being replaced by an influx of racial/ethnic minority groups are discussed.

3. I support public protests where concerns regarding Jews controlling the American economy are discussed.

4. Whites should take to the streets to protest demographic changes happening in America.
5. Whites should band together as a collective to garner support for policies that ensure a White majority.

**Collective Action (Experiment 2)**

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you would be willing to engage in different types of action to challenge discrimination toward people of your racial group. Please be honest.

The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1 = Extremely
2 = Moderately
3 = Slightly
4 = Neither
5 = Slightly
6 = Moderately
7 = Extremely
8 = Unlikely
9 = Unlikely
10 = Unlikely
11 = Unlikely
12 = Likely
13 = Likely
14 = Likely
15 = Likely

1. Act as a spokesperson on the issue.
2. Spend time working for a fundraiser.
3. Attend meetings or workshops.
4. Raise issues in groups or organizations.
5. Attend demonstrations, protests, rallies.
6. Contact media to express my opinion.
7. Sign an online or written petition.
8. Contact an elected official.
9. Help organize a rally or demonstration.

**Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency (Experiments 1 and 2)**
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1. If Donald Trump runs for president in 2024, I intend to fully support him.

1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Somewhat Disagree, 3 = Neither, 4 = Somewhat Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree

2. How likely are you to vote for Donald Trump in 2024?

1 = Extremely Unlikely, 2 = Moderately Unlikely, 3 = Slightly Unlikely, 4 = Neither, 5 = Slightly Likely, 6 = Moderately Likely, 7 = Extremely Likely

3. How warm do you feel toward Donald Trump?

1 = Not at all, 2 = A Little, 3 = Slightly, 4 = Moderately, 5 = Considerably, 6 = A lot, 7 = Very much so

4. How much do you like Donald Trump?

1 = Dislike a Great deal, 2 = Dislike a moderate, 3 = Dislike a little, 4 = Neither like nor dislike little, 5 = Like a moderate amount, 6 = Like a great deal amount, 7 = Very much so

Voting Restrictions (Experiments 2)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

1 =  2 =  3 =  4 = Neither  5 =  6 =  7 =
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

1. The government should make same-day voter registration legal. (Reverse coded)
2. The government should expand the number of voting locations in each US county. (Reverse coded)
3. All American US election ballots should be in English. (Reverse coded)
4. If elected officials suspect that the results of an election are fraudulent, they should have the authority to reject those results. (Reverse coded)
5. US citizens with past criminal convictions should be allowed to vote in US elections. (Reverse coded)
6. The government should make it easier for US citizens in jail to vote in US elections. (Reverse coded)

Exploratory Items (Experiment 1)

Instructions: To what degree do you oppose or support the following social and political movements in the U.S.?

1. Support for Alternative Right movement.

1 =  2 =  3 =  4 = Neither  5 =  6 =  7 =
Strongly Oppose Somewhat Oppose nor Somewhat Support Strongly Oppose Oppose Support Support

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2 = 2 = 3 = 4 = Neither 5 = 6 = 7 =
Strongly Oppose Somewhat Oppose nor Somewhat Support Strongly Oppose Somewhat Support Support

3. Minorities may disagree about some things, but one thing they agree on is that they don’t like White people.

1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = Neither 5 = 6 = 7 =
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

4. Despite their differences, different minority groups regard White people as a common enemy.

1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = Neither 5 = 6 = 7 =
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

5. Different minority groups are willing to cooperate with each other in order to take power away from White people.

1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = Neither 5 = 6 = 7 =
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree nor Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

Exploratory Items (Experiment 2)
Instructions: To what degree do you oppose or support the following social and political movements in the U.S.?


Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

2. Minorities may disagree about some things, but one thing they agree on is that they don’t like White people.

3. Despite their differences, different minority groups regard White people as a common enemy.

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your responses back to you.

4. Different minority groups are willing to cooperate with each other in order to take power away from White people.

5. I keep thinking about how upset I feel about my racial group being replaced by minorities.

6. I keep wishing that demographic change would end in the U.S.
7. I keep thinking about the negative consequences that increasing diversity in the U.S. will have against Whites.
APPENDIX D: DEMOGRAPHICS (EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2)

Instructions: Please answer the following questions about yourself.

1. What is your biological sex?
   1 = Male  2 = Female  3 = Prefer not to say

2. How old are you?

3. What is your gender identity?
   1 = Man  2 = man  3 = Non-binary/third gender  4 = Transgender  5 = Other  6 = Prefer not to say

4. What is your race/ethnicity (Select all that apply)?
   1 = White  2 = Black  3 = American  4 = Asian  5 = Native  6 = Latino  7 = Other

5. How would you describe the city or town you live in?
   1 = Very Urban  2 = Urban  3 = Somewhat Urban  4 = Not Urban  5 = Somewhat Rural  6 = Rural  7 = Very Urban or Rural

6. How would you describe your political party preference?
   1 = Strong Democrat
   2 = Not Strong Democrat
   3 = Independent, Lean Democrat
   4 = Independent
   5 = Independent, Lean Republican
   6 = Not Strong Republican
   7 = Strong Republican
   8 = other (specify)_____________________

7. How much demographic change do you think is happening in your local community?
1 = Not at all  2 = A little  3 = A moderate amount  5 = A lot  6 = Very much
Vita

Angel D. Armenta received his Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from California State University, Bakersfield in 2015. Angel then earned his Masters of Arts in Experimental Psychology from California State University, Fullerton in 2017. Angel’s work investigates how societal shifts impact intergroup relations. Angel currently has 10 publications in outlets and journals such as the American Psychological Association, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, and Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy.

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