The Latinx Community, Anti-Black Racism and Forward-Looking Collective Moral Responsibility

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THE LATINX COMMUNITY, ANTI-BLACK RACISM, AND FORWARD-LOOKING
COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my loved ones, especially my mother and father. I am grateful to all of you for your unconditional love and unwavering support.
The Latinx Community, Anti-Black Racism, and Forward-Looking Collective Moral Responsibility

by

Julisa Jazsmine Fernandez-Rivera, B.A.

Thesis

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Introduction

In the legal, social, and moral sense, structured collectives, such as corporations, institutions, companies, and clubs, can be held responsible for their wrong doings.¹ For example, in October 2016, the transportation network company, Uber, failed to inform its drivers and customers of a massive data breach and cover up. Uber had paid hackers $100,000 to destroy the stolen information of 57 million drivers and customers. As a result, two employees left the company, Uber drivers affected by the data breach were offered free credit monitoring and identity theft protection, and an apology on behalf of all Uber employees was given to the public by CEO Dara Khosrowshahi (“Uber Concealed Massive Hack that Exposed Data of 57m Users and Drivers”). On March 5, 2018, Pennsylvania Attorney General, Josh Shapiro, filed a lawsuit against Uber for violating Pennsylvania’s data breach notification law and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“Attorney General Shapiro Files Lawsuit against Uber for Massive Data Breach”). In this example, Uber is being held morally responsible, because they have performed actions (such as to not notifying their drivers in a timely manner of the data breach) for which they are independently morally blameworthy (Shockley 2013). We are able to hold companies like Uber and other collectives morally responsible for their actions because these kinds of collectives meet the conditions or have the properties necessary to qualify as a collective agent.

Though the literature on how we hold certain collective agents, like corporations and companies, morally responsible is an interesting debate that is currently ongoing, I am more interested in the instances where non-agential collectives have been the recipients of moral responsibility. Furthermore, my thesis will argue that there are certain non-agential collectives

¹ I want to quickly point out that though I will be identifying certain entities as collectives, this does not automatically entail that these entities are collective agents.
that can be morally responsible. At first, such an idea may go against our intuitions due to our understanding of the concept of responsibility and our understanding of how we hold collectives responsible in the moral sense. Nonetheless, and contrary to the current literature on collective agency, I believe upon further inspection the idea that non-agential collectives can rightfully bear moral responsibility will become more conceivable.

So what are the available accounts, and what kinds of collectives do they believe can be collective agents and collectively responsible? The current literature on collective responsibility provides three different approaches in order to make the case that a collective can be a collective agent and thus the bearer of collective moral responsibility. These three approaches include organized structure, shared intentions, and shared attitudes. To illustrate these approaches, I will be using the case of Uber as an example. However, note that for my thesis, my interest is not in how corporate bodies, such as Uber, can be the bearers of collective moral responsibility. For the moment, however, let’s consider the case of Uber so that the terms of the debate become clear.

Referring back to the Uber scandal, Uber is a collective that is structured in such a way that it has collective decision-making procedures (Shockley 2013). Therefore, Uber is able to govern itself, and in doing so, the company made the decision to pay the hackers and refrain from notifying its drivers. By being able to govern itself and have representative decision-making procedures, Uber meets the standard of a collective agent.

Uber also qualifies as a collective agent through the shared intentions approach. One account, shared we-beliefs, relies on the notion that a company has positions that are rule-based social positions (Tollefsen 2018). Agents who are in the position of representative authority,

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2 Though many philosophers believe that only agents, at the individual and collective level, can be the bearers of moral responsibility, there are some philosophers who believe collectives can be non-agents and yet bearers of moral responsibility.
such as the board of directors, are responsible for the beliefs and the intentional states of the group (company). Therefore, they have the ability to act on behalf of the group (Tuomela 1989). On this account of shared intentions, individual members, rather than the group as a whole, generate collective moral responsibility. The CEO of Uber, Khosrowshahi, is in the authoritative position to apologize to the public on behalf of Uber. Regarding shared attitudes, collective moral responsibility can be located in the shared attitudes of the members of a group. The idea behind this approach is that members of a group participate in the production of an “attitudinal” climate. Therefore, those who share and accept the same potentially harmful attitudes can increase the likelihood of harm (May 1992). In the case of Uber, one could claim that members who shared and accepted careless attitudes toward Uber drivers lead to the company’s action of refraining from notifying drivers about the data breach.

These are just three ways in which we can understand how some collectives, like Uber, can be collective agents. In the current literature on collective responsibility, collectives that are genuine collective agents are the kind of groups that have decision-making and executive processes, they can also deliberate, decide, and carry out actions. This kind of control (being able to deliberate, decide, and then commit an act) that collectives have over their actions brings to light how they can be held morally responsible.

For the approaches I have discussed, I used Uber as an example. These approaches not only take into account how groups of multiple individuals, such as corporations or governments, can be collective agents, they also take into account groups as small as two individuals. For example, approaches regarding shared intentions can explain how two individuals can have an interdependent intention to paint a house. Yet, there are cases where social groups are treated as subjects of moral responsibility without being collective agents. One way in which this
phenomenon has occurred is with the Latinx ethnoracial community.

Black, Afro-Latinx, and non-black Latinx academics and social activists have been vocal about the Latinx ethnoracial community’s own anti-black racism. An example of this anti-black racism in this ethnoracial group is the concept, *mejorar la raza*. Mejorar la raza translates into “better or improve the race.” The idea behind this concept is that being black or indigenous is not good for a person socially and economically. According to this concept, the way a Latinx person can benefit their ethnicity or community is by assimilating into whiteness. An example as to how Latinx people have experienced *mejorar la raza* is when they are encouraged by relatives or close friends to marry a white or Anglo individual (and even a light or fair Latinx person) in hopes that the offspring will be born with light skin and other valued European physical features.

The underlying belief is that what has substantive value in a person’s life is to be socially regarded as a white person, to be a part of the white racial group. As a result of *mejorar la raza*, the Latinx ethnoracial group, has faced criticism for having this belief.

Academics, social activists, and the everyday person have expressed anger, pain, and disgust due to the harm that results from this belief. When critics argue that this statement is harmful towards black and afro-Latinx individuals, and they make the case that members of the Latinx ethnoracial community should not share or accept this belief, they are not only addressing the individual Latinx people who believe in *mejorar la raza*. Critics are addressing and treating the Latinx ethnoracial community as one collective. By this, I mean that even though I do not share or accept *mejorar la raza*, the Latinx ethnoracial community as a collective does. Therefore, that demand to take action and do away with this belief is a responsibility that has been placed on the Latinx collective. Yet, it is unclear as to why this may be the case. The Latinx ethnoracial community can be a collective, but due to the lack of decision-making processes and
organization, this community does not reach the bar of a collective agent. As stated earlier, collective agency appears to be an important factor when debating which groups can be attributed moral collective responsibility.

In this thesis I will argue how a non-agential collective, particularly the Latinx collective, can be collectively responsible in the forward-looking sense to address the anti-black racism it has been benefiting from. I will do so by using Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes. In the first chapter, section one, I will provide a literature review on theories in philosophy of action. By doing so, it will become clear as to why the Latinx collective does not qualify as a collective agent. Then, in subsection one, I will discuss two problems I have formulated: The Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective and the Problem of Unity. Both problems are meant to show why it is not easy to attribute collective responsibility to the Latinx collective. In section two, I will explain why the Latinx ethnoracial community is a collective.

In chapter two, section one, I will discuss P.F. Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes, moral responsibility, and the moral address condition. Then, I will explain in subsection one theories by Deborah Tollefsen and Kay Mathiesen to demonstrate how a collective can be held collectively responsible. I will be referring to the works by Tollefsen and Mathiesen to show that Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes can be and have been applied to collectives. As a result, it will be made clear that the way collectives can justifiably be the subjects of reactive attitudes is if they meet Strawson’s moral address condition. However, it will appear that the Latinx collective cannot be attributed reactive attitudes, because only collective agents are able to meet the moral address condition. Yet, there are still cases where we do apply reactive attitudes to non-agential collectives. Tollefsen and Mathiesen accounts are not able to take into account these cases. I will argue in section two that there is a way for non-agential collectives, in certain
circumstance, to meet the moral address condition. The difference is non-agential collectives do not meet the moral address condition in the way individual agents do. In order to show this, in subsection two, I will review and utilize a case by Virginia Held and present a criteria as to how a non-agential collective, such as the Latinx collective, can meet Strawson’s moral address condition and justifiably be collectively responsible.

For the final chapter, in section one, I will explain the differences between the kinds of responsibility there are: backward-looking and forward-looking. I will then discuss the fact that reactive attitudes exist in the forward-looking sense, and similar to backward-looking reactive attitudes, also do grounding work in the subsection of section one. In section two, I will explain why forward-looking collective responsibility is the correct route to go when discussing responsibility and non-agential collectives. Afterwards, in the subsection of section two, I will provide two historical events in the Latinx collective to demonstrate it is possible for a non-agential collective to become a goal-oriented collective. Lastly, in section three, I will discuss how the Latinx collective meets the criteria I advanced in chapter two, and is the appropriate subject of forward-looking collective responsibility.
Chapter 1: Collectives: Agential and Non-Agential

As conversations regarding race and racism manifest more in society, I have noticed an increase in conversations treating ethnoracial communities as if they are collectives. More importantly, some of these conversations treat these communities as if they are collective agents. As if an ethnoracial community has the collective intention or goal to act maliciously or be willingly ignorant. My concern is how can that be the case, and can we actually make the statement that ethnoracial communities have the right structure to share intentions or goals? It is also unclear if we can regard ethnoracial communities as collectives. To address these concerns, I will turn to collective action theory to see if it is possible to make these kinds of statements about ethnoracial communities. My goal is to reveal that we cannot. However, it is the case that ethnoracial communities, such as the Latinx collective, are indeed collectives.

In subsections one through three of section one, I will review three different collective agency theories with the aim of providing a general idea of what collective agency refers to and what kind of collectives qualify as collective agents. Given the theories I will focus on, it will be unpromising to think of the Latinx ethnoracial community as a collective agent. I will refer to this as the Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective and discuss it further in subsection four of section one. Next, there are some concerns towards the idea of the Latinx ethnoracial community being referred to as a collective at all. For instance, the Latinx ethnoracial community has diverse cultural practices, languages, religions, etc. There is not a clean-cut example of what a “Latinx” person or community is. Some people would argue that it is problematic and even inaccurate to refer to this vast array of people as a collective because this community is not a collective in the way that groups of people in a social club or company are. I will refer to these specific concerns as the Problem of Unity and discuss it further in subsection
five of section one. Given these two important problems, I will explain my stance as to why the Latinx community should be referred to as a collective, more specifically, a non-agential collective in subsection six of section one.

1. **STANDARD VIEWS ON COLLECTIVE AGENCY**

   Broadly speaking, collective agency theorists, such as Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and Raimo Tuomela are interested in how or whether collectives can have intentions, beliefs, attitudes, and perform actions. Though it may be problematic that I am lumping together these distinct (and very different) accounts, my reason for doing so is to show why it is unpromising to think of the Latinx community as a collective agent. Research by Bratman, Gilbert, and Tuomela focuses on the kinds of collectives that can have joint intentions, beliefs, and engage in collective actions. In a very general sense, when a collective can have joint intentions, joint beliefs, mutual awareness or common knowledge, and joint actions, they can qualify as collective agents. Though Bratman, Gilbert, and Tuomela have different sets of conditions for collective agency, there is an underlining similarity that the collective in question should have the capacity to share an intention or a goal.⁴

   **1.1. Michael Bratman: Theory of Shared Agency**

   Bratman’s account is a theory of shared agency. For both cases, Bratman is interested in how the individuals in small groups have the capacity to act together or engage in shared intentional activities.⁴ Some cases of shared intentions Bratman provides are singing a duet, walking together, and painting a house together. Bratman’s aim is to provide sufficient conditions for agents to share an intention to walk together, sing a duet together, paint a house

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⁴ By “goal-driven intention,” I am simply referring to the scenario where a collective of two or more members share a “We will do ‘X,’” intention.

⁴ The difference between shared intentions and modest sociality is that cases of modest sociality are extensions of cases of shared intentions.
together, etc. (2009). The way in which he sets these conditions is by analyzing the structures (which are metaphysical, conceptual, and normative) central to individual agency.

Bratman (2013) asserts that a theory, called planning theory, of individual agency can serve as a model for shared intentions and modest sociality. His reason for this is the continuity thesis (Bratman 2013). The continuity thesis states there is a continuity between individual planning and shared intentionality.  

According to planning theory, individual agency is grounded on planning structures. The way in which we share our agency and achieve complex goals is through our capacity for planning. Bratman’s (2013, 15) theory states that within plans are intentions that guide, coordinate, and organize one’s thoughts and actions. Due to how intentions are embedded in plans (the guiding, coordinating, and organizing roles that they play), this theory states that intentions are plan states (Bratman 2013). Plans for Bratman are mental states rather than abstract structures. According to Bratman (1999), plans involve a commitment to an action. In order to have a plan to do something, it must be true that you plan to do it. For example, in order for Bratman to have a plan to roast lamb, it is required that Bratman genuinely intends to roast the lamb (1999).

According to Bratman (2013), plan states have to follow the norms of intention rationality. These norms are consistency, agglomerativity, means-end coherence, and stability. For plan states to be consistent, one’s intentions have to be consistent with one’s internal beliefs. Agglomerativity refers to how various intentions come together and form a larger intention. The means- ends coherence just means insofar one intends a particular end, one must also intend the means. By this, Bratman means that when a plan is initially formed, it is not complete, there are

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5 If this is the case, then a theory of shared agency would not require a fundamentally new element in the way that Gilbert’s account does (this will be clarified in the next subsection).
gaps in one’s plans because it is not necessary for one to conceive of every possible physical movement one would need to take to successfully execute the plan. The means-end coherence demands that the agent be able to fill in the gaps to one’s plan when the time comes. Lastly, stability refers to the pressure put on an intention to refrain from reconsideration and change (Bratman 2009). To clarify the planning theory of individual agency, take for example a case where I have the intention to have, make, and drink coffee at my home tomorrow morning. In order to achieve my goal, my plan states will be composed of my intentions to make sure I have a coffee machine, coffee grounds, that I wake up in the morning, that I am at my house, that I know how to use the coffee machine, etc. These plan states would also have to adhere to the norms of rationality. For example, in regards to the norm of consistency, one way in which my intention to have and drink coffee at home is not consistent with one of my internal beliefs is if I had the intention to have, make, and drink coffee at home in the morning but I did not have the belief that I would need a coffee machine or coffee grounds.

So far, I have thoroughly discussed Bratman’s theory of how individual agents make plans in order to carry out an action. Recall that having a plan means that one is committed to an action. This is important because the way Bratman attempts to carry the planning theory over to shared intentionality is by asserting that the capacity for shared intentional activity is grounded on individual planning activities (which are directed towards acting jointly. Bratman’s (1993, 106) proposed structure of participating planning agents sharing an intention is as follows:

“We intend to J if and only if

1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.

2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a and 1b, and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because
of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b.

3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us.”

Let’s consider each intention. Shared intentional activity is constituted by the inter-related and inter-connected planning structures of the planning agents. In Bratman’s example of two planning agents sharing the intention to paint a house, each individual would intend they paint the house together. The subplans of the participating agents mesh in order to avoid creating a condition that is too strong or demanding. For example, it would be too much to demand for the subplans of each planning agent to completely match because there could be features about their subplans that they do not know (about yet) or care about. One of the planning agents may not care about which store the paint brushes are bought from, they only care that they have paint brushes once they begin to paint. The main point is planning agents can intend to paint the house- they can have this shared intention- without knowing or seeking to know each other’s subplans and, though their subplans need to mesh as some level, they do not have to mesh right away. As long as their subplans mesh, they can intend that they ‘J,’ or as in this case, paint the house together (Bratman 1993).

Recall that Bratman is focused on small scale cases. The planning agents (the individuals participating in a shared intentional activity) should be in a position to have an idea of each other’s mind and actions. In other words, to have an idea of their intentions and beliefs in regards to the intended shared activity. Bratman claims being able to “know” is not centered on the “deep- psychological” mindset of the participants. Bratman (2014, 57) states, “...we can here think of common knowledge as consisting in a hierarchy of cognitive aspects of the relevant individuals: it is common knowledge among A and B that p just when (a) A knows that p, (b) B knows that p, (c) A knows that B knows that p, (d) B knows that A knows that p..., and so on.”
To clarify, the relevant individuals who intend to share an activity are aware of each other’s intentions and beliefs that they are going to carry out the shared activity. As an example, it would not be common knowledge if there was a misunderstanding where A knows that $p$, but B does not know that $p$. Referring back to Bratman’s example of two individuals intending to paint a house together, if A knows of the shared intention (painting the house together), but B does not know of the shared intention then according to Bratman’s theory these two individuals will not be painting the house together. They both could be painting the house at the same time, but it is not a shared activity.

**1.2. Margaret Gilbert: Joint Commitment**

Gilbert’s (2015) work falls into the domain of what she refers to as the philosophy of social phenomena. The philosophy of social phenomena aims to explore a specific case of the human condition- how is it that we do things together and how do we understand that we are doing something together? How is it that we paint houses together, sing a duet together, walk together and know that we are doing these activities together? Her account of how two or more people act together is grounded on commitments, specifically joint commitment. To clarify how joint commitments come into existence, Gilbert (2015, 9) begins by discussing personal commitments.6

According to Gilbert (2015), personal commitments come about when an individual decides to do an activity. There are two features of a personal commitment, a process and a product. ‘X’s’ decision to do ‘Y’ is the psychological process. In this step, ‘X’ is exercising their own personal will. The product of the personal commitment is normative. By that, I mean ‘X’ is now committed to doing ‘Y’. Commitments, in themselves, are rationally binding. There is a

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6 I want to note, though, that though joint commitment and personal commitments are similar on Gilbert’s view, they are not identical.
normative constraint. In other words, reason requires that an agent carry out actions that correspond with their commitment. ‘X’ acts in accordance with their commitment (Gilbert 2015). For example, if I make the decision to make coffee and not tea in the morning and I do not change my mind, then, I would be acting irrationally if I were to have tea in the morning instead of coffee. Since our personal commitments are a result of our own decision-making to carry out an action, we are in the position to void or rescind our personal commitments just by changing our mind. (Gilbert 2015). In my coffee example, if I change my mind and decide I want tea in the morning instead of coffee, I am not acting irrational because I changed my mind.

A joint commitment is a commitment of two or more participants. Take for example a philosophy graduate admission committee. The participants of the committee act as a single body. When they send out the letters of acceptances, they use the pronoun “we.” Their letters of acceptance might read, “Dear ‘X’, we are excited to inform you,” or “we have come to the conclusion,” so on and so forth. According to Gilbert (2015), all joint commitments come into existence because the participants are jointly committed to achieving a goal as a single body. Whenever individuals want to do an activity together, such as painting a house together, walking together, or singing together, there is a goal they are aiming for as a body. Therefore, joint commitments function as instructions for the participants to act, as best they can, as a goal-endorsing body. These “instructions” guide the participants’ actions. If, for example, I am in a joint commitment with someone to sing a duet Friday evening at ‘X’ location, then in order to achieve this goal, I am going to have to arrive at ‘X’ location Friday evening.

Note that in Gilbert’s view, joint commitments are not a product of an aggregation of the participants’ personal commitments. The participants are not jointly committed by being personally committed in the same way. For example, let’s say three philosophy graduate students
are in a joint commitment to write a paper together, the joint commitment is not the summation
or result of each individual students’ commitment to write the paper. Rather, the students in this
example are the subject of the joint commitment. In other words, there is only one joint
commitment, not three. Gilbert (2015) states that the participants are jointly committed to carry
out specific actions so that they “emulate a single Φ-er.”

Joint commitments come into existence in a way that is similar to personal commitments.
However, each participant must openly express their personal readiness to enter into a joint
commitment and espouse a certain goal as a collective. To understand how this is the case, let us
look at the psychological and normative aspects of a joint commitment.

The psychological aspect of a joint commitment is the participants’ beliefs, or the
acceptances of a rule, so that the collective can achieve its goal. The normative aspect is that all
participants are now committed (or have an obligation), as a body, to follow through with the
commitment (Gilbert 2013, 8). There is mutual belief between the participants and this is what
allows them to carry out whatever goal the collective is endorsing. Take for example a case
where two philosophy graduate students, Erin and Salena, are in a joint commitment to write a
paper together for a conference. This joint commitment comes into existence when Erin openly
expresses her readiness to write this paper with Salena and vice versa. As a result of this joint
commitment, both graduate students now stand in a special relation to one another. Each
participant is obligated to act a particular way in order to achieve the goal of writing this paper.
In the event that Erin violates the commitment by acting in a way that hinders the achievement of
their goal, Salena is in the position to object to Erin’s actions. Gilbert (2015) explains the reason

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7 I want to make note that, according to Margaret Gilbert, participants of a joint commitment are obligated to the
commitment. However, her usage of the word, ‘obligation,’ is meant to be understood as ‘normatively forceful
duties.’ It is not her intention to assert that the participants are morally bound to the commitment.
for this is the fact that joint commitments require mutual conformity. Each participant in a joint commitment has the right to demand that others conform to the commitment and their obligation are to perform their part in fulfilling the commitment.

As of now, I have reviewed Bratman’s account of shared agency and Gilbert’s account of joint commitment. On Bratman’s account, a shared intention is the result of the intentions of the planning agents to engage in a joint activity. Gilbert’s account, on the other hand, states that a new entity comes into existence when a joint commitment is formed. The last theory I will be reviewing is Tuomela’s account of joint intentions

1.3. Raimo Tuomela: Joint Intentions in the We-Mode Sense

Tuomela’s analysis of the social world centers on the conceptual and philosophical study of social practices and social institutions. Tuomela’s work ranges from analyzing how the social realm is created to how small groups perform joint actions. Tuomela’s (2006) theory of joint intentions is as follows:

(a) “(JI) Agents A1… Am have the joint intention to perform joint action X if and only if

(b) These agents have the we-intention (or are disposed to form a we-intention) to perform X; and

(c) There is mutual belief among them to the effect that (a).”

Regarding condition (a), Tuomela (2006) states joint intentions are an aim to bring about a certain state of affairs, they are the basis for joint actions. Similar to Bratman and Gilbert, the examples of joint intentions that Tuomela gives are singing a duet together, cleaning a house together, and planning to carry a table together. When Tuomela claims that joint intentions are the basis of joint actions, what is being asserted is that each (or at least most) participants are
intentionally performing their part on the basis of the we- intention to perform the joint action. For example, if three people jointly intend to paint a house together, each participant will intentionally perform their part due to the we- intention to paint the house. In order to understand what a we- intention is, let’s discuss condition (b) and what kinds of intentions there are.

Tuomela (2006) claims there are two kinds of intentions: action and aim intentions. Action intentions conceptually require the agent to believe that, individually, they can bring about the intended action. For example, my intention to open a window is action intention because I can satisfy this action by myself. For aim intentions, the agent assumes that their actions have the possibility to contribute to the result the group is aiming for. We- intentions are aim intentions. In order for participants to satisfy a joint intention, each agent has to perform their respective parts, and they must do so with the desired outcome in mind. To clarify what this means, imagine that you and two friends have entered into a joint intention to paint a house. In order to satisfy this joint intention, you and your friends are going to perform specific actions (buying brushes and paint, meeting your friends at the correct location at the agreed upon time, etc.) because you all believe that your actions will contribute to the house being painted. In fact, it is a condition for we-intending agents to intend to do their part in order to satisfy the joint action. Each participant believes that their action has the possibility to contribute to the painting of the house (the joint action).

Now, in order to understand condition (c) of Tuomela’s argument, we first need to look at two more underlying conditions for we-mode joint intentions. First, there is a rationality constraint for the we- intention. This condition states in order for an agent to rationally we-
intend they (1) believe they can perform their part of the joint action and (2) the agent believes that they and the other participants can perform the intended joint action (Tuomela 2006). For example, I have to believe that I can do my part and paint the house, and I also have to believe that I and my fellow house painters have the ability to perform the intention to paint the house.

Second, a necessary condition for the we-mode joint intention is the notion of we-attitudes. A we-attitude is an attitude a participant of a collective has if and only if the attitude was formed on the participant’s belief that the other participants have that attitude (Tuomela 2006).

Referring back to my example of the three agents and the painting of the house, according to Tuomela’s theory, the three agents must have the intention to jointly paint the house. Furthermore, it is necessary that the three agents have the we-intention to jointly paint they house. Each agent should intend to act accordingly so that the joint activity can be satisfied. Lastly, there should be a mutual belief between all three participants that they share the attitude to jointly paint the house.

As one can see, the collective action theories set the bar high. Only certain collectives qualify as collective agents. So, can the Latinx community qualify as a collective agent? Well, as of right now, Latinx community does not appear to meet a necessary condition in order to be a collective agent. I will be referring to this necessary condition as the mutual belief condition. For my argument, when I refer to the mutual belief condition, I am referring to the phenomenon where members of a collective agent all share the belief that they are working towards their collective goal. Recall the two graduate students working on a paper together, Salena and Erin. The mutual belief condition refers to Salena’s belief that she and Erin are working on a paper together and that Erin believes this, and Erin’s belief that she and Salena are working on a paper
together and that Salena believes this.

In the next subsection, I will explain the Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective. Note, the mutual belief condition is not the only condition the Latinx community fails to meet, but it is simply the most salient. The lack of a tight structure in the Latinx community does not allow it to share a mutual belief. Therefore, the Latinx community does not qualify as a collective agent. Furthermore, even if the members of the Latinx community may share similar beliefs about the culture, food, language, etc. and though they may even share the belief that certain features and characteristics define what it is to be “Latinx,” the lack of a structure does not allow for the emergence of the kind of mutual belief we see in the collective agency literature.

1.4. Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective

In the beginning of this chapter, I stated my stance on the Latinx ethnoracial community being a collective encounters two different kinds of problems. The first problem that I will be discussing in this section is the Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective. In order to explain this problem, I will discuss why the Latinx community does not qualify as a collective agent for any of the accounts I reviewed in the last section and, in doing so, I will explain why the Latinx community cannot meet the mutual belief condition. The way in which I will do this is by discussing three features that are present in collective agents. By explaining this problem, I can then move on to explain the Problem of Unity as both problems complement one another by making it appear to be the case that the Latinx community cannot even be a non-agential collective.

From the literature review I provided, the kinds of collectives Bratman, Gilbert, and Tuomela are considering have, in some varying sense, three key features that are important to
consider. These three features are a) structure, b) organization, c) decision-making procedures. These features are essential because they help in the coordination and functioning of the collective agent and they play a role in the collective agent having the capacity to satisfy the mutual belief condition. Though these features may be more apparent in larger collective agents, like corporations and institutions, they can still be found in the small collective agents. The problem is the Latinx community that I am focusing on does not have these features in the way that collective agents do.

In the case of structure, let’s consider a collective that would qualify as a collective agent for all three accounts I reviewed and compare it with the Latinx community. For the example, let’s say the collective is a university philosophy club of six members. The members of the club qualify as being a shared agency, having a joint commitment, and having a joint intention. Let’s also say the goal or aim of the philosophy club is to successfully function as a club. In this case, the foundation of the philosophy club is tightly structured. By “tightly structured,” I mean the club has features such as appointed positions like President, Vice President, Secretary, etc., there may be a mission statement or goal, the club may state that it has values, a constitution, rules, and so on and so forth. The Latinx community is not a tightly structured group. This community does not have appointed roles, a defined and set list of values, or rules.

Continuing with the philosophy club example, the structure of a collective allows it to have varying degrees of organization. To clarify, the members of the club who are in leadership positions have obligations to carry out certain actions that should maintain the existence and functioning of the club. However, how well these members carry out their actions (these actions could be making sure the club follows the university’s rules, guidelines, and requirements) depends on how well organized the club is. My point is when collectives have some kind of
organization (rules and decision-making procedures), they are moderately or tightly structured (they have the capacity to carry out the decision-making procedures, and can form collective intentions and actions). I think it is important to point out here there are certain Latinx people, such as Dolores Huerta, Cesar Chavez, Pedro Albizu Campos, etc. who are regarded as leaders by some members of the Latinx community. However, this does not mean the Latinx collective has the organization needed to be a collective agent. People like Huerta, Chavez, and Albizu Campos are said to be “leaders” out of respect for their contributions towards the Latinx collective. They are not leaders in the sense of being officially elected and appointed official positions.

The last feature I want to analyze is decision-making procedures. The decision-making procedure of a collective agent is connected to the structure and organization of the collective. Referring back to the philosophy club, we can see that the club has a capacity for decision-making whenever the club enforces rules, guidelines, and requirements, when the club decides what the mission statement is and which values will be endorsed, and so on and so forth. The main point is that the structure and organization of the philosophy club, and other collective agents, allows it the ability to make decisions. The Latinx community cannot carry out such processes. Once again, reasons for this is the members of the Latinx community do not have roles or positions to satisfy. Any “leadership” that the community has is not “official” in the way leaders are elected for moderate and tightly structured collectives, members are not elected to act on behalf of the rest of the members, and the reasons behind the actions of the members are not a result of the collective’s beliefs or attitudes. Lastly, the collective does not have an agreed upon list of beliefs, attitudes, or intentions. For example, unlike a structured and organized collective agent, such as a government or corporation, that can form and publicly state that it has beliefs,
the Latinx community is not able to form such beliefs. As an example, Uber can form and publicly state it believes keeping its users data private is important. The Latinx community cannot do that. As a result, The Latinx collective is not a shared agency, joint commitment, or a joint intention.

According to the literature in collective agency, one of the conditions for a group to be a collective agent is the members must have an intention to carry out an action. That is, they are goal driven. Unlike Bratman’s, Gilbert’s, and Tuomela’s accounts, the Latinx community did not come into existence by members coming together with the intention to form or engender something similar to a goal- driven body, nor is there a common purpose or shared purpose. It is a kind of socially constructed identity. Now, one may think that since there have been members of the Latinx community who have come together to carry out goals (such as the United Farm Workers or the Chicano Movement of the 1960’s), it in turn may qualify the Latinx community as a collective agent. This is not the case my thesis is will be arguing for. The way I am approaching my case of the Latinx community is by taking the stance that it’s not a collective with an intention nor is it focused on endorsing any goals.

There are two reasons for this. First, the members do not stand in relation to one another the way the members of a collective agent may. Members of a small collective agent, such as a student club, are structured tightly, so they members have the ability to verify whether their fellow members have the same belief as them. It’s not structurally possible for the member of the Latinx collective to verify whether their fellow members have the same belief as them. Second, the Latinx community does not share a common knowledge. As I have already stated, the Latinx collective does not have any of these. Now, one may argue that the Latinx community has a collective belief about religion, food, and culture. However, these are not collective in the
relevant way. Latinx community does not have a collective belief or attitude in the way that collective agents do in order to satisfy the mutual belief condition. Now, another problem that will have to be addressed next is the Problem of Unity.

1.5. The Problem of Unity

In this section, I will be referring to what I call the Problem of Unity.\(^9\) I intend to use this problem to focus on the fact that the Latinx ethnoracial community is not a homogenized, unified community. If the Latinx ethnoracial community is not a structured unified community, then it appears it cannot be the case that the ethnoracial community is a collective (agential or not). I am discussing this because if the ethnoracial community is not a collective, then I cannot make the case that this community can be collectively responsible. The way that I will answer the problem is by arguing that, contrary to what one would think, it is not necessary for the community to be unified in order to be a collective.

There are two features of the Latinx ethnoracial community the Problem of Unity focuses on.\(^{10}\) First, the Latinx community is not homogenized, and as a result of that, it is not a unified community. Philosophy of race theorists do not explicitly claim in order for an ethnoracial community to be a collective this feature must be satisfied. However, in this section, I will show it’s a general claim that is being suggested by Cristina Beltrán.

According to Beltrán (2010), to assume the Latinx community is homogenous is to believe that the members of the Latinx community perceive themselves as being a part of a political community. For Beltrán, the concept of a Latinx community is to make the assertion

\(^9\) I want to note this is a problem I have formulated on my own. This is not a well-known named problem in the literature.

\(^{10}\) Now that we have seen why the collective agency theorists would not regard the Latinx ethnoracial community as a collective, the Problem of Unity is meant to highlight why philosophy of race theorists would disagree with my stance that the Latinx ethnoracial community is a collective.
that there is a shared, political interest amongst Latinx people. To think that Latinx people are following a similar political agenda could involve the following thoughts: all Latinx people vote for democratic candidates; all Latinx people are progressive leaning; all Latinx people care about the same political issues; etc. The mistake in the assumption is the idea all Latinx people have a shared consciousness. In other words, it’s to assume that Latinx people are in agreement about issues dealing with what it means to be “Latinx,” or in agreement on what the Latinx collective identity is. However, this is not the case.

Beltrán and philosophy of race theorists have explained the complexity and contradictions that result from the concept of a “Latinx” or “Hispanic” identity. These complexities and contradictions occur because the concept of a Latinx identity is somehow supposed to neatly capture issues and concerns regarding race, gender, class, sexuality, language, immigration, colonialism, etc. (Beltrán 2010). Furthermore, as I pointed out in the previous section, there is a lack of agreement amongst Latinx people on what it is to be Latinx. In order to be Latinx, is there a demand placed on the members to be Roman Catholic, fluent in Spanish (such an assumption is a direct disregard to other languages in Latin America), to be a fan of Celia Cruz, or to be of a certain class? In order for the ethnoracial community to be a collective, some scholars do believe there has to be some common ground or shared interests and goals between the members which the Latinx community lacks.

One way to see why the lack of a homogenous community is a genuine problem in the literature and for my thesis is by recognizing that no one has a definition that accurately captures what it means to say, “Person ‘X’ is Latinx.” For example, Linda Martín Alcoff (2006) uses the term “Latinx” to pick out individuals who are from specific continents, subcontinents, or several large islands. It is also meant to refer to individuals from certain races, nationalities, ethnicities,
religions, and various linguistic aspects. Sally Haslanger (2008), on the other hand, offers a social constructionist account of race. For Haslanger, the concept of a racialized group refers to members of a group who have been placed either in a subordinate or privileged social position whether these positions be economic, political, legal, social, etc. Under Haslanger’s (2008) account, what it is to be Latinx just is to be a member of a racialized group.

My goal in this thesis is not to engage in the literature and offer a solution to these concerns and debates. The purpose of this section is to clarify the ways in which the Latinx community is not homogenized. After all, if a community lacks homogeneity, then how can it be referred to as a collective? As I stated in the previous section, the concept of a collective usually involves members having some similarities. Some philosophy of race and critical race theorists have attempted to offset the lack of homogeneity by asserting that one can find some other source of unity within ethnoracial community such as the Latinx community. However, upon inspection, it is not convincing that the members of the Latinx community are tightly joined in the right kind of way in order to claim there is unity.

According to Beltrán (2010), the mass media, politicians, advertising executives, and academics’ metaphorically refer to the Latinx ethnoracial demographic in the United States as a “sleeping giant,” and this creates the illusion that the Latinx community is unified. The sleeping giant, which is a metaphorical political agent, is used by both the Republican and Democratic parties to imply the inevitable political mobilization of the Latinx demographic in the U.S. For example, according to these politicians, the mobilization of the sleeping giant will impact American culture and politics. Beltrán (2010) states that any specific and distinct subgroup, such as Colombian, Dominica, Peruvian, etc., is disregarded, and the Latinx community is thus regarded as a non-diverse, homogenous, pan-ethnic entity.
What I want to point out is if the Latinx community were unified in this way, if there was some sense of a collective entity, it would entail that the members of the Latinx community regard themselves as genuinely being a part of a collective agent, as having shared interests or common goals, and a shared political agenda. By having such shared commonalities, it would entail that the members meet the condition of mutual belief. In other words, a unified Latinx community may qualify as a collective agent. However, the driving force behind the Problem of Unity is that the Latinx community can only be a collective if it is unified and, subsequently, meets the mutual belief condition. Similar to the Problem of Structure in the Latinx Collective, the Problem of Unity supports the assumption that only certain kinds of groups or communities can be collectives. The Latinx community does not meet this condition.

What I will argue in the next section is that certain non-structured, non-homogenized communities, like the Latinx community, can be a collective. I will also explain in the next section why unification is not necessary for the Latinx community to be a collective.

1.6. The Latinx Community as a Non-Agential Collective

Now that I have established why the Latinx community is not a collective agent nor a unified, homogenous group, I want to now explain why it still stands that this community is a non-agential collective. As stated in the previous section, it appears that the Latinx community cannot be a collective because it is not a unified group. This, however, is an unsupported assumption. By that I mean there is no prima facie reason for a non-agential collective to be a unified group as there are many collectives we can refer to that lack this quality. One example is the non-agential collective “American.” Similar to the Latinx community, the American collective is diverse, non-homogenous, and it lacks the quality unity. That is, American includes members of various race, sexes, ethnicities, classes, etc. It also fails to meet Beltrán’s notion of
unity because there are various political beliefs throughout the American identity, yet we are able to refer to and have discussions about Americans as a non-agential collective. I fail to see the reason as to why we cannot do this with the Latinx community as it is similar to the American collective. In fact, we do the exact thing with the Latinx community. Though it lacks homogeneity, we are still able to refer to it, that is when we say, “The Latinx community ‘X,’” we are still able to point to the specific community. Though the Latinx community is non-homogenous, as I pointed out in the previous section, it can still be referred to and discussed by the mass media, politicians, advertising agencies, academic papers, and so on and so forth. Therefore, throughout the rest of this thesis, when I refer to the Latinx community as a collective, I will be referring to what Alcoff says “Latinx” refers to. Hence, the Latinx collective is a non-agential collective in the United States consisting of members who are either from or descend from Latin America. This includes the members from different continents, subcontinents, or several large islands, certain races, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and various linguistic aspects.
Chapter 2: Non-Agential Collectives, Collective Responsibility, and the Moral Address Condition

As of now, I have explained why the Latinx ethnoracial community is a collective but not a collective agent. The next question is how can a non-agential collective have collective responsibility. There are people, such as academics and activists, having discussions (or making accusations) about ethnoracial collectives and their responsibility. Yet, it is still not clear how these discussions are able to be held. Especially since ethnoracial collectives are not collective agents. This is a puzzle, and the literature does not appear to have an answer. In this chapter, I will give an answer as to how non-agential collectives, including the Latinx collective, can have collective responsibility.

In regards to the literature on collective responsibility, the standard view is collective agents are the primary subjects of collective moral responsibility. As a result of this, non-agential collectives, such as the Latinx collective, are not taken into account. Since the Latinx collective is not a collective agent, it is automatically assumed that it cannot justifiably be morally responsible. If a collective agent can qualify as a moral agent, then assigning moral praise, blame, or punishment to that collective is justified. Organized collective agents, like universities, governments, and militaries have clear rules, decision-making procedures, and they have the right kind of structures such that they can form intentions, make decisions, and perform actions. There is a clear methodology as to how these organized collectives are able to function. Then, there are less organized and structured collectives which Tracy Isaac’s calls goal-oriented collectives (2014). These kinds of collectives can also be the appropriate subjects of collective responsibility. According to Isaacs’s (2014), goal-oriented collectives are able to have a shared understanding, a sense of common purpose, and they are structured in the right kind of way
which allows them the capacity to have collective intentions. Now let us take for example a random group of people on the beach as opposed to universities or governments. The group of random people on the beach cannot be the subject of collective responsibility because they lack the relevant structure to produce intentions, i.e., they are not a collective agent (Isaacs 2014). This group does not meet the current high standard placed on collective agency. Generally speaking, collective action theorists conclude that if a collective is not a collective agent - if it’s unable to deliberate, form intentions or beliefs, or carry out actions - then it is not possible for the collective to be the appropriate subject of collective responsibility.

Based on the standard view of collective responsibility, the Latinx collective cannot be held collectively responsible because it is not a collective agent, nor is it an organized or goal-oriented collective. Thus, the Latinx collective cannot be held morally blameworthy or praiseworthy because it does not form collective intentions or carry out collective actions. With that being said, it appears that I cannot support my stance that the Latinx collective has collective responsibility, specifically forward-looking collective responsibility. However, I want to point out that the kind of interpretation of moral responsibility being taken account of in the literature is backward-looking. The primary view of moral responsibility focuses on morally assessing the past actions of an agent (individual or collective). Hence, the reason why collective agents are the main focus of collective responsibility theories.

I argue a solution to this problem is utilizing P.F. Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitudes. Generally speaking, Strawson’s account claims what grounds our moral responsibility are our participant reactive attitudes (anger, resentment, praise, gratitude, etc.) in response to the attitudes and intentions of others (and ourselves) (2008). For example, if I am in need of assistance and someone goes out of their way to help me, my gratitude towards their
action grounds the moral praise directed at that person. Though Strawson’s account is primarily backward-looking, the concept of reactive attitudes allows me the flexibility to support my stance that the Latinx collective can appropriately be the subject of collective responsibility. Strawson’s reactive attitudes are flexible in that they allow me opportunity to take into account scenarios where a non-agential collective, such as the Latinx collective, can be the appropriate target of reactive attitudes. If I can show how certain non-agential collectives, like the Latinx collective, can be the subject of reactive attitudes, then I am able to show they can be collectively responsible.

In this chapter, I will defend the claim that there are non-agential collectives, such as the Latinx collective, which can be the appropriate targets of reactive attitudes. Thus, the Latinx collective can be collectively responsible. I want to flag right now I am not arguing all non-agential collectives are the appropriate subjects of reactive attitudes. I will provide criteria that non-agential collectives must meet. The way in which I will support my claim is by introducing and discussing Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitudes in section one. In the subsections of section one, I will then discuss how Deborah Tollefsen and Kay Mathiesen have extended Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes onto collectives. In doing so, it will become clear that the primary collectives taken into Tollefsen’s and Mathiesen’s accounts are collective agents. Collective agents are the focus of Strawsonian-inspired collective responsibility theories due to the moral address condition. In the second section of this chapter, I will discuss it is an unsupported assumption to think collectives need to meet the moral address condition in the exact same manner as individual agents. Furthermore, I will show this method is problematic when it comes to providing a complete picture of the relationship between collectives and

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11 As a quick reminder, non-agential collectives, such as the Latinx collective, are loosely-structured. By this I mean these collectives do not have collective intentions, beliefs, goals or perform collective actions.
collective responsibility. In the subsection of section two, I will provide a solution as to how non-agential collectives can meet the moral address condition.

1. STRAWSON’S ACCOUNT OF REACTIVE ATTITUDES

According to Strawson (2008), even if the determinist thesis were true— if all behavior was determined, then moral blame, punishment, and praise is unjustified— we could still hold others and ourselves morally responsible. His approach and analysis of moral responsibility does not require that he solve the metaphysical issue of determinism. Rather, he claims we care about and take into consideration whether someone’s attitudes or actions towards us are of goodwill, affection, indifference, malevolence, etc. On Strawson’s account, we do not need an “external justification” for moral responsibility. In other words, we do not need to solve the current debate on free will and moral responsibility in order to discuss the problems surrounding moral responsibility. Rather, his idea grounds moral responsibility through the usage of participant reactive attitudes. Therefore, to be held morally responsible is to be the appropriate target of a reactive attitude.

Strawson (2008) identifies three kinds of reactive attitudes: vicarious, self-reactive, and personal. Vicarious attitudes are the attitudes we have based on how others are being treated. Vicarious attitudes can be understood as impersonal and sympathetic towards others. If we were to see someone intentionally and maliciously step on the hand of another person, we may feel anger towards the offender on the behalf of the injured person. The self-reactive attitudes refer to the attitudes we feel towards ourselves based on how we treat others and ourselves. For example, if I were angry at someone and intentionally stepped on their hand to get back at them, I would feel shame or remorse for my action. Personal attitudes refer to the attitudes we have based on how we are treated by others. For example, I may feel resentment towards a person
who purposefully and unnecessarily steps on my hand.

Now, Strawson’s application of reactive attitudes focuses only on individuals and individual interpersonal relationships. The question here is whether collectives can be the appropriate targets of reactive attitudes in order to be held responsible. This matters for my purposes because in order to show the Latinx collective does have collective responsibility, I have to explain why it is the case that the collective can be the appropriate target of reactive attitudes. I want to flag right now, it is not enough to say that members of the Latinx collective (and members of any other ethnoracial collectives) have reactive attitudes towards the Latinx collective therefore the collective has collective responsibility. This would set the standard too low, and would allow a broad and unhelpful field of cases that really do not genuinely help us when distinguishing when there is an actual problem. For example, I do not want to say that member of ethnoracial collective ‘X’ has a negative reactive attitude ‘A’ towards ethnoracial collective ‘Y,’ therefore, ethnoracial collective ‘Y’ has some kind of collective responsibility. This is far too broad. What I mean by this is it is not enough to point to Latinx individuals who feel negative reactive attitudes towards the Latinx collective as a whole due to the fact that the collective benefits from anti-black racism. The reason why this does not work is it is not yet clear how reactive attitudes can be attributed to a non-agential collective. In the following section, I will discuss how collective action theorists, such as Tollefsen and Mathiesen, have extended Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes towards collectives in order to demonstrate how a collective can be the subject of reactive attitudes.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{12}\)The reason as to why I am first discussing the works of Tollefsen and Mathiesen is to show how reactive attitudes can be appropriately subjected to collective agents. In other words, reactive attitudes are not bound to individual agents.
1.1. Collective Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes

In the following two subsections, I will review the accounts of Tollefsen and Mathiesen to show how Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes are being applied to collectives. In doing so, it will become clear that the way Strawson’s account is being used only takes into consideration collective agents, not non-agential collectives. However, even though this is the case, it is clear that Strawson’s reactive attitudes are not only applicable to individuals, they can be applicable to collectives. This shows that collectives, albeit collective agents, are able to be collectively responsible through the use of reactive attitudes. Yet, there is no reason that the reactive attitudes cannot be used towards non-agential collectives. In the following section, I will explain why this is the case.

1.1.1. Tollefsen

Deborah Tollefsen (2003) argues that certain kind of collectives have been and can be the targets of reactive attitudes. On her view the kind of collectives that are the appropriate targets are the ones that are able to meet her normative competence condition. That is, the collective must have the capacity to understand moral demands, to guide its behavior and attitudes as a result of the moral demands, and to deliberate. As an example, she uses the tobacco industry to support her argument. In 1953, the tobacco industry released an advertisement falsely stating there was no connection between cigarette smoking and cancer. Following the release of the advertisement, the industry invested in a decades long campaign to deceive the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking. This deception has led to certain reactive attitudes towards tobacco companies such as anger, resentment, and indignation. According to Tollefsen (2003), these negative attitudes are not directed at individual employees of the tobacco industries. Rather, these attitudes are directed towards the collective as a whole. Since tobacco industries are
justifiably the subjects of reactive attitudes, they can then be held moral responsible for willingly deceiving the public about the health risks of tobacco.

As a result of Tollefsen’s normative competence condition, we now are able to justifiably apply reactive attitudes towards collectives. However, I suggest that the normative competence condition is unnecessarily strict and narrow. The only collectives that can meet her condition are tightly structured, they have hierarchal roles, and decision- making procedures. Though there are many collective agents which can meet this criteria, it excludes collectives that do not operate similarly to individual agents. Therefore, no room is left to explore other kinds of collectives. My concern also applies to Mathiesen’s theory.

1.1.2. Mathiesen

Kay Mathiesen (2006) argues that certain collectives can qualify as moral agents. Through a Strawsonian- approach, Mathiesen develops a criteria for moral agency by examining society’s practice of holding individuals morally responsible. She argues the conditions for an individual to be a moral agent are applicable towards collectives. Mathiesen’s three main conditions for moral agency are: perspective, a capacity for second-order reflection, and sensitivity to moral reasons. To understand the conditions, let’s first start with a single individual. In order for a single person to be held responsible for an action, they first have to qualify as an agent. Being an agent means one has to have the capacity to think through an action. This includes planning, forming intentions, and acting based off of those intentions. Mathiesen claims there are two main features an individual has to meet in order to be an agent. The first is perspective. Having a perspective means one has a framework of beliefs, desires, and goals. By having a perspective an individual is able to respond to their environment, they are able to reason, make choices, and form intentions. The second key feature is the capacity for
second-order reflection. Second-order reflection involves being aware and able to recognize one's intentions, beliefs, and desires. Furthermore, an individual engages in second-order reflection by being able to evaluate their intentions, beliefs, and desires, and they should be able to reflect on and decide if they want to continue endorsing their current intentions, beliefs, and desires. An individual who has a perspective on a capacity to engage and second-order reflection qualifies as an agent. Now, what distinguishes an agent from a moral agent is the capacity of moral reasoning. According to Mathiesen (2006, 244), to morally reason, “you must be able to see your behavior as a result of a perspective that you can evaluate and revise.” A moral agent must be able to understand and react to moral reasoning.

Now let’s consider how this account applies to collective agents. Mathiesen argues in order for a person to be morally responsible, they must first be an agent (and by agent, I mean they meet the perspective and second-order reflection conditions) and be able to morally reason. Mathiesen states there are collectives which meet this set of criteria. The members of these specific collectives are able to adopt the perspective of their collective, the collectives have the capacity to engage in second-order reflection through their members, and the members have the capacity to morally reason. Mathiesen (2006) introduces the idea of “taking” a perspective. Simply put, a member of a collective is able to adopt the perspective of the collective.\textsuperscript{13} By this, I mean the person is able to reason, intend, and perform actions through or based on the collective’s perspective. Therefore, certain collectives can be moral agents which means the collective agent has collective responsibility.

As one can see, Mathiesen’s theory gives us a clear and detailed description on how a collective can be a moral agent. In fact, we are provided a theory that step-by-step shows us how

a collective has to function and be structured in order to be parallel to an individual moral agent. As a result, we encounter the same problem we had with Tollefsen’s theory. Mathiesen’s theory also sets the bar too high for less structured collectives to meet. To give an example of the kind of collectives which would struggle to meet both theorists’ criteria are, for example, loosely-structured clubs. Imagine a case, let us call it the Philosophy Club Case, where we have a philosophy club that does not have any set hierarchal roles. There is a club constitution (a set of rules or procedures for decision making) that in theory the members of the club are aware of, have agreed upon, and would follow, however, in reality the club’s constitution is not enforced. As a result, theoretically, when the club “makes” a decision to not have a meeting the following week, this decision is made “on a whim.” The point is, this philosophy club would not qualify as a collective agent for Tollefsen’s theory, and it most certainly would not qualify as a moral agent under Mathiesen’s theory. Something is off here. Imagine the philosophy club officers, for whatever reason, were to withhold monetary funds without telling any of the other members, and the withholding of these funds was done without the club following the constitution. Now, regardless of the reasons why they are withholding funds, even though not every member participated, or any other small detail one could give, the main point of this example is to show that it would be counterintuitive to say we cannot hold the club responsible. Tollefsen, Mathiesen, and other collective action theorists who formulate their criteria with the this method are unable to address cases and collectives such as this philosophy club. Furthermore, even if such extreme cases were rare, the fact of the matter is it is too easy to provide counter-examples, whether it be loosely-structured collectives or specific scenarios involving loosely-structured collectives, to these theories. These counter-examples demonstrate how narrow theorists have set the bar.
As of now, I have discussed how Strawson’s work has been extended to collectives and how certain collectives can be the subject of collective responsibility. To reiterate what has been said in the past two sections, there is a problem with the way collective action theorists use Strawson’s concept of reactive attitudes. Tollefsen, Mathiesen, and other collective action theorists are assuming that the way we analyze how an individual is the appropriate target of reactive attitudes has to be extended or carried over to collectives. By now, it should be clear as to why this approach can be problematic. As discussed earlier, this approach to collective responsibility sets an unnecessarily high bar for collectives. These theorists provide reasons as to how certain collectives function similar to individuals when discussing responsibility, but they do not provide a reason as to why it has to be this way. By setting such a high bar and refraining from exploring other options, we end up overlooking scenarios where a collective genuinely has collective responsibility even though that collective does not qualify, in the traditional sense, as a moral agent, i.e., the philosophy club in the previous paragraph. The current literature on collective responsibility cannot account for these specific cases. The purpose of this chapter is to solve that problem. My goal is to show how a non-agential collective can justifiably be the subject of collective responsibility without being an agent or moral agent. Note, I am not arguing that the literature on collective responsibility is wrong, I am arguing it is incomplete.

2. THE MORAL ADDRESS CONDITION AND COLLECTIVE AGENTS: THE BIG DEAL

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the reason as to why collective action theorists approach collective responsibility in a parallel way with individual responsibility is because they think the moral address condition is sufficient, and only agents can meet this condition. So what is the moral address condition? Strawson (2008) argued that in order to be an appropriate target of reactive attitudes, individuals should have the potential to participate in interpersonal
interactions. When an individual meets the moral address condition, they are a part of the moral community which means they are being regarded as a fully responsible moral agent— they qualify as being able to participate in interpersonal relationships. For example, let us say that the person who intentionally and maliciously steps on my hand meets the moral address condition. Since this person is part of the moral community, they are not exempt from being held morally responsible for their action. My anger at them for intentionally hurting me is appropriate.

However, if we slightly change the example and say that this person is only a young child, we would then say they are not part of the moral community, or at least not yet.\textsuperscript{14} We should view the morally underdeveloped child with what Strawson refers to as an objective attitude. To view someone with an objective attitude is to view someone as needing to be treated, controlled, managed, cured, trained, or avoided. When someone is being viewed with an objective attitude, they are not part of the moral community. Thus, they cannot be fully responsible moral agents because they do not have the potential to participate in interpersonal relationships (Strawson 2008).

On face value, it appears that in order to hold collectives morally responsible, for collectives to be the appropriate targets of reactive attitudes, they also need to meet the moral address condition. Collective action theorists, such as Tollefsen, argue that our reactive attitudes towards certain collectives are justified if the collective meets the moral address condition. As a result of this, collective action theorists focus on developing their arguments in such a way so that certain kinds of collectives can meet the moral address condition. Here is an example. In Tollefsen’s case of the tobacco industry, we want to say and show that our reactive attitudes of anger, resentment, disgust, etc. are appropriately directed towards the industry. The collectives

\textsuperscript{14} By “yet,” I mean to point to the fact that the child has the potential to become a member of the moral community.
that meet this condition can be appropriately held morally responsible for their intentions and actions. By showing how this industry meets the moral address condition, our negative reactive attitudes are appropriate. We are justified in morally blaming and morally punishing them.

As I have stated throughout this chapter, the kinds of collectives that Tollefsen’s and Mathiesen’s theories account for are tightly structured and qualify as collective agents. This explains why their usage of Strawson limits which collectives we can examine. Unlike my example of the loosely-structured philosophy club, I am interested in collectives that are even more loosely-structured, the kind of collectives that do not have hierarchal roles or any decision-making procedures. One collective I will be focusing on is the Latinx collective which does not and cannot qualify as the kind of collective that can be the subject of collective responsibility under Tollefsen’s or Mathiesen’s accounts. The Latinx collective is not organized or structured in the way collective agents are. The Latinx collective does not have rules or decision-making procedures. It also does not have the capacity to have collective intentions or carry out collective actions. As it appear then, the Latinx collective cannot be a part of the moral community. Yet, it is not unheard of to witness people assigning reactive attitudes towards specific non-agential collectives, such as the Latinx collective, under certain conditions. I find it a disservice to write-off these special cases and scenarios and justify doing so by claiming misdirection and misplacement of one’s reactive attitudes. I will argue in the next section that there is no prima facie reason for our assessment of individuals and collectives to be analogous. Specifically, I am skeptical as to whether collectives have to meet the moral address condition in the way that individuals do.
2.1. The Overlooked Connection Between the Moral Address Condition and Non-Agential Collectives

In this subsection, I will offer a solution that will widen the field of collective action and responsibility. Before jumping into the Latinx case and how the Latinx non-agential collective does have collective responsibility, I want to focus on a smaller case with the purpose of showing how a small collective of individuals can be the appropriate subject of collective responsibility. In the following section, I will introduce what I refer to as the Non-Performance Case which is a modified version of Virginia Held’s case. The case is a scenario where a non-agential collective can be a part of an interpersonal relationship even though it lacks collective intention. When the non-agential collective has the opportunity to engage in interpersonal relationships, something changes. The non-agential collective has the opportunity to meet the moral address condition. By discussing what conditions exist and must be met when a non-agential collective is in this position, I can then explain how and why the Latinx collective does have collective responsibility. In order to thoroughly explain how this can be the case, I will discuss a modified version of an argument provided by Held regarding random groups and collective responsibility. By doing so, I will demonstrate how I have developed a criteria that non-agential collectives must meet in order to qualify for the moral address condition.

2.1.1. A New Criteria for the Moral Address Condition and Non-Agential Collectives

Held argues there are special circumstances where a random, non-agential collective (what she refers to as a random collection of bystanders) can be held morally responsible for failing to perform an action. Her argument is “when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to the reasonable person and when the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable, a random collection of individuals may be held responsible for not taking a collective
action.” (Held 1970, 476). There are two important conditions for her argument. First, the action being called for must be obvious to a reasonable person. That is, if a reasonable person could see that it was not possible for the expected action to be performed, then it would be unreasonable to expect the non-agential collective to perform the action. The second condition is that the expected outcome of the expected action should be clearly favorable. Her case is important to explore because it sheds light on a situation where it would not be uncalled of for anyone to have a negative reactive attitude towards a non-agential collective for its lack of performance or collective action. To illustrate this, here is the Non-Performance Case:

Seven “normal” strangers are sitting apart in a subway car. In this case, the second smallest passenger, in full view and hearing of all the other passengers, attacks and begins to strangle the smallest person in the subway car. The remaining five passengers do nothing even though they can hear and see what is occurring.

According to Held (1970), we would hold the strangers in the subway car morally responsible for failing to collectively stop the strangler, because it would be obvious to a reasonable person that the strangler ought to be stopped and that stopping the strangler would have yielded a favorable outcome. If we bracket her reason as to how and why the non-agential collective can be held morally responsible, her work brings to light certain interesting features about the interpersonal relationship between non-agential collectives and society.

From Held’s argument, I have provided three main conditions for collectives in specific circumstances. When these criteria are met, I am able to show how a non-agential collective meets the moral address condition. The non-agential collective thereby qualifies as a member of
the moral community. This then entails that reactive attitudes towards the non-agential collective are justified and that the non-agential collective is collectively responsible. The conditions are:

1) The non-agential collective should be structured in such a way that it has the capacity to become a goal-oriented collective.

2) The non-agential collective has to be in a situation or a state of affairs where the problem requires collective action.

3) The action being called into question (such as an expectation being placed onto the non-agential collective) is obvious to a reasonable person and the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable.

For the first condition, the collective is, a goal-oriented collective in Isaac’s sense. When I refer to a goal-oriented collective, I am referring to Isaacs’ (2014) account of a collective that has enough cohesiveness that it can have a shared understanding, common sense or purpose, and collective intention in order to become a collective agent. Note that such a collective does not need to have clear, defined roles, decision-making procedures, or specific mechanisms for acting. To see why it is important for the non-agential collective in question to have the ability to become goal-oriented, let us refer back to the Non-Performance Case. One way in which the members of the non-agential collective could not come together and would not even be expected to come together to stop the strangler would be if the members were a group of infants. In this case, the members of the collective need to have the “right” physical and moral capacity to become a goal-oriented collective to stop the strangler. What I mean by “right” is going to depend on each case, but for the Non-Performance Case, we may think that the strangers on the subway car would be, in some way, physically able to stop the strangler, the cognitive capacity
to understand what they are witnessing and to logically decide what ought to be done, and they would have some sense of moral understanding as to why the strangler ought to be stopped. For example, they should at least understand that it is morally wrong for the strangler to be strangling someone. A possible moral rule operating here may be “do not harm others” or “help people who are being harmed.”

For the second condition, if the circumstance the non-agential collective is in could be addressed and solved by an individual, then no collective action would be required by the non-agential collective. However, there are certain cases in the world that require a collective solution, such as climate change, the eradication of human trafficking, addressing systemic racism, poverty, the homelessness crises in the U.S., etc. In the Non-Performance Case, we could modify the example such that the strangler is a body builder, hence, it would require multiple individuals, rather than one individual, to stop this person. However, the Non-Performance Case does not fully capture what I mean by “The non-agential collective has to be in a ‘situation’...” My position here is though we are individual agents, we do not solely exist and experience life only as individual agents. Humans are social creatures, and in order to continue living in a society, we find ourselves in situations that call upon us to work together - that call upon strangers to work together as a collective. There are cases in the world that require collective action in order to obtain a solution.15

15 Here is an example of a non-agential collective that finds itself in a situation that requires collective action: The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Bracket the fact that the United States is a collective agent via its government and focus on the inhabitants of the nation-state. The inhabitants are a non-homogenous group that, for arguments sake, is not unified. It is not unified in the sense that there is an abundance of varying races, ethnicities, genders, sexualities, languages, classes, religions, and cultures which then breeds an abundance of varying political beliefs, beliefs and desires, expectations, etc. This disunified, loosely-structured collective is in a situation, i.e., a global pandemic, that requires a collective solution. In order to prevent further spread, infections, and death from the Coronavirus disease, this non-agential collective is expected to form into a goal-oriented collective because the situation called for collective action. It is not the case that one person could have single-handedly addressed the pandemic.
The purpose of the third condition is to capture the fact that there are cases where the expected actions of a non-agential collective are reasonable, and performing the collective action (which has to yield positive results) is the best option rather than not performing the collective action at all. Think about a case where a child is drowning in full view of a random group of adults, and for the sake of argument, let us say that it would require a collective effort to save the child. It is reasonable of us to expect that random collective of adults to collectively save or at least attempt to save the child rather than do nothing. Now that I have discussed these three conditions, I want to now discuss on the fact that my argument still stands even if we do not use Strawson’s reactive attitudes.

2.1.2. Emergent Performance Cases (EPC)

Perhaps you have your reservations towards reactive attitudes and collective responsibility, or you are not convinced my argument utilizes Strawson’s account enough. I want to point out that I engage in Strawson’s account by providing a route as to how non-agential collectives can meet the moral address condition. By this, I mean non-agential collective have the capacity, under the right conditions, to be a part of the moral community. Regardless, if reactive attitudes cannot be attributed to non-agential agents, my criteria is able to stand its ground through what I call Emergent Performance Cases (EPC).

In our society, there exists specific cases where people would morally demand a performance that will yield positive results. For instance, let’s say you are going for a walk near a lake, and out of the corner of your eye you notice someone is having difficulty swimming. You realize you are witnessing someone drowning. Not everyone would agree, and many would not suggest, jumping into the lake to come to the aid of the drowning person for that could result in you harming the person or you being harmed, i.e. you both could end up drowning. However, let
us say you have a cellular phone and you have reliable service. As a result of these facts, some would say that you are morally obligated to use your cellular phone to call for help. This example exists on an individual level, and through Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes, we could say that you have an obligation to perform some kind of action that will yield positive results, i.e. calling for an ambulance. Though the example I have given is in regards to an individual, I think cases where non-agential collectives find themselves in these situations are no different. They are no different in that there is a moral obligation for a collective agent to emerge. I call these cases Emergent Performance Cases (EPC).

An example of a non-moral EPC is an escape room. Let’s say that five strangers are participating in an escape room. In order to win the game, they have to solve a puzzle in order to open the door and be released. This collective starts off as a loose collection of individual agents who are, together, a non-agential collective. However, in order to win the game, they have to become a goal-oriented collective. This goal-oriented collective comes into existence in order to meet a task. It comes into existence as a means to an end (Rovane 2014). The moral example of an EPC is the Non-Performance Case I discussed in the previous section. The group of strangers in the subway car are morally obligated to become a goal-oriented collective.

In conclusion, I have discussed Strawson’s case of Reactive Attitudes. I have reviewed two important theorists who utilize Strawson’s argument in order to show how structured, organized agents are collective agents and can bear collective responsibility. In doing so, my aim was to show that even though there are current theories on collective responsibility, the conditions being used are too narrow and neglect to account for scenarios where less-structured

16 I understand that some philosophers may disagree with this and refer to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. However, this example, argument, and thesis is not focused on settling the debates on this doctrine.
17 Why morally obligated? Recall that in Strawson’s account relies on interpersonal relationships, and we at least owe our fellow community members regard or good will.
collectives can be the appropriate subjects of collective responsibility even if they are not collective agents.

This then raises the question of what kind of responsibility can a non-agential collective have? I have shown that certain scenarios do occur, and under the right conditions, a very loose-structured non-agential collective can become the appropriate target of collective responsibility. Now, the problem is what kind of collective responsibility am I referring to? As we have seen with the Tollefsen and Mathiesen arguments, the responsibility they discussed is based off of moral evaluation of an event and deeming the event morally shameful or morally praiseworthy. Though non-agential collectives in theory can appear to be the bearers of backward-looking (morally shameful or praiseworthy attitudes) collective responsibility, this is incorrect. As has been pointed out and reviewed, only agential collectives have the ability to perform collective actions that can be morally evaluated. I, on the other hand, am not using responsibility in this sense. The kind of collective responsibility that non-agential collectives can have, under my argument, is forward-looking.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the literature on backward-looking and forward-looking collective responsibility. In doing so, I will show that, appearances notwithstanding, I can indeed use Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes, as reactive attitudes have widely been used in the backward-looking sense. However, it is not necessary for reactive attitudes to be backward looking. In the next chapter, I will explain how non-agential collectives can have forward-looking collective responsibility. I will explain how these collectives, in particular the Latinx collective, has to transition into a goal-oriented collective in order to begin to fulfill its forward-looking responsibility. I will use the new criteria I have advanced in this chapter in order to show how it applies to the Latinx collective and anti-black racism.
Chapter 3: The Latinx Collective, Anti-Black Racism, and the Moral Address Condition

Now that I have shown how a non-agential collective can be collectively responsible, the next question is what kind of responsibility do non-agential collectives have? What kind of responsibility does the Latinx collective, in particular, have? Generally speaking, when we talk about responsibility, we do so in the backward-looking sense. We do so in a way that holds individuals, and even some collective agents, accountable for their past actions. This is not going to work for a non-agential collective, such as the Latinx collective. In this chapter, I will explain the kind of responsibility the Latinx collective has is forward-looking, and that the collective has this forward-looking responsibility to address how it is benefiting from anti-black racism.

To begin this chapter, I want to first reiterate the goal of this thesis. The main goal of this thesis is to show how it could be the case that the Latinx community, or what I refer to as the Latinx collective, has a collective responsibility to stop perpetuating anti-black racism within the United States. For example, when activists make claims such as, “We have to do something;” “We are responsible to do ‘X,’” “We have a responsibility towards the Black community,” I have aimed to provide an argument that shows how these claims are appropriate and justifiable. My aim is to show that their reactive attitude is an expectation to do “something”, it is not misdirected or misplaced, and it should not be quickly disregarded.

Thus far, I have shown in chapter two how the literature on collective responsibility is primarily focused on collective agents and the relationship between collective agents and collective responsibility. As a result, cases of non-agential collectives go unnoticed, or worse, ignored. In order to address this first hurdle, I discussed what I call the Non-Performance Case. In this case, there are seven strangers in a subway car, one stranger begins to strangle another stranger, and the remaining five strangers do nothing. From this case, I came to the realization
that there are three conditions that must be met in order for a non-agential collective to have collective responsibility. However, there are now two questions that I must address.

The first is the kind of responsibility am I referring, and the second question is how the non-agential collective becomes a goal-oriented collective in order to carry out its responsibility. Therefore, to address the first hurdle, I will discuss the difference between backward looking and forward-looking collective responsibility in subsection one. Then, I will discuss why it is best that the kind of responsibility I am arguing for is forward-looking in section two. I will then address the second question which is that some people may object and believe that a non-agential collective cannot be held responsible as it cannot carry out its responsibility. I will argue that, while this appears to be a problem for my argument, it is not. I will do this by discussing how it is possible for a non-agential collective to become an agential collective and carry out its responsibility by referring to historical events, such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the Chicano movement, in subsection two of section two. The purpose of these examples is to demonstrate that not only is it theoretically possible for a non-agential collective to become a collective agent to carry out a collective goal, but to show that we can refer to events in history where we have seen this unfold. Lastly, in section three, I will examine how the Latinx collective benefits from anti-black racism in the United States, and how it thus has forward-looking collective responsibility to perform actions that will remedy or further prevent future harm towards the Black community.

1. **Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility to Remedy and Prevent Future Harm**

   In this section, I will discuss the differences between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. I will then explain how it is the case that reactive attitudes are not
primarily backward-looking, they can be used in the forward-looking sense as well. I will then transition the discussion and explain why choosing the forward-looking sense is the appropriate route for non-agential collectives.


Now that I have shown how a non-agential agent can be the appropriate subject of collective responsibility, I want to now distinguish what kind of responsibility I am referring to. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of collective responsibility in the literature: backward-and forward-looking. According to Smiley (2014), backward-looking collective responsibility “focuses on a group’s responsibility for a particular state of affairs in the world.” That is, when we engage in backward-looking responsibility, we are evaluating the action of an agent, or in this case, the collective action of a collective agent. Recall, only collective agents can carry out collective actions in virtue of being able to form collective intentions (Smiley 3). In the backward-looking sense, we make moral judgments such as moral blameworthiness, moral praiseworthiness, moral punishment, etc. Backward-looking collective responsibility is what theorists, like Tollefsen, are focused on. In Tollefsen’s industry case, we are assigning backward-looking collective responsibility when we assign moral blame, resentment, and indignation over the company’s actions.

Given what I have argued thus far, it may seem that my argument may appear to allow us to hold non-agential collectives morally responsible in the backward-looking sense, because reactive attitudes are often used in the backward-looking sense. This is incorrect. Non-agential collectives cannot be bearers of backward-looking collective responsibility. However, I contend that non-agential collectives can be held morally responsible in the forward-looking sense, and
that is the kind of responsibility I am arguing for when these non-agential collectives meet my argument’s conditions. Forward-looking responsibility, similar to backward-looking responsibility, focuses on a collective’s responsibility for a certain state of affairs. The difference is that instead of evaluating a current and problematic state of affairs, forward-looking responsibility is interested in a collective bringing about a certain state of affairs. The particular outcome of the state of affairs, according to Smiley (2014) is typically a desirable one. Smiley (2014) states, “Hence, when we ascribe FLCR (future or forward-looking collective responsibility) to a group, we do not tell a story about its causal history. Instead, we point to what we think the group should now do.” Or as Rovane (2014) states, forward-looking responsibility undertakes, “future action with an eye to future consequences.”

For a collective to have forward-looking responsibility is for the collective to have a relationship with harm. That is, instead of saying the collective caused harm (the backward-looking sense), we are saying the collective has the responsibility to remedy or prevent harm from occurring in the future (Smiley 2014). For example, in the Non-Performance Case, we want to say that the five remaining random strangers have a responsibility to bring about a certain state of affairs and that certain state of affairs should be desirable. In this case, we can say the strangers, as a collective agent, should stop the bully, call the police, or do something that would have yielded a favorable result for the passenger being strangled. These are just a few examples of how that non-agential collective could have carried out their forward-looking collective responsibility.

One may ask what constitutes a desirable outcome? Smiley (2014) states when we use language, such as responsibility, we must trust the collective to come to its own judgment in order to figure out what state of affairs it should bring about. The non-agential collective in
question has the responsibility to, at the minimum or basic level, form into a goal-oriented agent and address the issue at hand.

Now that I have discussed what may constitute a desirable outcome, I want to note there may be a concern regarding distributed versus non-distributed responsibility. That is, non-distributed responsibility is the position that the responsibility of the collective cannot be distributed to each individual member. So, though the collective acts through its members, the collective’s actions do not necessarily reflect the actions of its members (Smiley 2017). I am arguing the responsibility of the non-agential collective is non-distributed. One reason for this is it is not feasible to quantify the responsibility and then distribute it to the members of the collective, nor are the reactive attitudes attributed towards the collective in a distributed form. Taking the Non-Performance Case as the example, how would one quantify the responsibility each individual is warranted, and would it be accurate to say that the expectation or moral obligation are being placed only on some of these strangers but not the others, or would this placement of reactive attitudes be random? Rather, I argue that when we say, “The collective has responsibility...” we are referring to the collective as a whole, and when we place reactive attitudes, such as obligation and expectation, on to the collective, we are also doing so in a non-distributed sense.

1.1.1. Reactive Attitudes in the Forward-Looking Sense

At this point, I have provided three conditions as to how a non-agential collective can meet the moral address condition and justifiably be the bearer of collective responsibility. The goal now is to shed light as to how reactive attitudes tie into collective responsibility, and specifically, collective responsibility in the forward-looking sense.

We know that once a collective meets the moral address condition, they are a part of the
moral community and they can be the appropriate target of reactive attitudes. However, I have not discussed what these reactive attitudes are such that they ground forward-looking responsibility attributions. I aim to further explore this and explain why Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes are still relevant and can play an important role when attributing forward-looking collective responsibility onto a non-agential collective.

First, when we discuss reactive attitudes, we may do so primarily in the backward-looking sense. Recall, this is done when we are evaluating the actions of an individual or even a collective. For example, we may evaluate my action of unnecessarily and maliciously stomping on a stranger’s foot and decide whether I ought be morally praised, blamed, or punished. Theoretically speaking, it appears a non-agential collective can be the subject of backward-looking reactive attitudes. However, in reality that does not hold. Remember, one cannot morally blame a non-agential collective for an action because non-agential collectives are unable to perform collective actions. My stance, is reactive attitudes also exist in the forward-looking sense and ground responsibility just as backward-looking reactive attitudes do.

The specific kinds of reactive attitudes that I am interested in and will examine here are judgments concerning when someone is obliged and expectation, because these reactive attitudes are examples of forward-looking reactive attitudes. One could say, and we hear this quite often, “Well, ‘X’ should have done ‘Y.’” This statement is brought up when discussing individual agents, “She should have done ‘Y;’” with collective agents, “‘The Tobacco industry should have told the truth;’” and even with non-agential collectives, “‘Those strangers in the subway car should have stopped the strangler.’” My point is that when we say, ‘X should have done ‘Y,’ we are talking about an obligation to correct or prevent harm, and I believe we are doing so in the moral sense. In other words, some form of harm should have been remedied or prevented. The
tobacco industry had a moral obligation to tell the truth about the health risks of cigarette smoking, and the strangers in the subway car had a moral obligation to come together to stop the strangler. The same could be said for expectation. For example, there is an expectation directed towards the non-agential collective in the subway car to have come together and stopped the strangler. There is also an expectation on the tobacco industry to tell the truth regarding the health risks of cigarette smoking.

In regards specifically to non-agential collectives, what I am trying to say is that we can use, and in fact do use, reactive attitudes in a forward-looking sense. We have the ability to discuss, justifiably, what a non-agential collective ought morally do. If a non-agential collective can meet the conditions I provided, then the non-agential collective has forward-looking collective responsibility through these forward-looking reactive attitudes. That is, we can justifiably say, “‘Non-agential Collective X’ has a forward-looking responsibility to do action ‘Y.’”

Note, one may ask how can one know when it is justifiable to place a forward-looking reactive attitude, such as obligation, onto a non-agential collective. My answer is we can use backward-looking reactive attitudes, though they cannot realistically be applied to non-agential collectives, to guide us as to what a non-agential collective could have done or should do. Referring back to the Non-Performance Case, there could be negative reactive attitudes, such as anger and disappointment, as a result of the passengers failing to come together and stop the strangler. This does not mean that we can hold these passengers morally blameworthy for not stopping the strangler, for at the time it is occurring they are a non-agential collective. Yet, these negative reactive attitudes could have served as a guide for the passengers. For example, they could have reasoned, “If we do not do anything to stop the strangler, people are going to be mad
at us.” To give an example of a current event, a case similar to the Non-Performance Case has occurred in a subway car. The New York Times (2021) has reported that in a subway car, near Philadelphia, a woman was sexually assaulted in full view of her fellow subway car passengers. No one intervened nor did anyone call the police. These were random strangers in a subway car, who at the very least could have called the police, and morality demands that they should have at the very least called the police for help.

I believe the individuals in the subway car meet the moral address condition. They were in a position where they could have become a goal-oriented collective, that is they could have shared the common purpose—stop the rapist. They were in a position where the solution called for collective action, and lastly, stopping the rapist would have yielded favorable results. The forward-looking reactive attitudes in this real-life case were obligation and expectation. These passengers could have used reactive attitudes to realize that they had a moral obligation to help this woman. Now I want to transition to explaining why I will be using forward-looking collective responsibility.

2. Non-Agential Collectives and Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility

As I have established, aside from the fact that only agential collectives can be held responsible in the backward-looking sense, there is another important reason as to why the forward-looking route is the best kind of responsibility for these kinds of cases, especially for the Latinx collective case. One of the advantages of forward-looking responsibility is that instead of focusing on the past, it focuses on the future and remedying or preventing further harm. The backward-looking route does not allow us to do this, it focuses on what the state of affairs already are. For clarification, take for example the Non-Performance Case. Since the non-agential collective is justifiably the subject of responsibility (the collective met my criteria
list), we cannot say they have backward-looking responsibility, because they are not the ones causing a collective harm in this case (whereas Tollefsen’ Tobacco industry case was). However, the responsibility being referred to is forward-looking, because there is an expectation for the collective to remedy or prevent further harm for the person being strangled.

Furthermore, the negative reactive attitudes being directed at the non-agential collective provide an idea of what we can do in the future should we ever be in a position similar to the Non-Performance Case. That is, if you were to find yourself in a situation, there is a harm occurring to someone that can only be resolved through a collective action, you and the individuals in your environment are situated in such a way that you can all form into a collective agent, and you can, theoretically, ask yourself what kind of reactive attitudes would arise if the collective action were not to take place. That is, if you can imagine there is a collective action that could produce desirable results for the current state of affairs that you are in, and you and the individuals around you do nothing, what kind, if any, negative reactive attitudes would be justifiable? For example, let’s say there is a child drowning in a pond within earshot and sight, you are with four close friends, you all have some concept of morality, you are all able-bodied in such a way that you can save the child, and it would require all four of you to come together to save the child. Before you do anything, I believe you can ask yourself what kind of reactive attitudes would you and your friends would have directed towards you if you were to choose to not work together to save the child. I think you would be able to realize there would be disappointment, anger, resentment, grief, and from these reactive attitudes, we could deduce that there was an expectation for you and your four friends to do something to at least try to save the child.

One may object and ask how it is the case that a non-agential collective can suddenly
become a collective agent with a collective goal. As long as the non-agential collective has the capacity to become a goal-oriented collective, they have the ability to become a collective agent and remedy or prevent further harm in whatever case is at hand. As a reminder, by goal-oriented, I am referring to Isaac’s account of a collective being loosely structured in such a way that though it lacks organization, the collective is still able to have a shared understanding or common purpose, i.e., a collective goal (2014).

The way in which I will show how it is not only theoretically possible, but actually possible for a non-agential collective to become a goal-oriented collective agent is by referring to two Latinx historical examples. These examples demonstrate how it is not uncommon for random members of a group, such as the Latinx collective, to form and share a common purpose or collective goal. After all, if it is possible for a non-agential collective to become agential in just the right way (in a way that allows it to carry out a collective goal), then it is possible for the non-agential collective to carry out or follow through with its collective responsibility.

2.1. Historical Examples of a Non-Agential Collective Becoming a Collective Agent

The first historical example I will discuss has to deal with the organization, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). LULAC was formed as a goal-oriented collective agent which aims to advance the civil rights of Latinx people in the United States. This organization was founded in 1929 in Corpus Christi, and was established by Mexican descent individuals of the Mexican Generation. Even though this collective is an organization, I argue it is loosely structured, because members of the Mexican Generation did not appoint members of LULAC to their positions and LULAC did not originally represent all U.S. residing Latinx people (they were more concerned with assimilating into whiteness, and advancing the lives of middle class, English speaking, Mexican American U. S. citizens) (Foley 2016). However, the
point is members of the Mexican Generation found themselves to be in a location, or position, where they knew Latinx people were being harmed by anti-Mexican and anti-Latinx racism. They recognized this was a collective problem that required a collective solution, and so they formed into a goal-oriented collective.

The second historical example I want to shed light on is the Chicano Movement in the United States. This movement was sparked by the Chicano Generation, that is, the movement was led by Mexican-descent individuals roughly between 1965 and 1975. Many years of racism, discrimination, segregation, and poverty of Mexican American individuals in the U.S. was the driving force of the movement. The Chicanos believed in self-empowerment, “Chicano Power,” rather than assimilating into “American” culture. Manifestations of this movement can be seen with the United Farm Workers (UFW) union, the land grant movement in Northern New Mexico, and Chicano student movements and walk outs in the high school and university levels (Garcia 2014). This movement is interesting and important to the case I am making, because this movement did not have a set or elected leader, there were no leadership roles, yet, this non-agential collective- the Chicano Generation- became a goal-oriented collective. The collective goal was to empower individuals of Mexican descent and address the effects of anti-Mexican racism in the U.S.

Now that I have shown it is not only theoretical for a non-agential collective to become a goal-oriented agent, I have shown it has actually happened. These two historical examples are not the only cases we can evaluate to see this. We have seen this occurrence with just about any social movement, such as members of the U.S. having to partake in mask wearing during the Coronavirus pandemic, mass protest resulting from the murder of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, and so on and so forth. I now want to transition to the main case of this thesis- the Latinx
collective, anti-black racism, and forward-looking collective responsibility.

3. THE LATINX COLLECTIVE, ANTI-BLACK RACISM, AND FORWARD-LOOKING COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

So far I have discussed the differences between backward- and forward-looking responsibility, why forward looking responsibility is the better route to take, and have provided historical examples to show non-agential collectives can become collective agents by sharing a common purpose or collective goal. My goal in this section is to return to the guiding case of this thesis— that of the Latinx collective and its responsibility to remedy anti-black racism. In this case, the Latinx collective is currently benefitting from the harm of the Black community. Now, the Latinx case is not entirely parallel to the Non-Performance case, for the Latinx collective in this case is actively benefitting from anti-black racism. By benefiting from anti-black racism, I argue this puts more pressure on the Latinx collective to become a goal-oriented collective. Note, I do not think this pressure is an undue burden on the Latinx collective. Morality demands the Latinx collective take action, and I have already demonstrated that members of the Latinx collective have formed into goal-oriented collectives before. In this case, what I will refer to as the Benefitting Case, I will explain why the Latinx non-agential collective is currently in a situation where it meets the moral address condition, and hence, has forward-looking collective responsibility to remedy and prevent further anti-black racism in the U.S.

3.1. The Latinx Collective and Anti-Black Racism

As the year of 2021 comes to an end, we have witnessed society in the U.S. become more socially aware of anti-black racism and the effects (both short- and long-term) it has had on the Black community. In the summer of 2020, we saw mass protests demanding justice for George Floyd and Breonna Taylor across the nation and even internationally. Race relations has become
a delicate topic that can no longer be avoided. What I want to point out is that the conversation on race and racism is primarily focused on the Black and White binary. That is, the focus is on the relationship between black folk and white folk in the U.S. What has yet to be made clear is who falls under the “white” category? Is it just Caucasians, or does this also include Latinx, Asian, Arabic people, for example? Answering this question is not the aim of this paper. Regardless of who qualifies as “white,” I want to shed light on the consequences of the Latinx collective and its historical anti-black racism. For instance, Neil Foley argues that becoming “Hispanic” i.e., “White Hispanics” in the U.S. has allowed some members of the Latinx collective to socio-economically advance and harvest benefits from white privilege. This ability to become a “white Hispanic,” to “forge this identity” is argued to have been at the expense of the Black community. Foley (2016) writes, “...Most immigrant groups, including Mexicans, have had the “option,” unlike Blacks, of becoming Whites and thus benefiting from... the ‘possessive investment in whiteness.’” That is, unlike the offspring of the Black community, some of the offspring of the Mexican community, and in truth the Latinx community, are able to “invest” in this whiteness. I argue the Latinx collective, as a whole, has had the ability to engage in behaviors that grant them the racial category “white.”

3.2. The Benefiting Case: The Latinx Collective and Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility

What is left in this chapter is to show that the Latinx collective meets Strawson’s moral address condition, and it has forward-looking collective responsibility to address the fact that it has been benefiting from anti-black racism. I want to now refer to the three conditions I had advanced in chapter two to show how the collective meets the moral address condition:

1) The non-agential collective should be structured in such a way that it has the
capacity to become a goal- oriented collective.

2) The non- agential collective has to be in a situation or a state of affairs where the problem requires collective action.

3) The action being called into question (such as an expectation being placed onto the non- agential collective) is obvious to a reasonable person and the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable.

Now let’s go through each condition in order to see how the Latinx collective meets them. Regarding the first condition, the Latinx collective has historically shown that it has the capacity to become a goal- oriented collective. I have shown this by giving the LULAC and Chicano movement examples. While these two historical examples are on a smaller scale, these examples at least point to the fact that members of a non- agential collective can form into a goal- oriented collective. So, even though the Latinx collective is non- homogenous, my argument does not require it to be one. The collective is structured in such a way where the members are capable of sharing a common purpose or goal. Therefore, the Latinx collective meets the first condition.

As for the second condition, the Latinx collective is in a position or state of affairs where the current problem requires a collective solution. That is, it will require more than just select individuals of the Latinx collective addressing anti- black racism to actually solve or attempt to remediate the current problem. Anti-black racism in the Latinx collective is at a scale where it will require a large number of the members of the collective to come together to carry out its responsibility. The reason for this is that when I refer to anti- black racism, I am not referring to “racist people, actions, attitudes, and beliefs.” Rather, I am referring to “racist practices, ideologies and institutions” (Taylor
Therefore, it is not enough for the members of the Latinx collective to be individually actively anti-racist, but for the collective as a whole to be actively anti-racist in order to address the grand scale of anti-black racism.

Due to the lack of unity in the collective, this may appear difficult or unlikely. However, as I have stated before, we can point to historical examples where a small part of the Latinx collective did form into a goal-oriented collective. Therefore, through education and an openness towards uncomfortable conversations about the fact that the Latinx collective is benefitting from anti-black racism, a common or shared purpose can be brought about. Two ways in which I think the Latinx collective can be educated and made aware is through school (with ethnic studies and critical race theory), through art (especially art museums hosting exhibits on these topics), and having those uncomfortable conversations with family and friends regarding race and racism. Though there are not any leadership positions in the Latinx collective, it is still possible to educate the members of the collective and bring awareness to the fact that the collective is benefiting from anti-black racism.

Lastly, the action being called into question—form into a goal-oriented collective in order to address the anti-black racism the collective is benefitting from—should appear to yield favorable or positive results from the perspective of a reasonable person. Though there is not a list to refer to that tells us which actions will yield a favorable outcome, here are some ideas of what would yield positive results.

First, a reasonable person could see that by choosing to do nothing, the Latinx collective would fail to carry out its forward-looking collective responsibility. This would then allow the harm directed towards the Black community to continue. Therefore,
it is worse to do nothing than for the Latinx collective to, at the very least, attempt to carry out its responsibility.

Second, it is not enough to only prevent or remedy harm. The third condition asks for positive outcomes. It asks for a clearly favorable outcome. The Latinx collective can come together as a goal-oriented collective and have the common or shared purpose to engage in actions that reduce or eliminate the benefits it has been receiving. So what would these positive results look like? By addressing the anti-black racism the Latinx collective has been benefitting from, the collective can educate its members (and even non-members) regarding the forms that anti-black racism takes and how anti-black racism harms the Black community personally and socio-economically. By doing so, I believe implicit racial bias could be significantly reduced which could, in theory, bring awareness to systemic racism. By bringing awareness to systemic racism, issues such as the school to prison pipeline and the prison industrial complex can be addressed. By educating its members on the mechanics of anti-black racism, it would also change how the public votes on its elected officials, influencing representation and legislation. This would then impact how the Black community is treated on an economic level. Therefore, this would then, in theory, address the economic disparities the Black community faces.

I want to note the shared goal should be one that is future or forward thinking. The driving force of the common or shared purpose is to bring about a certain state of affairs, in this case, to bring about systemic change. These positive results will not occur overnight or occur solely by the collective saying they're going to make amends rather than do what is necessary to help the Black community. Rather these results are going to take time to come to fruition, therefore, being actively anti-racist is a long-term
commitment. The Latinx collective has to focus an “eye towards the future” and

genuinely ponder which actions will bring about certain kinds of consequences, and

which actions will bring about the desired state of affairs.

By discussing how the Latinx case meets each individual condition, I have shown

how the Latinx collective meets Strawson’s moral address condition. Therefore, in this

specific state of affairs, the Latinx collective is, justifiably, the appropriate target of

forward-looking reactive attitudes, and it is the appropriate bearer of collective

responsibility in the forward-looking sense.

Now there are concerns which will arise due to what I am arguing. One important

corncern is can a collective become goal-oriented if not all members are willing to

transition? I want to say that first, my goal of this thesis was to show how a non-agential

collective can have collective responsibility, and I believe I have shown this.

Nonetheless, a simple answer to this question is yes. I believe a non-agential collective

can still become goal-oriented even if there are members of the collective who do not

agree with becoming a goal-oriented collective. Without a doubt, there are going to be

members of the Latinx collective who do not believe the collective benefits from anti-

black racism, who may think anti-black racism doesn’t exist, who may not care that the

collective is benefiting from anti-black racism, and so on and so forth. However, with

that being said, in order for this transition to be viable, or in other words, for this

transition to be considered successful, the media should begin to notice a change in

regards to the Latinx collective. In other words, my argument calls for the Latinx

collective to start a movement in order to bring about systemic change, and its transition

into being a goal-oriented collective becomes successful when the media begins to take
note of that change. One example I can give where we have seen this occur currently is with the Black Lives Matter movement. There are currently members of the Black collective who do not agree with or believe in the movement. However, the movement has gained enough media attention that it is seen as an actual goal-oriented collective within the Black collective. I am arguing the same has to be done with the Latinx collective. Once the media begins to report a large enough group within the collective that has the aim to prevent further harm towards the Black collective, then the Latinx collective has succeeded in beginning to carry out its responsibility.

In this chapter, I have explained what backward-looking and forward-looking collective responsibility are. From there, I then explained the benefits of using forward-looking collective responsibility when justifiably placing responsibility onto a non-agential collective. I then explained how, and in what way, reactive attitudes still play a role in my argument. That is, I explained how obligation and the expectation placed on non-agential agents to “do something” are forms of reactive attitudes in the forward-looking sense. Next, I addressed the concern over how a non-agential collective could be expected to form into a goal-oriented collective. I demonstrated that this task is possible and that parts of the Latinx collective have already become goal-oriented collectives by discussing two important historical events. Lastly, I discussed and thoroughly explained how the Latinx collective meets Strawson’s moral address condition. I did so by explaining how the Latinx collective meets the three conditions I had presented in chapter two.
Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown how a non-agential collective, such as the Latinx collective, can, under certain circumstances, have forward-looking collective responsibility. In order to show that it is possible for non-agential collectives to meet the moral address condition, I engaged and modified a case by Virginia Held and provided a criteria that non-agential collectives must meet. The criteria I have advanced in chapter two are a) the non-agential collective should be structured in such a way that it has the capacity to become a goal-oriented collective; b) the non-agential collective has to be in a situation or a state of affairs where the problem requires collective action; and c) the action being called into question (such as an expectation being placed onto the non-agential collective) is obvious to a reasonable person and the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable. When non-agential collective meets these conditions, they meet the moral address condition, and can have forward-looking collective responsibility.

Now that I have demonstrated how the Latinx collective, an ethnoracial community, can be ascribed collective responsibility, it should follow there are other ethnoracial collectives that can also have collective responsibility. Members of non-black ethnoracial collectives should begin to understand how it is the case that some black scholars and activists in the U.S. refer to non-black ethnoracial communities as a single collective, and demand that collective to confront the prominence and severity of anti-black racism.

My thesis also points out that members of non-black ethnoracial collectives have forward-looking collective responsibility just by virtue of their membership to their collective. As a result, I have shown being a member of a non-agential collective does not automatically exempt one from the moral community. A person could discover they are in a state of affairs that
morally requires them to form into a goal-oriented collective with the people around them.

My thesis also encourages us to take into account and recognize that when we are talking about responsibility, we are not always referring to responsibility in the backward-looking sense. The Latinx collective does not have backward-looking collective responsibility, they cannot be morally blamed or punished for benefiting from anti-black racism. However, they can be held accountable in the forward-looking sense. The conditions I have advanced in chapter two allow us the opportunity to recognize these occurrences. Recall that with the current literature, this was not possible.
References


Vita

Julisa J. Fernandez- Rivera is a born and raised El Pasoan. She was awarded her Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and psychology from the University of Texas at El Paso in 2017. Julisa was an undergraduate and later a facilitator for the bilingual outreach program, “Philosophy for Children in the Borderlands” from 2015-2018. During the completion of this thesis, Julisa has participated in a number of talks, panels, and presentations. These range from being on a panel discussion for José Jorge Mendoza’s, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration* in 2018, to co-organizing the “Moral and Political Philosophy at the Border Conference” in 2019, to presenting at the Sixth Biennial ENSO Social Ontology Conference at the Tampere University in Tampere, Finland in 2019. Julisa is also currently participating in two research projects. She is a researcher assistant for “The Effects of COVID-19 on Latinx College Students” research project for Dr. Isabel Martinez and a co-author for the “Campus Food Pantry” research project with Dr. Andrew Fultz and Dr. Jerry Kim. Julisa aims to pursue a doctoral degree in a field of study that will allow her to continue her research on morality, collectives, and systemic injustice.