The Scramble for Texas: European Diplomacy and Imperial Contest in the Republic of Texas, 1835-1846

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THE SCRAMBLE FOR TEXAS: EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND IMPERIAL CONTEST IN
THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, 1835-1846

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Petra and Dirk Jacobus, who have been a source of unwavering support. Through their encouragement, I have become the first person in my family to earn a Ph.D.
THE SCRAMBLE FOR TEXAS: EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND IMPERIAL CONTEST IN
THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, 1835-1846

by

PENELOPE LEA JACOBUS, B.A., M.A.

DISSERTATION

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The University of Texas at El Paso
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for the Degree of

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Vita 449
Introduction

The early nineteenth century was marked by tremendous global change, both economic and political. On the one hand, there were the revolutions for independence in the Americas: After the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century, the faltering of the Spanish Empire left behind a map of newly-formed states between the years of 1810 and 1825. Far from being consolidated and stable, however, these new states were geographically and politically fluid, as the case of Mexico demonstrates. The independence of Mexico was declared in September of 1821 by the First Mexican Empire, a large state that included the Central American provinces. Only two years later, the empire was dissolved and replaced with a republic – this time without the Central American provinces, which formed the Federal Republic of Central America only to splinter into its constituent member states less than two decades later.1 Border shifts also occurred around the United States, the first American colony to have broken away from its mother country: Transactions such as the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the cession of Florida to the United States through the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819 enlarged the young nation.

On the other hand, the early nineteenth century witnessed an enormous increase in European industrial output after the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Europe, with Britain at the forefront, grew continuously more efficient in its manufacturing and industry, which incited a sharp competition: In order to withstand the economic pressure of other countries, European states believed it necessary to seek steadily and diligently for more markets, more consumers,

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more raw materials. The political change of the Americas and the economic change of Europe met with lasting and significant consequences beginning in the 1810s, when Europeans sought to expand commercially into the former Spanish colonies, where trade had been regulated and restricted by Spain. The emerging young Spanish American states were generally less stable and established than their European counterparts and void of substantial industries of their own. Spanish America became a place for negotiation, competition, and imperialism, where the European need for raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods intertwined with the Spanish American need for foreign recognition, stability, and consumption.

This politically and economically contested space continued to change throughout the 1830s and 1840s, when a new republic declared its independence in the northern part of former Spanish America: Texas. After defeating Mexican troops under the leadership of General and President Antonio López de Santa Anna at the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836, the Texian government was met with many of the same challenges that its Spanish American counterparts had experienced only fifteen to twenty-five years prior: although the Texian government sought to instill its state with more legitimacy through the Treaties of Velasco, which had been signed by the captured Santa Anna though never ratified by the Mexican government, its representatives soon realised that Texas needed foreign recognition as well as economic and financial partners in order to survive in a global order increasingly defined by trade and one’s commercial prowess – rather than mercantilist policies imposed upon one’s colonial possessions, the new order began to focus increasingly on free trade. Internationally stranded after the United States refused immediate annexation due to the powder keg of slavery, which incited both Democrats and Whigs to refrain from incorporating the large area of Texas

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into the Union, the young republic looked to Europe, where eyes had fallen on the new American state as an economic, political, and imperial tool.

Rather than centering this story solely on that of the Republic of Texas as a sovereign state, this dissertation desires to build on previous scholarship which has analysed the Texas region as an imperial borderland, or as Andrew J. Torget calls it: “a central crossroads for overlap, collusion, and conflict between various powers – not only Mexico and the United States, but also Indian nations and European countries”. The independence of Texas was not guaranteed; annexation to Mexico or the United States both seemed possible. In the 1830s and 1840s, territorial sovereignty was fluid in Texas: depending on the perspectives of the observers of this region, it could be considered as its own republic, the North American Southwest, the Mexican North, or la Comanchería. Boundary disputes plagued all three of North America’s republics, and another actor, the Comanche Empire, did not recognise these nationally drawn lines beyond their use toward Comanche benefit. The combined actions of Europeans, Americans, and Native Americans shaped the territorial claims and possibilities of tribes such as the Apaches, but also states themselves, such as Mexico or Texas, who could only lay a nominal claim to those parts of their territories where Comanches resisted and overwhelmed Texian and Mexican power. Imperial contestations centring around commerce, politics, and settlement elicited a redefinition of the fluid concept of race: Diplomats attempted to categorise racially the various groups present in Texas using terms such as “Anglo-American” and “Anglo-Saxon”,

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4 “Nationally drawn” refers here to boundaries originated and accepted by European states, as well as those nations recognised by Europeans as such, including Mexico and the United States. As chapter five on international law showcases, Indian nations were not recognised by international law, developed predominantly by Europeans, as nations possessing the same rights as others. As chapter four demonstrates, many diplomats from the United States, Texas, Mexico, and European states viewed the Comanches as savage or uncivilised.
“Mexican” and “Latin”, or “Indian”. The German desire for settlement in Texas also incited racial debates on the resistance and persistence of the Germanic race vis-à-vis Native Americans and Anglo-Americans. The extreme fluidity of the Texas region can also be noticed in legal disputes, such as the Prussian effort to mediate between Mexico and the United States over U.S.-American reclamations. The Prussian umpire struggled to define the national, political, and economic circumstances of the region due to its changeability.

The story that this dissertation analyses is the attempted European penetration of the North American borderlands during the independence of the Texas Republic. It will analyse how the independence of Texas ties into new forms of imperialism exercised by Europeans and U.S.-Americans during the first half of the nineteenth century, a time when shifting ideas about freedom and coercion, international law and rights, civilisation, nationhood, and trade redefined imperial possibilities. Imperialism in the nineteenth century had to be increasingly compatible with ideas of freedom and justice, such as free trade, free labour and the use of fair legal tenets in the conduct among nations and diplomacy to solve international conflicts. Emigration projects and settler colonialism were also understood as more “humane” and acceptable forms of imperialism. The imperial presence in Texas of European and North American states was largely of an informal nature. Neither Britain nor France sought to incorporate Spanish American states or Texas into their colonial possessions; informal imperialism was enacted through subtler

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5 For racial Anglo-Saxonism, see Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), in particular. Horsman lays out the emergence of a racial ideology which placed some Europeans as superior to others, with American Anglo-Saxons at the very top of the racial pyramid. The origins of Anglo-Saxons, the noblest stock of men in this construction, could be traced back to the Germanic peoples, who travelled westward from the Asian steppes. The ancient German peoples’ pursuit of self-governance was, in the eyes of American anthropologists, nativists, and pseudo-scientists, tied to their racial identity, and it was believed that Anglo-Saxons inherited their own independence, initiative and intelligence from these Germanic peoples.

6 Arguments about enlightened settler colonialism were also made by the French in their conquest of Algeria. See Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
means. Using Texas’ dire economic state, its desperate need for foreign recognition, its fear of a Mexican re-annexation, and its need for both settlers and financial support in the form of loans, the various European states aspired to incorporate Texas into their realm of influence, making it an entity that would favour their economic and political needs over those of other European states without robbing it of its de facto sovereignty.

U.S.-American politicians acknowledged these motives with alarm, and exaggeratedly viewed British designs in Texas as an effort to ruin the entire North American Union. European imperialism was thus met with a growing imperialism on behalf of the United States, which became increasingly vexed by European involvement in the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine, first issued in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe, was initially intended as a warning against European imperialism. By the era of Texas Independence, however, the Monroe Doctrine had also turned into a tool of U.S.-American imperialism. Interlaced in this conflict was the presence of Mexico, subjected to European informal imperialism and the object of desire of U.S. imperialist and expansionary schemes, but also an imperial power itself for it sought to reintegrate Texas into its federation and crushed several other rebellions within its territory, such

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7 The Monroe Doctrine forbade any direct European involvement in the Western Hemisphere, declaring that the New World would no longer “be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” The Doctrine was borne partially from the concern that France might possibly intervene in Spanish America through the restoration of Ferdinand VII in the same year. The doctrine notes that although the United States would not interfere with existing colonies, if any European power should try to challenge the independence of Latin American republics that had already ousted Spain, the United States would view this as a violation of the doctrine, and take action to counter this “manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.” George Canning, Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1827 and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1822 to 1827, was a supporter of the budding British policy of free trade as well as the exertion of influence using commerce, and he realised that interference in former Spanish colonies by any continental European power would hamper British trade. In fact, this realisation had pushed Canning to push for a bilateral Monroe Doctrine on behalf of both England and the United States, a proposal that was rejected by the United States, still distrustful of entering into any alliances that might entangle it too deeply in other nations’ affairs. See: “The Monroe Doctrine”, The Advocate of Peace, Vol. 58, No. 1, (Jan. 1986), 8-10, Don Agustin Edward, “Speech at the Canning Statue, 1925” in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part II: From the First to the Second World War, Series D: Latin America, 1914-1939, Vol. 3: South America and Mexico, 1920-1924, ed. Philip, George, (Lanham: Universal Publications of America, 1989), 132, and Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 3, (Jul. 1914), 427-442.
as the independence movements of Yucatan and the Republic of the Rio Grande. Moreover, Native Americans also constituted an imperial power: As Pekka Hämäläinen shows in his work *The Comanche Empire*, Comanche Indians were an incredibly powerful entity with their own imperial, economic, cultural, and political motives. The political landscape of the Texas region was decidedly uncertain between 1836 and the early 1840s, but one thing was clear: each entity – be it the United States, Mexico, Britain, France, the Comanches, or smaller states such as those of the German Confederation – that sought to establish its influence over Texas had to challenge and contest a varied assortment of other imperial contenders, including the Texians themselves, for some of their statesmen hoped to build a Texian empire in its own right.

**The States and Their Interests in the Texian Borderlands**

Although my focus is on European states, the North American republics were obviously important actors. The United States had been home of the Anglo settlers that eventually rebelled against Mexican rule and proclaimed an independent Texas; it was also the state within which Texas was incorporated in 1846, and Texian officials maintained close contacts with their U.S. counterparts. The linguistic, social, and cultural similarities between most Texian settlers and U.S. Americans, particularly Southerners, are undeniable, and carried tremendous weight given that the new regime of Texas was one that largely excluded Indians and Mexicans, even those *Tejanos* that had supported the secession from Mexico. The United States, though initially eager to remove or mitigate the Mexican threat of re-annexation of Texas by encouraging Texian diplomatic ties to European states, became increasingly watchful of the same when it realised the growing English interest in Texas and the potential of continued Texian independence. As a burgeoning economic and imperial power, the United States, and especially its supporters of

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westward expansion, looked with dismay upon the attempted English expansion of power in what it regarded as the North American Southwest, of which Texas formed a crucial component. As the anxiety over British influence in Texas grew, so did the willingness to engage in conflict with Mexico over the issue of Texas.

Texas independence did not just set the United States on a collision course with Mexico, but also encouraged Mexican hostilities toward the United States: After Texas seceded from Mexico, the latter refused to acknowledge the independence of the former, maintaining that Texas was merely a rebelling constituent territory. This attitude placed the Mexican government on bad terms with several European representatives, who did not wish to damage their countries’ relations to Mexico yet also held interest in Texas and thus aspired to achieve a policy line that benefitted their interests in both republics. The principal episode of this European course of action was the joint Franco-English attempt to coax Mexico into formally recognising Texas so as to eliminate one of the primary reasons why certain political factions in Texas continued to seek annexation to the United States, fear of Mexican re-annexation. Yet other, less explored incidents also show that Texas independence influenced European dealings with Mexico. This includes, for instance, the Prussian mediation between the United States and Mexico in regard to U.S.-American reclamations brought forth against Mexico in 1839, some of which were complicated by the fact that damages and loss of U.S.-American property had occurred in Texas during the Texas Revolution and could thus not readily be connected to the Mexican government as the perpetrator of these damages. Another instance is the Hanseatic response to General-Consul Andreas Negrete’s protest regarding Hanseatic correspondence and commerce with Texas. Overall, the guiding questions for the Mexican aspects of this research include how
Mexico was impacted by European diplomacy with Texas and how Mexican officials sought to
steer European action.

Great Britain is another state whose involvement with Texas is analysed in depth here. As
the nineteenth century’s hegemon and economic-industrial powerhouse, England held vested
interest in many parts of the globe. Britain and France were motivated by several political and
economic factors which were intrinsically tied to their imperialist goals and desire for influence
abroad. An independent Texas, with close to no industry of its own, could become a new
European market, like the former Spanish American colonies after 1820. The sooner one got
involved in Texian trade, the less likely it was that a rival economic power would garner more
advantageous conditions. Texas also seemed like an excellent location for the cultivation of
cotton. Cotton was crucial to European, particularly British, prosperity and power, for the British
economy was built heavily on the textile industry, whose lifeblood was a steady supply of cotton.
Purchasing cotton from Britain’s (and Europe’s) growing economic rival, the United States, was
not considered optimal by some European statesmen of the era, though it was inevitable given
the lack of other viable locations for cotton cultivation (and did indeed continue through the
U.S.-American Civil War). ⁹ An independent Texas, Britons hoped, might emerge as a
supplementary or even alternative source to U.S.-grown cotton. Nevertheless, as the key foreign
influence in Latin America after Spain had lost its dominions, British politicians strove to strike a
delicate balance between their interests in Texas on one hand, and in Mexico on the other.
Moreover, the issue of slavery loomed large in British debates on Texas. Though English

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⁹ In the British Empire of the early nineteenth century, neither India nor the West Indies were able to produce a
statistically significant amount of cotton. Only a few months after the independence of Texas, British politicians
highlighted that this economic dilemma could be solved if Texas could be established as a cotton grower. Texas’
industrial weakness was hereby not a problem, but rather an advantage: unlike the United States, Texas was a long
way away from becoming an economic rival to Britain. One of the best sources for cotton-related statistics, see
officials saw economic interests in Texas, they also condemned the presence of slavery therein, and hoped that an independent Texas could be persuaded to abolish the practice.\textsuperscript{10} If Texas could moreover be convinced that it did not need to be annexed to the United States to achieve political stability and a measure of economic prosperity, it would also stand as a protective buffer between the unstable Republic of Mexico and the United States, the emerging imperialist rival of the French and British.

England’s ally in Texian affairs, at least as concerns the attempts to garner Mexican recognition of Texas, was France, which harboured similar economic motives in conducting diplomacy with Texas. The cultivation of cotton and the presence of other raw materials, combined with the lack of industry and manufacturing in Texas made it a promising target for European, including French, markets. Furthermore, the French policy line in Texas was influenced profoundly by events in Mexico. The so-called ‘Pastry War’ of 1838-1839, fought over reclamation claims, caused Franco-Mexican relations to slide to a nadir, and motivated France to recognise Texas in 1839, two years before the British.\textsuperscript{11} Racial ideologies and the idea of Pan-Latinism, a unification or solidarity among people who speak Romance languages such as the French, Italians, Spaniards, and Spanish Americans, also shaped French discussions on Texas, which was seen as a place where a war between two races – Anglo-Saxons and Latins – was being fought out as a result of the growing imperialism and settler expansionism on behalf of the Anglo-Saxons.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} A Texian dependence on British manufactured items, so British diplomats believed, would keep Texas under British influence, enabling Britain to impose its will on the American republic in many areas, a primary one being slavery. A dependent Texas reliant on Britain could possibly be persuaded into the abolition of slavery, which might inflame the debate over slavery in Texas’ sister republic, the United States.

\textsuperscript{11} For a brief summary of the Pastry War and its impact on Mexico’s politics, see Richard Bruce Winders, \textit{Crisis in the Southwest: The United States, Mexico and the Struggle over Texas} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 35.

Europe’s most dominant powers were not the only ones to recognise and engage in relations with Texas: Belgium and the Netherlands, the Hanse Towns, and Prussia were all involved in correspondence with or about Texas and found themselves on the latter’s radar for achieving foreign recognition. Whereas England and France were Europe’s imperial powers, both independent states with national identities, sizable economies and financial sectors, and military and naval resources, the Hanse Towns were almost the opposite. Though the Hanseatic League had dominated trade in Northern Europe between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, its importance had greatly diminished by the nineteenth. In fact, of the League’s members, only three remained by the time Texas became independent: the German city-states of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. These city-states were independent entities, yet the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna threatened this independence. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was forced to erase and merge many of its over three-hundred states in 1803 and was then replaced with the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806, which represented Napoleon’s consolidation efforts in Germany. In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, Germany was further consolidated into thirty-nine states of the German Bund by 1815.13 Caught within this consolidation effort and between the two great rivals in German affairs, Austria and Prussia, the Hanseatic cities had reason for concern. In order to highlight the necessity for their independence, the three towns looked overseas. Trans-Atlantic trade and the pioneering of German markets in the newly-independent Latin American republics in the 1820s and 1830s helped underline the significance of Hanseatic independence, for neither Prussia nor Austria, because of their commitment to the legitimacy of status quo ante regimes, were willing

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13 In 1815, the Ninth Act of the Congress of Vienna designated thirty-nine states for inclusion in the German Federation (including the Hanse Towns), but the ascension to this Federation did not actually happen until states joined it via the signing of a second treaty. This occurred between 1815 and 1820. Many of the independent cities joined late, in 1820. Frankfurt, though not a Hanse Town, is also among them.
or able to engage in large-scale negotiations or trade with the new states across the Atlantic.\(^\text{14}\)

Both Texian and Mexican independence fall into this matter of legitimacy, for Hanseatic trade with Mexico was unshackled by a necessity to uphold Spain’s authority in Spanish America. Moreover, only the Hanse Towns engaged in official correspondence with Texas, which they used to hold their ground in the German Confederation.

Though Prussia never engaged in diplomacy with Texas – Texian agent William Henry Daingerfield only exchanged a few letters with Friedrich von Rönne, the Prussian chargé in Washington until 1844 and leader of the Prussian *Handelsamt*, or Ministry of Commerce, in early 1845 – it is nevertheless included in this study, perhaps especially for the reason that it, out of all the European powers analysed here, did not recognise Texas or negotiate any treaties therewith. That is because the Texian republic became a principal issue in Prussian relations with Mexico and the Hanse Towns. Affairs within the German Confederation were influenced by the independence of Texas in several ways. In its dealings with the Hanse Towns, Prussian politicians acknowledged that Hanseatic connections to the trans-Atlantic world gave the city-states added weight as independent members of the German Bund. Although a stronger Hanseatic presence in the Federation could be interpreted as a hindrance to Prussia’s consolidation efforts, Prussian officials instead strove to draw their own advantage from

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\(^{14}\) Between Austria and Prussia, Prussia emerged as the party more interested in overseas trade, and often worked in connection with the Hanseates, for Prussia brought a certain measure of political power and the Hanse Towns brought economic freedom to German trans-Atlantic trade. The other members of the German Federation were not new states, but given the size of their economies, their political weakness, and heavy financial constraints, they also encountered difficulties in forming ties across the Atlantic. Combined with the recent political tumult caused by Napoleon, Europe’s partial restoration through the Congress of Vienna, and the economic threat in the form of the juggernaut British economy, the German states were at risk of economic instability, and several of them, such as Saxony and the Hanse Towns, feared for their continued independence. See, for example, Thomas D. Schoonover, *Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999), chapter one, or Jürgen Prüser, “Die Handelsverträge der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen und Hamburg mit überseeischen Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert,” veröffentlicht. a. d. Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Band 30, (1962).
Hanseatic trans-Atlantic trade by using it as a way to escape the straitjacket of legitimacy. As such, the Hanse Towns became a window for German trade into the Americas. Moreover, the interest of the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas – a society founded in Mainz in 1842, known as the Adelsverein because its founders were noblemen – also furthered Prussian interest in the new republic, because the Society approached the Prussian government for financial backing and official support in the 1840s. Lastly, Prussian views on Texas also serve a useful purpose in this study because they represent at times the opinions of bystanders: as a power without official ties to Texas, Prussia analysed the policy lines of the various other states involved – such as Britain, France, the United States, Mexico, and the Hanse Towns – in regard to a plethora of issues, including slavery and abolitionism, cotton and trade, and international law.

As the discussion above shows, none of the above-mentioned European states viewed the Republic of Texas in isolation. Diplomacy with Texas was deeply intertwined with these states’ diplomacy with Mexico, from which Texas had seceded, and the diplomats of one European state were oftentimes aware of the actions, motives, and plans of the other European states and their diplomats. Europeans were motivated in two ways by their competition and rivalry: on the one hand, for the smaller states of Europe who, much like Spanish America, suffered under Franco-British economic might, emigration became a significant factor in establishing oneself on the international stage. Belgium, also a very young nation having been recognised as independent from the Netherlands in 1831, harboured dreams of its own zones of influence and potential empire, and regarded Texas as an opportunity to establish such a zone through emigration. Large Belgian settlements in as well as a potential loan to Texas would strengthen Belgian influence in the Americas. For more on Belgian-Texian relations, see Pierre Henri Laurent, “Belgium’s Relations with Texas and the United States, 1839-1844,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Oct., 1964): 220-236. For some Germans, emigration to Texas was also perceived as an excellent opportunity to augment German power by establishing German influence in the Americas. Many Germans believed, had too few inhabitants and was generally too underdeveloped to be capable of assimilating the Germans as was occurring in the United States. Many German noblemen hoped to turn Texas into a Germany outside of Germany by exporting not primarily goods, but that which Germany had too much of: people. A German Texas would enable the German Federation to establish what Britain and France had long had, a zone of influence in the Americas. This idea was most prevalent among members of the so-called Adelsverein or Verein, the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas. One of the most recent and complete works on this subject is James C. Kearney’s Nassau Plantation: The Evolution of a Texas German Slave Plantation (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010).
hand, they aspired to outdo, outsell, and outearn their European competitors; on the other, they also sought collaboration if this secured their own position across the Atlantic or minimised their risk. German diplomats also worked with other states; for example, Prussian officials received most of their information on Texas from British, French, Texian, Mexican, or U.S.-American sources. Though Prussians and Hanseates had a lively correspondence, it is interesting to note that communication on Texas was sparse between these two German entities: Hanseates feared conflict with the most potent German state if their negotiations with Texas were uncovered.

Taken together, the correspondence of European officials with their home governments, one another, as well as with Mexican, U.S., and Texian representatives forms an intricate network across the Atlantic. Many connections were uni- or bilateral, such as the correspondence of Frenchman Saligny with his government or Prussian von Gerolt with Mexican politician Bocanegra. Nevertheless, one can also pinpoint connections between statesmen of several different states. This diplomatic web did not merely concern itself with the niche subject of the independence of Texas, a state whose nine years of independence may seem fleetingly insignificant in retrospect. Rather, this diplomatic web surrounding the young Republic of Texas engaged directly with some of the era’s pivotal issues, such as slavery and abolition, international law and ideas of nationhood and civilisation, economics and free trade, and the nature of Native Americans.

**HISTORIOGRAPHY**

Given Texas’ secession from Mexico, one can begin to analyse the scholarship on the Texas Republic with the Mexican perspectives. Andreas Reichstein observes that Mexican historiography has traditionally analysed the loss of Texas as “the inevitable result of a clash
between two cultures – one which was very interested in land, and the other, which was not.”

Indeed, as the correspondence of Mexican representatives shows, land was not deemed uninteresting or expendable by Mexico, and formed instead a crucial component to Mexican definitions of nationality, civilisation, and international law. While Miguel Ángel González Quiroga has argued that Mexico was limited in its ability to respond to the Texas Revolt by the material conditions of the federation’s member states, other recent perspectives challenge the inevitability of antagonism between Anglo settlers and Mexico and the resulting inevitability of revolution in Texas. Sarah Rodriguez argues that the first Anglo-American settlers in Mexican Texas did not harbour anti-Mexican sentiments when they relocated there. According to her, one must evaluate the 1820s as a time period when settlers’ nationalistic affiliations were flexible and motivated by self-interest. Mexico’s political and economic conditions actually suited settlers and hence attracted them, and Rodriguez writes that it was “Mexican political promise rather than failure” that enticed immigrants.

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez has shown how important the Texas question was to Mexican politics of the time. The desire to regain Texas dominated


17 González Quiroga argues that Nuevo Leon was difficult to mobilise in the fight against Texas, for it was a state heavily dominated by agriculture and poorly developed otherwise; a state in which only a small group held wealth as well as political power. He labels Nuevo León a “passive actor” in the Texas Revolution, suggesting that its inhabitants had other concerns that seemed more dire than the distant and abstract threat of Texians revolting, such as Indian attacks and hunger. This article also highlights how the attitude of one Mexican state could incite hostility in another: Coahuila accused Nuevo León of not providing enough aid toward the Texas campaign, which furthered the divide between the states of the Mexican Federation. Miguel Ángel González Quiroga, “Nuevo León durante la independencia de Texas, 1835-1836”, Historia Mexicana, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Oct. - Dec., 2006): 427-470, see 462-465.

18 Much of the language used by such early Anglo-American-Mexican patriots closely resembles that which was also used to discuss the United States: William Walker, for example, stated that “With these and a thousand other advantages I repeat that Mexico cannot fail, under the influence of a wise and liberal government, to become the greatest nation on earth”. Rodriguez notes that U.S. leaders of the 1810s and 1820s held a different opinion, however, already thirsting for U.S.-American expansion across the entire continent and believing that the immigrants into Mexico could be used as agents for this end. Her article changes the narrative of U.S. expansion as an inevitability and furthermore provides a different perspective on González Quiroga’s claim that Mexico’s loss of Texas was unpreventable. Sarah K. M. Rodriguez, “‘The Greatest Nation on Earth’: The Politics and Patriotism of the First Anglo American Immigrants to Mexican Texas, 1820–1824”, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 86, Number 1, (2017): 50–83.
discussions regarding centralism versus federalism and could determine the success or failure of a new president. As such, this question made the Mexican political landscape incredibly volatile and unstable. Another significant contribution by Vázquez is her analysis of Texas’ expansionism at the expense of Mexico. Besides mentioning the Texian-Mexican boundary and border dispute concerning the Nueces River, Vázquez details Texian proposals to Mexico for sales of land, which amounted to downright Texian expansionism and its own ‘Manifest Destiny.” Some scholarship on Mexican-Texian relations tends not to focus as heavily on Mexican politics, but more so on Tejanos’ fate in Texas.

Several works have also detailed contemporary U.S. perspectives on European imperialism in the Republic of Texas. Justin H. Smith’s *The Annexation of Texas* was first published in 1911 and later republished in 1941, and introduced Euro-Texian diplomacy to a wider audience by incorporating this niche subject in a monograph on the broader history of the Republic of Texas. It represents one of the first expansive works on the history of the annexation of Texas and provides an analysis of European designs in Texas through a U.S. lens. In the preface, he states that five nations - Mexico, Texas, the United States, Great Britain, and France - were brought almost to the verge of war as a result of the existence of a new republic on the continent between 1836 and 1845. Smith notes the potential influence an independent Texas could have had on future events in the Americas: for Britain, it could have meant the preservation of British power and *Pax Britannica* on the entire globe, including the Americas, and for the United States, this rival republic could have posed a tremendous threat. Had Texas

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remained independent, the United States might not be the economic and imperial power it is today.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1985, John H. Schroeder published an influential work focussing predominantly on the U.S. perspective on the Texas Question. Schroeder demonstrates how the annexation of Texas, with its associated consequences for American politics and history – the ever-growing, looming torment of slavery, the increasing and volatile sectionalism in American politics, the subsequent war with Mexico, and the failure of too many compromises which ultimately almost tore the nation apart in the 1860s – related to Texas’ diplomacy with Britain. Especially Southern advocates for annexation argued that Britain was certain to influence Texas: U.S. government officials spoke of England’s conquest of Texas, California, Mexico, or all three; of Britain’s imminent plan to coerce Texas into abolishing slavery, which would hamper Southern slavery; and of the danger Britain posed to the future of the United States. This hysteria over Anglo-Texian diplomacy has in part been analysed in regard to U.S. politics by Schroeder as well as Sam W. Haynes, though the question remains whether this Anglophobia extended beyond U.S. representatives to encompass other European, Mexican, or Texian officials as well. This query also informed the research of this dissertation.\textsuperscript{22}

Over the past decades, imperialism has emerged as a more central theme in the history of the North American Southwest. Amy Kaplan highlights that the link between slavery, expansion, and imperialism has often been denied by U.S.-American politicians, including James K. Polk

\textsuperscript{21} Smith wrote his book from a Progressive historian’s standpoint. Many historians of this strain, including Frederick Jackson Turner, regarded westward expansion as one of the foundations and antecedents of American democracy, and Smith is no different, viewing U.S. annexation of Texas as necessary and important for American liberalism and democracy. Justin H Smith, \textit{The Annexation of Texas} (New York: The Baker and Taylor Company, 1941).

who labelled slavery a domestic, yet not a foreign question. She moreover suggests that Perry Miller likewise saw the United States as a nation wrapped up in domestic affairs. According to Kaplan, Miller envisioned that “America – once cut off from Europe – can be understood as a domestic question, left alone, unique, divorced from the international conflicts – whether the slave trade or the Mexican War – in which that national identity takes shape”. Kaplan, however, emphasises that the “political struggles for power with other cultures and nations” are “struggles which make America’s conceptual and geographic borders fluid, contested, and historically changing”. Kaplan further underlines the parallels Miller draws between the history of the United States and the history of the Roman Empire as described by Edward Gibbon, writing that Miller used the Roman Empire to differentiate “the American republic in its illimitable capacity for self-renewal and expansion – to always be at the beginning – from the inevitable decline of Old World empires”.

Perry’s rejection of American empire, which alludes to European imperialism and underlines, according to Kaplan, the imperialist nature of U.S. culture and foreign policy, can also be witnessed in the historiography on the Republic of Texas. Though his work is entitled Dream of Empire, John Edward Weems does not refer to the region occupied by the Republic of Texas between the years of 1836 and 1845 as imperial. Weems had in 1971 considered the secession of Texas from Mexico an “inevitability”, suggesting that Mexican observers in the 1830s and 1840s had held the same belief. In order to underline his point, Weems utilised a

23 Kaplan and others looked at “the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and resistance which have shaped the cultures of the United States and the cultures of those it has dominated within and beyond its geopolitical boundaries”, including “European colonization, slavery, westward expansion, overseas intervention, and cold war nuclear power”. Amy Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture” in Cultures of United States Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4.
24 Kaplan, 7.
25 Kaplan, 15.
26 Kaplan, 9.
quote from Mexican Secretary of War José María Tornel y Mendívil, who had declared in 1837 that “the prevailing thought in the United States of America has been the acquisition of the greater part of the territory that formerly belonged to Spain”. Despite Weems’ acknowledgement of the U.S.-American desire for expansion, he does not in his book identify it as imperial in nature. In fact, his use of Tornel’s quote seems to suggest that Weems did not regard U.S. expansion as necessarily imperial, for he highlights that Tornel continued that the United States “has been neither an Alexander nor a Napoleon, desirous of conquest in order to extend its dominions or add to his glory, who has inspired the proud Anglo-Saxon race in its desire, its frenzy to usurp and gain control of that which rightfully belongs to its neighbors; rather it has been the nation itself which(…) has swept away whatever has stood in the way of its aggrandizement”.27

Several authors have sought to increase the variety of imperial actors in Texas. Brian DeLay and Pekka Hämäläinen both focus on the influence of Native Americans in the region, highlighting how they shaped the imperial designs of European and American powers. DeLay points out that the raids of Native Americans, particularly the Comanches, were instrumental in causing the instability of the Mexican frontier, finances, political arena, and economy. Hämäläinen targets the policies, geographic extent, and power of the Comanches, referring to theirs as an ‘empire’ in its own right. The Comanche empire challenged several regimes, including the Texian, Mexican, and U.S.-American ones, and formed a stumbling block for European imperial schemes and diplomatic missions. What the Comanche empire brilliantly showcases, given that it was an empire without set political boundaries, is that imperialism did not merely rely on colonialism, but could instead also be elicited through other means. The

Comanches’ empire was largely one that held power through commerce and trade, military action, and culture.\textsuperscript{28}

More recent works have also sought to connect the North American imperialist landscape to larger contemporary themes, such as slavery. Roger G. Kennedy’s 2013 monograph, \textit{Cotton and Conquest: How the Plantation System Acquired Texas}, focusses on the history of Texas cotton and how cotton became central to Texas’ economy especially upon gaining independence. Kennedy aims to make his narrative a transnational one, and incorporates European powers’ need for cotton and desire for the abolition of slavery during the time period of independent Texas. The first third of this work, labelled “The Transnational System” in reference to the legacy and impact of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, details Britain and France’s support for Texian independence against the desires of both Mexico and the United States due to surmised economic advantages to be plucked in Texas. Kennedy also showcases that Texian officials were aware of England’s aim to prevent the annexation of their republic to the United States as well as U.S. fears of British involvement in Texas, which the Texian government used to barter for support from both states.\textsuperscript{29}

Torget’s \textit{Seeds of Empire} is another such work, in which he argues that the “powerful economic and political forces swirling throughout the northern Atlantic world crashed into one another during the first half of the nineteenth century, swept across North America, and

\textsuperscript{28}Raids served as both a retaliation against foes as well as an economic tool, for stolen goods were resold or bartered with a variety of other groups, including Mexicans, U.S.-Americans, Texans, Europeans, or other tribes. Moreover, this trade often occurred according to Comanche terms. As Spanish officials observed, Mexican villagers sometimes dressed in Comanche attire in order to trade with Comanches, which demonstrates both the connection between trade and culture as well as between culture and imperialism. Hämäläinen, \textit{Comanche Empire} and Brian DeLay, \textit{War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexico War} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{29}Kennedy’s interest in European-Texian relations during the independence period is mostly contextual in nature, for he considers it through the lens of socio-economic and political consequences for Texas in the form of the slavery-plantation system and the Civil War. See: Roger G. Kennedy, \textit{Cotton and Conquest: How the Plantation System Acquired Texas} (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2013).
transformed Mexico’s northeastern frontier into the western edge of the southern United States. That process would, in time, redistribute power on the continent.” Torget also highlights the paradox of nineteenth-century abolitionism: just at a time when slave labour was more profitable than ever due to the influence and lucrativeness of cotton, anti-slavery sentiments began to rise throughout the Western world. The resulting polarization that occurred in the United States has, as Torget suggests, often been evaluated domestically, i.e. with a focus on the internal developments of the country rather than on global forces and themes. This the author seeks to remedy by analysing slavery in Texas as being shaped by and shaping events impacting the entire continent, including Mexico. Torget argues that there were three factors – slavery, cotton, and empire – that motivated Anglo-Americans to settle in Mexican Texas, thereby embedding the history of Texas and slavery in that state more firmly in the history of imperialism. Torget also credits both European as well as Indian powers with playing defining roles in the imperial landscape of the Texas region, and writes that “understanding the complex relationship of the Texas borderlands to the rest of the world is central to understanding the evolution of this portion of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands”.

An important sub-field of scholarship on independent Texas is diplomacy, particularly Euro-Texian diplomacy. The historiography on British-Texian diplomacy starts with J. L. Worley’s 1905 article “The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas” and Ephraim D. Adams’ book *British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846*, published in 1910. Worley’s article argues that Britain lost its dominance in the Southwest when it failed to prevent Texas’ incorporation into the United States. This analysis questions the inevitability of Texas annexation and U.S. supremacy on the North American continent, highlighting instead

30 Torget, 3.
31 Torget, 6.
that this region was one under contestation between powers. Building predominantly on British Foreign Office records, Adams is able to consider the details of the Anglo-Texian relationship in more depth. This work describes the plan to prevent annexation, the possibility of joint action with France, and the importance of abolitionism and slavery. Moreover, Adams mentions Mexico’s place in Anglo-Texian diplomacy, considers the role of English diplomats in Mexico, and connects the ‘Texas Question’ to broader schemes of expansionism, imperialism, and annexation. In his 1909 article, “English Interest in Annexation of California,” Adams connects English diplomacy with the Republic of Texas to English interest in the North American Southwest in general, and in California in particular. Adams published an edited volume of letters from the National Archives of the United Kingdom in 1917.

In 1999, Lelia M. Roeckell took a different stance on English-Texian relations in “Bonds Over Bondage: British Opposition to the Annexation of Texas.” She argues that it is “difficult to reconcile the grandiose designs attributed to British interest in Texas with realities of its diplomatic policy,” because Britain’s main objective was the maintenance of peace, not the prevention of U.S. expansion, the safeguarding of an alternative cotton supply, and the creation

32 Worley’s article is based predominantly on two manuscript collections found in the State Library at Austin, the “Diplomatic, Consular, and Domestic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas” and publications of the Niles’ Register, a weekly newspaper of the early nineteenth century. See: J.L. Worley, “The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas,” The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, Vol. 9, No. 1 (July 1905), 1-40.


34 Correspondence from the British Archives concerning Texas, 1837-1846, ed. Ephraim D. Adams (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1917). Following the literature by Worley and Adams were several dissertations, theses, and seminar papers. Many of these add relatively little to the historiography on English-Texian diplomacy. Nonetheless, Sherrill addresses the British hope that international law could be used to argue that a U.S. annexation of Texas would be illegal. This showcases that the diplomacy of Texas could certainly be valuable in a discussion of nineteenth-century international law and its impact on world history. Patricia Grace Sherrill, “British Attempts to Prevent the Annexation of Texas,” Texas Western College: Seminar Papers, 1956. See also Robert Earl Nelson, “Britain and the Annexation of Texas, with Particular Reference to the Slavery Question (1836-1845),” 1964, Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, and Professional Papers, 1710; and W.W. Jennings, “The Diplomatic Mission of Ashbel Smith as Charge d’Affaires to England During the Years of the Texas Republic,” Texas Western College: Seminar Papers, 1961.
of a North American power balance. Although this negation of British interest in both a cotton grower and a buffer state between the United States and Mexico is debatable given the wealth of source materials that showcase that England did desire to accomplish these other goals (ideally in accordance with a maintenance of peace, not instead of it), Roeckell rightly claims that Anglo-Texian relations must be viewed with Anglo-Mexican affairs and diplomacy in mind. Evaluating Britain’s influence in Mexico, the author argues, also helps to explain Anglophobia in the United States during this time. Overall, Roeckell argues that Britain recognised Texas not in spite of British interest in Mexico, but because of it, in an attempt to stabilise Mexico.\(^{35}\)

The first scholarship which focused on France’s diplomacy with Texas was Herbert Rook Edwards’ “Diplomatic Relations between France and the Republic of Texas” from 1917.\(^{36}\) Edwards explores the European travels of James Pinckney Henderson, one of the predominant Texian agents in charge of acquiring foreign recognition. Edwards is the first scholar of Franco-Texian diplomacy to mention Alphonse Dubois du Saligny, who went to Texas to assess the nation’s resources, and returned to France with an overwhelmingly positive image of abundance and fertility. In the late 1960s and early 70s, Nancy N. Barker published several articles on French relations with Texas, with particular reference to Dubois de Saligny.\(^{37}\) Barker regards Saligny’s efforts in Texas as a stepping stone which enabled Saligny to obtain more experience, a factor that ultimately allowed him to occupy a primary advising role during the French

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\(^{36}\) Initially a Master’s Thesis which was subsequently published in *The Southwestern Quarterly*, this article relies heavily on Garrison’s 1908 *Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas*, a 1500-page, three volume collection of letters on Texian diplomacy. Most of this correspondence targets diplomacy with the United States, whilst some of it covers ties to Mexico.

intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. She notes Saligny’s disdain for Mexico and its “Spanish race” and his praise for the “Anglo-American race”. Saligny’s racial views later influenced his attitude toward Mexicans during the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. Barker describes Saligny as devious and lacking in integrity, and asserts that he betrayed his own government by describing Texas as much more tempting for French interest than it actually was. Another valuable contribution is Barker’s mention of Sam Houston’s proposal that Texas might fight a war against Mexico with French support, and annex the already rebellious Yucatan peninsula, or give won-over land to France.

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez’ valuable article, “Santa Anna y el reconocimiento de Texas” (Santa Anna and the recognition of Texas) from 1987, incorporates Mexico into the discussion on British imperial designs in Texas. It highlights Britain’s role as Mexico’s primary ally and the pressures that the English desire for a Mexican recognition of Texas placed on the Mexican president. The scepticism toward and dismay over Mexican re-annexation efforts on behalf of British statesmen, combined with the void in the Mexican treasury’s coffers, made Santa Anna receptive to the Franco-British offer of “protecting the border ‘from any intrusion’”. 38 Santa Anna’s fighting of wars that Mexico had no money for, his unpopular campaign against Paredes, and the enduring British reclamations destabilised Santa Anna’s regime, inciting the President to find a quick resolution of the Texas Question. In response, he viewed British mediation as an increasingly attractive proposal. This article, which includes several pages of translated correspondence of British representative Charles Bankhead, is significant for its discussion of the British attempt to steer the Texian government away from U.S. annexation and toward continued independence, as well as the Mexican responses thereto.

Whereas Franco-Texian and Anglo-Texian diplomacy have been analysed in some depth in English-language literature, the same is not the case for German-Texian relations. For this subject matter, most relevant literature has been written in the German language. The only thorough work on German-Texian diplomacy is Manfred Kossok’s “Preußen, Bremen, und die ‘Texas-Frage’ 1835-1845” from 1964. Kossok discusses some of the main episodes of Hanseatic-Texian correspondence, such as initial exchanges between Texian envoy to Britain, J. Hamilton, and Hamburg’s Syndic Karl Sieveking, as well as Hanseatic motives for pursuing contact with Texas, including the inclusion of the German Confederation states within a Hanseatic-Texian treaty. Kossok also targets Prussian correspondence on Texas and with the Adelsverein and outlines how the Society sought to appeal to Prussian officials in an attempt to garner official and financial Prussian support of the Society’s goal, German emigration to Texas. Kossok has been one of the most productive and influential scholars on Hanseatic trans-Atlantic trade, together with Hendrik Dane and Walther L. Bernecker, the latter of which is one of the most prominent scholars of German-Mexican relations during the nineteenth century. The

39 Though an early (1892) work by Ernst Baasch, „Beiträge zur Geschichte der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Hamburg und Amerika.“ (Contributions to the history of the trading relations between Hamburg and America) evaluates trade between Hamburg and the United States, Baasch’s consideration of Texas’ position in Hanseatic commerce is very brief, and the political significance that the Hanse Towns attached to the treaty to be negotiated with Texas remains unmentioned. The 1962 publication “Die Handelsverträge der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen und Hamburg mit überseeischen Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert” (The treaties of commerce of the Hanse Towns Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg with overseas states in the 19th century) by Jürgen Prüser likewise touches on Hanseatic interest in Texas and vice versa only tangentially.

Adelsverein and German migration to Texas have been the subject of more works than the diplomacy of German states with Texas, and form a crucial component in European – particularly German – interest in that region of North America. Works of note include those by Rudolph Biesele, James C. Kearney, and Walter Struve.\textsuperscript{41} Joseph W. Schmitz offers a fine synthesis of the most significant events in Texian diplomacy and in doing so also considers German diplomacy with Texas.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} Rudolph L. Biesele, \textit{The History of the German Settlements in Texas, 1831-1861} (Fort Worth: Eakin Press, Reprint 1987), considers German migration to Mexican Texas, such as a Prussian officer’s plan for German settlements in Texas in the 1830s. The \textit{Mainzer Verein}, including its founding near Biebrich on the Rhine and Count Boos-Waldeck’s purchase of a plantation in Texas, is discussed by a number of historians. One of the first pieces of scholarship to assess the \textit{Verein} in conjunction with the publication of primary sources is Chester William Geue and Ethel Hander Geue’s work \textit{A New Land Beckoned: German Immigration to Texas, 1844-1847}, first published in 1966. In it, the Geues have translated and published Prince von Solms’ eleven reports on his experiences in Texas. See also Harald Winkel’s “Der Texasverein: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Auswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert,” (\textit{The Texas Society: A Contribution to the History of German Emigration in the 19th Century}), published in 1968. Walter Struve’s \textit{Germans and Texians: Commerce, Migration, and Culture in the Days of the Lone Star Republic} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), based on a prior 1983 German-language publication, (\textit{Republik Texas, Bremen, und das Hildesheimische: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von Auswanderung, Handel und gesellschaftlichen Wandel im 19. Jahrhundert, mit Briefen eines deutschen Kaufmans und Landwirts in Texas, 1844-1845}) evaluates the presence of roughly 10,000 German emigrants in Texas, who became farmers as well as merchants and businessmen. The latter two groups in particular are of interest to Struve, who argues that their presence in the port city Galveston aided in making commerce thrive between Texas and European states. Though Struve’s analysis of the German emigrants to Texas and the \textit{Adelsverein} remains largely unrelated to diplomacy, he does mention that the \textit{Mainzer Adelsverein}, led by its director and vice-president Carl Count zu Castell-Castell, Friedrich Prince of Prussia, and its founder Karl Emich Fürst zu Leiningen, hoped that colonisation projects in Texas would enable the German \textit{Bund}, and Prussia in particular, to participate in the imperial game dominated by Britain and France. The most recent and most extensive account of the \textit{Verein’s} history is James C. Kearney’s \textit{Nassau Plantation: The Evolution of a Texas-German Slave Plantation} (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010), which draws on diplomatic ties and details the importance of slavery to the \textit{Verein’s} affairs, focussing on the plantation that gave his work its name. Most of the archival base Kearney uses is drawn from the Solms-Braunfels Archives, which Kearney has analysed extensively and effectively in his monograph.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{42} Schmitz lists many of the major diplomats and politicians associated with Texas’ European affairs, including Texians James Pinckney Henderson, Mirabeau Lamar, Anson Jones, James Hamilton, Ashbel Smith, and William Henry Daingerfield; Frenchmen Dubois Saligny and Molé; and Britons Lord Palmerston, Richard Pakenham, and Charles Elliot; and even Hanseatic representative Vincent Rumpff. Schmitz lays out the main events in Texas diplomacy, including Daingerfield’s negotiations with the Hanse Towns, particularly Bremen, its desire for loans, its failure to conclude a treaty with Belgium and commence ties with Prussia and other European powers, and the influence of Euro-Mexican relations on the hesitation of some European states to engage in correspondence or official agreements with Texas. Furthermore, Schmitz denotes some of the major events in Mexican-Texian relations, including the sending of Barnard E. Bee, James Treat, and James Webb to Mexico for negotiations with that country. \textit{Handbook of Texas Online}, Joseph W. Schmitz, “DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS”, accessed February 12, 2020, \url{http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgd01}. 
This dissertation also builds on recent work on European ambitions in the Americas in the nineteenth century. A recent effort to analyse European interest in and impact on Latin America is Rafe Blaufarb’s article “The Western Question”, which seeks to fill a historiographic gap by connecting Spanish American independence to European diplomacy of the early nineteenth century. Blaufarb writes that “the rivalry of the great powers, insurgent and royalist attempts to draw them into their struggles, and Spain’s efforts to enlist them in its cause – produced a vacuum” that ultimately led to a “geopolitical realignment in the post-Napoleonic world”. The Napoleonic Wars left Spain subjected to French intervention and consequently weak, whereas Britain achieved an unprecedented degree of maritime and commercial power. These new conditions impacted heavily the political landscape of Latin America, for Spain was too weak to repress its colonies. At the same time, Latin Americans initially believed it prudent not to secede before the restoration of Ferdinand, who might enact reforms and reduce the desire for independence (though this did not occur). Blaufarb’s conclusions regarding the power vacuum following the collapse of Spanish rule that powers like the United States, France, and Britain sought to fill are helpful when tied to the concept of informal empire. Afraid of British hegemony, the United States looked toward expansionism, whereas France initially thought of monarchical restoration in Spanish America. As a result, recognition of the newly-independent Spanish American states fell predominantly to Britain, which was able to establish a new type of empire dominated by ideas of free trade, free labour, and international law.

Another work that combines new forms of European imperialism in the Americas with European diplomacy is Edward Shawcross’ France, Mexico and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867: Equilibrium in the New World, published in 2018. This work, though it

predominantly targets France’s imperial designs in Mexico, also includes a small section entitled ‘Texas: A Conflict of Races.’ Shawcross argues that France’s relationship to Texas was not solely shaped by trade and commerce, but also ideology, specifically Pan-Latinism. The discussion on Pan-Latinism, or the idea that Latin America was France’s natural sphere of influence due to both France’s and Latin America’s status as ‘Latin’ nations, aids in highlighting the racial components of European diplomacy with Texas. The French believed that they should protect Spanish America from invasion by the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and thus “save from irreparable ruin not only Mexico, but also the whole Spanish branch of Latin civilisation in the New World”. This sentiment was also used to justify the French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. Moreover, Shawcross utilises the framework of informal imperialism within his work, which has also influenced my research here.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Two frameworks in particular inform this research: Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis, which he began publishing in the 1970s, and informal imperialism, first popularised by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in their 1953 article “The Imperialism of Free Trade.” Both are relevant for understanding European ambitions in and encounters over Texas during its independence. They showcase why newly-independent Texas was so crucial to the economic and political motives of a very diverse group of countries, from city-states to empires.

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44 Edward Shawcross, France, Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 123.
45 Shawcross, 19, 119, and 123-130.
In “The Imperialism of Free Trade” Gallagher and Robinson argue that colonial imperialism, i.e. the possession of territory, was not the only form of imperial influence. Instead, imperialism could be elicited in a subtler way through diplomacy and trade.\textsuperscript{47} Since Gallagher’s and Robinson’s article, historians have evaluated how European pressures might lead to the revocation or reduction of tariffs within the western republics – sometimes for one European power alone – leading to a flooding of Latin American markets by European goods; the presence of European bankers and merchants as elites abroad; the use of coercion through gunboat diplomacy and blockading of harbours (as France had done in the Pastry War); and the establishment of Western European institutions and culture as global ideals. Latin America after 1820 is often listed as a prime example of informal imperialism because, though its republics were not reclaimed as colonies by European powers, European imperial influence persisted nonetheless. After Gallagher and Robinson, several more historians applied the concept to the British in Latin America, though others, such as Thomas Schoonover, have also begun to look at German and French forms of informal empire in Mexico and Central America.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover,

\textsuperscript{48} In analysing the French, Schoonover points out that, though the French intervened in Mexico in the 1860s by imposing a foreign regime under Maximilian I, the decades after 1820 saw several measures of French informal empire in Central America. In \textit{Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929}, Schoonover describes the efforts of imperialism in Central America on behalf of the German Empire after 1871, but also its predecessor states right after Latin American independence. Given the inexistence of a strong national state capable of imposing a formal imperialism, German leaders sought instead to use informal imperialist measures. A not negligible impulse for such desires was the impact British and French imperialism had on the German states, whose economies and industries were threatened by their stronger British and French counterparts. Such considerations shaped the relationship between the Hanseatic League and Prussia, who had traditionally harboured suspicions towards one another yet were driven towards cooperation by British and French economic might. See: Thomas Schoonover, \textit{The French in Central America: Culture and Commerce, 1820-1930} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999) and \textit{Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929} (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999).
scholars like Ricardo D. Salvatore have recently evaluated Latin America as a “U.S. informal empire”.\(^4^9\)

Informal empire has not been without its critics, however: Gallagher’s and Robinson’s thesis was soon questioned by other historians, including D. C. M. Platt, who published several articles and books on his rejection of free-trade imperialism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations” (1968).\(^5^0\) Platt wrote that British efforts to keep markets open

fell far short of the energetic promotion and intervention described by Gallagher and Robinson, and it fell short in the following respects: the range of government action on behalf of overseas trade permitted by the laissez-faire tradition of the time was extraordinarily narrow; official demands on behalf of British interests overseas never went beyond equal favour and open competition; non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states was one of the most respected principles of British diplomacy; and force, while often called for in the protection of British subjects injured by the government action abroad, was rarely and only exceptionally employed for the promotion of British trade and investments.\(^5^1\)

According to Platt, many failures of early intervention in Spanish America encouraged British politicians, beginning with Castlereagh, who refused Spain’s offer of trading benefits in Spanish America in exchange for mediation between mother country and colonies, to Canning, and finally to Edward Grey, to pursue a policy of non-intervention and equitable and fair trade.

\(^{49}\) Salvatore defines informal empire as a “collective enterprise (…) beyond the extraction of economic surplus through commerce, direct investment, or the provision of services, the empire was a pharaonic accumulation of representations”, including photographers, museum directors, or land surveyors. In his work Disciplinary Conquest, he showcases the role of U.S.-American social scientists in linking South America to U.S. power and informal empire. Salvatore demonstrates that science and knowledge were especially essential to the building of U.S. influence in the region, for the U.S. did not desire a directly interventionist approach there. See: Ricardo D. Salvatore, “The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire”, in Close Encounters, 72 and Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 2-3.


\(^{51}\) Platt, 297.
Neither the Board of Trade nor British politicians, Platt argued, had any interest in Britain’s meddling in the internal political affairs of Spanish and Portuguese America.\textsuperscript{52}

Since then, the debate on informal empire and particularly the imperialism of free trade has not yet found an end. Historians find themselves on both sides of the debate. Andrew Thompson rejects the concept’s contemporary use, declaring that “‘informal empire’ gradually entered into every imperial historian’s phrasebook, so much so that many writers have felt able to employ the concept without attempting to define let alone justify it. Informal imperialism has been a very seductive notion for it has conveniently solved our problem of what to do with all those ‘awkward’ nations which, whilst clearly not fitting into the narrower and more traditional definition of empire, did seem, at least at first sight, to lie uncomfortable on its fringes”.\textsuperscript{53}

Eugênio Vargas Garcia states that Spanish America constitutes a unique case in the history of imperialism, which scholars have since tried to define or capture, sometimes by using informal empire as a framework. Vargas Garcia advocates for a middle road between fervent support of the concept of informal empire and the absolute rejection thereof, writing that “the question of whether Latin America was an informal empire or not depends on the mode in which the concept is understood […] there is no consensual definition of what exactly is an ‘informal empire.’”\textsuperscript{54} C. A. Bayly, on the other hand, believes that British informal imperialism did not gain traction until the 1830s and 1840s: Bayly argues that free trade imperialism was not a logical conclusion to British hegemony after 1815 and asserts that the time frame between 1780 and 1830 was marked by a stricter colonial rule as the “colonial state began seriously to discipline and control marginal

\textsuperscript{52} Platt, 299.


groups and to create wider spheres for the exercise of state power.” Nevertheless, Bayly regards Spanish America as an exception to this, where informal-imperial strategies were used as early as the 1820s.\textsuperscript{55} The debatableness of informal imperialism’s existence, extent, and purposeful use on behalf of various interest groups, no doubt due to its flexible and less visible boundaries when compared with its formal cousin – an imperialism so easily identified by the existence of shaded areas on a map – can also often be seen on first glance when evaluating the titles of works that discuss it, whether it be Eugênio Vargas Garcia’s “¿Imperio Informal? La política británica hacia América Latina en el siglo XIX”, Paul Garner’s “El ‘Imperio Informal’ Británico en América Latina: ¿Realidad O Ficción?”, or Andrew Thompson’s “Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810-1914.”

Historians have also debated whether informal empire was a government strategy instructed by the centres of power, such as London and Paris, or whether the real agents of informal empire were the merchants and diplomats in the periphery. David MacLean denies that the core employed informal empire by itself or that it even played the dominant role, rather, he regards informal imperialism as a tool that arose in response to the communication between politics and commerce, and regards it as a strategy that emerged as a result of a network of decisions, interactions, and choices made by merchants and politicians.\textsuperscript{56} This point is also discussed by John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega, who examine informal empire in Mexico and suggest that, whereas British officials in London did indeed pursue a policy of non-intervention and fair trade, the merchants and diplomats located in Mexico, deeply intertwined in their interests (and sometimes merchant and diplomat were one and the same person), had a


different strategy, using the threat of British imperial might to garner concessions from Mexican officials who simply did not know the limits of British power and hence enabled the local British to get away with their bravado and sabre rattling. Vargas Garcia moreover points out that, whereas core officials in London, such as Viscount Palmerston, advocated for British neutrality and non-intervention, instructing their diplomats in the periphery to abstain from exercising undue influence, they also spoke dismissively of peripheral regions at other times: Palmerston claimed in 1850 that “semi-civilised states” such as those in Asia or Spanish America, were peopled by populations whose “opinions are of little utility”, and declared that the only argument understood by such peripheral peoples was the “argumentum baculinum [argument of the club]”. This showcases once more peripheral agents were empowered in their informal-imperial ambitions by opinions circulating in the core, where government agents officially propagated neutrality whilst maintaining biased views in which Europeans occupied an elite position vis-à-vis peripheral states. A. G. Hopkins engages with peripheral actors’ importance to informal empire in order to address one of the main criticisms brought forth against the concept of informal imperialism: Hopkins rejects “a restrictive (and unrealistic) definition of informal

57 John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega, “Imperialismo de libre comercio e imperio informal en la costa oeste de México durante la época de Santa Anna”, Historia Mexicana, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Apr. – Jun., 1991): 673-696. This 1991 article by John Mayo and Mario Zamudio Vega evaluates the importance of European statesmen in the Americas for European imperialism there. In response to D. C. M. Platt, who argued that British informal imperialism in Latin America did not exist because the British government in London desired fair and equal treaties with those states, which it was capable of obtaining without the intervention in their governments, Mayo and Vega write that one must also evaluate the British representatives in Latin American countries themselves, such as Mexico. Merchants who had already established themselves in Latin America prior to British recognition of the new republics were a useful source of information for the British government, and were sometimes even named as consuls once official recognition had taken place. British aid from London was minimal but did protect British interests according to the tenets of international law and thus provided some form of security to the British merchants. Mayo and Vega argue that the British consuls and officials in Mexico, who often stood in contact with British businessmen and represented their interests, frequently acted without clear instruction from London. Instead, they protected British trade, which they themselves profited from, through ad hoc assertions of British power. “Given that the Mexican officials with which” the British officials in Mexico interacted “had no way of knowing the real limits of British power, the British got away with it”. As such, Mayo and Vega look at informal empire in Latin America through local British officials.

58 Vargas Garcia, 371.
empire […] one that assumes that all causation was located in the metropolis, that events on the periphery had no effect on the centre, and that informal influence was the result of directives that were uncontaminated by negotiation or concession”. Hopkins’ argument thus illustrates not merely the significance of European agents in the periphery to informal empire, but also that of Spanish American agents, as well.

Thus, the primary difficulty with the framework of informal imperialism is that, given its informality and larger degree of subtlety, it can be difficult to distinguish a mere interaction between a stronger and weaker economy from an interaction within which the stronger state actually imposes its economic and diplomatic dominance onto another, weaker state. According to Walther Bernecker, only the latter should be considered an incident of informal imperialism. In his article on the imperialism of free trade, Bernecker suggests that British economic influence in Spanish America during the early nineteenth century was fairly inconsequential and small, and emphasises the large list of recent works that have criticised Gallagher’s and Robinson’s thesis. At the same time, he also points out that the other Atlantic states have frequently been ignored in the informal-imperialist debate. Bernecker argues that neither British nor German diplomats were encouraged by their governments to intervene in the political affairs of Mexico, and that they were to maintain a “neutral” attitude. Nevertheless, Bernecker also notes that local diplomats and merchants, inspired by their governments’ reticent policy-lines, pursued more interventionist strategies to protect their interests, which makes the concept of informal imperialism incredibly vague. He writes:

60 Bernecker, „Wirtschafts imperialismus“, 193.
61 Bernecker, „Wirtschafts imperialismus“, 194-195.
62 Bernecker, „Wirtschafts imperialismus“, 198.
In the daily interaction between foreign diplomats and Mexican agencies there emerged the development of a type of interaction situated in a ‘grey zone’ between political neutrality and diplomatic intervention; a type of interaction that, because of its specific vagueness, gives proponents of the various interpretations enough empirical data to undermine the mutually exclusive interpretations.

Elsewhere, Bernecker also asserts that Felix Becker challenged the thesis of free-trade imperialism by highlighting that the treaties between Spanish American and European states were “elements that built and structured a new order of states and commerce during the process of the transformation of a mercantile into an increasingly free-trade-oriented system on one hand, as well as that of the jus publicum europaeum into the modern international law, the international law (non-translated original) according to Jeremy Bentham”. A reading of Becker’s work on the Hanse Towns and their relations to Mexico suggest however that these two developments – free-trade imperialism as well as the development of international law in response to the trans-Atlantic treaties of the first half of the nineteenth century – were not mutually exclusive. Becker writes that “already with the Methuen Treaty (1703), England had proven that the domination of a market was not dependent upon a tedious, direct political control. After the liberation of Spanish and Portuguese America, this knowledge was consistently put into action”. Here, Becker quotes Gallagher and Robinson: “…the most frequently used political method of English expansion was the treaty of amity and commerce with a weaker state, which the latter signed or was forced to sign”. Instead of challenging this concept, Becker writes that “this instrument of domination of markets was one which the Hanse Towns used, also”. Here, he also quotes the commercial deputation of Hamburg, which acknowledged that the outflow of Mexican silver into Europe as a result of international trade deprived Mexico of its

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63 Bernecker speaks here of dependency theorists, informal imperialists, and their opponents.
64 Bernecker, “Wirtschaftsimpialismus”, 201.
65 Bernecker in Preussen und Lateinamerika, 234.
strength and power, a condition not disfavoured by the deputation.\textsuperscript{66} Chapter five of this dissertation, which analyses the impact of trans-Atlantic treaties briefly mentioned by Becker and by Bernecker in detail, likewise focusses on the intersection of international law and informal imperialism.

How can one determine then whether informal imperialism played a role in the diplomacy and commerce between European states and American states such as Texas or Mexico? This dissertation will focus on informal imperialism in a variety of ways: First, it will analyse which policies European diplomats, both in North America and in Europe, pursued in regard to Mexico and Texas. Did these policies differ? Were some more imperial than others – were, as Mayo suggests, local diplomats more likely to engage in informal imperialist strategies than their counterparts in Europe? Did key officials in Europe really push for fair and equal trade under any circumstances, like Platt argues? Second, this dissertation will explore the boundaries of informal empire and the imperialism of free trade. Bernecker suggests that the official British trading policy in Mexico advocated for fairness to prevent strife between European powers that might threaten the independence of Latin America. Yet, as Roger G. Kennedy highlights, British merchants and commercial interest nevertheless had an advantage in trade with Mexico, even vis-à-vis the French, who were “running alongside, panting,” as the juggernaut British economy assumed the role as the world’s cloth-maker and banker.\textsuperscript{67} This suggests that the British were less dependent on forcing a commercial advantage through coercion and manipulation. But with Britain as economically powerful as it was and given its status as the hegemonic power of the century, does the official policy-line of Canning – who himself claimed that Spanish America

\textsuperscript{66} Felix Becker, 107-108.
\textsuperscript{67} Roger G. Kennedy, \textit{Cotton and Conquest}, 42.
would be ‘English’ through British commerce – mean that its diplomatic and economic policies in North America were not imperial?

Moreover, just as formal imperialist designs have failed – consider Italy’s effort to turn Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate in 1895-1896, an event almost exclusively seen in the context of the imperial Scramble for Africa despite Italy’s failure – and still been evaluated as imperial in nature, informal imperialism should be analysed through the same light. Just because informal imperialist designs failed, including all European designs in Texas, this does not mean that the designs were not buttressed by strong imperial ambition of the actors standing behind them. The Adelsverein’s scheme for a ‘German state outside of Germany’, strengthening German, and particularly Prussian influence, globally, as well as British designs of an arrest of slavery in Texas, are but two examples of this. Lastly, the analysis of Europeans’ perceptions of each other’s policies as informally imperial is also an interesting aspect of informal empire, which has shaped European states’ policy-lines in their overseas affairs. As Bernecker notes, it was a prevalent thought among European statesmen and officials of the early nineteenth century that the British were using their economic dominance to place Mexico firmly in a sphere of British imperial influence: Frenchman Karl X. Samouels feared the British were turning Mexico into a British protectorate; other French agents were under the impression that British agents played the “decisive role” in influencing the Mexican government, and Prussian agent Friedrich von Gerolt expressed frustrations with Britain’s alleged ability to influence tariffs and laws at the expense of other European nations.68 Anglophobia, the subject of chapter five, is a primary example of this aspect of informal imperialism, and is also exemplary of the scramble for

empire: The United States in particular became increasingly eager to annex Texas as quickly as possible in order to prevent British imperial influence.

Texas is a great example of the European desire to project informal empire. Gallagher and Robinson briefly commented that British informal control also extended to Texas and Mexico, but that “American political strength thwarted British attempts to establish Texas, Mexico and Central America as informal dependencies”.

Mexico was a central contestant in British and French informal imperialist designs, as Edward Shawcross discusses in France, Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867. Other surrounding areas, such as the Caribbean, Louisiana, and other Spanish American states were likewise exposed to British and French imperial influence. Yet the existence of Texas raised new problems. In order to create an informal imperialist presence, European empires had to assure that they did not fall behind their imperial competitors commercially, culturally, and diplomatically. Texas’ independence proved to be on the one hand an opportunity for establishing influence more penetratively in these contested borderlands, but on the other, it was also a risk: In the event that Mexico regained this province, having recognised Texas in the first place could sour relations with Mexico and create a disadvantage for the imperial power in that way. Such considerations were debated at length by British, French, and the German state officials who sought to solve this situation to their best commercial advantage. Once Texas’ independence from Mexico seemed assured, many European states recognised Texas within a short timeframe, including the Netherlands and Belgium besides the above-mentioned parties of Britain and France. Nevertheless, informal-imperial aspirations on behalf of European powers in Texas continued to stand on rickety legs.

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even after recognition, for the possible annexation of Texas to the United States posed a bigger risk than reconquest by Mexico.

Associated with the concept of informal empire through commerce is Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis, which forms another foundation for my work. Wallerstein argues that the current world-system is centred around capitalism, and he distinguishes between a world-empire and a world-system by explaining that the former is dominated decisively by one political entity, whereas in the latter, no political party reigns supreme. Capitalism is defined by Wallerstein as the endless accumulation of capital. This basic condition has maintained the current world-system by centring it around the division of labour, which has prevented the world-economy from transforming into a world-empire. The existence of multiple states is necessary to preserve the world-system, for the dominance of one state would likewise lead to the existence of a world-empire and the end of capitalism. The states together enact policies that cement capitalism, a system that Wallerstein argues can only exist in a partially free market, created by states that enact policies to control the market in some ways. Wallerstein notes that nineteenth-century Britain actually achieved hegemony over this system, but it did not manage to replace the world-system with a world-empire.70 The policies of mid-nineteenth-century Britain, which focussed on informal imperial influence in Latin America as opposed to seeking an (unlikely) annexation thereof, are representative of Wallerstein’s theory. It sought this influence precisely through capitalist-commercial enterprises, i.e. the very concept on which the current world-system is built.

Wallerstein’s model is useful in analysing Texas in an imperial context because his framework can be employed in answering the question as to why informal empire based on free trade became a prevalent imperial strategy in the nineteenth century. Without the ability to create a world-empire – even the British of the nineteenth century would have been unable to formally colonise every state that was in some way involved in British imperialism – the core states, of which Britain was perhaps the most dominant party during the 1800s, accumulated power within the world-system based on capitalism by using commerce. Britain emerged as a chief core state through industrialisation, the creation of a periphery through the colonisation of some territories, and means to protect its industries (the quasi monopolies, especially in the case of the cotton/textile industry). Wallerstein’s framework can thus be utilised to showcase and analyse the use of informal imperialism as opposed to a brute show of force followed by colonialism: unlike Robinson and Gallagher, who label informal imperialism a conscious policy line dominated by the workings of the official mind, Wallerstein focusses on the inability of the British to override capitalism by establishing a formal world-empire and the consequential use of capitalism and commerce to acquire dominance and hegemony within the world-system.

Another component in this system are semi-peripheral states, which furthermore cement this system for they are in constant competition against other semi-peripheral states. These states wish to become core states, dread becoming peripheral, and hence legitimise oligopolies as well as the division of labour by seeking to attract oligopolies once their products have started to decline in profitability in the core. In the nineteenth century, states like the Hanseatic League or Prussia could have been viewed as semi-peripheral in some ways. They aspired to use trade and commerce to prevent becoming peripheral and provincialized by British economic might, and reaffirmed the capitalist and unequal system by plotting colonisation schemes or consulting the
British or French in the case of treaty violations by a Latin American party. Prussian and Hanseatic officials often worked alongside British and French representatives in Mexico in order to award their reclamation claims with more weight, and though Prussian politicians were not fond of the Hanseatic resistance to the German Customs Union, they appreciated that the three city-states were not limited by legitimacy and could hence more easily recognise new states in the Americas in order to facilitate German trans-Atlantic trade. Prussian officials in particular were incredibly concerned with French and especially English competition, and feared that the German states could be left behind economically if they did not increase their trade with the Americas. Moreover, the Hanseatic decision to engage in trade with Texas was motivated precisely by the fear of economic repercussions that may arise in the event of Hanseatic inaction. This would give Britain and France the opportunity to establish themselves as the most favoured nations in Texian trade to the detriment of the Hanseates and German trade more broadly. This fear of losing status and influence in a region or market also dominated French and British discussions on Texas, such as when Britons decided to recognise Texas in part because France had already done so, anxious that France may draw significant economic benefits and a stable pre-eminence from a lack of British recognition of Texas.

This dissertation seeks to combine world-systems analysis and informal empire to offer new perspectives on European imperialism in Texas. Gilbert M. Joseph highlights that views on imperialism and economic development in Latin America have changed among historians, from W. W. Rostow, who argued for modernisation theory and the idea that underdeveloped nations needed to adopt the path of developed nations in order to progress, to dependency theorists, who argued that Latin America had been kept in dependence on Western developed nations and had hence not been able to achieve prosperity, to newer theorists who focussed on “the U.S. (or
European) center’s penetration of the Latin American periphery”. Though Joseph denotes the shortcomings of dependency theory, he also writes that “the contributors of the present volume have all been deeply influenced by dependency theory and world-systems approaches; indeed, in many cases the essays build on and refine these perspectives, rather than jettison them”, as is the case for contributor Steve J. Stern. Stern argues that between 1750 and 1930, the imperial powers in Latin America, including the British, Spanish, French, and Portuguese, sought to “remake themselves anew” on several occasions, and that this process “implied a remaking of the imperial presence”. Latin America’s external links changed continuously as a result of the rivalry among European powers, the United States, and Latin American power contenders.

**Contributions**

The historiographies of the fields discussed above have largely remained separated from one another. Literature on Texian-European diplomacy has been overwhelmingly national or binational in focus and has frequently rejected the presence or questioned the intensity of European imperial motives and ambitions. Although the Texas region was a fluid borderland in which many states and non-state actors contested, resisted, or established power in the form of commerce, diplomacy, or military action, much of the literature remains focused solely on one or two aspects of this borderland, such as the diplomatic relations of Europe with Texas. Imperialism in Texas has also often been seen in isolation of European actors in Mexico. Only recently have works emerged that seek to connect the various broader themes coexisting in the era of the Republic of Texas, such as European relations, slavery, imperialism, emigration, and

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72 Joseph in Close Encounters, 15.
commerce. These works include Kearney’s *Nassau Plantation*, Shawcross’ work on the French Informal Empire in the region as well as Torget’s work on the role of slavery and cotton in shaping the imperialism extant in these borderlands. This project seeks to build on these efforts in order to engage with the theoretical question of the changing nature of European empire: using the Republic of Texas, I want to illustrate how European tools of empire changed during the first half of the nineteenth century. Thus, I hope to offer new perspectives on the relevance of Texas’ independence to global affairs, especially the new types of informal empire.

I also link informal empire to world-systems analysis to extend the importance of the former concept to semi-peripheral and peripheral states: German emigration to Texas, for instance, was not merely the flippant idea of a handful of German noblemen. Behind this organisation stood German schemes of nationalism and imperialism that were motivated by the post-Napoleonic changes in Europe, including the establishment of the German Confederation, heavily contested among its member states; the desire for commercial prowess in a world where British trade threatened to overrun the German economies; and the longing for a German nation capable of resisting foreign power, protecting its subjects abroad, and challenging the markets of France and Britain. When it extended into Texas, this society joined a playing field occupied by many other actors with whom it either sought to cooperate or resist, such as Prussia and England, and the Comanche Empire, respectively. Tying the *Adelsverein* into other events surrounding Europe’s interest in Texas is one of the ways in which I hope to showcase the interplay, cooperation and conflict between several European nations in regard to Texas. I will also use projects like the *Adelsverein*’s and the commercial rivalry of Europeans in Texas and Mexico to underline that Europeans used imperial and colonising schemes to engage in nation-building.
Chapter 5 in particular shows that German difficulties in Mexico were linked to the German domestic concern of defining German nationalism and centralising the German Bund.

Another benefit of combining world-systems analysis and informal empire, the two dominant theoretical frameworks utilised in this dissertation, is the creation of an imperial, collaborative and competitive web. Because I am considering interests of states such as the German states or Mexico, and because I do not look at core states’ interests in isolation therefrom, my analysis of European imperialism in North America offers richer perspectives on how European relationships functioned with other Europeans and Americans in North America. This approach will also enable me to situate Mexico more firmly in both the European struggle for influence in the region as well as broader global currents such as the development of nation-states and the law of nations. Reclamation efforts in Mexico, for instance, were often the subject of European collaboration and based on international legal principles. Besides the obvious economic vantage point, German support for the reclamations or intervention of the economically and politically stronger France or Britain was also motivated by the German desire to gain from this support an increase in their own international power and influence. Alone, the German states were too insignificant economically and politically to pressure the Mexican government into prioritising their commercial and legal concerns, yet in concert with Britain and France, this was a much more likely endeavour. This reliance on other Europeans strengthened the German longing for their own nation-state and informed intra-German debates regarding the Customs Union. Conversely, European reclamations in Mexico also shaped the latter republic, whose representatives utilised European action in Mexico and Texas, as well as U.S. and Texian threats to their nation in order to redefine their nationality and situate it more firmly in an international community of nations who abided by international law.
Another contribution is the use of German sources that have frequently been left out of the discussion on Texas. Most other scholars have neglected the Prussian Privy Archives and Prussia’s role in Texian diplomacy entirely. Even the Hanseatic sources on Texas have often been under-utilised, particularly in English-language scholarship.

**CHAPTER OVERVIEW**

This dissertation is split into seven chapters. The first will lay out European desires for informal empire in Spanish America after Spanish American independence. Though Mexico was a country in which Europeans held informal-imperialist ambitions, it was not a state in which it was easy for Europe to exert influence. This chapter shows which European agents were most interested in informal-imperial designs and how they tried to impose them; how Mexico resisted this attempted European interference and the means by which it sought to protect its budding industry; how Mexico’s instability impacted European desires and capacities for informal empire; and Mexican responses to manifest European pressure in the form of e.g. the Pastry War. Chapter Two evaluates the impact of Texas independence on European informal empire in Mexico, as well as European interests in informal empire in Texas. Though Europeans were initially unfavourable toward Texian independence because of their commerce with Mexico, Texas’ potential as a cotton grower and competitor to the U.S. was its salvation: Europeans were quickly interested in the Republic of Texas, even if they did not immediately recognise it. This chapter also details in which ways Europeans hoped to profit more from informal imperial schemes in Texas than in Mexico.

Chapter Three deals with slavery and abolitionism. The presence of slavery in Texas delayed the recognition of the new republic by Britain into the 1840s, for British officials
pursued throughout the early nineteenth century a war on the slave trade. England’s involvement in global abolitionism influenced how other states viewed their own and English interests in Texas. This chapter will analyse how the policies of Germans, including the Hanse Towns and the Adelsverein, as well as other states such as France, were shaped by English slave trade treaties and abolitionist fervor. Chapter Four illustrates how the Native Americans of the Texas borderlands were perceived by European, U.S.-American, Texian, and Mexican officials, and how they shaped Texian diplomacy. Many state actors saw Native Americans as an obstacle to a more stable Republic of Texas and a more stable Mexico because of plundering, rebellion, the harassment of settlers, and destruction of property. As such, Native Americans at times became a reason for Europeans to question the usefulness of Mexico or Texas to European markets. Moreover, this chapter will analyse to what degree officials were aware of the diversity of Native Americans. Whereas many European representatives situated in Europe were largely unaware of the differences between Native American groups, state actors, including Europeans, which were located in the Americas seemed to know a little more about the various tribes that existed.

74 The British Slave Trade Act of 1807 had outlawed the slave trade, and the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 ended slavery itself within the British Empire. Britain desired more than the mere abolition of slavery and the slave trade within its colonial boundaries and hence signed slave trade treaties with various European and American states, such as the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Venezuela, and Mexico. More than just a mere humanitarian effort, these treaties often involved a display of British power: Portugal and Spain for instance, weakened after the Napoleonic Wars, received British payments in exchange for their banning of the slave trade, and opened their vessels to British searches at a time when the Royal Navy ruled the seas. Many Spanish American republics, which had already abolished slavery shortly after their revolutions, did not sign slave trade treaties with Britain until the 1840s. These treaties were pushed and enforced by Britain, which possessed economic and diplomatic leverage over the Spanish American states: Former Portuguese colony Brazil found its vessels seized by the British in the 1840s after these vessels were proven to carry slaves. These slave trade treaties thus gave Britain additional rights over the vessels of other states, enabling it to search and seize those vessels. The influence that this awarded to the British was noticed and acknowledged by contemporary observers, who feared that the treaties would augment British power and imperialism and threaten the sovereignty of other states. For more on British abolitionism, see, for example, William Law Mathieson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1967), David Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860 (London: Routledge, 1991), and Dale H. Porter, The Abolition of the Slave Trade in England, 1784-1807 (Camden: Archon Books, 1970). For information on the Brazilian slave trade, see Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
The fifth chapter focusses on international law and the movement toward free trade. Texas was a state that inspired discussions and negotiations on international law and rights. The independence of Texas resulted in reclamations by U.S.-Americans against Mexico, a legal dispute that the Prussian government was meant to mediate. Such reclamation efforts are of interest in this chapter beyond the legal scaffoldings at work, for they often induced correspondence on ideas of nationhood, nationality, civilisation, and patriotism. Prussian officials’ difficulties in their reclamation disputes with Mexico encouraged them to engage in discussions on German nationalism and the benefits of a German nation, and the Hanseatic diplomacy with Texas, partially motivated by a desire to strengthen the city-states’ weight in the German _Bund_, resulted in a redefinition of Hanseatic identity, for they began seeing their role increasingly as that of pioneering, liberal free traders. For Mexican officials, too, the debates on reclamations provided a platform for a definition of the Mexican nation and Mexican nationalism. Mexican representatives often rebutted reclamations using concepts of patriotism and nationhood, as well as international legal principles.

Chapter Six targets Anglophobia and a general dislike for and criticism of English policy during the independence of Texas. U.S.-American Anglophobia has been analysed in part by previous scholars, however, European perceptions of U.S.-American Anglophobia have not. Prussian and Hanseatic representatives were ambivalent about German influence in Texas and the very existence of Texas because of U.S. Anglophobia, which could lead to Texas’ annexation. The French government, though Britain’s ally in some Texian affairs such as the Mexican mediation attempt, also held its reservations toward England and “Anglo-Saxons” in general, as the ideology of Pan-Latinism shows. The last chapter, Chapter Seven, will evaluate how Europeans’ perceptions of Texians’ nationality influenced their diplomacy with Texas.
European statesmen and diplomats frequently identified the parallels between U.S.-Americans’ national identity and that of the Texians, leading some to fear that Texas would choose annexation over independence due to a lacking determination to create and maintain their own nationality. This chapter thus also looks at Europeans’ changing definitions of concepts such as the nation or a nationality, as well as the growing expectation among Europeans that they encounter and engage in diplomacy with other nation-states abroad.

**Primary Source Base**

For the purpose of this study, I visited ten archives in four different countries and used a variety of published materials and online databases. In Germany, I gathered sources from the City Archives of Bremen and Hamburg, as well as the Prussian Privy Archives and the Federal Archives Division in Berlin-Lichterfelde, both in Berlin. Both City Archives had various actas on Hanseatic-Texan and Hanseatic-Mexican diplomacy. The Federal Archives had relatively few relevant folders, though they did hold materials on some European states’ early ties to Mexico. By far more fruitful was my search in the Prussian Privy Archives, where I found an abundance of Prussian correspondence with Mexico and the United States, correspondence of the Prussian consulates in Mexico, and correspondence between Prussian officials in various European states on the issue of Texas. Furthermore, the Prussian Privy Archives hold folders regarding the diplomatic ties of other German states to Mexico. There are also two folders on German and Swiss colonisation plans in Texas, respectively. In the United Kingdom, I consulted the National Archives in Richmond, where I gathered the correspondence between British officials on the matter of Texas and their correspondence with Texan politicians. Most of my English sources stem from the Foreign Office 75 collection. In France, the National Archives held some materials on French views on Texas and Mexico, but much richer was the source base available at the
French Foreign Ministry Archives, which holds nine volumes of correspondence with and on Texas.

Lastly, I also collected sources from three archives in Austin, Texas: the Dolph Briscoe Center for American History held several folders and bound volumes on the Adelsverein, as well as Texan officials’ correspondence among themselves, such as the Barnard E. Bee papers or the Ashbel Smith papers. For a perspective on Mexican sources, I consulted several collections in the Nettie L. Benson Library for Latin American Studies, including the papers of Santa Anna, Benjamin Muse, Jr., Juan Pablo Anaya, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, and, most extensive of all, Valentín Gómez Farías. Some of these, such as collection 65 B of the Gómez Farías papers, focus entirely on Mexican views on the Texas Question, whereas others, such as some of the Muse, Jr., folders or other components of the Gómez Farías collection, also incorporate documents on affairs such as the Pastry War and the French in Veracruz, the rebellion in Yucatan, insurgencies across the republic, and relations with Europe. Finally, I gathered sources from the Texas State Archives, where I found more documents on British-Texan and Franco-Texan diplomacy, as well as a small section on Texan correspondence with the Hanse Towns, Netherlands, and Papal States. This archive also holds U.S.-Texan and Mexican-Texan correspondence, as well as the papers of the Texan Legation to the United States.

In order to build up my source base on Mexican documents, I also consulted the online database of the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley on La Guerra de Texas/The War of Texas, which includes many scans of folders from the Mexican Foreign Ministry Archives. Published sources utilised include Ephraim Douglass Adams’ Correspondence from the British Archives concerning Texas, 1837-1846, Nancy N. Barker’s The French Legation in Texas, George Garrison’s Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Raúl F. Esquer’s

**A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY**

Given the abundance of North American nationalities discussed in this study, Americans who are nationals of the United States will be consistently referred to as ‘U.S.-Americans,’ not simply ‘Americans.’ In some places where it is appropriate given the contextual use of primary sources, the word ‘North American’ might also be used to refer to a U.S.-American, for the terminology ‘North America’ for the United States and ‘North American’ for a citizen of said country was relatively common in the first half of the nineteenth century. Given that ‘Texian’ was the terminology used during a time when a Texian nationality began to emerge among some of the republic’s citizens, and given that many readers do not immediately associate the term with the current-day U.S. state, I tend to favour this term: I desire that the reader experience the imperial contestation and resulting open-endedness of Texas’ fate as closely as possible, and the use of ‘Texian’ helps me in linguistically showcasing that Texas’ annexation to the United States was not an evident *fait accompli* as soon as Texas became independent from Mexico.

Moreover, German politicians will be defined by their state allegiance if possible, because a united German state did not yet exist in the 1830s. This study will also refer to Germans as Germans in the same way that the source materials do: when Prussian or Hanseatic officials discussed issues impacting the entirety of the German *Bund*, they did refer to themselves and the other states of the *Bund* as ‘German’ and ‘Germans,’ and the German *Bund*
was at times labelled simply as ‘Germany.’ Additionally, German emigration to Texas encompassed Germans from any of the German Bund’s member states, and hence, the term ‘German’ emigration will be used here, as the Adelsverein’s name also referred to their society as the ‘Society for the Protection of German Emigrants to Texas.’ German institutions, such as the Adelsverein, German Bund, or Zollverein will be labelled either by their German name or their English equivalent, though when their German name is given, it will be italicised. The Adelsverein went by many names, but will be referred to here as either the Verein, Adelsverein, Mainzer Verein, or ‘the Society’.

Though I use ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ more often than ‘England’ or ‘English’ when referring to the British, I am also influenced by the language used in archival documents from the era. When ‘England’ and ‘English’ outweigh ‘British’ and ‘Britain’ heavily in correspondence or newspapers, I tend to use the former two words, also. This project uses British-English spellings throughout but will use additional characters for names, places, and foreign words.
Chapter One – The Most Important State of Spanish America: European Commerce with Mexico in the Early Nineteenth Century

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were marked by tremendous change in the Americas, with global consequences. The thirteen colonies of North America broke away from the British Empire between 1776 and 1783, whereas France lost Saint Domingue and sold Louisiana in 1803. Shortly thereafter, the Spanish-American colonies fought against Spanish rule, gaining independence between 1810 and 1825. In 1836, they were joined by the Republic of Texas, which had seceded from Mexico, itself only a little over a decade old. In former Spanish America, where there were new markets, economic rivalry followed: European states and the United States all sought to commercially gain the upper hand in regions that had previously been restricted in their international trade by mother country Spain. Moreover, given that the young Spanish American republics were all fairly debile politically, in need of establishing themselves internationally through foreign recognition, and equipped with few economic means given the relative absence of industry and manufacturing, Spanish America became something of a power vacuum, one that many European states sought to step into. Generally, none of the European governments under investigation sought a new colonisation of the formerly Spanish colonies, for increasing industrialisation enabled European states to extend their influence abroad without the need for political aegis in the form of colonialism. With the exceptions of Spain, which did hope to regain its colonies after independence, and France, which briefly considered monarchical restoration in the early 1820s, a reconquest of Spanish America was not desired by European states. Moreover, John Darwin highlights that European regimes, including even Britain, would not have been capable of re-colonising Spanish America: Darwin explains that in Latin America, “no British government could have contemplated diverting the military force needed to occupy or annex a Latin American state”. See: John Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 122, No. 447 (Jun. 1997), 617.
importing therefrom raw materials needed for manufacturing as well as precious metals.

“Recognition in exchange for trade and trading advantages” became the mantra of European and Spanish-American relations during the first half of the nineteenth century.

Economic rivalry in the decolonised Americas is one of the nineteenth century’s guiding leitmotifs, and this chapter will focus on defining and analysing how this economic rivalry, particularly among European governments, developed and manifested itself in Mexico. Mexico, as a Spanish American republic, was one of the markets under European economic contestation, yet from its independence through the 1840s, its international relations were rocky. When analysed through the lenses of informal empire and world-systems analysis, one can regard Mexico during this era as a peripheral state which resisted the informal-imperialist influence of core states, such as Britain and France, exerted predominantly via commerce and diplomacy.

Mexico’s resistance centred, broadly speaking, on two categories of circumstances, the former of which was voluntary: Firstly, Mexican regimes upheld many trading barriers and resisted European reclamations in an effort to protect Mexico’s budding industries and prevent financial ruin in an already financially devastated country. These measures made Mexico a less lucrative market for Europeans and frustrated their attempts to permeate the entire country’s economic networks. Secondly, the political landscape of Mexico was highly unstable, making trade unpredictable and foreign reclamations or sanctions difficult.² Regimes might deny responsibility for a reclamation, be incapable of making payments because insurgencies drained the state coffers, or enforce changes in policy, often commercially restrictive in a different manner than previous efforts, after the overthrow of an old administration. After evaluating what European

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² Indeed, Mexico went from an empire (1822-1823), to a federal republic (1824-1835), to a central republic (1836-1846), and back to a federal republic (1846-1853) in the first half of the nineteenth century. See: Edward Shawcross, *France, Mexico, and Informal Empire in Latin America, 1820-1867* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 6.
informal empire looked like in Mexico, this chapter will analyse how significantly these two factors impacted European informal-imperialist designs.

**INDUSTRY, STATES, AND MARKETS IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY**

Much of the European correspondence of the era on Mexico, the United States, and Texas targets the textile industry, including linen goods and most emphatically, cotton. Cotton and the associated textile industry were of particular importance for Britain, a state that emerged as the hegemonic power of the century in the aftermath of political and economic change.\(^3\) British industrial output overall doubled between 1800 and the 1820s, and doubled once more between the 1820s and 1840s.\(^4\) British imports of cotton in 1787 totalled roughly 22 million pounds; by 1800, that number had risen to 56 million. During the 1820s, cotton made up a gargantuan 80% of total British imports.\(^5\) By 1840, Britain imported almost 600 million pounds of cotton, and in 1850, the number exceeded 660 million pounds per annum.\(^6\) Britain’s export industry was also dominated by this staple: by 1843, half of all exports were manufactured cotton products. The

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\(^4\) Shapiro, 231. This is based on Walther G. Hoffmann’s statistic regarding the average annual physical volume of Industrial production, United Kingdom, 1700-1899, (excluding building). With base 1796-1800 = 100, the 1820s received an index of 208.1, the 1840s, 420.0.


British production of cotton yarn between 1800 and the 1840s increased more than 14-fold, and that of piece goods more than 11-fold. Much of Britain’s wealth was thus drawn from the textile industry: Sven Beckert writes that it “was estimated that the livelihood of between one-fifth and one-fourth of all people was based upon the industry” and that “one-tenth of all British capital was invested in it”.8

Developments in cotton production and manufacturing during the first half of the nineteenth century were tied to a new form of capitalism: industrial capitalism. Sven Beckert argues that the success of industrial capitalism was linked to the existence of a “peculiar and novel form of state”, of which Britain is a prime example with its strong “trade networks and the institutions in which they were embedded – from a strong navy creating and protecting market access to bills of lading allowing for the transfer of capital over large distances. This state was capable of forging and protecting global markets, policing its borders, regulating industry, creating and then enforcing private property rights in land, enforcing contracts over large geographical distances, forging fiscal tools to tax populations, and building a social, economic, and legal environment that made the mobilization of labor through wage payments possible”.9 Statesmen’s realisation that trade networks, commerce, and industrial output had become crucial to their state’s power and importance also increased economic competition among the states of Europe, which became an essential component of European governments’ relations with one another.

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7 Shapiro, 253. This statistic is based on a statistic by Walther G. Hoffmann. When the base is 1796-1800 = 100, production of cotton yarn in the 1840s amounted to 1422.4, and production of piece goods in the 1840s to 1142.4. Stuart Bruchey has another statistic on cotton yarn exports, stating that they amounted to 5 million pounds in 1800, 63.7 million in 1830, and 135.2 in 1845. Cotton piece good exports went from 12 million pounds in 1800 to 144.3 million in 1840, and 199.3 million in 1845. See: Stuart Bruchey, *Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy: 1790-1860* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 10.


9 Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*, 76.
The forging of an industrial capitalist state dovetailed with the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, which left many Continental European economies in shambles as a result of Napoleon’s Continental System and Britain’s blockade against France. States like Prussia, defeated by Napoleon, had to participate in the Continental System, and France’s occupation of the Hanseatic city-states prevented the German states from making use of their most significant harbours.\textsuperscript{10} Prussia’s maritime trade decreased by 60%, and Silesian linens, Berlin’s silk, and Brandenburg’s \textit{Tuche}, making up roughly 50% of Prussian exports, lost their international markets. After Napoleon’s defeat, the Continental System ceased to exist, and British goods flooded European markets. German producers feared for their existence, and statesmen desperately sought to prevent the ruin of their economies through British output. Spanish American independence provided just the opportunity that European economies threatened by Britain had needed: new markets which could be used to sell German products and reinvigorate the German economy.\textsuperscript{11} A Prussian report from Mexico dated November 1836 evaluated the new economic order of European states, commenting that “with the extraordinary development and expansion of the industry of all European states, the necessity to secure the sales of domestic products in the trans-Atlantic states, where the population and the needs grow daily and where nature, for the satisfaction thereof, stores such immeasurable treasures of all metals, grows more urgent daily”.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} Katherina Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, “1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German Central European Historiography”, \textit{Central European History}, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2006), 547-579, 549.


German trade during the 1830s and 1840s was dominated by two entities, the German Customs Union, also known as the Zollverein, and the three Hanse Towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. The Zollverein had been born on January 1, 1834 after the conclusion of a treaty on March 22, 1833 and was designed to lift several of the internal tariffs within the German Bund. Such internal tariffs had been common practice among German states for centuries, and had been criticised by German writers of the nineteenth century and Second German Empire era: The Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Frankfurt (Main)’s journal from 1908 asserted that an Englishman named Thomas Wiccius had already referred to “the wonderful insanity of the Germans (miram germanorum insaniam) to kill their own traffic through tariffs” as early as the fourteenth century, and in his 1848 history of the city of St. Goar, Alexander Grebel pointed to the Rhine region of the thirteenth century as an example of this, claiming that ten such tariffs existed between the cities of Koblenz and Mainz alone.\footnote{Alexander Grebel, \textit{Geschichte der Stadt St. Goar} (St. Goar: Carl Sassenroth Print, 1848), 79. For others who have used Wiccius’ quote, see Georg von Schanz, \textit{Englische Handelspolitik: Gegen Ende des Mittelalters, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zeitalters der beiden ersten Tudors Heinrich VII und Heinrich VIII} (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1881), 671, and W. O. Henderson, “The Zollverein”, \textit{History}, New Series, Vol. 19, No. 73 (June 1934), 1-19. 1. Thomas Wiccius is sometimes also written as Thomas Wickes, see Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb Grellmann, \textit{Historisch-statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland und den vorzüglichsten seiner besonderen Staaten} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1801), 170. Grellmann cited Wickes‘ Chron. Ad. Ann. 1269 as a source.} The Customs Union of the 1830s was described by the Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Frankfurt as a crucial effort to promote and protect German commerce in an era when the fall of the Holy Roman Empire had led to a power vacuum, enabling several of the former member states of this fallen empire to impose internal duties due to the absence of a central entity forbidding or curbing such limitations on trade. This heightened fervour for internal tariffs in early nineteenth-century Germany had arisen after the breakage of Napoleon’s Continental System: this blockade had damaged German trade and created a certain levelling of duties within the continent and hence left Germany exposed to an English flooding of goods, particularly via the Hanse Towns upon whose independence.
England had in part insisted. In response, German states put in place several barriers to commerce that, though designed to reduce the import of foreign goods, also crippled the German economy and hence made the necessity for a more unified German economic system more dire. Historian W. O. Henderson had labelled the Customs Union “the first practical step towards the forming of a united Germany”.

Though the Zollverein was a customs union created to facilitate trade among the German states and form a counterweight to British industrial might, it was also an outgrowth of Prussian ambition. With Austria excluded from the Zollverein, Prussia was able to further its influence among its German sister-states without any formidable rival. By 1844, twenty-eight of the thirty-nine extant, post-Napoleonic German states were members of the Customs Union. Notably absent from this list were the three Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, which were, in fact, the union’s last addition. Though the unification of the German Empire occurred in 1871, the three city-states did not join the Zollverein for another seventeen years; only in 1888 did they take this step. Hamburg and Bremen also managed to secure the creation of Zollverein-exempt areas within their ports, which showcases the importance that the Hansa attached to their ability to conduct trade independently.

The three Hanseatic city-states were by the early nineteenth century the only remnants of the Hanseatic League, which had been a powerful trading organisation throughout the Middle Ages, having been referred to as “quite a singular product of medieval history”, “the most

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15 Henderson, 1.
17 Thomas D. Schoonover, Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 16.
important trade organization in the Middle Ages”, “the most powerful and lasting of the many medieval corporations of merchants designated by this term”, and “the most important political formation in German history of the late Middle Ages”. Though the three Hanseatic city-states, small, with little to no military power, may seem insignificant as political players in German or indeed global affairs at first sight, their importance is not to be underestimated. The Second German Empire of 1871, so proud of its maritime trade and so eager to trump the English Royal Navy, was heavily dependent on its Hanse Towns, particularly Hamburg and Bremen. (Lübeck became disadvantaged due to its location on the Baltic, not the North Sea as trade focussed increasingly on trans-Atlantic states). In the early twentieth century, roughly two-thirds of Germany’s foreign trade was maritime in nature, for which Hamburg and Bremen were the most significant ports, claiming almost 70% of the total maritime trade of an empire whose economy was second only to England. Germany’s merchant marine was likewise the second-largest, and Bremen and Hamburg again constituted the most important destinations with a combined 86%. Hamburg was the largest port of the European continent, and Bremen was Germany’s second-largest. The Hanse Towns, so crucial to the German Empire after 1871 and the primary trading league of medieval times, also held great significance to the German Bund in the early nineteenth century, maugre the difficulties that it faced as a result of the Napoleonic occupation. As this chapter shows, most German products destined for Spanish America sailed from Hamburg and Bremen.

20 Heinrich Flügel, Die deutschen Welthäfen Hamburg und Bremen (Paderborn: Salzwasser Verlag, reprint of the original 1914), 1.
EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH SPANISH AMERICA

The independence of Spanish America did not result in immediate recognition from European states, but strong European economic interests in the region guided post-Napoleonic War politics on the issue even before Spain’s defeat became clear. In 1815, the Spanish-American revolt seemed to have been crushed and as a result, Spanish America was discussed only marginally in relation to the slave trade at the Congress of Vienna.\textsuperscript{21} By 1817, the matter already looked slightly different: After Spain consulted the Great Powers in response to a Portuguese invasion of Banda Oriental del Uruguay, the four power of Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia disagreed on the best course of action. Whereas Britain, whose interest in Spanish American commerce had existed since the eighteenth century, pressured Spain to open its colonies up to free trade and award the Spanish Americans equal rights to Spaniards, Russia supported the Spanish government in its desire for dominance in its colonies, with the caveat that political and economic concessions would have to be made by Spain to its colonies in order to soothe the Spanish-American opposition to Spanish rule. Though England did not yet push for Spanish American independence, for some statesmen feared that new states in the Americas would fall under the sphere of U.S. influence, the overlap in interests between Britain and Russia were negated by the former’s desire to maintain its diplomatic dominance in Spanish American affairs.\textsuperscript{22} Austria and Prussia sided with the British in this matter, for they, much like the British


\textsuperscript{22} Kossok emphasised the rivalry between the European powers, particularly Russia and England, at the Congress of Vienna: for England, economic dominance in Spanish America, and indeed economic preeminence of the continental European powers, was of the highest priority, which is why London pushed for a balance on the European continent in order to prevent the rise of a commercial rival in extra-European trade. Spanish America had also already assumed a political importance by 1815, because England had, through its mediation between Spain and its colonies in 1811/1813, established a precedence for diplomatic dominance in the matter vis-à-vis other European powers. Russia, on the other hand, sought to contest England’s desire to secure for itself the lion’s share of
themselves, hoped to gain commercially from the loosening of Spain’s mercantile hold on Spanish America and feared that the Russian stance, which also considered economic sanctions toward the Spanish American revolutionaries should they decide to reject Spain’s concessions, would hamper German trans-Atlantic commerce. In the aftermath of Spain’s Bourbon Reforms, Spanish America had grown in importance for the German economies, and a more liberal Spanish trading policy would only augment Spanish America’s position as a German market further. Manfred Kossok sketched the German trade with the Spanish-American colonies prior to their independence, stating that by 1766, German states imported Spanish-American cotton, indigo, cochineal, tobacco, cacao, sugar, spices, woods, and animal hides and skins, whilst they exported iron manufactures, glass, wax, hemp, flax, and nautical equipment, such as rigging and lashing. The value of exported linens had grown from roughly 3.5 million Taler in 1748/49 to around 8-10 million Taler in 1800, and before the Spanish-American revolutions, half of all Silesian linens went to Spain, Portugal, and their colonies.

American commerce. Tsar Alexander I did not acknowledge England’s claim to supremacy in American affairs, and thus offered to mediate between the United States and England in a dispute in 1812 (for more, see chapter five). Alexander I also tried to persuade the United States to join the Holy Alliance, an attempt to turn this European entente into an international coalition with the potential of challenging English power. This policy of Alexander I did elicit a measure of concern in London. See: Manfred Kossok, *Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz: Deutschland und Lateinamerika 1815-1830. Zur Politik der deutschen Staaten gegenüber der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Mittel- und Südamerikas* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964), 49.

23 Russia’s influence in the matter quickly decreased: By 1818, it became clear that Russia’s warships, supplied to Spain in order to enable Madrid to regain control over its American colonies, could not even cross the Atlantic. See: Kossok, *Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz*, 57, and Schmieder, 150-151.


25 Most of Germany’s commerce with Spanish America occurred via Spain, particularly the port of Cádiz, which gave Spanish merchants a not insignificant amount of control over German-Spanish American trade. However, the high duties imposed on this trade by Spain combined with the latter’s other regulations regarding commerce with its colonies encouraged German merchants to engage in direct trade with Spanish America illegally. The last third of the eighteenth century, in which England, France, and Spain were heavily preoccupied with wars – including the American Revolution – was witness to increased desires by Germans to profit from Spanish-American commerce. Eager merchants argued that Prussia, as a neutral power in the American Revolution, could take advantage of the hostilities between England, France, Spain, and the thirteen colonies in order to further its own trade. In response, Berlin was confronted with plans that foresaw the establishment of a privileged and extended merchant marine. Nevertheless, most German hopes for extensive direct trade with Spanish America – either by using Prussia as a neutral power, by simply taking the risk of engaging in illegal direct trade, or by sailing to less-regulated Portuguese
Nevertheless, the establishment of the Holy Alliance, a conservative coalition between Russia, Prussia, and Austria aiming to restrain and curb liberalism in Europe, and defend the status quo ante monarchies, reduced the ability of German regimes, particularly Prussia, to freely advocate for the recognition of the Spanish American states that had by the early 1820s gained their independence. Austria and Russia, with fewer overseas commercial interests than Prussia, were concerned primarily with questions of legitimacy and rejected the recognition of Spanish America.\textsuperscript{26} France, on the other hand, was in a similar position as Prussia: French commercial interest in Spanish America had existed since the eighteenth century, and as Shawcross has pointed out, “France (…) did not lack ambition when it came to Latin America” in the nineteenth century, either.\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless, the restoration of monarchy in France under a Bourbon King and the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna also limited France’s abilities to recognise Spanish America, despite the fact that leading French economists and policy makers acknowledged that free trade with Spanish America—unrestricted by Spain—would benefit France. Thus, France’s first course of action did not focus on recognising the new states; rather, it aimed for an establishment of monarchies in Spanish America.\textsuperscript{28}

In response to the policies of continental European states such as France and the Holy Alliance, and with Spain still eager for reconquest, Spanish America’s need for foreign

\textsuperscript{26} Bernd Schröter, “Die Anfänge der preußischen Diplomatie in Südamerika“, in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 97. Of course, Austrian overseas interest did exist. In fact, Austria hoped to regain the Netherlands in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna in order to strengthen its ability to conduct trans-Atlantic trade and even possibly establish Austrian colonial ties to the Americas. This plan was ultimately surrendered in exchange for a better position in the new German Confederation, which was deemed more important to Austria’s national interests than trans-Atlantic trade. See Christian Cwik, „Revolutionen und Reaktion: Der Wiener Kongress, Österreich und die Amerikafrage“, in Mächtepolitik und Friedenssicherung: Zur politischen Kultur Europas im Zeichen des Wiener Kongresses (Münster: LIT, 2019), 107-121, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{27} Shawcross, 12.
\textsuperscript{28} Shawcross, 42-43 and 48.
recognition became more dire, for its new states sought to prevent invasion efforts by Spain, intervention by the Holy Alliance, as well as territorial disputes with their neighbouring states.\textsuperscript{29} Independent of the Holy Alliance and its restrictions, England was the first European state to forge connections with the new states: particularly once under the leadership of new Prime Minister George Canning, the British government pursued relations with Spanish America, with one primary focus: recognition was to be awarded if advantageous commercial connections were to be established. In 1822, Britain recognised the Spanish American rebels as a war party, and in 1823, it sent consuls to the new states of Spanish America. Official recognition often followed quickly thereafter: London recognised Gran Colombia, Mexico, and Buenos Aires in 1824/1825.\textsuperscript{30}

By 1824, the conquest of Spanish America was, under the new economic and political order, no longer possible for any of the powers analysed in this chapter. The only power with lasting interest in reconquest in the early nineteenth-century was Spain. At the Congress of Verona in 1822, a clear breach took place between the continental powers and England over the “Spanish Question”, or France’s proposal to intervene in Spain. France hoped to restore full power to Ferdinand VII, crush the liberals who had seized power in 1820 and had ruled Spain for three years known as \textit{Trienio Liberal}, and possibly arrange for the establishment of Spanish American monarchies disposed amiably to Spain and France, whereas England, represented at the Congress by the Duke of Wellington, supported a policy of non-intervention. Since the great powers decided to permit France’s invasion, which took place in 1823, England began to fully


\textsuperscript{30} Schmieder, 159-163.
pursue its own course vis-à-vis the Continental leaders of the Holy Alliance.\textsuperscript{31} Ferdinand VII, on the other hand, appealed to the Holy Alliance for support in France’s monarchical restoration efforts by downplaying the strength of the independence movements in his former colonies, arguing that his return to power in Spain would enable him to recapture Spanish America to the commercial benefit of European states such as Prussia.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, Austria’s, Prussia’s, and Russia’s response to English concern regarding Spanish America’s fate after monarchical restoration in Spain shows that these powers were not in complete disfavour of a reunion between mother country and colonies, so long as commerce did not suffer. This stance motivated English Prime Minister Canning to seek an understanding with the United States: a dual statement of European non-intervention in the Americas was the goal, though it was famously rejected by the United States, which, through James Monroe, issued its own proclamation of non-interference on behalf of European powers in the Western hemisphere.

Though Kossok argued that an intervention in the New World on behalf of the Holy Alliance was largely an exaggeration, based in part on a canard of the British press alluding to a secret treaty between the Holy Alliance and France to restore monarchies not merely in Spanish America, but also the United States, the idea led to such consternation in England and the United States that the Monroe Doctrine was born. England’s sending of consuls to Spanish America and the subsequent recognition of the new states led to a shift in the Holy Alliance’s policy in trans-Atlantic affairs.\textsuperscript{33} England’s weighty decision, combined with an awareness of the impracticality of conquering the large territory lost by Spain, led to the downfall of desires to capture Spanish America. Moreover, statesmen of the various commercial powers realised that economic rivalry

\textsuperscript{31} Schmieder, 153-158.
\textsuperscript{32} Kossok, \textit{Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz}, 103.
\textsuperscript{33} Kossok \textit{Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz}, 107-108
among these powers would prevent lasting conquest should any one of these parties decide to invade a former Spanish American colony. Edward Shawcross highlights that even France’s interventions in Mexico in 1838-1839 and 1862-1867 should not be seen as aims for territorial conquest, but rather signs of informal imperialism. In fact, in late 1823, Canning and the French ambassador Polignac agreed that Spanish American independence was a fait accompli and that neither party would attempt to conquer the former Spanish colonies.

The imperial aim was one for pre-eminence in the formerly Spanish realm of influence, to be achieved through economic dominance. The British, not bound by the policy of legitimacy, were the first to engage in this strategy in Spanish America. As Canning noted, “Spanish America is free and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English.” Even before Spanish-American independence, the Napoleonic Wars had given England an opportunity to further cement its position as the commercial leader in Spain’s colonies, as E. M. Lahmeyer Lobo argued: “The Spanish colonies grew dependent on England throughout the course of the 18th century…as the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian peninsula opened the possibility for political liberation, the Hispano-American nations remained English commercial colonies”.

34 As a British Parliamentary Paper highlights, “in 1825 there had been (...) on the part of the United States”, a project “to obtain possession of the island of Cuba. There were at that time in Cuba three parties, severally wishing for a connection with England, France, and America: the mutual jealousy of the three countries, however, prevented any one of them from taking possession of the island, and they came to a solemn treaty—notes having been actually interchanged by their respective Governments that neither England, France, nor America, should interfere with Cuba”. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 35, 925-967, cc. 928-942. Accessed using ProQuest U.K. Parliamentary Papers (BPP): https://0-parlpapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0035p0-0020?accountid=7121. The imperial rivalry among these industrial-capitalist states in Spanish America throughout the first half of the nineteenth century was thus one dominated heavily by commerce as opposed to conquest, though it remained imperial nonetheless. A noteworthy exception to this is the U.S.-Mexico War, in which the United States captured almost half of Mexico’s territory.
35 Shawcross, 1.
36 Schmieder, 161, and Shawcross, 48.
38 E.M. Lahmeyer Lobo in Kossok, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz, 16.
Early access and commercial connections to Spanish American states became imperative for European governments, who did not want to lose out on the economic benefits of Spanish American markets. As von Gerolt wrote in the case of Spain; by the time Spain had finally engaged in economic relations with Mexico, other nations who had forged ties earlier had “already won the upper hand”. The same concern also existed once Texas became independent.

**EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND COMMERCE WITH AND IN MEXICO**

Given the fear of missing out on trans-Atlantic trade, increasingly seen as so crucial to the stability, prosperity, and power of the European states, the governments of Europe tried to follow the English lead in Mexico by circumventing the political guideline set by the Holy Alliance. By 1836, Britain, France, and Prussia had all completed treaties and agreements with Mexico: After Britain’s recognition of Mexico in 1825, the first Anglo-Mexican treaty of amity and commerce was signed in 1826, making this the first such treaty Mexico signed with a foreign power. France, like other European continental powers, was limited by the straight jacket of legitimacy and restauration dictated by the Holy Alliance, which reduced its ability to follow the English lead. Legitimist principles and loyalty to Ferdinand VII notwithstanding, France’s government was aware of Mexico’s importance to French trade, and thus sent a representative to Mexico in 1822, largely to assess the situation and prevent England from gaining the upper hand in a market that French policy makers regarded as the most important of former Spanish America. The collapse of the Bourbon restoration and the rise of the July Monarchy finally gave France the opportunity to recognise the new republics in Spanish America in 1830.41

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41 Shawcross, 48-52.
Bernecker’s discussion on the early Prussian-Mexican relationship showcases the difficulties on behalf of both Mexico and European states like Prussia and France to settle and establish the formalities and officialities of their relations. Bernecker notes that Prussia desired to send a representative to Mexico in 1825, without the intention of creating diplomatic ties but with the objective of facilitating German trade through the presence of a trading agent. This new position, which lacked consular or diplomatic precedent in Prussia, was filled by Louis Sulzer, who had previously been to Mexico as a representative of the Rheinisch-Westindischen Kompagnie, a trading organisation that had represented the first Prussian effort to form unofficial, non-state ties to independent Mexico without disrespecting legitimist principles. Upon his return to Mexico, Sulzer, together with several other Prussian officials, including Christian von Rother, the President of Prussia’s maritime department the Seehandlung, as well as German merchants, encouraged the Prussian government to forge a proper treaty of commerce and amity with Mexico and to establish a consulate there. The first General-Consul was Carl Wilhelm Koppe, who arrived in Mexico in 1830. In 1831, the first Prussian-Mexican treaty of amity and commerce was completed and awaited ratification.42

For the Hanse Towns, trans-Atlantic trade emerged as imperative after the independence of Spanish America. The Napoleonic Wars had led to an occupation of their ports, preventing the use of their merchant marines which stood at the foundation of Hanseatic prosperity, and Britain’s economic might after 1815 resulted in a flooding of German markets and the overwhelming traffic of British vessels in Hanseatic ports. This, combined with a hindrance of European trade due to the increase in internal duties among German states as well as the heightened protectionism of states like France, led to a reorientation of trade outward and

42 Bernecker in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 218-226.
overseas, where the newly independent republics provided the Hansa with an opportunity to
revive their maritime trade and hence their raison d’être. Though the Hanse Towns were not a
part of the Holy Alliance and therefore not bound to the policy of legitimacy and restauration,
they struggled in establishing commercial ties to Mexico nonetheless. The two dominant powers
of the German Confederation, Prussia and Austria, were both members of the Holy Alliance, and
combined with the influence of other major European powers also bound in part by the
conservative order, e.g. France, the Hansa could not afford to pursue a policy entirely to the
contrary of the maxim given by the two leaders of the German Bund. Political pressures
notwithstanding, the Hanseatic city-states, which did have a history of engaging in trade even
when clothed in the guise of illicitness, had been, as Hendrik Dane found, sympathetic towards
the Spanish American independence movements since the 1810s, and also followed their own
diplomatic path in trans-Atlantic affairs: Whereas Friedrich von Gerolt, Prussia’s interim
General-Consul beginning in 1833 and chargé d’affaires (Geschäftsträger) in Mexico between
1837 and 1844, supported European interference in Mexico in the 1830s, the Hanseatic city-
states were largely against it. By the late 1820s and early 1830s, Hanseatic trade had resumed,
with a trans-Atlantic focus, a closer cooperation with Berlin, and the continued use of the other
German territories as suppliers of goods.

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43 Prussia was also in favour of trans-Atlantic trade, for it, too, suffered from European protectionism. Russia closed its borders to Prussian goods; as a result, Prussian trade with Asia was also limited. Austria closed Prussian access to Italy and France and the Netherlands increased duties on imports. See Bernecker in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 221.
45 For more on Hanseatic sympathy toward the Spanish American independence movements, see: Hendrik Dane, „Primera relaciones diplomático-comerciales entre Alemania y México“, Historia Mexicana, Vol. 17, No. 1 (July – September 1967), 72-102, 74-76.
In the following pages, German trade will be evaluated predominantly as the trade of one large economy as opposed to dissecting the economic importance of each of the German Confederation’s member states. The reason for this is because the Zollverein, as well as the political and economic landscape of Europe, incentivised the discussion of German trade as such, though attention will also be paid to the Hanseatic correspondence, which differed at times from Prussia’s. Nevertheless, even Bremian Mayor Smidt was informed by Hamburg’s consul Adolph de Bary that the Hanseatic interests were so deeply intertwined with those of the other German Bund member states that Hanseatic and Prussian policies in Mexico were most frequently the same.47 In an 1836 letter to the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, von Gerolt analysed the Customs Union’s benefit to German trading interests, particularly in Spanish America. “Your Excellency is aware of the large interests and commercial connections which Prussia has with the former Spanish colonies and the entirety of America, and primarily with Mexico since the emancipation of these countries”, wrote von Gerolt, “especially since these connections expand from year to year and increase in importance for our motherland”. As this importance grew, it became “all the more necessary and urgent” that Prussian subjects benefit from “a larger measure of protection and consequently larger advantages” given the “competition of the other nations”. This need for greater Prussian power to secure Prussian trading interests and subjects in Mexico and Spanish America at large was, according to von Gerolt, met partially by the Zollverein. Through the “benedictory formation of the German Zollverein, the (...) material interests of the member states of this large union had been closely connected and tremendously promoted”

47 Adolph de Bary to Mayor Smidt and Syndic Curtius of Lübeck, February 1845, City and State Archive/Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (StA HH): Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 3a, Fasc. 4, Hamburger Consulat zu Mexico: An die Senate der Hansestädte gerichtete Bitte um diplomatische Vertretung derselben in Mexico, unter Anerkennung der Verdienste des vormaligen Preußischen Geschäftsträger daselbst des Herrn von Gerolt, 3.
because the Union had aided in “freeing the German Gewerbstätigkeit and industry of its shackles”. With Prussia’s “providence”, the Union had enabled the German economy to “enter the lists” with the larger commercial nations.48

European commerce with Mexico was dominated by a European desire to acquire raw materials – in the case of Mexico, chiefly metals, predominantly in the form of silver – and to sell their manufactured products. In the Spanish era, the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru had been the most lucrative sources of metals, and the eighteenth century had seen an increase in production and exportation thereof, making New Spain and Peru all the more attractive for Europeans: the extraction of metals since 1700 rose five-fold compared to the rate prior to 1700, and between 1750 and 1800, the exportation of metals, largely silver, was higher than the entire yield between 1492 and 1700.49 Furthermore, as Seymour Shapiro has highlighted, E. A. Wrigley argued that metals were a crucial raw material for the industrialised states of Europe, for “the most important change in raw material provisions which took place was the substitution of inorganic for organic sources of supply, of mineral for vegetable or animal raw materials. This was the sine qua non of sustained industrial growth…” Cotton, Wrigley argued, was an exception.50 Indeed, mining was one of independent Mexico’s largest export sectors, and both mineral materials for European production as well as silver played a crucial role in European interest in Mexico. Shawcross has detailed the importance of silver to the French economy: Spanish American silver brought wealth and stability to France’s bimetallic currency system.51

48 The German original – in die Schranken treten, here translated as “entering the lists” – is similar in meaning to “entering the lists” and comes from the medieval practice of fighting out a competition behind a barrier. In that sense, it is also similar to “stepping into the ring with”, in this case, stepping into the ring with the other commercial nations. Gewerbstätigkeit is a German word no longer used, though Gewerbetätigkeit is sometimes used in a similar fashion to mean “industrial/economic activity”. See: Report of the Prussian General-Consulate in Mexico by von Gerolt, February 6, 1836, in GSta PK: III. HA MdA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico Vol. VIII, l. 366-376, 372.
49 Kossok, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz, 14.
50 Shapiro, 5.
51 Shawcross, 45-49.
An optimistic 1836 trading report highlighted the European focus on silver. It described the German economies’ increased competitiveness in commerce with Mexico. Putting the value of Prussian industrial products exported to Mexico at 7,342,870 pesos, it calculated that roughly 5 million of that sum should remain after the subtraction of import duties and other expenses. Moreover, the report claimed that Mexico’s production and export of silver valued around 18 to 20 million pesos, which meant that Prussia would receive roughly a quarter of this sum. In other words, Prussia would, according to these numbers, “have a share of one quarter in the entirety of foreign trade with Mexico”. Combined with several other German states, including Silesia, Saxony, Bavaria, Westphalia, or the Rhineland Provinces, Prussia held a share of roughly one third of silver production, which put it on par with Britain, with also one third, or France and the United States, who held combined another third. In a letter from Hanseatic merchants to the Senate of Hamburg, the former asserted that “a third of the entire foreign trade of this country (Mexico) goes through German hands, which in turn passes mostly through ours”.

What must be remembered about these statistics, however, is that many of them are not entirely accurate. Bernecker points out that von Gerolt’s estimation regarding silver exports was 50% too high, and he also questions whether German merchants could lay claim to a third of all foreign trade in Mexico, as does Kossok, who estimates that share at a quarter. Even German contemporaries questioned the accuracy of empirical data available. After being asked by Prussian statesman Friedrich Eichhorn, von Rother cautioned in 1837 that “the messages regarding the ships entering or leaving the ports of the Mexican state are very incomplete”, and

53 Hanseatic Merchants’ Petition for Diplomatic Representation to the Hanseatic Senates, February 1845, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 3a, Fasc. 4, Hamburger Consulat zu Mexico, 1.
commented that there were no documents for the year 1836 due to von Gerolt’s temporary absence from Mexico during which he was in Europe. For 1835, only a few pieces of data from the port of Tampico were available, and von Rother suggested that von Gerolt be encouraged to provide closer documentation. For the German trade with Tampico in 1835, only a small list of two Hamburgian vessels seemed available.55 Such reservations also challenge other shipping records, such as a directory that von Gerolt had sent to the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he stated that, in the years 1831-1833, only three of his government’s ships had visited Vera Cruz, namely the Mentor, Fredericke Sophie, and Elisabeth Luise. All of these vessels had likewise sailed from Hamburg.56

Though European economies provided a broad variety of goods for Mexican consumption, the dominant industry featured was the textile industry. Competition among Europeans in Mexico did not focus primarily on France’s and Germany’s effort to catch up with British cotton product sales, however. Rather, each economy had their own competitive textile manufactures. Bernecker points out that the English were able to dominate the cotton market in Mexico for decades, with the United States as its fiercest competitor in this field. The French and German commerce in Mexico had emphases on other goods, leading to what Bernecker labels a sort of “division of labour” among European economies in Mexico. Cotton, linen, and wool textiles all constituted an important part of European commerce with Mexico. One of the principal German products that German statesmen regarded as competitive in the realm of international trade was linen. The linen industry was highlighted in newspapers, correspondence,

55 The Mentor was a Hanseatic vessel commissioned by the Prussian Seehandlung. It is also, interestingly, the very first German ship under German captainship to circumnavigate the globe. See: Christian von Rother to PFM, March 30, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 2-3.
reports, and official documents of many German states as one of the region’s flagships, capable
of outselling even their British and French competitors in some American states.\textsuperscript{57} In 1836, a
Prussian trading report stated that half of all Prussian exports to Mexico were linen products with
a value of almost 4 million pesos.\textsuperscript{58} In the early 1830s, Silesian linens constituted a sixth of all
Mexican imports and exceeded the export value of any other German good, though other textiles
and iron, steel, and glass manufactures also sold relatively well in Mexico.\textsuperscript{59}

Various types of linen existed on the Mexican market, including \textit{platillas}, \textit{listados},
\textit{bretañas}, and \textit{creas}. The German linen product that seemed to sell best in Mexico were the
\textit{platillas}: a trade statistic from 1837 noted that the ship \textit{Emma}, which had sailed from Hamburg,
had brought 2068 pieces of \textit{creas}, 2850 pieces of \textit{bretañas}, 1050 pieces of \textit{listados}, but 12600
pieces of \textit{platillas}. Ship \textit{Hansa} from Bremen carried 1710 pieces of \textit{creas}, but 4100 pieces of
\textit{platillas}, and \textit{Neptunus}, sailing from Hamburg, carried 956 pieces of \textit{creas} but 11,000 \textit{platillas}. More German \textit{platillas} were brought into Mexico via the ports of New Orleans (1400 pieces),
New York (2000 pieces) and Havana (1000 pieces). Other ships coming from Hamburg and
Bremen, such as the \textit{Hebrus} sailing to Tampico, carried 6000 pieces of \textit{platillas}, 1000 pieces of
\textit{creas}, 200 pieces of \textit{estopillas}, 350 pieces of \textit{listados}, as well as \textit{Bielefelder Leinen} (Bielefeld
linens), Hessian rolls, \textit{Drelle} (twilled linen), and glass, and the \textit{Anna Johanna} carried 3000
pieces of \textit{platillas}, 600 pieces of \textit{creas}, 600 pieces of \textit{estopillas}, 350 pieces of \textit{listados}, other
linen goods, Hessian rolls, glass, iron, and hosiery. Beyond linens, some woollen textiles were
also sold such as \textit{Casimir}.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Bernecker in \textit{Preußen und Lateinamerika}, 237.
\textsuperscript{58} The total profit totaled less, of course. Trading Report of von Gerolt, November 14, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA
\textsuperscript{59} Bernecker in \textit{Preußen und Lateinamerika}, 244-245.
\textsuperscript{60} Trading Report of Joh. Eschenburg, November 30, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX,
l. 198-201.
As a result of linen’s significance to the larger German economy, efforts were made to facilitate and protect the trade with the American republics particularly in regard to linen products. Other European nations, chiefly among them Britain, had their own versions of platillas, creas, and the other types of linen sold on the Mexican market, and began to compete increasingly with the German linen products. The Rheinisch-Westindische Kompagnie, a pioneer of German trade in Mexico, had exported goods to Mexico in 1831 to the value of 7,939,379 Prussian Thaler, of which 3,287,919 Thaler’s worth had been linen goods. A few years later, however, English trade introduced British and Irish linens, which were mixed with cotton and hence had a shiny surface that Prussian Koppe identified as one of the reasons why English linens became increasingly successful. German officials often hoped that changes in Mexican laws or the market would decrease the competition from other foreign textiles. Von Gerolt hoped that new Mexican regulations in 1837 would dampen the success of the mantas trade, a trade in cheap cotton cloth consumed by the poorer classes, which was conducted heavily by U.S.-Americans. Mantas, according to von Gerolt, flooded Mexico and thus threatened the German markets for Silesian platillas. Moreover, Bahre hoped in 1840 that the recent cheap sales of German linens would hinder English linens from establishing themselves more firmly on the Mexican market.

Besides the mere sales of goods, Europeans also began to establish merchant houses and businesses in Mexico. Von Gerolt estimated that there were roughly 2000 Frenchmen, 1000 Germans – virtually all of which were either from the German Customs Union or the Hanse

61 Bernecker in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 243-244.
Towns –, and 1000 Englishmen in Mexico, and that the total number of foreigners did not amount to more than 5000 individuals, mostly settled in port cities such as Campeche, Vera Cruz, Tampico, Matamoros, Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlán, and Guaymas, or inland towns like Mexico City, Jalapa, Puebla, Oaxaca, Toluca, Valladolid, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Zacatecas, Durango, Guadalajara, as well as in the mining districts, such as Real del Monte. Indeed, historian Nikolaus Böttcher likewise asserts that Englishmen in Mexico never numbered more than roughly 1000 individuals before 1850.\textsuperscript{64} Whereas British competition was always seen as fierce, the Prussians evaluated the French as less threatening, for French trade, according to the report, was dominated by retail in the form of fashion and millinery goods, as well as shops owned by chefs, perfumers, tailors, carpenters, and wig makers. Moreover, the French owned several distilleries, sugar refineries, bakeries, and a pharmacy. The German and English merchants owned larger merchant houses; by the 1830s, the number of German houses had reached thirty, and by 1836, English houses numbered 27. Many Germans were watchmakers, lathe operators, and other types of artisans and tradespersons, such as tailors, shoemakers, milliners, saddlers and leather workers, and tanners. The British owned jeweller and watch shops, mechanical workshops, breweries, saddleries, and, as of 1836, a facility near Acapulco for the cleaning of cotton.\textsuperscript{65}

As the Prussian concern for German linens and their competitiveness shows, the same competition that existed between European powers globally also existed in North America, including Mexico. Von Gerolt argued that the flooding and saturation of Mexican markets was


“unavoidable” because of the large degree of European competition thereof, and Prussian Consul F. Schneider moreover highlighted that Mexican demand for European goods fluctuated strongly with the seasons: the rainy season made travel and transportation and hence access to markets difficult.\textsuperscript{66} Prussia’s interim consul in Tampico also spoke of limited demand in Mexico, for the Mexican population’s poverty restricted the purchasing power of many. An 1836 report by von Gerolt suggested that, as European merchants were becoming more aware of the amount of consumption in Mexico, they had also become more discerning in their selection of goods to be shipped overseas. European economies thus competed both based on quality and quantity, and the Prussian report announced proudly that it was the quality of German products and the careful selection thereof for the Spanish-American markets that had enabled them to challenge the English and French competition (though the interim consul in Tampico wrote in 1844 that German linens’ superior quality had not yet been properly appreciated by Mexico’s consumers).\textsuperscript{67} This made Spanish America all the more attractive to German trade, for Prussia had already lost out to English competition in Brazil and the United States, the report claimed: The English had “in earlier times succeeded, in Brazil and North-America, in largely displacing the German industrial products, and namely our most important article, linens, in introducing their (English) cotton fabrics as the main necessity of the inhabitants of these countries”.\textsuperscript{68}

Despite the fact that the report regarded Mexico as less suited for linen products, it noted that the sales of linen articles in that country were probably larger than in Brazil and North-America combined. Bernecker describes the competition extant between Germany and Britain in

\textsuperscript{67} F. A. Etansen (?), July 3, 1844, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127.
Mexico regarding linen goods as “cutthroat”, emphasising that strategies such as “dumping prices, unfair business methods, and speculative accommodations of credit” were already in use.\textsuperscript{69} Prussian correspondence demonstrates repeatedly that German linens were in fiercest competition with England, and officials such as von Roenne hoped for the dominance of German textiles vis-à-vis their English counterparts on the Mexican market.\textsuperscript{70} Because of this competition, von Gerolt wrote that it should be “one of the most essential duties of the agents, residing in Mexico and accredited by the various governments, to use their personal and official influence in order to promote their respective country’s interests within the changes that the Congress seeks to make in the customs tariff”. This could happen either through the rejection of and resistance to new restrictive laws or a reduction of the entrance duties for the agent’s respective country.\textsuperscript{71}

The interesting question is whether the European parties analysed in this chapter actually pursued informal imperialist strategies in the Texas region and if so, with what success and on what level. The trading report’s recommendation that European agents in Mexico use their official influence in order to attain a better customs tariff, being willing to either resist restrictive laws or accept an advantage for their country only, suggests that free-trade imperialism did play a role in Mexico in the 1830s and 1840s. The following evaluation of European commerce and diplomacy with Mexico and Texas will focus on various components of informal imperialism: In order to determine how significant informal imperialist ambitions were, various zones of contestation will be laid out, including Mexico’s efforts to protect its own industry, the European resistance to tariffs and duties, reclamations, and an analysis of the contraband trade. These

\textsuperscript{69} Bernecker in \textit{Preußen und Lateinamerika}, 244.
\textsuperscript{70} See, for example, von Roenne, October 18, 1844, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127.
discussions will include an evaluation of the success of Europeans in swaying or influencing the Mexican government’s policies.

The tendency of European states, as a response to their new-found economic-industrial prowess, to export their manufactured goods to trans-Atlantic states at the expense of those countries’ own industries was highlighted in the Prussian trading report, wherein was written that Mexico had, since its independence, witnessed a revival of agriculture and mining, but had very few other developed economic sectors, in response to which a “speedy flooding of the country with foreign industrial products of all kinds” had taken place.\(^72\) Moreover, the report emphasised that many Europeans who went to work in Mexico did not stay there permanently and instead returned to their motherland after several years or decades. The report continued to observe that “of all these foreigners there are only few, as experience has taught and continues daily to teach (us), who, after a number of years with a proportionate fortune and as rich people, do not return to their fatherland, where they put their capital to fruitful use. Most of them have their relatives or friends replace them in their shops in Mexico and thus lay the basis for their own fortune”.\(^73\)

Von Gerolt’s successor in Mexico, Ferdinand Seiffart, proudly made a similar observation in 1846, linking German wealth established in Mexico to German industriousness.\(^74\) These reports show that much of the wealth that was established in Mexico by European immigrants also remained in European hands. This led to the outflow of mineral wealth from Mexico: The report claimed that the metals mined in Mexico each year circulated first among several Mexican sectors, such as agriculture, mining, or industry, only to then end up in the hands of European


merchants, who transmitted them to Europe. “The same would also occur”, the report declared, “if this production were twice or thrice as high”. The Commerz-Deputation of Hamburg acknowledged the importance of silver in a letter to Hamburg’s Senate in 1838, claiming that silver was “all of Mexico’s power”, which flowed from that country to Europe and hence deprived Mexico of not merely its mineral wealth, but its power, also. 75

To a certain extent, Mexico was not capable of stopping the outflow of precious metals and breaking its dependence on European commerce, largely because of its instability. The 1836 report addressed this, and asserted that European merchants took advantage of Mexico’s financial crisis by re-buying orders, which were used as payment of import duties in coastal regions, from the Mexican government, which was in such dire need of cash that it sold these orders at a huge discount, enabling European merchants to circumvent, to a certain extent, Mexico’s import duties. Restrictive laws and regulations were sometimes waived in part or even entirely for merchants of European states whose local representatives had used their influence in order to obtain such an advantage for their nationals. Moreover, European products were also brought into Mexico via contraband trade and thus at “the expense of state revenue” – generally, these were “the most lucrative commercial transactions” for merchants. 76 Another letter from Bahre emphasises that European trade was partially responsible for contraband trade, with perilous consequences: Bahre argued that a revolution, which had commenced in Tampico in October 1838, “had been entirely and completely fuelled and sustained due to the known contraband commerce”, because merchants had, coaxed by significant discounts, paid import tariffs to the revolutionaries in advance and been able to ship into Mexico even forbidden goods.

The revolutionaries, on the other hand, thus possessed monetary resources which prolonged and bolstered their fight. Despite this, Bahre noted, Mexico’s central government had conceded to recognise these payments of foreign merchants, so long as they paid the additional 25% that the insurgents had granted to them.\footnote{Extract from a letter by Teodoro Bahre, September 12, 1839, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 98-101.}

Though many European merchants participated in the contraband trade, it was frequently identified as a problem by European officials, because it made the market more unpredictable. Contraband trade was made possible by the Mexican inability to stop this traffic, and the frequency and volume of this trade only exacerbated this issue. Prussian officials reported on the difficulties caused by “contraband trade, which has grown rampant in the last years in almost every harbour of the republic”. The Mexican government, one report by von Gerolt claimed, was only able to collect one-sixth of all entrance duties at best, for most goods found their way onto the market by contraband trade. This satiation of the market could not be adequately controlled by Mexican authorities and imperilled merchants, who were not able to make adequate predictions due to the vast amount of ‘black’ articles. As a result, “the prices of goods are continuously depressed, and the state of the real trade has generally, from year to year, been made more precarious”. The Mexican border patrol (\textit{Douanenpolizey}), the report lamented, lacked the means of stopping or curbing contraband trade in all or even most of Mexico’s harbours.\footnote{Trading Report of von Gerolt, July 24, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 90-96, 90-91.} Another Prussian report explained that many German merchants located in Mexico City and Veracruz had complained about a “lack of sales and depressed prices of our goods”. These complaints the report credited to “the northern parts of Mexico, where consumption has risen significantly through the increase in silver production”, and where people met their needs
“directly and by means of contraband trade, largely from New Orleans via the northern ports of Tampico and Matamoros”. Later on, contraband trade is criticised again as a hindrance to European commerce with Mexico. The officials behind the report believed that a French factory producing mantas, a certain type of cotton fabric, would not be of permanence and unable to make significant profit due to the heavy smuggling trade along the northern Mexican frontier, where U.S.-Americans covered Mexican consumers’ desire for mantas.79

Insufficient profits in response to the heavy contraband trade plagued many European merchants. In another letter to his government, the Prussian Consul-General analysed the market for German products in Mexico, concluding that “an improvement of prices could not be detected” and that “the German commerce has the highest hopes in an intentioned reorganisation of the local customs system and the reduction of entrance duties for the control of the contraband trade”, highlighting the Prussian beliefs that profits were not as high as desirable and that commercial regulations were inefficient.80 Another letter from July 1837, with a price list created by Prussian Vice-Consul in Veracruz, A. Stolz, analysed the linen market there, suggesting that “all Silesian linens, with the exception of ordinary platillas, of which there were lately 1000 pieces distributed among the local merchants, would only find buyers with considerable loss, (...) Saxon linens have, since the stocks were almost gone, been sold (...) with moderate profit, all sales did not exceed 800 pieces, however”.81

The mantas trade, as well as trade in cotton in general, was a nuisance to Mexico, which sought to build up its own cotton industry. Schneider wrote that textiles were, for patriotic

Mexicans, a proof of love for their country: because foreign textile industries had tremendous dominance in Mexico, Mexican patriots bought what Schneider referred to as “inferior native products” rather than foreign textiles.\textsuperscript{82} Mexican protectionism thus led to bans on the importation of cotton goods several times, including in 1838. This prohibition, which included cotton textiles as well as cotton twist, vexed the English, and stands as another example of Mexican protectionist measures to prevent European influence through European commerce.\textsuperscript{83} Prussian Vice-Consul in Matamoros J. Eschenburg reported that, in the aftermath of the prohibition, several Mexicans had established spinning factories and weaving mills, with the goal of satisfying the Mexican demand for cotton products. Nevertheless, though Mexico made efforts to restrict the foreign cotton trade, Prussian correspondence highlights that contraband trade in cotton as well as other products remained high. “All customs duties collected in Matamoros up to the first of October 1837 amounted to no more than 200,000 pesos, to which one can add 50,000 pesos for embezzlement or savings”, Eschenburg wrote to Eichhorn. “In response to these collected duties, one estimates that all imports amount to no more than 800,000 pesos, (…) the entire trade in Matamoros was founded on secret importation”.\textsuperscript{84} Since much of contraband trade was dominated by the U.S.-Americans, the 1838 prohibition of cotton-good importation impacted England most heavily.

European attempts to sway Mexican governmental policies, visible in e.g. von Gerolt’s recommendation that local European agents endeavour to coax the Mexican authorities into passing laws more favourable towards foreign trade, did not go unnoticed by Mexican representatives, who firmly rejected such European involvement in their country’s internal

\textsuperscript{83} Bernecker in \textit{Preußen und Lateinamerika}, 247.
affairs. J. M. Ortiz Monasterio emphasised this in a letter to von Gerolt, arguing that European consuls could make use of their right to make reclamations on behalf of their respective country’s subjects – if they were “fair and just” – but that this was the extent of their power, for they were “not authorised to engage the authorities in discussions nor issues of competencies on political or other non-commercial matters”. Such policy-lines frustrated Europeans, who did not believe that Mexico was doing enough to address their reclamations when the former relied solely on the practices outlined by Ortiz Monasterio.85

Mexico was also unable to establish commercial ties to European countries on truly equal footing, despite the rise of “free trade”. Though most treaties of amity and commerce signed between European parties and Mexico spoke of both parties treating one another as being among “the most favoured nations”, Mexican trade to Europe was disadvantaged when compared with European trade to Mexico. A Prussian report highlighted this and stated that the restrictive Mexican duties and laws which led to frequent European disgruntlement did not “amount to a fourth of those duties which a Mexican (merchant) house of the same category would have to pay in regular taxes in England, France, or Prussia”.86 Such examples notwithstanding, the Mexican government did at times refer to European and U.S.-American laws to resist European financial pressures. In the discussion on a reclamation that had been raised by European powers in response to a fire that had destroyed the customs house, Mexican diplomat and minister Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza had stated that Mexico would first contact its representatives

abroad to receive notice of the respective laws in Europe and the United States before conceding to any demands made by European merchants in Veracruz, where the fire had taken place.87

Though European informal imperialist ambitions existed, and though European powers had commercial advantages in trading with Mexico, the Mexican government often resisted the pervasive penetration of European commerce in its country. An early vexation for European merchants was the Mexican government’s use of forced bonds in 1836. The rationale behind this practice was that the monetary gain from such bonds would enable the financing of Mexico’s army, which, throughout much of the 1830s, cost on average 10 million pesos to maintain per annum. “Given the impossibility of enforcing direct taxes”, noted a Prussian report, “the governments see themselves as forced to impose forced bonds on capitalists and the merchant class”. There were huge disadvantages associated with this practice, however, for it was seen by Mexican and European merchants alike as irregular in implementation and prone to abuse, which elicited their resistance and outcries from foreign newspapers.88 Adolph de Bary, who had served as the consul for the free city of Frankfurt, as interim consul of the Hanse Towns, and had watched over the Prussian consulate in von Gerolt’s absence, described one such effort by the Mexican government when he lamented that a new law passed on June 6, 1836, disproportionally affected German merchants in Mexico. The law foresaw the establishment of forced bonds, amounting to the value of two million pesos, for the purpose of covering in part the deficit of the Mexican states. Certificates would be issued for these bonds, and at the end of the fiscal year, those living in Mexico could turn in their bonds in order to cover a tax to be established in connection to this law. De Bary saw an injustice in this law, for he argued that it

disadvantaged smaller merchants, especially German ones who were almost exclusively taxed at
the maximum rate. When German merchants sought legal reprieve, they were treated
dishonourably and threatened with greater financial losses, motivating de Bary to contact the
French and English representatives, for their subjects were likewise treated inequitably. This
correspondence suggests that European diplomats and merchants were not always able to easily
sway the Mexican government to their favour.

Next to Mexico’s deliberate resistance to European free-trade imperialism, in the form of
e.g. the forced bonds of 1836, Mexico’s political instability was identified by European officials
as problematic to European interests early on, and thus formed a less intentional Mexican
resistance to European imperialism. Prussian Consul-General in Mexico, von Gerolt, labelled the
country as disorganised, and another official report from 1836 complained about the lack of
security foreigners enjoyed in the country. The report referred to the plundering of Mexico City
in 1828, where many French subjects had lost 400,000 pesos; a “gruesome murder” of six
Frenchmen in Puebla, August 1833, for which the perpetrators had not yet been punished; the
murder of Swiss consul Mairet; as well as the recent shooting of several foreigners in Tampico.
Such events, combined with Mexican laws regarding forceable bonds, incited Europeans to
pressure Mexico for compensation. The 1836 report, for instance, deemed it probable that France
would impose penal measures on Mexico in the likely event that the Mexican government did
not give in to French reclamation efforts, and urged the Prussian government to support France
in such an event, given that “all nations with connections to Mexico have the interest that an

89 Adolph de Bary to PFM, August 2, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico Vol. VIII, l. 504-511.
90 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located
in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 21-26, and Report of the
VIII, l. 413-423.
order of things be established in this country, through which the foreigners would enjoy a more authentic protection and other guarantees than the ones granted to them by the treaties and the Mexican laws”.

In Mexico, resistance to European penetration and political-economic instability combined, often stymying European diplomats and merchants who desired to take legal redress for their losses, aware however that the Mexican government found itself unable to pay reclamations or properly address grievances by stopping the contraband trade. Oftentimes, Mexican measures to stabilise the country had a negative impact on merchants, who possessed much of the wealth in the country and were predominantly foreigners. Von Gerolt noted that low sales in Veracruz were exacerbated by the local lack of cash, which had only recently found alleviation after half a million dollars transported from Mexico City and Puebla reached the port city. Nevertheless, von Gerolt wrote, the sales of *platillas* and *creas* had even in Mexico City been lower than normal. This depression in sales did not merely impact German linens, von Gerolt claimed, but generally all industrial products of Britain, France, and Germany, a development owed to the devaluation of copper money to half its nominal value. This measure taken by the Mexican government was described by von Gerolt as “beneficent and necessary”, though he did note that this had caused Mexico to face a loss of 4 million dollars, mostly carried by the merchant class.

Bahre also pointed out that because “the entirety of trade is in the hands of foreigners and Altspanier (lit. old Spaniards)”, and because “the Mexicans know, as usual, how to secure their interests”, Mexican officials preferred at times to address the concerns of

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92 A devaluation of currency typically helps lower a country’s interest payments owed on foreign debts, one of the reasons why Mexico took this step. It also helps boost a state’s exports, for they are cheaper in comparison, though this did not really apply as much to Mexico in the 1830s and 1840s. See: Trading Report of von Gerolt, July 24, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 90-96, 96.
merchants last, suggesting that the European merchants’ position in Mexico was nuanced: they held tremendous significance to Mexican trade and the Mexican economy, and hence had increased influence, which Mexican authorities at times tried to fight.93

Similar circumstances can be seen regarding Mexican efforts to stop the contraband trade.94 Von Gerolt noted in a trading report that a new tariff had led to the closure of the port of Mazatlán – certainly a restriction on Mexican trading possibilities.95 This same tariff had come into effect in September 1837, and had limited foreign trade to the ports of Sisal, Campeche, Tabasco, Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros, as well as Acapulco, San Blas, Monterey, and Guaymas, partially in an effort to curb contraband trade by giving the underfunded harbour patrol a smaller range of ports to control.96 Von Gerolt also reported on the insurance rates on Mexican ships leaving New Orleans for Tampico, which had been incredibly high in the past and had hence resulted in little direct trade between these ports, disadvantaging the German Confederation’s trade, for German platillas and creas were still located in New Orleans.97 Fortunately, von Gerolt noted, this rate had, as of April 1836, been reduced to 3 percent, enabling the transportation of the German goods to Mexico.98 Even developments that were on the surface positive were at times criticised by European observers, because trading regulations were too stringent. Von Gerolt commented on German merchants’ discontent with a new tariff, which had been interpreted by them as “too strict” despite the fact that duties paid on German

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94 Von Roenne to von Bülow, February 25, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 74-76.
97 Not all German trade occurred directly between Mexico and the Hanse Towns. Some German goods were also shipped to Mexico from U.S.-American New Orleans. Given Mexico’s restrictive policies and Hanseatic trade with the United States, German goods sometimes found their way to New Orleans before being transported to Mexico.
creas now amounted to 6.30 pesos as opposed to the more than 7 pesos to be paid under the old tariff, whereas duties on platillas decreased from 4 pesos to 3.60. Von Gerolt showed himself more optimistic, however, hoping that the new Mexican government’s “good will” and “morality” would help alleviate the ills impacting its foreign trade.99

Nevertheless, discontent among Europeans, mostly due to reclamations, continued. Though some reclamations were successful, such as Eduard Ferdinand Färber’s of the Deutsche-Westindische Compagnie (also the Hanseatic consul in Veracruz), who received 11,095 pesos after von Gerolt had engaged in lengthy discussions with the Mexican authorities, many reclamations were rejected due to Mexico’s lack of money to pay for them.100 By 1838, Europeans had realised that their reclamations often went nowhere, and that the Mexican government was both incapable of and unwilling to pay what the Europeans demanded. The Pastry War had begun in November of 1838 due to Mexico’s failure to repay French nationals for the damages endured during unrest in Mexico City the previous months, and the failure of Mexico to pay off her debts to France.101 When France, through Louis-Antoine Deffaudis, gave Mexico an ultimatum to pay in August 1838, and Mexico refused, the French navy blockaded Mexican ports and captured both the port city of Veracruz as well as almost the entire Mexican navy.102 In order to prevent Mexican citizens from conducting trade illegally via Texan ports, France also sent naval ships to the Republic of Texas, and the Texan navy patrolled its own ports along the bay of Corpus Christi to prevent Mexican smugglers from transporting goods in and

102 Von Gerolt to PFM, August 21, 1838, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 474-477, and Copy of a letter authored by Deffaudis, April 15, 1838, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 1, Fasc. 2, Mexico Generalia, 7.
out of Mexico. The hostilities lasted several months, and Mexico continued to refuse to make concessions so long as its ports were blockaded by another power. The conflict eventually came to an end in March 1839, after a British-brokered agreement was made and Mexico repaid 600,000 pesos to the French baker situated in Mexico City who gave the Pastry War its name. Mexico also made the concession of eliminating the practice of forced bonds.

Though von Gerolt had expressed his support for intervention in letters preceding the Pastry War, the overall European reaction thereto was not exactly positive. Färber spoke to Syndic Karl Sieveking of the French blockade of Mexican ports as an unfortunate event for Hanseatic commerce. Färber criticised the blockade as being ineffective because France did not have a true hold on the ports. He reported of one U.S.-American vessel, the Anna Eliza, which had sailed from New York to Vera Cruz and had been able to enter the port unnoticed. Despite French efforts to deny the ship’s entry, their late realisation that a ship was entering the port prevented them from doing so. In response, Bazoche granted the vessel permission to unload cargo and leave. In addition to this mishap, Färber commented that most of Mexico’s ports had not been actively and effectively blocked by the French, which caused him to doubt whether “England and the other powers will recognise the blockade (…) in earlier instances, England acknowledged a blockade only if it was executed effectively and no possibility existed to enter such a blockaded port”. Even von Gerolt, favourable towards European intervention, had by 1838 changed his mind, arguing that a “hasty attack on behalf of France will have sad

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consequences for all foreign connections and interests in this country”. Färber also stated that a Hanseatic protest in Vera Cruz had been reported to him, and that the Hanseatic Senates could, if they deemed it best for Hanseatic interests, consider steps to resist this blockade. Eventually, France did face various reclamations in response to its intervention in Mexico: The *Diario del Gobierno* argued that Mexico should file reclamations against France because its vessels had been captured by the latter party. In the event that these vessels were not to be returned, Mexico should receive compensation for each ship. The Hanse Towns also desired a reclamation due to the insultation of their flag on behalf of French soldiers in Mexico.

The Pastry War constituted a very aggressive form of informal imperialism, likely marking the most direct episode thereof in Mexico since its independence. It is thus a useful and opportune point at which one can evaluate whether the relationship between Mexico and European countries became more imperial and inequitable in subsequent years, and whether Mexican authorities were more likely to make concessions to European diplomats and merchants.

Shortly after the Pastry War, the Mexican government passed new laws strictly regimenting foreign trade, an episode which put European influence after the show of military force to the test. Bahre reported on the increase in Mexican customs in 1840, lamenting that the existence of high duties on consumption of foreign goods damaged his business, and that he had only sold “a few hundred pieces of platillas”. Land-borne customs on foreign goods had risen

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107 E.F. Färber to Syndic Sieveking, May 5, 1838, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 1, Fasc. 2, Mexico Generalia. 2.
109 See: StA HH: Cl. VI no 16h, Vol. 3c, Fasc. 3: Hamburger Consulat Vera Cruz, Acta betreffend der Insultierung der Hamburgischen Consulatsflagge in Veracruz, 1-13.
110 This law had taken effect Nov. 26, 1839, see: Report of von Gerolt to PFM, December 16, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 311-316.
from 16 2/3 % to 50% of their maritime tariff, which had prevented Bahre from selling his goods further within the country. Re-exportation of goods likewise came at a loss, for Mexican harbours did not refund paid maritime tariffs. Bahre argued that both maritime as well as land-borne customs had to be announced with at least six months’ notice, for a failure to do so was akin to “placing Europeans into the largest disadvantages with frank deliberation”, and highlighted that the new tariff itself made note of the six-month timeframe in article 70.

According to Bahre, other merchants had complained of the deliberations which Mexican agencies applied regarding the new tariff. Several ships had sailed into Vera Cruz before the new tariff took effect, yet two weeks of bad weather delayed their unloading, causing the Mexican authorities to apply the new duties to the cargo despite the fact that arrival of the ship, not unloading of cargo, determined the proper tariff.111

The Mexican government thus continued to actively resist the influence of foreign powers through trade, perhaps even more harshly than before: Bahre wrote that the new land-borne duties on foreign goods were so discriminatory and the Mexican chambers of commerce so unyielding, that one could only speak of the Mexican governmental intention “to destroy foreign trade and consequently its influence in the internal affairs of this country”. Bahre feared that this aim could be realised, arguing that this law had already damaged foreign trade to the amount of one million dollars within just four months. 300,000 pesos of damages had been imposed upon German commerce alone, a number that Bahre believed would rise to 500,000 by autumn. In order to cover these financial losses, sales in Mexico would have to amount to 20 million pesos, Bahre argued, which, combined with the other risks that the German merchants faced in the country, mitigated the successes that German trade had accomplished in Mexico in the past six

years, particularly given that German commerce had already faced heavy losses through the plundering in 1828 and in the *Elberfelder Minen Compagnie*. Bahre identified the new tariffs as so problematic, empowering the Mexican government to easily manipulate foreign trade to their advantage, that he recommended that the European governments either fight this new regulation or end their relations with Mexico, encouraging their merchants to establish themselves elsewhere. English minister Pakenham had, according to Bahre, taken the same stance in the matter, and had encouraged his government to seek reclamation. The doing away with the new tariff should also be seen as imperative by France, Bahre suggested, for France’s last war and the resulting concession of the Mexican government in form of the elimination of forced bonds would essentially be useless if Mexico now hampered foreign trade through means of this tariff, which was “even worse”.\(^{112}\)

Interestingly, the new law was so unpopular that even Mexican voices expressed their disapproval for it. A Mexican newspaper had acknowledged that European reclamations in response to the impediments caused by the law would indeed be legitimate, for the six months’ notice outlined in article 70 had not been given to European merchants, which had caused a great disruption to trade and would lead, the author feared, to the complete halt of new European imports. The newspaper likewise pointed out that if France, “only propped on weak arguments”, had already blockaded Mexico’s harbours once before, forcing Mexico to pay 600,000 pesos in damages, then “we fear now that, propped on the *arancel* (the new tariff law) and plain reflections, that (the European powers) will demand everything which the Mexican authorities collected through the 10% increase, and possibly even the damages and disadvantages for the

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goods that were forced to rest in the ports”.\textsuperscript{113} Prussian observers pointed out that the Mexican chambers had been subject to “incessant complaints, grievances, and appeals of their own Mexican merchant class”, and that Mexican merchants themselves resisted the new law fiercely.\textsuperscript{114}

The discontent of even Mexican merchants, and the fact that their complaints fell on deaf ears within the Mexican government was sometimes explained by European diplomats as stemming from political corruption within a small Mexican political elite. A Prussian report communicated to the Prussian Royal Government that the many revolutions and ‘destructive’ civil wars in Mexico were largely the work of party members. This small group “pursued predominantly nothing but their own selfish purposes” whereas the “broad mass of the nation, together with the rich, propertied classes engaged in agriculture, industry, and commerce, have withdrawn as much as possible from all political affairs and into their private lives, leaving the field to those who view these revolutions for the purpose of their speculations and the attainment of military and civilian offices”.\textsuperscript{115} Disheartened, von Gerolt had already feared at the beginning of the Pastry War that a European intervention would destabilise the country further because “the largest part of those who will grab their weapons” to fight the French would “use such an opportunity for the realisation of their selfish goals”, which would “lead to the establishment of a general anarchy, in which the interests of foreigners will be the first victims”.\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{113} Excerpt from the newspaper \textit{Cosmopolita} on the increase of Mexican land-borne duties, April 28, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 189-191.
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\textsuperscript{116} Von Gerolt to PFM, August 21, 1838, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 474-477.
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political situation of the country, their doubts regarding military attacks, suggesting that the Pastry War did not benefit European imperialism in Mexico.

The Mexican government’s handling of the customs law controversy emphasises this conclusion. Despite protests, the customs law persisted in the coming months. Bahre contacted von Gerolt, desiring that the Prussian diplomat assist him in a reclamation matter related to the law. The inability of Bahre to move his goods into Mexico had forced him to buy them out of the customs house to avoid their forceable sale by the authorities, which had resulted in a considerable financial loss for him. Von Gerolt expressed his sympathies for Bahre, who had also filed another reclamation regarding confiscated weaponry, and lamented that the Mexican Minister of Finance had, as of late, rejected reclamations on behalf of all European merchants, including the French and British, with a “ruthlessness”. The minister had not given in to any demands until British diplomat Pakenham had made a show of force, claiming that he would take his passport and leave in the event that Mexico continued to refuse the British reclamations. The Mexican authorities relented, and made payments to the wronged subjects, though it appears that this concession was limited to Britons. This pressure by a European diplomat, Pakenham, on the Mexican government had been a unilateral decision: Pakenham had not had instructions from his government to pursue the strategy of threatening his departure if no reclamations were addressed, but he told von Gerolt that he was confident that the Britannic government would accept his justification. Von Gerolt surmised thereafter that Pakenham’s exit from Mexico would have led Britain to commence “a forceful intervention in the affairs of this country, which its commercial interests and the political situation of this country have long made desirable”.117

The Mexican government’s suspicion toward foreign trade are further highlighted in the same letter. Von Gerolt argued that both the Mexican Congress and the government had “hostile attitudes toward foreign trade and foreign connections”, which they had “displayed too obviously” to receive the same consideration and patience that the European powers had thus far applied towards Mexico. Moreover, though Pakenham’s threat of leaving the country had led to the Mexican government’s acknowledgement and payment of several English reclamations, von Gerolt surmised that this British show of force had probably only “increased the acrimony toward the diplomatic relations of Mexico with foreign countries”, suggesting that European agents’ efforts to use their countries’ political and economic dominance to arm-twist Mexican authorities into concessions had a negative impact on Europe’s connections to Mexico in the long run.\(^ {118}\) In another letter from 1841, von Gerolt wrote in a trading report that “the main object of my recent reports to your Excellency this past year” had been reclamations and diplomatic discussions on behalf of European representatives with the Mexican governments on “the subject on the interests and security of foreign trade”. These had been elicited by the “ruinous influence of the local trading policies”, which von Gerolt described as “hostile” and as “imposing all state expenses and duties on foreign trade”. So shortly after the Pastry War, von Gerolt noted that “England seems, under the current circumstances, excellently appointed to take the necessary steps to protect its local trade”, and argued that “the results, which England must achieve for the security of its local trading interests, are in the interest of all nations”.\(^ {119}\) The Pastry War thus rewarded the European powers with only meagre results, for the Mexican government’s attitude toward foreign trade had not changed, or potentially worsened, after this


intervention in Mexico’s internal affairs. Even as late as November 1844, Hanseatic merchants still reported to their government that there existed in Mexico “a distrust and a hostile atmosphere toward everything which is foreign” which “necessarily led to difficulties and claims of all kinds”. In 1844, just 5 years after the conclusion of the Pastry War, Deffaudis’ successor, Alleye de Cyprey, was so at odds with the Mexican government that he submitted to the French foreign ministry a plan to install a monarchy in Mexico under a French prince. These anecdotes suggest that even overt informal-imperialist acts were largely unsuccessful in Mexico, hence stymying the European agents, merchants, and states further.

The political, economic, and territorial instability extant in 1830s-40s Mexico caused European diplomats and merchants to find themselves in a quandary. On one hand, they acted as imperial agents in the periphery, largely without incentive or instruction from the centre, by resisting and complaining about Mexican duties, tariffs, and laws impacting the systems of finance and taxing, exposing Mexico to international pressures due to reclamations and other legal and diplomatic furores. To a certain extent, Mexican authorities were receptive to such European demands: the Mexican state had very little industry of its own and was thus dependent upon manufactured goods from abroad. It also desired official recognition as a nation on equal international footing with Britain, France, and the other European states. On the other hand, European influence, up to the outright use of force such as during the Pastry War, bore only little fruit. To a certain extent, this was due to Mexico’s instability: the country was in a continuous and dire need of money, faced with political corruption, constantly preoccupied with quelling rebellions and insurgencies, with no financial means to curb robberies and raids, and lacking

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120 Petition from Hanseatic Merchants to the Hanseatic Senates for the appointment of a new Hanseatic consul in Mexico, November 1, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16h, Vol. 3c, Fasc. 2: Hamburger Consulat Vera Cruz, 1.
both the manpower and the money to arrest contraband trade. Mexico was often simply not able to recognise European reclamations, such as those related to the new customs in 1840, because the money obtained through such regulations had already been spent by the time Europeans sought legal redress. Mexico’s difficult situation and the resulting impotence of European diplomatic and commercial pressures found note in a Prussian report, which encouraged European merchants to recognise that the 1836 policy of forced bonds – this “extortion” – had been implemented largely in order to enable Mexico to defend itself against threats and improve the security of property, particularly in its capital city.\textsuperscript{122}

Von Gerolt commented in December of 1840, more than a year after the custom law’s passage, that Congress had considered a modification or erasure thereof, but had ultimately decided to hold on to the law as it was. The reasons for this, von Gerolt noted, could all be attributed to Mexico’s debility: the country faced “great financial difficulties”, its civilian and military personnel was in “a sad state”, and the Mexican judicial system, also in charge of handling European reclamations and legal concerns, was “badly administrated” because its officials were not getting paid due to the lack of funds. All of these dire aspects had been brought up by proponents of the law in Congressional debates, and this, combined with the lack of initiative on behalf of Mexican politicians to draft up alternative laws based on e.g. an increase in maritime tariffs, had caused Congress to reject changing the law. Von Gerolt acknowledged Mexico’s dire financial situation, but also expressed his unwillingness to accept the damages that the law was imposing on the Prussian subjects, particularly merchants, in the country.\textsuperscript{123}

Though European merchants and diplomats recognised that Mexico’s internal problems prevented it from paying its European debts and reclamations, shrouding the country from the full brunt of European commercial and diplomatic influence, the fact that Mexico’s instability gave it protection from pervasive European imperialism was also deliberately used by Mexican officials. Von Gerolt highlighted this in a letter to his government dated October 1840, where he noted that he had approached Mexican official Ortiz Monasterio after Prussian reclamations had stalled. Though von Gerolt threatened that the Mexican government’s delay on reclamations, particularly after the spectacular incident of Pakenham’s promise to leave the country and Mexico’s subsequent acquiescence to some English demands, suggested to European governments that Mexico would only yield to those reclamations which were attained by force, Ortiz Monasterio merely attributed the delay to the Minister of Finance and his huge workload, which had prevented him from responding to von Gerolt’s reclamations. Von Gerolt further lamented that the Mexican government had not even taken steps to seek out and punish the murderers of several Germans named Tervooren, Otto, and Kraemer, and reported to his government that he had reminded Ortiz Monasterio of this matter yet again because of Mexican inaction.124 In January 1841, he approached the Mexican official again, impatient since the matter had still not been addressed.125

The futility of reclamations was also emphasised by Bahre. A merchant himself and hence deeply concerned with his best financial interest, he wrote a letter to the Prussian government advising it that he and various consuls in Mexico had written and signed an initiative

124 The only somewhat positive note on the murder of Tervooren, a man whose local friends did not even wish to pay for his funeral, was that a priest who had received some of his belongings had promised to say 15 prayers for the soul of the murdered. Report of von Gerolt to PFM, October 25, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 293-298.
concerning foreign policy in Mexico. Within it, the representatives stated that they preferred not
to seek legal recourse in the form of a reclamation in response to a trade embargo that had taken
place during an insurgency, because reclamations were costly, often impacted the relationship
between Mexico and foreign countries negatively, and were, frequently, ultimately fruitless. He
told the Prussian government that he could not understand why von Gerolt did not seek to pursue
the same policy-line as the other Prussian officials, particularly given that English representative
Pakenham had already approached the Mexican government and received a verbal guarantee that
the new government would strive to curb abuses such as those which occurred during the
embargo.\textsuperscript{126}

Though von Gerolt had not joined the course proposed by other German consuls and
merchants like Bahre in this instance, there were other times when von Gerolt likewise
discouraged reclamations because he deemed them pointless. In 1840, von Gerolt received a
reclamation raised by the merchant house Knecht and Stamm of Iserlohn, which desired
compensation in response to the confiscation of its weapons five years prior. Von Gerolt
received notice of this reclamation effort from Bahre, but reported to his government that he had
told the merchant that he would regrettably not be able to assist in this matter, for the incident
had already occurred several years earlier, making it difficult for the Mexican government to find
and hold accountable those individuals responsible for this injustice.\textsuperscript{127} In another instance, von
Gerolt stated that he would pursue a reclamation regarding the personal injury that had been
inflicted upon Prussian subject and merchant Stahlknecht in Durango, but was overall
pessimistic about its outcome, for he noted that “all foreign reclamations to this government,

\textsuperscript{126} Extract from a letter by Teodoro Bahre, September 12, 1839, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol.
XI, l. 98-101.
which are not supported by vessels of war, are very difficult to push through”.128 A report of the Prussian consulate in Mazatlan from 1844 outlined, much as similar reports from other Prussian agents in Mexico from that year, that the Mexican market was not very profitable at that time, and that all promises of European action to improve European merchants’ conditions and opportunities in Mexico had had a disappointing, even the opposite, effect: Mexico continued to enforce prohibitions and trading restrictions throughout the 1840s.129

What the case of Mexico shows is that informal imperialist strategies cannot work adequately in a state that is too weak. Though the relationship between a weaker and stronger state – one that is peripheral and one that is a centre-state – is required to perpetrate informal imperialism, such as through free-trade imperialism, too much instability and weakness hinders the establishment of this influence, for the weaker state is not as economically lucrative: Merchants lose their investments; reclamations face dead ends because of frequent changes in government or the presence of several governments, all vying for supremacy and capable of attributing damages at the root of reclamation efforts to their opponents; murderers of merchants and diplomats go unpunished for the government lacks the resources to pursue the perpetrators of such crimes; and restrictive trading barriers raised by the government in a frantic attempt to acquire money or curb debilitating and destabilising factors such as the contraband trade limit merchants’ profits. In Mexico, all of these aspects of weakness existed. More stability in Mexico was seen as a crucial element to furthering European influence and wealth by European agents. In one report, Prussian officials hoped for a more stable Mexican government in the future not

because this would make Mexico capable of augmenting its own industry, but because it would enable it to produce more mineral wealth – of which this country, the report coveted, had an “immeasurable” amount – which could be exported to Europe via its merchants. In another incident, von Gerolt quoted to his government the thoughts of a Mexican gentleman, well-educated, with prior political experience in Mexico, and a member of one of the country’s richer families, who had the idea that a foreign prince be installed in Mexico to bring stability to the debile state:

If we continue like we have, then the moment won’t be far away in which the other nations, tired of the scandal which we perform and our inability to rid ourselves of it, will seek to eliminate these evils through an intervention in our affairs, in the interests of humanity and civilisation. But how much more dignified and patriotic would it be if our nation, in the event that she decide in favour of a monarchy, chose its own monarch, as opposed to having him imposed by the foreign powers…

Von Gerolt was impressed by this statement, writing that he believed it to be of the greatest importance that this production of a Mexican, whose patriotism, nobility, and selflessness cannot be denied by all those who know him personally and know his character as a statesman, be made popular and known in Europe in order to attract the attentions of the cabinets toward the ever-growing necessity of a pacification of these states who are of such an importance to the industrial states of Europe and so richly blessed by nature…

This statement showcases that European diplomats did not believe that their countries could fully reap the advantages of trans-Atlantic trade if Mexico were not stable. Economic interests, and hence any free-trade imperialist motivations, were thus tied to a certain level of political stability. This analysis adds another layer to the findings of Heath, who writes that “British interests and capital sought to profit from (Mexico’s) financial crisis. But the consequences were

fatal to Mexico’s political stability and its economic growth”. European commerce likewise suffered under Mexico’s instability rather than solely taking advantage of it, and European officials were not in favour of their respective merchants’ engagement in destabilising practices, such as the contraband trade.

What also becomes evident about the European presence in Mexico is that, despite the existence of ferocious economic competition among the French, British, and Germans, many of the efforts to pressure Mexico into concessions were implemented in European unison. European agents in Mexico were aware of the reclamations of the other foreign powers, and in their resistance to the forced bonds of 1836 or the increased tariffs of 1839, European states often acted in the capacity of an interest group, combining and linking their respective interests together into one block of European commercial interests. Additionally, an analysis of the German correspondence on Mexico showcases the status and ‘imperial rank’ of the various European states involved in Mexico. Whereas Britain was the century’s hegemonic power and pioneer in Spanish-American trade through its early recognition of Spanish-American countries and its pursuit of its own individual political course rather than the Holy Alliance’s, the German states were to a certain extent semi-peripheral states when compared with England or France. Dreading their economic downfall under the onslaught of British commerce in continental Europe, the German Bund looked overseas and engaged in trade with Spanish-America, though political obligations, dominated by Prussia’s to the Holy Alliance and policy of legitimacy, complicated the German policy in Mexico comparatively to the British. The political straitjacket that Germany was in, combined with its desire not to slip into economic insignificance and dependence on England, gave it less political power in its negotiations with Mexico, as well as

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fewer possibilities for legal redress or the establishment of any sort of imperial pressure. As a result, the Prussian and Hanseatic policies in Mexico emphasised the support of English or French imperialist strategies in the form of the Pastry War, threatened future interventions, diplomatic ultimatums such as Pakenham’s proposed leave, et cetera, without engaging in any overt or aggressive actions themselves.

This support on behalf of European powers for another European power’s imperialism, which seems on first glance to be a paradox in an age of economic competition and free-trade imperialism, has also been mentioned by David Todd in “A French Imperial Meridian”, where he highlights that France was at times an agent of the British Empire in order to promote French imperialism: Todd points out that the French empire in the mid-nineteenth century was dominated by cooperation with the British as opposed to measures against them. This included informal yet coercive measures, such as the prevention of Argentina’s annexation of Uruguay in 1845-47 or the Second Opium War of 1856-60 that opened China further. In these joint missions, France and Britain were able to showcase their influence and prestige not merely by naval or military, or even commercial and economic means. Rather, they were also able to stress their role as the world’s civilised, just, and orderly authorities. Though France was arguably the junior partner in this alliance with Britain, it profited from this union because combined Franco-British strength was able to maintain favourable trading connections and conditions around the globe for both the French and British parties involved. Even when Britain drew the lion’s share of this benefit, France still found herself in the advantageous position of asserting herself vis-vis non-European power, and other European empires, such as Russia.

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134 Todd, 163.
The example of German states’ actions in Mexico point to the same strategy: as opposed to locking horns with both the politically, economically, and militarily stronger British as well as Europe’s new-old order dictated by the Holy Alliance, the German states supported British or French imperial action, in hopes that they would reap some benefits. If the British or French were to force Mexico to revoke a law restricting commerce, this would also benefit the German economy by achieving something that the German states themselves could not have done: wrestling Mexico into concessions. Von Gerolt emphasised this in a report to his government, arguing that intervention on behalf of larger imperial powers, such as England, “needed also the participation of the other Great Powers with vested interest (in trade in Mexico), as a moral support in order to carry out in an expedient fashion any sort of demonstration in favour of its commercial interests”. Europeans, though commercial competitors, stood to profit from presenting their economic interests as a united front and pursuing imperial interventions in the same manner. The failure of the Pastry War von Gerolt attributed to the lack of unison, stating that “France, which has exactly the same interest in the matter (of Mexico) has already made the painful experience that the isolated position of a power in a conflict with this republic comes with great difficulties”.135

These circumstances also existed on a national level in Germany. The Hanseates, though resistant to the Customs Union, did often rely on Prussian diplomats in Mexico, most noteworthy von Gerolt. One entire acta in the Hamburg State Archive is dedicated to documents that acknowledge the merit of von Gerolt, who assisted Hanseatic trade through his intermediation and representation of Hanseatic interests in Mexico during a time when Hanseatic-Mexican diplomacy faced several difficulties: Between 1842 and 1845, the Hanseates

did not have a consul in Mexico, and Consul Wilhelm Lobach appointed to Tabasco in 1839 did not get the *Exequatur* and recognition of the Mexican government in 1840.\textsuperscript{136} As a result of their lack of political power as individual entities, the Hanse Towns and other German states increasingly presented themselves as a consolidated front in trans-Atlantic trade, which will be the partial subject of chapter five.

As the above analysis of correspondence of European diplomats and merchants in Mexico shows, Europeans did seek to establish an informal imperialist influence – the ambitions and desires existed. For the most part, this occurred on the level of diplomats and merchants located in Mexico as opposed to the power centres in London, Paris, or Berlin. European power presented itself through the flooding of Mexican markets, the perpetration of contraband trade, attempts to steer Mexican political decisions through the use of diplomatic influence, and the accruing of wealth, particularly metal wealth, in the hands of European merchants and the outflow of silver to Europe. Though the desire existed, establishing or cementing this influence in Mexico was not easy – in fact, Europeans largely failed due to the instability of Mexico economically, financially, and politically. Paradoxically, though a weaker state is needed in order to create a free-trade imperialist relationship between the centre and the periphery, Mexico during the 1830s and 1840s was too weak to enable Europeans to properly dominate it, for mercantile risks remained large at a time when raids, plundering, murders, and insurgencies were common and the Mexican government unable to stop them. Böttcher, citing Bernecker and Ferns, writes that it was the periphery – in this case, Mexico – which determined how deep the

\textsuperscript{136} Petition from Hanseatic Merchants to the Hanseatic Senates for the appointment of a new Hanseatic consul in Mexico, November 1, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16h, Vol. 3c, Fasc. 2: Hamburger Consulat Vera Cruz, 1, Hanseatic Merchants’ Petition for Diplomatic Representation to the Hanseatic Senates, February 1845, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 3a, Fasc. 4, Hamburger Consulat zu Mexico, 1, and Cl. VI, no 16h, Vol. 3e, Fasc. 1, Hamburger Consulat Tabasco: Mexico, Errichtung eines Hamburger Consulats zu Tabasco, which showcases the rejection of Wilhelm Lobach’s *exequatur* by the Mexican Government, 1-6. See in particular: Extractus Protocollis Senatus Hamburgensis, April 22, 1840, November 11, 1840, and December 11, 1840, 1.
impact of European informal empire was. Measures to force the country to concede to
European reclamations did not constitute stabilising factors, either: too dire was the need for
money on behalf of the Mexican government, and so consequently debilitating were payments
made to Europeans; payments that Mexican military, governmental, and civilian personnel were
waiting on; payments that were needed to muster up the resources to better guarantee the safety
of commerce in Mexico.

Though the Mexican government did not have much control over a lot of the factors that
debilitated European powers, it did at times use its weakness to its advantage by stalling
reclamations, advising Europeans to seek redress from one of the insurgent – and by that time,
often inexistent – regimes in the various regions where insurgencies occurred, or replacing one
restrictive measure with another. Even the Pastry War, an aggressive and overt imperial act, bore
far fewer fruit than France and the other European powers had hoped. Moreover, such direct
forms of imposing European political and economic influence onto Mexico often only aided in
rallying the divided and torn country together against the one common enemy that many
Mexicans could agree upon: foreign powers, and especially, foreign trade. Mexico, though
European states sought to establish an imperial influence there, could not be thoroughly
embedded in Europe’s commercial-imperial web, because the country’s weakness paradoxically
gave it the power to resist such European efforts. All the more interesting was thus the
independence of the Republic of Texas. The next chapter will analyse Texas’ deemed suitability
for European informal imperialism, particularly in comparison to the story this chapter has
established for Mexico – would Europeans have better luck in Texas?

137 Böttcher, 218.
Chapter Two – The Best Part of Mexico: The Agents of, Ambitions for, and Impact of Informal Imperialism in Texas prior to the Anglo-French Mediation of 1844

As the last chapter has shown, European informal imperialist designs were not very successful in Mexico of the 1830s and 1840s. How then, did Europeans react to the revolution and subsequent independence of Texas in 1835-1836? Though immediate recognition of the new state did not occur, interest in Texas was palpable from the moment that news of this young republic on the North American continent reached European observers. The following chapter will seek to analyse the imperialist (i.e. the economic, political, and social) ambitions that influenced European actors, from diplomats in both the periphery and the centre to non-state actors such as the noblemen of the Adelsverein, from Britain, the political pioneer in post-independence Spanish-American affairs, to Holy Alliance member Prussia. The interests of Europeans in Texas will also be evaluated in light of their interests in Mexico and the rising influence and imperialism of the United States. Given that British and French interests in Texas have already been subject to significant scholarship, this chapter will focus on the interests of German states related to Texas.

This chapter will showcase that Texas was attractive to Europeans because it, much like Spanish America before it, provided Europeans with a new, though initially small, market. Whereas Mexico had restrictive trading policies, Europeans hoped that Texas, politically and financially frail, would impose fewer limits on its foreign trade. A parallel can thus be drawn between German, British, and French economic interest in the independence of Spanish America from Spain and the same economic interest that existed in the independence of Texas from Mexico. Moreover, Texas was cultivating a cotton-growing culture that suited European
economies better in an independent Texas as opposed to a Texas under Mexican authority, for Mexico’s protection of its cotton industry prevented the establishment of the exchange of peripheral raw material and core manufactured goods between Europe and Mexico deemed desirable by European states. This chapter will also analyse emigration to Texas through the lens of informal imperialism. Overall, the chapter argues that European informal imperialist designs seemed more promising in Texas than in Mexico because cotton constituted Texas’ primary export, the country had fewer trading barriers, was – despite its political weakness – less politically volatile and unstable than Mexico, and provided Europeans, due to its comparatively small population, with an outlet for migrants who could potentially sway the country’s ethnic and cultural affiliation towards their respective country or ethnicity and help build a market loyal to European goods. These designs were moreover perpetrated predominantly by peripheral agents, as they were in Mexico. This current of European political and commercial interest dovetailed but also conflicted with the rise of another imperial power in North America, the United States. Texas independence increased imperial conflicts between primarily Britain and the United States, for an annexation of Texas to the latter country stood to drastically change the fluid imperial landscape of the continent.

**The Texas Revolution, Texas Independence, and European Reluctance**

When Texas declared its independence in 1836, European states did not immediately engage in foreign relations with the new republic, despite the fact that Santa Anna had signed the Treaties of Velasco and the United States had rejected the young state’s annexation to the Union. Europe’s reticence stemmed from several factors, including the possibility that Texas could quickly be re-annexed by Mexico or fall to the United States, the treaties with Mexico and U.S. Congress’ stance on the matter notwithstanding; as well as the political conservatism of the Holy
Alliance, which had also delayed European recognition of Spanish America; and the fear that an
early recognition of Texas could damage one’s interests in and relations with Mexico, giving
other European states the opportunity to gain economic ground in a country where cutthroat
competition with the intent of not merely besting, but displacing one’s competitors, already
existed. Moreover, slavery posed a large problem, and given that many Texans were slave
owners, extending recognition to Texas was regarded by European politicians as risky if that
republic decided to reinvigorate the slave trade in the Gulf of Mexico. 138

The fear of locking horns with Mexico in the Texas matter was one of the most dominant
reasons for not recognising Texas right away. If European states were to recognise Texas, this
would surely affront Mexico, and given both the intense competition among Europeans in that
country and the hostility towards the pervasiveness of foreign commerce on behalf of Mexican
statesmen, the European states had to be careful not to lose valuable commercial connections
there through a hasty recognition of a new republic.

The consideration of not acknowledging Texas in order to prevent insulting Mexico was
particularly predominant among the German states. The Hanse Towns were approached in 1841
by Texian representative J. Hamilton, who desired to forge a treaty of commerce and amity
between the Hansa and his country. 139 Even at this late stage, the Senate of Hamburg protocolled
that “the independence of Texas is not yet totally assured, given that Mexico has not given up its

138 For British examples, see J.L. Worley, “The Diplomatic Relations of England and the Republic of Texas”, The
Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, Vol. 9, No. 1 (July 1905), 2, Ephraim D. Adams, British
Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1910), passim, and Lelia M. Roeckell,
2 (Summer 1999), 257-278.
For the Hanse Towns, see Christian Friedrich Wurm to Syndic Karl Sieveking, July 5, 1841, City and State
Archive/Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Bremen (StA HB): Acta C26: Texas. Slavery will not be discussed
in depth in this chapter, for it is the main topic of chapter three.
139 J. Hamilton to Sieveking, June 28, 1941, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16 m, Vol I., Texas, Acta betr. eine Convention mit
der Republik Texas, angetragen von dem Texanischen Envoys extraor. in London, General Hamilton, nebst Hrn
claims (to the territory)”, causing it to conclude that its representatives, though permitted to receive and correspond with Texian official William Henry Daingerfield, ought not to hurry the negotiations or completion of a treaty. The Senate also feared the possible annexation of Texas to the United States, giving it another reason for its hesitation. Nevertheless, the matter was forwarded to Hamburg’s Deputatis Commercii by Syndic Sieveking, who came to a similar conclusion and viewed Texian independence as very meagrely secured. Moreover, Sieveking emphasised that Hamburg’s trade to Texas would and did not stand in any comparison with that to Mexico, which was deemed more important to Hamburgian interests. Though Hamburg’s officials ultimately decided that their city state’s commercial interests in Mexico would not be damaged by an accession to Bremian negotiations with Texas, the fact that Hamburgian officials had these conversations shows that recognition of Texas hinged for Europeans on their interests in Mexico.

Additionally, a Hanseatic politician shared the concerns regarding Mexican commerce, writing to Syndic Sieveking that the Senate had expressed apprehension on “whether the commercial relations to Mexico would be impacted through negotiations with a state that has been torn from this state (Mexico) and is viewed by it as a province in the state of insurgency.” Mexico, so the official noted, “could possibly find” in such a negotiation with Texas “an expression of a hostile disposition toward Mexico”. Hanseatic Ministerresident Vincent Rumpff responded to the concerns primarily emanating from the governments of Hamburg and Lübeck by stalling, to a certain degree, the completion of a treaty of amity and commerce with

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141 Syndic Sieveking to the Commerce Deputation of Hamburg, March 6, 1844, Sta HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 6.

142 Unknown, more than likely from affiliated with the Senate of Hamburg, to Syndic Sieveking, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 12.
Texas by encouraging Daingerfield to visit the Hanse Towns personally, where the treaty would be finished.\textsuperscript{143} The Hanse Towns were thus reluctant to award foreign recognition to Texas, and the prospect of poor relations with Mexico in response to negotiations with Texas was one of the primary reasons for this hesitation. Souring relations between one European state and Mexico could have given other European merchants an advantage. Especially if Texas ended up being re-annexed by Mexico, taking such a risk by recognising Texas as an independent entity would have been in vain and awarded no benefit to the recognising entity – in fact, the only outcome of this decision would have been a disadvantage in relations to Mexico, and in the case of Britain and France, a further blow to the informal imperialist schemes employed in Mexico, already incapable of prevailing over the politically volatile and hence somewhat impenetrable country.

The thought processes, fears, and consideration outlined above and prevalent for German observers were similar to those of British and French statesmen. Adams pointed to this in his edited volume of British correspondence on Texas, noting that J. T. Crawford’s letters to Richard Pakenham on the subject of Texas were formulated very carefully, whereas Texian newspapers of the time surmised that Crawford’s 1937 mission to Texas had the goal of investigating “the civil and political condition of the country and [reporting] to the British government”. Crawford, on the other hand, stressed to General Houston that his “visit was wholly one of a Consular nature to collect satisfactory information respecting the Commerce of the ports to the Northward of the District of Tampico”, highlighting a British reluctance to demonstrate overt interest in the Republic of Texas.\textsuperscript{144} This emphasis had been a measure to prevent rumours regarding English recognition, which, if they had reached Mexico, could have been disadvantageous to commercial

\textsuperscript{143} Vincent Rumpff to Syndic Sieveking, March 13, 1844, Sta HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 39/3 ad. 15.
\textsuperscript{144} See J. T. Crawford to Richard Pakenham, May 26, 1837, and footnote 3 in Correspondence from the British Archives concerning Texas, 1837-1846 (CBA), ed. Ephraim D. Adams (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1917), 9.
and diplomatic relations between England and that country. The same dynamic can also be identified in Saligny’s arrival in Texas in late 1838.\textsuperscript{145}

As early as 1836, British Parliament had concerns about the developments in Texas. Since Adams outlined the initial House of Commons meetings on the matter from June and August 1836 in his in-depth study on British interests in Texas, they will only briefly be discussed here. Concerns regarding the independence of Texas were brought forth in particular by Barlow Hoy and Henry George Ward and can be summarised to fall into two broad fields: slavery – indeed, the topic of the debate dated August 5, 1836, was that of slavery in Texas – and British commercial interests.\textsuperscript{146} In both matters, discussions were marked by an emerging British-U.S. rivalry.\textsuperscript{147} An independent Texas was not a possible outcome of the Texas Question, the statesmen believed: either Texas would be incorporated into the United States or be

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\textsuperscript{145} Saligny wrote to his government that “just as it has been easy to foresee, my arrival has quickly given rise to a plethora of rumours. One is already saying here that France has formally recognised the independence of Texas, and that a minister of such power has arrived. I understood it as necessary that I, without delay, shatter such rumours, and from the beginning of my conversations with several people that I have seen, I have made it my mission to establish my position and to make it understood that I had come to Texas with no official character, without any mission from my government, and that I had simply been sent, with the authorisation of Your Excellency, by the head of the Legislation of the King in Washington, to study the country and address a report to my government regarding its situation”. See: Alphonse Dubois Saligny to Comte Molé, February 20, 1839, The French Foreign Ministry Archives/Archives des Affaires Étrangères (AAE): Texas, Vol. 1, 249.

\textsuperscript{146} Henry George Ward had interests in Mexico that predated the Texian Revolution: He had been British chargé d’affaires in Mexico between 1825 and 1827. Historian Elmer W. Flaccus identifies that Ward had been instructed to negotiate a favourable treaty of amity and commerce with Mexico, and on his own initiative, he also sought to curb U.S. influence in Mexico. Due to the latter objective, he had an intense rivalry with U.S. minister Joel R. Poinsett. As early as the 1820s, he was jealous of U.S. colonisation of Texas, fearing for British interests. Ward had also authored a book on Mexico which significantly influenced how British statesmen viewed Mexico and British interests in that country. As another sign of informal-imperialist influence by a peripheral agent, Ward also poisoned the relationship between Mexico’s president Victoria and Stephen F. Austin any chance he got, and once even prevented a meeting between both men. See: Elmer W. Flaccus, “The Secret Adversary: Henry George Ward and Texas, 1825-1827”, East Texas Historical Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1, Article 5, 5-15.

reconquered by Mexico. Given the belief that Texas was imperative to British interests, Ward pushed Parliament to take action on behalf of Mexico, if need be through naval and monetary support. Adams regarded the two 1836 House of Commons debates as a clear sign that some Britons desired official British interference in Texas, though he also pointed out that Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount and Lord Palmerston (1830-1834, 1835-1841) did not consider it necessary to take such steps at that time, partially because he hoped Mexico could be able to reconquer Texas. Palmerston also dismissed claims of undue U.S.-American governmental support for the Texas rebels, though he did not reject Ward’s claim that U.S.-American citizens had provided aid to the revolution to ultimately get ahold of the fertile Texian lands. Overall, Ward emphasised that a U.S. acquisition of Texas would lastingly and

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148 Though this is outlined by Adams, *British Interests*, 16-17, a deeper level of detail of Hoy’s and Ward’s views is given here: both men considered the incorporation of Texas into the United States a near inevitability should the province not be reconquered by Mexico. They feared “the consequence if the United States should be suffered to wrest the Texas from Mexico, and to take possession of it”, dreading that “Cuba and the other Spanish possessions in the gulf of Mexico” would “soon fall a prey to the United States” in such event, showcasing British fears of the United States as an emerging imperial rival. Barlow Hoy saw for the future of Texas only two likely outcomes, that “Texas should remain a province of Mexico, or should revolt and become a portion of the United States”, implicitly rejecting the idea of a sustained Texian independence. “It was evident that”, the Parliamentary script read, “the independence of Texas once established, that province would soon be added to the federal union of North America”. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.

149 Hoy encouraged the House to consider providing British assistance to Mexico, for “unless Mexico was assisted, as she ought to be by this country, she would be so weakened as soon to become an easy victim to the ambition of the United States of America”. Britain “ought to afford every species of assistance to Mexico, not only by remonstrating in an amicable manner with the United States, but by sending out a naval force to assist Mexico against Texas, and to prevent aggression by the United States”. Though Mexico was not a country that had successfully been subjected to British informal imperialism, British Parliament nevertheless regarded an independent Texas, virtually guaranteed to fall to the United States, as a threat to their imperial-commercial interests not merely in the Americas, but globally. In order to defend these interests, Hoy thus suggested an overt intervention of Britain on behalf of Mexico in this matter. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.

150 Adams, *British interests*, 16-17. See also the meeting of August 5, 1836: Palmerston argued that “the advantage of numerical superiority was at present possessed in a very considerable degree by the arms of Mexico; and by the latest accounts that had been received, it appeared, that the Government of that country were making great efforts to increase and equip their army”. Palmerston’s optimism was not shared by all Europeans, however: Armand Saillard, French consul at New Orleans, had already surmised in 1835 that Mexico would be unable to keep Texas, given that it was preoccupied with its other internal dissension and possessed neither money nor manpower to crush any rebellion in Texas. See: Armand Saillard to Henri Gauthier, Comte de Rigny, April 12, 1835, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 21-22. Nevertheless, European responses to the Texas Rebellion were initially mainly those of reluctance.

151 Ward noted that “Hon. Members might, perhaps, not be aware of the importance and value of such an acquisition. That territory contained upwards of 120,000,000 of acres of the finest land: it was watered by several
cripplingly hamper British trade in the Americas, a view that other parliamentary members reiterated in 1837.¹⁵²

British political discussions in 1836 emphasised aiding Mexico and protecting British trade there. Despite shortcomings of British informal-imperialist designs in Mexico, the country’s placement within greater commercial currents and imperial contestations in North America, primarily between Britain and the United States and involving also other European states, such as the German states of France, incentivised a British support for a Mexican Texas rather than one that was independent. British bondholders’ interest in Mexican lands formed navigable rivers, having their embouchures in the gulf of Mexico; and on its coast were to be found many harbours, superior to all others in the adjoining territories, and the possession of which would give them a complete command of that gulf”. Ward believed it essential to British interests that U.S. imperialist ambitions be curbed: “Ever since the erection of Mexico into an independent republic, the United States had cast most covetous eyes upon the province of Texas”, the parliamentary paper read, and had employed in their endeavour to gain ownership of this territory the questionable means of encouraging “all the refuse of their population to overflow the boundary line between the United States and the Texas, and to take possession of the lands of the latter”, after efforts to pay Mexico for Texas had failed. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.

Ward questioned “whether it were advisable to allow the United States to pursue a system of aggrandisement without any endeavour on our part to check them”, for such U.S. expansionism would “allow the extension of their territory to the Rio Bravo and the Gulf of Mexico, in such a manner as to obtain for them the absolute command of that Gulf; for certainly the acquisition of Texas would give them that command, and would enable them with half a dozen privateers to shut us out entirely from our present trade with Mexico, leaving us no route whatsoever by which to maintain a commercial intercourse with that country save that leading round Cape Horn to its western coast. Upon the importance of that trade, not only in reference to its present actual amount, but in reference also to the large probable increase which it would undergo, it was unnecessary for him [Ward] to dwell, it was growing more extensive every day; nor could he see any definite limit to its increase in future years. Our connection with Mexico was rendered, too, more intimate by this circumstance, that we possessed a large capital invested in mining adventures in that country. It was impossible, then, to contemplate without anxiety, events having a tendency, apparently, to sever from the Mexican State a most valuable portion of its territory, and to place our trade with that state at the mercy of a commercial rival”. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836. This summary of Ward’s statement to Parliament reveals much about how Britons perceived commerce and imperialism in the southern half of North America. Not only were France and the German states commercial rivals, as the previous chapter has shown in the case for Mexico, but the United States emerged also as an increasingly greater threat to British commerce and imperialism. In 1837, member of British Parliament William Molesworth also feared that the entanglement of U.S. citizens, as had been the case in Texas, could hold implications for Britain’s possession of Canada, highlighting emphatically the importance of Texas to relations of power and empire in North America. See: “Affairs of Canada”, House of Commons Sitting of Monday, March 6, 1837, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 36, 1280-1364, cc. 1287-1362. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlippines-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0036p0-0023?accountid=7121, and “Affairs of Canada – Adjournment of the House”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, December 22, 1837, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 39, 1426-1508, cc. 1428-1507. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlippines-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0039p0-0026?accountid=7121.
another crucial aspect of British policy in the Texas Question, and highlights that Britain was initially most concerned with its mercantile interests in Mexico rather than any sort of advantages to be gained from Texian independence. Ward stated that British merchants “had embarked 70,000,000 dollars in the Mexican dominions” and saw their investments in Mexico threatened through Texian independence. Adams and Kossok also pointed to the interests of British bondholders: Kossok wrote that England held liens of 45,000,000 acres of land in Texas, a security for the significant bonds of Britons in Mexico. Adams cited Mr. Robinson, chairman of the British committee for Spanish-American bondholders, who “recited that by an act of Mexico in 1837 it had been provided that security for that portion of the Mexican debt called ‘deferred stock’ should be offered to the English bondholders in the shape of one hundred million acres”, of which twenty-five million acres should be located, as desired by the bondholders, in the territories of Texas. Previously, an individual named Gordon had voiced a similar plan.

Though Prussian subjects did not have significant bondholders with interest in Texian lands, the broad British concerns regarding the Texian Question were shared by Prussian observers, who likewise saw the United States as an emerging commercial rival in Mexico and as a growing imperial power in the Americas. The early Prussian correspondence on the Texas Question is interesting, because it showcases an early European perspective on Texas. Adams asserted that “in the years 1837 and 1838 very little interest was attached by [British] diplomats to the situation in Texas”, and that agents in Mexico were only sent one instruction referring to Texas by Palmerston. Adams moreover noted that English statesmen were more concerned with

153 “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.  
155 Adams, British Interests, 27, 51.
French interference in Mexico during this timeframe as opposed to developments in Texas, and didn’t connect British affairs in Mexico to Texas until 1838.\textsuperscript{156} What the Prussian correspondence, dominated by agent Friedrich von Gerolt in Mexico, showcases, is that Prussian diplomats viewed the Texian affair as intertwined with affairs in Mexico, and indeed, European interference in the North American continent as a whole, before that date. U.S. imperialism was a primary reason for Prussian antipathy toward Texas shortly after the latter’s independence. Von Gerolt feared that, despite official U.S. neutrality in the Texas matter, the United States government would, through the “irresistible pursuit of the majority, spurred by the rich prizes which exist in Texas for the numerous North American land-speculators and thousands of adventurers” seek to “bring itself into the irrefutable possession of this territory, without consideration of the band of international law which tied Mexico and North America together, and without sparing any means”.\textsuperscript{157}

Consequently, von Gerolt expressed his disapproval of Texian independence if this would lead to the state’s annexation to the United States, because this would expose “the great commercial interests which tie England, France and Prussia to Mexico to the greatest danger, and there is no doubt that the North Americans, which, through any and all means at their disposal, impede already Europe’s direct trade to Mexico through their contraband trade, would, when in possession of all rivers and bays from New Orleans to Matamoros, cement, given the impuissance of the Mexican government, their contraband trade, within which no nation can compete with them”. Von Gerolt’s statement, combined with the problems that contraband trade

\textsuperscript{156} Adams, \textit{British Interests}, 20-21, 24.

posed for Europeans discussed in chapter one, highlights the growing commercial-imperial influence of the United States. In order to resist this U.S. expansion of power and influence, von Gerolt suggested that Prussia support an intervention by France and England on behalf of Mexico. Von Gerolt emphasised that the editor of the French Journal des Débats, M. Chevalier, deemed such an endeavour beneficial. “I think”, wrote von Gerolt, “that such an intervention won’t merely curb the danger which our commerce in Mexico is threatened by, but that it will also enable the local (Mexican) government to better organise its tariff-system and its finances and fulfil its numerous obligations to foreigners of all nations, aspects which cannot be thought of (realised) as long as Texas is the theatre of war”.

As von Gerolt’s statement showcases, Texas’ revolution, independence, and the Mexican efforts for its reconquest had negative impacts on European commerce in Mexico. In December 1835, the Prussian General Consulate’s report to its government stated that Ortiz Monasterio had mentioned to the Prussian agents that forced bonds, which were eventually introduced through a law passed in 1836, would have to be imposed in order to enable the Mexican government to fund its failed campaign as well as future campaigns in Texas. These forced bonds had to be imposed, Ortiz Monasterio had told von Gerolt, “after all other means in order to acquire the necessary amount of money have been tried in vain”. Ortiz Monasterio also emphasised that such bonds would impact predominantly “wealthy inhabitants and the merchant class of the capital city”. Texas’ war of secession from Mexico thus stood behind one of the most hated and contested practices of 1830s-Mexico, which helps explain Europeans’ antipathy towards Texas in 1836.

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158 Friedrich von Gerolt to Prussian Foreign Ministry (PFM), September 14, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 467-482, 482.
In the same month, circulars issued by Mexican minister Vallejo reached foreign merchants, stating that the mercantile class had to contribute to financing the war against Texas. Several Prussian merchants, including Ebert and Schneider, Radiche de Bary and Bahre, and Uhde and Eschenburg, wrote to von Gerolt, reporting that the circular demanded “1000 – 800 – 600 – and 500 pesos” respectively as forced loans in order to cover the costs of war against Texas, a measure that they rejected based on the treaty of amity and commerce between Prussia and Mexico.\(^\text{160}\) The French and English governments likewise resisted the “monetary extortions” that had been imposed upon their merchants, and demanded reclamations from the Mexican government in early 1836. Yet again, the Mexican government rejected the British and French claims, emphasising that it denied the possibility that these claims were founded on any principal of international law. If Mexico were to pay the reclamations, then it would only do so in order to avoid British and French hostilities, suggesting that Mexico at times actively challenged European informal imperialism. Prussian observers feared such developments, for the outlined Mexican defiance towards reclamation efforts would disadvantage those European states who did not possess the naval power to make such shows of force – Prussia being one of them – and make them more dependent on British and French mediation, or simply make it less likely that they would receive the desired reclamations.\(^\text{161}\)

The campaign against Texas also led to an increase in contraband trade. In order to feed his troops and satisfy the Mexican army’s need for weaponry, Santa Anna furnished a contract with a “rich Spaniard” named Rubio and located in San Luis Potosi, who had “for many years

\(^{160}\) Secretaria de Hacienda Seccion 1a, Vallejo to Ebert and Schneider, December 2, 1835, and German merchants to von Gerolt, December 5, 1835, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 344-347. See also German merchants’ complaint on the same matter directed at Adolph de Bary, June 27, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 512-513.

now held a kind of monopoly on the contraband trade in Tampico and Matamoros”. Against an advance of 200,000 pesos, this contract foresaw that, in order to provide the necessary goods to the army, Rubio would be allowed to circumvent all entrance duties in both of those harbours. European merchants responded to this contract with “great unsatisfaction”, for they predicted the abuse of this agreement towards the “blackening” of foreign goods, i.e. their illegal importation and transport within the country. This development dovetailed with an increase in sea-borne duties, as well as the suspension of payments on loans, bonds, or contracts to facilitate Mexico’s financing of the war.\(^{162}\) The transport and export of Mexican silver, so desired by Europeans, was furthermore impacted by the Texan campaigns, as von Gerolt highlighted: In December of 1835, Santa Anna’s troops gathered in San Luis, for all “silver transports from the centre travelled to Tampico via San Luis Potosi”, giving Santa Anna the opportunity to, “in case of need, secure the necessary monetary means”.\(^{163}\)

The situation did not improve after the Texian rebels had won their independence in May 1836. Von Gerolt, situated in Paris in September of 1836 and having left the General-Consulate in the hands of Adolph de Bary, wrote to his government that he had received several promises from Mexican statesmen that, as soon as the Texian campaign had ended, Mexico would fight the contraband trade in more earnest. The proposed plan foresaw the concentration and consolidation of foreign vessels in the port of Vera Cruz, where duties were to be paid. After this initial step, ships would be able to approach other harbours, also, in order to unload their cargo. This measure would be accompanied by lowered entrance duties and modified tariffs, which had caused von Gerolt to leave Mexico in early 1836 with “the blithe hope” that the contraband


trade, which according to von Gerolt, was by this point mostly in the hands of U.S.-Americans and damaged German trade the most, would finally be curbed in its debilitating severity. “This prospect regarding the elimination of the contraband trade (…) has sadly experienced yet another indefinite delay due to the unfortunate result of the campaign of Santa Anna against Texas”. In August of 1837, von Gerolt lamented that the commercial situation of Matamoros had “worsened considerably since the campaign against Texas” had taken place.

The instability of Mexico was also worsened as a result of the Texas Revolution, a circumstance that European observers were aware of. In late 1835, the campaign in Texas dovetailed with the return of Mexican General Mejia, who tried to capture Santa Anna but, after realising that the latter had already left his hacienda for Mexico City, revised his plan and sought to capture Tampico. This scheme brought Mexico into further conflict with European governments, for two Frenchmen had been forced by Mejia to either pick up arms or be executed. When they did so and were captured by Santa Anna’s troops, they were executed anyway for having supported an insurgent general. These executions angered the French government, which believed that its two subjects had been shot in vain and unjustly. Prussia and the German Confederation shared this sentiment, for there had been seven Germans among the other executed individuals.

When Santa Anna was captured by Texian troops in May 1836, de Bary reported that the conservative “party of aristocrats and priests” in Mexico tried to use the Mexican general’s

absence to “provoke an intervention by France through their hidden intrigues”. This, as de Bary had heard from “persons who are very au courant in this matter”, was a ploy to install a Spanish prince and consequently a monarchy in Mexico. Though such a project was not likely to come to pass for Mexicans’ hatred towards Spain had not yet dissipated, it nevertheless showcases that the political instability Mexico faced was not lessened through the Texas revolt. Moreover, de Bary feared that Santa Anna’s absence would lead to the liberal party’s rise, for “he was, through his influence on the army, the only one, who could keep the liberal party in check”. De Bary doubted that another proclamation of a federal system as preferred by the liberals would contribute to the stability of Mexico.168

The economic and political troubles of Mexico were exacerbated by continued efforts to recapture Texas after Santa Anna’s loss. The Mexican troops had lost and left behind many of their weapons, horses, mules, and donkeys, and had, bereft of clothes as well as nourishment, disbanded. Those troops that remained had been reorganised under various generals, who gathered near the Rio Bravo Norte, where General Urrea planned a new attack on Texas. For this purpose, von Gerolt wrote, “the government supported him as much as possible by sending all disponible troops from within the country to Texas”. The downside to this effort was another imposition of forced bonds to the value of 2 million pesos, which caused von Gerolt to view Urrea’s campaign and Texian independence as “affairs so significant to Prussian trade with Mexico”.169 This policy of forced bonds was protested against on behalf of the Prussians, who addressed their concern to the consulate in Mexico, still under the temporary leadership of de Bary. The merchants argued that the forced bonds, amounting to a total of 2 million pesos to be

distributed among merchants in such a manner that the highest levy should not exceed 1000 pesos, disproportionately impacted and exposed to discriminating treatment the German merchants. “Of each of the local German merchants who have signed below, the highest levy has been demanded (by the Mexican government)”, the protest stated. The German merchants labelled the “extortions” of the local government as already nearly ruinous to German trade and nearly “unbearable”, but complained that the distribution of these forced bonds should elicit action on behalf of the Prussian government, for none of the rich Mexicans, some of which were “known to be millionaires” had been asked to pay the highest levy. Though Prussian statesmen and merchants felt like their countrymen faced the largest disadvantages regarding the measure of forced bonds, the English and French governments likewise confronted the Mexican government with reclamations based thereon. Though the Mexican government relented in response to English, French, and Prussian protests, lowering the levies imposed on many foreign merchants from the highest sum to amounts between 500 and 100 pesos, the policy itself remained, causing U.S.-American and French protests. In response, the Mexican government sought judicial legitimation of its policy and commenced the forceable taking of the levies, which Prussian agents predicted would lead to a direct confrontation with France. Texian independence thus elicited a chain reaction that reached pervasively into the commercial and diplomatic relationship between Mexico and foreign powers, destabilising Mexico and heightening hostilities between the country and Europe.

Texian independence hurt Mexico in other ways, also. Many European observers agreed that by losing Texas, Mexico had lost one of its best territorial possessions. British members of

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170 German merchants’ complaint on forced bonds, directed at de Bary, June 27, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 512-513.
Parliament Ward and Hoy were not the only ones to point towards Texas’ fertile land, important geographic and geo-political location, and luscious rivers. French ecclesiastic Jean-Henri Baradère wrote a lengthy summary on the conditions of Texas in late 1835, raving that “there are only few countries with such a fortunate location as regards commerce and agriculture, as Texas. The large number of navigable rivers, which traverse this province in all directions, facilitate the transport of its products, the extraordinary fertility of its soil, the splendid and perpetually temperate climate and its superb locations, make this country one of the most interesting on earth”.¹⁷²

Von Gerolt called Texas “indisputably the best part of Mexico”, a province “whose daily growing population could, through its strong example of industriousness, industry, and enterprising spirit, when united with Mexico, exert a decisive influence on the welfare and political stabilisation, as well as the adoption of a tolerant legislation in this country”.¹⁷³ He lamented that Mexico “would, according to the (Treaty of Velasco) lose the most valuable part of its territory, a piece of land which is almost half the size of France and which unites, due to its many navigable rivers through the most exquisite bays and due to its fertile climate, the most fortunate location and all elements for industry and trade”.¹⁷⁴ In view of Texas’ importance to commerce and agriculture in North America, von Gerolt sent a map of the territory to his government which highlighted the province’s great fertility, long sea coast, numerous rivers,

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¹⁷⁴ It is likely that von Gerolt has been inspired here by Baradère, whose notes on Texas can be found in a translated German version in the Prussian Privy Archives. It is likely that von Gerolt had read this document. See: Von Gerolt to PFM, September 2, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 467-482, 472, and Report by A. Baradère, October 6, 1835, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 315-328.
valuable soil, and ability to grow superb cotton, sugar, tobacco, rice, and generally “productions of tropical climates”, as well as the existence of great countries for raising cattle and other livestock. In an 1835 letter, Armand Saillard, French consul at New Orleans, emphasised the suitability of Texas to growing one of the most significant agricultural resources desired by Europeans: cotton. Within just one year – between 1833 and 1834 – cotton production and transportation to New Orleans rose from roughly 2,000 to 8,000 bales.

Texian representatives, in their approach of European governments, highlighted their country’s natural and agricultural assets. A letter from several Texians, including W. H. Wharton, to the French stated that “Texas possesses a territory which suffices for an annual exportation of over 200 million dollars’ worth of cotton and sugar”. The Texians were confident that their country’s agriculture would develop rapidly, and that, through cultivation of its excellent soil, Texas would be able to produce many of the raw materials relevant to the European markets. General Hamilton, in his letter to Syndic Sieveking of Hamburg, wrote that “as the relations of commerce between the Free City of Hambourg and the Republic of Texas must from the peculiar nature of the Trade and productions of each become highly profitable and interesting to both, if placed on a reciprocally sound basis by a judicious convention – I am curious of knowing whether the Honorable the (sic) Senate of Hambourg is prepared to form and conclude a Treaty of amity and commerce with her”. In his request, Hamilton emphasised the potential importance Texian commerce could have for Hamburg due to the “peculiar nature of the Trade and productions of each” – i.e., in Texas’ case, these were predominantly raw

177 W. H. Wharton et al to M. Pageot, February 8, 1837, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 53.
178 J. Hamilton to Karl Sieveking, June 28, 1941, Sta HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol I., Texas, 2.
materials. Daingerfield, in a letter to Rumpff, emphasised the advantages of a treaty of amity and commerce in light of the “rapidly increasing Commerce between the two governments”.¹⁷⁹ British merchant Charles Power wrote to Saligny that Texas could be “an exporting as well as consuming Country of the Manufactures of both France and England”, showcasing that early European representatives in Texas often shared such views.¹⁸⁰

Beyond this mere advertisement of raw materials, Texians were aware of the significance their republic held to the commercial, political, and imperial dynamics of North America. As early as 1836, when the question of annexation to the United States was more open than in the subsequent years, Stephen F. Austin instructed William H. Wharton, Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, to highlight Texas’ importance to and ability to influence the power relations on the North American continent. “You will use every possible exertion to bring the question of recognition and annexation, to an issue during the present session of the United States Congress”, wrote Austin. Wharton should emphasise that, “should our affairs assume a more favorable aspect by a termination of the war, and a treaty with Mexico, and by the manifestation of a friendly disposition towards us by England and France, it will have a powerful influence on public opinion, and in all probability decide it in favor of remaining independent”. If Texas were to be met by U.S. indifference or illiberality in admitting Texas to the Union, Austin noted, why should Texians choose annexation? England, he argued, would recognise Texas due to its commercial interests: “In the event therefore of discovering any such disposition in the Government or Congress of the United States you will have full and free conversations with the British, French and other foreign Ministers, on the Texas question, explaining to them the great commercial advantages that will result to their nations from our Cotton &c. and finding a market

¹⁷⁹ William Henry Daingerfield to Vincent Rumpff, January 5, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 3.
¹⁸⁰ Power to Saligny, June 20, 1842, CBA, 72.
here for their merchandise, and an outlet for their surplus population, on the basis of a system of low duties and liberal encouragement”.181 With this one statement, Austin summarised most of the major European commercial and imperial motives that incentivised the recognition of Texas.

Because Europeans recognised Texas’ assets, interest in Texas existed quickly after its independence, resulting in a slow shift in European policy. The interests of Britain and France in Texas have been detailed quite thoroughly by previous scholars, most predominantly by Adams, Pletcher, Kennedy, and Torget for the British and Barker for the French. As a result, the interests of these two states will only be discussed subsequently for context, to refer to little-discussed correspondence, or to offer a new analysis. The first step taken by the British to assess the situation in Texas was the sending of British Vice-Consul in Tampico, Joseph T. Crawford to Texas in February of 1837.182 Though Adams asserts that little interest in Texas was expressed by British diplomats prior to 1838, Crawford’s mission is an exception: Crawford analysed Texian trade arguing that Anglo-Texian trade could be beneficial because Texas, with no noteworthy manufacturing sites of its own, was dependent on imports. Crawford believed that a modification of the Tariff will be carried by the present Congress, to the effect of authorizing the President to exempt from duty for one year all articles for Agricultural use, provisions of all kinds, seeds and plants, Saddlery and Harness, Artificiers Tools, Lumber and framed houses…should Texas maintain its Independence of Mexico an advantageous Barter trade can be established with other Countries who will supply manufactures and take Cotton and other produce in return. Almost any quantity of the finest and most durable timber for the purposes of Naval architecture can be furnished from the forests for little more than the expence of felling and taking away.183

182 Crawford to Bidwell, Feb. 9, 1837, CBA, 3.
183 Crawford to O’Gorman, May 13, 1837, CBA, 3. Crawford’s letter focussed mostly on his perception of trade in Texas, stating that trade “at presence is less than it was formerly” as a result of the aftermath of fighting between Mexican and Texian forces. For Crawford, trade was the decisive factor in Anglo-Texian relations, and if good potential therefor existed, only then did a recognition of Texas seem sensible to him.
Crawford’s assessment showcases several of the principal components upon which the hegemon Britain built its supremacy: the cheap supply of raw materials, drawn from states who would not rival British industrial potential, free trade policies in particular with such states, and a strong navy. Though Britain and other Continental European powers had not yet recognised Texas and European political and economic currents had in 1836 been in disfavour of Texian independence, this attitude changed by 1837, largely due to one resounding conclusion: Mexico would not be able to regain its lost territory.

**EUROPE MOVES TOWARD RECOGNITION**

De Bary reported to his government in August of 1836 that the Mexican campaign against Texas, led by Urréa, had been delayed due to a pluvial period. His army, de Bary noted, was “supposed to be in a completely shattered state” according to observers, largely because of the government’s dire lack of financial means. “One is generally of the opinion”, de Bary wrote, “that this campaign will not take place, and that Mexico will lose Texas”. The independence of Texas dovetailed with rebellions elsewhere, such as in Oaxaca, making it incredibly difficult for the Mexican government to muster up any money for the Texas campaign when it had to prevent other parts of its territory from revolting.¹⁸⁴ In December 1836, de Bary mentioned another delay, and pointed out that U.S.-American General Gaines had occupied Nacogdoches, in response to which Mexican minister Gorostiza requested his passport in Washington D.C.¹⁸⁵ In a letter from May 1837, de Bary summarised that U.S.-Mexican relations had not improved; Gorostiza had left the United States and severed ties to that republic. This rupture further disillusioned Europeans about Mexico’s chances of reincorporating Texas. De Bary reported also of a new campaign against Texas planned under General Bravo, but wrote a month later that the

recognition of Texas on behalf of the United States had led some members of the Mexican government to believe that they should abandon their efforts to recapture the new republic.\textsuperscript{186} “For Mexico, this would certainly be for the best”, argued de Bary, “since it could never maintain its possession of Texas without a large army, in case the reconquest succeeded”.\textsuperscript{187} Von Gerolt shared his colleague’s views on the Texas matter: In June of 1837, von Gerolt noted that Mexican politician Luis Cuevas, who had spent time in Europe and returned to Mexico in response to his appointment as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, found his country “in the sad political situation into which it had been brought through the failed campaign as well as administration of the prior President, General Santa Anna”. Von Gerolt commented that he regarded the government’s efforts for a new campaign as hopeless due to the “shattered state of finances” that made it impossible for the Mexican army to move beyond the port of Matamoros, “bare of any means” to make war. Texas, though blockaded by the Mexican navy, gained more stability as the planned Mexican invasion stalled, and re-annexation seemed increasingly less likely.\textsuperscript{188}

The Mexican blockade on Texas, one of the only penalties Mexico was able to impose on Texas, suffered also from U.S. intervention, further discrediting the Mexican claim to the young republic. Based on excerpts from U.S. newspapers, von Gerolt reported that the United States responded to the Mexican blockade by despatching a man of war, the \textit{Boston}, to the coast of Texas, where the vessel protected any ship with authorisation to enter Texian ports. When Mexico reacted to this by sending brig \textit{Urrea} to capture several Texian vessels as well as a U.S.-American vessel, which were all brought to Matamoros after the \textit{Urrea} had completed its

\textsuperscript{187} De Bary to PFM, April 29, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 67-72, 71.
\textsuperscript{188} Von Gerolt to PFM, June 25, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 79-89, 81.
mission, the United States man of war *Natches* demanded the immediate release of the U.S.-American ship. When Mexico refused, the captain of the *Natches* fired onto the *Urrea*, forced its captain to exchange the Mexican flag for a U.S.-American one, and took it as a prize. Though the U.S. government apologised to its Mexican counterpart for this incident, releasing the *Urrea* and disposing of the captain of the *Natches*, the U.S. policy of protecting Texian vessels nevertheless demonstrates that U.S. intervention debilitated Mexican penal measures against Texas, and discredited further Mexico’s efforts to recapture the lost territory.¹⁸⁹

Mexico feared U.S. influence in the former and present Mexican North, suspecting hectically and nervously that the United States could destabilise its other provinces in the region. In 1837, Mexican President Anastasio Bustamante described his country’s situation to von Gerolt, highlighting that Mexico’s northern regions were and had been subject to “invasions of the North American population”, and expressed his desire for a sizable increase in European immigration to northern Mexico in order to enable his country to withstand this U.S.-American pressure threatening the integrity of the Mexican state.¹⁹⁰ In a speech to Congress in January of 1837, Bustamante spoke of California and New Mexico as home to subjects who “desired to subject themselves to foreign domination”, and connected this struggle to the previous Texian rebellion. He moreover accused the United States of honouring neither the conduct of neighbourliness nor its treaties with Mexico. Mexico could not, though it desired to, improve U.S.-Mexico relations, until the United States treated Mexico more fairly.¹⁹¹ Shortly before this speech, upper California had revolted against Mexican rule, forcing the Mexican government to

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¹⁹¹ Discurso que pronunció en la solemne apertura de las sesiones del Congreso General Mexicano el exmo. Señor presidente de la república, General D. Anastasio Bustamante, el día 1º de enero de 1838, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 262-265.
send troops there to quell the rebellion. In October of the same year, unrest broke out in New Mexico, with the result that the governor as well as several officials were murdered by rebellious townsfolk. Official documents and correspondence of the Mexican authorities blamed this uprising on the intention of New Mexican residents to rip their state from the Mexican Federation and join the United States. Von Gerolt doubted this theory, emphasising that most New Mexicans had probably been more upset about the stringency with which the tax laws had of late been enforced in their province. The likelihood of von Gerolt’s explanation notwithstanding, this incident showcases that the independence of Texas and U.S. support for it had alerted Mexico to growing U.S. imperialism in the former and present Mexican North.\textsuperscript{192}

Among the British, the belief that Mexico would not be able to reannex what it deemed nothing but a rebellious province likewise grew continuously stronger. As early as 1837, Crawford argued that Texas had a potent militia which “would be very effective, in a Country where there are so many Brakes and so much Timber, where every man is a Marksman and carries his Rifle…Should the Mexicans undertake another Campaign into Texas, they will probably never reach beyond the Colorado. They would be met with the full quota of the Militia.” Moreover, he stated his belief that Texas would not fall into American hands, either, for Texans, after the failed annexation effort to the United States, had realised that independence suited their interests better.\textsuperscript{193} Though Adams noted that the statesmen in London did not actively involve themselves in the Texas Question before in the 1830s, one can nevertheless


\textsuperscript{193} Crawford to Pakenham, May 26, 1837, CBA, 9-15. Again, trade figures prominently into Crawford’s argument, as he suggested that Texas, with a good climate and soil would be “capable of producing, as much if not more Cotton than is grown in America…, what could be gained to Texas by exchanging her products against manufactures, which She requires, if that produce was to pass thro’ America and the Manufactures be received thro’ the same medium. She would lose the advantage of Competition, and could reap no solid benefit by the adding her Cottons into the growth of the United States.”
identify the resignation regarding Mexico’s chance for reconquest as early as 1837 through Crawford’s letter, and subsequently through Ashburnham’s letter in 1838.\textsuperscript{194}

Beginning in 1837 and 1838, European powers generally evaluated the independence of Texas from Mexico as fairly secure; at least secure enough to pursue diplomatic or commercial ties with the new republic. Imperative to these relations was trade. The system of economic competition that England, France, and the German states, and increasingly, the United States, engaged in did not exclude the young Republic of Texas. Rather, as the European views on Texas outlined above underline, Texas was seen as a crucial component of this competitive system. As in, though even more strongly than in, Mexico, the economic competition extant between the various European states and the United States in Texas dovetailed with imperialist schemes, designs, and motives. The rising industrial power, the United States, held interest in its own expansion, whereas Britain and France sought to secure their trade in the Gulf of Mexico and saw in Texas a suitable cotton supplier. The German states, without noteworthy maritime and military strength for overseas imperialism as practiced by the greater powers, were home to a more pronounced imperial focus on emigration as a source of German influence upon Texas.

British interest in Texas was motivated by Britain’s costly imports of cotton from the United States, as well as by the belief that it was necessary to recognise Texas in order to protect vital British commercial interests in the Americas.\textsuperscript{195} The importance of cotton to British interests will not be expounded here, for it has been discussed in depth by scholars like Worley, Adams, Torget, and Kennedy.\textsuperscript{196} The most crucial aspect to point out here is Britain’s desire to

\textsuperscript{194} Adams, \textit{British Interests}, 24.
have a supplementary, or ideally, alternative cotton supply to that produced in the U.S. South. Statements by Britons like Francis C. Sheridan, Colonial Secretary under Governor MacGregor in Barbados, and Commander Joseph Hamilton of the British navy, showcase the British desire for cotton from a country that was not Britain’s imperial and commercial rival.197

European interest was prompted further by Texas’ efforts to reach out to European governments. In 1837, James Pinckney Henderson was appointed as Texian minister to England and France, and in response thereto, a French memorandum on Texas stated that “the time has come, therefore, to submit a review of the present situation of that country and its revolution against Mexico for the consideration of the Minister (Molé)”. The memorandum emphasised that Mexico had more than likely lost Texas for good, because “the anarchy prevalent in Mexico, its financial difficulties, and the natural indolence of the Mexican people have frustrated all efforts” to recapture the province. Moreover, the exquisite fertility of Texas was highlighted on several occasions, as well as the “rich possibilities” extant within the country: its cotton and location on the Gulf of Mexico “places it [Texas] naturally in communication with all maritime and

197 Sheridan noted that the English might derive “in a few years from Texas a full supply of Cotton for her manufactures,…and I really believe that twenty years would not pass away, before England (if necessary) might exclude every Bale of Cotton made in the States”, and argued that Britain had “superior terms to be made with them (the Texians),” and should thus recognise Texas as early as possible. Adams likewise used Sheridan’s letter to showcase the development of British interest in Texas by 1840. See: Sheridan to Garraway, July 12, 1840, CBA, 18. Particularly the latter statement indicates just how prevalent a cotton supply from a region other than the United States, where the British stood on more advantageous footing, figured in the minds of British statesmen. U.S. cotton stood at the foundation of the growing U.S.-American prosperity, and with this wealth came industrialisation, economic rivalry with Britain, and – given the significance of land suitable for cotton cultivation to this prosperity – territorial expansion and imperialism. Establishing Texas as an independent power would hinder the United States in its ascent, and potentially offset the imperial balance in North America to Britain’s favour. Texas, the British believed, would be a more beneficial cotton source. Joseph Hamilton highlighted Britain’s necessity for cotton, and the hope that British informal imperial strategies in Texas could displace U.S. influence in the region. A treaty of commerce between Britain and Texas, he anticipated, would diminish American trade and eventually, “all Commerce between those Countries would dwindle into mere insignificance.” Hamilton to MacGregor, June 23, 1840.
commercial powers”. 198 A note from October emphasised once more that “the separation of Texas from Mexico was a fait consommé and irrevocable”, and that, given that the United States had refused annexation, Texas was an independent state with a growing population and “a culture which flourishes rapidly (…) the country is advancing and organising itself”. 199

In 1838, France was spurred into taking more decisive action in the Texas matter due to the fear of losing commercial advantages to Britain. As memorandums of the same year showcase, English economic rivalry played a crucial role in French policy. “The (…) increase in agricultural production and exploitation of (Texas’) immense natural resources will open new and valuable outlets for foreign trade”, a document from September 5, 1838, noted. “France cannot afford to let herself be forestalled in this area”. The memorandum continued to illuminate the fine line between commercial benefit and political disappointment in matters of awarding foreign recognition to new states: “Although in this question of the recognition of Texas hasty action is likely to entail disappointments and complications should be avoided”, the memorandum stated, summarising the reasons for European hesitation regarding Euro-Texian diplomacy, “it should be recognised, at the same time, that in excessive delay lies the risk of losing the advantages that will naturally accrue to the first European power to treat with the new republic”. In the case of France – as indeed for any power of the era – the main competitor who could steal from France such advantages of early recognition was Britain. England had, in 1837, sent an envoy to investigate Texas (Crawford), and Count Édouard de Pontois, minister plenipotentiary from France to the United States, recommended that France do the same. The

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choice fell on Alphonse Dubois Saligny, who would go to Texas because the French, “above all, (... do not want to be outstripped by the English and the Americans”.  

France’s eventual decision to recognise and sign a treaty with Texas in 1839 was in part motivated by the growing French disdain for and negative relationship with Mexico. In 1838, a French memorandum asserted Texas would have remained “a wasteland in the hands of Mexico”, and that the former’s independence had effected a transformation that could not “be other than advantageous to our commerce”. As such, French observers emphasised that Texian independence could be beneficial in light of Mexico’s economic incapabilities. Moreover, another memorandum pointed out that the obstacles that had prevented France from recognising Spanish-American independence straight away did not exist in the Texian case, for the government of the Restoration had had reasons to defer to Spain that did not exist in the case of Mexico. Though Mexico may desire that France reject the presence of any French agents in Texas and vice versa, the memorandum argued that Mexico’s reasoning was not compelling enough for France to take such a step, largely because of the way the latter had been treated by the former: “The French government has many times demonstrated its friendliness and generosity toward Mexico only to be rewarded by injuries and insults so that indeed we were forced to despatch a squadron to Mexico to put an end to these outrages”. The memorandum referred here to the looming Pastry War, a French response to the belief that French interests in Mexico had been ignored and French patience abused.

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201 Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95.
202 Memorandum for the Minister, September 5, 1838, FLTx Vol. 1, 47. The Pastry War, though fought between 1838 and 1839, had its origins in the prior conduct between France and Mexico and was largely a result of France’s desire to finally receive the reclamations its subjects had been demanding so pressingly. In March 1837, the French agents in Mexico received instructions from their government that they should insist on the return of the loans extorted from Frenchmen, and threaten Mexico with the use of force if this reclamation was not granted, see: De Bary to PFM, March 3, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 26-30. Von Gerolt pointed
Several Frenchmen highlighted that France’s negative relationship with Mexico dovetailed with its recognition of Texas. In a note from Hersaut to Molé, the former pointed out that Texas was “now our national ally as a result of our dispute with Mexico”, which demonstrates that France’s diplomacy with Texas commenced partially in the light of France’s sour relationship with Mexico. Saligny, shortly after his arrival in Texas, said the same, writing that “the fact is that our differences with the Mexican government is a stroke of luck for Texas, and our (naval) diversion against Mexico will contribute not a little to the increase in our popularity in this new republic”. With Saligny, France had moreover chosen an agent with relatively little regard for Mexico and its ability to recapture Texas. In March 1839, Saligny described Texas independence as a “fait accompli”, and already suggested that Anglo-Americans, such as the Texians and U.S.-Americans, would eventually conquer more of Mexico, the latter being peopled by the “degenerate descendants of Pizarro and Hernando Cortés”. The potential benefit of the Pastry War to Texian interest was also seen by Texian observers, who

out that the increased presence of French vessels of war later that year, suggesting France’s willingness to intervene in Mexico, was not supported by the English, more than likely because the latter were aware that such an intervention could risk their commercial interests in Mexico more than they would gain in concessions therethrough, see: Von Gerolt to PFM, June 25, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 79-89, 82. Maugre such risk, France took action in 1838. The Minister Plenipotentiary of France in Mexico, Baron Deffaudis, lamented in his ultimatum to the Mexican government from March 1838 that many Frenchmen had been killed in Mexico, including those who were “in high esteem and engaged in useful industry for this country”. In 1833, five Frenchmen at Atencingo had had their throats slit and had had their bodies, together with that of a woman, mutilated in the most gruesome manner. The assassins had been well-known Mexicans who had killed the French subjects “in broad daylight and under the cry of Die, Foreigners”. Deffaudis provided a long summary of such murders of Frenchmen in Mexico that had gone unpunished, together with the undue punishment of Frenchmen for crimes for which only little to no evidence existed regarding their guilt. The minister accused Mexico of “barbaric treatment” toward his compatriots, and noted moreover that claims were not taken seriously, rejected, or ignored by Mexican authorities. See: L’Universel: Journal Commercial, Industriel, Politique et Littéraire, April 3, 1838, No. 197, in GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico Vol. IX, l. 326. Mexican Minister of War Tornel had, in 1836, even boasted with the fact that Mexico was treating France harshly, eliciting disconcert and bewilderment in de Bary. See: de Bary to PFM (Ancillon), May 27, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 459-464.

203 Hersaut to Molé, November 29, 1838, FLTx Vol. 1, 50.
205 Saligny’s racial views will be discussed in more depth in chapter four, but see: Saligny to Molé, March 3, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 258-281.
hoped in 1838 that Henderson’s mission would be more fruitful as a result and that he would be able to acquire a French extension of the blockade of Mexico to the Texian ports, where Mexican contraband trade ran rampant.206

**Texas, Recognition, and Treaties of Amity and Commerce**

In 1839, France became the second nation to recognise Texas as an independent country, the United States having been the first in 1837.207 The Netherlands followed shortly after in 1840, though Britain, despite its interest, remained hesitant.208 French recognition of Texas in 1839 played a large role in Britain’s eventual decision to furnish a treaty with Texas, for the commercial consideration that Britain could not leave the opportunities an independent Texas offered to French hands became more prevalent after France had taken such a significant diplomatic step.209 Just as England’s sending of an envoy had spurred French action for fear of losing out economically in 1838, by 1839, French recognition of Texas pressured British representatives to take the next step, also. Joseph Hamilton expressed his awareness of the importance of France’s earlier recognition of Texas, noting that, though he was optimistic that a commercial treaty between England and Texas would be “placed upon the most favourable footing by that Country; Notwithstanding France might by her Treaty, consider herself entitled to a prior claim as the most favoured Nation.”210 Hamilton’s statement highlights that France had in Texas done what Britain had used to her advantage in Spanish America in the 1820s: through early recognition, Britain had obtained a head start in Hispano-Anglo commerce. This same

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209 Some Britons were concerned about French influence in Texas, and did not want to lose a valuable trading partner to their chief rival. See: Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, in *The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, vol. 15, no. 1, ed. Eugene C. Barker (Austin: The Association, July 1911), 237.
210 Joseph Hamilton to MacGregor, June 23, 1840, CBA, 17.
advantage it now stood to lose to France in Texas, a significant threat given the high hopes some
British observers had for the country, particularly in regard to its cotton culture. In response,
British negotiations for a treaty with Texas were put under way.

The Hanseates summarised the Texian treaties in correspondence regarding their own
potential treaty with Texas, writing that the treaty with France has been completed on September
25, 1839, and subsequently ratified on February 14, 1840, followed by the treaty with the
Netherlands, completed September 16, 1840 and ratified on June 15, 1841. Lastly, Great Britain
also completed a treaty with Texas on November 13, 1840, though ratification did not take place
until June 28, 1842. All of these were treaties of amity and commerce, „resting entirely on the
basis of equality (of foreign vessels) with national vessels, and on the reciprocal treatment as the
most favoured nations”, wrote Hamburg’s Commerce Deputation. These treaties encouraged
the Hanseatic city-states to spur into more vigorous action on the subject of Texas in 1844, and
under the direction of Rumpff and Daingerfield, a treaty began to take shape.

Whereas French and British interest in Texas was present very shortly after the latter’s
independence, the German states’ policies were a bit different. Given the Prussian concerns of
legitimacy, the only official correspondence between Texas and Germany was that between
Texas and the Hanse Towns, predominantly Bremen and Hamburg. Just as for Britain and
France, trade was a dominant motive for the Hanseatic city-states. Bremian Consul to Galveston,
Diedrich Hermann Klaener encouraged the Bremian Senate to award more importance to Texas
as an economic partner, for Bremen, as a Handelsstaat, i.e. state whose existence was, like
Bremen’s, founded on commerce, needed to defend its mercantile interests in all major locations
of trade. “The Bremian trade with Texas, so insignificant just a short while ago, has, since the

211 Commerce Deputation of Hamburg to the Senate, March 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
independence of this young republic, increased so tremendously, that it can be expected that, given such progress, Texas would soon become one of the main markets for German products”, wrote Klaener. Granted that Klaener pursued not merely Bremian, but also individual interests in this instance – after all, he desired to become consul, and highlighted several times that “the appointment of a Bremian Consul for the protection of Bremian property” or the “recognition of mercantile interests” was “an inevitable necessity” and a “palpable need” – the Senate’s decision to establish a consulate in Texas demonstrates that it shared many of Klaener’s views on Texian-Hanseatic trade. In August of 1843, Bremian Mayor Smidt sent a declaration on the reciprocity between Texian and Bremian vessels to the Texian government, stating that “in consideration of the commercial connections between Bremen and the Republic of Texas, which have existed now for several years, and in order to extend these on the basis of a just and complete reciprocity, the Senate of the free Hanseatic city and Republic of Bremen” deemed it desirable to take such a step.

Hanseatic correspondence and negotiations with Texas are at the crossroads of the political, commercial, and imperial currents of the era, which make them a very valuable subject for analysis. Hanseates were limited in Texas by the larger political guidelines established by the Holy Alliance and Prussia. In March 1844, the Commerce Deputation of Hamburg argued that negotiations with Texas should not be engaged in if these would “have a negative impact on the commercial relations to Mexico, so tremendously crucial to several interests”. What followed, however, was a caveat to that statement: given that ties to Texas had already been created by England and France, “whose friendly relations to Mexico have not been disturbed in the slightest

212 Diedrich Hermann Klaener, Plea to Bremen’s Senate for Appointment as Bremian Consul at Galveston, November 8, 1842, StA HB: C. 26: Texas.
213 Smidt’s Certificate, August 9, 1843, TSA, RG 307 Correspondence: Belgium, Netherlands, Hanse Towns, Spain, Folder 2.
through this action”, the Deputation believed it recommendable that Hamburg join Bremen in its official negotiations of a treaty with Texas.\textsuperscript{214} This excerpt thus highlights the consideration European agents paid to their countries’ commercial interests in Mexico, the growing belief that diplomacy with Texas did not damage the former, and the economic and political layers of imperialism and power in the nineteenth century. Just as Prussian statesmen in Mexico often supported the British and French policies in Mexico because they lacked the maritime and political strength to act alone, the Hanseatic policy toward Texas also sought legitimation and political acceptability by following the English and French examples.

In other instances, Rumpff showcased his awareness of the importance that the independent Republic of Texas held to the imperial landscape of North America: “In the event that war break out between England and the United States”, wrote Rumpff, “the Texian flag would make great gains in its importance”. Texas, Rumpff argued, would in such an event change the commercial relations extant in this part of the globe, and hold geopolitical significance to foreign states, including the Hanse Towns.\textsuperscript{215} Moreover, he linked the U.S.-American policy on Texas to the U.S. policy regarding the Oregon Territory, shared by both England and the United States. Rumpff noted that the U.S. Senate had, with a vote of 28:18, decided that its convention with England regarding the “joint occupation of the Oregon (Columbia) should not be discontinued”, a decision that facilitated negotiations between the United States and Britain. The attitude that the U.S. Senate had expressed through said vote was, according to Rumpff, a signal to the “war party” of the country, which also sought to provoke the incorporation of Texas into the Union.\textsuperscript{216} Rumpff regarded both, the Oregon as well as the Texas

\textsuperscript{214} Commerce Deputation of Hamburg to the Senate, March 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
\textsuperscript{215} Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
\textsuperscript{216} Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
Question, as tied to imperial contestation between England and the United States, and thus situated Texas within a broader, global struggle.

Though Europeans had the initial concern that their commerce with Mexico could be negatively impacted through recognition of Texas, the Hanseatic example of 1844 has already hinted that this position changed throughout Texian independence. In fact, British and French representatives began to believe that an independent Texas could be beneficial to Mexico. Sheridan showcased this in a report, where he stated that he was optimistic that much could be gained from trade with Texas, even as far as British interest in Mexico was concerned. He estimated that Texas, in exchange for Mexican recognition mediated by the British, would pay Mexico 3 to 5 million dollars, which would fill Mexico’s coffers on one hand and serve British commercial interest on the other, for Texans would “also assume a portion of the Debt due by Mexico to British Merchants.”

Moreover, as merchant Power emphasised, a strong Texas “may be made a barrier to the encroachments of the United States”, whose citizens were already teeming towards the south of North America. The Franco-British ambition of establishing Texas as a ‘buffer state’ between an expansionist United States and a vulnerable Mexico has been acknowledged by several historians, including Kossok, Adams, and Worley. German historian and traveller G. A. Scherpf wrote in 1841 that the independent Republic of Texas would stop U.S. expansion into the Southwest, because Texas would be “the ‘until here and no further’” for the United States, and protect Mexico from U.S. annexation.

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217 Sheridan to Garraway, July 12, 1840, CBA, 18-26.
218 Power to Peel, June 20, 1842, CBA, 70-71.
219 See: Kossok, Adams, British Interests, and Worley.
Because of such factors, Britain’s new policy was the reconciliation of Mexico and Texas to protect British interests in both countries. Britons like British Commander Evan Nepan did not believe in Mexico’s chance for reconquest, and thus emphasised mediation with Mexico.\textsuperscript{221} William Kennedy, who had travelled to Texas in 1839, published a two-volume book on the country, and became British consul at Galveston beginning in 1842, moreover believed that mediation with Mexico would increase the likelihood of continued Texian independence.\textsuperscript{222}

After the initial reluctance to engage in relations with Texas in 1836-1837, British interest rose starkly in the 1840s, and hence advocated for the laying aside of the dispute between the two republics of Mexico and Texas. British interest in neither one of those two countries stood to benefit from this strife, for it worsened Mexican instability and financial difficulty and made Texas more prone to U.S. annexation. Adams outlined the policy of the British in Texas, and described the years between 1839 and 1841 as a timeframe where London continued to express fairly little interest in Texas – most of the people who urged British involvement in Texas, particularly on what can be labelled an informal-imperialist level, were agents situated in the periphery: In 1841, William Kennedy announced to Foreign Secretary George Hamilton Gordon, 4\textsuperscript{th} Earl and Lord Aberdeen (1841-1846) that he believed that “unless English influence be

\textsuperscript{221}Nepan to Douglas, July 24, 1841, CBA, 39-42. Nepan acknowledged in 1841 that “Mexico has great reason to feel indignant” due to Texas independence, which occurred under “total want of honesty” on behalf of Texians, “but as these people are now become a free and independent Republic and recognized as such by the great powers of Europe, it is folly to contend any longer against the state of things which is totally out of the power of Mexico to remedy”. As such, Nepan noted that Pakenham had been instructed to mediate between Mexico and Texas, which he had done on several occasions and in accordance with Texian officials such as Barnard E. Bee, Hamilton, James Treat, and Judge Webb.

\textsuperscript{222} In 1842, Kennedy reported to Aberdeen that he considered “the successful invasion of the Country [Texas] by Mexico as wholly impracticable – Nor am I disposed – (so far as I have recently observed) – to think that the Texans would seek annexation to the United States unless constrained by financial exigency and inability to defray the cost of Government, which has been greatly augmented by the unsettled state of their relations with Mexico”. Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 10, 1842, CBA, 51-53. Only a few weeks later, Kennedy emphasised again that “if this feeling” toward U.S. annexation extant in Texas were “to be allayed, Great Britain must interpose her Mediation with effect for an early Settlement of the differences between Mexico and Texas”. Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 28, 1842, CBA, 56.
employed in raising up a stable independent power on the South-Western and North-Western
frontiers of the (U.S.) Union, a very few years will suffice to place the whole territory they covet
under the Sovereignty of the United States. There lies the danger to the Maritime and
Commercial supremacy of Great Britain”. Aberdeen did not respond in any official capacity to
Kennedy. British chargé d’affaires and Consul-General in Texas, Charles Elliot, was also not
sent to Texas until 1842, though Elliot was also a very enthusiastic supporter of British
interference in Texas. 

James Hook’s report from 1841 is a good example of how British agents and merchants
believed Britain could profit commercially from Texas’ geographic and geopolitical location. Hook outlined quite starkly what can be referred to as informal imperialist designs intersecting
with a relationship between Texas and Britain that is akin to that between a peripheral and core
state in Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis. Hook observed:

It is true that Texas is capable of producing almost every thing which we import in a raw
state from foreign Countries,…the first, and decidedly, to Great Britain, the most
important is her Cotton. Her soil, climate, and position for producing this most valuable
Article has no equal, and though in England more than one Million and a half of people
are employed in this trade, Texas can produce more Cotton, and at a cheaper rate than we
at present consume. I would here beg leave to observe, that we, in payment for this and
other raw Materials, give our manufactured goods of Manchester, Glasgow, Sheffield and
Birmingham. I need not stop to point out the great advantage which must arise to our
merchants and manufacturers from such a Commerce…(Texas) is, and will be for more
than a hundred years to come, destitute of all kinds of manufacturies, whilst her daily
increasing population and wealth will require a supply of almost every thing made in this
Country, for the payment of which, as before stated, she will give us bullion and raw
Materials.

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223 See: Adams, British Interests, 74.
224 Adams, British Interests, 74 and 109.
225 Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38. James Hook claimed that Texan rivers would enable British
commerce to extend by boat “many hundreds of Miles into Mexico,” and that on the other end, “we may penetrate
by water as far as Canada.” He viewed Texas as ideally situated for its integration into a network of English trade,
and noted several other benefits to the territory, such as the alleged absence of yellow fever and the existence of a
lucrative fur trade with Indian tribes. In fact, Hook noted that “Nature has evidently given to Texas commercial
advantages which she has denied to every part of Mexico,” demonstrating his belief that Texas would soon become
more economically important to Britain than her prior mother country.
226 Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38.
For Hook, Texas was an ideal candidate as a raw material supplier, for he did not see the possibility of her becoming an economic rival such as the United States was becoming during the 1830s and 1840s.227

Though several Britons underlined the commercial-imperial advantages of Texas, the instructions from Aberdeen to Charles Elliot encouraged – consistent with official British policy outlined in the centre, London, for the entirety of the Americas – that the latter remain neutral.228 This would suggest, much as in the case of Mexico, that informal-imperial actions or schemes were not the official policy of the centre and often emanated from local agents. As his correspondence on the Texian blockade against Mexico proclaimed in March 1842 highlights, however, Aberdeen was conflicted on Britain’s neutrality. Adams outlined this in regard to Britain’s maritime policy: Because British commercial interests in Mexico were threatened by this blockade, Aberdeen addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, requesting that the British navy send vessels to the Gulf of Mexico in order to protect British interests.229 Aberdeen’s stance was criticised in Texas, as Adams pointed out, because it suggested that “British neutrality was more nominal than actual”, not least because of the confusion that had arisen in response to the Montezuma and Guadaloupe affair. This affair was,

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227 British merchant Power held similar views in 1842, writing to Robert Peel that he had loaded his vessels in Texas and sent them to England with “some 14,000 Bales” of cotton in 1841 and 1842. “In ten years”, he stated, “we shall export as much Cotton as Alabama now does, which is now from 4 to 500,000 Bales”. Through Texas, Britain would be able to “afford our British Manufacturers a considerable market for her products as well as the raw materials without being so dependent on the United States”. See: Power to Peel, June 20, 1842, CBA, 70-71.

228 “With reference to our political relations,” Aberdeen wrote in July of 1842, “I shall wish that you should, at first, assume the attitude, rather of an observer than of an actor, of a passive, but not an inattentive spectator rather than of an energetic agent or counsellor”. Aberdeen demanded “the strictest impartiality”, for Elliot’s main mission was to acquaint himself with “the resources, military, naval, financial, and commercial” aspects of Texas, and report back to the British government.

229 See footnote 1, CBA, 83.
according to Adams, evidence that Aberdeen “lacked perfect confidence in his own protestation” that England observed perfect neutrality in the contest between Mexico and Texas.\textsuperscript{230}

Adams does not consider however that Aberdeen also used arguments of antiquity in his protest of the Texian blockade to suggest Texas’ weakness vis-à-vis European powers: Despite instructing Elliot that “all representations which you […] make to the Texian Authorities […] should be conveyed in such a tone and language as it becomes one independent Govt. to use towards another independent Govt., without reference to the greater strength and more ancient reputation of the one or the lesser power and antiquity of the other”, Aberdeen also argued that “a Govt. so recently established, and as yet so scantily recognized, as that of Texas” ought to always avoid such an act as a blockade, for it was “always attended with great danger and odium to the Blockading Power, and liable to excite feelings of disgust and hostility in all other Powers; - the great Commercial Powers especially”.\textsuperscript{231} Aberdeen continued to instruct Elliot that he should “use (his) best endeavours to induce that Govt. (of Texas) to raise the Blockade without loss of time; representing to them the ill will which a continuance of it will excite in foreign Nations, and especially amongst the Merchants of the higher Commercial Powers, whose friendship it must be so greatly the interest of the Texian Govt. to conciliate in the infancy of their Country’s independence”. Within such statement, one can identify that British imperialism and commerce functioned symbiotically in North America, and that informal-imperial measures were not always limited to peripheral agents.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{230} Adams, \textit{British interests}, 82-91. Murphy, the Mexican minister to Great Britain, and Lizardi and Company, a British company, had furnished a contract for two vessels of war for the Mexican government, the \textit{Guadaloupe} and \textit{Montezuma}. Since officers of the English navy were supposed to command these vessels, several Englishmen “believed that these vessels had been contracted for under Melbourne’s ministry, and that the Admiralty was responsible for their plans and models”, causing Consul Kennedy and Ashbel Smith to protest and urge for the detention of the vessels. The situation was alleviated when the British made the decision not to arm the two vessels.

\textsuperscript{231} Aberdeen to Elliot, July 1, 1842, CBA, 79-80.

\textsuperscript{232} Aberdeen to Elliot, July 1, 1842, CBA, 82.
The above nevertheless demonstrates that British statesmen in London were less enthusiastic toward the Republic of Texas and possible British interference therein than peripheral agents were, and were overall more inclined toward stabilising relations with Mexico. Adams pointed to this in his work on British interests in Texas, arguing that Kennedy and Elliot, the two primary British diplomats in Texas, expressed great confidence in Texas as a place where Britain could impose its influence, whereas correspondence from Aberdeen to the English representatives in Texas was considerably more subdued. Roeckell also focusses on the aspect of British foreign policy that existed most predominantly in London and favoured good relations with Mexico as opposed to actual and substantial interest in Texas.233 Yet Adams and Roeckell do not consider the potential strength that peripheral agents could exert upon their country’s policy in another country: Mayo and Zamudio Vega, for instance, demonstrate that British agents and merchants in Mexico were key drivers behind British informal-imperialist ambitions.234 It is important to consider thus that Kennedy and Elliot, although their ideas were to a large extent not shared by Aberdeen, had the potential of exuding an influence beyond the policy dictated by the core. As Torget points out, reports from British merchants, diplomats, and travellers in the periphery, such as Power, Hook, and Sheridan, as well as Elliot and Kennedy, did influence British decision makers in London, including Palmerston and his successor Aberdeen.235 Lastly, British interference in Texian affairs did exist at times even among statesmen in London, as the above discussion of Aberdeen’s policy toward the Texian blockade shows. Adams did underline


234 Adams also acknowledges the influence of Pakenham in Mexico, arguing that his actions there heightened Mexican suspicions toward England. See: Adams, *British Interests*, 61. Pakenham did, as chapter one shows, act on his own account at times rather than awaiting official instructions. It is interesting that Adams and Roeckell are less inclined to concede such an influence to the peripheral British agents situated in Texas.

235 Torget, 213.
that some of Aberdeen’s motives in sending Kennedy to Texas as part of a mission in 1841, and the latter’s influence on the Texian government, are part of private correspondence whose content is unknown, which makes it difficult to fully determine Aberdeen’s motives in this matter. Chapter three will also highlight British interference in the matter of slavery, within which Adams also concedes that Aberdeen sought to influence Texian policy on at least one occasion.236

To a certain extent, Texas seemed more suitable for European informal imperialism than Mexico. Analyses in this regard will be made first in regard to trading restrictions and barriers, as well as reclamations. The second section will consider informal imperialism through emigration. The latter strategy was employed in particular by the Adelsverein, founded in Mainz, though European states also considered this informal-imperialist tool. As a result of both imperial as well as commercial and financial considerations, connections can be seen between the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas, Prussia, the Hanse Towns, and England.

As the previous chapter showed, Mexico was not a country that European imperialism and commerce could easily permeate and penetrate. Next to its resistance to reclamations and its restrictive laws such as forced bonds or raised duties, Mexico maintained differential duties amounting to 25% for imports occurring under foreign flags and imposed increased tonnage on foreign vessels.237 As such, Mexico’s discrimination of foreign vessels was more severe than that of other countries: in Brazil, foreign flags paid 8% more on entrance duties, and in the United States, goods transported thereto indirectly from the harbour of a country with which the United

236 Adams, British Interests, 145-146.
States had a reciprocity agreement had to pay a special tax of 10%. The clause of treaties, such as that in articles VI and VII of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty or article III in the U.S.-Mexican treaty, or agreements of most favourable nation merely gave foreign flags the concession of equality among other foreign flags whose countries had such agreements with Mexico, not the equality with Mexican ships themselves. Mexico moreover strictly regulated its coastal trade: As article X of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty highlights, foreign powers were not allowed to participate in this trade, which was reserved for Mexican vessels. Mexico moreover waited a long time to ratify treaties: the treaty with the Hanseates of 1827 was never ratified, and, after over a decade, the two parties finally signed a changed draft in London on November 8, 1841. Von Bülow noted that this delay was caused in part by Mexico’s desires for changes: because Mexico feared being the disadvantaged party in treaties based on complete reciprocity, it deemed it important to protect its industry and economy by maintaining differential duties.

Matters were different with Texas, which pleased Europeans. The treaty between the Netherlands and Texas made no mention of the coastal trade exception, and the Hanseatic representatives actively pushed for an additional clause in their treaty with Texas that would

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238 Prüser, 39. Prüser highlights that England was excepted from several duties in Brazil because of the legacy of the Methuen Treaty.


explicitly permit such trade, including the possibility for partial unloading in several harbours.\textsuperscript{243} Moreover, the Hanseatic draft had a second clause that foresaw that the vessels of the contracting parties should be considered equal, in regard to tonnage and other duties, to “the national vessels or those of the most favoured nations”.\textsuperscript{244} This showcases that the Hanseates regarded Texas as an opportunity to negotiate more liberal and favourable treaties. Moreover, in sending a note by Daingerfield to the Senate, Hanseatic diplomat Rumpff in Paris argued that a treaty with Texas would be advantageous given that he hoped it could be negotiated on a “liberal basis”.\textsuperscript{245}

Though Hamburg’s involvement between 1842 and 1843 had been relatively minor, it nonetheless sought to participate in negotiations led by Bremen because a treaty between Texas and the Hansa was viewed in Hamburg as potentially beneficial even in the event that the former be annexed by the U.S, partially because it was hoped that the treaty would be, “at least as concerns that part of the united landmass of the North American free states, equally binding.”\textsuperscript{246} The potential for a very liberal trade treaty was one of the Hansa’s main motivators in maintaining their correspondence with Texan diplomats, predominantly Daingerfield, throughout 1844 and 1845. Given both Texas’ desire to “step into the footsteps of the United States” as regards its treaties, as well as Daingerfield’s limited time in Paris, Rumpff suggested that previous treaties between Texas and European states as well as the Hanseatic treaty with the U.S. could be used \textit{brevi manu, mutatis mutandis} as a guide in furnishing the Hansa’s treaty with Texas.\textsuperscript{247}

\textsuperscript{243} Eventually, the final version of the treaty (never ratified) also had a coastal trade exception, though the Hansa’s push for a treaty without this caveat is nevertheless interesting because it explains Hanseatic ambitions in commercial ties with Texas.
\textsuperscript{244} Zusatz ad. 9, with comments by Smidt, March 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 15.
\textsuperscript{245} Extract of the Senate Protocol, Jan. 10, 1844, S. 19., StA HB: C. 26.
\textsuperscript{246} Unknown, more than likely from affiliated with the Senate of Hamburg, to Syndic Sieveking, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 12.
\textsuperscript{247} Note extracted from the letter of Min. Res. Rumpff, No. 27, d.d. Paris, February 16, 1844, in StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
the draft for a treaty between the Hansa and Texas was built, partially because the Netherlands, by this point in time a smaller, less imperial commercial state than other European powers such as England or France, was viewed as a better reference point than the other aforementioned European parties. When evaluating the treaties on which the modifications to this base draft were modelled, two feature particularly prominently: the treaty of the Hansa with the U.S., and, what is perhaps more noteworthy, the treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela.

The treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela was labelled by Prüser as the most progressive trade agreement of its time, more so than those of Venezuela and Britain or Venezuela and France. Within the Hanseatic-Venezuelan treaty, the Hansa’s products were given treatment entirely equal to that of Venezuelan goods, a status quo that England and France were able to obtain as well. Unlike the latter two European powers however, the Hanse Towns were able to get a concession of equal treatment with Venezuelan vessels and goods concerning tariffs and duties for any products imported into Venezuela in Hanseatic ships, regardless of origin. This was an achievement shared with the United States and its treaty with Venezuela, and according to Walter Kresse, this was an important milestone in the elimination of mercantilist structures and the dawn of free trade. What the Hanseatic city-states and other European states had not been able to accomplish in Mexico, they tried to accomplish in Texas: trade agreements that were overall more favourable to European economic interests.

In their negotiations, the Hanseatic cities also insisted on one condition deemed crucial to both Hanseatic and greater German interests: the inclusion of products from the states of the

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248 Vincent Rumpff to the Hanseatic Senates, March 8, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
249 Mentioned for one of the first times in a note edited by Bremian Mayor Smidt (authored by Rumpff?), StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
250 Prüser, 51.
German Bund in several of the treaty’s stipulations. The significance Hanseatic representatives attached to the extension of some of the treaty benefits to the entirety of the German Bund was an innovative component of this treaty which made Texas more attractive as a negotiating partner than Mexico. Though this preference for incorporating the German Confederation’s member states was initially ill-received by Daingerfield, because he feared that this would both reduce the interest of other German states to engage in their own treaty negotiations with his state and trouble the young republic’s Senate, which might lead the ratification of the treaty ad calendas graecas, Rumpff indicated to Daingerfield that this was a sine qua non on behalf of the Hansa, and that an exclusion of the German states would lead to the termination of negotiations, which caused the latter to acquiesce to his counterpart’s demand so long as the other German states were not listed by name and merely addressed by the blanket term “states of the German Bund.” This underlines that Hanseatic representatives, despite the fact that their republics were not large political weights, possessed, to a certain degree, more power than they did in Mexico.

The Hanseates were not the only ones who found the Texians overall more amenable to their wishes and Texas more attractive to European commercial interests. Given that Texas possessed only very few vessels, – nearly no navy at all – differential duties did not make much sense for the country: As Daingerfield himself noted, Texas could not agree to too many limitations as regards flags and their privileges, e.g. the limitation of maritime tax-related benefits to only those vessels sailing from or to Texas from a treaty partner’s port that were under either the Texian or treaty partner’s flag, because Texas was heavily dependent upon U.S.

253 Rumpff to the Hanseatic Senates, March 15, 1844, and extract from the report No. 37 of Rumpff, March 28, 1844, in Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
vessels. In 1842, a German newspaper estimated that the value of goods legally imported into Texas (contraband trade was, like in Mexico, a large factor) amounted to roughly 1.6 million dollars, and that almost 80% of goods were imported from the United States, followed by Britain, France, and Bremen. Texian commercial maritime traffic was rather negligible. Nevertheless, this opened opportunities for Europeans, who hoped for lower duties and more advantageous terms of trade with Texas than with other, Spanish American, republics. Saligny wrote to his government in April 1839, recommending that it respond to Texas’ pleas for a treaty, for France “could easily have obtained from Texas valuable concessions to our commerce and navigation, in exchange for subsidies” in the form of loans, predominantly.

The fact that Texas was viewed as a more favourable location for European imperial and commercial designs is also reflected in European agents’ occasional efforts to garner advantages for their state over others. Saligny, for instance, highlighted that he had spoken to Texian Congressmen and asked them “to adopt a law at the beginning of the next session placing a duty of 25 to 30 percent on the export of timber, but stipulating an exemption in our favour for twenty-five or thirty years”. Since the President did not like England, according to Saligny, he had been optimistic that such a law might be encouraged and passed. This desire to secure Texian timber for the French market was motivated not merely by fear of English, but also Russian competition, for Saligny reported of a Russian engineer, Pepin, who had heard of the excellent quality of the good. In June of the same year, Saligny reiterated that France would be

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254 This actually led to problems in the negotiations between Rumpff and Daingerfield, for Hanseates feared that their own discriminating duties against foreign countries could be made ineffective through the indirect sailing over Texas to the Hanse Towns. Rumpff to Sieveking, March 29, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 21/71.
255 Documents – le commerce extérieur, publiés par le Ministère de l’agriculture et du commerce, May 1843, No. 41, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, No. 4 ad. 17/55.
256 In April 1839, Saligny did not see the situation as favourable as it had been several months prior due to the arrogance of the Texians, who he described as “vain and presumptuous”. Nevertheless, he still pointed out that Texas could be an advantageous trading partner.
257 Saligny to Molé, April 20, 1839, FLTx, 79, 94.
able to get more deeply involved in Texas than in other parts of North America. When the
negotiation of a treaty between France and Texas was still in the air, Saligny pressed that
finalising steps be taken:

Shall we once again reject the opportunity open to us to establish our influence over a
portion of this continent and to open important outlets to our industry and navigation?
Shall we again let ourselves be outstripped by England? In my preceding despatches I
explained to your Excellency how we might obtain special advantages in Texas. My
conviction and hopes in this regard have not changed. But even in the event that the
Government of the (French) King might not want or were unable to obtain special
concessions owing to the current theories on free trade, we would still derive very
valuable benefits from the sympathies of the Texian population and from their marked
preference for our ideas, tastes, and products. Our wines, silks, muslins, et cetera et cetera
would find a huge market there; we would receive, in exchange, the products of its fertile
soil, cottons reported to be of superior quality…258

What Saligny’s statement demonstrates once more is that Europeans, often agents in the
periphery, did foster ideas of informal imperialism in the Americas. What is more, Saligny noted
that, even in the event that the French government abide by ideas of free trade, a beneficial
exchange of peripheral raw materials and core industrial products could still occur, and that the
popularity of French culture would assist and promote French trade. Free trade was also
something that Europeans had been unable to establish in Mexico, which protected its young
industries, and thus set it negatively apart from Texas.

INFORMAL IMPERIALISM THROUGH EMIGRATION

Next to these financial, tax- and treaty-related advantages that Texas offered to European
commerce and imperialism, there existed also the benefit of emigration to Texas. This moreover
set Texas apart from Mexico, where few emigration projects in the 1830s and 1840s succeeded
and where, as this chapter and chapter one have shown, many Europeans got killed or otherwise
feared for their safety and security of property. Though concerns regarding migrants’ safety

258 Saligny to Dalmatia, June 24, 1839, FLTx, 95-103.
existed also in Texas, where the Comanches held significant power and conducted raids, many Europeans had a much more positive and optimistic outlook on emigrants’ future in Texas given that it had a manageable, not too sizable population, and possessed great agricultural resources and fertile soil. Texas thus became subject to European emigration schemes, which were deeply related to and intertwined with the commercial and imperial motives European states held in Texas.

European emigration projects into Mexico were generally not very successful, as a Prussian report from 1836 observed: “of the various colonisation efforts which the foreigners have attempted in the form of land speculations (Landbauspekulationen) in the various parts of Mexico (Texas excluded) none have flourished, with the exception of the German effort in the state of Veracruz, not far from Huatusca and Arizaba [Orizaba]”. This settlement did not amount to more than one hundred souls, however. The independence of Texas also hampered the Mexican dream and European schemes for colonisation efforts. One Baron of Racknitz of the German Würtenberg sought to settle a border region between Tamaulipas and Texas along the Nueces River, and had thus made arrangements with the Mexican government, which granted his request for settlement as long as he introduced at least 250 German colonists into Mexico. This plan fell flat in response to the Texan Revolution and the resulting boundary disputes and hostility along the frontier. The 1836 Prussian trading report also emphasised that Texas had been one of Mexico’s most attractive lands for settlement due to its many rivers and consequential fertility, which had already been acknowledged over a decade earlier by Anglo-American colonists.\(^1\) Indeed, noteworthy European efforts to settle colonists in Mexico focussed on northern Mexico, where Irish empresarios Power and Hewitson received grants for

colonisation in California and McMullen and McGloin brought Irish and Mexican settlers to the area of modern-day Corpus Christi.\textsuperscript{260} Financial resources were often a limiting factor for such efforts: German merchant in Mexico City, Joseph Vehlein, tried thrice to settle families in Texas, with very little success – the first two efforts remained entirely fruitless.\textsuperscript{261} German historian Kossok summarised that Mexico “did not possess the socio-economic prerequisites” for colonisation projects on its northern frontier.\textsuperscript{262}

In response to this assessment and the shift in European diplomacy toward Texas after 1837 and particularly after 1839, emigration to Texas became a chief subject, especially to German observers, whose loose confederation of states lacked the political and economic influence of its English and French competitors. Germans believed that Germany had one thing to offer in abundance above all: people. Germans were already emigrating in large numbers in the nineteenth century, partially due to unsatisfactory conditions within their home states such as lack of political freedoms, heavy taxation, as well as widespread poverty.\textsuperscript{263} Many migrants made the United States their new home, but emigration societies and efforts existed in several German states, advocating for one certain location, such as Australia, Brazil, or Hungary. The Verein zum Schutze deutscher Einwanderer in Texas, also known as the Mainzer Verein, Adelsverein, or simply the Verein, made it its mission to settle Germans in Texas.\textsuperscript{264} Founded in Spring of 1842, in the aftermath of a meeting of the Rate deutscher Fürsten und adeliger Herren, i.e. the council of German princes and noblemen, in Biebrich on the Rhine, this “Society for the

\textsuperscript{260} Chester W. And Ethel H. Geue, A New Land Beckoned: German Immigration to Texas, 1844-1847 (Waco: Texian Press, Reprint 1972), 1-2.
\textsuperscript{262} Kossok, “Preußen, Bremen, und die ‘Texas-Frage’ 1835-1845“, 77.
\textsuperscript{263} Geue, 1, and Kearney, 18.
\textsuperscript{264} The most recent and most comprehensive work on the Society is Kearney’s Nassau Plantation. In it, he details many of the society’s operations.
Protection of German Immigrants in Texas” desired to better organise German overseas migrations in order to alleviate the difficulties migrants faced on their voyages.\textsuperscript{265} When the idea for a settlement project in Texas became popular, the Society, made up of 20 noblemen and one noblewoman, Countess von Isenburg, sent two members to Texas to evaluate the situation and buy land: Viktor Count von Leiningen and Count Joseph von Boos-Waldeck.\textsuperscript{266}

Christian Count von Neu-Leiningen-Westerburg had already spoken positively of Texas to his eventual society members in March of 1842. He highlighted that Texas was a country “destined by nature to, because of its location, climate, fertility, and its many navigable rivers, become the cradle of important future events”. No other part of the Americas, von Leiningen believed, was as well suited to German settlement as Texas. Von Leiningen emphasised that Texas had already been praised by Alexander von Humboldt – an important judgement for Germans of this time – and that the state had developed very quickly both politically as well as economically. Von Leiningen also used travel literature by Scherpf and Kennedy in order to justify why he promoted Texas as a destination. Other positive German pieces of literature also influenced the society according to Louis E. Brister, namely Charles Sealsfield’s \textit{Das Kajütenbuch, oder Schilderungen aus dem Leben in Texas} (1841) and Detlef Dunt’s \textit{Reise nach}

\textsuperscript{265} April 20, 1842, is often given as the date of founding, but sources suggest that a meeting was held in March of that year, though not yet in terms of a society for Texas specifically. The society also changed into a joint-stock company in 1843. See: Kearney, 12.

\textsuperscript{266} The names of the society members can be confusing, for many were each other’s relatives. Christian Count of Neu Leiningen-Westerburg, called hereafter Count von Leiningen, had a cousin, Carl Count of Castell, who held the power of attorney in the society, and another relative, Karl Emich Prince von Leiningen, was the president of the society. The latter Leiningen was also a \textit{Fürst}, not a \textit{Graf}, i.e. a prince, not a count, and the patriarch of the Leiningen lineage. Another Leiningen involved in the society was Viktor Count von Alt-Leiningen-Westerburg – a slightly different lineage, for unlike Christian, who was of the Neu-Leiningen lineage (New Leiningen), Viktor was part of the Alt-Leiningen (Old Leiningen) lineage. Another important individual to mention here is Carl Prince von Solms-Braunfels, who travelled to Texas after initial efforts on behalf of the society stalled. Two other Solms-Braunfels relatives, Princes Ferdinand and Alexander, were also part of the society. Letters of the Leiningen family can be difficult to identify sometimes, for some of the Leiningens referred in their letters solely to their ‘cousins’ or ‘uncles’ et cetera. For more on the names of the German nobility involved, see Kearney, 16-17, and Moritz P. G. Tiling. \textit{History of the German Element in Texas} (Houston: Moritz Tiling, 1913).
Texas nebst Nachrichten von diesem Lande (1834). Margarete Erika Thompson has also illustrated that German travel narratives portrayed Texas in an overwhelmingly positive manner, as a “Garden of Eden” where opportunities, democracy, open lands, and freedom could be found.\textsuperscript{267} Such travel literature had also influenced von Leiningen, who argued that Texas was an ideal location for emigration because it had a tremendous amount of land but very few settlers. This was, according to von Leiningen, an advantage to the Germans who emigrated, for they would be received with open arms in a state that sought to bolster its population. The Count also asserted that Germans were well-liked in North America and that their industriousness and work ethic had contributed to Anglo-American wealth in “no insignificant measure”. He proceeded to ask:

\begin{quote}
Would the German not be more trusting in joining/fastening on/affiliating with a well-known name, not (be more likely to) hope for a guarantee in those, which he has for centuries been accustomed to regard as his home and shield?-- Should the best elements towards the unpredictable wealth/prosperity of the future remain unused, torn from the motherland, useful only for foreign entrepreneurial spirit?-- Does there not lie, in the gradually increasing necessities of such a colony, the potential for extensive economic projects? …The overpopulation of Germany, the circumstance that America is, almost throughout, the destination of emigrants, the percentage with which the merchant marine of our fatherland participates in global commerce; the colonisation projects, popping up sporadically in the newspapers, must, after thoughtful consideration, lead to the conviction that centralisation cannot be far away; subsequently, decades will surpass centuries in productivity, and the names of those who constituted the first effort of unification, will go down in history!
\end{quote}

Von Leiningen’s statement showcases several beliefs. First, German productivity was benefiting foreign powers, primarily the United States, which received many industrious Germans who made the country prosper. Second, German emigrants would prefer maintaining their own culture and remaining in affiliation with German leadership. Third, if the first two points could be combined – if emigrants could settle in a country where they could maintain their German

\textsuperscript{267} Margarete Erika Thompson, \textit{German Immigration to the United States and Texas During the 1840s: A Study in Hardship and Success}, Thesis, (University of Texas at El Paso, 1993), 6.
identity and not enrich a foreign power – this would be tremendously beneficial to Germany. Lastly, such colonisation efforts might even aid in the process of German unification and centralisation.268

Von Leiningen’s speech highlights that Texas stood at imperial, commercial, and social crossroads that the Society sought to use and tip in its and Germany’s favour. The *Adelsverein* did not merely endeavour to rid Germany of its superfluous population; it wanted to use the emigrants in order to increase Germany’s overall global prosperity, influence, and strength. Rather than passively watching as the United States reaped the benefits of Germans’ hard-working and skilful nature, the Society attempted to actively concentrate German emigration in Texas. Conditions for affordable and impactful German settlement in that country, where the population was small and the government thankful for migrants, were deemed excellent by von Leiningen.269 Scherpf also commented that Texas had had, in 1830, only a population of 16,000 souls, and that as many as 15 million Europeans could settle in the large country.270 In 1842, the Texian Congress granted the President the authority to offer land tracts to European societies and entrepreneurs who would settle migrants in Texas, underlining further von Leiningen’s belief that Texas would gladly receive German settlers.271

This German ambition for Texas was not new by the time the Society formed its plans in the 1840s. In 1821, a retired Prussian army officer published a book on Texas and its mercantile opportunities for Germany. German emigration to Texas, he believed, could enable Germans to

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270 Scherpf’s 1841 work influenced Leiningen in his idea of settling Texas, and Leiningen hoped to get him involved in shares of the society once the latter had achieved its organisational bearings. Garrison’s *Rise and Progress of Texas* likewise served as an influence and source of information for Leiningen. See: Scherpf, 9.
271 Kearney, 21, and “An Act granting Land to Emigrants” sent as a copy to the *Adelsverein* members, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 43-49.
dominate the trade with Indians down into South America, and Galveston, if home to German merchants, would provide Prussia with a harbour from which it could ship German goods into Mexico or the United States. Prussia would be able to better sell its manufactures and receive raw materials that could potentially be grown in abundance in Texas, such as cotton or sugar. Nevertheless, as the previous analysis on European efforts to colonise land during the Mexican era shows, such ambitions were either not put into practice, suffered from poor execution, or failed. The Society sought to remedy this: according to a report, it was “true that many Germans have failed in this blessed land. But what was the cause? Could the lone family, without protection, advice, and knowledge of the country, without a home, exposed to the influence of the weather and climate (…) expect a different fate?” The Society, the report stated, would make sure that such difficulties facing migrants would not ruin the Germans moving to Texas.

The Adelsverein’s sending of von Leiningen and von Boos-Waldeck resulted in the latter’s purchase of a league of land in modern-day Lafayette County, which was named after the patron of the society, Duke Adolf von Nassau. The first objective was to establish a plantation there, for von Leiningen and von Boos-Waldeck, though the former desired ultimately to settle Germans in Texas, realised upon arrival that buying land grants for German colonisation, organising the voyages of families, and affording their protection, would be too impractical, costly, and time-consuming given that the Society was new and had not done any preparations yet.

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273 Memorandum and Declaration by the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants into Texas, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 34-42.
274 Viktor von Leiningen to von Castell, October 11, 1842, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 27-30. See also: Kearney and Biese.
275 Kearney, 32, and mentioned in the Adelsverein correspondence in the Solms-Braunfels Archives, *passim*. For an example, see: Colloredo Mansfeld to von Castell, April 24, 1843, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 70-73.
Earnest German colonisation projects would not start until Carl Prince von Solms-Braunfels became more involved in the society in 1844. The contract for a land grant purchased by the Society in 1842, though not settled with German families, had expired in December of 1843. Despite the assurances of Bourgeois d’Orvanne, who had helped the Society in acquiring the contract, that the contract could be renewed, von Solms found upon his arrival in 1844 that this was not the case.\footnote{Geue, 3.} This notwithstanding, von Solms promoted the idea of German emigration to Texas. He in particular shared the idea that Texas could become a state in which Germans could live as Germans, connected to their motherland and hence beneficial to Germany, merely a Federation of states and hence lacking in the commercial and political power enjoyed by nations such as France and England.\footnote{The history of the Society and its missions in Texas is laid out here in a highly abbreviated version, largely because it has already been described and detailed by several other people, including Kearney, Struve, Bieselee, Geue, Tiling, Kownslar, Jordan, Koerner, and Senger.}

Von Solms issued eleven reports during his time in Texas. Within them, one can see that his desire that the Society facilitate the maintenance of connection between emigrated Germans and their home country. Shortly upon his arrival, von Solms wrote that he was approached by a German living in Texas by the name of Ernst, who expressed to him a toast “to the health of the noble and generous German princes who think of the well being of their subjects on the other side of the ocean”. Von Solms commented on this interaction by stating that “many are happy that through community interests they will be able to have closer ties with the Fatherland”, highlighting that the Germans already in Texas supported the idea of maintaining their German identity and connections despite the geographic distance between Texas and Germany. In order to support his fellow countrymen, von Solms wanted to obtain from the Texian Congress trade advantages for the German farmers of Texas, as well as to “give German industries a new
market, and expand the German maritime industry”\textsuperscript{278}. Much like von Leiningen had wished for in his first address in March of 1842, von Solms also conflated German commercial interest with a colonial presence in Texas. The Germans settling in Texas were not to assimilate as had occurred in the United States – they were supposed to maintain their German identity. As von Solms wrote in his second report, in response to d’Orvanne’s remark that “nationality (was) only a word”, “Yes, for you perhaps, but not for me and the \textit{Verein}”.\textsuperscript{279}

The commercial power that the Society hoped to gain through its colonisation efforts was moreover underlined in von Solms’ reports. On August 20, 1844, von Solms emphasised that he desired a new grant for German settlement located on the Medina River. This tract of land would facilitate commerce with Mexico, he argued, due to the proximity of the Rio Grande and the mule caravans. “In order to make this trade advantageous to our German merchants”, said Solms, “I shall endeavour to secure from Congress a reduced import duty on all shipping under the auspices of the \textit{Verein}.” The conflation of commerce, emigration, and power becomes more evident in his subsequent statement: “The \textit{Verein} is entitled to some evidence of appreciation from the Republic for bringing in resources such as man power”. Von Solms actively argued that German states, through the proxy of the Society, were entitled to commercial advantages vis-à-vis other nations because they provided Texas with immigrants. In order to successfully accomplish these goals, he also requested that the Society send German men to Texas to aid the families who would settle there, for he did not trust Mexicans or Americans to do so. Neither did he trust Frenchmen d’Orvanne, whom he described as having the “typical French arrogance but not the quality to gain for themselves respect”. In order to make this project, so crucial to

\textsuperscript{278} Prince von Solms’ First Report dated July 15, 1844, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History: 3F401, Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
\textsuperscript{279} Prince von Solms’ Second Report dated August 20, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
Germany’s greater commercial, political, and imperial future, viable, von Solms believed that those with the largest interest in its success should lead the German emigrants: fellow Germans.\textsuperscript{280}

In order to solidify these objectives, von Solms recommended that the Verein seek out support from the German governments.\textsuperscript{281} Prussia was an obvious first choice: Prince Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig of Prussia, was a member of the society, and his uncle, King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia, was not unfavourable towards the Verein.\textsuperscript{282} In late 1843, Count von Castell approached the Prussian government through a letter in which he highlighted the benefits that Prussian support of this project would have for Prussia. Von Castell estimated that roughly 35,000 Germans emigrated each year, cutting all ties to their fatherland, and taking both money and valuable labour with them. In the last twenty years, von Castell believed, Germany had thus lost 1,200,000 labourers and 600 – 800 million Gulden, a loss that had spurred the creation of the Adelsverein. The Society, said von Castell, wanted to funnel German emigration into one direction and one location, to assure that the German “labourers would not be exploited by foreign states, and benefit instead the motherland”. The goal was for a German colony that would, despite Germany’s lack of a nation-state, noteworthy navy, and colonial experience, elevate Germany on the international playing field. The fact that Germany could not compete with England, France, and the United States on an imperial level could be used to its advantage, von Castell asserted, because Texas, “fearing the dependence upon North America, England, and France, desires a connection to Germany”. Germany ought instead to impose its influence through its people, because Texas had, according to his estimate, only roughly 160,000 white

\textsuperscript{280} Prince von Solms’ Second Report dated August 20, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
\textsuperscript{281} This was, of course, also a decision motivated heavily by the financial burden of the society.
settlers, among them some Germans. If the 35,000 emigrants leaving Germany each year could be guided toward Texas, the German element in Texas would grow immensely.\footnote{Denkschrift, 25. November, 1843” regarding von Castell’s proposal, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89: Zivilkabinett, jüngere Periode, Nr. 13358: Acta des Königlichen Civil-Kabinets, 1. Abthl., betreffend die Anlegung einer deutschen Colonie in der Republik Texas, 4-5.}

The Verein had started this project on its own, von Castell noted, but it now desired official protection and support from the German regimes. Prussia, described in this letter as the “shield of Germany”, had already acknowledged the importance of an overseas colony for the prosperity of Germany in the 17th century, and would thus, von Castell was sure, recognise the importance of the Society’s involvement in Texas. Prussia’s mission was the promotion and protection of German industry and independence from foreign influence, which it had already defended in various wars, the letter stated. In a second letter, von Castell moreover stated that Daingerfield was eager about this project, for Texas needed migrants. Like von Solms, von Castell believed that it was important that no foreigners guide German emigrants to Texas, because this would not benefit the German fatherland. Rather, Germans should be in charge of establishing a colony in Texas that would essentially create a German state outside of Germany, which would provide the German merchant marines with a trading post akin to those possessed by Europe’s maritime powers. Germany could draw from Texas raw materials, whilst its industry would be able to best its European rivals because of Texas’ German affiliation created through German migrants, and as a result, Germany’s economy would grow and enable more Germans to stay in their homeland.\footnote{Denkschrift, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89, Nr. 13358: Texas, 4-5.} Such considerations showcase deeply how closely linked imperial and commercial ambitions were, even for a non-imperial power like the not-yet-existent Germany.

The Prussian government considered von Castell’s plea, but felt like it did not possess enough information on Texas to make an immediate judgement. In response, it contacted
Alexander von Humboldt as well as the Bremian government. Von Humboldt, though von Leiningen had stated earlier in an address to the Society that the former had praised Texas, was sceptical towards the project, because he feared that Prussian support would create the impression that the state actively encouraged emigration. Moreover, the famous Prussian rejected the idea that German settlers could somehow maintain a significant enough tie with their fatherland, precisely because Germany was not a maritime power like England or France. Those countries, he argued, could support emigration of their subjects, because they possessed navies and marines. He also pointed out that von Castell, who had approached von Humboldt about official support for the Society, had really asked the wrong person because his name, being that of a well-known and influential traveller, had been used and abused by other emigration societies, causing him to shy away from involvement in any colonisation schemes. Based on his discussions with a Texian representative in France and Frenchmen, von Humboldt emphasised to the Prussian government that England had significant imperial interest in Texas – as a buffer state which could protect Mexico from the United States and a state in which slavery could be contested due to the state’s political weakness – which increased U.S.-American anxieties to annex Texas sooner rather than later to prevent the republic from becoming an English stronghold. Prussia, von Humboldt believed, was not fit to enter this debate. He also doubted that the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, guided by von Bülow, who had helped complete the treaty of commerce and amity with Mexico, would be inclined to provide the Society with assistance for its colonial project.

Minister Christian von Rother also gave his opinion on the matter. As chief of the Seehandlung, the Prussian maritime department, he agreed with von Humboldt’s concerns, emphasising that he questioned strongly the practicality and practicability of the Verein’s plan. Much like von Humboldt, he was in disfavour of emigration, and actually asserted that emigration of Germans had gotten so bad, laws would have to be put into place to stop it. Prussia in particular did not suffer from overpopulation, so supporting an emigration society was contrary to its interests, von Rother wrote. The strong imperialist conflict between Mexico, England, and the United States was not one that the German element would be able to compete against, for the three powers would nip any German influence exerted through emigrants in the bud. England, von Rother feared, would use an informal imperialist presence – through the manipulation of tariffs, duties, and taxes – in Texas to make German exports thereto profitless and “impossible”. Since Prussia found itself with politically “bound hands”, preventing it from taking an initiative on the Society’s project, von Rother furthermore recommended that von Castell approach other German Zollverein states and ask them for financial support, especially since the huge sum needed for such an undertaking could not be singularly paid by Prussia, anyway. Lastly, given that he was sceptical regarding Germany’s commercial interests in Texas, von Rother contacted Bremen, which had already established commercial connections to Texas.287

The Bremian who responded was merchant Fred. Delius, who considered Bremian, and more broadly, German, trade with Texas as fairly insignificant. Settlers who had gone to Texas with Bremian vessels delivering goods had been small in number, unaffiliated with the Verein, and Bremen had not been able to export anything of significant value due to the strong economic

287 Von Rother to Prussian Privy Minister von Thile, December 17, 1843, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89, Nr. 13358: Texas, 36-41.
presence of the United States in Texas. The rivalling power there commercially was England. Generally, Delius regarded the civilisation of Texas as backward and consumption as insignificant, and feared that the republic would not maintain its independence for long given its financial and political lability. Texian fears of Mexico contributed to this instability. Just as how commercial competition and the economic advantages of being ‘the first’ in a new market had spurred English and French agents and diplomats on in the process of recognising Texas, the same factor discouraged Delius’ view of Texas. England and France, he argued, had already established a significant presence in Texas, and this, combined with the low consumption there, might prevent German trade from establishing a significant foothold. Delius did not know whether the creation of a “German protectorate” in Texas, fuelled by German emigrants, and the subsequent benefits to German trade, would be achievable.288 Prussian Consul in London, F. W. Schmidt, who also had mercantile connections to Mexico, was also consulted by Rother, and responded to the latter that he strongly rejected the idea of Prussian support of Texas or aid for the Verein. In response, the Prussian government declined the Society’s request for protection and support.289

The Hanseates, though they did not officially support the Adelsverein or engage in significant correspondence with it, had an interest in German emigration to Texas and the society’s project nonetheless. This interest went beyond that which was held by Bremian consul Klaener, who was also involved in the Society during his time in Texas.290 In his negotiations with Daingerfield, Rumpff sought to use the emigration of Germans to Bremen’s advantage. Bremerhaven was, together with Hamburg, Germany’s largest port for emigrants, and the vessels

290 Klaener to Smidt, November 21, 1843, StaA HB: C 26.
sailing to Texas sailed almost exclusively from Bremen. Rumpff wrote to the Senate of the Hanse Towns that his impression of Texas as a destination for German emigrants – based on Daingerfield’s information – was positive, and suggested a separate convention or treaty with Texas on the subject of emigration. In another letter to the Senates, Rumpff reiterated that “the German emigrations to Texas seem indeed to carry a certain measure of weight”, for Daingerfield had emphasised his desire for such a convention on emigration, which might spur the Texian Congress’ desire to sign and ratify the treaty of amity and commerce between the Hanse and Texas. Rumpff pointed here to a society under the leadership of German noblemen, including the Duke von Nassau, the Prince von Leiningen, and Count von Boos-Waldeck – the Adelsverein. The Commerce Deputation of Hamburg hoped that such German colonisation efforts would, if they increased, consolidate the political situation of Texas and thus secure German trade with Texas. In yet another letter, Daingerfield pronounced once more the Texian desire for “respectable immigrants, not entirely without means”, highlighting that Texans hoped to increase the prosperity of their state through European migrants. This motivated Rumpff to write to his governments with the plan of tying emigration to Hanseatic maritime advantages: duties to be paid by Hanseatic vessels could possibly be reduced, he argued, if the ships also carried migrants and their belongings. The capital brought by migrants could result in a proportionate subtraction of the tariff imposed on cargo. Particularly the negative experience Daingerfield had had in Brussels, Belgium, might persuade him to make such a concession to the Hanse, Rumpff noted. The Adelsverein’s goal of bringing 4,000 to 8,000 German emigrants to

292 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 13, 1844, Sta HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2, 39/3 ad. 15.
293 Extract from report No. 39 by Rumpff, April 10, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 22/73.
294 Commerce Deputation of Hamburg to the Senate, March 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
295 Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
Texas in the near future were thus seen as positive by Rumpff. In a subsequent letter, Rumpff announced to his governments that he would press the matter of a convention on this subject with Daingerfield, for he wanted Hanseatic trade to take advantage of German emigration as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{296} In the Hanseatic case, emigration was used as a means by which to increase Hanseatic negotiation power and influence in order to further Hanseatic commerce.

Given Prussia’s rejection to the \textit{Adelsverein}, von Solms, with familial connections to the English royal lineage, sought to acquire a good standing for his society in Britain. He contacted British consul in Texas, Kennedy, in late 1844. The latter was favourable of von Solms, referring to him as an “able and active representative”. Kennedy supported the idea of European emigration to Texas, and wrote to Henry U. Addington that it would be a “pity” if the German endeavour would not succeed.\textsuperscript{297} In another letter, he told Aberdeen that von Solms was “an acute observer” who would recognise “fitness for the arduous enterprise of planting European Settlements in the wastes of Texas”, highlighting that he thought of the Society as more than just a group of dreaming, illusional, German nobles. Kennedy stated: “I bore favourable testimony to the character of the German emigration to this Country. Still greater success may be anticipated for that emigration when conducted under the auspices of so respectable and enlightened a body as the German association represented by the Prince of Solms”. He moreover pronounced that “no sensible friend of independent Texas” would object to this introduction of German colonists, tying the Society’s ambition to a goal that suited English interests: the prevention of U.S. annexation of Texas.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{296} Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
\textsuperscript{297} Kennedy to Addington, October 24, 1844, CBA, 371.
\textsuperscript{298} Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 6, 1844, CBA, 385.
Given that other European powers also had an interest in European migration to Texas, in hopes that this would encourage Texians to have a stronger affiliation to Europe and a lesser to the United States, von Solms wrote a letter to Kennedy outlining that he hoped for some British support in his project. Instead of underlining solely the interests that Germany had in Texas and the benefits it could hope to gain commercially, politically, and militarily, von Solms emphasised the importance of an independent Texas to all of Europe, for a Texas annexed to the United States would lead to the latter’s domination of the entire Gulf of Mexico and the continent. In order to prevent this scenario, von Solms suggested that “there is a very obvious step to be taken, - and that is to fill this Country, and especially the Western part of it, as soon as possible, with a large number of Europeans. Probably aware of the concerns Prussia had had regarding its maritime possibilities, von Solms highlighted to Kennedy that British vessels could aid the German association with the transport of migrants and help equip them. “English arms”, he wrote, referring to previous wars in Europe, “were effective weapons in the hands of the German soldiers of the Legion”. Whereas the Adelsverein’s letters to the Prussian government had portrayed England as a rival, von Solms wrote of a deep Anglo-German friend- and kinship: his intention, he said, “is to serve my native country, as well as Great Britain – that noble Empire, always so nearly and faithfully allied with Germany, and, to show my zeal and solicitude for the service of your Most Gracious Queen, on whom may God bestow his richest blessings!”

What this statement showcases is that agents, even those not necessarily affiliated with a particular government, were well aware of the imperial ambitions and contestations that existed for and in Texas. People like Klaener, von Solms, Schmidt, or Saligny, the first a consul for Bremen as well as an agent of the Society, the second likewise an Adelsverein member, the third a Prussian

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299 Prince von Solms to Kennedy, December 3, 1844, CBA, 386-390.
consul with mercantile interests in Mexico, and the fourth a Frenchman trying to bolster his
career, all showcase that state motives and actions dovetailed with personal interests in the
commercial, diplomatic, and imperial landscape of 1830s and 1840s North America, which
added to the unpredictability, contestability, and fluidity of power relations in the contested
Texian borderlands.

The Republic of Texas emerged in North America at a time when the continent was
highly contested between several powers, including mother country Mexico, England, France,
the United States, the Comanche Empire, and, situated on a lesser imperial tier, the German
states, led politically and economically by Prussia and the Hanse Towns. Initially ill-received by
Europeans because of its destabilising effect on Mexico and threat to European interests there, as
well as its likely annexation to the United States, an imperial and commercial rival who
contested European intervention and influence in the Americas through the Monroe Doctrine,
Texas became interesting to European commerce by the late 1830s due to its raw materials and
lack of industry. Europeans hoped that Texas, described frequently as the best part of Mexico,
now lost to that country, would provide Europe with cotton, sugar, timber, and other raw
materials, and become at the same time a market for European manufactures. Quickly,
Europeans did not believe in the reconquest of Texas by Mexico, and feared that such efforts by
Mexico would only lead to the former’s annexation to the United States. As a result, and in
response to feeling imperilled due to growing U.S.-American imperialism and expansion,
European states tried to persuade Mexico to recognise Texas as independent, seeing the latter as
a buffer state that could secure European commercial interests in the former.

Texas was also seen by several European actors as a state within which their respective
countries could establish their influence. Unlike Mexico, which had been and continued to be
difficult for Europeans to dominate in any way, even through direct intervention in the form of
the Pastry War, Texas seemed an easier target for European informal imperialism.
Commercialey, Europeans hoped for and received better trade agreements, and the country was
stable enough to afford the quick ratification of treaties (unlike in Mexico, where the Hanseatic-
Mexican treaty had even once been lost in the aftermath of chaos caused by insurgencies and
rebellions). Texas, predominantly a plantation and farm-based society and economy, would
factor well into European commercial networks that emphasised the exportation of manufactured
goods from the European core to American peripheral states and the importation of peripheral
raw materials into core states. Cotton was of particular importance to the British. Several
European agents used diplomatic pressure to try and obtain concessions from the Texian
government regarding the commerce of their respective country. Given Texas’ need for people,
Europeans, chiefly among them the Germans through the Adelsverein, also sought to use
emigration to establish a dominant influence in that state vis-à-vis commercial, political, and
imperial rivals.

Though Europeans were in favour of Texian independence by the late 1830s and early
1840s, one large issue remained: Slavery. In the next chapter, the effectiveness and methods of
European informal imperialism in Texas will be analysed in regard to slavery, which many
Texians defended furiously whereas Europeans sought desperately to eradicate it.
Chapter Three – ‘Part and Parcel of the Law of the Land’: European Responses to the
Presence of Slavery in Texas and Informal Empire

Though European interest in Texas was strong, and European agents believed that the young state could be placed in their respective country’s zone of influence, the agents of each European state hoped that Texas, given its strategic geographic location between the United States and Mexico, would tip the commercial, political, and imperial balance in their government’s favour; and Texian cotton in particular became an economic consideration for Europe’s industrialised powers. But Texas’ cotton wealth and potential, praised so frequently in European correspondence, was both the republic’s blessing and its curse.¹ Behind the bales of cotton that were being exported to Europe in steadily growing numbers stood a practice that the European states, under British lead, increasingly condemned: slavery. Texian farmers, like their counterparts in the U.S.-American South, relied heavily on slave labour to grow their cotton. This had already set them up for confrontation with the Mexican government, which sought to rid its territories of the moral ill. Having seceded from Mexico, the Texians had already succeeded once in defending their use of forced African labour, which was, in fact, a main motivation for the Texas Revolution of 1835. How could European agents, interested in their respective state’s commercial gain, respond to a republic whose existence could be credited to its inhabitants’ belief in slavery?

Though it had been responsible for much of the trans-Atlantic slave trade operations for roughly 300 years, Europe, with Britain in the forefront, spent much effort on ending slavery

¹ Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson emphasise in Globalization: A Short History that the nineteenth century was marked by a “double revolution” which had occurred in the late eighteenth century, one political, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and one industrial. See: Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels. P. Petersson, Globalisation: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 59.
throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century. From the banning of the international, trans-Atlantic slave trade to the abolition of slavery within their empires, Europeans were moving toward the eradication of the heinous practice. Britain, claiming for itself the driver’s seat in this endeavour, negotiated a large number of treaties with other European and American governments with the objective of guaranteeing that no slaves be transported on vessels under their respective flags. Abolitionist societies gained prominence on both sides of the Atlantic, and occupied successfully and effectively the moral high ground on this subject, particularly in Britain. The global, predominantly trans-Atlantic triangular, network of slavery, found itself under attack in response to political pressures brought forth by the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment era. Slavery no longer seemed just or justifiable, ultimately leading to the war on slavery during the nineteenth century. This political current clashed, however, with a commercial one: Though the moral inaptitude of slavery was widely acknowledged and accepted in Europe by the first half of the nineteenth century, the commercial benefits to be reaped from it had grown in response to the Industrial Revolution. The textile industry, and especially the British one, relied heavily on cotton. As chapter one has showcased, this crop stood at the foundation of Britain’s economic wealth and power. Unfortunately, most of this cotton, so imperative to Britain’s commercial interests and consequently its imperial, military, and maritime strength, was grown in the United States, more specifically in the U.S.-

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2 Beckert points out that Europe was able to dominate and build an empire of cotton which gave it wealth, power, and prestige because Europeans began “combining imperial expansion and slave labor with new machines and wage workers.” See: Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), xi. He moreover describes England prior to the revolution as “an imperial nation characterized by enormous military expenditures, a nearly constant state of war, a powerful and interventionist bureaucracy, high taxes, skyrocketing government debt, and protectionist tariffs,” which was able to combine the powers of the state and capital to create a global production complex – tied to the Americas via plantations, Africa via slaves, and England for processing – wherein the British “used the capital, skills, networks, and institutions of cotton to embark upon the upswing in technology and wealth that defines the modern world.” See: Beckert, Empire of Cotton., xv.
American South – by slave labourers.³ Britain needed cotton, of that fact there was no question, but it also wanted to pursue an abolitionist policy at a time when slavery was increasingly less accepted socially and morally. How could it combine its two opposing interests, when U.S. use of slaves was made so tremendously more lucrative because of England’s cotton-hungry factories? This question loomed over the British government, unable to find a way of uniting its political, moral, philanthropic, and social interests on the one hand, and its commercial and economic on the other.

The independence of Texas brought this question to a head more urgently than before, for independent Texas actively and overtly portrayed itself as a slave state. Slavery stood at the

³ Britain tried to obtain cotton from elsewhere, but this proved difficult in the early nineteenth century: As a result of political tumult and revolution, Spanish America’s economic output was decimated, including its cotton output. In 1821, production had fallen to 44 million pounds, and continued to fall until 1840, when production amounted to 35 million pounds. Asian production outside of India fell also, from 190 million pounds in 1791 to 110 million in 1840. See: Stuart Bruchey, *Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy: 1790-1860* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), 7. For more statistics on cotton, see Bruchey, 7-40. C. A. Bayly describes the weakening of Asian empires in *Imperial Meridian*, where he asserts that many Asian empires experienced a “hollowing out” from within in response to a “tribal breakout” – the rise of smaller power groups – which provides a “critical context for the rise of British territorial dominion in India and the rising influence of European powers within the Ottoman empire and Iran”. See: C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Longman, 1989), 2-6. Beckert also highlights that the cotton production of many Asian empires did not respond well to European demand because their countrysides did not adapt to it, see: Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*, 87. The political instability and change in Asia and Spanish America, together with the decreased import of Indian textiles into Europe, the increased British exportation of its cotton cloth to India, as well as the existence of raw cotton trade networks among Asian states, negatively influenced cotton production in these regions, and combined with the ever-growing need of British cotton mills, Britain had to obtain most of its cotton from elsewhere. See: Helta Kawakatsu, *The Lancashire Cotton Industry and Its Rivals: International Competition in Cotton Goods in the Late Nineteenth Century: Britain versus India, China, and Japan* (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2018), 60-61. Beckert highlights that, though India was an important cotton producer, the British had to compete against Asian buyers of Indian cotton. Bengal, for example, imported more than 43 million pounds in 1802, principally from India. These competing circuits of cotton manufacturing existent in Asia began to collapse by the second half of the nineteenth century. Beckert also notes that Indian cotton growing was more difficult to manipulate according to British demand than U.S.-American cotton growing, due to how the Indian countryside produced cotton. See: Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*, 130-134. By the early 1840s, 85% of the raw cotton reaching British shores originated in the southern United States. In fact, by this point in time, U.S.-grown cotton made up more than 60% of global production, and by 1850, it briefly surpassed two-thirds of the global total. Just as the British economy became tied to the import of raw cotton and export of cotton manufactures, the U.S. – particularly its South – became tied to the export of raw cotton. Whereas only a little over 3 million dollars’ worth of capital was employed in growing cotton in 1791, this number rose to 80 million ten years later, and reached 800 million in 1835. Between 1830 and 1845, the percentage of crop exported rarely dropped below 80 percent annually. See: Bruchey, 7, 8, 14, and Andrew J. Torget, *Seeds of Empire: Cotton, Slavery, and the Transformation of the Texas Borderlands, 1800-1850* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 282.
foundation of its existence and secession from Mexico. Like many new Spanish-American
countries, Mexico quickly worked on restricting slavery and finally abolished it in 1829. The
Texian secession thus symbolised an overt expansion of slavery and forced the British
government to take a stance and make a fateful decision: Should it, in the interest of morality and
commerce, assist Mexico in fighting Texian independence, or should it follow its growing
commercial interests in Texas and afford it recognition despite the presence of slavery? Or was
Texas perhaps an opportunity – an opportunity to cement British influence in North America by
using informal-imperialist measures to establish Texas as a rival of the United States, the latter of
which would be damaged economically, halted in its expansion, and threatened in its practice of
slavery, if the former could be turned into a cotton-producing, slave-free republic? This chapter
will analyse European responses to the slavery question in Texas and will argue that slavery was
one of, and, more than likely, the largest point of contestation between European powers and
Texas. Slavery prevented deeper commercial, social, and political ties between Europe and
Texas, and ultimately became the one subject which put informal imperialism in Texas to the
test: could European governments pressure Texas into ridding itself of slavery? In the 1830s and
1840s, Texas became the dominant North American battleground between European imperialism
and its U.S.-American counterpart, with slavery being the catalyst.

**Slavery and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century**

The morality of slavery, questioned emphatically in the late eighteenth century and
ultimately rejected, had lasting consequences on European imperialism. Slavery led to a major
political revolution in French Saint Domingue, a territory built on slave labour which
successfully revolted against French rule; it spurred U.S. imperialism and expansion, and almost
tore the nation apart in its bloodiest war; and the continued presence of slavery in Africa was one
of the contributing factors to European justifications of their colonisation of ‘uncivilised’ Africa toward the end of the nineteenth century. Many of the political, moral, philanthropic, and social arguments that guided Western policy on slavery throughout the century were founded on French Revolutionary and Enlightenment Era thought. Jeremy D. Popkins highlights how France’s colonial empire shaped the French Revolution and its theoretical bearings, pointing out that slavery was one of the gravest offences to the French cries for Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité and that the slave insurrection in Saint Domingue pushed revolutionaries in Paris to embrace emancipation. In front of the Convention of February 4, 1794, Louis-Pierre Dufay tied France’s revolution and its ideals directly to French pride, honour, and dignity, by expressing his beliefs that France needed to abolish slavery in order to fully fulfil the promises of liberty, and to allow France to reassume her position amongst Europe’s Great Powers. This underlines that the issue of slavery became a two-headed prong for Europeans after the French Revolution: on the one hand, a rejection of slavery enabled European governments to occupy the moral high ground and improved their political standing; on the other, the significance of the textile industry in the

4 After the fall of the monarchy on August 10, 1792, the French revolutionaries were less certain about the stance that France should take in regard to that dreaded institution. Should France not advocate for the end of slavery, led under the banner of liberty and equality, and by doing so pose as an example for the rest of the world? The emergence of this question dominated French discussions of slavery, which became more rhetorical and philosophical, creating a rift between France’s economic motivations and interests, i.e. the benefits of slavery, and its political ones. The decreased validity of economic arguments is evidenced by the fact that white colonists did not try to convince the Convention of the benefits slavery held, and instead endeavoured to persuade it to maintain that institution by pointing out that their political rights had been violated, which marked the true absence of liberty and equality promised and thus France’s real failure. Deciding the fate of slavery in the colonies was difficult for the Convention, for many of its constituents were unaware of how slavery truly functioned, and what should replace it. Condorcet, for instance, did not apparently understand that slaves had not sold themselves, but were placed in their dire situation by force. Whereas Lequinio believed emancipation needed to happen, he wanted this to occur slowly. Robespierre, arguably at the head of the Convention, did not mention much on slavery, other than that he condemned the slave trade. See: Jeremy D Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 329-340.

5 It is noticeable that the revolutionary leaders were unsure of how to proceed in the colonies, and that their insecurity stemmed mainly from their need to define ideals of liberty and equality, and who they encompassed. Dufay made his case for emancipation of slaves on a mostly political and rhetorical, not an economic, basis. He couched his argument in enunciations of liberty and equality – the fairly standard considerations of the French government at the time. But he also included another element, that of French national interest. See: Popkin, 358.
aftermath of the Industrial Revolution made slavery economically more propitious and rewarding.  

Napoleon reinstated slavery in France’s colonies in 1802. Nevertheless, the French Revolutionary Wars and especially the subsequent Napoleonic Wars helped spread French Revolutionary ideas to other European states, where Enlightenment thought had already established itself.  

Wallerstein evaluates the importance of these ideological underbearings cemented in Europe during the era of the French Revolution in regard to World-Systems Analysis, arguing that ideology bound this world-system together in form of what he labels a ‘geoculture’: developed during the time frame of the French Revolution, this ideology revolves around the belief in sovereignty of the people. The beliefs in equality, liberty, and fraternity did not lead to the immediate abolition of slavery, as the final abolition of slavery in French colonies did not occur until 1848 (1833 for English colonies). Moreover, Europe pursued a policy of political restoration through the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 and thus reintroduced some conservative principles. Nevertheless, French revolutionary and enlightenment thought contributed to the arguments used by the opponents of slavery.  

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6 Dufay had argued in the late 18th century that slavery was not economically efficient, suggesting that there no economic factor to be considered in the matter. By the early 19th century, cotton’s importance to European commerce and prosperity really cemented itself, which augmented the prevalence of the above-mentioned paradox: Europeans wanted to get rid of slavery at a time when it was becoming most economically advantageous.  
7 Napoleon, despite the fact that he proclaimed himself emperor, brought back some of the customs of the ancien regime, and reintroduced slavery in 1802 after emancipation had been decreed by the National Convention in February 1794, enforced many revolutionary changes in French law, education, and society. Where Napoleon’s empire spread, those revolutionary changes followed. The Code Civil gave renewed affirmation to the inviolability of private property, the abolition of feudalism, as well as civil equality. Scholarships, technical schools and improved secondary schools were made available to Frenchmen, and through his conquests of Spain, Germany, Italy and other European regions, the French legacy from 1789 spread across the European continent. See: Rafe Blaufarb, Napoleon: Symbol for an Age. A Brief History with Documents (New York: Bedford, 2008), 11-16.  
8 Slavery in the British colonies was impacted by the French Revolution in several ways, and not all of them were of a purely ideological nature. Michael Duffy in “War, Revolution, and the Crisis of the British Empire” points out that British officials were initially eager to acquire France’s lucrative Caribbean and West Indy islands, believing that they would afford Britain “a degree of commercial prosperity beyond all calculation”. Yet the presence of slavery there posed a logistic problem concerning British designs of annexation, for the emancipation of slaves in February 1794 by the National Convention raised fears among British statesmen that the French Caribbean Empire would no
The French Revolution had not been the spark for British abolitionism. As John Dinwiddy has argued, British evangelicalism had its own compunctions as regards slavery and formed another element of abolitionist sentiment in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Dinwiddy does assert, however, that English religiosity and the Church of England rose in importance during the French Revolutionary age. Moreover, Michael Duffy argues that the French Revolutionary War and the impact of French ideals of abolitionism and emancipation resulted in a disruption of the elements of British imperialism: “military strength, mutual economic benefit and an opportunist game of divide and rule.”

Duffy notes that Britain was heavily confronted with French revolutionary ideals and their potential for eliciting insurrection and disquietude in the Caribbean and West Indies. By the onset of the nineteenth century, Britain was confronted with religious, strategic, ideological and ethical arguments against slavery.

British compunction over slavery resulted in significant political and legal change within the British Empire, impacting its global commerce, imperialism, and hegemonic understanding longer be maintainable and manageable. Unrest among the slaves on these islands would strain the British navy, and might not have been quellable in light of Britain’s engagement in a war with France beyond the American coastal lines. Britons fretted the possibility that French revolutionary sentiment could spill from French-owned colonies to theirs, and by 1795, British aspirations of taking over France’s predominantly slave-built empire had given way to British desperations to hold on to their own. Slavery became thus a factor of severe unpredictability and potential destructiveness in British colonies. See: Michael Duffy, “War, Revolution and the Crisis of the British Empire,” in The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, ed. Mark Philip (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 118-120.

10 Duffy, 120.
11 One such example is Grenada, where Catholic French planters and francophone mulattoes protested British restrictions of their rights (a decision that had been made in anticipation of unrest among slaves yet led to discontent among the more elitist planters and mulattoes), using revolutionary ideals to do so. See: Duffy, 130. This confrontation with the French Revolution, which concerned itself domestically with British imperialism in the West and East Indies, but also Ireland, and England itself, led British officials and intellectuals to define themselves largely in contrast to the French. French liberty, portrayed by the British as tyrannical for it was marred by the bloody struggles of the 1790s when thousand were guillotined, was contrasted starkly with British liberty built on British institutions. Duffy, 11-116. Philip also addresses the debates between intellectuals in Britain, some of whom were Francophile reformers who regarded the French Revolution as a bearer of universal liberty, and others who were loyalists who rejected the excesses of the French and referred instead to British liberty. See: Philip, “The Fragmented Ideology of Reform,” in ed. Philip, 52.
of itself. In the early 19th century, the British public founded anti-slavery societies, and newspapers condemning slavery, such as the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*. The abolitionist movement in Great Britain gained such momentum that it resulted in multiple pieces of legislation being passed that limited the expansion of slavery in the British Empire, beginning with the Slave Trade Act of 1807, which banned the international slave trade, and culminating in the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. With slavery banned in the British Empire, most British abolitionists redirected their focus, and, strengthened by their success, decided to encompass in their movement an international facet with the goal of ending slavery world-wide. One of the first steps taken was to target slave trafficking, which encompassed British excursions into African coastal regions. The Ashanti Empire, a dominant force in the African Gold Coast region, had defended some of their territorial claims against the British in 1824 and signed a boundary treaty with the British Empire in 1831. In order to impel the Ashanti to quit partaking in the slave trade and slavery, the British offered to educate the son and nephew of the Ashanti King in London in 1836, which the *Morning Post* hoped would lead to the spread of enlightened and humanitarian thought to the Ashanti Empire. The British Empire’s efforts against slavery during this time frame did not concentrate primarily on Africa, however: rather, they focussed on other European powers.

**THE BRITISH SLAVE-TRADE TREATIES AS A TOOL OF BRITISH POWER**

One way by which the British hoped to curb slavery’s expansion and in fact exact its retreat was by use of anti-slavery treaties with several nations around the globe, beginning with


13 Close, 2-5.

other European states. In 1818, the British government ratified a treaty with the Spanish which foresaw the abolition of the slave trade within the entirety of the Spanish Empire. For this, the British government even paid 400,000 pound sterling (over forty million U.S. dollars in 2019 currency) to the Spanish Crown so that it may compensate those Spanish subjects who had been engaged in the trade slave and either had incurred losses due to British capturing of vessels prior to the ratification of the treaty, or were expected to incur them in the future as a result of the cessation of the slave trade. The British also initiated treaties with other states, such as Portugal and the Netherlands. The treaty with Portugal looked very similar to that with Spain: Britain demanded an end to the international slave trade within a very short period of time, stating that those engaged in the trade would be given “six months after the date of (ratification) for the completion of enterprises already commenced.” Portugal received 300,000 pound sterling (around thirty million U.S. dollars in 2019) for losses suffered at the hands of British vessels that had seized Portuguese ships transporting slaves during the Napoleonic Wars, and in exchange for the ratification of the treaty, Portugal also received a British loan over 600,000 pound sterling. The British government also established six Mixed Commission Courts with Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch representation (those nations which had been heavily engaged in the slave trade and with which Britain had signed treaties) in Brazil, Cuba, Suriname, and three courts in Sierra Leone. Britain’s remarkable ability to impel other European empires to cease their engagement in the international slave trade in such an astonishingly short period of time was coupled to Britain’s newly acquired status as the world’s hegemonic power after the defeat of Napoleonic

15 British and Foreign State Papers, 1834/1835, 55.
16 British and Foreign State Papers, 1834/1835, 78.
France in 1815, which rang in the onset of a century of relative peace in Europe (although not necessarily overseas) under the banner of *Pax Britannica*. The fact that many of these treaties, which enabled the British to search and seize foreign vessels, gave the British significant power did not go unnoticed by European states: the Prussian government, for instance, rejected an Anglo-Prussian treaty for the abolition of the slave trade, and refused to sign or accede to the Franco-British treaty on the same subject matter. As Prussian representative Ancillon noted, Prussia feared that Britain would use such a treaty as an excuse to unjustly seize and search Prussian ships. This fear, said Ancillon, existed within the Prussian government mostly because Prussia engaged but little in trade with those involved in the slave trade, and with the Maritime Company and the Company of Eberfeldt, the two predominant maritime endeavours of Prussia, under government control, there should have existed little reason for the British to desire a slave trade treaty with Prussia – unless, of course, the British merely held the ulterior motive of gaining the right to search Prussian commercial vessels for British commercial benefit.\(^{18}\) Hans Count von Königsmarck, Prussian agent in the Hague, underlined in an 1849 letter to his government that the British government’s behest had motivated the Dutch King to incorporate the earlier agreements between the two countries regarding the slave trade within the Dutch statute book, a move that the English had desired in order to pressure France on the slave trade matter and its unwillingness to engage in further agreements with Britain. “Dutch compliance”, according to von Königsmarck, could pose as a “recommendable example for France”\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) British and Foreign State Papers, 1834/1835, 115.
The might that Britain could achieve through the slave-trade treaties was indeed utilised in full by the British, to the extent that the Portuguese government sent a circular note to the European courts with the object of complaining against British policies that had arisen in response to Anglo-Portuguese slave agreements in 1839. These policies Portugal described as “unprovoked, oppressive, and unjust”; an attack upon that independent nation. This showcases how interlaced slavery, slavery-related agreements and treaties, power, and imperialism were during the first half of the nineteenth century. In response to the Portuguese note, British Viscount and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry Palmerston, likewise wrote letters to the European courts, justifying British action by attaching the negotiations and agreements concluded between Portugal and England. Palmerston asked the European representatives, including Prussian Baron Werther, chargé d’affaires of the King of Prussia in London, “to refer to those negotiations for proofs, showing how entirely groundless and false are all the assertions made by the Government of Portugal”. Britain used the Portuguese note to portray itself in a favourable light and enhance its political prestige. Palmerston spoke of British “forbearance” and goodwill towards a Portugal guilty of “bad faith” and “breach of engagement”. What made the elimination of slavery such a compelling foreign policy issue was that, due to political and philanthropic currents extant in the entire Western world at the time, Britain was able to occupy both the moral high ground and intervene in other states’ affairs at the same time.

In a copy of papers relating to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty from the Regency era, this potent combination is clearly identifiable in the language used by Palmerston in addressing
Portuguese Baron de Moncorvo, chargé d’affaires in London: given that the slave trade “has long been denounced as criminal by all the Nations of Europe”, Britain thought that it was “entitled to claim the co-operation of Portugal” on the matter, and, given the horrors of the trade and the British belief in Portugal’s morality, ethics, and humanity, it did not “permit (itself) the doubt, that such co-operation will be obtained”. A stance against such agreements with Britain could easily give the rejecting nation a negative image; an image of a state in favour of trafficking humans and perpetrating slavery, which could sway public opinion in several European countries against that party which had opted against this treaty. Because of its moral superiority and sagacity, Britain also reserved the right to steer Portuguese slave trafficking even if Portugal were to turn down the British effort for a treaty: “in case the Sovereign of Portugal ‘should persist in allowing his subjects to prosecute the traffic, (…) His (British) Majesty had an undoubted right to require, that their commercial operations should be confined to their usual haunts, and should not be extended to the tracts of coast, which His Majesty had determined to abandon and to leave to the undisturbed possession of its native inhabitants.’”

British politicians expected that other European powers follow their country’s lead and leave alone those regions Britain had declared as abandoned by Europeans and as being in the possession of the natives. Such examples emphasise the interplay of political-imperial influence and moral rectitude regarding slavery. Abolitionism played a role in cementing British hegemony.

The prestige that Britain was afforded through its abolitionist activism was identified as somewhat unique to that country by British politicians, who took pride in the fact that their country was ‘the first’ to initiate many of the milestones that would eventually lead to the end of

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22 Copies of Papers Containing the Substance of the Negotiations Between Great Britain and Portugal for the Purpose of Putting Down the Slave Trade Carried on Under the Flag of Portugal, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA, II, Nr. 5324: Slave Trade.
slavery. Britons regarded it as important that their country maintain this status as the trailblazer and vanguard of abolitionist policy, for it gave Britain moral credence, clout, and influence. In a Parliamentary paper from July 6, 1837, Colonel Thompson noted that he had had, in January of 1820, the “honour of negotiating, under the orders of Sir William Keir Grant in the Persian Gulf, the first treaty or public act in which the slave-trade was written down by its proper name of piracy”. He pointed out that North America had likewise made such a treaty in the same year, but was quick to emphasise that, despite frequent perception to the contrary, this treaty had followed England’s treaty rather than vice versa. The U.S. treaty, spoke Thompson, had taken place in May, which meant that “the British was actually the prior” – it was only for “the difference in the modes of communication” that “the American act was known in England first”. Thompson highlighted that he wanted to make British politicians aware of this fact, which would remind the British government of its significance in the struggle against slavery, and might motivate the government to take more urgent steps in substantial affairs related to slavery: “above all things”, Thompson stated, his remark was supposed to aid the government so as “not to expose themselves to the charge of stopping the small flies in their net, and letting the great ones through”.

Britain continued to assume its position as the world’s dominant abolitionist force even after the demise of the Portuguese and Spanish empires in the Americas and entered treaties with Latin America’s new nations. Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela are just three Latin American nations that signed treaties with Britain with the objective of banning the slave trade.

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24 Most Latin American nations had already banned slavery prior to that during or after their revolutions against Spanish rule.
Sometimes, the British even used coercion to accomplish their goal, such as in Brazil in the 1840s. In a Parliamentary session in 1838, Harry C. W. Verney supported the idea that Britain ought apply “nothing short of the punishment of piracy for those engaged in the horrid traffic in slaves,” emphasising a British willingness to intervene against slavery on an international scale. Verney highlighted the Brazilian slave trade as contemptible, declaring that “there were no fewer than seventeen slave-ships, fully laden, entered for clearing in the port of Rio Janeiro in the last month of 1837”. “These things”, said Verney, “should not be allowed to pass unnoticed, neither should the present opportunity be suffered to elapse without a further effort to suppress the diabolical traffic”. The potency that such British intervention in the affairs of other countries was able to establish due to its foundation on arguments against slavery was also underlined by the parliamentary paper’s summary of Verney’s views: “Whatever might be the issue, he trusted, that the Government would not shrink from enforcing the treaties entered into on the subject, even by war if necessary; and he was quite sure, that however strong the course they might take, they would have the cordial concurrence of the public”. Abolitionism was a moral as well as an imperial tool that strengthened the British Empire by unifying its political and public opinions on this matter. As Verney remarked: “It was a singular fact, and one which he hoped the Government would be able to explain, that those States over which England exercised most

25 There, slavery was still incredibly prevalent, and the relatively bloodless revolution of the 1820s which had left a king in charge and an empire in place had done little to change the social structure. Brazil’s elites continued to rely heavily on slave labour, but when foreign recognition was sought, Britain refused to open diplomatic relations with Brazil until the latter agreed to signing an anti-slave trade treaty in 1826. When Brazilian elites continued to resist the treaty and ignored its provisions, in the 1840s, the British navy seized Brazilian vessels that carried slaves. See: L. M. Bethell, “Britain, Portugal and the Suppression of the Brazilian Slave Trade: The Origins of Lord Palmerston’s Act of 1839,” The English Historical Review, 80, No. 317 (1965), 761-84.

influence were those which were most active in the traffic”. In another meeting, Colonel Thompson voiced something similar, asking “for what were we strong-why did we keep up a large army, and why such a noble navy, if not for the purpose of upholding our own rights, and causing the rights of others to be respected?” Informal imperialism could be justified so long as the ground for intervention was the curbing of slavery; this justification stood to satisfy both British politicians and the British public, and it occurred under a banner of selflessness, for Britons liberated Africans whose rights Britain had gloriously taken it upon herself to defend.

Correspondence and negotiations with Mexico, which had abolished slavery years earlier, were also opened in regard to a slave-trade treaty; this effort came to fruition in 1843. This treaty emphasised that it was Britain’s desire to effect “the total extinction of the barbarous traffic in slaves”, which other states – in this instance, Mexico – had the “sincere desire to co-operate” with. Much like Portugal, Prussia, or Brazil, Mexican authorities feared the potential influence the British navy could garner over Mexican vessels due to the article on the mutual right to search and seizure in the event that slave trafficking be suspected. As a result, Mexico pushed for the exclusion of its immediate coastal area in order to protect its coastal trade from possible British intervention, a move in accordance with Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of an article in its treaties of amity and commerce with other states that specified that its coastal trade be reserved for its own national vessels. The concern was that British vessels might circumvent this article by use of the slave-trafficking treaty, which would give it an advantage vis-à-vis Mexico and other commercial and imperial powers. Thus, the treaty specified that determined coastal

27 “Foreign Slave Trade”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838.
regions would be exempted, “with a view to avoid even the possibility of annoyance to the
coasting trade of Mexico from the exercise of the mutual right of search stipulated in the present
article”. 

Moreover, Mexican doubts led to the incorporation of another stipulation which Mexican
authorities hoped would protect their country from too much British influence: Article IX of the
treaty outlined items and scenarios that qualified as “reasonable” cause for the belief that a
certain vessel was engaged in slave trafficking. These included the presence of spare planks (to
build a second or slave deck), shackles, bolts, or handcuffs; a quantity of water much larger than
that which would commonly be found on a merchant vessel; a large quantity of mess tubs; and
an extraordinary quantity of certain foodstuff such as rice, flour, manioc, maize, or cassava.

Mexico, subject to so much internal strife and desperate to quell the insurgencies extant in so
many places – rebellions had occurred in Zacatecas, Tampico, Yucatan, Tamaulipas, and several
other states between 1835 and 1845 – worried that this treaty with the British would hamper its
ability to transport troops or convicts by sea, thus impacting deeply the governmental ability to
regain and maintain order in the country. Because of this, the treaty included a clause stating
that, “to avoid even the possibility of prejudice resulting from the Ninth Article of the Treaty of
this date to the merchants vessels which the Mexican Government may have occasion to employ
in certain cases for the conveyance of troops by sea, or of convicts from one point of the
Republic to another, it is agreed to except from the operation of the said IX Article the merchants
vessels employed by the Mexican Government in such service”. Britain’s crusade for

abolitionism was thus identified by Mexico, already cautious regarding European intervention, influence, and imperialism exercised through informal means, as another tool that the British might use to pervade it more deeply.

The United States in particular became a thorn in the eyes of British slavery opponents, who believed that their Anglo-Saxon cousins should follow their doctrine and banish the taking of humans as property from their Southern plantations. British parliamentary member John Bowring argued that, whereas Britain had made great strides toward the abolition of slavery, this marking the one subject that Britons of “all parties and all sides of the House” could agree on, progress on the matter could be facilitated if British abolitionism “spread to another great nation”, the United States. Bowring referred to U.S. conduct as “distressing to her best friends”, particularly because the United States was a nation founded under “republican auspices” that were betrayed by the existence of slavery there. Especially the perpetration of the slave trade to Texas was criticised by Bowring as problematic. Though Bowring acknowledged that English pressure on the United States could only be limited, he hoped that the British government would go as far as it could “with propriety” to communicate its feelings regarding slavery to the U.S. government. The fact that such a large portion of British imports of cotton came from the United States thus agitated British abolitionists, as well as the general British public, which, constituting the main recipients of British textiles, pressured both the government as well as British manufacturers to consider alternatives to U.S. cotton.


34 Bowring furthermore lamented that “not only did (the United States) make no difficulty in admitting to her union new states in which slavery had long existed, but by her instrumentality slavery was forced into countries where it had been wholly extirpated”. “Treaties for the Abolition of Slavery”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, July 6, 1837.
With the overwhelming majority of cotton coming from the U.S.-American South, where the economy was built on the backs of African slaves, many Brits who opposed slavery argued that the British Empire was essentially still a nation in favour of the heinous practice. Beckert identifies the paradoxical relationship between British commercial interest in cotton and British antipathy towards slavery, noting that emancipation in the British West Indies had contributed to their decline as a cotton source for the British mainland.\(^\text{35}\) Nevertheless, he also showcases that slavery became a commercial liability due to its volatile nature and unpredictability, which led most Britons to ultimately favour the abolition of slavery in the United States. Slave rebellions could cause unrest in the U.S. South and break supply chains, continental Europeans were increasingly competing with Britain for U.S. cotton, and a dependence on U.S. cotton decreased the effectiveness of the core-periphery relationship between British manufacturers and U.S. cotton growers. Therefore, Britons increasingly saw an abolition of slavery in the United States and the seeking of alternative cotton sources as compatible with British commercial interests.\(^\text{36}\)

**Slavery in Texas: A New Slave State**

As soon as British Parliament discussed Texas, slavery became a primary issue. In the 1836 parliamentary sessions discussed last chapter, members Barlow Hoy, Henry George Ward, and Fowell Buxton all expressed their disfavour for the independence of Texas on the grounds that this would lead to a promotion of the slave trade and slavery that would not occur with Texas under Mexican rule.\(^\text{37}\) Hoy expressed this reservation even though the United States had

\(^{35}\) Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*, 96.

\(^{36}\) Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*, 121-123.

\(^{37}\) Hoy observed that Mexico, if it could keep Texas, would be very likely to arrest the slave trade in that territory, given that Mexican laws prohibited it, whereas the prevailing of the Texians would lead to the state’s annexation to the United States and hence the spread of slavery. See: “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836, Collection: 19\(^\text{th}\) Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 35, 925-967, cc. 928-942. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: [https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0035p0-0020?accountid=7121](https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0035p0-0020?accountid=7121). Mexico had several laws curbing slavery. The introduction of slaves was forbidden, and given that Anglo-Texians did not abide by this
also banned the international slave trade in 1808. He, together with other parliamentary members, believed that the Texian Revolution had only been a fight for slavery, not for liberty. Subsequent debates continued to regard the Republic of Texas and its likely annexation to the United States in the event that Mexico did not reconquer it as a huge setback for British plans of abolitionism. Henry George Ward also raised the House’s awareness concerning the delicate balance of slave and free states within the United States, which would be thrown off balance if prohibition, Mexican troops were sent to Texas in 1830. The main objective of this action was the suspension of contraband trade, including that in slaves. The small number of troops did not make a large impact on the Texians coming from Southern U.S. states. The Constitution of 1824 forbade the continuation of slavery by birth, i.e. no person born in Mexico after 1824 should be born a slave or introduced into Mexico as a slave, and slavery was officially abolished in Mexico. State Coahuila y Tejas had an additional article in its 1827 constitution which reaffirmed the federal constitutional tenets. In 1829, President Guerrero issued a decree abolishing slavery in all of Mexico, effective immediately. WhenTexians sought to circumvent such legal restrictions by labelling their slaves as ‘apprentices’ officially and by keeping them as indentures servants for ninety-nine-year contracts, the Mexican State Legislature passed a law forbidding contracts for periods over ten years. This was a direct response to the Texian resistance to Mexico’s abolitionist stance on slavery. Children of ‘apprentices’ should moreover be freed from this state (de facto, slavery) by the age of fourteen. See: Benjamin Lundy, The War in Texas: a review of facts and circumstances, showing that this contest is a crusade against Mexico, set on foot and supported by slaveholders, land-speculators, &c. in order to re-establish, extend, and perpetuate the system of slavery and the slave trade in the republic of Mexico (Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1837), 10. The step of annexation, if it occurred, would surely be taken by Texians and U.S.-Americans to “establish slavery, and the slave-trade, permanently, in that province”. The war fought by the Texians, Hoy asserted, was “not for independence, not for liberty, but positively for slavery”. He was joined in this belief by Buxton, who asserted that the Texian-Mexican war’s main purpose was, on the Anglo-American side, the expansion of slavery. “If the British Government did not interfere to prevent the Texian territory from falling into the hands of American slave-holders”, he warned, “in all probability a greater traffic in slaves would be carried on during the next fifty years than had ever before existed”. The issue of slavery dominated the Parliamentary debate so enormously that one Colonel Thompson felt it necessary to remark that “the political importance of the subject (of Texas) had been a good deal lost sight of in the stress which was laid upon the question of the slave trade”, demonstrating that the presence of slavery in Texas overshadowed all other British considerations. Indeed, Hoy had already raised concerns regarding the presence of slavery in a meeting on June 30, 1836, and in subsequent discussions in Parliament, slavery continued being a primary issue. On March 9, 1837, slavery in Texas was considered at length. In 1838, the Texas Question arose again in relation to slavery, when Verney addressed Parliament, claiming that “the annexation of Texas to the United States of North America would be a death-blow to the abolition of slavery, if some strong measures were not taken to neutralize the evil consequences certain to accrue from it to the hapless negroes”. See: “Foreign Slave Trade”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838. Though slavery was a major topic for debate, other points were brought up, like British financial and commercial interest in Mexico. A Parliamentary member named Molesworth also connected the Texas Question to the Canada Question in several meetings, interrogating whether parallels could be drawn between both territories that could impact British policy-line in Canada. See, ex: “Affairs of Canada”, House of Commons Sitting of Monday, March 6, 1837, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 36, 1280-1364, cc. 1287-1362. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu/parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0036p0-0023?accountid=7121. Many of these excerpts dovetailed and ultimately led back to the discussion of the slavery question, however.
Texas were annexed and possibly result in an even more expansionist imperial rival to Britain; one that would spread slavery across the continent.40

Hoy also pointed toward Britain’s right to interfere in the Texian struggle in support of Mexico, for Britain had already spent a lot of monetary resources on crushing the slave trade: “after the enormous sums expended in abolishing and putting down slavery”, he stated, “it would render the whole of that expenditure useless, and allow slavery to take deep root in situations with respect to which this country, had both the power and right to interfere in suppressing it”.

The costs of the described endeavour were listed by Hoy:

The expense of the establishment at Sierra Leone was annually 40,795l.-the support of captured slaves 25,000l.-the expense of the Commissioners, 16,000l.-the expenses of twelve vessels stationed off the coast of Africa, 60,000l. and for eight or ten vessels in South America and the West Indies, 25,000l. more. These expenses were annual, and still continuing charges upon the country. The several items amounted to 166,000l. If to these payments was added the interest upon the 20,000,000l. given to the West-Indies, with the grants to Spain and Portugal, and the head-money formerly paid to the navy, to the amount of 484,000l. per annum, the whole annual expenditure of this country for the suppression of the slave trade was about 1,100,000l., calculating the interest at about 3½ per cent.41

This highlights that slavery was deeply intertwined with the imperial and commercial currents of the era. Britain had invested a lot of money into its humanitarian effort of suppressing slavery, but this humanitarianism dovetailed with the continued strengthening of the British navy, one of the main cornerstones of British imperialism and commerce, as well as the slave-trade treaties completed between Britain and other countries, which were used to establish Britain as a hegemon through moral, not just military and economic, superiority.

40 “The result of the annexation of the province of Texas would be the creation of nine additional slaveholding States,” Ward argued, “with eighteen Representatives in the Congress at Washington; and that circumstance would put an end to all hopes of doing away with a system which formed the most degrading feature in the whole frame of the United States”.
41 “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.
U.S.-American abolitionists shared Hoy’s and Buxton’s view that the war in Texas had been one solely for slavery. The title of one of Benjamin Lundy’s works aptly summarises his stance on the issue: *The war in Texas: a review of facts and circumstances, showing that this contest is the result of a long premeditated crusade against the government, set on foot by slaveholders, land speculators, &c.: with the view of re-establishing, extending, and perpetuating the system of slavery and the slave trade in the republic of Mexico*, first published in 1836, addressed many of the concerns that had been raised in British Parliament. Much like Ward, Lundy pointed out that the U.S. government found itself in a state of being torn between pro- and anti-slavery constituents. 42 With Texas added to the Union, the entire United States would find itself “completely under the influence of the slave-holding interest”. 43 U.S. interests in Texas had from early on been intertwined with Southern slavery, which shaped the U.S.-American response to the Texian revolt: Lundy lamented that U.S. citizens, much like some Britons also suspected, were engaged in aiding the rebellious Texians, through arms and manpower.

Interestingly, he also regarded the Texian revolt as an imperial, not merely a philanthropic affair: in speaking of the newly-independent Texian state, established by slaveholders who had resisted Mexican authority primarily due to the slavery question, Lundy referred to a ‘*Texian Empire*’, underlining the connection between imperialism and slavery in the

42 Lundy, 3. The Executive, he argued, had already chosen a side of the debate: “The Slaveholding Interest is now paramount in the Executive branch of our national government; and its influence operates, indirectly, yet powerfully, through that medium, in favour of this Grand Scheme of Oppression and Tyrannical Usurpation”, he wrote. It remained to be seen whether the Legislature would join the Executive or choose a different path, one that Lundy associated with the true and fundamental characteristics of U.S.-American government and described as being built upon universal liberty and free republican institutions.

43 Lundy, 24-25. Southerners had vied for Texas for over a decade by 1836, hoping to gain a commercial as well as a political advantage from its addition to the Union: slave states, a writer calling himself Americanus noted, would gain the majority in Congress, and Judge Upshur of Virginia asserted that prices for slaves would rise as much as fifty percent, benefiting the slaveholders of his state.
first half of the nineteenth century. This empire of slavery would seek to expand farther into Mexico, entirely contrary to the ideals of humanity and liberty. Indeed, Lundy shared several newspaper excerpts written by other abolitionist authors, all of which emphasised that Texas, an immense territory, would lead to a significant spread of slavery on the North American continent. If annexed to the Union, Texas might, due to its size and continued territorial claims against Mexico, be annexed in the form of several slave states. Some authors feared that this number would be as high as five, six, or even nine additional slave states, turning the United States into one of the most powerful nations in support of such a heinous and morally corrupt practice.

Reference was also made to Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri, whom Lundy viewed as morally wicked due to his open and limitless support of and advocacy for slavery. Benton’s arguments as laid out by Lundy showcase a deep and pervasive link between empire and slavery in North America: Benton asserted that the “United States once had a rightful claim to the province of Texas, by virtue of the Louisiana purchase; but that (…) it was lost through the influence of the non-slaveholding interest in Congress.” “This being his view”, stated Lundy, “he now calculates that the SLAVEITE PARTY is strong enough to reverse the existing state of things, and open a new world, as it were, for the employment of slave-labor, like the colonial projectors have generally done before him, since the discovery of the American continent by the Europeans”. This commentary underlines that the expansion of slavery was seen by U.S. politicians, both advocates and opponents of the practice, as an inherently imperial and even overtly colonial act, comparable to the imperialism of the first European trans-Atlantic empires. Benton promoted the idea of a change to this U.S.-American version of imperialism: rather than

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44 Lundy, 15.
relying on trans-Atlantic connections like Europeans had done and were still doing in the
nineteenth century, when they continued to draw their raw materials from peripheral American
(and also other, such as Asian) states, Benton suggested that the United States “convert the
whole extent of the country, where slave labor is unprofitable, and where provisions are cheap,
into an immense nursery for slaves, and by this means people those more southern region with a
race of serviles (...) at least twice as fast as it could be done by the foreign importation alone.”

Lundy also republished in his treatise the entirety of John Quincy Adams’ speech on
Texian independence to the U.S. Congress. This speech, given in May of 1836 was referenced in
the correspondence of the English, Prussians, and French, as well as in several newspapers,
showcasing its influence and political weight. Adams urged Congress to consider the injustice
of the Texian rebellion against Mexico, recommending that the United States not support the
revolution which he viewed as a Mexican civil war. The war fought by the Texians, stated
Adams, was undeniably one for slavery, in which the United States was urged to intervene by
slaveholders. Adams tied the colonial push of Anglo-Americans into Mexican Texas to slavery,
referring to it as an “overture, offensive in itself”, with the purpose of re-establishing “slavery
where it was abolished”. This was a war of conquest, a war of a nation which possessed “already
over-distended dominions”, much like an empire. As a result, Adams noted, the United States
would face imperial resistance: “Neither Great Britain nor France will suffer you to make such a
conquest from Mexico”, he declared to Congress. Britain, having spent “one hundred millions

46 Lundy, 28. This Bentonian idea is remarkably similar to British concerns for a cotton supply in that both Benton
and British officials sought to break their dependence on one particular source for a good needed – in Britain’s case,
this was cotton, which it desired to obtain from somewhere outside of the United States so as to prevent its feeding
into a system continuously more dominated by the latter country. In Benton’s case, these were slaves, which he
hoped to breed in a territorially large United States that would no longer need to rely on slaves from Africa, a traffic
dominated by the British hegemon desirous of arresting and eliminating the trade. Slavery was a central component
of the imperial showdown and economic competition in North America during the 1830s and 1840s.
47 It’s also been considered in secondary literature, as well. See, for example: James Oakes, The Scorpion’s Sting:
dollars” on the abolition of slavery, would not accept such an extension of U.S. imperialism; it would defend the tenets of Pax Britannica, and the United States would face war with the hegemon of the era.48

Adams continued: A long coastline on the Gulf of Mexico would break the Union’s back in its interaction with Europe. Great Britain, France, even Russia would seek to contest U.S.-American claims and establish colonial projects that the United States lacked the means to prevent. Such a coastline, though Southerners and war-hawks may think that U.S. power would rise with it, would place the United States into an imperial position that she could not maintain, and the imperial conflict with Britain that it would elicit would be one that it would be no match for: “She, by her naval power, and by her American colonies, holds the keys to the gulf of Mexico”, Adams announced of Britain. Even reasons for earlier territorial boundary settlements could be found in imperialism: because the United States had not been able to defend its claims against British might, U.S. politicians compromised to the extent that their country’s political and military strength allowed. Moreover, since the imperial incentive of slavery had not existed in the same measure, U.S. justifications and ambitions for a claim to more territory in the South-eastern and South-western part of the continent had been thinner during President Monroe’s times. Slavery had, however, fired such imperialist and expansionist motivations that an annexation of Texas was likely, for geopolitical and -strategic reasons moreover, to be followed by the conquest of Cuba. This would be ruinous for the United States, Adams asserted: Spain, too weak after having lost her continental colonies, would need to entrust Cuba’s naval protection in someone else’s hands. “Suppose that naval power should be Britain”, Adams surmised. “There is Cuba at your very door; and if you spread yourself along a naked coast, from

48 Speech delivered by John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives of the United States, May 25, 1836. Found in, for example, Lundy, 35.
the Sabine to the Rio Bravo, what will be your relative position towards Great Britain, with not
only Jamaica, but Cuba, and Porto Rico in her hands, and abolition for the motto to her union
cross of St. George and St. Andrew?" From the very onset of Texian independence, slavery was
the powder keg that threatened to set the imperial landscape of North America alight.49

Indeed, slavery became one of the largest points of contestation between the United
States and Britain. Many of the negative comments on their U.S.-American rival were voiced by
Britons in connection to slavery, namely Britain’s rejection and North America’s lowly, ignoble
perpetration and cultivation thereof.50 In the instance of O’Connell’s discussion of slavery in
front of Parliament in 1837 and his comparison between a noble, just Britain and a morally
impoverished, treacherous United States, some parliamentary representatives even made talk of
war. Though this idea was dismissed in favour of more diplomatic means, it nevertheless
showcases that slavery and morality became tied to the struggle between the two most significant
imperial rivals in the region, the United States and Britain. Parliamentary member Lushington
voiced his resignation that the United States would not be an ally to Britain in the strive for the
abolition of slavery. Rather, Lushington did not hold the United States in high regard in that
aspect: The President of the republic, he claimed, held views on the matter “characterised by the
most cold, calculating, and unfeeling spirit, which declared that neither he nor the people of the

49 Speech delivered by John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives of the United States, May 25, 1836.
50 In 1837, parliamentary member O’Connell asserted that behind the Texian revolt stood the interest of U.S.
slavery, “a blot which no country but America would suffer to stain her history. No nation was ever degraded by
such a crime except the high-spirited North American republic”. He contrasted the ideals upon which the United
States had been built with the stark reality of slavery, noting that U.S.-Americans “talked of the progress of
democratic principles”. “No man admired those salutary principles more than” O’Connell, the parliamentary
transcript of his speech notes, but he doubted their legitimacy: “what became of their boasted efficacy if they could
not induce those who enjoyed them to abstain from such a horrid speculation” as slavery? What followed was a
summary of England’s stance on slavery, including the abolition of slavery within the British Empire and British
efforts to curb slavery around the globe. “Oh what a contrast did that form between the Government of Great Britain
and that of the American republic!”, O’Connell exclaimed. “Could say thing [sic] be more striking, could anything
be more glorious to this country, or more degrading to North America?” See: “Texas”, House of Commons Sitting
of Thursday, March 9, 1837.
United States would be moved by any considerations of moral right or human happiness”. U.S. motivations were, according to Lushington, economic.\(^\text{51}\) This showcases once more that British and U.S.-American interests clashed on several fronts in Texas: commercial competition and cotton production played a deep role in how officials and diplomats viewed slavery from both sides of the Atlantic.

Neither France nor the German states remained unaffected by this contestation over slavery. As the discussions on French Revolutionary thought and the English treaties and negotiations with France and Prussia have shown, abolitionism was a fundamental subject for European powers throughout the nineteenth century. This shaped Continental European views on Texian independence, also. In 1836, Prussian representative Friedrich von Gerolt criticised the rebellion of Texas, identifying it as a Southern U.S.-American move to strengthen their influence in the Union and pursue the expansion of slavery. Von Gerolt wrote to his government that U.S.-American speculator interest in Texas combined with that of the slave-states, who “regarded the annexation or independence of Texas and the introduction of slave trafficking, already introduced by the colonists, as the safest means by which to, in unison with this new state, put up heavy resistance to the great opposition which exists in the northern states of North America against the maintenance of slavery”.\(^\text{52}\) Similar views were also expressed by the French *Journal des Debats* and the New York *Advertiser*.\(^\text{53}\) Like many of his contemporaries, von Gerolt’s report was heavily influenced by John Quincy Adams’ speech. Another source consulted by von Gerolt were English newspapers, who had likewise republished Adam’s speech. Von Gerolt, like many

\(^{51}\) “Foreign Slave Trade”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, May 10, 1838.

\(^{52}\) Von Gerolt to PFM, September 14, 1836, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5219: Mexico, Vol. VIII, l. 467-482, 478.

of his European contemporaries, regarded the “protection and expansion of slavery” as an 
offence to humanity and argued that “the principles, acknowledged by all civilised nations, are 
threatened and hurt” through the independence of Texas as a slave-state. The *Journal des 
Débats* shared this stance, asserting that the Texians “violate the principles most sacred to 
humanity; because they propagate slavery in vast regions where no necessity calls for its 
existence”.55

This humanitarian and philanthropic sentiment was, much as in the case of Britain, joined 
by commercial interests. The *Journal des Débats* lamented that European states were too caught 
up in affairs on the European continent to turn their full attention to the events in North America – a mistake, the newspaper judged, because North America was, particularly due to the United States, a continent where the progress in the means of transport and industry approached more 
and more those of Europe. The advancement of the United States, and its cultivation of the 
landscape under its possession – Texas would be no different – included the transformation of 
forests into cotton fields, but this admirable progress occurred under the most despicable 
circumstances: not only had U.S.-American colonists disobeyed Mexican laws, they had done so 
regarding the most odious practice of slavery.56 An 1838 French governmental report argued that 
the southern U.S. states had a vested interest in the annexation of Texas because, beyond 
improving their chances of resisting northern U.S.-American abolitionism, this annexation would also eliminate an economic rival in the raw material trade.57 Another Prussian politician situated

57 Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95, 82-83.
in Berlin informed his government in 1838 of the possible colonisation of Germans in northern Mexico, which would benefit the German settlers, located in one of Mexico’s best agricultural regions, as well as Mexico, which would have a bulwark of Germans to resist U.S.-American encroachment into its territory. These Anglo settlers the Prussian observer did not hold in high regard, for he saw them as Southern U.S.-Americans who had disrespected Mexico’s humanitarian abolition of slavery and already broken off part of the country’s territory in the form of Texas. Rather than having Germans settle in the United States, which promoted the economic strengthening of that country and further enabled its southern states to pursue expansionist policies into Mexico and spread slavery there, Prussia should promote settlement in Mexico, which would provide larger commercial and economic benefits to the German settlers, the German Confederation, and Mexico.58

Though Europeans nearly universally condemned the existence of slavery in Texas, leading them to deplore the independence of said state, seen as an extension of the interest of the U.S. South, the resignation that Mexico would not be able to reconquer Texas changed Europe’s policy toward Texas. Part of this policy change has already been discussed in chapter two focussing on commerce. Europeans came to the conclusion that an independent Texas did not pose a significant problem to their commercial interests in Mexico; this had been the largest economic concern and objection to the recognition of Texas prior to the late 1830s and early 1840s. But how then, and why, did European policy shift in regard to slavery, which Europe condemned and Texas seemed unwilling to rid itself of? Overall, slavery remained a large obstacle to better relations with Texas for European states throughout the former’s independence.

However, given that Texas was not a strong and established country like the United States, which had resisted European and particularly British military and economic might in instances such as the War of 1812, Europeans, above all the British, theorised that Texas could be persuaded to get rid of slavery through informal-imperialist means: economic, political, military, and social pressure all seemed viable options in the battle against slavery. In fact, some Britons believed that Texas provided Britain with an excellent opportunity: if Britain succeeded in obtaining the Texian acquiescence to the abolition of slavery, it would establish that country more firmly as an influential imperial power on the North American continent, especially vis-à-vis the United States, whose cotton-slavery empire might stumble and falter underneath the increased international and intranational moral and economic pressures.

Whereas the last chapter has shown that scholars like Adams and Roeckell have expressed doubt regarding the influence of peripheral agents in Texas on statesmen in London, the discussions on slavery in Texas suggest otherwise. Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, though more willing to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude on Texian independence, did acknowledge in front of the House of Commons that slavery was a great evil and that particularly the slave trade ought not to be extended to Texas. In discussing slavery and the British stance thereto, Palmerston emphasised the importance of Britain’s diplomatic and imperial network: in order to gage the current state of slavery, the “correspondence between the Government at home and its agents abroad” was evaluated by British Parliament “with regard to the progress or diminution of the trade in slaves”. British statesmen in the periphery were crucial for the operation of the government in the core, a relationship that encompassed the British policy on slavery, also.59

59 “Slavery in Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, August 5, 1836.
These peripheral agents – British merchants, travellers, consuls, and diplomats – frequently expressed optimism regarding Britain’s ability to interfere in Texas with the goal of abolishing slavery. Crawford seemed confident that Texian representatives would be willing to curb slavery in their country, writing to Pakenham that General Houston had called upon Great Britain to aid Texas’ navy in controlling slave trafficking with the goal of ending the trade. Crawford argued that this sign of goodwill signified that the people of Texas would be open and willing to exterminate slavery in its entirety within the Texian republic, so long as Britain acted fast, before more slaves from the United States were introduced. Joseph Hamilton also sought to alleviate British reservations concerning slavery by suggesting in 1840 that informal influence on behalf of Britain ought to be capable of eradicating slavery from Texas within a few years: Joseph Hamilton argued that Texians were “well aware” of the advantages of direct trade with Europe, and that they would be willing to “make a sacrifice to obtain commercial Intercourse with the rest of the World.” Moreover, he believed that slavery in Texas was “a Condition, which might be remedied by Treaty with some influential Nation,” showcasing that the British tied trade, slavery, and influence together in a net of connections centring around informal imperialist strategies. Briton Francis Sheridan viewed this situation similarly, arguing that Britain could

60 The Texian Constitution only permitted the introduction of slaves via the United States, from whence most slaveholding Texians had come and continued to do so. Nevertheless, some slaves were brought into Texas illegally: Most of the maritime importation of slaves occurred under the U.S.-American flag, though some breaches of Texas’ laws in this regard had also taken place under the Texian flag. Houston, cognizant of the fact that the Texian navy was not large or potent enough to stop this trafficking, approached both the United States and Britain for assistance.

61 Crawford to Pakenham, May 26, 1837, in The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, vol. 15, no. 1, ed. Eugene C. Barker (Austin: The Association, July 1911), 214 and J. Pinckney Henderson to R. A. Irion, January 5, 1838, in Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1908 (DCTx), Vol. 3, ed. George Garrison (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 839-842. Hook also expressed his belief that, as the number of European migrants in Texas grew, anti-slavery sentiment would, also. He argued that the “friends of abolition are numerous and powerful even in that Republic”. See: Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38. The British also used other methods to pressure Texas, such as by taking individual Texans’ slaves as was the case with John Taylor, who took his servants to British-ruled Barbados See: John Taylor to Mirabeau Lamar, July 28, 1840, DCTx, 900-902.

62 Joseph Hamilton to MacGregor, June 23, 1840, CBA, 17.
employ several informal imperial measures in order to promote the abolition of slavery in Texas: One, once Texas was recognised and more Britons emigrated there, the presence of free labour would make slavery, currently in use in Texas because of a labour shortage, redundant. Two, Texas’ need for British recognition, which Sheridan surmised elicited a sheer desperation within the Texan government, would allow “England almost, to make her own terms upon every, even the Slave question”. Britain would be able to “insist upon the severest restrictions and penalties being imposed at once on the introduction of Slaves” and would possibly even be able to “appoint their own Agent to superintend and see that these penalties were inflicted”.63

James Hook’s report to Palmerston in April 1841 reinforced these ideas, and also suggested that the eradication of slavery in Texas through British influence could facilitate the attack on slavery in the United States. “I firmly believe,” Hook wrote, “that Slavery may be forthwith abolished in Texas, which…would prove a powerful engine in the hands of Abolitionists towards extinguishing that moral pest in the United States.” Hook argued that he believed that the abolition of slavery would bring the “death blow” to slavery in the Americas, because “by example and sympathy,” abolition in Texas would make severe waves in the Slavery question within the United States.65 In 1841, Hook considered the conditions for the abolition of slavery in Texas to be “peculiarly favourable”, and actively suggested that British pressure in Texas could damage slavery in the entirety of North America, highlighting that “Her Majesty’s Ministers have now an opportunity of inflicting a Mortal wound on the giant slavery

63 Sheridan to Garraway, July 12, 1840, CBA, 18-26.
64 Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38.
65 The Republic of Texas, he claimed, was inhabited by “freemen,…who have carried with them the language, the habits, and the lofty love for liberty, that has always characterised and distinguished their Ancestors.” He believed that these peoples were predominantly Britons and Americans, and with this statement he showcases his affinity for Texas in part because of its Anglo origins. This Anglo drive for liberty, he believed, would also impel Mexico to change for the better, and halt the expansion of the U.S. Southern slave states. See: Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38.
existing in the United States, by simply forming a Commercial treaty with the Independent
Republic of Texas”, so long as the sine qua non of this treaty be the abolishment of slavery. Hook
actively advocated for British interference.66

Nevertheless, not all peripheral agents shared this optimism. In September 1840, English
barrister Nicholas D. Maillard lamented that the Texans were importing more slaves from the
United States and noted that he found it unjust that Mexico had been held to a higher standard in
diplomatic negotiations in the 1820s than Texas was in the 1830s and 1840s: Mexican abolishment
of slavery, or at least an end to the slave trade, was viewed as important by British officials, and
Maillard praised Mexico for having been the “first civilized Nation that abolished Slavery”.67

Given his dismay at Texas’ blatant expansion of slavery within its territory, Maillard highlighted
that England should exert power and apply pressure on Texas, and as his book showcases, he
was not in favour of official British recognition of the new republic: if Texas did not put an end
to the slave trade, he argued, it should be viewed as nothing more but Mexico’s rebellious
province, and Britain ought to seize all Texian vessels under the justification that a slave trade
treaty existed with Mexico, a nation within which slavery and the slave trade had been abolished.
In fact, in his letter, Maillard’s critique of slavery focussed intensely on its effect on Britain’s
economic network: he feared that “we shall see Slavery revived and perpetuated, and other
Institutions still more injurious to our Interests,” demonstrating that commerce and British
interests were the main issue at stake for British officials overall.68

66 Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38.
67 Maillard had gone to Texas for his health. In 1842, he published a book to counter Kennedy’s positive evaluation
of Texas. This work is The History of the Republic of Texas, from the Discovery of the Country to the Present Time;
68 Maillard to Palmerston, September 15, 1840, CBA, 27-29.
echoes earlier Parliamentary debates, in which it was also suggested that Britain apply Mexican laws to Texas in order to suppress slavery there.

**Continental European Views on Slavery in Texas**

Hamilton’s conduct in official treaty negotiations with Britain also suggests that Texians were less inclined to get rid of slavery than several peripheral British agents had hoped, which delayed Britain’s ratification of the three treaties until 1842. Britain’s diplomacy with and recognition of Texas were not the only ones that experienced a delay due to the slavery question. The Hanseatic Towns found themselves in much a similar position when Hamburgian Syndic Karl Sieveking was first contacted by Texan diplomat James Hamilton on June 28, 1841, when the latter announced Texas’ interest in a treaty of commerce with Hamburg. As a Syndic, Sieveking had to elevate Hamilton’s note on the subject matter to the Senate of Hamburg, having

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69 There are several Parliamentary meetings that discuss this delay. See, for example: “Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Thursday, February 18, 1841, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 56, 704-729, cc. 705. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: [https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu.parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0056p0-0015?accountid=7121] and “Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Friday, March 5, 1841, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 56, 1346-1410, cc. 1346. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: [https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu.parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0056p0-0025?accountid=7121] and “Texas”, House of Commons Sitting of Tuesday, April 26, 1842, Collection: 19th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers, Third Series, Volume 62, 1110-1177, cc. 1127-1129. Accessed using ProQuest BPP: [https://0-parlipapers-proquest-com.lib.utep.edu.parlipapers/docview/t71.d76.cds3v0062p0-0014?accountid=7121]. See also two letters by Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 10, 1842 and January 28, 1842, CBA, 51-57. Three treaties were negotiated between Britain and Texas, including a treaty of amity and commerce, a treaty providing British mediation between Mexico and Texas, and lastly, a slave-trade treaty akin to previous examples involving the mutual right for search of vessels suspected to be engaged in the slave trade. Hamilton, the Texian signee, had not had the authority to negotiate the latter treaty, and in an effort to obtain British foreign recognition and mediation with Mexico without having to swallow the bitter pill of the slave-trade treaty, Hamilton sent the first two treaties to Texas separately from the latter, in the hopes – as British politicians suspected – that Britain would ratify them as soon as Texian Congressional approval had been received. This would have enabled the Texian government to delay significantly the completion and ratification of the slave-trade treaty. In order to avoid manoeuvring itself into such an unfavourable position regarding negotiations with Texas, Britain simply refused to ratify all three treaties until the Texian Congress had also approved the third, which – as Congress had already adjourned by the time the last treaty reached Texas – did not occur until 1842. See: Adams, British Interests, 54 ff.

70 The *Syndicus* or Syndic, addressed with the title “Magnificenz” or ‘Magnificence,’ was a position in the Hamburg Senate. A Syndic, though no senator, had the potential of being quite influential as a governmental representative of his city, as was the case for Karl Sieveking, who is one of the most significant figures of early-19th-century Hamburg. Though also known for his involvement as a philanthropist in his city, he is best remembered for his engagement in improving Hamburg’s trade and foreign affairs. It is noteworthy that Hamilton addressed his letter to Karl Sieveking as the “Minister of Foreign Affairs of the City of Hamburg.”
limited influence and decision-making power on the issue himself. Nevertheless, in order to learn more about Texas, formulate his opinion on the issue, and possibly advise Hanseatic officials, Sieveking read several documents on Texas and sent some of the materials he had gathered – as it seems, the treaties between England and Texas and the Netherlands and Texas – to historian and writer Christian Friedrich Wurm, from whom he hoped to receive an informed and knowledgeable opinion: Wurm was one of Hamburg’s chief authorities on Anglican history and literature, and his works often combined international law, economics, and philosophy (in which he obtained a Ph.D. in 1825). Wurm responded to Sieveking on July 5, 1841.

Within this letter, Wurm questioned the suitability of Texas as an ally and destination for German emigrants. One of the dominant reasons Wurm cited for this was the presence of slavery in that young republic, writing “even though the humanity of the young state possesses all of my respect […] I cannot suppress my grave doubts in regard to German emigration to Texas […] in Texas, slavery is ‘part and parcel of the law of the land [non-translated original].’” In John Scoble’s pamphlet, p. 13, I find the words of the law, and on the back page a law which will make obtaining the rights of citizens impossible for Africans, their descendants, and Indians.” The prolongation of slavery in Texas and the fact that children born to slaves would continue to be slaves – a condition that, as an earlier discussion in this chapter has shown, Mexico’s laws had explicitly rejected – vexed Wurm. Though Wurm stated that slavery did not prevent European states – whether it be the Hanse Towns, England, or France – from negotiating a treaty with Texas per se, it did cause him to ponder whether “under these circumstances, Hamburg

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71 Originally from Württemberg, Wurm relocated to Hamburg in 1827 due to the city’s desire for an English-language newspaper focussing on American and English politics.
ought to, directly and by state means, participate in the encouragement of German emigration to Texas.” Next to the moral compunction Wurm associated with slavery, he also considered the negative consequences for the Hanseatic international image, especially because English papers were, according to Wurm, keeping a keen eye on the ports of Hamburg and Bremen. Though Wurm unfortunately does not elaborate on the matter, this reference to England is interesting because it underlines British influence in the policies of other states, including those focusing on abolitionism. The Hanse Towns, politically weak on their own and without a noteworthy military, could not afford to pursue policies that might prompt British intervention in Hanseatic maritime trade. Wurm considered the recognition of Texas and the encouragement of German settlement there as such a policy.

Wurm’s evaluation of the slavery question in Texas and his opinions regarding the possible impact that an engagement with Texas could have for the Hanse Towns impacted Sieveking. No noteworthy Hamburgian correspondence on Texas exists after Sieveking’s exchange with Wurm until 1844, when Texian-Hanseatic negotiations centred on Bremen as a diplomatic partner. Though Sieveking’s involvement in the Texas question following Bremen’s initiative did not indicate his disapproval of Hanseatic-Texan negotiations of a treaty, he could not be described as overly enthusiastic on the matter, either – in 1844, when Daingerfield and Rumpff met in Paris, he permitted, so long as the Senate’s instructions were not to the contrary, Rumpff’s proceeding in the matter, albeit with several caveats: “although the independence of Texas is not fully secured, given that Mexico has not yet relinquished its claims to the territory, and given that the entry [of Texas] into the North American Union is not less than likely,” he writes, “concl. [conclude] that [Rumpff] can generally consider the matter, without rushing the

73 C. F. Wurm to Sieveking, July 5, 1841, StA HB: Acta C.26.
conclusion [of a treaty] all too much.” Slavery became a key issue for Hamburg, and is one of the reasons why Hamburg took the back seat in the Texas Question, watching rather passively as Bremen dominated Hanseatic action.

The German association for the protection of German settlers in Texas, the Adelsverein, had a different viewpoint on slavery in Texas, or rather, given that over twenty nobles took part in it, it was home to a variety of opinions on the matter. As has been discussed in chapter two, the initial ideal of fostering German emigration to Texas as early as 1842 turned out to be unrealistic after Ludwig Joseph Count von Boos-Waldeck and Viktor August Count von Leiningen visited the country, realising that their society did not possess the financial resources, manpower, and organisational planning necessary for such a project. As a result, von Boos-Waldeck bought a plantation in modern-day Fayette County on January 9, 1843. This plantation, named after Vereins member Adolphe Duke of Nassau, is remarkable, because it constitutes the only example considered in this dissertation which showcases a German stance not in disfavour of slavery. Neither Prussian nor Hanseatic diplomats raised their voices for slavery, and both Prussian and Hanseatic correspondence are interlaced with anti-slavery views. In 1830, even Stephen F. Austin remarked that he would like to settle Germans and Swiss in Texas, for they were not prone to the speculatory character of the U.S.-Americans and would not, like the latter, introduce slavery. Count von Boos-Waldeck, however, purchased slaves from markets in Houston, Galveston, and New Orleans, planning to run the plantation with the use of slave

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74 Extractus Protocolli Senatus Hamburgensis, Monday, March 4, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI, no 16m, Vol. 2: Texas, 5.
labour. Count von Boos-Waldeck’s views on slavery have been considered in considerable detail by scholar Kearney.\textsuperscript{76}

This decision elicited discussions among the society members. Count von Walderdorf withdrew his participation in the society in February of 1843 after finding out that von Boos-Waldeck had purchased land for a plantation on which slave labour was going to be used. Von Walderdorf had been sceptical about the society’s endeavour in the “distant Texas” from the beginning, but emphasised that the plantation’s “cultivation through/by Negroes” was not one that he agreed with. He also doubted that this project would be profitable, and hence determined that he did not wish to take part in (or be a stockholder in) the society.\textsuperscript{77} Christian Count von Leiningen, however, seemed less concerned about slavery: In his initial speech to the nobles before their meeting at Biebrich on the Rhine, Count von Leiningen highlighted that slave plantations were profitable. With this statement, the Count probably wanted to underline that those who emigrated to Texas could become prosperous, particularly on an agricultural basis, but this main objective notwithstanding, von Leiningen’s implicit acceptance of the existence of slavery in Texas can be assumed.\textsuperscript{78} In another letter, a relative of von Leiningen actively supported the idea of a plantation as a fruitful endeavour, arguing that it would be profitable. He suggested that the plantation be established in a more elevated region, claiming that this would

\textsuperscript{76} James C. Kearney’s \textit{Nassau Plantation: The Evolution of a Texas German Slave Plantation} (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010), 40 ff. Boos-Waldeck did not know much about the plantation-slave complex that had been established in the U.S.-American South by the nineteenth century. Two U.S.-American merchants, S. M. Swenson and Morgan Smith, explained to the Count that plantations were typically run by an overseer, prompting Boos-Waldeck to hire William Bryan. After buying his first set of slaves (six men, five women) in New Orleans, Boos-Waldeck found himself unable to transport his merchandise (which included his slaves and other usual items, such as tools, agricultural implements, and raw materials, but also items betraying him as a German noble, such as a feather mattress, a luxury in Texas, and a pleasure carriage, as well as an imported collection of Schiller’s works) upon arrival in Houston, expecting to find draft animals waiting for him there, but realising quickly that he had to purchase oxen in order to move his goods and slaves. In Houston, six more slaves were bought, bringing the number of Boos-Waldeck’s slaves to 17.


\textsuperscript{78} Speech of Christian von Leiningen, March 1842, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 1-10.
be safer for the “human capital, the slaves”, and more financially lucrative.\textsuperscript{79} Ferdinand Prince von Solms was likewise passive, and if anything, encouraging about the use of slave labour: Negroes, accustomed to the humid, hot climate of Texas, would be better able to grow crops and do hard labour on the plantation than whites, increasing the plantations’ earnings and benefitting the society.\textsuperscript{80} A report of the Society regarding the preparations taking place in Texas also expressed dislike for liberal German newspapers and pamphlets, arguing that they sought to besmear the German emigration projects in Texas. The arguments used by the German papers were so “pathetic”, the report asserted, that its author(s) did not deem them worthy of the \textit{Verein’s} commentary or response.\textsuperscript{81} Overall, it appears that the \textit{Adelsverein} was dominated by more conservative currents, which could explain the society’s apathy regarding slavery in Texas.

Though the society justified the use of slavery on the plantation by citing that practice as profitable, von Boos-Waldeck’s experience told a different story. Building the plantation was much harder and took much longer than expected, and prime crop-planting seasons came and went. Fencing the property turned out to be a nearly insurmountable task for von Boos-Waldeck, unfamiliar with organising the enclosing of the immense acreage he had purchased. In a letter, the Count lamented that a lot more livestock – sheep, cattle, pigs, horses – was needed for the proper and successful operation of the plantation. The fields had to be planted in a more complex way than imagined, and von Boos-Waldeck considered growing corn, cotton, and sugar cane in order to finally induce the plantation to make profits. He had exhausted his credit in New Orleans, and the austere and primitive lifestyle of the frontier weighed on him, as he imagined it would on other Europeans, as well. He criticised both his overseer Bryan as well as the fertility

\textsuperscript{79} F. G. von Leiningen, February 14, 1843, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 59.
\textsuperscript{80} Ferdinand Prince von Solms to Count von Castell, February 18, 1843, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 61.
\textsuperscript{81} Report, DBC, Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 139-147.
of the soil, questioning whether the plantation could grow to be profitable. Ultimately, he
determined that he desired to return to Germany as soon as a replacement for his position in
Texas had been found among society members. Von Boos-Waldeck’s problems on the plantation
also concerned the slaves to a not insignificant degree: due to the slow building process, the
slaves spent a lot of time living in tents or huts; the eventual slave quarters were described by an
observer as “dreadful barracks”. The Count also questioned the slaves’ quality, noting that most
of them were not as hard-working as he liked – only one woman, Emily, was praised by von
Boos-Waldeck. It is likely that she had eventually become his mistress during his time on the
plantation.82

After von Boos-Waldeck left, disillusioned about the profitability of the Nassau
Plantation, Prince von Solms came to Texas in 1844. One of his first recommendations regarding
the plantation was that the society get rid of it. His reasons were two-fold: first, he doubted its
economic viability and productivity. Second, he did not believe it wise that the Society associate
itself with slavery. In his first report, von Solms noted that many of the slaves had been
overworked, with at least one who had gotten sick because of it. Two slaves had been killed after
an attempted robbery, which von Solms labelled a lost investment. Though he respected von
Boos-Waldeck, von Solms listed a number of bad choices that the Count had made, including the
appointment of Bryan as an overseer. Von Boos-Waldeck, not knowledgeable enough on
agricultural endeavours himself, had charged Bryan with a lot of work around the plantation,
which the latter had not fulfilled adequately according to von Solms, who pointed out that the
cotton had not been planted correctly, leading to the loss of a lucrative harvest. Moreover, Bryan

82 Kearney, 44-47.
was described as a drunkard in von Solms’ report.\textsuperscript{83} In his fourth report, von Solms explained that one more slave had died, and another had run away, though she was later recaptured. The crop looked “pitiful”, and von Solms estimated that the plantation would yield no more than five or six bales of cotton. Though von Solms suggested that acquiring more slaves might alleviate the situation, he did not like this idea, favouring instead the sale of parcels of the land to Europeans.\textsuperscript{84} By his sixth report, von Solms distanced himself completely from the operation of a slave-based plantation: “In no case am I in favour of buying slaves but, on the contrary, I stand by my previously established views: the sale of the entire league […] From the bottom of my heart, I can only say that this slave mess is an unworthy affair for the Verein. It is truly a stain on human society; and this thing in particular, as well as the whole farm, has caused me more anger, worry, and unpleasantness than all the dangers, privations, and hardships, that I have suffered in the interests of the Verein up to now”.\textsuperscript{85} Though Nassau Plantation was not sold immediately after von Solms’ report of December 1844 – the sale to Otto von Roeder occurred in 1848 – von Solms’ evaluation of the property was the death knell for the plantation’s future as the safe haven that German immigrants could first turn to upon arrival in Texas.

The French stance on slavery was likewise more nuanced than its British counterpart. As early as 1835, pro-Texian views existed among Frenchmen, and these typically downplayed or reinterpreted the relevance of slavery in that region. French abbé Jean-Henri Baradère alleged in his exposé on Texas that the colonists had loyally and faithfully abided by Mexican law “for as long as [Mexico] spoke the language of the law with them”, but that the Mexican failure to uphold this policy had induced the colonists to rebel – as Baradère suggests, justifiable so.

\textsuperscript{83} Prince von Solms’ First Report dated July 15, 1844, in Chester W. And Ethel H. Geue, \textit{A New Land Beckoned: German Immigration to Texas, 1844-1847} (Waco: Texian Press, Reprint 1972), 21-25.
\textsuperscript{84} Prince von Solms’ Fourth Report dated September 20, 1844, in Geue, 39-41.
\textsuperscript{85} Prince von Solms’ Sixth Report dated December 23, 1844, in Geue, 45-53.
Though he sympathised with Mexico on the grounds that that country did not possess the necessary resources for an adequate administration of its immense territory, making abuses of power on behalf of local officials in far-off states such as Texas likely, Baradère nevertheless supported Anglo rebellion, explaining that the colonists possessed an energy “of men belonging to a free country”, emphasising the idea that Anglo-Americans’ settlement in new territories was partially justified by their vigour. Mexico was instead characterised as subservient by Baradère, who made an interesting, actually counterintuitive, observation in relation to slavery: Mexico, the Abbé suggested, was a country whose people suffered from compliance/submissiveness, a circumstance characteristic for those countries “which have made themselves contemptible through the long existence of slavery”. This, wrote Baradère, was also the reason why Mexicans accepted the abuses of officials, whereas the Anglo settlers did not. This observation on behalf of the French abbé is so noteworthy because it turns the slavery question on its head: rather than pillorying the Anglo settlers for bringing slaves with them, thus disrespecting Mexican laws and the Mexican state, which had taken early steps toward the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, he described the Anglo colonists as free, liberal men, ignoring entirely the fact that they illegally brought slaves with them, and critiqued the Mexican authorities for molesting the law-abiding Anglos, a condition that existed in Mexico because of the long former presence of slavery in that state.  

Saligny, the French diplomat in Texas after 1839, did not see slavery in Texas as highly problematic. In March 1839, he noted that many U.S.-American planters were moving to Texas with their slaves, a circumstance that the country ought to thank Mirabeau Lamar for.  

87 Saligny was generally favourable of Lamar, partially due to the latter’s French origins.
emphasised that this immigration would improve conditions in Texas because the planters were rich, thus bringing to Texas people and capital all at once.\textsuperscript{88} A month later, Saligny reiterated his impression, tying Texas’ economic success and importance to France (via cotton) to the presence of planters with slaves, suggesting that he viewed slavery as perhaps akin to a ‘necessary evil’ that was needed to advance the country.\textsuperscript{89} Another letter from June of that year seems to underline this: Saligny, though he labelled slavery an “odious institution”, acknowledged that slavery was “the foundation stone of Texian society”, and argued that slavery could either be seen “as a question that interests humanity as a whole” or “in terms of national interest”, which suggests that he did regard slavery as profitable and its preservation as a matter of national interest for Texians and U.S. Southerners, who grew such large quantities of cotton using slave labour.\textsuperscript{90} In instructions that Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, the Duc de Dalmatie and French Foreign Minister (1839-1840) sent to Saligny in October of 1839, the former also remarked that England’s policy in Texas was an interesting one, in part because of the conflict the slavery question had elicited. De Dalmatie labelled Texian slavery a “social necessity”, and referred to the British government as one in “deference to pro-Negro opinion”, suggesting that slavery was not one of de Dalmatie’s dominant foreign policy goals as it was in the case of most Britons. Moreover, he stated that England’s hesitation in the Texas matter – which England would not be able to maintain for the sake of her economic and national interests – had benefitted France in forming ties to Texas, possibly a sign that some French officials saw within British abolitionist fervour an advantage for French commerce and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{88} Saligny to Molé, March 16, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, l. 292-304, 300.
\textsuperscript{89} Saligny to Molé, April 17, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, l. 317-328.
\textsuperscript{90} Saligny to Dalmatie, June 24, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 4-21, 13.
\textsuperscript{91} Instructions by Dalmatie to Saligny, October 16, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 69-70.
Given that abolitionism was not as significant to French policy, and given that the German states were second-tier powers in this early-19\textsuperscript{th}-century world-system, lacking political as well as maritime might, the main conflict regarding slavery in Texas existed with Britain. After the slave-trade treaty of 1842 was successfully ratified, British officials continued to hope that their country would be able to exert more influence in Texas in order to effect the abolition, even if gradual, of slavery. The two British agents that were employed in Texas in 1842/43, William Kennedy as Consul at Galveston and Charles Elliot as chargé d’affaires, showed significant interest in the abolition of slavery. Elliot remarked in late 1842 that Britain, now that it had established a slave-trade treaty with Texas, should aim for the abolition of slavery in that country next. In the interests of humanity, slavery should be abolished, and all political restrictions on people of colour lifted. He combined this endeavour with one for “\textit{perfectly free trade}”, showcasing that commerce, philanthropy, and international law intertwined in his vision of the Republic of Texas, and indeed, the Texian borderlands: Elliot hoped that such policies would either spread to Mexico, or cause northern Mexican states, already in a state of rebellion, to join a liberal and humanitarian Texas. Elliot also suggested that England could support abolitionism in Texas by financing it via a loan; this would enable the Texian government to compensate its slaveholders.\textsuperscript{92} Though the ratification of the slave-trade treaty had been delayed, Elliot wrote that he had spoken to another Englishman in the country, who had told him that “there is a much more general and strengthening feeling in favour of” the abolition of slavery “than he had conceived possible”, indicating Elliot’s hopefulness that abolition in Texas was attainable.\textsuperscript{93} Adams laid out that much of Elliot’s correspondence in which he expressed his

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\textsuperscript{92} Elliot to Addington, November 15, 1842, CBA, 125. For the Texian response to Elliot’s idea regarding a loan for the abolition of slavery, see: Ashbel Smith to Isaac Van Zandt, January 25, 1843, DCTx, 1103-1108.
\textsuperscript{93} Elliot to Addington, March 26, 1843, CBA, 165-169.
\end{flushleft}
support for official British intervention in Texas was addressed not to Aberdeen, but to Henry Unwin Addington, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Though they were “nominally personal letters […] they were regarded in the light of official correspondence”. 94

Despite such hopefulness on behalf of many British diplomats, agents, and merchants, Aberdeen requested a detailed report from Kennedy on May 30, 1843. This report was supposed to detail a variety of aspects of slavery in Texas, including the political and legal possibilities and opportunities of African-Texians, the population of slaves and ratio of slaves to whites, the slaves’ origins, and the sentiment of abolitionism in Texas. 95 On August 22, 1843, Kennedy told Aberdeen that he could not yet comment on the strength of the abolitionist movement and the likelihood of the abolition of slavery in Texas, though his response to Aberdeen’s request for a report was sent in September. Kennedy emphasised that no trans-Atlantic slave trade had occurred between the African continent and Texas, as it was in accordance with the British-Texian treaty and Texian laws. Nevertheless, slaves had little to no legal possibilities; as criminal law did not extend to slaves or even to free blacks, and evidence brought forth by slaves was not considered in court. Moreover, the Texian Constitution’s expressed prohibition of a legal statute that could forbid the importation of slaves via the United States virtually guaranteed that the number of slaves would increase annually as more U.S. settlers moved to Texas with their slaves. 96 In a follow-up letter, Kennedy also stated, more sober than other Britons, that “there is, in Texas, no recognized party favourable to the Abolition of Slavery”, and that efforts to abolish slavery or promote the emancipation of slaves had been small, not numerous, and curbed by the

94 Adams, British Interests, 109.
95 Aberdeen to Kennedy, May 30, 1843, CBA, 199-200.
96 Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 5, 1843, CBA, 254.
fear of popular mobs unwilling to expunge slavery. Kennedy’s resignation notwithstanding, Elliot continued to hold on to the idea that Britain could use her international influence and power to persuade Texas to rid itself of slavery.

Though Roeckell and Adams questioned the influence of peripheral agents Elliot and Kennedy on statesmen in London, Adams did concede that Aberdeen’s stance regarding the slavery question changed in mid-1843. This could also explain Aberdeen’s interest in Kennedy’s report on slavery in Texas. Adams argued that Aberdeen’s interest in this matter was raised probably in response to several factors, including Pakenham’s communications, Elliot’s letters, and an abolitionist meeting held by Texians and U.S.-Americans in London. As Adams had shown, this is also where Aberdeen met a Texian lawyer, S. P. Andrews, who likewise suggested that Britain should advance a loan to Texas for the abolition of slavery. Aberdeen’s interest in the abolition of slavery in Texas was quickly instrumentalised by proponents of Texas’ incorporation into the United States, such as General Duff Green, who exaggerated Aberdeen’s interest in British interference in Texas. Nevertheless, though British statesman Everett denied to U.S. official Upshur that Aberdeen had ever taken any partiality to the slavery question, Adams concluded that Aberdeen’s responses to Ashbel Smith do showcase a personal interest on behalf of Aberdeen to see slavery in Texas abolished.

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97 Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 6, 1843, CBA, 261-263.
98 Elliot referred in late 1843 to a Mexican offer of recognising Texian independence so long as slavery in that republic were curbed. The British Consul enjoyed this idea, for “one great practical advantage of the proposal of Mexico to acknowledge the Independence of Texas […] would be the indisposition of the Slave holders of the United States to bring any more of their people into this Country”, which would prevent on the one hand the further excursion of U.S.-Americans southward and westward, where they stood to threaten Mexico, and it would establish Texas as a republic of free labour, enabling Britain to finally refuse cotton grown in the United States. See: Elliot to Aberdeen, September 1843, CBA, 265-267. Mexico’s offer was politically cunning, for it elevated Mexico’s image and prestige in Elliot’s eyes. The latter spoke of Mexico as just, honourable, and humanitarian, emphasising that its recognition of Texas under such preconditions would aid in getting Mexico its “due and needful weight” in the balance on the North American continent, because Mexico would be turning “evil into good”, something that would impact her honour and international standing lastingly. See: Elliot to Doyle, October 10, 1843, CBA, 268-270.
99 Adams, British Interests, 137-145.
Mexican officials had a different opinion on the slavery question in Texas altogether. John Paul Tymitz has shown that many Mexican politicians and newspapers believed that England was only out for its self-interest, and rejected arguments of English philanthropy either regarding the issue of slavery or the establishment of a buffer state to halt U.S. expansionism and thus protect Mexico. One Mexican newspaper in particular, *El Precursor*, decried that Britain cared only for its commerce and was thus willing to betray its ethical and moral principles. Signing a treaty with Texas was not enough, newspapers argued, for the Texians would never give up their slavery. Pakenham reiterated over and over again to his government as well as in communications with the Mexican authorities that the allegations of newspapers regarding British selfishness and intrigue were simply not true, yet Mexican antipathy toward Britain’s decision to engage in relations with Texas remained.\(^\text{100}\) Interestingly, several Mexican officials and newspapers tied slavery and British power together to rouse Mexican sentiments of nationalism vis-à-vis the British: The *Precursor*, for example, wrote that foreign influence in Mexico’s internal affairs, including those of Texas, threatened “to convert the Mexican [sic] into imbecile slaves of a foreign domination”.\(^\text{101}\)

The presence of slavery in Texas quickly caused abolitionism to become one of the key factors in both European diplomacy with that state and the broader imperial struggle within the region. Initially, many European powers were indisposed to recognising Texas because they did not want to associate themselves with slavery. This was partially a result of political change in the aftermath of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which gave rise to a more humanitarian and philanthropic current in European governments, newspapers, and institutions.

\(^{100}\) John Paul Tymitz, “British Influence in Mexico, 1840-1848” (Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1975), 31-33.

\(^{101}\) Tymitz, 34.
But it was also a representation of British hegemonic might during the nineteenth century. The political, maritime, commercial, and imperial strength of Britain, the primary abolitionist force of the century, motivated politicians of more peripheral states to take caution in their interactions with trans-Atlantic states, as was the case for Hamburg’s Syndic Sieveking and historian Wurm. Von Solms likewise believed that the Verein should distance itself from slavery. The fact that British slave-trade treaties and agreements were potent and had the potential of giving Britain a commercial and strategic advantage was not lost on other nations, either: Portugal complained about unjust British treatment, Prussia resisted such a treaty with Britain, and Mexico pushed for the inclusion of several caveats to protect its coastal trade and military/naval freedom.

Nevertheless, economic interest eventually motivated Britain to commence negotiations with Texas, anyway, largely because of Texas’ prime ability to grow cotton. U.S.-grown cotton was heavily associated with slavery and U.S. imperialism, and even though acquiring cotton from Texas did not create an immediate solution for Great Britain’s ethical dilemma, British agents believed that their chances for an abolition of slavery were higher in Texas than in the United States. Maillard’s suggestion that Texan vessels be seized, and Elliot’s, Crawford’s, Sheridan’s, and Joseph Hamilton’s projections of British influence in slavery on Texas showcase that some British officials – the ones most engaged in Texian affairs – were convinced that it would be much easier to exhort the smaller, weaker and younger Texas into abolishing the heinous practice than it would be with the United States. Thus, British statesmen viewed the Texas Republic as an opportunity to curb slavery further, paradoxically through the republic’s recognition. Several British statesmen hoped that Texas, fearful of a potential Mexican invasion, in a state of shattered finance, and economically dependent on manufactured items, would be more willing to make concessions to British abolitionist plans, and that Texas, once it had
become enveloped in British informal-imperialist influence, would fall even more susceptible to Britain’s desire for abolition. Using her commercial might, Britain also sought to coax Texas into abolishing slavery by offering to finance this endeavour and compensate slave owners making temporary losses after abolition. British pressures on Texas on the matter of slavery led to the ratification of an African slave-trade treaty between the two parties in 1842, which gave Great Britain, much as in most other cases, the permission to investigate and search any Texan naval vessels suspected of carrying slaves. Several Texan officials were not happy with such treatment at the hands of their European partner, but saw it as a necessary evil to maintain good relations with the British, whose trade and recognition they were already becoming reliant upon.102

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102 James Hamilton to Abner Lipscomb, January 4, 1841, DCTx, 921-925.
Another issue that shaped diplomatic relations and informal-imperialist possibilities in North America was the presence of Indian tribes in Texas and Mexico. Many statesmen of Europe and Texas feared that Indian attacks could destabilise the Texian government and make Texas susceptible to either a reinvasion by Mexico or an annexation to the United States. Moreover, agents hoping to use emigration projects to exert influence over Texas identified Native Americans as one of the key obstacles to successful colonisation. Not only did Europeans dread Native American raids in Texas, but they also did so in Mexico, because the power of Indian tribes and their pursuance of their own commercial and ethnic interests jeopardised those of the Europeans who were in need of stable and reliable trading routes and safety for their nationals abroad. As such, Native Americans formed a key consideration for European diplomacy and imperialism in North America. Texian officials also used their contempt for Native Americans in order to justify their independence from Mexico, by asserting that Mexico had not adequately addressed the ‘Indian Problem’ in the region and had even employed Indian tribes in an undignified and unjust war on Texas. Native Americans were frequently perceived as brutal and diplomacy with them considered a fruitless endeavour, for state officials did not believe that they could be integrated into the established international commercial and legal order. Particularly the Comanche pursued their own imperial policies in the Texas borderlands, to the dismay of European, Texian, and Mexican agents. The discussions on Native Americans in the region were often of a racial nature, no matter where the diplomats hailed from: Mexican,
Texian, U.S.-American, German, French, and British actors often spoke of the various Indian tribes as ‘savages’ and deemed them generally uncivilised and barbarous. This perception influenced how Europeans and Anglo-Americans shaped their own racial identities and those of others, such as Mexicans: The character traits attributed to the various groups in the region and the level of detail that went into distinguishing between them tell revealing stories of an emerging racial hierarchy in North America.¹

Oftentimes, the diplomats of the states under investigation did not distinguish between the various Native American groups, instead referring to them as ‘Indian tribes’, ‘Indians’, or ‘savages’ (as well as their equivalents in other languages, such as sauvage in French or Wilde in German).² Additionally, Indians were almost always depicted as hostile or uncivilised. Attorney George Whitfield Terrell, in detailing the relations between Native American tribes and the Texian republic, wrote that there were “numerous hostile Indian tribes which live on our Northern frontier to plunder our establishments and to commit the most inhumane massacres without sparing neither women nor children”, a condition which he titled a “war of savages”.³ Prince Karl von Solms-Braunfels, one of the principal individuals behind the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas, the Adelsverein, described the area surrounding the Nassau Plantation as “frequented by Indians and marauders”, surmising that this, combined with

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¹ For racial Anglo-Saxonism, see Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), in particular. Horsman lays out the emergence of a racial ideology which placed some Europeans as superior to others, with American Anglo-Saxons at the very top of the racial pyramid. The origins of Anglo-Saxons, the noblest stock of men, could be traced back to the Germanic peoples, who travelled westward from the Asian steppes. The ancient German peoples’ strive for self-governance was, in the eyes of American anthropologists, nativists, and pseudo-scientists, tied to their racial identity, and it was believed that Anglo-Saxons inherited their own independence, initiative and intelligence from these Germanic peoples.

² See, for example, Saligny to Thiers, October 30, 1840, where Saligny labelled the Indian raiders of Linnville as ‘savages’, or also Saligny to Thiers, November 14, 1840, where Saligny referred to 300 Indian warriors as a “band of savages”. See also: Saligny to Thiers, December 14, 1840, Saligny to Guizot, July 14, 1841, Saligny to Guizot, September 11, 1841, and Saligny to Guizot, June 14, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, 3, 7.

³ Terrell to Ashbel Smith, October 15, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 6. Terrell was appointed district attorney in 1840 and Attorney General in 1841. He also served as a diplomat in contact with Britain, France, and Spain.
the great distance from other inhabited regions of Texas, made trips coming from the west impossible. Though the Prince boasted that he expected to “have good relations” with the Indians, he nevertheless requested that the directors “send [him] firearms so that [he] may be in a position to impress the Indians”, suggesting that he perceived the Native American tribes of the region as formidable and potentially dangerous.\(^4\) He also noted that some settlers had enlisted in “the mounted company to serve as a guard against the Indians”, whom he described as being “always mounted”.\(^5\) Joseph Baron von Hormayr-Hortenburg, the royal Bavarian chamberlain and privy Ministerresident to the free Hanseatic Cities of Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, labelled the Indians as “immensely wanton”, particularly for alcohol and weaponry.\(^6\) British Consul-General to Texas Charles Elliot likened Indians to “disorderly and dangerous persons” who engaged in plunder, and in The Comanche Empire, Pekka Hämäläinen also states that Texians branded Indians as “red niggers” or “wild cannibals of the woods”.\(^7\)

Regions settled by Native American tribes and few or no peoples of European origin were also labelled a ‘wilderness’, ‘savage’, or “uninhabited’. French consul Alphonse Dubois de Saligny called any North American land not yet or seldom visited by foreigners “encore tout sauvage [still entirely savage]” and asserted that some of the landscape was “impenetrable to humans and occupied solely by savage animals”; he quoted General Sam Houston as having referred to Austin as “that squalid spot, thirty-five miles beyond the pale of civilization”.\(^8\) British

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\(^4\) Prince von Solms’ First Report dated 15th of July, 1844, DBC: Box 3F401, Ethel Hander Geue Papers. Von Solms’ eleven reports can also be found in Chester W. And Ethel H. Geue, A New Land Beckoned: German Immigration to Texas, 1844-1847 (Waco: Texian Press, Reprint 1972).


\(^7\) Charles Elliot to Adrian Woll, October 18, 1842, CBA, 119, and Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 215.

\(^8\) Saligny to Molé, February 20, 1839, and April 17, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, l. 247-253 and 317-328, and Saligny to Guizot, April 26, 1842, FLTx, 311.
representative William Kennedy underlined the advantages that Texas held for the European emigrant, yet also noted that, “if [the colonist] be unable to endure what, in older communities, would be deemed privations – if he be wanting in moral courage – if he cannot look hopefully to the future under temporary discouragement – he ought not to enter upon the life of a settler in the wilderness, however fair and fruitful that wilderness may be”.\(^9\) Moreover, Kennedy noted that several parts of Mexico that had been claimed by Texas were inhabited by Indians and Mexicans, yet that the “greater portion of this territory [was] waste”.\(^10\) U.S.-American statesman John Quincy Adams likewise labelled Texas a “wilderness inhabited only by Indians” prior to the Mexico’s independence, showing that the Indian tribes were not judged as capable of cultivating or somehow changing the land they lived on.\(^11\)

Especially the Prince von Solms-Braunfels branded Indian lands as uncivilised and wild, which gave him yet another way of justifying and emphasising the advantages of a German colony in Texas. He considered many regions far from towns and settlements unsafe, because even if it was “admitted that 50 to 100 families living in a group are safe from Indian attacks, there would still be no assurance that their crops in the fields or their herds would be safe”. The only way of properly securing settlements, said von Solms, was the establishment of towns between already inhabited – i.e., by ‘whites’ – spaces and places far removed from other villages and towns, which he referred to as “the forward push of civilization”, suggesting that Indian settlements were not civilised.\(^12\) In another report, he highlighted this, documenting that though

\(^9\) Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 9, 1844, No. 21, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA): Foreign Office (F.O) 75, Texas, Vol. 10: Consuls Kennedy, McDougall, Foreign Various and Consular Domestic, January to December 1844, l. 141-150, 149.

\(^10\) Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 5, 1843, CBA, 255.


\(^12\) Prince von Solms’ Second Report dated August 20, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
Texas was full of Indian camps, these camps tended to disappear “as soon as civilization comes near, they withdraw because the sound of the ax in the woods is annoying to them”.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, von Solms called the regions inhabited by Indian tribes as “uninhabited”. In one report, the Prince wrote, quite ironically, that “the Indians are everywhere, but only in large numbers in the uninhabited regions”. His disregard for the Native Americans of Texas becomes clear in other reports, also, where he stated that several of these supposedly uninhabited tracts of lands potentially suitable for European settlement were “land from which the Indians must first be driven”.\textsuperscript{14}

It is worth mentioning that not all Europeans shared these views regarding Native Americans in North America. Particularly German travellers and writers of the nineteenth century romanticised Indians, as H. Glenn Penny has shown. Penny demonstrates that the German fascination with Native Americans can be traced back to three figures: Cornelius Tacitus, Roman senator; Alexander von Humboldt, Prussian traveller; and James Fenimore Cooper, U.S. author.\textsuperscript{15} Penny concludes that Germans’ identification with a tribal heritage, combined with the ideal for self-edification and the partiality for freedom and nature encouraged

\textsuperscript{13} Prince von Solms’ Tenth Report dated March 27, 1845, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
\textsuperscript{14} Prince von Solms’ Third Report dated August 26, 1844, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
\textsuperscript{15} Tacitus wrote \textit{Germania} in the first century C.E., a work that described the Germanic tribes as ‘noble savages’ in much the same way in which romantic portrayals of Native Americans were written by Europeans and their descendants in the nineteenth century. Since the fifteenth century, when Tacitus’ \textit{Germania} was rediscovered, Germans established and defined themselves, their identity, and their role in Europe using the heritage of the Germanic tribal societies, and the defeat of the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest became one of the pivotal points in such debates. The interest in Germanic tribes was further roused by the German cultural drive for \textit{Bildung}, a general sense of education and self-edification, in the nineteenth century. Von Humboldt exemplified this ideal, and his travels to the Americas became staples for Germans desirous for \textit{Bildung}. Von Humboldt spoke out against the excesses of empire and for Native Americans in many of his works, and German scholars, guided by the ideal of \textit{Bildung}, questioned negative accounts of Indians due to Anglo-Americans’ and Europeans’ lack of understanding for – and lack of \textit{Bildung} regarding – Native Americans and their customs. Lastly, Penny argues that Cooper supplied Germans with more realistic narratives of North America’s indigenous inhabitants. These were less romantic than predecessors but nevertheless emphasised values like freedom in natural landscapes.
Germans to view Native Americans more positively.\textsuperscript{16} Harry Liebersohn points to a similar sympathy for Indians among French travellers, including Alexis de Tocqueville, who cast Native Americans as aristocrats who had been defeated by the Anglo-American conquerors. Given Native Americans’ aristocratic role, de Tocqueville challenged the expansionary and conquering component of Anglo-American ideology. Other Frenchmen, like Blosseville, shared de Tocqueville’s views. In fact, Blosseville’s line of reasoning resembles that of German sympathisers for Indians: The indigenous of North America closely resembled the earlier Franks and Gauls living on the borders of the Roman Empire, and had a culture similar to that of the Germanic tribes discussed by Tacitus.\textsuperscript{17} This makes the negative perceptions of Indians on behalf of \textit{Adelsverein} members, such as von Solms, others involved in emigration projects, and diplomats like Saligny perhaps even more noteworthy.

Sometimes, the blanket term “Indian” was used because of a lack of knowledge on behalf of Texian, Mexican, U.S.-American, or European observers. A report of the Battle of Walker’s Creek fought by Captain J. C. Hays in June of 1844 noted that a Texian troop of fifteen men was sent out “to ascertain what tribe of Indians were committing so many depredations”, but when Hays found a party of Indians, he seemed incapable of determining which tribe they belonged to, for he continued to label them as “Indians”.\textsuperscript{18} The blanket term “Indian” can lead to confusions in evaluating the correspondence, for it can often be unclear what tribe the author is referring to. In one lengthy report by Prussian Consul-General to Mexico, Ferdinand von Seiffart, for

instance, the author analysed the population of Mexico and guessed that it numbered roughly
eight million. Of these, he estimated that roughly seven million were Indians. These, he asserted,
had “nothing in common with the European population, save for religion”. This is, of course, a
broad generalisation of Native Americans living in Mexico, and also oversimplifies the complex
racial nuances and mestizaje existant in Mexico.\textsuperscript{19} Seiffart continued by labelling all Indians in
Mexico as “\textit{gente sin razon}, (unreasonable people) as they were for the Spaniards 300 years
prior”, without acknowledging that this definition likewise has a much more complex meaning
than merely distinguishing between the Spaniards and all Indians.

Letters such as this one by Seiffart illustrate that European diplomats’ use of the term
“Indian” does not adequately portray the large variety and diversity among Native American
groups in the Mexican North and Texas borderlands, though they do showcase how diplomats
perceived Native Americans. In the same letter, Seiffart also highlighted that Indians were not
just seen by Europeans, such as the Spaniards of centuries prior, as \textit{gente sin razon}, but also by
Mexicans of the 1830s and 1840s: Though the indigenous of Mexico were “equally free and in
all political rights equal to the other inhabitants of the republic”, within the “ego of the Mexican,
there is an insurmountable chasm between himself and the native/indigenous”.\textsuperscript{20} As such,
diplomatic correspondence, precisely because it often offered very generic views of the
indigenous actors of the Texas borderlands, reveals a lot about how the Native Americans of
Texas were perceived in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century on both sides of the Atlantic.

\textsuperscript{19} More on Seiffart’s racial views regarding the Mexican population follows later in the chapter. It is unclear how he
classified the ‘white population’ vis-à-vis the ‘indigenous population’, i.e., it is not evident in which group he
included \textit{mestizos}. In this report, he speaks of ‘whites/Europeans’ and ‘Indians’ only.
\textsuperscript{20} General Depiction of the German-Mexican Trading Relations: Addition to the Trading Report of the Royal
General-Consulate in Mexico No. 3, by Ferdinand Seiffart, May 20, 1846, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA,
Handelsamt, Nr. 127: Acta betreffend der Handels- und Schiffahrts-Verhältnisse in Mexico, October 18, 1844-1847.
This report spans roughly a hundred pages. For references to Native Americans, see pages 60 ff. in particular.
Nevertheless, some tribes found frequent mention by Europeans. The Comanches were described in correspondence and newspapers as dangerous and threatening. U.S.-American statesman Daniel Webster wrote to Powhatan Ellis in Washington D.C. of the accompaniment of a certain Franklin Coombs on the Texan expedition to Santa Fe, and justified the presence of weaponry on this expedition by highlighting the need for defence against Indian tribes, particularly the Comanches, rejecting any hostile motives towards Mexico on behalf of Texas as possible reasons for the expedition’s armament.\footnote{Webster to Ellis, January 3, 1842, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection (NLB): Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Paper about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 1, #5129-5152, 5141.} James Hamilton called the Comanches ‘hordes’ from which protection was needed, and A. J. Donelson referred to the Comanches as a “fierce and warlike” tribe.\footnote{James Hamilton to Santa Anna, Newspaper Excerpt from March 22, 1842, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 3, l. 138, and A. J. Donelson to Mr. Allen, June 13, 1845, Newspaper Excerpt from 1845, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 13, l. 163.} The Civilian and Galveston Gazette detailed a battle between a small troop of Texians and a larger force of Comanches, who had been stealing horses in Corpus Christi. The account labelled the Comanches as ‘savages’ with such a pivotal warrior cult that Colonel Kinney’s brave conduct in the battle allegedly earned him praise from the Comanches, who had “since said that he acted more like one of their own warriors than a pale face – the highest compliment they could pay him, however it may sound to the ears [of] civilized men”.\footnote{The Civilian and Galveston Gazette, October 18, 1845, Vol. VII, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 13, l. 236.}

Such reports, though they imply a certain respect for Comanches in their capacity as warriors, showcase that Comanches were regarded almost solely as warriors whose behaviour did not fall within the bounds of civilisation. In another issue of the Civilian and Galveston Gazette, an

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\footnote{The names of these individuals are all misspelled as Wesber, Elis, and Cooums, respectively, but the Nettie Benson Collection’s guide lists the authors of the notes exchanged as Daniel Webster and Powhatan Ellis. See: Webster to Ellis, January 3, 1842, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection (NLB): Valentin Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Paper about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 1, #5129-5152, 5141.}
encounter between Texian and Comanche forces was laid out, specifying the events of a battle between 150 Comanches and 75 Texians, the latter of which lost four men and more than sixty horses and mules. According to Hämäläinen, Mexican inhabitants of the northern states cast the Comanches as “alien others, animalistic barbarians who had to be erased in the name of civilization, religion, and national honor”. One Mexican observer explained that the “numerous Indian tribes living in the border regions, particularly the Comanches, have always been so formidable and destructive for the citizens of Mexico”, and that “the Comanches inspire more terror in (the Mexicans) than any other tribe”.

Many European statesmen drew their knowledge of the Comanches and other tribes from Texian newspapers, which detailed accounts of raids orchestrated by and conflict with Native Americans. Beyond this, they had nary a source base, as is evidenced by how seldomly the Comanche tribe was discussed: Prussian officials make hardly any noteworthy mention of the Comanches in their correspondence on Texas, whereas the Hanseates and British do so incredibly sparingly. Bremian merchant Delius cited that roughly 70,000 – 80,000 Comanche Indians lived in Texas, who were viewed as the ultimate “mortal enemies of the whites, by whom they were thus killed and eradicated at any given opportunity”. Prince von Solms likewise referred to the Comanches and in fact generalised that the Indians of Texas were “namely the Comanches”, suggesting that he believed that most Native Americans – or those of note, anyway – were Comanche Indians. He described them as “great in number, and brave”, and though he

25 Hämäläinen, 226.
20 No signature, no date. NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5177.
27 This letter can be found without signature in the Solms-Braunfels Archives, but it is the same letter that Delius wrote to von Rother. See: Fred. Delius to von Rother, December 15, 1843, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89, Nr. 13358: Texas, 52-54. Briton James Hook estimates that there were roughly 40,000 Indians in Texas. See: Hook to Palmerston, April 30, 1841, CBA, 29-38. As Adams writes in a note of his edited volume on British correspondence, many estimates regarding the population of Texas – be it white or Indian – were inaccurate. See: CBA, 20.
knew only little of and had never interacted personally with them, he was, based on how the Comanches were portrayed by contemporaries, ready for hostilities. He wrote, rather naively, that he planned on “politely pay[ing] them the first visit. They will either make peace terms and keep them or [he] shall immediately strike them such a blow that they will be rendered harmless for a long time to come, if not forever”. 28 This statement illustrates the prejudices toward and fear of the Comanches, even on behalf of German newcomers to Texas who knew relatively little about the Indian affairs of the young republic. 29

By far the most extensive account of the Comanche presence in Texas is given by Alphonse Dubois de Saligny. The French diplomat made fairly frequent mention of the Comanches, whom he saw as the enemies of the Texians. 30 In one letter, he wrote that the Comanches were the “most bellicose and powerful of the Indian tribes of Texas”, who were constantly at war with Texas as well as Mexico, and that many people of Texas believed any peace negotiations with said tribe to be “a trap on behalf of the Comanches”. 31 Military confrontations between Comanches and Texians were not uncommon, and Saligny commented upon them in the Texian’s favour. When an encounter between a Texian and a significantly larger Comanche group led to the latter’s defeat, Saligny underlined that “this extreme disproportion of forces did not scare the Texians, who bravely arrested the Comanche passage”, showcasing his perception of the Texians as noble warriors whereas he labelled the Comanches as “savages” later in the letter. 32 Much of Saligny’s correspondence casts the Comanches as

29 In general, the members of the Adelsverein knew very little about Texas, as von Solms even acknowledges himself in a report where he laments that Fisher had taken advantage of the Verein’s lack of knowledge. Prince von Solms’ Eighth Report dated February 8, 1845, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
unbridled, impulsive and threatening, such as when he discussed the Comanche “hatred towards the Lipans” and underlined that he perceived the Comanches as the “most dreadful” Indian tribe.33

The French consul’s views were influenced by reports of kidnappings of whites and the raiding of villages by Comanche Indians. In one instance, Saligny described the encounter of Texian Colonel W. C. Cooke with twelve Comanche chiefs. After a “violent discussion”, Cooke told the Indian chiefs that they were taken prisoner and would not be released until the “whites held by them [were to] be released sound and safe”. “At these words”, wrote Saligny, “one of the Comanche chiefs moved towards the door to leave, but the guard guarding them crossed the bayonet in front of him, the Indian pulled out his dagger and struck him. In the same moment, the other chiefs moved quickly toward the door also and hurt several Texians. A terrible scramble/fight broke out, and the twelve Indians were massacred within a few minutes”. Even though the chiefs were killed, Saligny expressed fairly little sympathy for them, stating that “it seem[ed] like the savages fight with a fury and despair one cannot imagine”.34 In another instance, the consul bemoaned the minacious atmosphere in the Texian borderlands, where people “waited for another attack on behalf of the Comanches”, and lamented that “mules and horses had been kidnapped by the savages”.35 Another report details the joint Comanche and Cherokee attack of the town of Victoria, where the majority of the population was killed by the Indian party and the village plundered and then set ablaze. Afterwards, as Mayfield informed Saligny, the party moved toward Linnville to do the same.36 The events of Victoria and Linnville

34 Saligny to Dalmatie, March 5, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 137-147. This account of the scurry occurring in San Antonio is also described by Hämäläinen, 216.
36 Mayfield to Saligny, April 5, 1841, AAE: Texas, Vol. 3, l. 136-142.
inspired wrath within the Texian government, which despatched an expedition into Indian
territory. Though this force consisting of 1800 men did not accomplish much – Saligny surmised
that the reason for this was the Texians’ complacency in times of peace, forgetting the prior
Indian raids and “falling back in their security” – the “[intended] success of this company,
stopped [prevented] by General Huston, seemed unmistakable: […] the extinction of the entire
tribe”.37

The trans-Atlantic governmental dislike for the Comanches also extended to other Indian
tribes, not least because of the frequent use of the blanket term ‘Indian’ for any tribe.

Nevertheless, even when other tribes’ names were given in newspapers and correspondence, they
hardly fared much better than the Comanches. In the case of the Karankawa, German newspapers
and officials of the Adelsverein fell prey to the misconception that this group of Native
Americans engaged in cannibalism.38 When their name occurred in newspapers, it was often in
relation to violence. One issue of the Civilian and Galveston Gazette spoke of a “party of
Caronkewa Indians, who had shown marks of hostility to” Texas. Due to the suspicion of
“mischievous designs”, Texian troops disarmed the party.39 The Morning Star labelled the
‘Cronkewas’, i.e. Karankawa, as “troublesome to the settlers in the vicinity of Aransas Bay”
because of robbery and a generally “threatening and hostile attitude towards the settlers.”40 In his
 correspondence, Saligny also referred to another article from the Civilian and Galveston Gazette
in which a battle between a Texian company under Captain Hays and a band of Karankawa and
Comanche Indians was described. According to the article, wrote Saligny, both sides fought

38 You can see this misconception in Ernest K. Gruene’s narrative, The Founding of New Braunfels, in which he
Tonkohuas and Wacos practiced cannibalism. See: Ernest K. Gruene, The Founding of New Braunfels, DBC: Ernest
K. Gruene Narrative, Box 2R7.
39 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, November 8, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 310.
“with a lot of cold blood and intrepidity”, and Saligny continued to label both Indian tribes as ‘savages’ for the remainder of the letter.41

Besides the appearance of the Karankawa in Saligny’s letters, one can see that he also juxtaposed the Tonkaways and Lipans with the Comanches, their ‘mortal enemies’. He noted that the former, though allied with the Texian government, had the potential to be just as troublesome to the Texians as the Comanches because any peace negotiations with the Comanches would lead the Tonkaways and Lipans to terminate their alliance with Texas.42 Furthermore, he alleged that the surroundings of Austin were “infested with Lipans and Tonkaways. Scattered through the country in small bands, they raid settlements and massacre the travellers”. The quote exposed his wariness towards the two tribes.43 In another instance, Saligny recounted that Texian troops had to be despatched to keep both tribes at a distance from Texian settlements.44 In one report, Prussian chargé d’affaires to Mexico von Gerolt lamented the destruction caused by “savage Indians (Apaches)” in the Mexican state of Chihuahua, the government of which found itself forced to take out loans in order to acquire the means to arrest Indian incursions.45

**Native Americans’ Influence on European Commercial Ambitions in North America**

The above-mentioned incident discussed by von Gerolt demonstrates one of the two primary concerns that dominated European discussions on Native Americans in the Mexican North and Texian borderlands: that of finance and commerce. The presence of Indian tribes in

43 P.S. January 20, 1840, attached to Saligny to Dalmatie, January 19, 1840, FLTx, 116.
Texas and Mexico threatened trading networks, because plundering en route could lead to loss of goods as well as life. Moreover, as the case of Chihuahua exemplifies, Mexican governments were destabilised by Native American intervention, leading to a vicious cycle of debility: Indian attacks hampered the economy of Mexican regions, yet without economic success, these same areas were unable to properly defend themselves against raids, plundering, and the destruction of property. European officials were keenly aware of this and, combined with the already less-than-ideal commercial conditions in Mexico as discussed in Chapter One, Native American action made Mexico less attractive for European trade. Prussian consul to Mexico, Franz Schneider, evaluated trading routes in New Mexico, concluding that they brought less commercial profit than the Texian harbours because the route via Santa Fe necessitated lengthy bypasses around Indian territories and the armament of caravans for defence against Indian tribes.\textsuperscript{46} In a letter to Texian Minister Plenipotentiary to France and Britain Ashbel Smith, Anson Jones identified the same problem for Mexico, claiming that the country did not possess the resources to invade Texas because of “numerous and belligerent Apache and Comanche tribes” which organised “destructive incursions into [Mexico’s] territory” from San Luis Potosi to Matamoros, placing Mexico in such shambles that “all of its resources of credit have been exhausted” and that it was indebted heavily to European governments, who sought to recover their financial losses.\textsuperscript{47} Hämäläinen also comments that some contemporary observers spoke of Mexico as a Comanche colonial possession, which was only saved from complete destruction because Mexicans fulfilled the Comanches’ need for horses.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, he argues that contraband trade and commerce with the Comanches damaged the economic and political stability of Mexican state Chihuahua,

\textsuperscript{46} Franz Schneider to von Roenne, March 25, 1845, GSta PK: I. HA, Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 126: Acta betreffend Berichte des Konsulats in Mexico (Tampico), January 20, 1845-April 8, 1846.
\textsuperscript{47} Anson Jones to Ashbel Smith, June 10, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 301-309. French translation: l. 286 ff.
\textsuperscript{48} Hämäläinen, 219-220.
and that northern Mexican communities lived on or under the “subsistence level”, demonstrating how crippled Mexico’s international trade was as a result of the commercial interests of the Comanches.\textsuperscript{49} The French \textit{Journal des Débats}, though it did not specifically mention Native Americans as responsible, likewise lamented that “the Mexicans lack money for the interior services of the country. They do not have one cent to open routes or to repair those of the Spaniards, to maintain their ports or to subdue the thieves with whom the country is infested”, revealing a French awareness of the difficulties of trading in Mexico, particularly those related to plundering and unsafe travelling.\textsuperscript{50}

Next to monetary issues, diplomats also identified a lack of manpower as a reason for Mexico’s struggle in quelling raids, robberies, and plundering. Hämäläinen writes that many villages of northern Mexico were so undermanned and isolated that they stood no chance against Comanche raiders, and governmental support in the form of troops was often insufficient and militia units in “pitiable condition”, inciting contemporary Josiah Gregg to note that Mexican troops and settlers were, because they were so outnumbered by the Comanches, often of the opinion that their resistance was futile, resulting in empty pursuits of Comanche bands that ended with the Mexican soldiers sleeping in a cornfield to avoid face-to-face confrontation.\textsuperscript{51} Teodoro Bahre, German merchant in Mexico, pointed out that political insurgencies led the federal troops to congregate in and around the cities, leaving trading routes exposed to robbers and thieves. As a result, Bahre lamented, one German merchant house had lost over 3,000 dollars.\textsuperscript{52} In another letter, Schneider surmised that it would be difficult to make the frontier

\textsuperscript{49} Hämäläinen, 229 and 231.
\textsuperscript{51} Hämäläinen, 227.
\textsuperscript{52} Excerpt from a letter by Teodoro Bahre, December 31, 1844, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5225: Acta des Ministeriums der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten (MdaA) betreffend die Handelsverhältnisse mit Mexico und die
more impervious to attacks by tribes because the population of Mexico’s northern states was incredibly sparse and scattered. In those states, wrote Schneider, “the organisation of the few armed forces is lacking, and the local authorities futilely plead for help from the highest government. One has now transferred to these departments a large portion of the general state revenue, namely duties from internal tariffs and direct taxes”. This provided significant aid to the states, though it did occur at the expense of the federal government. Schneider hoped that this effort would prove successful, because it would enable the states to manage their own police departments whereas the Mexican army would have to be used less for the defence against Indian tribes in the form of escorts, securing of trading routes and the pacification of towns. Nevertheless, he regretted that this re-organisation would more than likely take time to transpire.53

The idea that Mexico’s inability to properly defend itself against Indian attacks stemmed in part from an insufficiently large population was shared by Schneider’s contemporaries, including several French officials. A French memorandum feared that Mexico was “incapable of defending itself against relentless hostilities of the Indian tribes” and linked this condition to Mexico’s being “depeopled” and “prey to misery”.54 Saligny also reported on the meeting between the Texian government and Mexican general Mariano Arista, who aspired to bring about a peace agreement between Texas and Mexico that would facilitate the protection of the shared frontier from Comanche raids.55 At the same time as diplomats recognised that a low population made Mexican towns more susceptible to raids, they also acknowledged that Indian

53 Franz Schneider to PFM, October 27, 1845, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127, Mexico.
54 Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95.
attacks caused people to abandon their villages. This is a condition that Mexican General José Urréa highlighted in a letter to frequent Vice-President and President of Mexico, Valentín Gómez Farías, where he bemoaned that the “barbaric tribes” responsible for “death, plunder, and desolation” had commercial connections to both the Texians and U.S.-Americans, from whom they acquired arms and munitions in exchange for saddleries and other goods robbed from Northern-Mexican settlers in states such as New Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. This trade, warned Urréa, was akin to a “war on the nation”, for it destabilised the Mexican frontier.\textsuperscript{56} Prussian von Gerolt suggested that the establishment of military colonies in the northern states of Mexico would help stabilise the country and save it from excursions by hostile forces, yet also commented that this was an idea that had existed for quite a while – it could not be executed because the Mexican population was too sparse.\textsuperscript{57}

Mexico’s supposedly numerically insufficient population also impacted European perceptions in other ways, as Seiffart’s summary of Mexican history reveals. Seiffart’s report focussed on the Native American population of Mexico that lived largely sedentary lifestyles in or around Mexico’s cities as opposed to the Comanches and other “warlike” tribes of the Mexican North. Next to stating that Mexico’s population numbered only roughly eight million people, of which seven million were Indians, Seiffart surmised that six million of the indigenous inhabitants were not a part of the international trading network and hence made Mexico less attractive for German trade because of a lack of consumers. Seiffart explained this condition as such:

\textit{The Indian exists to serve the Mexican, and nothing occurs so that he may forget this destiny/designation. Thus it is explainable why the Indian has, after three-hundred years

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{56} Urréa to Gómez Farías, April 6, 1840, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 47A: Correspondence, January 1839-July 1840, Folder 4, #573-641, 625.

\textsuperscript{57} Excerpt of a Report by von Gerolt, October 1, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdA, III Nr. 14360: Swiss Colony in Texas, l. 69-70.
\end{footnotesize}
of community with a civilised people [Volk], only forgotten the oppressed culture of his ancestors without appropriating any of that of his conqueror. If one estimates the Indian population living in the immediate proximity of the larger towns at one entire million at most, then there remain at most six million inhabitants to whom the necessities of civilisation are entirely foreign and who are not drawn to an acquaintance with such by anything. These six million must, as regards the question concerning the currently possible extent of sale volumes of foreign industrial products in this country, be excluded entirely. They are consumers for not one of these products.

Seiffart maintained that only the million Indians living close to the cities and in service of the Mexicans were possible indigenous consumers of German products, chiefly linen goods. Nevertheless, linens were “as much a necessity as a luxury” for this class of Mexico’s population, and beyond the desire for linens, Seiffart did not believe that they formed a noteworthy component of the consumer base in Mexico. “All other imported goods thus exist solely for the consumption of the white population, which one cannot peg at more than one million, and to which one can certainly add no more than ten to twelve-thousand foreigners”.58

Although Seiffart asserted that this portion of the population had a high level of consumption bordering on extravagance and prodigality (Verschwendung), the fact that he believed that roughly seventy-five percent of Mexico’s population did not qualify as consumers or/and participants in international trade at all demonstrates how little European diplomats valued Native Americans and how significantly their presence altered how Europeans perceived Mexico commercially.

Prussian official Seiffart also regarded the governmental structure in charge of handling Indian affairs as insufficient, though for different, slightly more sympathetic, though no less condescending reasons. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Seiffart described the “Indian as docile/good-natured, teachable, and skilful himself in some aspects”, and declared that the

58 General Depiction of the German-Mexican Trading Relations by Seiffart, May 20, 1846, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127, Mexico. This report spans roughly a hundred pages. For references to Native Americans, see pages 60 ff. in particular.
Mexican government had not done anything for his development. It is again likely that Seiffart is referring not to the more mobile tribes engaged in raiding and plundering, such as the Comanches, but to those Mexican Indians that lived within Mexican towns and villages, for he referred to them generally as the “people [Volk] of the peasantry [/serfdom]” in a later passage. There, he criticised that public education in Mexico at the time was firmly in the grasp of the clergy, because it was “certainly not the aim or according to the wishes of the clergy that the people of the peasantry be delivered from the indign idolism with which one blasphemes the name of Christianity here”. In the same letter, Seiffart identified the Mexican government as overly idle in the matter of public education, for most schools not led by clergy had been established by foreigners, predominantly Englishmen and U.S.-Americans. Without the development of its human capital, including that of its indigenous peoples, Seiffart asserted, Mexico would not be able to progress its economy and industry, sustaining its dependency upon European manufactured goods. In reference to the cultivation of silk, for instance, Seiffart believed that the “Indian possessed care and industriousness enough” in order to acquire all of the skills of a good cultivator of silk.

The ‘Indian Problem’ also dominated Mexican political debates at the expense of international trade. Von Gerolt addressed this in one of his reports to the Prussian government and stated that the Mexican government had not yet evaluated its treaty of commerce and amity with the Hanse Towns because the responsible “chamber of deputies had not dealt with anything but the acquisition of monetary means for the combat against the Indians on the northern borders and the campaign against Texas, which is also why the Hanseatic treaty has not yet been placed

59 General Depiction of the German-Mexican Trading Relations by Seiffart, May 20, 1846, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127, Mexico. This report spans roughly a hundred pages. For this section, see pages 70 ff.
in front of the respective commission”. Von Gerolt looked upon this situation with unease, pointing towards unrest among the south-eastern states of Mexico which were at the moment insurgent. Despite this, von Gerolt wrote, the Mexican central government worried primarily about its northern frontier, where Indian tribes had renewed their incursions to a level that von Gerolt described as “devastating”. The presence of Native Americans in northern Mexico and the central government’s inability to defend its states in that region also caused discontent among these states, where insurgencies were already common. Gómez Farías summarised that the Mexican Congress had spent a lot on the protection of the Mexican frontier from Indian raids with little success, that his country faced commercial losses that could only be curbed through emigration to the frontier regions, and that the actions of northern settlers did not always follow the guideline of the government. Texian officials seemed to be partially aware of this, for H. McLeod suggested that, because of the “opposition to Santa Anna in northern provinces” of Mexico, “a counter revolution there, would immediately follow his success into the interior. And that in that case, the country west of the Rio Grande would gladly avail themselves of our aid in resisting Santa Anna”. In order to encourage Mexico’s northern provinces to side with Texas, McLeod proposed enticing them with the promise of protection from Indians: “as a means of giving protection, as well to the Mexican frontier in case they took part with us, [Gen. Green] proposed arrangements for conciliating the Indian tribes”.

The same concern for commerce and nationals’ safety also applied to Texas. A Bremian official observed that the “civilisation of the country must be incredibly backward, because, with

62 Gómez Farías, undated, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Paper about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 6, #5158-5168, 5159.
63 H. McLeod, January 1844, Newspaper Excerpt, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 13, l. 43.
the exception of an over-abundance of game, the only foodstuff consumed by the population is that which has been imported, e.g. salted meat, flour, bacon and butter from North America – and imported coffee sugar et cetera, even though the country is capable of producing the former article in large excess and possibly also the latter”. As a cause for the underdeveloped Texian economy, the Bremian listed the existence of Indian tribes, particularly the Comanches.64 British officials identified Native American influence in Texas as a possible incentive for Texians to seek annexation to the U.S. in order to garner more protection from raids and plundering, a measure that would have had significant repercussions for British commercial interests. Kennedy reported that an English trader named Redmond, resident of Corpus Christi, had informed him that “in consequence of the unusually formidable character of the late Indian inroads, the residents of Corpus Christi had made urgent application for protection to the Government. [...] it was further intimated, by President Houston” that “arrangements should be made for calling in a protective force from the United States”, particularly if Mexico proved to be behind the Indian attacks.65 In a report to the Texian Senate, David S. Kaufman lamented that Texas was unable to prevent Indian hostilities due to its weakness, claiming that Texian families were “made desolate by the scalping-knife of the savage” and that Texas was falling prey to the “murderous savage or the predatory Mexican”. Protection, he asserted, could only be provided by the stronger, more stable United States, because its East lived in “comparative security” and could “come to the aid of their suffering brethren of the West”. England was rendered in this report as “incapable […] to

64 This letter can be found without signature in the Solms-Braunfels Archives, but it is the same letter that Delius wrote to von Rother. See: Fred. Delius to von Rother, December 15, 1843, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89, Nr. 13358: Texas, 52-54.
65 Kennedy to Aberdeen, July 29, 1844, CBA, 350-353.
secure our Independence”, with which statement the author rejected European support as an option of defence against Indian attacks.66

**NATIVE AMERICANS, EUROPEAN COLONISATION PROJECTS, AND EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF RACE**

For several European agents, Indian raids formed a key consideration for settlement in Texas. Saligny regarded the choice of Austin as the republic’s capital as a wise move, because he believed that this would be “the only way to afford protection from the Indians and to encourage settlers to venture in this rich land where, with ax [sic] and plough, they will develop the inexhaustible resources of this rich country”.67 This mention of settlers’ hesitation to explore the entire Texian state due to the presence of Native American tribes reveals that diplomats did fear how Indian tribes could impact commerce and nationals’ safety not just in Mexico, but also in Texas. In fact, Saligny’s erstwhile successor, Viscount Jules de Cramayel, judged many of the uninhabited parts of Texas as unworthy for planned European settlement, because they were either places “unsuitable for culture and neglected for this reason” or “frontiers still unoccupied and exposed to the depredations of Indian hordes”.68 The *Texian and Brazos Farmer* also identified Indian raids as a reason for a lack of European settlement, reporting that peace with the Native American tribes was needed before Texas could “teem with nature’s richest products under the hand of the peaceful and industrious emigrant who is now afraid to settle on our most fertile and prolific lands”.69 Whereas this newspaper viewed Indian peace as a prerequisite to

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66 Report by David S. Kaufman to K. L. Anderson, President of the Senate, January 20, 1845, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 13, l. 48-52. See also: Letter by Mr. Gilmer, Governor of Virginia, regarding the annexation of Texas to the United States, in AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 139-148.
67 Saligny to Dalmatie, March 17, 1840, FLTx, 129-131.
68 Cramayel to Guizot, July 15, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 6, 5-9.
European migration, the *Texas National Register* linked migration and Indian affairs in the opposite manner, suggesting that migrants were needed to defend Texas against attacks by tribes (mirroring the idea that Mexico needed a larger population in order to fend off Indian raids). The newspaper esteemed that a “population of steady, industrious Germans, is raising in the west, that best bulwark against the red-man – actual and permanent occupation of the soil”, showcasing the belief that Indian tribes did not make proper use of the land and that, due to a lack of permanent settlement on behalf of some Native American groups, they were not genuinely entitled to ownership of Texian lands.\(^70\) Prussian official von Bülow discouraged his government from supporting German emigration to Texas due to the additional dangers colonists would deal with there, including the presence of “savage tribes”.\(^71\) Another Prussian statesman questioned the value of German colonisation in Texas, surmising that the presence of the “fearsome Comanche Indians” made the most fertile and suitable tracts inhospitable.\(^72\) Briton Kennedy, who viewed von Solms’ project favourably, feared that “a single Indian inroad might break up the first establishments, and affect disastrously the entire plan of the Association”, demonstrating how pivotal Indians were to plans of European migrations to Texas.\(^73\)

Europeans also feared that emigrants might become savage through association with Indian tribes, which deterred some officials from supporting emigration. Elliot feared that one might find the British Emigrant who “comes into contact with the American or frontier Stations [...] squalid, poor and a Wreck”.\(^74\) Kennedy shared this belief, and argued that certain Europeans were better suited for living in the wilderness than others. The Germans he regarded as “the most

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\(^{71}\) Von Bülow to Flottwell, November 17, 1844, GSta PK: III. HA MdA, III Nr. 14360, l. 92-94.
\(^{72}\) Report of a Prussian Regierungs-Assessor (more than likely from Berlin) on the matter of German emigration to Texas, GSta PK: III. HA MdA, III Nr. 14360, l. 96-100.
\(^{73}\) Prince von Solms to Kennedy, December 3, 1844, CBA, 386-390.
\(^{74}\) Elliot to Addington, March 26, 1843, CBA, 165-169.
successful”, a reputation that preceded them, and considered that the Irish fared well, also. The French, however, he deemed as unsuited for Texas, evincing “the least aptitude for the situation in which they are placed”. “A Frenchman left to himself in an insulated Settlement”, maintained Kennedy, “will soon become barbarized”.\textsuperscript{75} The possible ‘barbarisation’ of Europeans through contact with Indian tribes, particularly the Comanches, is also addressed by Hämäläinen, who writes that many Spanish and Mexican officials had the “fear of being culturally consumed by the \textit{bárbaros}”, whose dress and habits some northern Mexican villagers had already adopted in order to engage in trade and more fruitful relations with the Comanches.\textsuperscript{76} The German \textit{Adelsverein} pressed for closely placed German settlements to prevent the dissolution of the civilised German nationality into that of the American “yankees”, who were described as backwood individuals and squatters against whom no “foreign, more civilised element” would stand a chance, highlighting the idea that life in the wilderness had made U.S.-Americans less civilised than a German.\textsuperscript{77}

Germans in particular discussed how Texas’ Native American tribes would impact emigration thereto. As the \textit{Texas National Register’s} article showcases, German settlers formed a significant portion of migration to Texas.\textsuperscript{78} A German pamphlet on \textit{Adelsverein} addressed the ambilateral issue of immigration and Indian affairs in the young republic, stating that Texian

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\textsuperscript{75} Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 9, 1844, CBA, 356-362.
\textsuperscript{76} Hämäläinen, 207.
\textsuperscript{77} This letter can be found without signature in the Solms-Braunfels Archives, but it is the same letter that Delius wrote to von Rother. See: Fred. Delius to von Rother, December 15, 1843, GStA PK: I. HA, Rep. 89, Nr. 13358: Texas, 52-54.
\textsuperscript{78} One report by Saligny dated March 16, 1839, asserted that 137 wagons carrying immigrants near Nacogdoches were “mostly Germans”, see: Saligny to Molé, March 16, 1839, FLTx, 64-69. Kennedy observed in 1844 that only few Englishmen and -women had migrated to Texas and that the majority was German and French, see: Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 9, 1844, CBA, 356-362. In 1845, Kennedy remarked that the “European emigration to Texas during 1845, has, with slight exception been exclusively German”. See: Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 31, 1845, CBA, 573. In the attached enclosure, he also provides a list of ships carrying German emigrants, pegging the number for 1845 at 3,084 migrants.
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independence could only be guaranteed through internal consolidation and strength, something that could only be achieved through a “quick expansion of the population (through immigration)”. At the same time, the pamphlet also noted that German emigrants had to take precautions in Texas, not for reasons of climate or other environmental challenges, but the threat of Indian attacks. The Adelsverein only had limited resources available to provide for the necessary protection of their emigrants, which would cap the number of families moving to Texas at two-hundred for the first year. German Captain Colloredo Mansfeld expressed scepticism regarding the planned settlement of German emigrants in Texas, citing that reports highlighted that the available tracts of land were in Indian territory. Given that German settlers were thus susceptible to Indian raids, Mansfeld inquired who would be there to protect the ‘peaceful’ Germans. Subsequently, in a memorandum of the Society, the Adelsverein concluded that the German colonists needed land grants adjoined to one another to facilitate “security against the Savages”. Another report of the Society also urged that measures against the Indian tribes had to be taken in order to guarantee the safety for their settlers. Given the large number of Germans who sought to emigrate, many societies and enterprises advertised various locations around the globe as best-suited for German settlement, including Hungary, Texas, the United States, or Australia. The presence, number, and characteristics of the native populations of these various places formed a chief consideration for emigrants and were thus portrayed by advocates of emigration in a certain manner depending on which location they favoured and supported. A pamphlet on the Third Expedition to Port

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79 Einwanderer-Verein für Texas, Würzburg pamphlet, in StA HB: C. 26.
80 Mansfeld to von Castell, April 24, 1843, DBC: Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 70-73.
Adelaide in Southern Australia endeavoured to extol Southern Australia and in doing so provided arguments against German settlement in Texas and the United States. Next to economic factors, such as travelling costs and distances as well as the suitability and fertility of the land, the pamphlet also considered the native population of Southern Australia as incredibly docile and peaceful. “The number of natives”, claimed the pamphlet, “coulored persons with plain hair, beard and well-developed extremities, is very low and seems to decrease continuously […] The enmity between the tribes, infanticide and an itinerant lifestyle seems to be the causes for this decrease. The British government seeks to civilise the savages, it only succeeds seldom in getting them to work and tying them to education […] there is an attorney employed in Adelaide to protect the rights of the natives and to spare them from slavery and maltreatment”. One settler, Christian Bothe, was cited as having written to his brothers that “the tribes who live here are very good/friendly, some of them are also working, although they do not want to know anything about the word of God”. In general, the pamphlet described Southern Australia as incredibly safe and stable, highlighting that the German “colony enjoyed complete tranquillity and security of property”, something that could not be said for Texas or the U.S.83

Another society supported the emigration of Germans to Brazil, suggesting that this region was extremely well-suited for settlement because of its low population density.84 Wilhelm Friedrich Karl Stricker, a German historian, doctor, and journalist, stated that German “settlers

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84 „Verein zur Unterstützung der in die südlichen Provinzen Brasiliens einwandernden Deutschen“, StA HB: C. 26. Sadly, the original pamphlet exists only in an incomplete version in the Archive of Bremen. However, similar pamphlets and opinions are discussed by Frederik Schulze, who argues that German discourse on Latin America in general were dominated by the premise that “Latin America had only a small population and was largely uninhabited”; this conception prevailed from the 1840s through the 1940s. Agents of emigration and colonisation projects hoped to “fill the [Latin-American] space, nearly devoid of people and immeasurably vast, with a German population”. See: Frederik Schulze, Auswanderung als nationalistisches Projekt: 'Deutschum' und die Kolonialdiskurse im südlichen Brasilien (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), 117.
[...] enjoyed greater rights than the natives”, and that settlers in Brazil lived relatively peacefully among one another, be they German, French, English, Brazilian, or North American. Settlements were surrounded by “negroes, Indians of all tribes, and several mixed races”, but Stricker does not point to any hostilities toward European emigrants.\footnote{Wilhelm Friedrich Karl Stricker, \textit{Die Deutschen in Spanien und Portugal und den spanischen und portugiesischen Ländern von America. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen außer Deutschland} (Leipzig: Gustav Mayer, 1850), 245, 254, and 289.} The \textit{Fränkische Merkur}, a newspaper, asserted that Brazil might be a better destination for German emigrants because they were less likely to mix with the “Portuguese tribe” living there as opposed to the North American in the U.S., where Germans assimilated within a few generations.\footnote{"Deutsche Bundesstaaten", \textit{Fränkischer Merkur: Mit allergnädigsten Privilegien}, June 8, 1846, No. 159. Digitalised by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, July 13, 2010.} Although the pamphlet itself exists only in a very incomplete form in the Texas-related Bremian archival materials, the fact that the society behind this enterprise touted Brazil by underlining its vast regions suitable for settlement and void of people does reveal that the presence of indigenous populations played a factor for migrants.

As the reference to the “Portuguese tribe” exemplifies, German opinions on the inhabitants of the destinations for emigrants were not just limited to Native Americans. Hungary constituted one of the most-discussed regions for German settlement, and for supporters of Texas, also one of the most hated. Captain Mansfeld emphasised that, though Indian attacks in Texas may harass the German settlers, the latter would be able to defend themselves if living in a properly built plantation complex, which would make life no more dangerous than that in Hungary during the presence of the “swarming Turks” from which the villagers of Hungary had to seek protection.\footnote{Mansfeld to von Castell, April 24, 1843, DBC: Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 70-73.} The Würzburg pamphlet on German emigration to Texas stated that “the colonisation in Texas is judged in very varied manners, partially because the circumstances in
Texas are very little known, partially because we have party interests of entrepreneurs to combat, who tout other places for immigration in their own interest, (even the Hungarian feverish airs [Fieberlüfte] and the Flugsandsteppen of the banat, for the increase of the legally thusly called misera contribuens plebs, and in an epoch where ultra-Magyarism has witnessed an increase in the Germanic principle of the Todfeind)". The writer of the pamphlet much preferred Texas to Hungary for the above-stated reasons of viewing Hungary – and south-eastern Europe – as unhealthy and infertile, home to insalubrious air and sand dunes.

Der Bayerische Landbote had similarly negative views of Hungary and Magyarism, i.e. Hungarian nationalism. After listing many reasons for the future success of colonisation efforts in Texas, the writer noted that “it must thus have caused the highest indignation, when one had to hear vociferated the worst vilifications and denigrations of the noble intentions of the Society for the Protection of German Immigrants to Texas in a recently published leaflet entitled: ‘The Emigration of Germans to Texas, North America and Hungary, a warning to the nation, Munich by Georg Franz 1844’”. This publication, authored by an Austrian named Mathias Koch, aspired to denigrate any trans-Atlantic or generally overseas migration of Germans, praising Hungary as a destination instead. Like the Würzburg pamphlet, the Bayerische Landbote

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88 The word Fieberlüfte is not common in German, though is in this context probably meant to indicate that Hungarian air is unhealthy and ‘feverish’. Flugsandsteppen are a type of sandy steppe existing in Hungary and parts of the Balkan, the literal translation is “wind-blown sand steppe”. The Banat is a historic region in south-eastern Europe, located in the border region of today’s Romania, Hungary, and Serbia. Misera contribuens plebs is Latin and can be translated as the “poor, tax-paying people” or the “poor people who contribute”. The latter part of this sentence – „und in einer Epoche, wo sich der Ultra-Magyarismus einer Verstärkung des germanischen Princips Todfeind erzeigt” – is difficult to translate for its complexity. What the writer probably meant to signify is that ultra-Magyarism, i.e. a form of Hungarian nationalism evaluated as threatening by German contemporaries, was the Todfeind, or mortal enemy, of the Germans, whilst the concept of a Todfeind was likewise a German principle. The usage of the word Todfeind in this sentence thus more than likely refers to both the German principle and ultra-Magyarism, the latter of which has, in this epoch, been seen increasingly as the ‘mortal enemy’ or Todfeind of the Germans. The verb erzeigen is likewise complex and can mean to witness, to prove, to evince, or ‘to show or prove oneself’, such as ‘to show oneself thankful’, the most common usage of erzeigen in German today (sich dankbar erzeigen). Sich als Todfeind erzeigen thus shows a certain degree of culpability on behalf of ultra-Magyarism in becoming the German mortal enemy – to a certain extent, they proved themselves to be the mortal enemy.

emphasised the presence of Magyarism and fevers in Hungary. In addition, the newspaper also
criticised manorialism and feudalism, which restricted the freedoms of Germans who migrated
there, unlike in Texas, where the constitution, inspired by U.S.-American example, guaranteed
that the settler should have “all advantages and freedoms which one can wish for”. In Hungary, a
lord of the manor could even, according to the author of Der Bayerische Landbote, restrict the
amount of acorns that a German settler used to feed his pigs. Such insolence and hubris
combined with the outgrowths of Magyarism, argued the newspaper, had led to the formation of
a “contrepoid in a great many patient [/meek] Germans”.90

The Bavarian representative in communication with the Adelsverein, von Hormayr-
Hortenburg, referred to the same pamphlet authored by M. Koch, labelling it a brochure
conceived by the “most brusque ignorance regarding all trans-Atlantic conditions”, which sought
to demote any settlement in North America and eschewed the colonisation of Texas. The “sole
beatific solution” to German overpopulation was, according to Koch, Hungary and the Banat.
Von Hormayr-Hortenburg, however, argued that the “current crisis showcases […] urgently the
necessity of strengthening the German principle vis-à-vis Magyarism and Slavism” due to the
“highest irritability and the distrustful [/suspicious] repugnancy of the Stockungarn”.91 Von

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91 Stockungarn is a word that was only used seldom, and usage seems to be restricted to the 19th century. An 1847
book by Joseph Baron OW on the ancestry of the Greeks defines Stockungarn as “those who speak only their own
language”, whilst an 1811 volume on the geographic, historical, and statistical conditions of Europe refers to
“Stockungarn or Magyars”, suggesting that the two are synonymous. See: Joseph Baron OW., Die Abstammung der
Griechen und die Irrthümer und Täuschungen des Dr. Ph. Fallmerayer. Mit einem Anhange ueber Sprache, Volk,
und Fremdenherrschaft in Griechenland (München: Verlag von Georg Franz, 1847), 20-21, and Carl Ritter,
Europa: Ein geographisch-historisch-statistisches Gemählde für Freunde und Lehrer der Geographie, für Jünglinge
die ihren Cursus vollendet, den jedem Lehrbuche zu gebrauchen, Zweyter Theil (Frankfurt a.M.: J. C. H.
Buchhandlung, 1811), 43. The Wiener Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung calls the Stockungarn the “Magyars that build the
core of Hungary”, and Hesperus: Ein Nationalblatt für gebildete Leser calls the Stockungarn the Ur-Ungaren, i.e.
the ancestral stock of Hungary. See: Wiener Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung, August 17, 1847, No. 98, Year 7, and
Hesperus: Ein Nationalblatt für gebildete Leser, April 1814, No. 17. The issues from 1814 have been collected in a
volume entitled Hesperus: Encyclopaedische Zeitschrift für gebildete Leser (J. G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung,
1814), see page 133. As such, the Stockungarn referred to by von Hormayr-Hortenburg are ethnic Hungarians.
German media often described them as rather nationalistic, particularly during the rise of Hungarian nationalism or
Hormayr-Hortenburg criticised the Hungarian climate, “the pressure of the obligarchy [sic], the lack of freedom and security of property, which crushes even all large commercial and transactional traffic […] in the wonderful Hungary”, promoting Texas as a destination instead. Pro-Texian German newspapers, such as Der Bayerische Landbote, also sought to portray the Indian situation in Texas as well taken care of in order to promote German emigration to Texas. The Bavarian newspaper asserted that “Texas had treaties with all Indian tribes save for the Comanches, who wanted to appear at the peace convention in April of this year” and that “the Texian government has had, for about a year now, a company on horseback on the Indian frontier, and since then, one does not hear of Indians, who do no more than stealing horses, which has been spoiled for them”.93

Next to German emigration societies and pro-Texian newspapers, who had obvious incentives to tout Texas as an ideal place for German settlement and downplay the frequency and severity of Indian attacks, there were also some diplomats who saw the new Texas republic as more capable of handling the Indian situation than Mexico. British representative J. T. Crawford commented in 1837 that the Texian government had, next to the regular army, established “several Companies of Rangers on the various Frontiers to check the Indian Tribes. – These last however have but little occupation, as the Policy of General Houston has been conciliatory and he has very lately entered into Treaties with the most influential Chiefs”. Nevertheless, should there be need for defence, Crawford surmised that Texas had a fairly positive outlook because it


was a country where “every man is a Marksman and carries his Rifle”, showcasing that Crawford believed that Texas had the sufficient manpower to repel attacks, and as of late had such a large number of soldiers for this purpose that many of them remained underutilised. Saligny pointed out in March of 1840 that “the government has recently determined on more vigorous measures which will soon put an end to their [Indian] plundering”, and he commented several times on Texian troops’ efforts to pursue raiding bands. Only a short while later, Saligny recorded on March 17, 1840, that “the energetic measures of the government against the Indians have produced good results. Travel is now much easier and safer”. Though the presence of Native Americans surrounding Texian towns continued to force travellers to take lengthier detour routes, Saligny noted that he “travelled with an escort of fifty Texian volunteers, and this was sufficient to keep the Lipans and Tonkaways at a respectful distance”, suggesting that he valued the Texian government’s efforts to guard against Indian tribes. By 1843, a year in which Texas established more treaties with many Indian tribes, opinions on how threatening the Native Americans of Texas were did change on both sides of the Atlantic, because a pacification of the Indians seemed possible.

Although diplomatic perceptions of Native Americans were rather negative – especially as regards the tribes of Texas, who were seen as violent and destructive – officials did recognise that a more peaceful coexistence with them had to be sought. Thus, newspapers and correspondence do offer some more positive accounts of Indian tribes when discussing peace settlements with them. Elliot praised Houston’s policy of seeking peace with the various tribes, judging it as “particularly honorable” and “wise”. He furthermore criticised that “the most tremendous crime of these modern times is the treatment of the Indians on this Continent.

94 Crawford to Pakenham, May 26, 1837, CBA, 9-15.
95 Saligny to Dalmatie, March 17, 1840, FLTx, 129-130.
Robbers and Murderers pronounce that the civilized man cannot live in peace with the Indian, and the whole Christian world accepts the precious falsehood”.  

Saligny commented on the Texian willingness to make concessions to Native American tribes, stating that the Texian government had promised the Comanche tribe that they could, should they sign a peace treaty with Texas and “remain abident to the laws of the country, count on, like all the inhabitants of Texas, the protection of the government”.  

The Texian and Brazos Farmer reported in 1843 that several Indian treaties were being negotiated, and that a successful treaty had been concluded with the “Delawares, Shawnees, Ironise, Caddoes, Wacoes, Tahuachonaiies, Keachies, Wichetaws, Anadakahs, and Quapaws”, which had been “anxious to make” such a treaty and were eager to also “preserve peace with the wild tribes”.  

The newspapers hoped that a “final treaty can be made in October, which will include all the tribes in Texas and effect a lasting and permanent peace”. Whereas Native Americans were often described as ‘savage’ in many newspapers, this account of peace settlements spoke instead of “Indian eloquence” and printed several statements made by Indian chiefs, such as the speech of Qahquash [sic], the Waco chief.  

Although more sympathetic towards the Native Americans of Texas, Thos. Johnson, the editor, maintained a condescension nonetheless, stating that the writers of the Texian and Brazos Farmer “cannot believe in the doctrine of making friends with one or two tribes of Indians, in order that they may make war on the other tribes, and thereby lead to the final extermination of all the sons of the forest – it is a policy at once inhuman, barbarous, unchristian and

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96 Elliot to Aberdeen, December 11, 1842, CBA, 135-141.  
97 Saligny to Dalmatie, June 24, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 4-21.  
98 This is the treaty of Bird’s Fort.  

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unstatesmanlike”. This reveals that many Texian diplomats endeavoured to use Indian tribes for their own benefit.

Texian officials desired to employ Native Americans for their own advantage, by playing tribes against one another and using them to distinguish themselves from Mexicans and portraying Mexico as the national enemy or to take a stance in the matter of the annexation or independence of their republic. Even editor Johnson, who claimed he did not deem the policy of using a friendship with one tribe to incite a war against another desirable nor honourable, held such ulterior motives, as he revealed by writing that he believed that the Texian “frontier will be protected better than by a standing army” once peace with the Indian tribes had been made, demonstrating his desire to use Native American tribes for his nation’s gain. Saligny reported that Texian statesmen sought to use the animosity between the Comanches on the one hand and the Tonkaways and Lepans on the other by using forces from the latter two tribes to march against the former. British statesman Charles Elliot pointed out that President Houston had advised him in a meeting that, whereas he had “the sincerest disposition to adjust the difficulties” with Mexico and sought to “cultivate most friendly relations” between that and his republic, he regarded the incessant raids by Mexico upon the Texian frontier as so problematic that he may have to incite “measures of a similar nature, but of far more extensive effect”. In order to do so, Houston hoped to use Indian warriors, for “the relations of this Government with certain Indian tribes always left it in his power to carry on a warfare of the most formidable description along the whole Eastern frontier of Mexico”. This demonstrates that the coexistence of Texans with Indian tribes occurred not merely under the banner of peace, but frequently to further Texian

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100 Column by Thos. Johnson in the \emph{Texian & Brazos Farmer}, April 15, 1843, Vol. 1, No. 41, TNA: F.O. 75, Vol. 6, l. 101.
102 Elliot to Aberdeen, August 29, 1842, CBA, 95-99.
motives. Saligny also commented on Texas’ desire to pacify the Indians so that “considerable and lucrative trade” could be established between the tribes and Texians, showcasing Texian commercial motives for peace with Native Americans.\textsuperscript{103}

Another individual, Thaddeus di Lusignan, had self-reportedly “lived among the Indians”, feeling “as they do”, and approached the British government for aid to prevent the U.S. annexation of Texas. The Indians, he claimed “could they but receive powder and flints from the Canadian Military Posts, would soon Master the Country West of the Mississipi [sic]. They can appreciate to its real value the boasted power of the United States. They have Witnessed the Black Hawk expedition (1832) and also the Florida War […] they are now aware of their own strength”. Di Lusignan had dislike for the U.S.-Americans, and desired that annexation not take place, but wrote that he begged “from the Foreign Office; in the event of the Annexation I have mentioned, the office will know it a long time before the fact is made public. – Could I hope to receive hint, as early as possible, so that I could hasten home and begin operations immediately”.\textsuperscript{104} Though di Lusignan asserted that he had a kinship with several Indian tribes, he also labelled them as “savage” and did not identify himself as being part of any tribe, simply having lived among them.\textsuperscript{105} It is also apparent that di Lusignan appealed strongly to Britain’s own interests, suggesting that an armament of Indians would possibly repel the U.S.-Americans from succeeding in the annexation of Texas.

Teodoro Bahre was one of the few individuals in the correspondence evaluated who explained the hostility among certain Indian tribes. In one of his reports, Bahre summarised a story circulating in Mexico that Santa Anna had been pursued by a group of Native Americans,

\textsuperscript{103} Saligny to Guizot, January 10, 1842, AAE: Texas, Vol. 4, l. 12-30, 16.
\textsuperscript{104} Di Lusignan to Addington, May 6, 1844, CBA, 317-319.
\textsuperscript{105} Di Lusignan to Aberdeen, April 12, 1844, CBA, 315-316.
from whom he had fled in disguise and the accompaniment of no more than six men. The Indians, Bahre stated, had been robbed of their land, and were so irate that they had continued to pursue Santa Anna, whom they had eventually imprisoned. In order to buy his freedom, Santa Anna had offered them money under the provision that they leave the country, yet Bahre had no information as of March 1845 whether the President had been released or not. What this event illustrates is that Native American hostilities in the Texian borderlands, and in fact the remainder of North America, were often tied to land disputes, and that Europeans had an awareness of this circumstance.\textsuperscript{106} In a speech, U.S.-American politician John Quincy Adams likewise pointed to the fact that the “Indian savage” had been “the original possessor of the land from which you are scourging him already back to the foot of the Rocky Mountains”, and denounced those who sought to distinguish themselves from and condescend to other racial groups because of their Anglo-Saxon background. “Oh! yes, sir!”, spoke Adams, “far be it from me to depreciate the glories of the Anglo-Saxon race; although there have been times when they bowed their necks and submitted to the law of conquest, beneath the ascendancy of the Norman race”. Adams used his speech to showcase that Native Americans in North-America had not been treated kindly by the Anglo-Saxon settlers of the area, and labelled the Anglo-Saxon as the “exterminator of the Indians” – quite an apt explanation for the hostility on behalf of some Indian tribes.\textsuperscript{107}

**NATIVE AMERICANS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR TEXIAN INDEPENDENCE**

The presence of Native American tribes in the Texas region also played another role, this one more intrinsically for the Texian diplomats rather than their European counterparts. Texian


statesmen used Mexico’s conduct regarding Indians as a justification for Texian independence by allegation that the Mexican government had not adequately addressed the ‘Indian Problem’ of northern Mexico and Texas. Hämäläinen points toward this, writing that the Texian representatives cited the inability of Mexican governmental agencies to defend Texas against Comanche raids as one of the reasons for the petitioned separation of Texas from Mexico. The settlers lamented that certain communities “have disappeared entirely; in some of them the residents dying to the last man […] Many early settlers and their descendants have been sacrificed to the barbarians […] Every last one of us is probably threatened with total extermination by the new Comanche uprising”. In a letter from Texian James Hamilton to Mexican president Santa Anna, the former desired to vindicate the Texian revolutionaries by listing several factors of injustice on behalf of Mexico. One such aspect laid out by Hamilton was the claim that the Mexican government had less claim to the state of Texas as a result of its fear of Indian tribes, in response to which it invited Anglo-American settlers to the northern territory – Hamilton wrote that “these colonies of the Anglo-American race were introduced to protect your own colonies from the hordes of the Comanche Indians, from which your troops had fled so shamefully despite their sumptuous bravery”, indicating that the Mexican government had no right to interfere with the Anglo-American presence in Texas now because it had been sought out by a cowardly Mexico incapable of defending its settlements against Indian raids.  

108 Hämäläinen, 200.
109 Hamilton to Santa Anna, 1836?, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Paper about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 1, #5129-5152, 5145. This is a translation of the letter as it exists in the Gomez Farias Archives. An English version of the letter was printed in a Texian newspaper, which gave the translation as: “These colonies of the Anglo-American race were introduced to protect your own Mexican settlements from the hordes of the Camanchee (sic) Indians, from whom in spite of their bravery, your troops had so ingloriously fled”. See: James Hamilton to Santa Anna, Newspaper Excerpt from March 22, 1842, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 3, l. 138. Note that this excerpt is dated March 21, 1842.
In another letter, Gómez Farías reiterated this Texian viewpoint and addressed that the Texians did not perceive themselves as “usurping intruders, they were invited to take up residence in Mexico primarily by the Spanish and later the Mexican authorities, [...] they were called upon to colonise, not for their own interests but for those of Spain and Mexico in order to protect a debile province without the help of the nomadic Indian tribes”. Texian Anson Jones echoed Hamilton’s argument in one of his letters, writing that Mexico had provoked the North American immigration in order to safeguard its territory from the attacks of Indian ‘savages’. Hämäläinen provides several more examples of Texians who believed they deserved to secede from Mexico because of their bravery in the face of Comanche attacks, something that Mexicans had not demonstrated. William H. Wharton, for instance, argued that Anglo-Americans had “conquered an underused wilderness from the Indians” whereas Mexicans “could not be induced to venture into the wilderness of Texas”. Indeed, the Anglo belief that they had the ability to tame the Texian wilderness occupied by “savage tribes” whereas Mexico did not, continued after the U.S.-Mexico War: As Brian DeLay has illustrated, article 11 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which ended the war and ceded much of Mexico’s northern territory to the United States, established that the United States assumed the responsibility of forcibly restraining Indian incursions into Mexico and rescuing Mexicans held captive by Native American tribes. This showcases that U.S.-Americans remained optimistic that they could subjugate tribes such as the Comanches. The United States had underestimated the power of the Native Americans in its

110 ‘Derechos que se suponen en los texanos para haberse proclamado independientes de México y para unirse a la republica de Norte América’, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5174.
112 Hämäläinen, 201.
new Southwest, however: years later, the United States, knowing that it had not been able to bring Indian tribes under its control, insisted that the Gadsden Treaty had released it from all liability when the Mexican government asked for restitution for Indian raids.\footnote{DeLay, 406.}

The way in which the Mexican government handled the presence of Native Americans in the region was interpreted by Texian officials in a second fashion, likewise to help build Texas’ case for continued independence from Mexico and to cast Mexico as the Texian enemy. Texian officials often accused Mexico of inciting hostile Native American action in Texas, such as raiding and plundering. \textit{The Morning Star} reported that it was believed that a band of Karankawa Indians had been instigated by Mexico to rob a merchant in Lamar, and the \textit{Civilian and Galveston Gazette} commented that Bexar was “an extreme frontier town, insulated from the rest of Texas, eminently exposed to attack from Indians, or Mexican banditti”.\footnote{The Morning Star, September 20, 1842, Vol. IV, No. 397, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 4, l. 86, and Civilian and Galveston Gazette, June 24, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 176.} A report of the acting Secretary of War and Marine from November 1844, printed in the \textit{Texas National Register}, summarised that Texian “relations with Mexico” had “assumed a more threatening aspect”, and linked “depredations in the neighborhood of San Antonio” to a party “composed of Camanches, Wacoes and Mexicans, who fought desperately”; moreover, the report noted that a “small settlement at Corpus Christi ha[d] experienced considerable annoyance by both Indians and marauding Mexicans”.\footnote{Texas National Register, December 14, 1844, Vol. 1, No. 2, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 9, l. 153.} British statesman Kennedy recorded similar occurrences, noting that there had “been a petty Indian inroad, attended with some loss of life, at Corpus Christi, which is also threatened by Mexican Marauders”.\footnote{Kennedy to Aberdeen, June 11, 1844, CBA, 335-336.} In a letter to Joseph Count von Boos-Waldeck, an unknown member of the \textit{Adelsverein} likewise emphasised that raids and plundering
were not merely executed by Indians, but also Mexicans, which is why the author of the letter recommended that the Verein not take a land grant close to the Mexican border.\textsuperscript{118} Saligny complained that Indian raids were possibly made worse because they were planned and executed “with the Mexicans who do not cease to incite [the Indian tribes] against Texas”.\textsuperscript{119}

Texian officials also instrumentalised such collusions – be they fact or fiction – between Mexicans and Indians in order to demote Mexicans racially as barbarous and savage. Another issue of the Civilian, in criticising the conduct of a U.S. dragoon that had run into conflict with a Texian troop, wrote that the behaviour of the U.S.-American captain had been so shameful, “Armijo himself could scarcely have acted more barbarously towards our citizens, had he have captured them, than to disarm and turn them adrift in the wilderness, without provisions or the means to procure them, in the neighborhood of bodies of hostile Mexicans, and surrounded by savages”. This statement is representative of Texians’ perception of Mexican officials as barbarous and Mexican peoples as dangerous, listed together with Indian ‘savages’.\textsuperscript{120} From the War Quarter spoke of those Mexicans living peacefully among the Texian settlers of the Corpus Christi area as “domesticated”, a word typically reserved for animals in service of humans.\textsuperscript{121} In President Jones’ message from December 1844, Mexico was execrated for its supposedly “barbarous policy toward Texas”, which entailed declaring against Texas “a war of savage extermination”, thus linking the Mexican government’s conduct to those of savages, i.e. uncivilised persons.\textsuperscript{122} Ebenezer Allen shared this view, referring to Mexico’s “intention to

\textsuperscript{118} Unknown to von Boos-Waldeck, May 24, 1843, DBC: Solms-Braunfels Archiv Vol. 1, 77-81.
\textsuperscript{119} Saligny to Thiers, July 17, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 224-234, 234. See also: Saligny to Guizot, April 26, 1842, AAE: Texas, Vol. 4, l. 215-225, 224.
\textsuperscript{120} Civilian and Galveston Gazette, August 23, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 231.
\textsuperscript{121} “Letters from Texas No. 1-3”, August 1845, in From the War Quarter, Newspaper Excerpt, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 13, l. 218.
\textsuperscript{122} President Jones’ Message to Congress, December 19, 1844, Newspaper Excerpt, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 9, l. 157.
prosecute the war upon Texas” as “barbarous”. Mexican observers were aware of this Anglo-American impugnation on their nationality, criticising that Anglo-Americans had not merely taken part of their territory and taken their property but also “called us barbarians and thieves”. Mexico, so said one author, did not seek to fight a cruel war against Texas and instead sought to resolve the issue as peacefully as possible, “observing the rules that humanity dictates and that civilisation recommends”. A statement that had been written by the Texian Secretary of War in which Mexicans are labelled as “semi-barbaric” and characterised as equally treacherous to the “inhumane savages”, the Indian tribes, circulated in a translated version among Mexican statesmen, demonstrating further that they were aware of the Texians’ racial hatred.

One individual who was deeply involved in inciting hostility toward Mexico using comparisons to or actions of Native Americans was General Duff Green. A newspaper excerpt spoke of the news shared by General Green from Mexico pertaining to a Mexican order “to exterminate the present inhabitants of Texas, without regard to age, sex, or condition”, which the newspaper entitled as “savage orders”. This announcement by Green was met with scepticism by various contemporaries, including Kennedy, as well as the Prince von Solms, who doubted that “such a thing could be done in our days”, labelling such an act “hors de saison” and so unimaginable that he had to keep himself from telling Green that he thought “nothing” of the act for he could not believe it to be accurate despite Green’s assurances. Charles Elliot generally

123 Allen to A. J. Donaldson, December 13, 1844, CBA, 474-476.
124 Gómez Farías, December 11, 1846?, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5170.
125 No signature, no date, assumed 1842. NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5169.
126 Gómez Farías, undated, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Paper about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 6, #5158-5168, 5158.
128 Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 5, 1844, CBA, 379-383, and Prince von Solms to Kennedy, December 3, 1844, CBA, 386-388.
accused Green of fabricating, in several ways, “nothing short of a conspiracy against Mexico”, and suggested that Green’s motives were “a subject of curiosity and interest” due to their ambiguity. Another one of Green’s ideas had been the removal of Indians from Texas, and due to a lack of clarity in his statement on the matter, several observers feared he desired to deport tribes into Mexico where they might wreak havoc. Though Elliot highlighted that Green had not in fact disclosed such motive, he did conclude that “it is not so plain that the driving back of the Comanchee and Apache tribes upon Mexico would be equally advantageous to that Republic”, exhibiting the potential risks the Texian Indian project could have for Mexico.

Yet again, John Quincy Adams identified this trend among Anglo-Saxons in the United States and Texas, when he asked in a speech what “the feelings of all this motley compound of your Southern population” were “towards the compound equally heterogeneous of the Mexican population? Do not you, an Anglo-Saxon, […] hate the Mexican-Spaniard-Indian”? Adams characterised the Mexican citizen as carrying “the torch of liberty in his hand”, seeking, among other things, the “revenge to the native Indian”, and asserted that Mexico would, in the case of a U.S.-Mexico war, look for help among Native Americans as well as African Americans, making it a “Mexican, an Indian, and a negro war” for the United States. Such a war Adams referred to as a “war of races – the Anglo-Saxon American pitted against the Moorish-Spanish-Mexican American; a war between the Northern and Southern halves of North America”. As the statement regarding Mexico’s “revenge to the native Indian” demonstrates, Adams failed to identify the disdain that certain factions of Mexican society held against some Indian tribes, such as the Comanches. Yet this speech nevertheless highlights that statesmen often saw the Mexican and Indian populations as racially intertwined, a condition which Texians used to justify their

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129 Elliot to Aberdeen, December 29, 1844, CBA, 400-403.
130 Elliot to Aberdeen, January 15, 1845, CBA, 408-410.
independence and their hatred for Mexico.\textsuperscript{131} The same was also observed by a French newspaper, the \textit{Journal des Débats}, which stated that “the multitude of Anglo-Americans despises the Mexicans who, in return, as said by M. Adams, detest the same wholeheartedly. The North Americans have an awareness of their superiority with regard to their indolent neighbours, and they have concluded that they are destined to dominate and invade them”\textsuperscript{132}

Though Texians much more frequently engaged in discussions tying Mexico to Native Americans raids in order to debase the mother republic from which Texas had seceded, the same can also be observed among European observers. Saligny – possibly influenced by the opinions of Texian newspapers – reported in March of 1839 that the recommencement of Indian raids in West Texas had been “incited by Mexico”, and asserted a year later that Austin’s surroundings were “exposed to the attacks of the Mexicans as well as the savages”.\textsuperscript{133} Victor Bracht, a German author who moved to Texas, claimed that Mexican President-General Santa Anna was the “war chief of the Comanches”, ignoring Mexico’s own significant problems with said tribe and alleging instead that the Mexican government and Comanche tribe worked together.\textsuperscript{134} British official Francis C. Sheridan identified that the Texian “contempt for the Mexicans and Indians” was the driving factor “inconsequence of which [the Texians] consider themselves competent to stand alone”, unveiling that the reasoning Hamilton had applied in his letter to Santa Anna was not lost on the Europeans.\textsuperscript{135} Interestingly, Saligny also used the demotion of character by way of comparing it to that of the ‘uncivilised Indian’ against the Texians on at least one occasion,

\textsuperscript{133} Saligny to Mole, March 8, 1839, FLTx, 59-63, and Saligny to Dalmatie, March 17, 1840, FLTx, 129-131.
\textsuperscript{134} This observation was made in August 1847, but Bracht had lived in Texas for at least several years prior to that. See: Victor Bracht, \textit{Texas in 1848}, quoted in DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.
\textsuperscript{135} Sheridan to Garraway, July 12, 1840, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 1, l. 61-77.
writing that he was “tempted to believe [himself] in the midst of a Tribe of Savages rather than a civilized and friendly nation, unless the Texian government shakes off its inconceivable lethargy […] and to make an honorable reparation to France for the wrong done her”. What this statement shows is that the comparison or conflation with Native American tribes was perceived and used by statesmen as an insult and used to dishonour one’s opponent or to spur them into action to tidy their image by removing whatever condition gave them the semblance of an Indian tribe. In the case of Saligny, this means that he sought to motivate the Texian government to make reparations to France by alleging that its current action was akin to that of an uncivilised nation.136

The perception of Mexicans as weak, cowardly, and racially tied to Indians with whom they also shared a hatred for Texas that caused them to induce or participate in treacherous Indian attacks on the young republic also constituted a component of the broader racial ideology that some statesmen applied to the conflict between the Anglo-Saxon Americans and those of the Spanish or Mexican race. Not all prejudice and dislike for Mexicans, Texians, or U.S.-Americans was necessarily racially motivated, as the discussions of the Adelsverein demonstrate. In one of his reports, for instance, Prince von Solms expressed distrust towards U.S-Americans and Mexicans in Texas, claiming that the German settlers should not rely on either to transmit messages and should instead establish their own network because “there is no one among the Americans and Mexicans here in Texas that is trustworthy”.137 This suspicion regarding the Mexicans and U.S-Americans stemmed more from socio-economic interest rather than racial misgivings, as seen in a later report by von Solms, in which he noted that he aspired to provide a “great future, a rich reward, and entirely new stimulus to everything in the beloved Germany”

rather than, as Fisher had asserted according to von Solms, remaining hostile to all Americans. Nevertheless, there are many accounts in the correspondence and newspapers of the time in which the story of Texas is evaluated and analysed as a *racial* war.

Texian representative Hamilton cemented his idea that the Texians were, as Anglo-Saxons, more racially fit to settle Texas and the Americas than their Mexican counterparts in a letter to the British government, where he stated that “the best resources of Texas are her moral Resources – in the Anglo American and Anglo Saxon Race, who are in permanent and [illeg.] occupation of the Southern portion of the American Continent, who belong essentially to a law abiding and debt paying people”. This political effort to persuade the British government of Texas’ stability and financial credibility found its backing in a racial argument of Anglo-Saxon astuteness and uprightness. Hamilton continued that “if in spite of her natural resources if [sic] Texas has not the forecast to provide for the payment of the comparatively insignificant Loan she desires to negotiate, Great Britain will be entitled de jure under the ultima ratio to foreclose the mortgage”, but emphasised thereafter that “Texas will make no default. Where has the Anglo Saxon Race ever established a Colony in a propitious climate, and fertile soil that it has not grown into a powerful State? Texas will form no exception to this invariable Law of Anglo Saxon power”. It was, according to Hamilton, primarily the race of the Texians that enabled them to prosper, an advantage that by inference Mexico had not. Moreover, Hamilton pointed out the racial ties between British and Texian nationals, claiming that an independent Texas “gives to Great Britain a friendly ally belonging to her own blood and race”. The argument of Anglo-Saxon prosperity and power was one that Britain could hardly deny, and to stress this, Hamilton paid tribute to the British as the Texians’ ancestors, praising that Texas,

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“speaking the language and worshipping at the altars of old England, she will bear the standard of Religion, Literature and Laws over a Region more comprehensive than the dominion of the Casars [sic] to the remote ages of a distant prosperity”. Due to the lack of positive arguments regarding Texas’ finances, which were in shambles, Hamilton relied on notions of race to achieve his goal of receiving a loan for his republic.139

Hamilton’s effort to convince the British government of the entitlement of Anglo-Saxon Texians to possess Texas, previously part of Mexico, also incorporated a comparison of the degenerate Mexican and the powerful Anglo-Saxon races: “It is quite obvious that the debased and corrupt Race who hold in temporary occupation, the delightful Region comprehended within the temporary Limits of Mexico cannot long continue permanently to possess it”, he wrote, “more especially when the Anglo Saxon Race, through Texas begin to press closely upon them.” He accused the Mexican government of “popular anarchy and governmental misrule” which would only lead to Mexico’s “dissolution which must terminate in a feeble and disjointed federative system”. Hamilton extended this Anglo-Saxon right to own Texas beyond the young republic’s borders, declaring that “the Northern Provinces of Mexico are now ripe for Rebellion, for which an Invasion by Texas of Mexico would be the first signal”, underlining the Texian desire to expand into regions of Mexico which the debauched Mexicans were incapable of and unqualified to rule, anyhow.140 According to Hämäläinen, Mexico’s inability to fend off Comanche raids played a factor in Anglo-Americans’ dislike for the Mexicans even on a racial basis, for they had yielded to “savage rule”.141

139 James Hamilton to Aberdeen, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 2, l. 45-70.
140 James Hamilton to Aberdeen, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 2, l. 45-70.
141 Hämäläinen, 234.
Hamilton’s connections are interesting, because they underline the emerging racial thought of the era. He compares the Anglo-American race’s ‘dominion’ to that of Caesar, thus drawing a connection to the Roman Empire. As Liebersohn and Penny have argued, Germans with sympathy for Native Americans often drew parallels between the indigenous of North America and the Germanic tribal societies that resisted Roman rule and conquest. Hamilton is alluding here to the opponent of these tribes as a model for the Texian state and Anglo-American race. Nevertheless, as Horsman has shown, the same similarities that gave German travellers a partiality towards Native Americans were also turned by German nationalists into the tenets of emerging racial theories and thus contributed to the increased desire to highlight one’s own race vis-à-vis those of others. Tacitus’ ideas were combined by German scholars in the 1840s with the vision of the Aryans as “vigorous peoples sweeping westward”, which became, amalgamated with the myth of the freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons, a cornerstone of U.S. racial ideology of the nineteenth century and a justification for U.S. expansionism and imperialism.142 A message from Anson Jones to the Texian Congress manifests this: Jones stated that “the history of their [Anglo-American] migrations, and that of the noble race from which they sprung, clearly demonstrates, that, neither in the climes of the farthest east, nor in the islands of Australia and the Pacific, nor in the wilds and prairies [sic] of the West, have they ever in a single instance as a people or a community [sic] degenerated from the distinguished virtues of their ancestrel [sic] stock, nor become degraded by adopting in their intercourse with savages, any of the barbarous usages or customs incident to savage life”.143 No matter where Anglo-Saxons went, they brought with them a superior form of civilisation.

142 Horsman, 35-39.
The French, predominantly consul Saligny, likewise engaged in analyses of the Anglo-American and Mexican races, regarding the former as the dominator of the latter. Like Hamilton, a French memorandum on Texas portrayed the Texians as financially shrewd, stating that with the “entrepreneurial and speculative genius of the American race, these miserable villages [of Texas] and these humble dwellings can one day become remarkable towns and buildings”.\footnote{Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95.}

The American race Saligny titled as “indomitable and creative” and he lauded it for taming the “vast wilderness” that had existed only a few years prior during Spanish reign.\footnote{Saligny to Molé, April 17, 1839, FLTx, 74-79.} In another letter, he described the Anglo-American race as being known for their “restless temperament, their insatiable avidity, their unbridled ambition, their adventurousness, their boldness, and their tenacity”; a people who did not merely dream of the “conquest of the Indian, the bear, and the buffalo”, but also all of Mexico. Saligny alleged that the entire North American Southwest was “destined to be conquered by the Anglo-American race within a quarter of a century”, which did not interest the people of Europe much because Mexico’s malfortune was there perceived as “a just punishment inflicted by heaven on a people deplored by responsible and informed men of all civilized nations”.\footnote{Saligny to Molé, March 3, 1839, FLTx, 58-59.}

Not only had Mexico brought its own misery upon itself, but Texians were, according to the French memorandum, justified to take the land because they were a productive and consumating people” venturing into a land “which would have remained deserted and uncultivated in the hands of Mexico”.\footnote{Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95.} Together with his contemporary Gaillardet, Saligny did not believe that the Mexicans would stand a chance against the brave race of Anglo-American Texians.\footnote{Saligny to Molé, March 16, 1839, FLTx, 64-69. See also Barker’s footnote in this volume, 69.} The “miserable Spanish race of Mexico, moronic, degraded, worn out in physique as
in morale by corruption, is condemned to lose the magnificent country which God has placed in their hands”, whereas the “modern civilisation” of Texas was destined to succeed in the North American Southwest. Saligny reiterated this idea several times, writing in another letter that Mexico was “condemned to perishing”, and that the Spanish race of Mexico would soon be replaced by the Anglo-American race.  

Not all observers regarded the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race through such a positive lens as Saligny. British merchant Charles Power begrudgingly commented that the secession of Texas from Mexico and possible annexation to the U.S. would lead to “the March of the Anglo-Saxon race to the conquest of the South American Continent”, and that, given the negative impact this would have on European commerce, European states “ought not to allow the race to travel beyond its present limit, for travel they will with their energy”. Thus, he also considered the Anglo-Saxon race as vigorous, bold, and restless, though he identified these characteristics as potentially devastating to European trading interests. The members of the Adelsverein feared the adventurous American race, for they dreaded that it would replace the Germanness of their emigrants. Since the Society hoped to establish a German colony, and possibly a German state, outside of Germany, its members did not desire that their German settlers adopt American language and customs. 

The Native American tribes of Texas played a large role in the socio-economic and political circumstances of the Texian borderlands, influencing statesmen, merchants,
entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and settlers’ decisions, possibilities, and opinions. The individuals of several trans-Atlantic states, including Britain, France, Mexico, Texas, the U.S., and the German states, viewed Indians essentially unanimously as formidable and as a principal actor controlling and shaping the events of the Texas region. Indian raids and plundering were feared on both sides of the Atlantic, eliciting concerns for international commerce and prosperity as well as the safety of one’s nationals. Because of this, Native Americans were often described in negative terms in correspondence and newspapers, where they were labelled as savage, barbarous, wanton, murderous, and uncivilised. Indian tribes, chiefly among them the Comanches, sought to define power dynamics in the Texian borderlands according to their own goals and interests, damaging and threatening the states of the region. Mexico’s northern states were economically crippled and experienced a continued depopulation, which had been one of the primary reasons for inducing Anglo-American settlement in the first place. Europeans’ opinion on Mexico changed for the worse in view of the inability of that republic’s government to repel Indian attacks, and Mexico became less attractive for European merchants and states as a result thereof. Texian observers were particularly brutal and ferocious in their assessment of Indian tribes due to the destabilising effect that they had on the Texas republic.

Nevertheless, Texians also used Native Americans to define and categorise the world around them. The language used to describe Indian raids was also used to debase any Mexican action regarding Texas, and Mexicans, both due to their indigenous heritage and their state’s inability to control Native Americans, were labelled as likewise savage and racially degenerate. This conceptualisation of Mexicans reached the other side of the Atlantic, where observers commented on the racial justification behind Texians’ claim to their republic and, in the case of Saligny, reiterated the righteousness of Texas’ existence as an independent entity. Indians also
played a role in how Europeans defined their own racial circumstances, for many statesmen and entrepreneurs questioned whether their settlers would not adapt to the savage conditions existent in Texas. For German backers of various emigration projects, the presence and characteristics of the indigenous population formed a key component in deciding which project to support and how to advertise it to the general populace. Moreover, the racial features of Native Americans were used in the trans-Atlantic definition of civilisation and in particular the Anglo-Saxon and Spanish-Mexican races, the former of which was seen as the exterminator of Indians and the aggressive usurper of the Americas, whereas the latter was increasingly seen as debile and weak, prey to the savage Indians on one hand and the stronger Anglo-Saxon race on the other. Conceptualisations of race, which manifested themselves and were tested and shaped in Texas, became another tool in the arsenal of informal empire, especially for Anglo-Americans. Moreover, trans-Atlantic concepts on civilisation and law were shaped by Native American action in the Texas region and by the emergence of racial thought at this same time period. Ideas of law, civilisation, and nationality during the time of the Texas Republic and their significance to informal imperialism will also constitute the subject matter of the next chapter.
Chapter Five – “A Protective Arm to Watch Over Them”: The Development, Discussions, and Impact of International Law, Free Trade, and Nationalism in North America

The previous chapters have largely focussed on the imperial, commercial, and political contestations extant in the Texian borderlands during the independence of the Republic of Texas. Various areas of this contestation – such as slavery and abolitionism, trading barriers, emigration, and diplomacy – and numerous actors – such as diplomats in the periphery, i.e. Mexico and Texas; politicians in the core, i.e. Britain, France, and Prussia; merchants, the Adelsverein, and journalists – have been discussed in this context. Overall, the past chapters have analysed many of the drivers and motivators behind the economic, political, and imperial connections outlined above, whether it be the Verein’s desire to foster German emigration to Texas due to a perceived problem of overpopulation within Germany and the aspiration for a hub for German commerce on the Gulf of Mexico, the British fervour for abolitionism and the resulting debate on informal empire in Texas, or the significance of the textile industry in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, leading to serious competition between Europe’s economies and the scramble for new American markets, including those of Mexico and Texas. This chapter seeks to analyse how this contestation that existed in independent Texas shaped international law and human rights, perceptions and definitions of nationality and nationalism, and the development of free trade.

Reclamations, a huge point of conflict between European states and Mexico, were more than a merely financial affair. In fact, they shaped how nations perceived one another and their international community as one made up of ‘nations among nations’, and influenced ideas of and discussions on the laws that governed this community. One such example are the mediation efforts between two states that were guided by a neutral party: When Mexico and the United
States encountered discrepancies and disagreement regarding reclamations that had arisen in the aftermath of the Texas Revolution, the Prussian government was called upon to serve as umpire in the matter, as Prussia was deemed a neutral party to the conflict. In his justifications concerning the decisions he had made for each reclamation, von Rönne also referred to a blend of thoughts on international law, philosophy, and nationality, highlighting the important interplay of these factors with those of finance. Texas, where several U.S.-Americans had pressed for reclamations against Mexico, became a state that von Rönne could use to apply concepts of international law, and for questions on the interplay of national independence and the construct of a nationality, as well as a nation’s rights – could a nation commit suicide, for example? – Texas became a precedent that shaped international law. Mexico was also heavily involved in shaping international law and ideas of nationalism via reclamations and legal disputes with foreign states and their agents. For the Mexican government, this was a primary outlet for the defining and cementing of a Mexican nationality at a time when the Mexican Republic was in the process of falling apart: With so many of its states in revolt, Mexico needed to establish the tenets of its nationality both internally as well as externally. Mexican responses to foreign reclamations showcase that the Mexican government used reclamations to cement their nationality and their nation’s place as one among other nations on the international stage, and to strengthen patriotism within Mexico itself.

Lastly, this chapter will also analyse how trans-Atlantic trade, international law, treaties, and the commercial-diplomatic currents discussed particularly in chapters one and two, influenced and increased sentiments of and desires for a German national identity and unity. The German states realised in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars that they were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis France and Britain, which, though empires, had at the core transformed into nation-
German politicians regarded the nation-state as a fundament of strength that would be able to protect and defend German interests abroad, be they commercial, financial, military and maritime, or political in nature. The premonition that trans-Atlantic states like Mexico, so crucial to the new order of Europe’s economies after 1815, were not likely to privilege German interests given that Germany lacked a central governing apparatus capable of defending its interests abroad in the same manner that Britain or France could, led to aspirations for a German nation-state among several German officials, particularly Prussians. Moreover, several Germans also bemoaned Germany’s lacking imperial strength in contested states such as Texas. This intellectual process, which found Prussia and Austria as the main contenders to lead a possible German unification or cementation, was augmented by politically and economically weaker German states, who, realising that they did not hold enough weight to fruitfully negotiate with trans-Atlantic states themselves, deferred to Prussian leadership and sought Prussian aid. These international circumstances dovetailed with the establishment of the Zollverein on a national basis; a customs union designed to unify and standardise the German economies to make the larger German economy competitive globally vis-à-vis Britain. Overall, commercial competition was a key driver behind desires for German unification in the 1830s and 1840s: even the Hanse Towns, so vested in their independence, recognised that in this burgeoning age of economics, German interests had largely moved beyond the German Bund’s individual member states.

As has been discussed previously, Bayly considers the timeframe immediately before the 1830s as an imperial meridian. Bayly regards the 1830s as the beginning of a shift where the

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strict Second British Empire gives way to one that does focus more on informal, particularly free trade, imperialism. 2 This chapter seeks to underline this view by evaluating the various treaties of amity and commerce that European states negotiated with American ones. Rather than concentrating solely on British policies and agreements, this chapter will also analyse German treaties as well. This chapter will argue that smaller states, such as the Hanse Towns, which did not possess an imperial presence of their own and shaped imperial contests mostly through their support, cooperation, or collaboration with an imperial power, such as Britain, were crucial to the development of free trade in the nineteenth century, in part because they were seen by less powerful American states as more equal trading partners with whom more liberal agreements were less risky. Though their lesser political and military significance also hindered smaller states such as the Hanse Towns in some ways – e.g. through pressures from larger powers or the prioritisation that British or French trade experienced in Spanish America, sometimes at the expense of the Hanseatic city-states – it was also an advantage in others, largely because they were regarded as less threatening by both European and Spanish-American states.

GERMAN TRANS-ATLANTIC TRADE AND ITS ROLE IN GERMANY’S GROWING UNIFICATION IN THE 1830S AND 1840S

Before delving into the chapter’s main foci of international law, free trade, and nationalism, a quick outline of the German political landscape will be made. The series of wars that had occurred in Europe between 1750 and 1815 – the Seven Years’ War and the Napoleonic Wars in particular – changed the balance of power in Germany. States such as Saxony, previously a Central-European great power, found themselves severely weakened by 1815. 3 The

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3 The Napoleonic Wars, in fact, had brought Saxony to the verge of inexistence, for its Francophile stance, paired with Russian and Prussian ambitions to divide eastern Central Europe among themselves, had almost led to Prussia’s annexation of Saxony had it not been for English, French, and Austrian resistance to this design (Russia would have

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situation that emerged within Germany after the Viennese Congress was one that saw Austria and Prussia as the dominant political weights. Commercially, Prussia emerged as the more active party; it had escaped the Holy Alliance legitimist conservatism through the use of mercantile agents in Spanish America and had commenced by the late 1820s and early 1830s to negotiate treaties with trans-Atlantic states.\(^4\) For states like Saxony, whose trans-Atlantic commerce predated Spanish-American independence and was not insignificant in volume, the Prussian stance was more beneficial than that of Austria, which focussed more on restauration and legitimacy within Europe.\(^5\) As has been discussed in previous chapters, the Hanse Towns, due to their geographic location and mercantile history, formed the other commercial weight within the German Bund.\(^6\) As such, the German political and commercial landscape regarding Spanish America was dominated by the Prussia and the Hanse Towns, respectively. Under this two-

\(^{\text{annexed the Duchy of Warsaw}}\). After this, Saxon officials recognised that their state, which had managed to remain independent yet had lost half of its territory and over a third of its population to Prussia, had definitely left the playing field of the European political stage; most of Saxony’s political ambitions and policies thereafter concentrated on the German Bund as well as cooperation with Prussia. For more on Saxony’s political situation and trans-Atlantic trade, see: Jörg Ludwig, *Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika 1760-1830: Warenexport, Unternehmerinteressen und Staatliche Politik* (Leipzig: Nouvelle Alliance, 1994), 65-71.\(^4\) See: Walther L. Bernecker, „Preußisch-mexikanische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts“ in *Preußen und Lateinamerika*, 217-258.\(^5\) Ludwig, *Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika*, 150.\(^6\) Neither the Hanseatic nor the Prussian central and pioneering roles to German trans-Atlantic commerce were universally accepted in Germany during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, as historians Ludwig and Zeuske have determined, the latter in his various works centring on the German ‘hinterlands’ and their efforts for direct trans-Atlantic trade. Yet by the 1830s, the major projects on behalf of Saxon entrepreneurs to establish direct connections with Spanish America had failed, leading to an acceptance on behalf of other German states and merchants of the Hanseatic dominance in mercantile relations to America until the foundation of the Second German Empire. See: Michael Zeuske, “Handels- und Konsularbeziehungen“ in *Preußen und Lateinamerika*, 148-149, and „Deutsche „Hinterländer“ und Amerika. Die Sächsischen Mitglieder der „Rheinisch-Westindischen Compagnie“ 1820-1830“ in *Sachsen und Lateinamerika. Begegnungen in vier Jahrhunderten*, ed. Michael Zeuske, Bernd Schröder and Jörg Ludwig (Frankfurt a.M.: Vervuert, 1995), 164-200, 186, and Jörg Ludwig, *Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika*. The necessity for the Hanseatic middleman was largely geographic in nature: Given that the majority of German states was land-locked, Hanseatic harbours were by far the most important for the export of German goods, especially those of Bremen and Hamburg. Much of the international trade that German representatives sought during this time frame was trans-Atlantic in nature, and North Sea port-cities Hamburg and Bremen were geographically better equipped for this than the Baltic Sea port city of Lübeck. See: Von Rönne to von Bülow, March 1, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 73-76.\(^7\)
pronged leadership, a common German policy in trans-Atlantic affairs emerged that other
German states largely followed, primarily for three reasons.

First, the political guideline set by the Holy Alliance, and the decimation of political
power of German counterweights to Prussia and Austria, such as Saxony, prevented many
German states from pursuing an independent course on Spanish-American matters. Many
German states waited on Prussian precedent before engaging in diplomatic or commercial
relations with Mexico in order to have the political safety provided by one of Germany’s great
powers legitimising this step through prior action. Second, German states’ interests could not be
seen in isolation from one another. The entire German economy was heavily linked despite the
presence of internal tariffs before the Customs’ Union did away with them, and as a result, many
states did not want to risk damaging the larger German, and consequently their own, economic
interests, particularly at a time when English commercial might pressured the German markets.

7 Kossok quoted Georg Anton von Schäffer, a German pushing for the diplomatic recognition of Brazil on behalf of
German states, who said that “one cannot expect anything from the smaller states of Germany so long as Austria,
Russia, and Prussia have not determined a course [on the matter of recognising Brazil], because these great powers
make the laws, and the states of third or fourth rank are afraid of voicing their opinion as long as they do not know
the stance of states of first and second rank”. See: Manfred Kossok, *Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz: Deutschland

8 This was the case for Bavaria, which waited until Prussia had finished its treaty of commerce and amity on
February 8, 1831. See: Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497: Acta
des MdaA betreffend die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Baiern und Mexico, l. 1. Saxony’s treaty also followed the
Prussian precedent and was signed in October of the same year, see: Treaty of Amity and Commerce between
Saxony and Mexico, ratified December 31, 1832, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5499: Acta des MdaA betreffend
die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Sachsen und Mexico, l. 4-10. Württemberg likewise waited until 1832 before a
treaty with Mexico was signed by the ministers plenipotentiary of both states in London, Karl August Franz Count
von Mandelsloh and Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza. The negotiations with Mexico that preceded the treaty had
actively been encouraged by Prussia, which believed it sensible that Württemberg respond to de Gorostiza’s desire
for a treaty. See: Freiherr von den Linden, Württembergian chargé d’affaires in Prussia, February 19, 1833, GSta
PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5498: Acta des MdaA betreffend die Handels-Verhältnisse zwischen Württemberg und
Mexico, l. 7-8.

9 The Bavarian example again showcases this. Bavarian officials in 1831 highlighted that the “interest of the
customs union between Bavaria and Württemberg were so closely tied to those of the Prussian” that they desired to
use the Prussian treaty of amity and commerce as a model for their own treaty, and even considered the possibility
of a simple ascension to the Prussian treaty because Bavaria’s interests were so closely connected to Prussia’s. See:
Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497, l. 1. Saxony, under their agent
Jacob Colquhoun, pushed for a separate article in its treaty with Mexico which enabled various duchies and
principalities to ascend to the treaty, see: Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Saxony and Mexico, ratified
Thirdly, the political clout of the German states was too insignificant to attract the same attention in Mexico that Prussia was able to garner. Bavarian representative Count von Cuxburg, for instance, approached Prussian statesman Eichhorn, asking him whether the Prussian representative in London, von Bülow, would be able to assist the Bavarian von Cetto in his desire to forge a treaty between Mexico and Bavaria, indicating Prussia’s greater political influence as well as experience with trans-Atlantic treaties. Notwithstanding that the Hanseatic city-states had significant commercial influence, they also struggled in Mexico due to a lack of political power.

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10 Though Austria was also a dominant German power, its more dominant focus on legitimacy and restauration made it a less significant trans-Atlantic commercial partner, and is hence not included in this summary of “the German states”. German historians made the observation that Austria was not as involved in trans-Atlantic trade as Prussia (or more generally, the Zollverein) as late as the 1860s, see: Julius Schadeberg, Der Zollverein, Oesterreich und die Sonderbündler (Halle: G. Schwetschkescher Verlag, 1864), 41.

11 Von Cuxburg to Eichhorn, September 20, 1831, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5497, l. 1. Another such example is given by an article in the Mexican Diario, wherein a writer lamented that the Mexican government had sought Congress’ approval of the treaties with Bavaria, Württemberg, Switzerland, and the Hanse Towns, yet without success. The writer identified a potential cause for the Mexican Congress’ lack of interest when he noted that Mexico’s commercial connections with these German states – with the exception of the Hanse Towns – remained minimal. See: Excerpt from the Diario del Gobierno de la República mexicana, May 20, 1840, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Acta Mexico, Vol. XI: December 1839-December 1841, l. 242-247.

12 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342. Though Hanseatic negotiations for a treaty with Mexico predated Prussian efforts, von Gerolt reported in January of 1841 that the ratification of the second attempt at a Hanseatic-Mexican treaty of commerce and amity had not yet taken place, despite the fact that this draft had been ready to be ratified for six or seven years. Von Gerolt suspected an “invisible hand intentioned to prevent the treaty” was behind this delay. Before ratification did finally occur in London later that year, Hanseatic officials had to send another copy of the treaty to the Mexican authorities, for unrest in the country had led to the displacement and ultimate loss of the treaty draft possessed by Mexico. The Hanseatic experience in Mexico highlights that even the Hanse Towns, commercially crucial as they were, did not possess significant political influence. Such difficulties encountered by the Hansa – the holders of a virtual monopoly of German trans-Atlantic shipping – encouraged Hanseatic officials to seek out political support from another German power in Mexico: Prussia.
Though the Hanse Towns and the Prussia, the *primus inter pares* of the Customs Union, had partially opposing interests on a political-national level, they often cooperated, out of necessity, on the international stage in order to promote German products and trade and protect German interests abroad. A letter from Prussia’s Consul in Hamburg, Wilhelm Oswald, emphasised to his government that Hanseatic and broader German interests were deeply intertwined in Mexico, because “Hamburg and Bremen are the sole agents of the commercial relations between Germany and Mexico”.13 Another Prussian observer pointed out that “the Hanseatic merchant class engaged in traffic with Mexico and in possession of establishments in that country does not merely engage in Hanseatic trade with Hanseatic goods, rather, it engages in German trade with products of the Zollverein, predominantly of Prussian origin”.14 This relationship between the Hanseatic city-states, in possession of Germany’s most important harbours yet only secondary participants in the production of German export goods, and the other German *Bund* states, particularly those that later joined the *Zollverein*, which often did not have direct access to maritime trade yet produced German manufactures for export, led to a certain degree of symbiosis on behalf of the two parties. As a German observer noted: “It should become clear then, that the German *Zollverein*, even with the help of a Prussian navigational act, will not be able to do without the Hanse Towns, in much the same fashion as the Hanse Towns will not, individually and torn from Germany, be able to establish any sort of commercial or

13 Oswald to von Rönne, February 4, 1845, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127: Acta betreffend der Handels- und Schifffahrts-Verhältnisse in Mexico, October 18, 1844-1847, 177. Because of the German mercantile reliance on Hanseatic ports, not all German ships leaving Bremen and Hamburg were Hanseatic vessels, and a lot of cargo transported from Hamburg and Bremen to the Americas was entirely non-Hanseatic in origin – as chapter one outlines, linens, particularly Silesian ones, were the dominant German product exported. A Prussian trading report from chargé d’affaires von Gerolt dated September 30, 1837, shows that two vessels shipping from Hamburg, the *Johannes* and the *Maria*, shipped Bavarian toys, glass, and iron products to Mexico, whilst the *Emma* had a “significant cargo of Silesian linens”. See: Trading Report by von Gerolt, September 30, 1837, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Acta Mexico, Vol. IX: April 1837-October 1838, l. 144-146.

political meaning/power. For the Hanse Towns as well as the Zollverein, only reciprocity can bring true benefits”.

One particular report showcases that German diplomats aspired to productively combine Prussian and Hanseatic interests in Mexico: The Hanseatic trade and the Hanseatic flag were primarily responsible for the export of German goods, including those of Prussia and the Customs Union, to Mexico, yet the Hanse Towns did not possess the necessary political authority to press for a timely ratification of the treaty of commerce and amity between their governments and that of Mexico. Such a ratification was deemed important not merely to Hanseatic, but also to Prussian representatives. As von Gerolt noted, German trade as a whole would profit if the Hanseatic flag were to be imbued with more legitimacy through an official treaty, which is why he hoped that his government would allow him to support Hanseatic interests in this matter. A Hanseatic consul in Mexico, Eduard Ferdinand Färber, likewise approached von Gerolt to ask for his help, aware of the fact that von Gerolt, as the chargé d’affaires of Prussia, the politically most eminent state of the German Confederation, could possibly press the ratification with greater urgency and authority. Von Gerolt surmised that the Hanseatic Consul Färber did not possess the necessary political and official weight needed in order to effect the ratification by himself. Indeed, in 1844, von Gerolt wrote to his government that the ratification of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty had finally occurred, and that it was he who was responsible for this laborious achievement, as the Hanseates in Mexico acknowledged also.

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15 Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift, Iss. 1, 1846, (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1846), 59-61.
16 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
Von Gerolt’s deeds and engagement on behalf of Hanseatic interests were recognised by German merchants in Mexico, many of whom were Hanseates. In October 1844, when it became evident that von Gerolt would leave Mexico to assume a diplomatic post in the United States, many of these merchants wrote a letter to von Gerolt thanking him for his service to not only Prussian, but also and “especially Hanseatic interests”.\(^\text{18}\) A subsequent letter by von Bülow sent to the head of the Prussian Commercial Department, Friedrich Ludwig von Rönne, emphasised that German merchants engaged in overseas trade had requested that von Gerolt’s replacement visit Bremen and Hamburg to familiarise himself with the harbour cities that exported German products, highlighting the importance of the Hanse Towns to German commerce.\(^\text{19}\) The man who stepped into von Gerolt’s footsteps, Ferdinand Seiffart, did indeed approach a Hamburgian merchant house in April 1845, shortly after his appointment, and engaged in contact with the Prussian General-Consul in Hamburg, Wilhelm Oswald, and – indirectly – the Mexican Consul Negrete in Hamburg.\(^\text{20}\) This was in part due to necessity: Seiffart wanted to bring assets and financial instruments into Mexico, and in order to do so, he was dependent upon Hanseatic maritime traffic.\(^\text{21}\)

This type of cooperation and collaboration, and the realisation on behalf of many German statesmen that their respective state’s economic interests overlapped strongly with those of other German states formed an important component to ideas of German national unity. Many scholars have analysed the unifying impact of the Zollverein on the German states, particularly under Prussian leadership. Hans Blum illustrated how the Customs Union and its treaties with non-

\(^{18}\) Petition of the Germans living in Mexico to von Gerolt, October 1, 1844, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 66.

\(^{19}\) Von Bülow to von Rönne, March 14, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 77-78. See also a more legible copy, von Bülow to von Rönne, March 14, 1845, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127, 429.

\(^{20}\) Seiffart to von Bülow, April 8, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 79-80.

\(^{21}\) Von Bülow to Seiffart, April 11, 1845, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 82.
German states, especially the one with France, strengthened Prussia’s position as a political and economic leader in the German Confederation whilst it weakened Austria’s. Blum argued that this treaty, spearheaded by Prussia, put an end to the “secret hopes of the Southern German states for a permanent agreement [or Customs Union: Zolleinigung] with Austria”.\textsuperscript{22} Ernst Rudolf Huber has also demonstrated that the Zollverein promoted the idea that Prussian hegemony in the Bund and German unity and liberty were not mutually exclusive and could instead “be united and develop into a reciprocally complementing and supporting system of interests and power”.\textsuperscript{23} Hans-Werner Hahn has shown how the Zollverein became a union with significant national meaning, and writes that “after 1834, an increasing number of voices of the public opinion in Germany assessed that the Zollverein had a greater national meaning than the German Bund”. Economic questions, Hahn determines, grew in importance as factors of nation-building. “Especially the Zollverein offered a clearly definable substrate for models of national identity in comparison to the rather amorph surfaces of projection such as the common language or culture”, Hahn manifests, and notes that the mere name of the Customs Union – called the “Deutsche Zollverein” or German Customs Union, despite the fact that the initial treaties for this union did not include the word ‘German’ – suggests that it was utilised by many as a national term. According to Hahn, the Customs Union was seen by several voices of public opinion as “not merely an important factor in Germany’s economic integration, but already they also often considered it an important step towards increased political unity”.\textsuperscript{24} Hahn showcases many of the

\textsuperscript{22} Hans Blum, \textit{Vorkämpfer der deutschen Einheit. Lebens- und Charakterbilder} (Berlin: Hermann Walther Verlag, 1899), 139 ff.
\textsuperscript{23} Ernst Rudolf Huber, \textit{Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789: Der Kampf um Einheit und Freiheit, 1830-1850} (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988), 288.
positive views German statesmen, journalists, poets, and economists had of the *Zollverein* as a tool of national unity as well as power abroad.\(^{25}\)

The importance of commerce to the formation of a German national identity in the nineteenth century can also be witnessed among German statesmen in Mexico. Seiffart pointed out that Prussia’s interests in Mexico were really German interests, for the actual number of Prussian subjects was small – of those Prussians, many had lost “their characteristics of Prussian subjects”, Seiffart argued, and even the Prussian consul in 1846 was not actually a Prussian and affiliated instead with one of Hamburg’s merchant houses. Seiffart’s next statement highlights beautifully the process of German nationalisation occurring in the periphery of Mexico: “But in a distance of 2000 miles from their common [shared] fatherland, the Germans have forgotten that particularism, which unfortunately estranges them from one another so frequently in the *Heimath*”.\(^{26}\) In another instance, Seiffart wrote that German merchants exhibited “in such a far distance a more strongly prominent attachment to the fatherland” and aided German trade “through the pride of asserting [Germany] and its achievements on foreign markets”. Germans in Mexico were “true patriots” for defending German interests against English competition, Seiffart noted, which showcases the importance of English commercial competition to ideas on German unification and consolidation.\(^{27}\) Seiffart’s predecessor, von Gerolt, held similar views. “The band of the *Nationalgefühl*, which has wrapped itself anew around the German states in the fatherland, also unites the colourfully mixed Germans of all kinds in these distant zones, and one does not see here, as formerly in foreign countries, that the Germans reject their origins, cowering under


\(^{26}\) Seiffart to Royal Minister of State, Freiherr von Canitz, April 15, 1846, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 134-145.

the protection and nationality of the English or French”. Von Gerolt juxtaposed a common German identity with German competitiveness abroad, and viewed Mexico as a place where German unity could be witnessed clearly.

In another report, Seiffart reiterated the desire of Germans in Mexico for and the importance of a wholly German presence that could compete with its French and English counterparts, behind which stood nation-states:

One cannot lament enough the evil that arises from the fact that German interests are represented by a colourful mass of agents of large and small, well-known and unknown governments here, where it is so imperative that the Germans are established/perceived as a compact mass/unit next to the English and French, and that the particularities destroy yet again the impression of a totality. There are Hanseatic, Bavarian, Prussian, Saxon, and other German consuls, of which no one, neither here nor in Germany, believes that they do anything besides using the small prerogatives of the consulate for their own advantage and arrogance.

Seiffart’s statement indicates that the consuls of individual German states were judged by him and others, both in Germany and Mexico, as ineffective and powerless. In order to defend German interests, particularly against the constant pressure provided by English commerce, it was crucial that German states unite behind one common German representative.

This commonality of German interests resulting in greater German unity and desires for centralisation dovetailed with the difficulties that German agents faced in Mexico. What is noteworthy about this is that Mexico’s periodic indifference to German demands and requests, as well as the Mexican government’s disapproval of Germany’s means of diplomatic and mercantile representation in Mexico, both contributed to a growing desire for more German unity.

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28 Nationalgefühl, literally, national sentiment. See: Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdAA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.

and political centralisation on behalf of Prussian officials. Frequently, developments in peripheral regions as well as the influence of the periphery are neglected or downplayed when discussing nationalism in the European core states, such as France, England, or Germany. In the case of Germany, several works have shown that emigration and colonisation projects were used to foster nationalism within Germany. Frederik Schulze, for example, has argued that colonisation in southern Brazil was a national project used to define ‘Deutschtum’ or a German national identity, whereas Nikolaus Barbian has shown, based in part on works by Bradley D. Naranch and Sebastian Conrad, that the “Auslanddeutschen” played a significant role in both the development of a German national identity and a foreign Kulturpolitik. Barbian cites Patrick Schreiner in stating that the Außenkulturpolitik (i.e. “foreign cultural politics”) is that type of Politik, “in which the foreign-political and national-cultural aspects of the nation-state do not merely dovetail, but rather mutually necessitate each other”, showcasing that nationality can in part be developed in the periphery. Again others, including Hans Fenske and Wolfgang Reinhard, have focussed on the Germans as imperial bystanders during the first half of the nineteenth century. Fenske speaks of the Germans as “impatient spectators” to European imperialism between 1815 and 1880, a timeframe where several Germans desired colonies but were unable to obtain them. Fenske argues that this longing for an overseas empire combined


31 See: Barbian, 17.
economic, scientific, and political concerns and was particularly present among the middle class, which is why Fenske dubs it an “intellectual imperialism”.

What von Gerolt’s and Seiffart’s comments on Mexico reveal however is that negotiations with trans-Atlantic, Spanish-American states formed a component of this increasing desire for a common national identity and a nation-state in Germany, particularly on the level of politicians and statesmen. Moreover, Felix Becker’s work on the Hanse Towns and Mexico also includes anecdotes of other German statesmen and agents who, like Gustav Schaedtler, note that a strong diplomatic representation of Germans in “half-civilised countries like Mexico” would provide ample protection and “promote unity and National-Gefühl [national sentiment]”, thus preventing the German abroad from “renouncing his fatherland [and] turning himself into an Englishman, a weakness which has only been excusable because of the lack of proper representation”. Seiffart explicitly connected the issue of German representation in Mexico to German unity, arguing that Germany needed a Gesammt-Vertretung, i.e. a representation “for German interests which leads to the recognition of Germany as a whole”. It was essential that such a representation “put an end to the recurring particularities and that it achieve, in its standing vis-à-vis the [Mexican] government, the same consideration and significance as is conceded to the representatives of other nations”. Seiffart continued: “The Germans perceive it as painful that all this is denied to them, that in such a distance [from Germany], there is no protective arm watching over them, that there is no representation possessing the dignity and

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33 Becker also points out that Schaedtler’s remarks were intended to spur Hamburg into action. The Hanse Towns relied on Prussian diplomatic representation, having only appointed consuls themselves. See: Felix Becker, Die Hansestädte und Mexiko: Handelspolitik, Verträge, und Handel, 1821-1867 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984), 73.
importance/weight of the nation”. Seiffart actively tied this need for German national agents abroad to the difficulties that German interests faced when represented by the individual states in Mexico. The protectionist economic policies of the Mexican government and the resistance to European reclamations were one of the main reasons for Seiffart’s belief that a common German identity abroad was necessary.34

The standardisation of the German economy – through the elimination of tariffs extant within the German Bund, for example – was also aided and spurred on by trans-Atlantic developments. At the time, it was still common for the various regions of Germany to use different versions of the unit Elle, a unit to measure length, particularly when assessing e.g. the length of cloth.35 This unit varied widely in actual length depending on the region it was used in: The various Ellen from the northern German states were often roughly 60 centimetres in length, whereas they were longer in the South, where Ellen of around 75 centimetres were more common. Overall, Ellen ranged between 40.2 centimetres and 81.1 centimetres, which meant that some Ellen were twice as long as other Ellen. A report by Seiffart to his government, spanning roughly 100 pages, emphasised that German merchants in Mexico criticised the broad variety of German measurements, particularly among the unit Elle, because Mexican consumers were reluctant to buy cloth or fabric (as well as other goods) when they were unfamiliar with the measurement used to determine the amount that they were to receive of a certain good. The fear among Mexican consumers was that the German merchants, as the only persons who knew how to use the different types of Elle, would take advantage of buyers and charge them too much. If

35 The word Elle is the German word for the ulna (or, in older English, ell) in the human body, and the unit of measurement was based on the distance between elbow and fingertip.
all German merchants used “one type of German measurement, [Mexican consumers] would easily be able to get used to it and its proportion” to the Mexican *Arancel*. Seiffart also urged the use of a standardised unit of measurement in the production of textiles, especially woven fabrics and thread. England and France had already implemented the use of such a standard for all of their overseas exports, enabling consumers to know exactly what they were buying and thus increasing sales for English and French goods. The facilitations that the trade of Germany’s competitors experienced because of this conformity to one standard among all French and British producers led Seiffart to conclude that it was “incomprehensible why German producers are unable to achieve the same consensus without the use of force and regulations”.36

In the same report, Seiffart asserted that German standardisation in trans-Atlantic commerce could moreover facilitate trade and make the latter more independent from reliance on England if a *Verschwisterung* between the Hanse Towns and the *Zollverein* could occur.37 Communication between Germany and German agents in Mexico was predominantly orchestrated and maintained by the use of English packages transported via British vessels. German vessels, primarily Hanseatic ones sailing from Hamburg or Bremen, only carried such communication irregularly and sporadically. This defect in Germany’s connection to its overseas officials could be remedied if the *Zollverein* and Hanse Towns created a maritime traffic union, a *Schiffahrtsbund*, and if Germany had not several, but one national *Handelsflagge*, a merchant flag. This would “confront foreign/distant nations with the nation [of Germany]”, enabling Germany to finally receive similar advantages and concessions to those possessed by France or Britain. Without centralisation, Seiffart believed, Germany would never be able to compete

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37 *Verschwisterung*, literally a unison among siblings, could be translated with ‘kinship’ or ‘twinning’.
effectively and sustainably with nation-states in trans-Atlantic commerce; thus, an alliance between Hanse Towns and Zollverein was “the most urgent and most essential” subject for German regimes. Seiffart regarded German unification in regard to international trade as so important to German interests that “no sacrifice is too big” to take the step toward a German maritime union. Much like the Adelsverein, Seiffart also asserted that a united German maritime traffic could maintain a common national identity among German emigrants, and increase German influence worldwide.38

Seiffart, in emphasising the advantages that the structure of the nation-state had for European interests in Mexico, also considered the nation-state as an imperial state, showcasing that commerce between a growing community of nation-states and nations was not necessarily non-imperial when contrasted with the previous mercantilist and colonial empires of the 17th and 18th centuries. Seiffart noted that England and France were able to defend their national and commercial interests better in Mexico due to their maritime might, which made their demands on Mexico regarding reclamations more imposing and pressing. The German route, maintained Seiffart, was ineffective: German agents attempted to solve their disagreements and conflicts with Mexico with profuse politeness, an imperative strategy in the eyes of many German merchants who feared that a more aggressive stance would make Mexico hostile to their interests at a time when Germany lacked the tools of power – maritime and military – to enforce their interests in any other way. All the more important was thus a diplomatic representation in Mexico more akin to that possessed by nation-states like France and Britain, Seiffart argued.39

39 Seiffart to Royal Minister of State, Freiherr von Canitz, April 15, 1846, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 134-145.
“A representative of the nation”, according to Seiffart, would be able to protect German interests even without a war fleet such as those of France and England.\textsuperscript{40} Seiffart – as a Prussian agent – emphasised the importance of a Prussian statesman in this role, and underlined that this Prussian would protect, much like a Briton for Britain and a Frenchman for France, all German interests rather than just those of Prussia, i.e. this Prussian official would occupy a position similar to that of an agent of a nation-state. This would give the Prussian agent more prestige and influence and benefit the commerce and interests of all Germans in Mexico and German states in general.\textsuperscript{41} As such, Prussia was able to establish itself as the \textit{primus inter pares} in the German Bund using trans-Atlantic trade, a measure which Austria did not adopt.

Other German states, and as Seiffart’s reports showcase, non-Prussian German merchants, considered this Prussian representation as beneficial, despite resistance to the loss of their independence in intra-German affairs.\textsuperscript{42} After the Prussian government intended to send Seiffart to Mexico as a consul, an appointment of a Prussian chargé d’affaires or \textit{Ministerresident} was even seen by the Hanseates as an important step for German interests, mainly for one reason: Mexico did not acknowledge consuls, including Consul-Generals, as diplomats. Felix Becker outlines the history of consuls’ position after 1815, noting that agreements of the Congress of Vienna and the Protocol of Aachen (1818) had determined the exclusion of consuls from the ranks of diplomatic agents. Consuls in non-Christian countries could have a certain diplomatic status during the first half of the nineteenth century, but Christian

\textsuperscript{41} Seiffart to Royal Minister of State, Freiherr von Canitz, April 15, 1846, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 134-145.
\textsuperscript{42} Saxony, for example, feared for its independence after the Congress of Vienna, dreading annexation to Prussia despite close cooperation with the latter state.
states could decide individually whether they wanted to award diplomatic status to another country’s consuls or not. The United States, for example, allowed Austria to be diplomatically represented by a consul until 1838. For Mexico, this was not the case.

The Hanse Towns did not send an agent properly acknowledged by Mexico as a diplomat either, for two primary reasons. The first was financial in nature, though the second was based on the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty. This treaty stated the mutual agreement that consuls of either party could and would be treated as diplomats in the other party. Though the Hanseates honoured this stipulation and awarded diplomatic status to Mexican consuls in the Hanse Towns, Mexico ignored this article. The Hansa, without political or military might and no means of imposing pressure upon Mexico, had little choice but to accept the Mexican stance under protest. All the more important then was the ability and possibility of Hanseatic agents and merchants in Mexico to turn to more powerful European states, such as England or Prussia. Particularly the latter was a crucial partner for the Hanseates given the mutual commercial interests both parties shared in trans-Atlantic affairs.

The fact that Prussia did not plan on appointing a proper diplomat after von Gerolt’s departure either, however, was problematic for the Hanse Towns and German interests at large.

43 Becker, 73.
44 In the early ages of Spanish-American independence, when the Holy Alliance’s legitimist and restaurationist policies had prevented Prussia from fostering official relations with Mexico and the other new states across the Atlantic, the Prussian government had bolstered its economic interests in Mexico through the use of mercantile agents as well as the support of private merchants via the conferral of patents. This had enabled Prussia to circumvent, to a certain extent, the restrictions that conservative Continental-European policy had imposed on the Prussian regime. By the late 1820s, Prussia went a step further, appointing a General-Consul for Mexico in response to the realisation that states with official relations to Mexico, such as England, the Netherlands, and even the Hanse Towns, were in a better commercial position. But Prussia did not send a chargé d’affaires until von Gerolt’s appointment in 1837. See: Ulrike Schmieder, „Das Bild Lateinamerikas in der preußischen und deutschen Publizistik vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts“ in Preußen und Lateinamerika, 59-91, 73.
45 See, for example, Manfred Kossok, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz: Deutschland und Lateinamerika 1815-1830. Zur Politik der deutschen Staaten gegenüber der Unabhängigsbewegung Mittel-und Südamerikas (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964), 214 ff.
A petition from Bremian merchants to the Prussian government called upon the latter to appoint a diplomat to Mexico after von Gerolt’s departure from Mexico. The Hanseatic merchants justified their plea for a Prussian diplomat who should support Hanseatic commerce by underlining that Prussia stood to benefit from this appointment, because Hanseatic commercial interests overlapped significantly with their Prussian counterpart. “The trade with German products and manufactures is almost entirely in the hands of Hanseatic establishments in Mexico”, the petition noted, “exclusively Prussian or Zollverein merchant houses do not exist. Should the Prussian chargé d’affaires in Mexico thus choose to restrict his activities solely to Prussian or Zollverein interests, this agent would hardly benefit German trade. The Hanseatic houses in Mexico do not trade with Hanseatic products, however, rather, they do so with Zollverein [products]; if their business is thus disrupted, the entire German or Zollverein trade will suffer”.46 This letter showcases the interdependence of Prussian and Hanseatic officials, merchants, and agents, which both Hanseatic and Prussian parties sought to use to their own state’s advantage, and the Hanseatic willingness to be represented by a Prussian chargé d’affaires demonstrates Prussia’s growing prestige and importance in Germany as a result of its trans-Atlantic engagement, something that Austria did not possess.

Seiffart was not the only Prussian agent to push for the idea of a national German agent in Mexico. During von Gerolt’s times, this idea had also existed and found his support: Von Gerolt argued that a German mission under Prussian leadership should be established in Mexico, stating that the “intimate connection of all German and namely the Prussian and Hanseatic interests regarding the commerce and trade with Mexico, and the necessity that these interests be, given the constant disorganisation of this country and the imposing competition of the

46 Note on the petition of German merchants for the appointment of a Prussian diplomat in Mexico, February 1845, GSta PK: I. HA Rep. 120 HA, Handelsamt, Nr. 127.
commercial interests of the other nations, protected and promoted through a watchful and active representation in the capital” were the reason why he believed that other German, including the Hanseatic, governments would surely be willing to contribute financially to the establishment of such a representation in order to “secure the diplomatic protection” that had thus far been awarded to Prussian subjects by the Royal Prussian Legislation. A German mission in Mexico with the purpose of representing all German interests under Prussian leadership was seen by von Gerolt as a good idea, for states like Saxony, Bavaria, or Hesse-Cassel would be able to better promote their economic interests if represented by the stronger political entity Prussia, whereas Prussia would be able to gather prestige as the representative of German interests at a manageable cost through the financial contribution of those states that utilised the Prussian mission to fight for their economic interests. All sides, he argued, stood to gain from a closer German cooperation on the playing field of international trade.47

Despite this move towards German consolidation under Prussian leadership, which found expression through the Zollverein or the desire for a Prussian agent representing Germany’s national interests in Mexico, Hanseatic independence continued to pose as a special case in intra-German relations. Part of the reason for this was the fact that Hanseatic independence enabled German trade to pursue a dual policy. France and Britain, as nation-states, had to choose a course of action in their commerce and diplomacy with American states. An example of this is the Pastry War: France had chosen to intervene in Mexico via a blockade and maritime/military pressure in order to push its reclamations. This had enabled France to receive 600,000 pesos’ worth of compensation, but Mexico’s policy toward foreign states had not markedly changed; in fact, an increased hostility among Mexican authorities may have been the most noteworthy

47 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
outcome. The French government had to assume the full consequences of its actions in Mexico, and if ties between both states had been severed, for instance, this would have negatively impacted French trade, incapable of permeating Mexico in a meaningful manner without its merchant marine. Due to the existence of many German states, von Gerolt believed that Prussia could circumvent such consequences should they occur if Prussia chose to support the intervention of Europe’s great powers in Mexico: In the event that war between Mexico and Europe’s great powers, joined by Prussia, broke out and Euro-Mexican trade was hindered between the parties at war, or in the event that European intervention encouraged Mexican authorities to apply penalties to the trade of those parties who had intervened or supported such an intervention, Prussia could always use the “neutral Hanseatic flag in order to bring our industrial products into Mexico”.  

Though some of the advantages of Hanseatic independence were acknowledged by Prussian officials, the desire to bind the three city-states more closely to the Zollverein and into Prussia’s zone of influence outweighed the consideration for such benefits. In another instance, von Gerolt questioned whether his conclusion regarding the neutral Hanseatic flag and its ability to bring German goods into Mexico was sound, for pressures from or an intervention on behalf of a great power in Mexico would more than likely lead to hostility toward all foreign trade on behalf of the latter, and stymy Hanseatic maritime trade, also. In the same report where von Gerolt emphasised the advantages a common German diplomatic representation via a Prussian statesman could have for the Hansa’s and other German states’ interests, he also pointed out that his past willingness to promote Hanseatic reclamations was deeply dependent upon his personal position and interconnectedness in Mexico. Surely, von Gerolt surmised, he did not actually

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48 Excerpt from von Gerolt’s Report No. 45, April 30, 1841, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 27.
49 Von Gerolt to PFM, July 6, 1844, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222, l. 432-437.
possess the legal authority to protect non-Prussian Germans – the Mexican government could thus reject von Gerolt’s intervention on behalf of Hanseatic reclamations. Only his good relationship to several important persons among Mexico’s authorities enabled him to submit Hanseatic reclamations without resistance from the Mexican government. Becker has also illustrated that von Gerolt announced repeatedly that his successor in Mexico would not be able to assist Hanseatic merchants with their reclamations unless a formal agreement were reached between Prussia and Hanse Towns. Such remarks could be perceived as threatening to the Hanseates, for they suggested that Prussian officials might not defend Hanseatic interests in the future barring a deeper official connection between Prussia and the Hanse Towns.

Though Prussian officials aspired to form a stronger connection between the Hanse Towns and the Zollverein – and predominantly Prussia – they also recognised that the Hansa could not be pressured too intensely because their interests were so relevant to Prussian and German ones. In 1841, von Gerolt wrote that half of Germans in Mexico were Hanseatic citizens, which meant that “their protection and legal representation are incumbent upon me also, for, as Your Excellency is aware, our commercial interests are related to and tied intimately to those of the Hanse Towns”. As such, he aided the Hanseates in many reclamation efforts. Of all German reclamations that von Gerolt received from German persons in Mexico, “there is not a single one in which the Hanseatic interests did not have, and still have, an important share/role”, suggesting that Hanseates were among the main effectors of German interests in Mexico.

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50 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
51 Becker, 73.
52 Report concerning the position of the Prussian Royal Mission in Mexico toward the Germans of all states located in this republic, by von Gerolt, January 6, 1841 (Duplicate), GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: l. 337-342.
Trans-Atlantic treaties incited discussions on German unity and centralisation through the
deferece to and orientation toward Prussia on behalf of many German states, such as Bavaria,
Württemberg, or Saxony; the realisation that German interests often existed in unison with, and
not in opposition to, one another in the Americas; and the realisation that Germany lacked
strength vis-à-vis imperial nation-states France and Britain in Mexico. Yet as the above example
suggests, the Hansa formed to a certain extent a counterweight to this development toward a
centralisation of German interests and power under Prussian leadership. Though many Hanseatic
merchants, particularly those in Mexico or other American states, sought cooperation with and
support from Prussia, backing the idea of a Prussian agent to represent and defend common
German interests, the position of many Hanseatic officials located in the city-states themselves
had different views that focussed more on Hanseatic independence. This was also lamented by
von Gerolt, who stated that, whereas Hanseatic merchants in Mexico had been incredibly
thankful for his promotion of the Hanseatic-Mexican treaty in front of Mexican authorities, he
had not heard “one word of thanks” from the Hanseatic, particularly the Hamburgian,
governments, who apparently regarded it as “not worth their while” to honour Prussia’s
engagement on their behalf.53 Though Syndic Sieveking stood in contact with Prussian
representatives, such as Johann Ludwig von Hänlein, and spoke in 1838 of ‘common German
interests’ in Mexico, most Hanseatic officials viewed their cities as a unique weight in the
German Bund and privileged independence over deference to Prussia.54

These contestations that existed between Prussia and the Hanse Towns and were shaped
by trans-Atlantic trade gained a new facet through the independence of Texas. Prussia did not

53 Von Gerolt to PFM, August 28, 1844, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5225: Mexico Vol. XIV, l. 73-81.
54 Extrakt aus der Depesche des Herrns von Hänlein, No. 63, September 21, 1838, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr.
5221: Acta des MdaA betreffend die Handelsverhältnisse mit Mexico und die Nachrichten über Handels- und andere
engage in any correspondence with Texas beyond a few letters exchanged between Daingerfield and von Rönne; thus, the Hanseatic correspondence with the young republic marks the only official German engagement with Texas on a state level. This gave the Hanse Towns another opportunity to establish themselves as the commercial pioneers and entrepreneurs of the German Bund, who would also act independently from the Prussian policy line. As previous chapters have showcased, the Hanseatic decision to enter or not enter into negotiations with Texas was heavily influenced by the international political landscape – only after Texas’ recognition by France, Britain, and other states such as the Netherlands did the Hanse Towns consider it wise or plausible to become receptive to Texian envoys’ advances. The Hanseatic correspondence on the treaty to be signed with Texas demonstrates that Hanseatic officials sought to use this experience to bolster their own position within the German Bund, resist Prussian pre-eminence and the criticism of other Zollverein states, and promote German economic interest in North America.

**Texas and the Development of Trans-Atlantic Treaties of Commerce**

Previous chapters have discussed the Hanseatic focus on their treaty with Venezuela in shaping the Texian-Hanseatic treaty’s articles, stipulations, and concessions. Beyond its liberalism, the treaty between the Hansa and Venezuela was also cited by Rumpff in his negotiations with Daingerfield as one of the precedents which motivated the Hanseatic cities to insist on one condition: the inclusion of products from the states of the German Bund in several of the treaty’s stipulations. Article X in the Venezuela-Hansa treaty formed the basis of this Hanseatic desire in negotiations with Texas.\(^5\)\(^5\) The prevalence Hanseatic representatives attached to the extension of some of the treaty benefits to the entirety of the German Bund was an innovative component of this treaty because it provided a potentially viable alternative to the

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\(^5\) An extract from the report No. 37 of Min. Res. Rumpff, d.d. Paris, March 28, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 18, l. 57.
Zollverein’s handling of trans-Atlantic treaties. The creation of the Zollverein, though it facilitated intra-German trade and commerce, helped make the German economy more competitive on an international basis, and fostered Prussian engagement in the trans-Atlantic world on behalf of most other German Bund member states, did not lead to the termination of treaties completed between individual German states and American ones. Treaties between Mexico and states such as Prussia, the Hanse Towns, Saxony, or Württemberg remained intact after the Zollverein’s foundation. Only a very small number of treaties of amity and commerce were renegotiated with the Zollverein as a party to the treaty, including those with Great Britain, Belgium, and Naples.\(^{56}\) One of the primary reasons why these treaties were rare is the fact that, in order to negotiate such treaties, all Zollverein member-states’ governments had to engage in correspondence with one another, for no Zollverein state – including Prussia – had the ability to single-handedly complete a treaty on behalf of the entire Zollverein. The only way in which the Customs Union could forge a treaty of amity and commerce with a foreign power was by agreement and approval of each member-state; if even one constituent rejected a treaty, the treaty could not be ratified.\(^{57}\)

This problematic was one of the factors standing behind the failed treaty between the Zollverein and the United States. An 1844 letter from the Prussian Foreign Ministry to the Prussian envoy to Dresden, von Jordan highlighted the difficulties that the Zollverein faced in completing this treaty of amity and commerce: the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed von Jordan of the U.S.-American envoy Wheaton’s suggestions for mutual concessions to be

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\(^{56}\) Franz Klefeker, *Vertheidigung des für den Zollverein in Vorschlag gebrachten Differentialzollgesetzes* (Berlin: Wilhelm Herß, 1848), 86. See also: GStA PK: I. HA Rep. 81: Gesandtschaften (Residenturen) u. (General-) Konsulate nach 1807, Nr. 23: Gesandtschaft Dresden IV B: Ausgesonderte Stücke Nr. 8, 1841-44, particularly a letter addressed to von Jordan, July 31, 1841.

incorporated in this treaty. Since the Prussian government judged the U.S.-American
Congressional stance as very favourable toward this treaty and Wheaton’s ideas, which promised
great benefits to German commercial interests, it wanted to pursue this opportunity
expeditiously, particularly because Wheaton had various time constraints of his own. Von Jordan
was thus instructed to receive Saxony’s commentary on and approval of Wheaton’s suggestions
as soon as possible. Prussian representatives in other Zollverein member-states were asked to do
the same for those respective governments. Though Prussia still hoped for a timely completion of
the treaty, the fact that the Prussian government had to receive approval from each Zollverein
government stymied the Custom’s Union’s ability to pursue this treaty effectively: though it was
completed, the treaty between the United States and the Zollverein was not ratified.\textsuperscript{58}

The Hanse’s desire to incorporate, in some fashion, all German Bund states in their treaty
with Texas would have presented an important precedent for Germany’s international trade, for
this treaty could have been used as a basis for future negotiations between German parties and
American ones. The way in which German Bund states were supposed to find inclusion in this
treaty and its benefits was the possibility for them to easily ascend to the treaty. This preference
was initially ill-received by Daingerfield, because he feared that this would both reduce the
interest of other German states to engage in their own treaty negotiations with his state and
trouble the young republic’s Senate, which might lead the ratification of the treaty \textit{ad calendas
graecas}.\textsuperscript{59} Smidt emphasised that Daingerfield’s concerns regarding the lessened interest of other
German states concentrated particularly on Prussia, showcasing the Texian awareness of
Prussia’s growing pre-eminence in the Bund.\textsuperscript{60} Rumpff, however, indicated to Daingerfield that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[58] Saxon Foreign Ministry to von Jordan, January 13, 1844, GStA PK: I. HA Rep. 81, Nr. 23, Nr. 8.
\item[59] Rumpff to the Hanseatic Senates, March 15, 1844, and extract from the report No. 37 of Rumpff, March 28, 1844,
StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
\item[60] Smidt to Rumpff, March 21, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
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the incorporation of German *Bund* states in the treaty was a *sine qua non* on behalf of the Hansa, and that an exclusion of the German states would lead to the termination of negotiations, which caused the latter to acquiesce to his counterpart’s demand so long as the other German states were not listed by name and merely addressed by the blanket term “states of the German *Bund*. ”

The Hanseatic efforts to incorporate the other German *Bund* states into the treaty with Texas were orchestrated in such a way as to strengthen the Hanse Towns’ prestige and economic-political importance within the German *Bund*. Though all German products originating from the German *Bund* were included in the treaty benefits – such as the elimination of differential duties and low tariffs –, this was only the case if they were shipped under a Hanseatic flag. Initially, Rumpff had hoped to effect a limitation of navigational and commercial benefits to the Hanseatic and Texian flag only, a desire that fell on fruitless grounds with Daingerfield, who argued that Texian commerce was dependent on their prioritisation of the U.S.-American flag in light of the near inexistence of a Texan fleet. Nevertheless, Rumpff insisted on the limitation to Hanseatic flags. This latter point stood to benefit Hanseatic maritime trade – as Smidt summarised, in order to be able to export non-Hanseatic goods from a non-Hanseatic port, e.g. Hannover or Oldenburg, to Texas, Prussia would either be exposed to differential duties or be forced to rely on Hanseatic vessels instead, which would only change if Prussia also furnished a treaty with Texas. By April of 1844, Hanseatic officials decided to aim for the removal of all references to merchant flags in article III of the Hanseatic-Texian treaty: A note from Bremen emphasised that the Hanseatic-Texian treaty would, in such a form, enable the

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61 Rumpff to the Hanseatic Senates, March 15, 1844, and extract from the report No. 37 of Rumpff, March 28, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
62 Rumpff to Hanseatic Senates, March 29, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 21/71.
maintenance of treaty benefits should the German Bund create a common merchant flag, as had already been suggested by some Prussian officials. The Hanseatic-Texian treaty was seen as advantageous because it gave the Hansa the ability to extend its commercial benefits to the entire German Bund, regardless of future developments within the Bund.

The extension of treaty benefits to the entirety of the Bund reaffirmed the Hansa’s preeminent position as traders in the German Bund, for it would motivate German states to ascend to a Hanseatic treaty. As Rumpff stated in his correspondence, the German states’ ability to join the treaty by use of a special convention would “put our trading politics into a liberal light, without there being the possibility that the slightest disadvantage for us could emerge of this situation.” In a notice from Bremen to Rumpff, more than likely authored by Senator Johann Gildemeister, several suggestions for improvement of the treaty draft were made in order to maximise the profit that the Hansa were to obtain within the German Bund as a result of their negotiations with Texas. Gildemeister, Rumpff, and other Hanseatic politicians such as Syndicus Banks and Kirchenpaner sought to make each article as clear as possible, and deliberated profusely over the placement of commas in articles such as Article III, where Banks feared that a comma between “which may be imported from the Hanseatic Republics, into the Republic of Texas” could limit the applicability of the treaty to Hanseatic ships departing from the Hanse Towns only. Gildemeister’s remarks to Rumpff highlighted the importance of the Hansa’s freedom on this matter: Using stipulations from improved versions of Articles XVIII, IV, II, and XIV, Gildemeister argued that the Hanseatic-Texan treaty would give Hamburg, Lübeck, and

64 Rumpff to Smidt, April 8, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
65 Zusatzartikel, einzuschalten zwischen XIV und XV oder Separatartikel, sent to Rumpff March 16, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
66 Rumpff to Syndicus Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24.
67 Syndicus Banks to Rumpff, date unknown (April 1844), StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
Bremen the ability to ship their – or generally, German goods – from the ports of any German state who had acceded to the treaty:

In Article IV it is written that a, e.g. Bremian ship, if it sails from Hamburg to Texas, ought to, same as its cargo, be treated according to the treaty as if it were coming from Bremen itself. Through Article II, the cargo of the same Bremian ship departing from Hamburg, if it consists of products of the German Bund, is protected from differential duties privileging similar products of other states…according to Article XIV, these rights of the Bremian flag would remain even on such a voyage even if Hamburg terminated its contract with Texas…this…will also now be the case for each acceding state of the German Bund, so that, e.g., Hannoveranian ships can sail from Hanseatic ports, or Hanseatic [ships] from Hannoveranian ports as if they were their own,…68

The two-fold advantage bestowed upon the three city-states through these stipulations – that German states would have an incentive to accede to the treaty in order to avoid differential duties and that Hanseatic ships could sail for Texas from any acceded German Bund port to do the same – was considered significant for the Hanseatic representatives who regarded this as an opportunity to improve their image in the Bund and pronounce their importance. Sieveking spoke rather dismissively of Prussia’s aspirations for German economical centralisation and standardisation as Zollvereinsfanatismus, and doubted disgruntledly that the other German Bund states would pay the Hanseates the respect and thanks due to them for their pioneering work.69 Rumpff sneeringly voiced his disdain for the Zollverein, and asserted that the Texian-Hanseatic treaty would help establish the Hansa’s influence in the Bund vis-à-vis the Prussian-dominated Customs Union: using the biblical reference “therefore, if thine enemy hunger, feed him, if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head”, he stated that article XVIII of the treaty – the one enabling German Confederative accession – “heaped coals of fire on the head of the Zollverein, without the need for us to burn our fingers”.

68 Senator Gildemeister (?) to Rumpff, September 5, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2.
69 Sieveking to Smidt, April 6, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
70 Rumpff to Smidt, April 8, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
mayor, Johann Smidt, wrote that unlike Southern German states, which often looked to Prussia for guidance – Smidt called them “Southern German leaves” in order to showcase their debility and lack of tenacity in the face of Prussia’s leadership, much like leaves in the wind – the Hanse Towns enacted their own policies for the benefit of not just themselves, but the German Bund as a whole: “The Hanse Towns […] do not, in the way in which Southern German leaves often accuse them of, focus entirely on their particular interests in their relations to the trans-Atlantic foreign states, […] unlike the Zollverein, which, in similar negotiations, seeks only to pave the way for its member states, […] we assume our position as the outpost and avant-garde of the German states vis-à-vis the trans-Atlantic world, which was factually assigned to us due to our location.”

Though the Hanseates sought to use their treaty with Texas and other trans-Atlantic treaties, as well as trans-Atlantic trade more broadly, to establish and legitimise their independence and importance in the German Bund, treaties of amity and commerce also had the potential of confronting German officials, economists, philosophers, and historians with more difficulties that stemmed from Germany’s status as a loose confederation in the process of standardising and centralising parts of its political and economic landscape. These were also conflicts that intersected with arguments of free trade. Germany’s unique position vis-à-vis consolidated nation-states caused some German officials to fear that trade agreements between German states and Mexico would be disadvantageous to Germany, mainly because the 1830s and 1840s constituted a time when, though free trade was on the rise, certain trading restrictions and protectionist barriers still existed, particularly in Europe. The treaty between Württemberg and Mexico was criticised by statesmen from Bavaria, with which Württemberg was in a special

71 Smidt to Sieveking, March 17, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
customs union at the time of the treaty in 1833. Article V of the Württemberg-Mexico treaty of amity and commerce needed modification according to Bavarian officials, because the clause on the most favoured nation was too unspecific for the special Württembergian circumstances:

Article 5 determined that both states, Württemberg and Mexico, would be placed on the footing of the most favoured nation regarding exportation and importation of goods in the respectively opposite country. The Bavarian ministry feared that Mexican authorities would try to use this clause in order to receive the same concessions that other German states had in their relations with Württemberg: At a time when Germany strove for the eradication of internal barriers in the form of taxes, tariffs, and duties, Bavaria raised the concern that Württemberg’s treaties and agreement to this effect with Prussia, Hohenzollern, Hesse, Coburg, Weimar, and Bavaria itself would be interpreted by Mexico as those conditions given to the “most favoured nations”, potentially giving Mexico the opportunity to take advantage of commercial and trading regulations that were supposed to benefit the standardisation, strengthening, and centralisation of the German economy.72

Similar concerns existed regarding the Hanseatic-Texian treaty. Gildemeister analysed the draft of this treaty and pointed out that article III, focussing on duties to be imposed on exportations made from one party to the other – which should not be higher than those imposed on other foreign states and most favourable nations – made the Hanseates susceptible to the inability to enforce differential duties on vessels of foreign nations which had sailed to the Hanseatic ports via Texas, i.e., this article, Gildemeister noted, might enable a third party to use Texas as an entrepôt over which goods could be shipped to the Hanse Towns in order to avoid duties and Hanseatic trading barriers. This thought, manifested Gildemeister, had already existed

in prior treaties, though Hanseatic statesmen had concluded in these cases that their concern about third parties’ circumvention of duties via an American state with which the Hanse Towns had a treaty was not well-founded enough to justify change to this stipulation or the termination of negotiations, because the formulations of the treaty made such an abuse of the treaty unlikely. In the Texian case, however, the situation was more difficult due to the inexistence of a Texian merchant marine.

As a result, Daingerfield had desired the elimination of the words “by vessels of the republic of Texas” in article III in reference to vessels included in the treaty benefits. This, according to Gildemeister, would expose the Hanse Towns to third parties’ indirect voyages to the Hanse Towns via Texas, and would lastingly prevent the city-states from imposing duties or other restrictions to protect their own trade. The Hansa should therefore incorporate a separate article or clause in their treaty with Texas that outlined that the benefits of an indirect passage over Texas to the Hanse Towns would only apply to those foreign states which permitted the same for Hanseatic vessels’ voyages to their ports.73 Rumpff later reiterated Gildemeister’s arguments in his communications with Gildemeister.74 In another instance, Rumpff also noted that he had insisted on the words “in vessels of the contracting parties” in order to “restrict the liberality of article I”, which would have otherwise removed almost all restrictions regarding the unloading of cargo in both parties’ ports.75 This highlights that protectionism was still very much a factor in 1830s and 1840s Europe, even at a time of rising free trade sentiments. Nevertheless, Smidt referred to the Hanseatic treaties with Texas, Venezuela, and the United States as treaties

73 Gildemeister to Rumpff, March 23, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 19, l. 65.
74 Rumpff to Smidt, March 29, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 21, l. 71.
75 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 15, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, ad. 16, l. 41.
of “the most liberal fashion”, demonstrating that the Hansa prided themselves in the perpetration of free trade in the first half of the 19th century.76

Other trade agreements between Texas and the Hanse Towns preceding the treaty of 1844 also raised concerns among intellectuals and statesmen. C. F. Wurm, when he was consulted by Sieveking in 1841, combined international law, economics, and philosophy (in which he obtained a Ph.D. in 1825) in order to assess the new republic.77 Using his background in these fields, Wurm expressed his concerns about the ‘Memorandum on a Convention between Texas and Hamburgh.’ In Article IX, Wurm questioned the exclusion of cargo in seizing an enemy vessel, largely due to the impracticality of this limitation. “The ship is confiscated,” Wurm wrote, “what happens to the cargo? It ought not to be confiscated. But how should it be returned? […] Not to the owner, for he cannot reclaim it; as the enemy, he does not have personem standi in judicio…”78 One of the chief publicists cited by Wurm in his critique of Article IX and its de facto applicability is enlightenment-era politician and writer August Adolph von Hennings. A statesman from Danish Schleswig-Holstein, Hennings is known for publishing the book Ueber die wahren Quellen des Nationalwohlstandes, Freiheit, Volksmenge, Fleiß, im Zusammenhange mit der moralischen Bestimmung der Menschen und der Natur der Sachen, a rebuttal to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in which Hennings argued that morality and religion are and have been responsible for generating national wealth in Western countries, not merely self-interest.79

76 Smidt to Rumpff, March 21, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
77 Originally from Württemberg, Wurm relocated to Hamburg in 1827 due to the city’s desire for an English-language newspaper focusing on American and English politics.
78 The right to sue. See: C. F. Wurm to Sieveking, July 5, 1841, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
The Hanseatic-Texian treaty, though it promised to be liberal and facilitate German trade, ultimately failed in part because of Texas’ annexation to the United States, but also Hanseatic discord on the Texas matter. As soon as Rumpff engaged in negotiations with Daingerfield, he highlighted the difficulties he had encountered in acquiring the permission from Hamburg and Lübeck to sign a treaty on behalf of all Hanse Towns. Though the Senates of Hamburg and Lübeck eventually took steps towards authorising Rumpff’s negotiations in March 1844, Hamburg’s and especially Lübeck’s involvement remained sparse – in the archives of Hamburg and Bremen, one can only find a total of roughly five letters from Lübeck’s officials on the Texas matter. Despite this, the fact that Rumpff had to negotiate for three city-states meant that he had to address concerns and complaints from three sides – not to mention Daingerfield as the representative of Texian interests – which slowed down negotiations. Though Sieveking estimated that the Hamburgian Senate would not refrain from empowering Rumpff to sign the treaty on Hamburg’s behalf, he did ask for several improvements to be made to article I, as well as those stipulations based on article IV in the U.S.-Hanseatic and article II in the Venezuelan-Hanseatic treaties. Despite such desires, he did not stand in frequent communication with Rumpff, for the latter lamented in a letter to Bremen that “Sieveking strings me along in truly the most gruesome way regarding the Texian treaty”, and that he no longer knew what to tell Daingerfield regarding negotiations and Hamburg’s stance.

Rumpff also highlighted that “it might not be the poor, possibly plagued (in the matter) Sieveking’s fault, for his influence in Hamburg is not as great as one believes, at least abroad”.

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80 Extractus Protocolli Senatus Hamburgensis, Monday, March 4, 1844 and March 6, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 5, l. 8. See also: Rumpff to Sieveking, March 8, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 11, l. 25, and Rumpff to Smidt, March 28, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
81 Note on the Hamburgian Senate’s decision on the Texas Question, March 6, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 7, l. 11. See also: Representative from Lübeck to Smidt, March 22, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
82 Sieveking to Smidt, April 6, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
This demonstrates that various interest groups existed within each Hanse Town, also. Though Rumpff included this caveat in his letter, he did conclude that Sieveking held little interest in the Texas matter, writing that “of course, if the issue at hand is not relevant to the harness of his pro tempore hobbyhorse, he is much more inclined to study Turkish or Chinese or whichever sundry destitute/breadless arts, rather than Texian”.83 Rumpff’s letter as well as Kossok’s analysis do showcase that Sieveking was not the main obstacle in the negotiations with Texas; rather, these were Hamburg’s merchants, who did not wish to endanger Hanseatic-Mexican relations so shortly after the treaty of amity and commerce between the Hansa and Mexico was finally completed and ratified. Out of the three Hanse Towns, Hamburg and Bremen were the most engaged in trans-Atlantic trade. Yet between the two of them, Hamburg’s role was more significant than Bremen’s, particularly in Mexico. This also provides an explanation for Bremen’s greater willingness and Hamburg’s greater reticence to receive Texian representatives and form a Hanseatic-Texian treaty, for Bremen, whose interests in Texas were stronger than Hamburg’s stood to gain more than Hamburg, whose interests in Mexico were greater, from such a treaty.84 The fact that Rumpff had to serve three masters, all with similar though slightly differing interests and priorities made negotiations more confounded and complex – when one realises that the three Hanse Towns struggled to come to a consensus on the Texas matter, it becomes evident why the Zollverein, with over a dozen members by the early 1840s, found itself unable to forge a significant number of international treaties of amity and commerce.

83 Sieveking was very involved in international affairs, having been imperative in the negotiations of a Brazilian-Hanseatic treaty in 1827. His focus on Hamburg’s overseas commerce and relations are the reason why Rumpff refers here to Turkish and Chinese, suggesting that Sieveking is likely to privilege other overseas affairs, no matter how destitute, over Hanseatic ones in Texas.
84 Rumpff to Smidt, April 8, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
International trade with the trans-Atlantic world, including Mexico and Texas, influenced German definitions of and justifications for German unity and a common German identity. Whereas movements like the 1848 political revolution were heavily dominated by intellectuals and students, and ultimately crushed by states like Prussia and Austria, which did not desire a German nation under such a liberal guise, the commercial and diplomatic connections between Germany and North American states Texas and Mexico showcase the perceived necessity for German centralisation on a state level, particularly in Prussia. Germany in the 1830s and 1840s was thus in a state of consolidation – a confederation of states within which there were rising sentiments of and calls for nationalism and unity. This can be contrasted by the example of Mexico in North America: though a nation-state, Mexico found itself in a state of dissolution in this era. Many states sought to secede from the Mexican Republic, and some even succeeded. Next to Texas, there was Yucatan, which gained its independence in 1841 and was not reintegrated into the Mexican Union until 1843, as well as the effort of the Republic of the Rio Grande, which was an effort of several northern Mexican states to form their own independent state. Given its disorganised state and the lack of a binding sense of unity among many local elites, finding ways of consolidating Mexican patriotism was important for Mexico’s central government. Just as issues of international law and commerce impacted and influenced the development of a common German identity, Mexican intellectuals and statesmen used the same two fields to justify and underline their nationality, patriotism, and their nation’s validity and equality among other nations. The following pages will outline and analyse these Mexican arguments and underpinnings of nationality based on international law and interactions with foreign states.
PRUSSIA’S MEDIATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO IN 1839: TEXAS AND EUROPEAN CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

An interesting episode in the history of Prussian-Mexican relations is the assumption of the role as an umpire by Prussia in 1839 in an effort to mediate between Mexico and the United States regarding reclamations made in Texas. The United States, as a Prussian report authored by von Rönne noted, had only requested the mediation of a neutral third party in two prior instances: These were the disputes with Great Britain regarding the first article of the Treaty of Ghent (December 24, 1814), mediated by the Tsar of Russia, and the north-eastern boundary between Canada and the United States, which was mediated by the King of the Netherlands beginning in 1827.85 Beyond this, the United States had only utilised mixed board of commissioners for the purpose of deciding various reclamations.86 The Prussian report emphasised that only the Russian mediation was comparable to the *Schiedsrichteramt* to be assumed by Prussia regarding the reclamations of U.S.-Americans against Mexico, for the mediations decided by commissions only relied on an independent arbitrator possibly from a third-party state, not on the evaluation and verdict entirely determined by a third party.87 The

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86 Most of these had also centred on disagreement with Britain: A mixed board of commissioners was to be established in the aftermath of the Jay Treaty (1794) in order to address reclamations by British subjects, but issues soon arose when the fifth member (in addition to the two U.S.-Americans and two Britons) was likewise an Englishman, who had met with his fellow countrymen before the commission’s official discussion on the matter – a violation of the commission’s rules. The United States faced similar problems in other similar endeavours: commissions established to solve disputes with Britain, Spain, and France often ended either fully or partially unsuccessfully, and led to complex debates on how the workings of such commissions could be improved. See: Report by von Rönne, Philadelphia, April 14, 1840, GStA PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7933/4, I. 1-82, 3-5.

87 A *Schiedsrichteramt* is an umpireship
Russian umpireship, the only precedent that Prussia could fall back on in this matter, had never been called upon in the dispute between Britain and the United States, which left von Rönne – not just a diplomat and statesman, but also a lawyer – with the option of looking to the more distantly related commissions in order to familiarise himself with “the basic tenets which were decisive for these commissions in their decisions regarding the reclamations”. 88

The number of reclamations submitted by U.S. subjects was 65, of which 29 were listed without and 36 with the sum being demanded. In the latter case, this sum amounted to a total of 1,395,343.87 dollars. Some of these reclamations summarised the wrongdoing that the Mexican government was being held responsible for by the U.S.-Americans, whereas others did not. Overall, von Rönne concluded, the justifications for and reasonings behind each reclamation listed were very vague and insufficient for the determination of awards to be made, yet he attached them to his report nonetheless for they enabled Prussian officials to view the types of reclamations that had been brought forth. “In all of these cases there are claims for indemnification for damages which the [U.S.] American citizens have unlawfully been forced to suffer as regards their fortune, person, freedom, and honour”, von Rönne wrote. He elaborated on the latter point: “There are among the points of grievances listed in the two documents grievances regarding insults, which have not only been inflicted upon [U.S.] American citizens, but rather upon the [U.S.] American Government”. Interestingly, the United States decided not to leave these reclamations to the Prussian umpireship. U.S. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote to Mexican representative Martinez in September of 1838 that he wanted to address “the causes of complaint which directly affect the national character” separately from the other reclamations because they involved “points not supposed to admit of arbitration or compromise”. 89 As von

Rönne stated, these cases affecting the national character were insults to the U.S.-American flag (cases 36 and 46), consuls (cases 44 and 49), and Lieutenant Osborn (case 51). Since neither person nor property had been damaged through these insults and were not borne from such reclamations brought forth by U.S. citizens, von Rönne likewise concluded that these cases were not fit for Prussia’s umpireship.

Von Rönne furthermore determined that international law, the tenets of fairness, the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Mexico, and “the spirit of democratic-republican institutions of both countries” ought to be used as the foundation for Prussia’s mediation. As such, von Rönne referred to and cited works on international law, including those authored by German diplomat and scholar on international law Georg Friedrich von Martens, Saxon historian, professor of law, and economist Friedrich von Bülau, and Portuguese statesman Silvestre Pinheiro-Ferreira. The latter also worked with Emer de Vattel, a Prussian subject of Swiss heritage who authored *The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law*, one of the most important works on international law of the eighteenth century. De Vattel links the political economy to international justice, writing that it had been commerce which had transformed Europe from a “confused heap of detached pieces” into a community in which the members were united “for the maintenance of order and liberty”. This trend can be identified in Europe’s relations to Mexico, where commerce and international law in the form of reclamations, treaties, and other agreements went hand in hand, and where European states often strove for a certain degree of unity in order to imbue their reclamations and pressures on Mexico with more legitimacy. As the first part of this chapter showcases, this sense of unification also

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occurred on a national basis for Germans in Mexico. De Vattel and one of his predecessors, Christian Wolff, both argued that the society of nations ought to “cultivate human society”, for which trade was of a primary importance. De Vattel did not confine the definition of the law of nations to a series of “maxims and customs”, and instead advocated for a natural law of nations akin to the natural laws and rights attributed to individuals in Enlightenment thought. De Vattel’s idea that nations should restrict trade as little as possible and only in the effort for self-preservation; and aim for the breaking down of internal barriers hindering their citizens from engaging in trade. Ultimately, de Vattel concluded that Britain was the nation whose international conduct was most worthy of emulation, and that a balance of power according to British example would quell France’s desire to engineer its hegemony on the European continent. In some ways, de Vattel’s work can be linked to 19th-century trends, including the eradication of internal trading barriers in the German Zollverein as well as Britain’s decisive role in international affairs, including those related to international law and rights in e.g. the instance of slavery.

Using the ideas of the above-mentioned international and public law figures, von Rönne addressed the legitimacy of some of the reclamations made, for they had occurred in the politically fluid Texas. Based on the tenets of international law, Mexico should be held responsible for any financial damages inflicted upon U.S. citizens by Mexican authorities. Officials and government employees were “the organs of the state”, von Rönne highlighted, a view shared by Pinheiro-Ferreira, de Vattel, and Bülau. The responsibility that the state assumed

92 De Vattel, Preface, 1. See also: De Vattel, Preface, 11: “Nations, it is true, can only be considered as so many individual persons living together in the state of nature; and, for that reason, we must apply to them all the duties and rights which nature prescribes and attributes to men in general”.  
93 He also promoted the dissemination of technological know-how from European states to peripheral regions.  
for its employees – von Rönne speaks here of *Vertretungsverbindlichkeit* – extended to actions that officials had executed without authorisation, as a precedent, a U.S.-American and French reclamation dispute, had already determined.\(^95\) Though the state’s liability for its officials was acknowledged by von Rönne, he noted that Mexico’s frequent political changes made applying this concept to some of the reclamation efforts difficult: In 1817, two individuals saw their property confiscated by the authorities of Santa Fe, and in 1818, the Brig *Cossak* was confiscated by authorities of Mazatlán. Both cases led to reclamations, for which Mexico could not be held accountable, von Rönne argued. “The authorities accused of inflicting these damages were Spanish and not Mexican officials; the Spanish authorities still existed in Mexico at that time, and the alleged damage was inflicted by them”. Consequently, such reclamations should not be brought forth against the Mexican government, which had not existed in 1817 and 1818: “Mexico was not yet a nation at the time, there did not exist a Mexican sovereign *Volk*; the originator of this damage – in whose name the [damage] was inflicted – the sovereign government of Spain – still exists today; thus, both claimants should have approached [that government]”.\(^96\)

Precedents had also established that the *Vertretungsverbindlichkeit*, the liability assumed by a government for its officials, was not something that could be transferred to a new state like other burdens, such as state debt.\(^97\) Hamburg and the Netherlands had, for example, not been held accountable for the damages inflicted upon U.S. merchants during the French occupation, for the officials who had been responsible for the customs barriers had been French. What is more, U.S.-American reclamations in response to this commercial loss had demonstrably been

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\(^{95}\) Report by von Rönne, Philadelphia, April 14, 1840, GStA PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7933/4, l. 1-82, 16.


\(^{97}\) *Vertretungsverbindlichkeit* can be translated with the „liability/responsibility/obligation to represent/stand-in”, and is used by von Rönne to indicate that a state is liable for its officials’ mistakes and/or wrongdoings.
satisfied by French monetary compensation and indemnities for damages.\textsuperscript{98} Von Rönne thus concluded that Mexico could not be held responsible for reclamations prior to its independence, because officials at that time had not been Mexican, but Spanish officials. Though this seems to be, on the surface, an advantage for Mexico, von Rönne tied this string of arguments to Texas in the subsequent pages. Several U.S. reclamations accused Mexican authorities in Texas of wrongdoing, but von Rönne argued that claimants had to address the Texian government in order to receive compensation, for Texas was no longer part of Mexico.\textsuperscript{99} What, though, could be made of the fact that Texas had just seceded from Mexico, that Mexican authorities were blamed for the damages inflicted upon U.S. citizens in Texas, and that Mexico did not recognise Texas as independent? Von Rönne’s subsequent arguments to address reclamations that had occurred during Spanish rule or in Texas led him down a rabbit hole that could only have displeased the Mexican government.

On the U.S.-American side, Mexico’s acknowledgement that it would accept the reclamation in the case of the Brig \textit{Louisa}, which dated back to Spanish rule, was evaluated as a concession that should apply to other reclamations that had occurred before 1821, yet von Rönne argued that the Brig \textit{Louisa} represented a different issue altogether: Though Spain had still held political authority in Mexico in February and March of 1821 – the times of the incidents – the damages had not been caused by Spanish authorities, but by the head of a political party, namely Agustín de Iturbide, who had “represented a part of the sovereign Mexican \textit{Volk} which had risen up against Spanish rule”. As such, only the Mexican people could be held accountable,

\textsuperscript{99} A similar argument, von Rönne noted, could have also been made regarding the state of Yucatan, which had also declared independence for several years, though because it willingly sought the reunification with Mexico, which the latter approved of and effected, Mexico had essentially acknowledged that it would also assume the \textit{Vertretungsverbindlichkeit} for Yucatan as well.
“represented by their current government”. Von Rönne wrote subsequently of the importance of defining terms such as “political party”, as well as rebellion, revolution, civil war, and insurgents, and determined that these definitions would be different for a democratic-republican rather than a monarchical government. These terms were particularly important “when there is, in actual fact, a lack of stability, and as long as a nation has not yet engaged in the continuous process of forming its own types of government”. Von Rönne continued: “The question here always must be whether a resistance to the Nationalwillen can be assumed or not”. Such a resistance was – von Rönne cited Pinheiro-Ferreira – a rebellion, for “the rebellion consists of putting up a resistance to the national will”. If there was more than a resistance to the national will, however – if the nation split into several factions of which one could no longer determine who was in the majority and who in the minority – “one can no longer speak of a rebellion, it is instead a civil war”, von Rönne wrote. The rebels could, during a civil war, no longer be labelled as such, and were instead ‘political parties/factions’. Especially in Mexico, under a democratic-republican government, having a majority party was regarded as crucial by von Rönne. Since this did not exist, and since Santa Anna engaged in frequent disputes and battles for power with opposing factions and the government of Mexico in 1839, “there is no question that” Mexico’s situation “deserves the label of a civil war”, von Rönne stated. Given this definition of a political party in relation to the national will, von Rönne determined that Mexico could be held responsible for the Brig Louisa reclamation, which complained about damages inflicted by a Mexican political party, not a Spanish authority.

101 The Nationalwillen is the national will.
This line of reasoning became disadvantageous to Mexico on the international stage when tied to the Texas Republic. As von Rönne had argued, Mexico could not be held accountable for the U.S. reclamations regarding Texas, because the latter had established its own state. Von Rönne thus believed that Texas was no longer a territory in rebellion, as Mexico’s government viewed it – even if Texas’ international and foreign recognition was still shaky in 1839, it was at the very least a political faction representing a part of the national will, a conclusion that would mean Mexico was engaged in civil war, or in fact an entirely independent nation with its own national will. Either way, von Rönne’s arguments weakened Mexico’s claim to Texas. If Texas was acknowledged as a party engaged in warfare – a *kriegsführende Parthei* – this would moreover, according to von Rönne’s definitions, enable Texas to “assume the rights that parties at war are allowed to claim vis-à-vis third parties”, a concession that was not in Mexico’s best interests.\(^{103}\) Only upon reunification and the return of peace in a country engaged in civil war, could the nation be held accountable for the damages inflicted by one of the parties at war, a circumstance that could not be applied to Spain (for Mexico was lost by Spain for good and the political party responsible for the damages of the Brig *Louisa* had been representatives of the Mexican, not the Spanish national will) or Texas (which had not been reintegrated into Mexico).

To add insult to Mexico’s injury, von Rönne also wrote that von Bülau’s works led one to conclude that foreign recognition was not the primary factor that defined an independent state; instead, it was “traffic [*Verkehr*] of states as such or through individual citizens, regulated by international law […] individual states as such can only engage in peaceful traffic with those states, which they have recognised as independent states. Of course, they do not obtain these characteristics through foreign recognition; they must possess them because of their own

\(^{103}\) Report by von Rönne, Philadelphia, April 14, 1840, GStA PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7933/4, l. 1-82, 22.
strength, and can also possess them without recognition”, von Bülau wrote. Even though Texas could only become an equal member of the society of nations through foreign recognition, it could be independent without it nonetheless.¹⁰⁴

Next to these conclusions, which questioned seriously the existence of a united Mexican national will and rejected Texas’s status as a Mexican territory in rebellion, von Rönne made further claims that troubled Mexico’s authorities. The Prussian minister argued that it did not matter whether the political party responsible for damages came out of the civil war victorious; the government would have to accept reclamations from foreigners from the losing party, also. That is, von Rönne emphasised that some reclamations listed by U.S. citizens had been brought forth because of damages inflicted by a political party at war, which existed in many parts of Mexico during the 1830s and 1840s due to the efforts for independence on behalf of Yucatan, Zacatecas, the Republic of the Rio Grande (an 1840 insurgency in modern-day Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, and Coahuila), and others. The central government was also subject to frequent attacks, coups d’état, and the existence of several regimes that claimed authority for themselves. Even though many of these political parties at war were ultimately crushed by the Mexican army or faced instability themselves (such as Santa Anna’s regimes), von Rönne believed that the Mexican government was responsible for damages inflicted by any of these political parties, even if they had been unable to come to power. In connection to this argument, the Prussian representative also rejected Forsyth’s note on U.S. reclamations: This note, sent to the Mexican government, emphasised that the U.S. sought indemnity for those damages inflicted by the legitimate Mexican government (von der herrschenden Parthhei, the governing party). Though von Rönne surmised that it was unclear whether Forsyth included in this definition also those

ruling parties that had reigned fleetingly on a regional level, he ultimately concluded that Forsyth’s claim was not in accordance with the tenets laid out by the international law of de Vattel, Pinheiro-Ferreira, or Martens, and should hence not be taken into consideration for the decisions to be made regarding the U.S. reclamations.\textsuperscript{105}

Prussia’s umpireship was not well-received in Mexico, as Kossok has highlighted. Because von Rönne’s reasoning denied Mexico the “legal proof” necessary to denounce U.S. involvement in the Texas matter as “an intervention in the internal affairs” of Mexico, and because Prussia’s decision was moreover perceived as too generous toward the U.S.-Americans and hence financially unfortunate for Mexico, the Mexican government’s view on Prussia was negatively impacted for years to come. Prussia’s initial choice to send Seiffart to Mexico as merely a General-Consul, not a chargé d’affaires as von Gerolt had been, was also perceived as an affront by the Mexican government. Seiffart wrote in 1846, the year marking the beginning of the U.S.-Mexico War, that anti-U.S. sentiments had grown drastically in Mexico and become a Nationalhass, a national hatred, in relation to which Prussia was also occasionally mentioned “because public opinion had never been able to get accustomed to not seeing a favouring of the extravagant North American demands in the arbitrated decision [of Prussia]”.\textsuperscript{106} Prussia’s umpireship changed how Mexico was able to use international law and its tenets in an effort to reconquer Texas. But this Texian episode is just one way in which international law defined the relationship between Europe and Mexico, and indeed, Europe and the trans-Atlantic world. What becomes noticeable is that international law, defined by Europeans, became increasingly applied

to the new American states, the latter of which had little say in shaping international law or determining how it should be applied.

Discussions on and philosophies of international law were shaped by two currents, that of natural and that of positive law. Whereas de Vattel had focussed on natural law as the basis of the law of nations, Martens is regarded as the first thinker of international law to establish a detailed system of positive law based on empiricism. Particularly treaties – of amity, commerce, trade, neutrality, peace, alliance, et cetera – were of interest to Martens. Not only did von Rönne cite Martens, but Hanseatic representatives did so as well in their correspondence on Texas: Vincent Rumpff, commenting on the in-depth analyses occurring among the Hanseates regarding the Hanseatic-Texian treaty, noted that “Martens would shake his head, smiling”, if he could see that the current draft of the treaty would only oblige the Hanseates to treat Texian vessels as they would those of any other country, without imposing differential duties – something that “we could never think of, anyway”, Rumpff noted. Martens’ works focussed on international law from an exclusively European standpoint: Some of his works include *Précis du droit des gens modernes de l’Europe*, *Einleitung in das positive Europäische Völkerrecht auf Verträge und Herkommen gegründet*, *Erzählungen merkwürdiger Fälle des neuern europäischen Völkerrechts*, and *Grundriß einer diplomatischen Geschichte der europäischen Staatshändel und Friedensschlüsse seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts*.

This focus on Europe extant among key figures of international law extended to de Vattel, who used international legal tenets to justify that Europeans had settled the “uncultivated land” of the Americas. De Vattel wrote that “every nation is then obliged by the law of nature to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share”, and that a nation did not possess the “right to

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107 Rumpff to Smidt, March 18, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26.
enlarge its boundaries, or have recourse to the assistance of other nations, *but in proportion as the land in its possession is incapable of furnishing it with necessaries*. This is a significant remark, for it justifies not only European settlement of the Americas, but could also be used in theory to justify the United States’ expansion into Mexico, if one counts the cultivation of Southern cotton as a “necessary”, particularly since Mexicans did not engage in much cotton cultivation in Texas prior to Anglo settlement there. “Those nations”, wrote de Vattel,

> who inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands, and chuse [sic] rather to live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage and pernicious beasts. There are others, who, to avoid labour, chuse [sic] to live only by hunting, and their flocks. […] Those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for, and have therefore no reason to complain, if other nations, more industrious, and too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of those lands. Thus, though the conquest of the civilised empires of Peru and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabited them.109

De Vattel’s analysis denied the status of civilisation to Native Americans such as the Comanches, whose importance to power relations, influence on culture, and exertion of imperialism in the Texian borderlands have been discussed in chapter four.110 Though de Vattel himself, noting that the empires of Peru and Mexico had been civilised even prior to Spanish arrival, would not have viewed the U.S. War with Mexico as lawful, his conclusion that an industrious nation could lawfully take possession of land held idly by another certainly sounds similar to U.S. justifications for expansion into Mexico and Native American territory.111

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109 De Vattel, 130.
110 De Vattel also wrote: “The savages of North America had no right to appropriate all that vast continent to themselves: and since they were unable to inhabit the whole of those regions, other nations might with-out injustice settle in some parts of them, provided they left the natives a sufficiency of land”. See: De Vattel, 310.
111 De Vattel commented that “whoever agrees that robbery is a crime, and that we are not allowed to take forcible possession of our neighbour’s property, will acknowledge, without any other proof, that no nation has a right to expel another people from the country they inhabit, in order to settle in it herself. Notwithstanding the extreme inequality of climates and soils, every people ought to be contented with that which has fallen to their share”. This
Though de Vattel argued in another passage that the civilising of nations in need thereof ought not to occur by force, and that a nation could decide what to do with its vacated lands, his perspective that the American nations prior to European arrival needed such civilising indicates that debates on international law centred on European ideas of law, civilisation, justice, progress, cultivation, and right.\textsuperscript{112}

Though many of these individuals were Germans, hence not politically and diplomatically powerful like the British, they nevertheless impacted international law profoundly and perhaps even most heavily. Martti Koskenniemi writes that “The way we theorise about international law has grown out of German public law […] the theoretical articulation of the nature and problems of modern international law comes from the tradition of German public law”.\textsuperscript{113} De Vattel was also a major inspiration for the fathers of the American Revolution, which subsequently impacted many political revolutions and shaped ideas of liberalism and liberty, human rights, and democracy. De Vattel was also cited by political conservatives during the Congress of Vienna, such as Cardinal Ercole Consalvi of the Papal States.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, these individuals had a global outreach. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, their definitions of international law as being centred on Europe began to incorporate the American states. Mexico’s response to this development is particularly interesting, because Mexican authorities resisted arguments of international law brought forth by European agents and held

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\item De Vattel, 265.
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against them their own interpretations of and arguments based on international law. By doing so, Mexican statesmen also continuously reemphasised and shaped Mexican nationalism.

**MEXICO AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Mexican officials used international law to condemn the independence of Texas. Texians, however, used international law in order to accomplish the opposite. One note highlighted that Texians were not intruders or usurpers, having been called into Mexico, and that they had, after independence, established enlightened and free institutions under the banners of peace and security. Texas had been, the excerpt asserted, accepted into the family of nations, and because of Texas’ recognition by the United States in particular, the former had the “unquestionable rights of being considered and treated, under all aspects, as an independent power”. Any efforts by Mexico to conquer Texas were unlawful. On the other hand, Mexican officials saw it as a matter of fairness and law/right that Texas not become independent. A pamphlet from 1837 argued that the Texian Congress was not one that honoured these two principles, stating that anyone who “dared to raise their voice in defence of the most obvious principles of fairness and law was charged [by all of Congress]” and labelled as a bad citizen who had sold himself to Mexico.

Another Mexican observer accused U.S.-Americans and Texians, who engaged in contraband trade and were generally hostile toward Mexico, of “depriving the nation of its rights”. Urréa asked whether Mexico ought not to finally implement laws that would save it from

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115 ‘Derechos que se suponen en los texanos para haberse proclamado independientes de México y para unirse a la república de Norteamérica”, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5174.
116 The Mexican pamphlet speaks of “equidad y derecho”. Though Texas was already independent at the time, Mexico continued to consider it as a territory in rebellion. See: “Contestaciones habidas entre la legación extraordinaria de México y el departamento de estado de los Estados-Unidos, Año de 1837”, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5220: Mexico, Vol. IX, l. 31, xxiv-xxv.
the ruinous influence of the “usurpers”, who were taking advantage of the fact that Mexico had not yet made a serious enough effort to stop them. Was this not Mexico’s right?117 This question is one of international law, which de Vattel also considered in his Law of Nations – for Mexico, international legal tenets were of particular importance after the rebellion of the Texians.118 What Mexican authorities found out, however, is that international law was not often used by Europeans and others in their support, at least not effectively (as previous chapters have discussed, Europeans did recognise Texas to Mexico’s chagrin, and did not condemn seriously the U.S. breaches of neutrality in the Texas Question).

Another instance showcases that Mexican representatives often felt abandoned by international law when they needed it. J. Álvarez linked the Texas matter to the United States and the Pastry War, stating that U.S. support for Texas and a violation of its proclaimed neutrality in the matter was a sign of the “disdain with which [the U.S.-Americans] see us”, which made him believe that the United States would not be a country that would intervene in France’s blockade of Mexico in 1838-39. Álvarez labelled France’s blockade an ‘injustice’ with which the rest of Europe, though at other times so concerned with international law, would not occupy itself: Though Deffaudis had announced that France’s action was not an offence against the Mexican nation, but solely against its government, Álvarez argued that the French intervention was really an attack on Mexico’s independence, and thus a violation of Mexico’s rights. France, he believed, did not care whether Mexico was centralist or federalist, free or enslaved; for France, it was much more useful to turn Mexico into a colony or to form another royal dynasty there, for this would promote French interests in Mexico. England, on the other

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117 Urréa to Gómez Farías, April 6, 1840, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 47A: Correspondence, January 1839-July 1840, Folder 4, #573-641, 625.
118 See, for example: De Vattel, 265.
hand, did not care about justice or international law either, for it only cared about its commerce and that “its capitals enjoyed the sufficient guaranties”. “The question is nothing more but ours and exclusively ours”, Álvarez said of the Pastry War, highlighting that he did not expect support from the world’s great powers.\(^{119}\) Anastasio Bustamante was also sceptical regarding the French blockade, and wrote that Mexican troops that had just quelled internal insurgencies ought to be used against the French in case the latter exceed the limits of a simple blockade.\(^{120}\)

In many of Mexico’s international struggles, Mexican representatives felt as though international law had disappointed them or left them in the state of a second-tier nation—European international law seemed to take hold when it suited Europe’s commercial or political interests. Vargas Garcia views aspects of international law, particularly treaties of amity and commerce as well as slave-trade treaties, as inherently unequal, arguing that Britain in particular pushed for agreements that were nominally fair but favoured it in practice: “only one of the contracting parties was in the position to demand that the other observe the clauses in case of divergence”, Vargas Garcia states. In most cases, this was the European power.\(^{121}\) In the case of new reclamations brought forth by the United States, Álvarez even argued that these represented an effort in which Mexico was not even recognised as a proper nation, highlighting his discontentment with international legal standards.\(^{122}\) Because of this, Álvarez challenged European definitions of international law. Deffaudis’ justification of French intervention and his remark that France sought solely to intervene against the Mexican government, not the Mexican

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\(^{119}\) J. Álvarez to Coronel don Manuel Montoro, December 15, 1838, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 46: Correspondence, December 1838, Folder 3, #554-572, 558.

\(^{120}\) Anastasio Bustamante to General D. Martín de Cos, June 7, 1838, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 46: Correspondence, January-June 1838, Folder 1, #425-487, 483.

\(^{121}\) Vargas Garcia, 364.

\(^{122}\) J. Álvarez to Coronel don Manuel Montoro, December 15, 1838, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 46: Correspondence, December 1838, Folder 3, #554-572, 558.
nation, was rejected by Álvarez, who wrote that “only we, as Mexican citizens, can distinguish that point at which the government is different/separate from the nation, because we examine the issue with the eyes of our own interest and measure the extent of the dispute with the dimension of our laws: the foreigner and us have different modes of viewing the aspects of the difficulties that we are occupied with”. Álvarez explicitly rejected the legal tenets laid out by Europeans, for they did not adequately reflect the state of Mexico’s affairs and had not been shaped by Mexico as Mexico’s laws had. Much like Álvarez, who believed that Europeans only acted in their best interest, Valentín Gómez Farías labelled “the Texas Question as a question of life or death for the Mexicans. I, who have lived a bit abroad, know the importance and politics of the nations (the United States, England, and France) which contend, albeit by very different means, to appropriate/seize [Texas]”.

U.S.-American influence in Texas had to be prevented, this was certain for Gómez Farías, but he also criticised English and French intervention: “it is said that we are running a huge risk if the annexation [of Texas to the United States] turns out to be true, and in this fact, I have no doubt, but we will not have [the risk] any less […] if the English stay in/keep Texas”. This scenario, manifested Gómez Farías, would lead to the establishment of a foreign monarchy at the feet of Mexico. He emphasised subsequently that Mexico did “desire peace with all nations”, but that it could not maintain peace – i.e., keeping by international legal tenets which foresaw that laws regulate international relations – if this came at the expense of the Mexican nation. In another letter, Gómez Farías reiterated this, lamenting that the “English dominate the Mexican government” and sought the latter’s recognition of Texas because they did not want Texas to be annexed to the United States. Gómez Farías rejected England’s policy, arguing that

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123 Gómez Farías to Bernardo González Angulo, May 2, 1845, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5209.
Mexico would not let “our soil be dominated by the Yankees or the English, we want and must be solely Mexicans, and so we will be, and we will reconquer Texas”\textsuperscript{124} Another observer also noted that Mexico could not expect help in the Texas matter, and had rather ruined its relationship with Europe over the issue: “We have destroyed ourselves, discredited ourselves in Europe, and prepared two foreign powers for setting a trap in our path by which they can conquer, subjugate, and humiliate us”.\textsuperscript{125}

As the above cases have shown, Mexico’s statesmen’s views on Texas were accompanied by a certain resignation that appealing to England or France would not help Mexico in solving the Texas Question. With the Hanse Towns, however, Consul Negrete hoped to have better luck: These small towns, not politically or militarily powerful, might respond better to a Mexican protest regarding Hanseatic-Texian relations and negotiations of a treaty. In October of 1844, A. Negrete, the General-Consul of Mexico in the Hanse Towns, wrote a letter to the Hanseatic Senates, submitting a protest concerning the appearance of Texian representative (the “so-called Colonel Dangerfield [sic]”) William Henry Daingerfield in the Hanseatic Cities, “with the goal of negotiation the recognition of the Venerable Senates of the independence of this territory violently removed from the legal authority of the Mexican Republic”. A Hanseatic recognition of Texas would be “not merely against the rights of my government, but also the interests of the subjects of our two respective countries”, Negrete wrote, and referred subsequently to the Texians as “usurpers”. Hanseatic negotiations with Texas would be contrary to “the rights and the sovereignty of the Mexican Republic”, which showcases that Negrete sought to use legal foundations in order to cement his position.

\textsuperscript{124} Gómez Farías to Manuel González Cosío, April 25, 1845, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 8, #5169-5233, 5210.
\textsuperscript{125} Luis de Cortarar to Gómez Farías, March 3, 1838, NLB: Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Box 65B: Papers about Texas, 1838-1844, Folder 1, #5129-5152, 5135.
Though he tried to use Hanseatic commercial interests to persuade the Hansa’s Senates to reject Daingerfield’s status, the Hanseatic response also used legal, particularly international, principles to justify their reception of the Texian: “Far from prejudging on a question of public or international law, the Senate limits itself strictly, as it has done in the past, to cultivating the rapports of navigation and commerce which have naturally formed themselves between the entrepôts of Germany and a country such as Texas”. Rather than rejecting Negrete’s claim to international law, the Senate’s response was rather diplomatic – though it did not disregard Negrete’s comment, it steered clear of making a telling or partial remark by emphasising that the Hanse Towns cultivated commercial relations where they formed ‘naturally’. Moreover, the letter pointed out that Mexico had profited from this Hanseatic stance not long ago: In the 1820s, when restorationist and legitimist policy advocated for Spain and the non-recognition of Spanish-American independence, Mexico had aspired to receive the same recognition from Europe that it was now denying to Texas. This weakened Negrete’s legal arguments.

The Hanseatic response reemphasised once more that it followed the commercial lead of the great maritime powers, but sought to refrain from voicing any views regarding international law, particularly because of Mexico’s importance to and friendship with the German city-states. This Mexican appeal to international law thus fell on deaf ears, because of the precedent that Mexico’s own independence had set in this regard.126 Nevertheless, Negrete sent another response to the Hanseatic Senates, using international legal principles to establish why Mexico’s case had been different from Texas’: Mexico had, indisputably, declared Negrete, been its own nation by the time the Hanseates engaged in official relations with that country, and Mexicans had not demanded that a neighbouring country hand over part of its territory to enlarge their

126 See also: Kossok, “Preußen, Bremen, und die „Texas-Frage“ 1835-1845“.
own. Mexicans had already established a nationality by the time they became independent; Mexicans shared a language, religion, and had won a “glorious battle in order to found a nationality and enjoy the rights” of their ancestors and other nations. Texas, according to Negrete, had none of these characteristics. Thus, Negrete took this opportunity to cement and legitimise his country’s nationality and independence at the same time as he tried to degrade Texas’.

Contestations arose between Europeans and Mexico in response to these differing views and usages of international law. Mexicans tried to resist European recognitions of commerce through other means, also. One newspaper excerpt highlighted that Mexico would no longer treat those nations who had recognised Texas and those which had not the same, and that it would view those treaties with Texas as hostile to Mexico. “We do not possess vessels of war with which we can make war, but we have our appetizing commerce”, the writer noted. With the latter, Mexico could try to influence foreign nations.\footnote{A Negrete to Sieveking, October 7, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16h, Vol 2 Fasc. 4: Mexiko: Verhandlungen mit dem Mexikanischen General-Consul, Herrn A. Negrete, betreffend b) Protest gegen diesesitige Anerkennung des Colonel Dangerfield, Agenten von Texas und Verhandlung mit demselben, 1844, 1.}

European responses to this Mexican resistance likewise referred to legal tenets in order to reaffirm their point of view. Mexico’s young history inspired one Prussian observer to argue that the Germans in Mexico had all experienced an exquisite political education, whereas Mexicans generally had not.\footnote{Seiffart to Royal Minister of State, Freiherr von Canitz, April 15, 1846, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA I, Nr. 7916, l. 134-145.} This could be used as a justification for discrediting Mexicans’ political thinking. In one instance, von Gerolt rejected Bocanegra’s argument regarding a particular law that had given rise to reclamations, stating that foreigners’ civil rights in Mexico had not been
taken into account by Bocanegra. Moreover, von Gerolt underlined the European focus of international law when he stated that international and public law had been accepted by the United States and Europe, which gave it enough credibility and legitimacy to be applied to the remainder of the globe – Spanish-American views of international law were not of essential importance. Vargas Garcia notes that European perceptions of international law contributed to Spanish American states’ relegation to peripheral areas, where the “dilemmas of political influence, economic expansion, and strategic relevance did not manifest themselves in the classical colonial sense, but in a deterritorialised frame with certain international rules, many of which were not written […] and without legal restrictions to the discretionary unilateralism of the powers at the peak of the hierarchy of global power”. Mexicans contested the monopoly that Europeans sought to claim for the interpretation of international legal standards: Bocanegra, in another reclamation matter, referred to international law in order to justify his government’s decisions. In one instance, Mexico’s authorities had determined that, “owing to the tenets of equality and justice, which form the foundation of [Bocanegra’s] actions, the Prussian subjects’ forced bonds ought to have the same fate as those of the French, English, and North Americans”, which meant that these reclamations would be sent to the ministry of finance for evaluation. Regarding reclamations submitted because of plundering, however, Bocanegra emphasised that his government could not respond or accept these efforts, because Mexico had never acknowledged that it was obliged to extend the right to indemnities to such a scenario. The French case, where compensation had occurred in the aftermath of the Pastry War, could not be used as precedent, Bocanegra argued, for Mexico had not acknowledged that France’s demands

129 Von Gerolt’s comments on Bocanegra’s letter to him, October 9, 1843, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5224: Mexico, Vol. XIII: January 1843-June 1844, l. 419.
131 Vargas Garcia, 353.
had been lawful or righteous. In his response to von Gerolt, Bocanegra appealed to principles such as peace, equality, justice, and humanity between nations.\textsuperscript{132}

In internal affairs, Mexican representatives used international law, also. When another rebellion broke out in Mexico City in 1841, a message to the Mexican nation was issued by President Bustamante, in which he appealed to international legal tenets in order to unite the Mexican people behind his cause. Bustamante highlighted that the Mexican nation was exposed to great suffering, unable to assume a flourishing era for which it was destined and incapable of enforcing important reforms to its institutions and agencies. The President blamed the various military chiefs, who frequently engaged in resurrections and insurgencies, for Mexico’s dire state, and stated that they were the primary reason why Mexico had not yet been accepted as an equal among the civilised nations of the globe. These military men kept Mexico from implementing the ideals of the Enlightenment, as well as proper liberty and patriotism, and it was his goal, Bustamante claimed, to foster “steady principles and foundations” for the Mexican nation, so that it might grow prosperous and receive credibility in front of other nations, who regarded Mexico’s name “even more contemptuously” in the aftermath of rebellions such as the one of September 1841. Whereas von Rönne had rejected a common national will in Mexico, Bustamante appealed directly to it: Mexico could, like other civilised and educated countries, solve its problems through empirical means.\textsuperscript{133} Another message by a Mexican official argued the same, emphasising that a liberal and constitutional government was important in elevating Mexico in the community of nations.\textsuperscript{134} In 1839, Rocafuerte had also sought to unite the country

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Hamburger Neue Zeitung}, November 18, 1841, Is. 73, No. 269, GSta PK: III. HA MdaA II, Nr. 5222: Mexico, Vol. XI, l. 506.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Diario del Gobierno de la República mexicana}, June 8, 1844, No. 3.273, Tom. XXIX, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16h, Vol 2 Fasc. 4, 2.
using international legal arguments, writing that Mexico was in need of eradicating the resistance to “the progress of enlightenment and the march of civilisation. The mental emancipation and the cause of civil and commercial liberty encounter […] obstacles, which appear in this moment to be insurmountable”. Mexico could overcome these obstacles through patriotism, Rocafuerte argued.135

International law and the contestation thereof, as well as its applicability to America, shaped definitions of and sentiments of nationalism in both Mexico and Germany. For German officials, Mexico, a country where German interests were weakened by Germany’s political fragmentation, became a place where German national unity became more visible and more necessary. This inspired Prussian officials such as von Gerolt and Seiffart to engage with the idea of a German national representative under Prussian leadership in Mexico. This type of German nationalism, which existed not among liberals – students, professors, and other intellectuals who fought for German unity and democracy in 1848 – but conservatives and particularly Prussians interested in a Prussian-led, monarchical Germany, was shaped by events and currents in peripheral Mexico. International legal struggles stood behind many of the discussions that German officials had regarding German centralisation, from the standardisation of measurements, to customs unions, to national agents, and Germany’s position in Europe and vis-à-vis England and France. Trans-Atlantic trade was also imperative to the conflict between both Prussia and Austria and Prussia and the Hanse Towns: Austria was not a trans-Atlantic power and lacked the economic-commercial incentive for centralisation and unification that Prussia could offer via the Zollverein internally and a German-Prussian agent representing all German interests abroad externally. This gave Prussia an importance in a facet of the development of a

national German identity that Austria, at times dismissive of the trans-Atlantic world, did not possess. In Hanseatic-Prussian relations, trans-Atlantic trade became a subject of constant contestation: Prussian agents sought to bind the Hansa more closely to Prussia by emphasising that Hanseates were heavily dependent upon Prussian representation. On the other hand, Hanseatic independence also benefitted the German Bund’s trade because the Hansa were not part of the Holy Alliance. Moreover, their significance as port cities and merchants abroad, as well as as pioneers in trans-Atlantic affairs and international legal agreements, such as the Texian-Hanseatic treaty, made it difficult for Prussia to pressure the Hanse Towns in the same way as it did with other German states.

Mexico’s relationship to international law is equally interesting. Mexicans often felt like international legal principles did not apply to them in the same manner in which they did to Europeans; rather, they felt disadvantaged by a growing system of international law that was predominantly shaped by European thinkers with European perspectives. Mexicans believed that those who enforced international law – the great powers, and predominantly England – often did so in ways that suited their commercial interests rather than focussing on an objective ‘right’ or justice. This could be seen in Mexican responses to European reclamations, as well as views on Europe’s reaction to France’s blockade in 1838-39 or the independence of Texas. As a result, Mexican observers responded to Europeans using international legal principles in order to highlight that their country should be perceived as an equal in the community of nations. International law was also used by Mexicans to define their nationality. Officials such as Bustamante appealed to his nation using international-legal language, seeking to unify his nation and thus establish Mexico more firmly and favourably on the international stage.
Chapter Six – Under the Wing of the American Eagle or in the Jaws of the British Lion: An Analysis of Anglophobia and Anti-British Sentiment on Both Sides of the Atlantic, and Its Role in the Annexation of Texas to the United States

Economic rivalry was a primary factor in the European recognition of Spanish America and Texas, and economic incentive and the fear of commercial competition became dominant factors in the efforts of restorationist regimes to circumvent legitimist policies. France, Prussia, and the Hanse Towns were all eager to re-establish commercial ties with the Spanish-American states after their breakaway from Spain, fearful of losing crucial and valuable trading advantages to Britain, which emerged as the era’s hegemon. Chapter one has outlined Britain’s economic prowess after the Congress of Vienna and showcased that many European regimes enforced protectionist measures after 1815 in order to save their markets from the flooding of English goods. In Mexico, English-German commercial rivalry had elements of cutthroat competition, and France hoped that its earlier recognition of Texas would give it the economic advantages that England had accrued in some parts of the Americas through their early involvement in and recognition of independent Spanish America. Few conversations regarding competition were held among continental European agents in North America that did not mention England, for the English economy was the one to beat and the most threatening in trans-Atlantic trade. As chapter three has shown moreover, Britain was also the dominant power in the abolitionist movement, and the political, legal, extra-legal and imperial power of British slave trade treaties was

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1 Terrell questioned annexationists’ fervent belief that Texas “must be taken under the protecting wing of the American Eagle or […] inevitably fall into the jaws of the British Lion!”. See: “Speech of Hon. G. W. Terrell, Late Texian Minister to France and England. Delivered at the public dinner, given to him at Galveston on the 2nd October 1845”, Newspaper Excerpt, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 14: Consuls Elliot and Kennedy, Foreign Various & Consular Domestic, January to December 1845, l. 164-166.
recognised by Europeans and Americans alike. Immanuel Wallerstein emphasises Britain’s unique degree of power in his works on world-system analysis, stating that only at most three powers had achieved hegemony over the current world-system centred on capitalism: the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The nineteenth century was the era of British hegemony.

That British power was capable of striking fear in the hearts of American and European statesmen seems clear, as does the fact that English commercial competition vexed both European and American states. What though can be said of outright Anglophobia? The historiography on U.S.-American views on Texas has revealed that U.S. statesmen had been motivated to annex Texas sooner rather than later in part due to intense fears of English influence and interference in Texas. Historians like Sam W. Haynes, William Freehling, Frederick Merk, David Pletcher, and Paul Varg have considered U.S. Anglophobia to varying degrees, and argued that it was one of the arguments used by Southern and Texian pro-annexationists and indeed, one of the reasons for Texas’ annexation.² What this chapter seeks to evaluate, however, is the extent to which Anglophobia on the subject of Texas went beyond that of the United States and Texas: French agents in particular also expressed anti-English views, as did some Germans. As the last chapter has already outlined briefly, some Mexican observers likewise branded Anglo interest in Texas as a mere effort to subjugate that country, even if not necessarily by turning the young republic into a British colony. As a result, Mexicans often viewed England as self-servient and at times expressed contempt for the latter on that account. This chapter will evaluate the degrees of anti-British sentiment among Texians, Mexicans, Germans, and the French regarding Texas and

will also analyse European perceptions of the U.S. hatred for Britain, which amounted to outright Anglophobia. This chapter will also showcase one important aspect of informal imperialism: Even if informal-imperial measures are not actually fruitful, the mere perception of English informal empire in Texas on behalf of other agents was enough to shape lastingly the political landscape and power relations extant in the Texian borderlands. Moreover, the chapter will also analyse British perceptions of U.S. Anglophobia.

Though several works have been done on U.S. Anglophobia, with Haynes’ works representing some of the most thorough efforts, a brief outline of this sentiment will be given regardless, for it serves as context for European perception of U.S. Anglophobia. Haynes has showcased that Anglophobia existed in most parts of and among most political factions in the United States, though predominantly as a tool to advance regional interests. Whereas Northerners acknowledged British power as dangerous to U.S. interests in the North via Canada, Southerners focussed on British abolitionism and British influence in Texas and Mexico.³ Pro-annexationists attributed grand designs and dark schemes to Britain, claiming that the British had used their influence in Mexico to mediate between Texas and that country solely with the intent of advancing British interests and power; that Lord Aberdeen had offered a loan to Texas in exchange for abolition of slavery – an idea that was advanced by some Britons, including Charles Elliot – and that Britain would use its presence in Texas to surround the United States, ultimately leading the latter country to perish commercially. An example of an argument borne of this fear is a pro-annexationist editorial published in The Evening Star in August of 1837, which cited English interest as a reason for the necessity of immediate U.S. action on the matter.

³ Haynes, 117.
of Texas. The editorial showcases how English informal imperialism – be it real or perceived by U.S.-Americans and others – and commerce intertwined in Texas:

If Texas continued to be an independent republic […] we unavoidably throw her into the arms and under the protection of England. Texas says to England, “Bring in your Woollens at a duty of ten per cent. ad valorem, and all your other articles of manufacture at the lowest possible rate: Mexico and the United States have both prohibitory duties; send your manufactures here, and they will soon find their way through Mexico and through the Southern and Western States. Take our Cotton in payment at lower rates than you can obtain it on the Mississippi.” What would become of our Tariff and our manufactures and our revenue laws under this influence? The whole West would be flooded with cheap British goods: England would hold a most commanding and influential position, controlling the mines of Mexico – the trade and commerce of Texas – together with an influence over the Indians on our frontier. That our Eastern manufacturers should take measures to avoid this state of things cannot be doubted, and it only can be avoided by bringing Texas fairly and tranquilly into the Union at once. 4

This excerpt has been given here in almost its full length, because it discusses the benefits of lower trading barriers in Texas, the fear of British power, and the establishment of British influence via informal-imperialist measures centring on commerce. In another instance in Spring of 1837, U.S. representatives were scared that Mexico might try to sell Texas to Britain. In a letter from William D. Jones to John Forsyth, the former announced that Mexican general José Marino Michelena had made a proposal to the Mexican Congress that Texas might be sold to Britain “at the rate of twenty five cents per acre, in order to pay off the British debt”. 5

In another interesting episode of anti-British sentiment, a U.S.-American observer blamed England for the international law violations committed by U.S.-Americans, in this instance, a violation of neutrality. After discussing the disarmament of Texians by U.S. troops, and the refusal to defend them against an oncoming Mexican force, the writer lamented: “but so it goes. England tramples upon Americans with impunity, and we follow its laudable example

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and trample upon other (weaker) nations”. This highlights both the use of Anglophobia as an excuse, explanation, or justification for U.S. expansion and aggression, as well as the deep pervasiveness that Anglophobia had for U.S.-Americans’ identity of self. In his book, Haynes analyses the influence of Anglophobia on U.S. society, culture, politics, expansion, slavery, commerce, and diplomacy in the first half of the nineteenth century, showcasing the deep pervasiveness of anti-English sentiment and its importance to the formation of a U.S.-American identity. One of the key Anglophobes mentioned by scholars who have evaluated this aspect of U.S. history is Andrew Jackson, who highlighted incessantly that the United States needed to annex Texas or fall prey to England. In March 1844, Jackson believed that “the present golden moment to obtain Texas must not be lost, or Texas must, from necessity, be thrown into the arms of England, and be forever lost to the United States!” He feared British interference not merely in Texas, but also in California, which would “cost us oceans of blood, and millions of money, to free us from the evils that may be brought upon us” by the British. Texas would be a “strong iron hoop around our Union, and a bulwark against all foreign invasion and aggression”. Jackson’s dislike for Britain bordered on hysteria, for he believed that there was no act too treacherous or sinister that England would not try to imperil the United States and possibly lead the Union to perish.

One of Mirabeau Lamar’s associates, William Jefferson Jones, lamented that U.S. statesmen “fear another contest with Great Britain” – U.S. interference in Canadian affairs, paired with strong British interests in the Southern part of North America, made W. J. Jones believe that “our [U.S.] government will hardly be able to steer between Sylla [sic] and

6 “Violation of Neutrality”, Civilian and Galveston Gazette, Wednesday, August 23, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 231.
7 Opinions of General Jackson concerning the Annexation of Texas to the United States, No. 1 and No. 2, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 61-62.
Charybdis”. Nevertheless, W. J. Jones identified some possible benefits for Texas: “A war between Great Britain & America would be worth millions to Texas by judicious management on the part of your [Texian] government”. He advised Lamar with the words in medio tutissimus ibis, suggesting that Texas pursue a middle course between English and U.S. influence and interest.⁸ In another letter, Jefferson Jones asserted that “the public mind both here [in the U.S.] & in England is prepared for war”. He emphasised the contribution of slavery as an explosive issue, noting that “the slavery question is a mania in England and the attempt to unite Texas with a view to strengthen that institution will arouse he [sic] English Naion [sic]”.⁹

Among Texians, anti-English sentiment existed as well, particularly among pro-annexationists. Texian Anglophobia was deeply connected to its U.S. cousin, for both the Texian and the Southern-U.S.-American Anglophobias centred on the preservation of slavery. After independence, Texian statesmen pushing for annexation tried to use U.S. Anglophobia to their advantage in negotiations with the United States. After immediate annexation failed, supporters of a Texian accession to the North American Union emphasised the weight that English interest and influence in Texas could potentially hold for the political, commercial, and imperial relations in the North American Southwest. James Pinckney Henderson, Texas’ Acting Secretary of State at the time and a Texian representative who travelled to Europe shortly after independence to acquire a loan for his country, wrote to Memucan Hunt in December of 1836. The latter had just been commissioned as Minister Extraordinary of Texas to the United States, and was supposed to effect the recognition of Texian independence on behalf of Texas’ northern neighbour. Moreover, he was to push for the annexation of Texas to the United States. Henderson focussed particularly on the second point, and told Hunt to emphasise to the U.S. statesmen that the

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⁸ W. J. Jones to M. B. Lamar, January 8, 1838, MLP, Vol. 1, 21-22.
⁹ W. J. Jones to M. B. Lamar, January 10, 1838, MLP, Vol. 1, 23.
United States “would forever and entirely” be precluded “from enjoying any of the benefits resulting in Texas from the richness of her soil, commerce &c &c.” if it did not annex Texas. This disadvantage to the United States would arise because a lack of annexation would force Texas to seek treaties with Europe, especially England. Henderson knew about the heated debates on the imperial and geopolitical contestation between England and the United States, and stated that such a treaty with England would cause “all advantages of commerce wealth and strength” to be “forever lost to the United States and important advantages given to a Power on her Southern border which already confines her on the North”. Henderson labelled Texas’ annexation to the United States as a “national defensive point of view”: “take from the United States these advantages and add them to England or any other power and it would hang like an Incubus upon her prosperity”.10

In an 1844 letter to Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston suggested that he would be in favour of Texas’ annexation to the United States, though he underlined that Texas, if it could establish peaceful relations with its neighbours, was not in need of annexation. Rather, Houston argued, it was the United States that needed Texas, for “the United States cannot, without great hazard to the security of her institutions, exist without Texas. The United States are one of the rival powers of the earth; and from their importance, as well as the peculiarity of their institutions and the extent of their commercial relations, they must expect at no distant day, wars, the object of which will be to prevent their continuance, if possible, as a nation”. With this statement, Houston could only have promoted Jackson’s already-rampant Anglophobia, for he questioned the very existence of the United States after future wars to come. Possessing Texas would be crucial to the United States’ geopolitical success, Houston asserted, but Texas, “has nothing to apprehend

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10 James Pinckney Henderson to Memucan Hunt, December 31, 1836, TLP, 89-95.
for years to come. Other nations would not dread her rivalry; but rather court her friendship for commercial advantage”. Like Henderson had in the 1830s, Houston alleged that Texian independence would lead that republic to become a European commercial hub in North America. With its low tariffs, Texas would become the main place from which Europeans would conquer the commerce of northern Mexico, and U.S.-American manufactures would no longer be competitive. Annexation to the U.S., however, would integrate Texas into the U.S. economy, and thus secure the advantages outlined above “to the American Merchant to the exclusion of the Europeans”. U.S.-American and Texian arguments for Texas’ annexation to the United States showcase that commerce, slavery, and imperial rivalry were deeply interrelated in North America, and statesmen used Anglophobia as a means of manipulating this connection in the United States’ favour.

Beyond fanning U.S. fears of Anglophobia in order to speed up or encourage annexation in the years after independence, Texians’ conviction that annexation was necessary in order to save their state from English interference also grew in the 1840s. Slavery arose here as a primary cause of anti-English hysteria. As early as 1838, Henderson pointed out to Lamar that one of the main reasons for Britain’s delay on the decision whether to recognise Texas or not came from the widespread British opposition to slavery. In an 1843 letter, a Texian observer expressed fears regarding British abolitionist influence in Texas, writing that “if captain Elliott [sic] and the British Abolitionists succeed in making Texas an anti-slavery country, and are allowed to open

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11 Houston to Jackson, February 16, 1844, Letter on Annexation, in the Galveston Civilian, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 162.
12 On the other hand, some Texians were concerned about the extent of U.S. Anglophobia and its potential effect on their country. Anson Jones believed that Anglo-U.S. affairs could influence Texas’ geopolitical situation: he highlighted that Texas should settle its boundary disputes with its neighbouring countries, including not just Mexico, determined for reconquest, but also the United States, as soon as possible before a war break out between Britain and Texas’ northern neighbour. Anson Jones to Barnard E. Bee, March 11, 1839, DBC: Box 2Q432, Barnard E. Bee Papers, Part I.
rendezvous for runaways […] it will be a difficult matter for our planters to keep any slaves”.

The writer identified British interference in Texas as a “danger to our internal tranquillity”, and pointed to “the increased temptation to insurrection, with the probably immense pecuniary losses” as consequences of British abolitionist fervour. An 1843 article from the Civilian and Galveston Gazette detailed the grim future Texas would face if it remained unannexed and fell to British informal empire. “The Duke of Wellington tells us that the consumption of British manufactures depends upon the legislative control of Great Britain – or in other words, that the prosperity of England depends upon the ability of British Parliament to compel other nations to consume her manufactures”; the writer quoted General Duff Green, showcasing the link between U.S. and Texian Anglophobia and observers’ linking of British commerce to British politics and empire. This particular article argued that the English were limited by the low consumption of their manufactures in their colonies. As a result, they would establish themselves in Texas in order to influence that country’s politics, particularly regarding slavery. An abolition of slavery in Texas, the writer asserted, would lead to the abolition of it in the United States, and hence destroy U.S. competitiveness to Britain, which was itself limited by the cessation of slavery in its colonial empire. “England will again through her monopoly of the East India market, be enabled to levy contributions on all other civilized nations”. For U.S. Southerners and Texians, slavery was the predominant issue regarding British interests in Texas, and they connected it to most other issues of the era: commerce, expansion, and liberty.

15 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, Wednesday, November 8, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 310.
In both the United States and in Texas, Anglophobia regarding British interference in Texas was linked strongly to annexationism. Smith of the Texian Congress, for instance, who was in favour of annexation, believed that independence would mean that “in less than three months from this period, we may be annexed to England or any other European power”. Those in favour of Texian independence may have held suspicions against Britain because of its power, but were often ultimately of the impression that Texas could prove itself in a British world. This makes sense, given that Anglophobia and the belief that Britain would subjugate small and weak Texas and abolish slavery there would easily lead to the conclusion that an accession to the United States would protect Texian interests, and hence also worked well even if the concern about British interference was not always authentic but rather a political tool. A pro-independence article from 1843, published in The Citizen, argued that “the reasons advanced by the press of the United States for annexation, are forcible truths”, and suggested that Texas should remain independent because of her valuable assets. In order to avoid becoming “the bone of contention”, Texas could turn to England, for “she only is the great medium through which we can look for obtaining by diplomacy possession of the soil we occupy”. Relations with England would legitimise Texian independence from both the United States and Mexico, and though the writers acknowledged that England “has her motives”, they also believed that these were “in this case reciprocal in their relations, (she wants our staple products, we need her commodities”. Though a fear of British influence was a reality for many Texians, particularly due to the concern that Britain would interfere with slavery in Texas, the fact that Texian nationalists were generally less scared of England and its power suggests that Texian Anglophobia was heavily used as a

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17 Views on Annexation, Newspaper Excerpt from The Citizen, December 30, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 10, l. 164-166. l. 21.
political tool. Given the strong pro-annexationist sentiments of 1836-1837, and again after 1843, Texian Anglophobia also seems to have been most present in the few years following independence and those approaching 1845.

Next to pro-independence newspaper articles and publications, there were also statesmen with positive views on the Republic of Texas and consequently more optimistic views on England. Though Robert Anderson Irion, Texas’ Secretary of State in 1837, did acknowledge that Texas, if not annexed by the United States, would become “an immense cotton and sugar growing nation in intimate connection with England”, he also argued that, in the future, Texas’ relations with the “commercial and manufacturing countries of Europe […] shall have been permanently adjusted on the equitable principles of reciprocal interests”. He did not fear economic dependence on Europe’s industrial powers, writing that they “may have to deplore the loss of that ascendancy in manufacturing and the carrying trade that they now so triumphantly enjoy”. Overall, Irion promoted Euro-Texian relations, noting in late 1838 that Texas’ proposition for annexation to the United States should be withdrawn; this “will have a most favorable effect on our negotiations in Europe”, he argued. Another observer downplayed Europe’s potency, also: Tejano O. de A. Santangelo labelled John Quincy Adams’ ideas that a war of the races could break out in Texas and incite Anglo-French intervention as “chimeras”, suggesting that he did not believe that European influence could impact Texas’ political or commercial independence. As a result, he also believed that U.S. annexation of Texas would not be necessary. Another opponent of annexation, George Whitfield Terrell, asserted that the

18 Robert Anderson Irion to Memucan Hunt, December 31, 1837, TLP, 267-271.
19 Irion to Anson Jones with Enclosure, November 29, 1838, TLP, 314-319.
20 “Petition to the Honorable Congress of the Republic of Texas” by O. de A. Santangelo, April 22, 1838, MLP, Vol. 1, 143-152. Barnard E. Bee had similar hopes: he had confidence in his relations to the British in Mexico, arguing that his positive relationship to the Lizardis, a powerful group in Mexico and the agents of the bondholders in England, as well as his fledging connection to Packenham, would give him and other Texian officials the ability
Anglophobic fear that Texas would be annexed by or at the least dependent on England was “an insult to every independent man in Texas”. The “intrigues of the British Cabinet” and the “unwarrantable interference” inflicted by “that insidious British Cabinet, within the dark recesses of whose secret councils are engendered more than half the evils that afflict mankind” were evaluated by Terrell as a boogieman: “suppose that, in truth, all the sin of this management, intrigue, bribery, falsehood […] should lie at the door of the United States”, Terrell stated in a speech.21 Those opposed to annexation were more likely to view England in a favourable light, and some, such as Terrell, held suspicion regarding U.S. policy in Texas.

What the correspondence and opinions of U.S.-Americans and Texians such as Irion and Houston highlight is that sentiments of fear were not solely limited to the British, though Anglophobia was by far the most pervasive and potent fear toward another country in both the United States and Texas. At times, Anglophobia was connected to the anxiety that Britain might be joined by other European powers in its designs, or that Europe, even if not immediately connected to Britain, might interfere in Texian affairs to U.S. detriment. Andrew Jackson argued that “the whole European world could not, in combination against us, make an impression on our Union” if Texas be annexed, and the “probabilities of future collusion with foreign powers” would be lessened as a result.22 One Texian observer explained that the United States’ preferred course in the Texas matter, i.e. annexation, was singularly beneficial to that country, whilst Texian independence “was most desirable for all parties, except the United States”. The article

22 Opinions of General Jackson concerning the Annexation of Texas to the United States, No. 1 and No. 2, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 61-62.
emphasised in particular France’s and England’s gain from Texas’ independence. Britain’s policy line was also seen as the guiding principle for the remainder of Europe by some. Another article criticised “the astute diplomacy and active intrigue of Europe” and identified those two factors as “the only weak points in our national position – points which, it seems to me, none but enemies can contemplate with satisfaction”. At the same time, this observer seemed to have conflated Britain with Europe, for his subsequent comments concerned themselves solely with the dangers of British influence, writing that there had already been “evidence of a design on the part of Great Britain to interfere directly in the relations of Texas”.24

Though Anglophobia, together with anti-Mexican sentiment, was the primary U.S.-American concern regarding foreign intrusion in Texas, there are instances of U.S. jealousies specifically toward a perceived interference of other European states. Laurent’s article on Belgium’s interests in Texas showcases that the United States pressured Belgium to terminate negotiations with the Texians regarding a loan-colonisation deal, demonstrating that U.S.-Americans saw any European immigration to Texas as an undue influence exercised over what they regarded as their backyard.25 Among Texians, a different stance was taken regarding emigration, largely due to the necessity of peopling the country. As Daingerfield’s correspondence with Rumpff, discussed in prior chapters, has outlined, Texian statesmen believed that they were in dire need of emigration. Texian observers had confidence that most of

23 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, June 24, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 176. The article did focus predominantly on Anglophobia, not Francophobia, however: The writer continues by stating that negative comments were made “by half the papers (in the U.S.) on British interference, English rapacity, and all the old cant phrases which demagogues have used, ever since the American revolution, to keep alive the fires of jealousy and hate between England and the Anglo Saxons of North America, men of the same blood, complexion, language, laws, and religion, and whose high duty should be to march on hand in hand in giving peace, knowledge, liberty, and happiness to the benighted unfortunate, and oppressed of every land, instead of fostering petty jealousies and disputes, and following the movements of each other abroad with suspicion, opposition and animosity”.
24 Civilian and Galveston Gazette, June 24, 1843, TNA: F.O. 75, Texas, Vol. 6, l. 176.
the emigrants arriving were “not the viscious [sic] and idle, or foreign speculators, but mostly men who wish to settle permanently in the country; and while they seek their own, add to the general prosperity”. Barnard E. Bee also suggested optimistically that, shall Texas be met with war with Mexico, “volunteers from all nations will flock to you, Ten thousand Germans, ten thousand French, - give moderate bounties in land, have a good Commissariat, and you need not give a dollar pay during the time they are in service,” demonstrating his confidence in the power Texas held via its land.  

26 Unlike the U.S. perception – which even encouraged U.S. officials to pressure Belgium into rejecting the loan-colonisation deal – Texian views of European immigrants were more favourable. 

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**European Agents’ Awareness of Anglo-American Anglophobia and Jealousies Toward Continental Europe**

Nevertheless, U.S. imperialism and the anxiety toward not just English, but any European influence, were recognised by European observers. As previous chapters have showcased, Prussian minister Christian Rother rejected the Adelsverein’s plea for official support for colonisation schemes in Texas, citing the strength of British and U.S. imperialisms in the region as a primary reason. As soon as Germany would seek to establish its own influence in Texas, Rother argued, Britain and the United States would take steps to push Germany out of the young republic, making it impossible for Germans to establish even the most rudimentary trading connection to Texas.  

28 This demonstrates that Prussia was well-aware of U.S. jealousies regarding foreign influence – even if not British – in North America. The Adelsverein, on the

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26 Bee to Webb, May 24, 1839, DBC: Barnard E. Bee Papers, Part I.
27 “Late from Texas”, in *The Daily Picayune*, March 29, 1839, DBC: Barnard E. Bee Papers, Part I.
other hand, believed that it was worthwhile for German states and the Society to resist U.S. expansionism motivated in part by U.S. jealousy of Europe. The politics of the United States were referred to by Prince von Solms as “rapacious”, and he dismissively labelled U.S.-Americans and the United States as “Yankees, the big ‘go ahead nation’” which sought to export their “adventurers and villains” to Texas. In another report, von Solms expressed awareness of Anglo-American perspectives designed to spur sentiments against him and his German-national project in Texas: Von Solms wrote that Fisher had apparently hired a lawyer and told the latter that von Solms was hostile to U.S.-Americans and that he did not permit Anglo-Americans in his colonies, primarily because von Solms sought to protect German interests only. Fisher identified von Solms as a threat to Anglo-American interests because he was opposed to annexation. This instance demonstrates once more that Germans were cognisant of U.S. jealousies regarding foreign interference. It also shows that U.S. hostility toward Europeans extended beyond the British, even if the British case is perhaps the only one severe enough to be labelled a phobia.

The Hanseates were also aware of U.S. Anglophobia, and considered it as a factor in their negotiations with Texas. Rumpff stated of Daingerfield that “he had told me that his instructions indicate that he should seek to connect [also affiliate or associate, anzuschließen] with the Hanse Towns, for which the people of Texas held a special sympathy as the ancient representatives of true free trade, and that Texas had a more vested interest in an intimate relationship to the Hanse Towns than in the protecting relationships [protegierenden Verbindungen, also: sponsoring relations with Texas as a protégé of] with the greatest monarchies of Europe”. Moreover, as has previously been discussed in Chapter Five, Rumpff was aware of the animosity between England

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30 Prince von Solms’ Eighth Report dated February 8, 1845, DBC: Ethel Hander Geue Papers.

31 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 23, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, ad. 20, l. 69.
and the United States, and believed that a recognition of Texas on behalf of the Hansa would be beneficial for the latter in case a war between the United States and Britain broke out. To a certain extent, Rumpff thus regarded the recognition of Texas as an advantageous way in which the Hansa could avoid commercial repercussions in response to a U.S.-British War and U.S. Anglophobia, because an independent and neutral Texas would continue posing as a haven for German goods. At the same time, Rumpff also knew that Texas’ annexation to the United States was made all the more likely because of Anglophobia: „The ratification on behalf of the Senate“ of a treaty for Texas’ annexation to the Union, wrote Rumpff, „which seemed so impossible to the Colonel Daingerfield, could now perhaps be facilitated through the skillfully [ingeniously] aroused and hence desperate anti-English national sentiment“.

Moreover, the British themselves were aware of the strong presence of Anglophobia among U.S.-Americans. Henry Fox, the English minister to the United States, analysed President John Tyler’s Message to Congress from December 5, 1843, which included excerpts revealing anti-British sentiment. Fox paid particular attention to the passage that discussed “interference on the part of stronger and more powerful nations, which, intent only on advancing their own peculiar views, may sooner or later attempt to bring about a compliance with terms, as the condition of their interposition, alike derogatory to the nations granting them, and detrimental to the interests of the United States”. These ‘peculiar views’ on behalf of foreign powers – predominantly Britain – included those on slavery, yet Fox rejected U.S. accusations of undue interference. “Considering the character of the institution of slavery”, a British abstract on the issue of Texas annexation summarised Fox’ view, “it was a monstrous assumption on the part of the United States that third parties, wholly independent countries, should not be permitted to treat

32 Rumpff to Sieveking, April 17, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 24, l. 76-80.
33 Rumpff to Sieveking, May 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 36, l.136.
with one another for the abolition of slavery within their own territories, for fear that by so doing they might render it more difficult for the people of the United States themselves to maintain in security that inhuman and hateful institution”. Though Fox did not deny that the British sought to use their influence to limit slavery in North America, including in Texas and Mexico (where slavery had already been abolished), he did not see this as a justification for U.S.-American anti-English sentiment.34

At the same time, British policy as instructed by statesmen from London emphasised neutrality and the publication of letters and statements that would show U.S.-American and Texian sceptics of Britain that that country would not intervene unduly in Texas, and that it respected fully the sovereignty of Texas. Aberdeen wrote to Richard Pakenham – by then minister to the United States of America, no longer to the United Mexican States – in 1843,

that as much agitation appeared to have prevailed of late in the United States relative to the designs which Great Britain was supposed to entertain with regard to the Republic of Texas, Her Majesty’s Government deemed it expedient to take measures for stopping at once the misrepresentations which had been circulated, and the errors into which the Government of the United States seemed to have fallen, on the subject of the policy of Great Britain with respect to Texas.

Aberdeen continued that Britain was indeed hoping for an abolition of slavery in and aiming for Mexico’s recognition of Texas, but not to slight the United States. Rather, “the British Government was convinced that the recognition of Texas by Mexico must conduce to the benefit of both of those countries”, Aberdeen argued. As regarded abolitionism, Britain “would do nothing secretly or underhand”.35 Aberdeen fully rejected the idea that Britain desired to

34 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 133, December 13, 1843, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 4-5.
35 Aberdeen to Pakenham, No. 9, December 26, 1843, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 6.
establish “any dominant influence” in Texas. “She only desired to share her influence equally with all other nations”, he wrote of England; “her objects were purely commercial”.

Despite this emphasis, U.S.-Americans would not have felt relieved by Aberdeen’s letter: given the English focus on commerce and abolitionism, and given the significance of slavery to the cotton-growing South, pro-annexationist Southerners regarded the combination of the British economy and abolitionism as threatening. Though Aberdeen denied that Her Majesty’s Government had any intention to cement a dominant influence in Texas, his note that England would “share her influence equally with other nations” seems to suggest that Britain did hope for a certain degree of influence, though one that was similar to those of other states. In consideration of Britain’s strong naval and maritime might, economic and commercial prowess, and political weight, it is unlikely though that such an equal influence – on par with, say, a minor political player such as the Hanse Towns – would have been a reality in Texas. Moreover, as previous chapters and the historiography on the imperialism of free trade and informal empire suggest, Britain’s commercial objects were often connected to her global power. Ultimately, Aberdeen concluded that Pakenham should emphasise that Britain’s efforts for its commerce, and particular for the abolition of slavery, would not “disturb the internal tranquillity” and “prosperity” of the United States.36 At a later date, however, he also instructed Pakenham to make Britain’s dissatisfaction with the prospect of Texas’ annexation “privately known in influential quarters” in the United States.37

36 Letters to Bankhead, No. 11, December 26, 1843 and to Elliot, No. 2m January 3, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 8.
Indeed, Pakenham lamented in April of 1844 that Southern slaveholder and Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, had misinterpreted Aberdeen’s despatches: “far from being interpreted by Mr. Calhoun in a spirit of fairness and good faith”, Pakenham observed, the British note “had been received in a sense quite contrary to either obvious and literal meaning, and that it was even attempted to assign to England, on the ground of her avowed desire for the abolition of slavery, the principal share in the responsibility of the proposed arrangement” of Texas’ annexation.38

Calhoun wrote to Pakenham that the aim for world-wide abolition on behalf of Britain would be achieved in Texas through British influence, particularly diplomacy, and that Texas, even if one supposed that “the influence and exertions of Great Britain” would not be “extended beyond the limits assigned by Lord Aberdeen”, would not be able to resist British desires. Once rid of slavery, Texas would be placed “under the influence and control of Great Britain”, and “from the geographical position of Texas” Britain would have “the most efficient means of effecting in the neighbouring States of this Union, what she [Britain] avows it to be her desire to do in all countries where slavery exists”.39 U.S.-Americans were unwilling to recognise England’s ambition for the abolition of slavery as an issue separate from England’s imperial influence.

In subsequent letters to Pakenham, Elliot, and other statesmen, Aberdeen sought not only to alleviate U.S. concerns regarding British influence: he also defined Anglophobia as a homemade problem of the United States, for the politicians of that country actively spurred anti-British attitudes and spread misinformation. Aberdeen criticised the U.S. policy line in Texas as unnecessarily suspicious of Britain, thus putting the blame for the tense Anglo-U.S. relationship

38 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 36, April 28, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 54-55.
in Texas partially on the United States. “Her Majesty’s Government must attribute the manner in which the President, when adverting to the relations between Texas and Mexico, had thought proper to speak of the probable interference of stronger and more powerful nations intent upon advancing their own peculiar views, by forcing them upon the weaker of the two parties, as the condition of their interposition”. It was clear to Aberdeen that the ‘foreign power’ alluded to was Britain, and that Tyler would voice such unfounded, provoking, and inflaming suspicions had “caused Her Majesty’s Government much surprise and regret”, the Briton wrote.  

Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of the Navy and Calhoun’s predecessor as Secretary of State during Tyler’s administration, alleged that the British government had misinterpreted Tyler’s message, and that his statement applied as much to France and other powerful European states as it did to Britain. The British were not convinced, and commented rather dismissively that “Mr. Upshur spoke like a man who knew that he was defending a bad cause, his defence was accordingly a lame one”.  

Officially, the British decided to drop the matter in order to prevent an endless series of arguments, and received furthermore a note from Texian President Anson Jones, who acknowledged the British statements regarding England’s intent as “satisfactory”.  

Pakenham’s dispute with Calhoun, however, dragged on for longer, though after Calhoun persisted on his point of view, “declaring that he did not consider the remarks contained by Mr. Pakenham’s

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41 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 5m February 27, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 17-18.  
answer to his first note, as a denial of its correctness”, Pakenham decided to terminate correspondence with the Southerner.⁴³

British discontent with the United States focussed on the Southern slaveholding states, which were accurately regarded as the fervent supporters of annexation. Pakenham felt it hardly necessary to explain to Aberdeen that the advocates for Texas’ annexation were Southerners and members of the democratic party, which formed a large share of “that class of persons, and a very numerous class [Pakenham] feared it must be considered in that country, who were always in favour of acquiring or retaining anything worth having, careless of the rightfulness or legality of the title”.⁴⁴ In his conversations with Calhoun on the matter of Texas’ annexation, Pakenham reiterated emphatically that “neither within the compass of his imagination, nor from aught that he had ever heard of the feelings and wishes of Her Majesty’s Government upon the subject, could he discover any process or mode of arrangement by which the annexation of Texas […] could be made agreeable” to Britain. This “important alteration in the territorial distribution of the American Continent” would have political and commercial consequences to England, and thus not permit him to respond to Calhoun’s desire – that England, Mexico, and all other parties with an interest in the Texas Question could be rendered agreeable with the U.S. annexation of Texas – affirmatively. Though Britain had not protested formally yet, Pakenham stated, U.S. proponents of the measure should not mistake this for Britain’s indifference on the matter. In fact, Pakenham emphasised that his government reserved the right “to take […] whatever steps might upon consideration be deemed advisable”, and that he would even be willing to deviate

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⁴³ Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 36, April 28, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 54-56.
from London’s official course should such a protest seem promising, for success would justify this deviation in front of Aberdeen. The overall conduct of the U.S. government was described as being to a certain degree “without regard to fairness or propriety of the proceedings”, and Pakenham acknowledged that a Southern fear of British abolitionism was behind the conduct of men such as Calhoun.

Because the supporters of annexation were Southern, pro-expansionist slaveholders and consequently opponents of abolition, and because their dislike for England was known to English statesmen, a certain degree of anti-U.S. sentiment was also present among Britons. Pakenham stands out here; as a British minister to the United States, familiar with U.S. views on Texas’ annexation and the ways by which the United States hoped to attain it, Pakenham believed that “the progress of the mischief” practiced by the latter country ought to be stopped, for the U.S. government’s intentions were “evil”, as he labelled them. He lamented that Britain would not be able to stand its ground on the matter through formal protest unless supported “by an intimation of more decisive measures of resistance”. What added insult to injury, he argued, was that the most recent effort for the annexation of Texas, brought forth in Spring of 1844 – a “mischievous affair” – had not even arisen “from an honest and deliberate conviction of the expediency and propriety of such an arrangement”. Rather, it had been “an electioneering manoeuvre of Mr. President Tyler”. Calhoun’s conduct left a bad impression on British statesmen, particularly Pakenham, not merely due to his insistence upon British imperial and undue influence, but also

46 Calhoun also rather dismissively received Pakenham’s suggestion that the United States, France, and England could bind themselves to support the independence of Texas “with a smile”, showcasing his determination to see Texas annexed.
47 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 22, April 14, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 42-44.
due to his justification of slavery based on what he asserted was statistical data: Calhoun argued
that the large number of mentally and physically ill free black men was caused by the simple fact
that blacks were not designed for freedom; rather, slavery protected them from themselves and
their low state of civilisation. Though Pakenham’s superficial and disengaged response was met
with a clarification on behalf of Calhoun that his statistical information had not had the intention
to “expound the subject of slavery” and to defend it, no further correspondence between
Pakenham and Calhoun took place thereafter.48 Pakenham concluded that the U.S.-American
conduct on Texas as a whole had been subject to “instances of bad faith and flaring perversion of
facts which were to be found so repeatedly in the correspondence” on the matter, and he hoped
that the United States government “would receive from public opinion in England and elsewhere,
the condemnation which it deserved”.49

Though some British statesmen had a measure of disdain for Southerners and
slaveholders like Calhoun, they hoped that the upcoming U.S. election would end in Henry
Clay’s favour. Clay, an opponent of Texas’ annexation and more favourable towards a gradual
abolition of slavery (despite owning slaves himself), was a member of the Whig party, a party
with more strongholds in the North than the South. Both Pakenham and his French counterpart
Pageot believed that “the Governments of England and France had every thing to gain by the
success of Mr. Clay; and accordingly whatever might in any way unfavourably affect his

48 See: Pakenham to Calhoun, April 19, 1844, and Calhoun to Pakenham, April 27, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum
and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F.
49 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 45, May 13, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating
to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-
1845, 68-70. In May of 1844, Elliot and Pakenham viewed with alarm when the U.S. government ordered a
concentration of its naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico, fearing that this order’s intent was hostile toward England
(though the order did not seem to indicate this). Pakenham thus informed Charles Adam, Commander-in-chief of the
West India Station, of the situation. See: Elliot to Aberdeen, No. 11, May 10, 1844, and Pakenham to Aberdeen, No.
53, May 29, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the
prospects, ought by all means to be avoided”. Because of this, Pakenham suggested that Britain refrain from any interference in the Texas matter or U.S. affairs prior to the election, for he credited non-interference on behalf of France and England as one of the reasons for the rejection of the last treaty on annexation. “Any resistance” to Texas’ accession to the Union “on the part of [England and France], would, Mr. Pakenham thought, have had the very opposite effect to that intended, and would probably have led to the ratification of the Treaty instead of its rejection”.50 This showcases that the British walked a fine line in 1844 Texas: their official policy line advocated for non-interference and no establishment of dominant influence, and the English government did not regard their desire for abolitionism as invasive in either Texian or U.S. affairs, for the abolition of slavery was not pressed upon Texas as a prerequisite for foreign recognition or mediation with Mexico. Nevertheless, British non-interference was politically motivated shortly before a U.S. election with potentially tremendous consequences, and ultimately, the British wanted Texian independence.

Though the British government emphasised continuously that it would not interfere unduly in Texas, it did hope to sway the Texas Question in its favour by encouraging independence. After Tyler’s effort for annexation seemed to have been shot down, Aberdeen suggested in late May of 1844 to Cowley that, since the annexation project “might be hereafter resumed, […] it therefore became desirable that those Governments who were most deeply interested in the independence of Texas, should concert together for the adoption of such measures as might appear to them best suited to defeat any future scheme of annexation, and to secure the permanence of that independence”. What becomes noticeable in Aberdeen’s letter

50 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 76, June 27, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 120 ff.
(and the correspondence by others, such as Elliot or Pakenham) is the vague language used. Though the official British policy emphasised that Britain would not exert a “dominant influence”, it is unclear whether the measures to be adopted to encourage Texian independence would have been informally imperial in nature – the ‘measures’ spoken of were often left in generic terms.\(^{51}\) The only measure that was outlined in detail was that of a joint Franco-British venture to persuade Mexico to recognise Texas as independent, in order to make annexation to the United States less attractive to the latter state. “In case Mexico should agree to take this step”, Aberdeen wrote to Cowley, “an assurance would, as above described, be in that case given to the Mexican Government that Great Britain and France would, on their parts, formally bind themselves to guarantee Texas against falling into the hands of any Foreign Power, and also to secure the boundary of Mexico […] against all future encroachment on the side of Texas”. In order to avoid U.S. accusations of undue British involvement, Britain should invite the U.S. government to follow the Franco-British example.\(^{52}\) Moreover, though concessions would be made to Mexico by Britain and France, Mr. Bankhead, British minister in Mexico, made it clear to the Mexican government that England would provide no support should Mexico attempt a reconquest of Texas.\(^{53}\)

France, as one of Britain’s most prominent commercial, political, and imperial rivals, was also sometimes eyed with suspicion by Texians and U.S.-Americans. Though German


\(^{52}\) Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 162, May 31, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 80-82.

\(^{53}\) Bankhead to Aberdeen, No. 65 and 66, August 29, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 145-146.
emigration was generally well-received by Texian statesmen, one observer expressed concern about the Franco-Texienne Bill, which he viewed as a tool that France could use to pry open the gateway to Texian politics and “afford a pretext for a foreign government to interfere with our domestic institutions”.⁵⁴ James S. Mayfield also disliked the Franco-Texienne Bill for the same reasons, highlighting the dangers that it posed to Texas, a circumstance that Saligny scoffed at for Mayfield had participated in drawing up the bill.⁵⁵ Saligny quoted Mayfield as having denounced the bill as “the result of a plot contrived by His Majesty the King of the French and General Houston through the intermediacy of the French chargé d’affaires designed to deliver up Texas to France, which would make it into a kingdom for one of the King’s sons”.⁵⁶ General Hamilton also believed that the abolition of duties on French wines in early 1840 had been conceded too prematurely; rather, Lamar should have waited with taking this step until Hamilton had completed negotiating for a loan in France. Now that France had a commercial advantage and concession in Texas, Hamilton feared that France would no longer be interested in providing support for Texas. This suggests that Hamilton regarded France, much like England, as a country concerned predominantly with its own benefit, though Texian sentiments toward France did not reach a degree of phobia as they did toward England.⁵⁷ Vice-President Burnet was also criticised several times by Saligny as possessing “secret antipathy for France”, unlike President Lamar, whom Saligny identified as a friend of France and an apt man of French heritage.⁵⁸ Overall, Daingerfield concluded in a letter to Rumpff that the treaty with France had, surprisingly, not

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⁵⁷ Saligny to Dalmatie, May 4, 1840, FLTx, 136-142.  
⁵⁸ Saligny to Thiers, December 5, 1840, FLTx, 175-177.
been very well received in Texas, despite – or perhaps because of – the fact that France had been the first European power to recognise Texas, and its action had thus been “a show of mercy”.  

French-Texian relations were also marked by a measure of disagreement and antipathy, most noteworthily an episode oftentimes called the “Pig War”. Hostilities in 1840 and 1841 were dominated by the disdain for France expressed by Mayfield and his associates, such as Moseley Baker and Mr. Chalmers, and the debate regarding the Franco-Texienne bill. In mid-1841 however, another outlandish affair stood in the foreground of Franco-Texian relations. The pigs of a hotelkeeper, Richard Bullock, had not been properly fenced in and hence roamed around freely. Problems arose when the pigs penetrated Saligny’s stables and his house, including his bedroom. As the pigs started eating his papers, Saligny ordered his servant to shoot them, which motivated an irate Bullock to beat the servant and threaten to do the same to Saligny. This matter became a diplomatic affair for Saligny, who left the country after Bullock did not go punished immediately (the Lamar administration would not punish him without due process of law). Before his departure, the Texian government also called for Saligny’s recall, and listed several accusations by Texian ministers against Saligny as reasons for this desire for his removal from Texas. Besides killing Bullock’s pigs and threatening him, Saligny was also accused of having passed counterfeit money and having refused to pay his hotel bill. Interestingly, some of the other claims brought forth were of undue foreign interference: Saligny was accused of “having insulted the [Texian] government in his correspondence, of having attempted to arouse the citizens against their government, of having tried to have passed in Congress a bill from which

59 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 23, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, ad. 20, l. 69.
he would have derived enormous benefit, of having incited meetings against the government
[…]” 62 Though Guizot hoped that the removal of a few of the key anti-French Texians in the
administration would aid in bettering Franco-Texian relations, Saligny wrote a few months later
that Guizot’s note had not been well received in Texas, and the French diplomat did leave the
country. 63 Nevertheless, French relations with Texas did persist: in 1843, Saligny was
temporarily replaced by Viscount Jules de Cramayel.

Texian and U.S.-American views regarding the French, slightly suspicious yet much
more subtle and less substantial than Anglophobia, were also picked up upon by the British, who
pursued a policy of both alleviating U.S. concerns regarding a joint Franco-British imperial
influence in Texas and using their French counterparts to reject U.S. Anglophobia. British
officials knew that their country’s influence was the main concern of U.S.-Americans, yet they
were also aware that France was at times mentioned as a secondary power and junior partner to
Britain’s supposed ploys in Texas. Thus, Aberdeen wrote to Lord Cowley, stating “that it was
probable that the late message of the President of the United States to Congress had not failed to
attract the attention of the French Government, especially the part […] speaking of the foreign
relations of the Republic”. Cowley was supposed to convene with Guizot regarding the matter to
ascertain that France’s views on U.S. phobia concerning foreign influence were similar to
Britain’s. At the same time, Aberdeen also believed that U.S.-Americans’ fear of French
influence, which was significantly less substantial, could also be used to highlight that U.S.
Anglophobia was unfounded. If Britain and France pursued such similar policies in Texas, and
given that France “would not, any more than […] Britain, look with indifference upon any

62 “Memorandum on the Request by the Government of Texas for the Recall of Mr. de Saligny, French chargé
d’affaires”, FLTx, 251-252.
63 Guizot to Saligny, August 18, 1841, AAE: Texas, Vol. 3, l. 246-247, and Saligny to Guizot, January 10, 1842,
measure by which Texas would cease to exist as a separate and independent State”, the United States’ xenophobia could hardly be justified in concentrating on the British, Aberdeen implied.\textsuperscript{64}

Much like their British counterparts, the French rejected U.S. claims of undue foreign influence, though they did stand by their interests in Texas. The French King highlighted that it was “for the advantage of all maritime States, for France and Great Britain in particular, that the independence of Texas should be maintained and that a barrier should thus be opposed to the encroachments of the United States”. The King feared that U.S. expansionism would not halt with Texas, it would also extend into Mexico, which would seriously harm French interest.\textsuperscript{65} Guizot was also of the opinion that the annexation of Texas to the United States ought to be prevented in the interest of his government. Thus, he contacted M. Pageot, the French minister in Washington, to instruct him in “the same sense in which Lord Aberdeen had written to Mr. Pakenham”. “It would not suit the French Government”, the British abstract summarised Guizot’s stance, “to accept such a change without opposition”, particularly given that the Texian population was split on the issue and that the U.S. interest in annexation was primarily that of slaveholders’.\textsuperscript{66} After James K. Polk’s election and Clay’s loss, Guizot moreover reiterated the importance of the Texas Question to Franco-British interests, and recommended that Britain and France “ought to be strenuously exerted in order to prevent” the planned invasion of Texas by Mexico, “since nothing would be so likely to induce the Texians to throw themselves for

\textsuperscript{64} Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 16, January 12, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{65} Cowley to Aberdeen, No. 31, January 15, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 11.
\textsuperscript{66} Guizot to the Louis-Clair de Beaupoil, the Comte de Ste. Aulaire, January 29, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 12-13. Guizot may have overestimated the Texian opposition to annexation here. For more on this issue, refer to Chapter 7.
protection into the arms of the United States”.

As late as December 1844, French and British statesmen still hoped that Texian annexation could be prevented.

The Franco-British rapprochement on the Texas Question bolstered U.S. concerns about France in response to France’s association with Britain. In summer of 1844, the British and French became aware of an article published in the Richmond Enquirer, which outlined that France had decided to join Britain in an effort to prevent the U.S. annexation of Texas. The relationship between England and France was described as having “an unusual intimacy, and active intercourse of communication” on the matter, and the article also betrayed knowledge of the protest of the French King and excerpts of Aberdeen’s despatches, which the French and British representatives had agreed they should keep secret so as to avoid rousing U.S. fears of foreign intervention. The writers outlined their disappointment with France. That Britain did not desire annexation was clear, but “we had been under the impression” the article stated of France, “that she would rejoice in our prosperity and growth, and would like to see a Power on this continent, fully equal to Great Britain. But it now seems that France, too, thinks we are growing too strong, and would like to cut a pinion of the young eagle’s wing”. Despite this disapproval of France’s actions, the writers did have more positive words for France than for England: whereas the latter was just the disliked former colonial master, the former was described as having extended “the hand of brotherhood” to the United States in its hour of need.

Overall, France’s aid for the thirteen colonies in their struggle against England was mentioned by U.S.-American, Texian, and French statesmen as a demonstration of France’s

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support for newly independent republics in the Americas and opposition to and distinctiveness from England. In conversation with Saligny, Bee stated that “it seems, in truth, that France has been destined by Providence to be the Protectress of the republics of North America. It was France who sustained […] the infant United States in its battle against England and assured the independence of that glorious republic”. 69 Colonel James Love, a confidante of Lamar, also expressed a toast to France and her alliance with Texas. 70 Texian statesmen Isaac Van Zandt, William N. Porter, and Lindsay S. Hagler expressed a similar sentiment, referring to France as the “the great and generous nation which, the first in Europe, had offered her hand to Texas in friendship”. 71 Granted, men like Love, Van Zandt, and Bee of course tried to flatter the representative from “chivalrous and generous France” given Texas’ need for European recognition and its desire for European loans, but the fact that he and several other Texian statesmen referred to France’s support of the United States against England shows that France occupied a position different from England’s in the minds of Texians. Dalmatia also believed that France’s aid in the American Revolution should elevate his country’s standing within Texas: “They will never forget, I hope, that France was the first nation in Europe to recognise their independence, just as, sixty years ago, she had been the first to salute and recognise that of the United States”, he wrote to Saligny. 72

A few months after the publication of the Richmond Enquirer, Calhoun responded to notes from U.S.-American minister at Paris, Mr. King, highlighting his satisfaction with King’s impression that the prior information regarding a Franco-British opposition to annexation was “in all probability, without foundation”. “You were right in making a distinction between the

70 Saligny to Thiers, June 26, 1840, FLTx, 149-153.
71 Saligny to Thiers, November 25, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 317-324.
interests of France and England”, wrote Calhoun, “in reference to Texas […] France cannot possibly have any other than commercial interests […] while it is certain that England looks beyond, to political interests”. France, Calhoun asserted, actually had interests “directly and deeply opposed” to the British scheme, for Britain’s designs in Texas focussed on the abolition of slavery and the establishment of a dominant English influence over Texas.73 France, not heavily engaged in international abolitionism, was not a thorn in the eyes of Southern slaveholders like Britain was.

**FRANCE AND U.S. ANGLOPHOBIA**

England’s desire for a collaboration with France on the matter of Texas raises the question of how U.S. Anglophobia was perceived in France. Before annexation became a threatening issue to European diplomacy in 1844, the French, and Saligny in particular, considered how U.S. Anglophobia could be used to their advantage. Just as Calhoun expressed little concern about French influence in Texas, in part because France did not pursue an abolitionist policy worldwide, Saligny also tried to incentivise Texian relations with France rather than England by emphasising that English politics and diplomacy were dominated by the abolition of slavery, whereas France’s were not. During Lamar’s Presidency of Texas in 1839, Saligny wrote to his government that Lamar’s “antipathy toward England is well known to me”, and that he had outlined the benefits of a Texian relationship with France to both the President and General Hamilton. “I alluded to the attacks of the Tories and the radicals on Texas, the intrigues of the abolitionists, and the opposition of O’Connell, to whom several articles in the

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73 Calhoun to King, August 12, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 183-192.
radical press against Texas are attributed”, Saligny summarised. Only a few weeks later, Saligny reiterated Lamar’s dislike for England and his sympathy toward France, which gave the French agent confidence that the preferential treatment toward France in the Texian timber trade would be put into practice. In another instance, Saligny argued that U.S.-American and Texian suspicions of England and the latter’s possible support of Mexico in the event of war should encourage France to cement its relationship with Texas, for this Anglo-American distrust for England – even if unfounded – would elevate France as the most important European power in Texas. Dalmatia held the same view in October of 1839, instructing Saligny to follow the policy of England toward Texas. He believed that British anti-slavery politics might defer an English recognition of the young republic, enabling France to get a head start in that country. England, Dalmatia claimed, “is already jealous of our recently formed relations with the Texian republic”. In late 1840, Saligny wrote that Abner Lipscomb, Secretary of State in 1840, had “prejudices and hatred for England”, which he expressed “with a frankness bordering on imprudence”. Given such attitudes in the Texian government, Saligny even asserted that he might be able to prevent the ratification of an Anglo-Texian treaty should it serve “too exclusively the interests of England at the expense of France”. The French were also aware of several episodes of tension within the Texian-English relationship, including the Little Penn Affair, Taylor’s introduction of slaves into Texas, and a land dispute. When discussing these events with his government, Saligny often emphasised that

74 O’Connell was a leading English abolitionist. He favoured abolition in Texas to enable fugitive slaves from the United States to seek refuge there. See: Saligny to Molé, March 26, 1839, FLTx, 69-74.
75 Saligny to Molé, April 20, 1839, FLTx, 79-87.
76 Saligny to Dalmatie, June 24, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, 4-21.
78 Saligny to Thiers, October 30, 1840, FLTx, 166-168.

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Texian officials, particularly Lamar, viewed the British with disfavour. Saligny concluded that these tensions between Texas and Britain would elevate France’s status, writing that “the unsatisfactory relationship existing between the cabinets of London and Austin increases the desire of Texas to be on friendly terms with France. She never misses an opportunity to manifest her sympathy and respect for the Government of the King”. Only a few days later, Saligny stated that the Franco-Texian friendship had already born fruit, for Lamar, “employing the authority vested in him by Congress, has abolished all duties on French wines imported directly from France […] it proves, better than all the truly extraordinary marks of respect and gratification constantly extended to me as the chargé d’affaires of the King, the genuineness of their friendship and gratitude toward France”. Saligny furthermore expressed his desire that the

79 Briton John Taylor had introduced black servants into Texas, where they were sold as slaves despite the fact that emancipation had occurred in Barbados. In 1836, John Taylor, a British subject and resident of Barbados, had brought nine black servants to Texas; it had been declared as illegal by the revolutionary council of Texas that any free blacks or mulattos enter the country. Before his arrival in Texas, Taylor had drawn up contracts for his servants and upon arrival in Texas, he transferred them to Texian slaveholders for cash, suggesting that his intent had been to sell his servants. Taylor ultimately denied this claim, alleging instead that he had been forced to take this step because Texas had, at the time, been a warzone. He was also the first to inform the British government of the sale of his servants in Texas upon his return to Barbados, sought support from one of Barbados’ leading abolitionists, and lamented that the Texas affair had ruined his social reputation. In 1840, the British took definitive action in the matter, leading to a certain amount of tension between the Texian and British governments. After one of the Afro-Barbadians, then a slave in Texas, had escaped back to Barbados and accused Taylor of being the sole perpetrator of the scheme, Taylor was arrested. Subsequently, the British sent the brig Pilot to Texas to reclaim the Afro-Barbadians and register a complaint against this violation of human rights. For this episode, see: Ryan Eyford, “Slave-Owner, Missionary, and Colonization Agent: The Transnational Life of John Taylor, 1813-1884”, in Within and Without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History, ed. Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 168-186, 173. Saligny observed that British Lieutenant Hamilton, who carried a letter from the governor of Barbados to the Texian government in order to effect the freedom of the enslaved, was not received by Lamar, for the latter was “far from relaxing his hostile attitude toward England”. Lamar, so Saligny, merely feigned ill health so as to avoid receiving the Briton, despite the fact that Texian statesmen nearly unanimously concurred that this introduction of Afro-Barbadians had been unjust. Lamar did fall ill in late 1840, to the point where the Vice-President Burnet was asked to fulfill presidential duties as Lamar planned a trip to the United States to visit doctors. See: Saligny to Dalmatie, February 9, 1840, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, I. 98-110, and Saligny to Thiers, November 14, 1840, FLTx, 171-172. The latter affair was that of land sold to English emigrants to Texas. A London company had purchased land titles, though upon their arrival in Texas, the emigrants found the titles to be fraudulent and worthless. The situation was resolved when the Texian Congress extended the benefits of a land concessions law that had expired in January of 1839 to September of 1840. Though Lamar had acknowledged that the English families had been ill-treated and had to be compensated, he nevertheless told Saligny that, no matter how hard he tried, he “still cannot like the English”, showcasing once more the President’s dislike for England. Saligny to Dalmatie, February 27, 1840, FLTx, 126 ff.

80 Saligny to Dalmatie, February 12, 1839, FLTx, 124-125.
French government take action to cement its influence in Texas and “put down deep roots in this country” whilst the affections of the people of Texas were in favour of France vis-à-vis England.\(^\text{81}\)

**THE ROLE OF U.S. ANGLOPHOBIA AND FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF BRITAIN’S COMMERCIAL PROWESS IN THE 1844 FRANCO-BRITISH MEDIATION EFFORT BETWEEN MEXICO AND TEXAS**

The fact that France sought to exploit Anglophobia to achieve a better standing in Texas raises the question how the Anglo-French relationship in Texas was impacted by French suspicions of England. Though anti-British sentiments on behalf of statesmen involved in the Texas Question were not comparable to the level of Anglophobia extant among Anglo-Americans, concerns regarding British competition did influence how the French ultimately perceived their joint mediation with England in Mexico. From the beginning of French interest in Texas, English rivalry and the perception that England often acted either predominantly or exclusively for its benefit were important factors in France’s relationship with Britain in Texas, which also motivated the French agents to analyse what advantages France might draw from U.S. and Texian Anglophobia. In Texas, Saligny believed, “England will […] establish her political and commercial predominance”, and a Mr. Cosmao, Commanding Officer of the Sloop the *Sabine*, wrote to the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies in 1841 that “England also has her partisans” in Texas, and that it had been “their influence, probably, that lay behind” the recent anti-French sentiment expressed in the Texian government via individuals such as Mayfield.\(^\text{82}\)

Saligny’s more level-headed replacement, de Cramayel, regarded England’s interests in Texas as more pronounced than France’s, and reported that the British were sure to attribute the mediation

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of an armistice between Mexico and Texas “to [their] influence alone”. De Cramayel, though he believed French involvement in the Texas Question worthwhile, continued that England would “not fail to seek using her good offices in behalf of some selfish financial or political interest” in Texas, signifying a degree of suspicion on his part. Ultimately, French peripheral agents’ fear of England as a commercial rival was augmented by the realisation that England was frequently mentioned by U.S. and Texian presses as the primary European power in Texas: Saligny lamented that France was seldom mentioned by the Texian presses and statesmen, suggesting that the French were considered secondary to the British in Texas. In August of 1844, for example, Saligny summarised an article from the National Vindicator, regretting that France had only found one incidental mention whereas Britain occupied centre stage. The Frenchman continued that “a complete change has taken place in the dispositions of this [Texian] government”, highlighting that France had lost its favourable position to England and the United States.

The opinion of the peripheral French agent was shared by Guizot, who believed that Britain already had the upper hand in Mexico vis-à-vis France, in part due to the latter country’s numerous grievances with Mexico and French intervention during the Pastry War. England, Guizot told Lord Cowley, had large possessions in America whereas France had lost control of her American territories. Consequently, England’s interest in the Texas Question and the

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83 Overall, however, de Cramayel seemed less concerned about undue English interference in Texas, reporting that, though some Texians viewed the proclamation of armistice between Mexico and Texas, issued by Houston in mid-1843 and partially mediated by England, as proof of English involvement based on “an ulterior motive of selfish ambition”, most received the news of armistice “with greatest joy” instead. De Cramayel continued to report on his good relationship with Elliot, with whom he stayed in frequent contact on Texian affairs. De Cramayel to Guizot, June 25, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 315-320. Moreover, he did believe that a joint Franco-British mission to prevent annexation by mediating between Mexico and Texas, thereby receiving concessions from both not to attack the other, would be beneficial to French and British interests. See, for example, Cramayel to Guizot, February 10, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 199 ff.

84 Saligny to Guizot, August 27, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 262-281.
independence of the young republic was greater than that of France. Though Cowley emphasised that Britain and France held interest in Texas, to which Guizot conceded that “Undoubtedly, we will use our best efforts for that purpose (of obtaining from the Mexican Government the acknowledgement of Texas’ independence), and will even refuse to recognize the annexation of Texas to the United States”, Guizot ultimately concluded that “as a question of peace or war, I am not prepared to say that its junction with the American States is of sufficient importance to us to justify our having recourse to arms in order to prevent it”.  

85 Count von Armin, Prussian diplomat at Paris, reported the same back to his government, writing that Guizot “did not see in this affair [the annexation of Texas] a ca\textit{\textsc{casus belli}}, neither vis-à-vis the United States nor vis-à-vis Mexico. He added that France was not an American power like England”, which was the reason why France would not go to the same lengths as England to prevent annexation.  

86 Guizot was willing to join Britain in the endeavour of obtaining Mexico’s recognition of Texas, but only if this did not involve France in war. France’s unwillingness to go to war over the issue dovetailed with Texians’ perception of England as a paper tiger: Consul Kennedy wrote that the Texian annexationists boasted that Britain, “in their prudential anxiety for peace” would not intervene if the annexation of Texas to the United States were to take place.  

87 By December of 1844, Guizot’s policy became even more reticent, and he told the British that “France had not agreed to unite with England in a protest against Annexation”.  


87 Kennedy to Aberdeen, November 12, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 168.  

88 Postscript of Pakenham to Aberdeen, December 12, 1844, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 192.
France was not the only power reluctant to commit to a joint mission that went beyond a mediation with Mexico: Many Englishmen likewise believed that their country should only engage in a mediation, an interesting observation given U.S.-Americans’ fear of the omnipresence and omnipotence of their former parent country. Though Guizot believed England’s interests in Mexico to be greater, even England began to consider in late 1844 whether sustaining Texas’ independence partially to maintain Mexico’s integrity from U.S. encroachment was worth it, given that Aberdeen argued that “there was unfortunately but little in the general conduct of the Mexican Government which could induce Great Britain to risk such a collision for the sake of Mexico alone. In Mexico British subjects had been oppressed, harassed, and maltreated without redress”. Should France withdraw from the effort to maintain Texian independence, the British government did not know whether it would be capable of preventing annexation alone, particularly because U.S. and Texian Anglophobia made a unilateral English action suspicious – it could potentially have an effect opposite of the intent and thus encourage Texas’ annexation to the United States. Aberdeen believed that “any doubt as to the unanimity existing between England and France, with respect to Texas, might have a most injurious influence upon the course of events in that country”, which made it all the more vexing for England that Mr. King had been told by Guizot that France would not interfere in Texas’ annexation should it indeed occur. Pakenham, for one, asserted that King must have misunderstood Guizot, for Pakenham had heard from the Frenchman that France would protest the measure. Though Guizot denied ever having made a claim so absolutely opposed to French

interference in the Texas Question, he was nevertheless uncertain of whether a Franco-British
mediation could bear fruit, in part because he shared the British belief in Mexico’s incompetence
and corruption. In response, Paris was reluctant to join a British declaration on the Texas
Question intended to include Texas and France.91 This declaration spoke of French and British
involvement in Texian-Mexican relations and the endeavour to persuade Mexico into
recognising Texas as independent.92 Though Aberdeen stated as late as January of 1845 that
France and England were of a unanimous opinion in the Texas Question, Guizot seemed a bit
more reluctant, writing to Comte Saint Aulaire that the French insisted that the Franco-British
mediation offer should not include the word ‘guarantor’ because “we […] have feared that its
usage might result in consequences of too indefinite a nature”.93

Though the French were at times suspicious of British designs in Texas, considered
England a commercial rival, and saw begrudgingly that England was considered the *primus inter
pares* among European states in Texas, the 1830s and 1840s were nevertheless a period of
entente between the two powers. Shawcross has shown that the French were either supported by
the British or at the very least not confronted with British opposition in Spanish-American affairs
between 1830 and 1867. Though he concedes that there existed an Anglo-French rivalry and “the
habitual upsurge in anti-British public opinion” in those years, French foreign policy between

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91 Cowley to Aberdeen, No. 28, January 20, 1845, and Guizot to Count Ste. Aulaire, January 17, 1845, in “Texas:
Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United
92 “Draft of proposed Declaration to be made by England, France, and Texas”, in “Texas: Memorandum and
Abstract of Correspondence relating to the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O.
414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-1845, 234-235. See also: Cowley to Aberdeen, No. 41, January 27, 1845 and No. 46, January 31, 1845, in “Texas: Memorandum and Abstract of Correspondence relating to
the Question of the Annexation of Texas to the United States”, TNA: F. O. 414/486: Texas: Annexation, 1843-
1845, 244.
93 See: Aberdeen to Cowley, January 7, 1845, FLTx, 603-605, and Guizot to Saint Aulaire, January 17, 1845, FLTx,
609 ff.
1840 and 1870 “was generally directed by Anglophile statesmen”, and Guizot hoped for an amicable relationship with England. The mediation in Texas does show that Guizot and Aberdeen, despite the former’s reluctance to get his country involved in this project to a point where France could face dire consequences, largely sought unanimity on the issue and aimed to prevent annexation jointly. Shawcross summarises that England and France did not go to war against each other after 1815; any war efforts happened with the other, such as in the Crimea or the Second Opium War. In Spanish America, many interventions were also executed cooperatively, such as the blockade of Buenos Aires, 1845-1847. Shawcross manifests that “this partnership was based on a commonality of interests” even when Britain did not intervene with France and instead merely allowed it: “The position of the British government over French intervention throughout the period was that if France could secure these terms for Britain, then so much the better”.94 This echoes Prussian attitudes in Mexico and showcases the web of empire extant among Europeans in the nineteenth century. Todd also discusses that the French Empire could, during the nineteenth century, even act as an agent of British Empire by furthering the interests of both empires.95 Thus, French attitudes regarding the British in Texas, though sometimes sceptical, cannot be compared to the Anglophobic hysteria raging in the United States.

**GERMANY AND ANGLOPHOBIA**

The German states and actors were even less prone to sentiments of Anglophobia in Texas. The *Adelsverein*, as previous chapters have showcased, was linked to England via its nobles, and von Solms had actively sought out British support for the Society, demonstrating that

the Verein was more Anglophilic than Anglophobic, despite its desires to elevate German
commerce vis-à-vis its British counterpart. Von Solms, rather than favouring an independent
German policy in Texas, suggested that the Verein look to England and France, the European
great powers who could, in his opinion, not allow for Texas’ annexation due to their interests in
that state’s independence. Particularly after Prussia’s rejection of official support for the
Adelsverein, the Society needed to use the international current and resistance to U.S. expansion
represented and brought forth by England: Unlike Mexico, the United States, and France, with
serious imperial ambitions in Texas, the Verein, without official German support, slim financial
resources, a disorganised colonisation effort, problems with fraudulent or worthless grants, a
small base of members and an even smaller base of people at least somewhat competent enough
to put any emigration plans into action, had no basis for Anglophobia. The Verein’s limited
degree of power also meant that it could never have stood up to England, unlike France and the
United States, nation-states that were noteworthy competitors for English interest in Texas.

The same can be said for the Hanse Towns. Though the Hanseatic city-states engaged in
correspondence and negotiations with Texas with the goal of elevating their position in the
German Bund and for German commerce, they nevertheless kept treaty negotiations secret from
the press and from Prussia, which pursued a policy of non-recognition of Texas (and hence also
had no viable reason to be Anglophobic in Texas). In 1844, Rumpff wrote that “to my elation
[relief], the local newspapers have not yet gotten wind of our negotiations with Texas.
Nevertheless, on the 26th [of this month], the Quotidienne has published the copied [written off]
article under the section “Hambourg”:

Quotidienne, Sunday, May 26 1844

Hamburg. There is a lot of talk on the conclusion of a treaty of commerce between Texas
and the Hanse Towns of Hamburg and Bremen. In this moment, where the Zollverein has

just united for a treaty of the same nature with the United States, and where Texas will perhaps enter the territory of the latter state, this new pact in question will not for certain remain without influence in the international affairs of the German states.  

The fact that this French newspaper article was enough to rouse Hanseatic anxieties regarding the publicity of their treaty showcases why Anglophobia was not a dominant factor for the Hanseates in Texas: Though the Hanse Towns were not as powerless as the Verein, they were nevertheless a political and commercial power that played in a rank far inferior to that of England, France, or the United States. Consequently, Anglophobia with the intent of rivalling British power, as was the case for U.S.-American observers, was not a Hanseatic preoccupation. Though Anglophobia did not have to come from a position of power, of course, one can nevertheless argue that Hanseatic officials were not dominated by anti-English sentiment: after all, Hanseatic independence in the Congress of Vienna had been supported by Britain, which meant that Anglophobia was not in the best interest of the Hanse Towns.

Ultimately, a French lack of confidence in their own interests in Texas if those came at the expense of a war, as well as the concern that England might stand to benefit more than France from this engagement, made the French more reluctant to get deeply involved in the British-French mediation effort. But French scepticism was also roused by U.S. Anglophobia. Whereas Saligny had initially hoped that Anglophobia could improve France’s chances of becoming the preferred power in Texas, this opinion had changed by 1843. Because anti-British sentiment played a large role in U.S. plans for Texas’ annexation, U.S. Anglophobia became a

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97 Excerpt from the Quotidienne, Sunday, May 26, 1844, in an excerpt from Rumpff’s report no. 50, May 27, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 37, l. 138.

98 As Kossok determined, the French feared that the English endeavour could precipitate a military engagement on behalf of the French and British; this also explains Guizot’s reluctance regarding the language used in drafts outlining the mediation of both powers. Kossok wrote “Guizot did not have the inclination to rescue the English chestnuts from the American fire with French pliers”. See: Manfred Kossok, “Preußen, Bremen, und die „Texas-Frage“ 1835-1845.“ Bremisches Jahrbuch, Band 49 (1964), 73-104, 81
risk rather than an opportunity for the French. De Cramayel explained in October of 1843 that Texian hysteria regarding a supposed English abolitionist ploy had only been kept alive by newspapers, “on the pretext of accusing the government of connivance with abolitionist schemes or of blaming England as the originator of these intrigues”. Both Texian and U.S.-American newspapers thus advocated for Texas’ incorporation into the Union based on fears of British influence.\textsuperscript{99} In the next weeks, de Cramayel reported frequently of the fact that Anglophobia was utilised to strengthen Texian and U.S.-American interest in annexation, an act that would finally “evict[ing] England from Texas”.\textsuperscript{100} Saligny emphasised that rumours of British interference were highly exaggerated by the Anglophobic presses in Texas and the United States, noting that Britain “is far from harbouring the ambitious designs in Texas attributed to it by certain individuals”.\textsuperscript{101} In another letter, Saligny voiced his frustration with U.S. politicians’ conduct, asserting that the rumours about England were “exploited by President Tyler” and were, “as dishonestly as […] successfully”, used “in trumping up a make-believe scare in the United States and arousing all of the prejudices and hatreds of the Americans in regard to Great Britain”.\textsuperscript{102} Since U.S. Anglophobia drove the project of annexation, hopes that France might benefit from it were gone by 1843.

A fear of the power of U.S. Anglophobia also tampered British efforts to prevent the annexation of Texas. Rumpff, as a Hanseatic observer on the matter, likewise recognised that U.S. Anglophobia, and the general fear of foreign influence, stymied the British and French in their endeavours to maintain Texian independence. Kennedy lamented that British-French mediation, or indeed any project on behalf of European powers to encourage Texian

\textsuperscript{99} De Cramayel to Guizot, October 11, 1843, FLTx, 475-480. 
\textsuperscript{100} De Cramayel to Guizot, November 13, 1843, FLTx, 482 ff. 
\textsuperscript{101} Saligny to Guizot, March 14, 1844, FLTx, 507 ff. 
\textsuperscript{102} Saligny to Guizot, August 27, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 262-281.
independence, would “be dilated into a Scheme of alarming magnitude, calculated to awaken fresh Jealousies in the United States respecting British interference, and to serve as a pretext for those who wish to precipitate a war. Among the excitable population of the North American Confederacy, a small spark may kindle a great flame”.103 Shortly thereafter, Kennedy reiterated his complaints of U.S. Anglophobia. After Clay had declared that the United States would, “prevent, if necessary by an appeal to arms, the Colonizing of Texas by any European Nation”, Kennedy expressed his disdain with the fact that “an excitable people might be brought to believe that the private enterprize of a foreign Agent had originated in the ‘Ambitious designs’ of the Country to which he belonged” through “a very slight exercise of perverted ingenuity”.104 Aberdeen likewise underlined the critical role that Anglophobia played in the question of annexation, manifesting that partisans of Texas’ incorporation showed jealousy at “any sign of interference, or even of interest expressed by a Foreign State against the cause in which they are engaged”. If this jealousy led to hostilities between Mexico and the United States, Texas could not “hope to escape [these hostilities] with her Independence”, Aberdeen argued.105 The Hanseates were aware of the negative influence of Anglophobia on Texian affairs, as well: After another attempt at a U.S. treaty for annexation failed, Rumpff wrote in June of 1844 that this “obviated an Anglo-French protest, which is important insofar as that such protest would, it is my firm belief, lead to the opposite of the desired effect in the United States” and encourage U.S. desires for annexation rather than quelling them.106

103 Kennedy to Aberdeen, June 18, 1844, CBA, 338-342.
104 Kennedy to Addington, September 24, 1844, CBA, 367 ff.
105 Aberdeen to Elliot, January 23, 1845, CBA, 428-433.
106 Excerpt from Report No. 60 by Rumpff, dated June 24, 1844, July 1, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 40, l. 143.
European reactions to U.S. Anglophobia offer revealing perspectives on imperialism in North America at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century. Whilst Britain was perceived and portrayed by U.S.-Americans and Texians as a leviathan that threatened the existence of the United States and desired to dominate the entire North American continent, thus suggesting that the United States faced Britain in a David versus Goliath struggle, the fact that Britain and France, the most formidable imperial powers of Europe, were discouraged from taking decisive action to prevent Texas’ annexation by their fear of inciting U.S. expansionism illustrates that U.S. imperial power in North America was already present and competitive vis-à-vis its French and British counterparts. Though the United States lacked the means to enforce the Monroe Doctrine that had been proclaimed in 1823 in South America, it was more effective in Texas. Given that many Texians were open and favourable to annexation, British and French agents were concerned that too much interference in Texian affairs would encourage the republic’s incorporation into the Union rather than preventing it. As a result, U.S. rejections of European involvement in North America were taken more seriously in Texas. De Cramayel believed it imperative that France contest the Monroe Doctrine in Texas, questioning “should we not make [the Americans] understand that the European powers have not only the right to settle their own affairs among themselves, that the United States consents to let them be without getting involved, but also that at any time that their material or political interests are compromised in affairs in the new world, [they have the right] to get involved with or without the approbation of a nation that has absolutely no right to exercise a monopoly of influence [in the Western hemisphere]?”.\(^{107}\) Texas could serve as an important precedent in this matter and either imbue U.S. claims with legitimacy or discredit them as hollow. Though Cramayel asserted that the U.S. claims with legitimacy or discredit them as hollow. Though Cramayel asserted that the U.S.

“claim to regulate the destiny of the two American continents and their challenge to the overseas empire of Great Britain, can be viewed as nothing more than idle bluster”, he did note that these ideas “constantly crop up everywhere” in response to the topic of Texas’ annexation. The Texas Question thus also popularised U.S. support for the Monroe Doctrine, which was restated in one of Tyler’s speeches.

U.S. Anglophobia and the associated fear of British imperialism, commercial rivalry, and influence in Texas proved to be an effective tool in cementing U.S. imperialism and expansion in North America through the annexation of Texas. Neither the British nor the French were willing to risk war with the United States over the Texas Question, but feared that the latter country would not have the same inhibitions: Kennedy wrote in December of 1844 that he had heard from a reliable source in the United States that Calhoun and his party “would prefer war with England to the non-acquisition of Texas”, and surmised in a subsequent letter that the United States had gotten so invested in the Texas Question that it would not be willing to “bear what might be deemed the humiliation of retreat”. Given Texians’ fickleness regarding annexation, Mexico’s military weakness and instability, the hesitation for unilateral action, and the overall desire to avoid war, the British and French did not seriously challenge Texas’ annexation when it did finally occur. This was a victory for the United States, which found its imperial status strengthened and legitimised in North America. Nevertheless, supporting Texas would have been significantly easier for Britain and France had the former country rejected U.S. proposals of annexation. The issue of Texian nationalism and Europeans’ perceptions thereof will be discussed in the next chapter.

108 Cramayel to Guizot, October 11, 1843, FLTx, 475-479.
109 Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 5, 1844, CBA, 379-385.
On February 19, 1846, the Republic of Texas was no more. It was integrated into the United States of America, without the declaration of war on behalf of any European power. Peace then, was more important to Europeans than the maintenance of an independent Texas. For the Adelsverein, business continued much as usual; in fact, it was able to settle more Germans in the new U.S. state than had been the case in the independent Republic of Texas.¹ Hanseatic correspondence on Texas effectively ceased between 1845 and 1846, and the entire matter was laid to rest. Prussians, who had rejected displaying interest in Texas early on, were not surprised by the annexation of Texas, and even French and British agents, earlier so keen on preventing Texas’ incorporation into the North American Union, adapted to the new situation without much protest. The power most roused by the accession of Texas to the United States was Mexico, which had itself insisted so furiously and feverishly on the reconquest of the territory. Fuelled by anti-U.S. sentiment, by U.S. provocations, and by a northern neighbour whose hunger for war finally got the better of it as Southern, pro-slavery and pro-expansion factions gained power in

¹ Kownslar determines that roughly 40,000 Germans settled in Texas between 1865-1890. Even before the Civil War, there were over 24,000 foreign-born Germans in Texas in 1860, and between October 1845 and April 1846 – when annexation had already been decided – 5,000 Germans arrived in Texas via 36 vessels. See: Allan O. Kownslar, The European Texans (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 110-111. After rescuing Prince von Solms from creditors upon his arrival in Texas in May 1845, John O. Meusebach, the second Commissioner-General of the Adelsverein, oversaw a larger German settlement effort of the Society. In winter of 1845, 4,000 Germans arrived in Texas, though the Society’s dire finances and disorganisation caused much misery among the German population. By the late 1840s, the Society had achieved more stability, and the German immigration project became more successful. See: Rudolph L. Biesele, The History of the German Settlements in Texas, 1831-1861 (Fort Worth: Eakin Press, Reprint 1987), 123-135.
the form of a new President, James K. Polk, Mexico headed towards war. The U.S.-Mexico War, 1846-1848, would leave Mexico bereft of roughly half its territory.²

Thus, the nine-year old Republic of Texas did not fall into the depths of historical meaninglessness, leaving neither traces nor impact. Rather, its existence had tremendous consequences on the imperial relations of the North American continent, and indeed, the world.

What, however, can be said of a nation marked by such comparative ephemerality – in fact, can the Republic of Texas lay claim to the term ‘nation’ at all? Tenets and principles of international law would suggest so. But was the Texian nationality anything more than nominal in nature? Were there truly differences between the identities of Texians and U.S.-Americans? This chapter will analyse this question by evaluating the opinions of European observers in order to determine how important the existence – or absence of – a Texian nationality was to Euro-Texian diplomacy. Though this chapter does engage with Texians’ own views on Texian nationalism, proving or disproving the presence of a uniquely Texian nationality is not its main purpose.

Rather, the chapters aims to showcase that Europeans increasingly expected to encounter nation-states abroad and defined their relations with foreign states in terms of the nation, nation-state, and a distinct nationality assigned to this state. The uncertainty surrounding Texian nationalism confronted Europeans with new challenges to their informal imperial aspirations because of Texians’ identification with the United States, and it brought rise to new international legal questions.

Questions surrounding Texian nationalism – when it existed, who its adherents were, how commonplace it was, and whether it even existed at all – have already been analysed in the scholarship on the Republic of Texas. One of the most-explored epochs in regard to Texian nationalism has been the Lamar administration. It is well-established that Lamar aspired to build up an independent Texas that would possibly expand westward and rival U.S. expansion towards the Pacific.\(^3\) Dorman H. Winfrey has written on Lamar’s Texian nationalism in depth, arguing that the Texian statesman sought to lay “the foundations of a great empire” and expressed his nationalism most presently through his statements “concerning one’s devotion to and the supremacy of the state, the question of annexation, races and nationalities, military policies, a national bank, and national education”.\(^4\) Winfrey also points out that Lamar consistently used the term “Texian” in order to instil national sentiments in his people. Lamar supported the sustained independence of Texas and was opposed to annexation, claiming that Texas was better off if it could control its own Indian affairs, commerce, trade, and treaties.\(^5\) Because of Winfrey’s detailed discussion of Lamar’ nationalism, Lamar will not find significant mention in this chapter. Mark E. Nackman wrote a monograph on Texian nationalism, outlining what he believes to be the tenets and characteristics of Texian nationalism, whereas Andrew F. Lang has focussed on the nationalist legacy of the Republic of Texas, showing that Texans of the 1860s


\(^5\) Winfrey, 188-191.
used their state’s recent independence to justify the secession from the Union. Both of these works will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.

Thus, several scholars have evaluated Texian correspondence with other Texians and U.S.-Americans to answer whether Texian nationalism existed and how it was expressed from the independence period through the Civil War. However, given that Texas laid claim to being a nation on the international playing field, analysing the perceptions that Europeans had of Texas’ nationalism and their responses to Texian statesmen seeking recognition of or treaties for their republic can be useful: Evaluating Texian nationalism from this perspective can offer new insights on how it manifested itself, how it was defined, and how it ultimately impacted the state’s diplomacy with Europe.

“BARELY OUTGROWN ITS DIAPERS”: TEXAS AS A NATION IN A STATE OF INFANCY

Europeans recognised early on that the Republic of Texas was a state in the early stages of development. A French report from 1838 commented that “the country, the society, the state here are in their infancy”, and that “this republic [Texas] had just been born”. As a result, it was faced with all of the “uncertainties which are bound to the destiny of a new people like [they had been] to the weak beginnings of the life of man”. Hanseatic official Vincent Rumpff referred to Texas as a republic that “had barely outgrown its diapers”, illustrating the country’s youth. Texas’ youth was highlighted by Rumpff on several other occasions, albeit with less flowery language. Wurm, whose opinion on Texas is only represented in the Hanseatic correspondence

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7 Note sur le Texas, Direction politique, May 8, 1838, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, 76-95.
8 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 13, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 3 ad. 15, l. 39.
9 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 15, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, ad. 16, l. 41, and Rumpff to Sieveking, May 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 36, l. 136.
through one letter sent to Syndic Karl Sieveking, likewise regarded Texas’ youth as one of the key characteristics of the republic. These anecdotes are not surprising since Texas was indeed a very young state. Given that Anglo-American migration to Texas had also been a fairly recent development, it only seemed natural that Texas’ nationality found itself in its infancy as well. But how did this perception influence European observers?

Though Texas had seceded from Mexico, Europeans were, as previous chapters have shown, not primarily concerned with a Mexican reconquest of the new state, but rather with its incorporation into the United States. This also led them to view Texas, though formerly part of Spanish America, as much more closely affiliated with the United States than with Mexico. Rumpff noted that Texas was “considerably more inclined to follow in the footsteps of the United States rather than those of the South-American states” and that Texians generally “hold some mistrust regarding the treaties that have been negotiated between the South-American republics” and European states. In another instance, he wrote to Sieveking that the Texian government was sure to swallow any treaty stipulations that were also included in the Hanseatic-U.S.-American treaty, referring to the United States as the country “which serves as the sole role model for this young republic”. According to Rumpff, Texas wanted “to follow [the American example] as closely as possible”. Daingerfield encouraged the Hanseatic Ministerresident to perceive Texas as such, for the former had communicated to the latter that it was “the institutions and commerce of the United States of America, with which those of Texas are almost indentical [sic]”. Englishman Kennedy called Texas a country that had been “recently settled”.

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10 Christian Friedrich Wurm to Syndic Karl Sieveking, July 5, 1841, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.
11 Excerpt from a letter by Rumpff, No. 27, February 16, 1844, sub. March 6, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 4, l. 7.
12 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 13, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 3 ad. 15, l. 39.
demonstrating that he did not consider the number of Mexicans (or Native Americans, for that matter) sufficient to refer to Texas as a Mexican settlement – rather, he regarded Texas as a territory that had recently been settled by Anglo-Americans.14

De Cramayel also identified Texas as a successor state of the United States rather than Mexico due to its cultural and national similarities to the likewise Anglo-American United States. De Cramayel travelled to Texas via the United States, and claimed that this journey had permitted him to acquaint himself with the U.S.-American opinion on Texas. U.S.-Americans, reported de Cramayel, saw “the formation of the new republic as the first offspring of a people who, up to the present time, have been generally regarded as in a state of infancy, but that now has donned the toga of virility and in its turn procreates new nations in imitation of their fathers in the Old Country, as Europe is called here”. Rather than viewing Texas as an offspring of Mexico, de Cramayel was first confronted with Texas through the lens of an Anglo-American perspective that highlighted Texians’ national affiliation with the United States.15 Guizot also identified a close bond between the Texian and U.S.-American nations, surmising that the latter would always come to the aid of the former should Mexico seek to invade or threaten it.16 Bourgeois d’Orvanne had similar views, arguing that the U.S. influence in Texas was strong, not due to U.S.-American diplomatic representatives but rather because the “emigrant [to Texas] himself was American […] his parents and friends around him were fellow Americans. The language, the political and social ideas of their native land endured”. American ideas, said d’Orvanne, were predominant in Texas.17

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14 Kennedy to Aberdeen, July 7, 1842, CBA, 88-89.
16 Guizot to de Cramayel, April 21, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, 1, 255-256.
17 Bourgeois d’Orvanne to the Ministry of Commerce, July 4, 1842, FLTx, 344-348.
This inclination towards the United States caused Europeans to question whether there were indeed differences between the emerging Texian nationality and its U.S.-American counterpart. In his 1842 letter to the French minister of commerce, d’Orvanne expressed doubt, arguing that only the U.S.-American divide on slavery had prevented an annexation of Texas to the United States.\textsuperscript{18} One of the largest sceptics was de Cramayel, Saligny’s temporary replacement in 1842 and 1843. In one of his initial impressions of Texas and U.S.-American opinions on the state, de Cramayel reflected that some U.S.-Americans he had met on his way to Texas rejected the idea that Texas had already established a nationality separate from that of the United States by 1842, though they did not exclude – and indeed feared – the possibility that a uniquely Texian nationality might emerge over the years.\textsuperscript{19} Several months later, de Cramayel echoed this impression, arguing that Texians continued to hold a deep attachment to their initial homeland: the United States. He went even further, stating that “The expression ‘Texian people’ is pure fiction. There are no ‘Texians’”.\textsuperscript{20} In another letter, the Frenchman asserted that even Sam Houston had admitted that Texas’ revolution and independence had come too early, i.e. at a time when the Texian people were still an “undisciplined rabble” and “incapable of governing themselves”. De Cramayel continued that the Texian population was essentially made up of citizens from the United States, which meant that Texians, “the citizens of the United States which now compose the population of Texas, can not be considered as a separate and distinct people. In colonising Texas and in rising against Mexico they have always had one and only one goal in view, which is that of seizing a province of their neighbours, the Mexicans, and adding it to their fatherland”.\textsuperscript{21} In subsequent letters, he repeated this view, writing that the population of

\textsuperscript{18} Bourgeois d’Orvanne to the Ministry of Commerce, July 4, 1842, FLT\textsuperscript{x}, 344-348.
\textsuperscript{19} De Cramayel to Guizot, December 23, 1842, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 108-112.
\textsuperscript{20} De Cramayel to Guizot, February 10, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 199-210.
\textsuperscript{21} De Cramayel to Guizot, June 9, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 281-300.
Texas was “made up entirely of Anglo-Americans who have been in this region ten years at most and who exercise their rights of citizenship in both countries, it is difficult to determine to which they belong”.22 In addition to seeing Texians as U.S.-Americans, de Cramayel thus also rejected that either the Mexican population of Texas – the Tejanos – or the Native population could lay claim to a distinct Texian nationality.

**Texian Nationalism and the Prospect of Annexation**

Because of this absence of a Texian nationality, de Cramayel manifested that independence had come against the Texians’ wishes, making independence a state that the diplomat labelled “unnatural” for this country.23 As a result, the diplomat lamented, the Texians always turned to one theme in “moments of distress – annexation to the United States”.24 Texas’ independence the Frenchman identified as being in the interest of Europe alone.25 Several Texians were moreover “willing to be used as instruments” in the intrigues of Murphy, the American chargé d’affaires in Texas, who was strongly in favour of annexation. This de Cramayel attributed to Texians’ “national sympathies” for the United States.26 This was despite the fact that Murphy was, according to the Viscount, a catastrophe: the French agent had so much contempt for Murphy that he referred to the U.S.-American as “mentally deranged”, not least due to his boastful claims that the United States would send troops to Texas to effect a military occupation of the country.27 The entire conduct of the United States de Cramayel reduced to “an intrigue” based on false principles, and the stance of Mexico was not much better: the Frenchman had very little faith in Anglo-French efforts to attain a Mexican recognition of

22 De Cramayel to Guizot, August 22, 1843, FLTx, 461-464.
23 De Cramayel to Guizot, June 9, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 281-300.
24 De Cramayel to Guizot, FLTx, 406-408.
26 De Cramayel to Guizot, October 11, 1843, FLTx, 475-480.
27 De Cramayel to Guizot, November 13, 1843, FLTx, 482-486.
Texas. One of the only people the Viscount was willing to mention in a light that was more positive for France was Houston, whom he described in early 1844 as silent on the matter of annexation and overall reserved towards the United States. Unfortunately for Europe, this attitude was limited to Houston according to the diplomat: “the opinion of the immense majority of the population of Texas, to which one can only give the name Texians with great difficulty, is American by heart and birth and aspires only to be reunited with their fatherland”, de Cramayel wrote to Guizot. Shortly after this letter, de Cramayel left Texas.

De Cramayel was thus rather pessimistic about Texas’ future as an independent state. Did the views of Saligny, the predominant French agent in Texas and considerably more flamboyant and optimistic than Cramayel, differ significantly from his counterpart’s? Indeed, in March of 1839, Saligny was more confident in the independence of Texas, claiming that Houston had become unpopular in Texas in part because he pursued the project of annexation so stubbornly, “a project opposed by a majority of the people” of Texas. Saligny’s impression of Texas was coloured by the subsequent election of Lamar, whose Texian nationalism – and indeed, imperialism given his hopes for westward expansion – are well-known in the literature on the Republic of Texas. In the same months, Saligny moreover expressed his confidence that the Texian people had realised that an accession to the United States was contrary to their interests, and that Hamilton, despite his earlier advocacy for annexation, had changed his mind and become supportive of Texian independence. Nevertheless, Saligny’s correspondence gave few examples of what a Texian nationalism might entail beyond Texians’ economic interests: Saligny

28 De Cramayel to Guizot, December 16, 1843, 488-490.
29 De Cramayel to Guizot, January 12, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 4-8.
30 Interestingly, de Cramayel criticised Lamar for much the same things in 1842-43 that Saligny had criticised Houston for in 1839. See: Saligny to Molé, March 16, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 1, l. 292-304, 300.
31 Saligny to Molé, March 26, 1839, FLTx, 69-74.
acknowledged that many Texians were recent U.S.-American arrivals and wrote on another occasion in 1839 that the question of Texas’ annexation to the United States was “irrevocably resolved” in favour of Texian independence due to the strength of U.S. abolitionism.\textsuperscript{32} This, however, is not a sign of Texian nationalism either, but rather an external factor. Nevertheless, based on Saligny’s early reports, the Duc de Dalmatie concluded that Texian independence seemed fairly assured.\textsuperscript{33}

After his physical recovery from the illness that had forced him to return to France in 1842, Saligny returned to Texas in early 1844. Immediately, he was confronted with a situation different from the one he had left behind. Though the Pig War affair had caused Saligny to lock horns with parts of the Texian government, causing him to claim at one point that “Texas could not presume to consider itself an independent state and establish friendly relations with other nations if it did not have both the desire and the means to fulfill the obligations” of a nation, he continued to label Texas as a “nation” nonetheless.\textsuperscript{34} But by 1844, annexation overwhelmingly dominated Texian politics. “The newspapers in Texas”, reported Saligny, “continue to be preoccupied exclusively by annexation”. Optimistically, the Frenchman asserted that “the repugnance of General Houston for annexation has not diminished”, and he thus hoped that the project of annexation would fail as it had before.\textsuperscript{35} Yet less than two months later, the diplomat acknowledged that his confidence might have been misplaced: “On my arrival here I was at first little moved by the host of rumours making the rounds in the United States and Texas of the impending incorporation of Texas in the American confederation”, stated Saligny, “however, the

\textsuperscript{32} Saligny to Dalmatia, June 24, 1839, FLTx, 95-103, and Saligny to Thiers, May 17, 1840, FLTx, 142-144.
\textsuperscript{33} Instructions by Dalmatie to Saligny, October 16, 1839, AAE: Texas, Vol. 2, l. 69-70.
\textsuperscript{34} Saligny to Guizot, March 1, 1841, FLTx, 209-212. See also: Saligny to Guizot, November 2, 1841, FLTx, 265-266.
\textsuperscript{35} Saligny to Guizot, February 6, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 23-25.
organs of Mr. Tyler have dwelled incessantly on this theme and with a tone of assurance have represented the treaty of annexation as already signed by Messrs. Upshur and Van Zandt”.

According to the Frenchman’s sources, Houston had also begun to consider an incorporation of Texas into the United States more seriously. Though Saligny continued to hope that annexation would not take place, his hope was not based on his faith in any sort of Texian nationality but rather U.S. abolitionism. In the same letter, Saligny spoke of a “planter from Alabama” who owned property in Texas and who was a proponent of annexation.36 Such anecdotes, together with other accounts of the large number of settlers in Texas who had only arrived from the United States less than a decade ago, showcase that many Texians held fairly little patriotic sentiment for Texas, viewing themselves rather as U.S.-Americans in a country that would soon join the Union.

In subsequent months, Saligny shared with his government summaries and newspaper excerpts on the annexation affair, though he was unable to provide much conclusive analysis of the situation, admitting that there circulated many rumours on the issue and that he was not quite sure what was going on. He assumed that Houston was in disfavour of annexation, though he knew little that was concrete.37 On April 30, 1844, the French diplomat manifested that General Terrell, Attorney General of Texas, was a staunch opponent of the scheme of annexation, and that, “in spite of what certain individuals would have us believe”, many Texians were likewise opposed to the measure.38 Saligny’s optimism notwithstanding, one of his subsequent letters tells a different story: in a meeting in Galveston, Houston was exposed to a storm of slurs and insults directed against his person, and when he made an effort to leave, men barred his passage with

36 Saligny to Guizot, March 3, 1844, FL.Tx, 502-506.
37 See Saligny’s correspondence with Guizot from March through April 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7.
38 Saligny to Guizot, April 30, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 105 ff.
pistols and knives.\textsuperscript{39} Besides Houston, whom Saligny identified again and again as a proponent of an independent Texas, the Frenchman also pointed to Anson Jones, a candidate for the Texian presidency of whom it was said in Texas that he was likewise in favour of independence.\textsuperscript{40} Just shortly thereafter however, Saligny questioned Jones’ sincerity, having heard of rumours that attributed to him a “two-faced policy” and that he was secretly making deals with annexationists.\textsuperscript{41} Saligny’s return to a confidence in Jones’ interest in the maintenance of Texian independence just another few weeks later shows that the French representative had little conclusive evidence on the matter of Texas’ annexation.\textsuperscript{42} His hopes that Texas could remain independent stemmed largely from his desire to promulgate French interests, and concentrated predominantly on Texian political actors: In early 1845, he disclosed to his government that, although he spoke again of a “Texian nationality” and noted that a party in favour of annexation was growing among the Texian populace, he did not have “explicit confidence in the dispositions of the population” of Texas on the matter of Texian independence.\textsuperscript{43}

British officials’ views on Texas were not much more optimistic regarding the development of a Texian nationality than their French counterparts’. Kennedy also commented on the fact that most settlers were U.S.-Americans, particularly Southerners, and told Elliot that many Texian settlers did not desire European immigration.\textsuperscript{44} “The inhabitants of Texas wanted emigrants like themselves – and no others – Men speaking their own language, and subject to their own Customs and laws”, Kennedy reported, showcasing that most Texian settlers still identified strongly with a U.S. (Southern) nationality, a circumstance that they were unwilling to

\textsuperscript{39} Saligny to Guizot, May 20, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 150-156.
\textsuperscript{40} Saligny to Guizot, November 17, 1844, FLTx, 582-585.
\textsuperscript{41} Saligny to Guizot, November 23, 1844, FLTx, 585-590.
\textsuperscript{42} Saligny to Guizot, December 27, 1844, and January 3, 1845, FLTx, 599-602.
\textsuperscript{43} Saligny to Guizot, March 13, 1845, FLTx, 630-635.
\textsuperscript{44} Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 10, 1842, CBA, 51 ff.
see changed through the influx of Europeans. Kennedy thus also viewed the Europeans of Texas as separate from the majority of Anglo-American Texian settlers, referring to them as “the European residents” rather than seeing them as Texian nationals. These Europeans were heavily opposed to annexation, located in Galveston, and held mercantile interest in the Republic.

Much like de Cramayel, Elliot pointed out that the United States was likely to fear the emergence of a confident and independent Texas, for this new country could challenge U.S. access to westward expansion. In another similarity to his French counterpart, Elliot found it difficult to distinguish between Texian and U.S.-American nationals, struggling in one instance to determine whether General Green, who spoke boastfully of a protection of “Our Western and North Western frontier” from British interference, regarded Texas as already a part of the United States or whether he had become a Texian citizen.

Elliot and Kennedy struggled in much the same way as Saligny in determining which information on the annexation project was reliable and true. Unlike Saligny, Kennedy spoke in June of 1844 that Houston was now in favour of annexation, though much like Saligny, Kennedy was unsure of how to process the information for it was based on a rumour and the professions of Houston’s close friends. Kennedy acknowledged that it was difficult to discern both the accuracy of certain statements as well as the reasons for their publication at a given time. Frustrated, Kennedy established that “political finesse is as well understood and as unscrupulously practised in this unfledged Republic, as in the hoary despotisms of remotest Asia”.

Elliot was possibly the more optimistic of the two British agents, for he hoped until

45 Kennedy to Elliot, June 5, 1843, CBA, 202-204.
46 Kennedy to Elliot, May 6, 1844, CBA, 321-323.
47 Elliot to Pakenham, April 14, 1843, CBA, 172-178.
48 Elliot to Aberdeen, January 2, 1845, P.S. January 15, 1845, CBA, 408-410.
49 Kennedy to Aberdeen, May 31, 1844, CBA, 333-335.
50 Kennedy to Aberdeen, August 14, 1844, CBA, 354-355.
early 1846 that the will of the Texian people was actually one for independence rather than annexation. In February of 1845, he wrote to Aberdeen that the pro-independence movement in Texas was growing, and a week later, he sent to Aberdeen excerpts of Texian newspapers to support his claim that the press of that country was “leaning against Annexation”. In April of that year, Kennedy shared less positive news, summarising the statements of several pro-annexationist newspapers in Texas. Nevertheless, in December of 1845, Elliot reported once more that the number of Texian anti-annexationists was growing, leading him to hope that they might gain in influence in Texas. Even after the resolution to annex Texas passed both Houses and was approved by the President, Elliot continued to believe that opposition to annexation was growing in Texas, alleging thatTexians had not had a “freedom of choice” on the matter, and that “two thirds of the people abstained from voting at all, or voted against Annexation”.

Though the two Britons wished to see Texas remain independent, neither one offered any evidence of an emerging Texian nationality. Elliot, his claim that Texian anti-annexationists were becoming more powerful notwithstanding, could not determine on what grounds a Texian nationalism might be taking shape in pro-independence circles. Aberdeen engaged with the idea of Texian nationalism more firmly, however, and concluded, despite the fact that he referred to Texas as a “Texian Nation” in some of his instructions, that a real Texian national identity did not exist. Opposition to annexation, Aberdeen told Cowley, was tied more to the disadvantageous terms of Texas’ incorporation outlined by the U.S. Congress rather than an earnest desire for independence due to national differences. “Little dependance [sic] could be

51 Elliot to Aberdeen, February 8, 1845, Elliot to Aberdeen, February 15, 1845, and Elliot to Aberdeen, February 22, 1845, CBA, 442-449.
52 Kennedy to Aberdeen, April 25, 1845, CBA, 479-481.
53 Elliot to Aberdeen, December 14, 1845, CBA, 566-567.
54 Elliot to Aberdeen, January 20, 1846, CBA, 585-589.
55 Aberdeen to Elliot, July 1, 1842, CBA, 78-80.
placed on the steadiness of the disposition on the part of the Texian people to maintain their independance [sic] against the United States”, wrote Aberdeen, “it is in fact pretty obvious that the present disgust evinced by that people arises more from the disadvantageous nature of the terms offered to them by the United States than from any high national feeling”.56

The Germans involved with Texas were likewise conflicted on the question of a Texian nationality. Von Rönne’s analysis of the U.S. reclamations against Mexico that concerned Texas is one interesting aspect of this debate, for it opened up the possibility for perceiving Texians as either representatives of a faction of the Mexican national will or of an entirely new national will, i.e. that of a new nation.57 Many German statesmen had differing views. Von Gerolt, being the Prussian chargé in Mexico, often adopted language more agreeable to the Mexican authorities in his correspondence with them, referring to the Texians as “insurgent colonists in the Department of Texas” as late as 1841.58 In accounts to his government, however, von Gerolt sometimes labelled the Texians “North Americans”, a name often used in German correspondence to designate U.S.-Americans.59 T. Bahre, Prussian merchant, regarded Texas as a U.S. expansionary scheme as early as 1839, and thus surmised that the United States would try to resist English colonisation efforts in Texas.60

Though Daingerfield claimed that von Rönne had told him that Prussia would recognise Texas at once if the latter’s independence were guaranteed, the Prussian correspondence of von Humboldt, Schmitz, von Rother, and Bremian merchant Delius shows that the outcome of

56 Aberdeen to Cowley, April 5, 1845, AAE: Texas, Vol. 9, I. 69-76.
57 See chapter five.
independence was overall not perceived as likely enough to make official relations with Texas worthwhile.\textsuperscript{61} This suggests that if the Prussians recognised the existence of a Texian ‘nation’ or national identity, they were skeptical that it would survive. Indeed, most reports from Prussian diplomats in London and Paris – this correspondence forms the bulk of the Acta concernant les affaires du Texas located in the Prussian Privy Archives – deal with Texas as a prospective new state of the North American Union, a project that England and France were seeking to prevent. Within these letters, Prussian representative at London, von Bunsen, declared that “Lord Aberdeen had for a long time now foreseen the case of a suicide of the Texian government of slavers and vagabonds [du gouvernement négrier et vagabond du Texas]. Last year, he had offered to me the discussion on the admissibility of such a suicide according to the principles of international law”. Von Bunsen reported that it had been said that there had been erected in Texas a government opposed to annexation, which had elicited much noise from the Texian chargé d’affaires in London, who declared to Aberdeen that Texas “was determined [fut résolu] to maintain its independence […] this noise”, decided von Bunsen, “is entirely a falsehood”.\textsuperscript{62} In another letter, von Bunsen pondered the question whether a nation was permitted to commit suicide, concluding that Texas must be a country incapable of governing itself if it was willing to take such a step.\textsuperscript{63} These impressions by von Bunsen illustrate a Prussian scepticism toward Texian independence.

The Hanseatic perspective on Texian nationalism as the foundation of Texas’ independence was not much more optimistic than that of Prussian statesmen, as Delius’

\textsuperscript{61} Daingerfield to Terrell, February 5, 1845, DCTx, 1521-1523.
testimony already suggests. Much like his fellow diplomat Rumpff, Bremian Consul Klaener, though he had appealed for a Hanseatic consular post at Galveston, guessed that a U.S.-American jealousy of England would increase the likelihood of a U.S. offer of annexation, which Texas, “following the wish of its population” would probably agree to.\footnote{Extract from the Senate Protocoll, January 10, S. 9: Klaener, Consul to Galveston, letter of November 21, No. 1065, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.} In another letter, the Bremian consul underlined the clear ties between Texas and the United States, stating that the latter country assumed a relationship of a Bürgschaft (pledge, sponsorship, guarantee) for the former.\footnote{Klaener to Smidt, October 25, 1843, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.} The Hanseatic representative also drew attention to Houston’s postulation that the Texian Congress had thus far not prioritised the Hanseatic-Texian treaty due to the assumption of that Congress that Texas was to be annexed soon and that negotiations with the Hanse Towns were thus moot.\footnote{Klaener to Smidt, April 20, 1844, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.} Klaener, being situated in Texas unlike other Hanseatic representatives, had more knowledge on the disposition of the Texian population, and his opinion on this matter is thus likely to have caused further hesitation among Hanseatic officials seeking to furnish a treaty with Texas. Even the Adelsverein, according to consul Fehrmann, approached the governments of France and Britain to ascertain that Texas’ independence was likely a permanent one.\footnote{Fehrmann to the Senate, November 20, 1855, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.} Overall, Rumpff may have summarised Hanseatic interests in Texas best when he said that, even if Texas became incorporated into the United States eventually, having completed a Hanseatic-Texian treaty prior to that event would benefit the Hanseates because they could use this treaty as advantageous precedent for future trans-Atlantic negotiations. As Rumpff said: “fiat experimentum in corpore vili” – let the experiment be performed on a worthless body.\footnote{Rumpff to Sieveking, March 23, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, ad. 20, l. 69.}
Thus, Europeans were largely uncertain whether Texas did indeed have a nationality distinct from that of the United States, particularly the U.S. South. This overwhelming similarity between Texians and U.S. Southerners heightened Europeans’ fears of Texas’ annexation to the Union. Texian statesmen sought to alleviate this European anxiety by confirming emphatically their desire for maintaining their independent nation. Daingerfield told Rumpff in 1844 that he viewed the incorporation of Texas into the United States as “entirely impossible”, a stance that Rumpff evaluated as “natural” for a representative of such a young nation. Nevertheless, he surmised that Daingerfield’s assurance “seems indeed to be his innermost conviction”. Nevertheless, Rumpff commented only shortly thereafter that annexation, despite the fact “that it had seemed unlikely to Colonel Daingerfield” now appeared quite likely, in part due to anti-English sentiment in the United States. De Cramayel’s observations also raise doubts regarding the sincerity of Daingerfield’s Texian nationalism: before the Colonel had gone to Europe in 1844, he had also gone to the United States in 1843. Though his official business was to secure a loan, de Cramayel concluded after a lengthy conversation with Daingerfield that the latter was “actually going to the United States to seek once more the active protection of the North Americans and, as a last resort, to join the Union by means of annexation if they would consent”.

**TEXIAN DIPLOMATS’ FORMULATIONS OF TEXIAN NATIONALISM**

Though Daingerfield had already received his appointment to Europe at that time and the predominant reason for his travel via the United States was not the pursuance of annexation but rather the delivery of the commercial treaty between Texas and its northern neighbour to Van

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69 Rumpff to Sieveking, March 13, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 3 ad. 15, l. 39.
70 Rumpff to Sieveking, May 18, 1844, StA HH: Cl. VI no 16m, Vol 2, 36, l. 136.
71 De Cramayel to Guizot, February 5, 1843, FLTx, 406-408.
Zandt, de Cramayel’s statement does highlight that Daingerfield’s claim to Rumpff of the “impossibility of annexation” was exaggerated. Daingerfield knew of the political currents extant on the matter in Texas as well as the European awareness thereof, as evidenced by his letter to Anson Jones in September of 1843, where he noted that the United States was the country “with which […] we are closely identified in the European mind”. In Spring of 1844, the Texian chargé in Europe penned once more that the Hanseatic-Texian treaty “encountered many delays, and latterly, the doubt which existed as to the annexation of Texas to the United States occasioned great hesitation and at one period threatened to suspend the negotiation altogether”. As a result, he highlighted to Rumpff that, though Texas was indeed culturally and politically affiliated with the United States, his country was strongly in favour of independence. Nevertheless, in correspondence with Jones, Daingerfield implied that Texians were of an “American character”, which meant that Rumpff’s knowledge of the United States (and the character of its people) facilitated his understanding of Texas.

Daingerfield’s views on a Texian nationality are summarised best in a letter to Jones dated July 28, 1844, in which he concluded in response to the pending application for annexation, to which several Texians had raised objections, that

we must treat affairs as we find them actually existing, that diplomats must deal with facts and not with probabilities much less possibilities. That in this light the nationality of Texas must be viewed, and consequently its actual and existing capacity to enter into negotiations must be considered. That annexation can only be considered as a possibility or if you please, a probability of greater or less intensity, or more or less remote. But still only a probability. That there is not a Government in Europe which may not possibly or even probably change its form – and that within a space of time more brief than that required for annexation. And yet that no one would think of raising this

72 See: Jones to Daingerfield, January 20, 1843, DCTx, 1534-1535.
73 Daingerfield to Jones, September 25, 1843, DCTx, 1548-1553.
74 Daingerfield to Jones, April 20, 1844, DCTx, 1557-1560.
75 See, again: Daingerfield to Jones, April 20, 1844, DCTx, 1557-1560.
possibility or probability as an objection to the formation of merely commercial treaties on the footing of perfect reciprocity.\textsuperscript{76}

Daingerfield defended the existence of a Texian nationality by emphasising that many nationalities of the nineteenth century were transient. At a time when many Spanish American states were barely a quarter century old, when Belgium had barely received the recognition of its independence from the Netherlands through the Treaty of London five years prior, and when many German states feared for their independence in the German Confederation, Daingerfield’s point of view seems reasonable. Though he did express profound interest in the maintenance of Texian independence in his letters from the Hague, he did strive to serve his country, Texas, by seeking earnestly the ratification of the Hanseatic-Texian treaty. In early 1845, Daingerfield had been informed by Ashbel Smith that General Terrell was refused his nomination as Texian representative in Europe, and that it would be best if he likewise returned to Texas in the event of annexation.\textsuperscript{77} In response, Daingerfield wrote to Smith in July of 1845 that, even as annexation seemed likely, he “was guided by the opinion that with me it was a paramount duty to maintain unqualifiedly the separate nationality of our country up to the moment when I was informed officially that that nationality had ceased to exist; of the correctness of this determination I am fully satisfied”.\textsuperscript{78}

Much like the Colonel, General Terrell was cognisant of the suspicion among Europeans that Texas was merely an extension of the United States waiting for its official consummation, a circumstance that Terrell much disdained. In a letter to George Villiers, 4\textsuperscript{th} Earl of and Lord Clarendon, the General complained about the way in which the House of Lords had discussed Texas as merely an appendage of the United States. Terrell quoted the reference that he had

\textsuperscript{76} Daingerfield to Jones, July 28, 1844, DCTx, 1570-1573.
\textsuperscript{77} Smith to Daingerfield, February 13, 1845, DCTx, 1576-1577.
\textsuperscript{78} Daingerfield to Smith, July 1, 1845, DCTx, 1579-1581.
found most objectionable; a parliamentary representative had announced “which may at no distant time endanger the peaceful relations of the U States with our country, by affording to the restless and encroaching people of Texas an opportunity of gratifying their tastes for establishing a boundary quarrel, and thus creating a cause of war with Mexico which must be viewed with interest in this country”. In response, the Texian commented that “this statement does so much injustice to the people of Texas that, as the representative of that Republic […] I feel myself called upon to vindicate them from an imputation so unjust and injurious; and to place your Lordship in possession of facts which will enable you to appreciate more correctly the true character of the people of that country”. Terrell continued that Texas “has been so much the subject of misrepresentation, and is consequently so much misunderstood abroad”, underlining his awareness that Texians were often perceived by European sceptics as U.S.-Americans in-the-making.79

Less impartial and practical than Daingerfield, Terrell was one of the Texian statesmen most staunchly in favour of his country’s independence. Even as annexation seemed likely in 1845, Terrell expressed confidence in the existence of a Texian nationality, arguing that Texas could “still be saved” because it was not up to the United States whether Texas be annexed or not: “to the people alone, and to no one else, belongs the right to abdicate its nationality and to dispose of its territory in favour of another nation”, Terrell told Saligny. If the Texian nation did indeed disappear, it would not have been a result of the wish of the people, Terrell claimed, but rather a result of the ambitions of a handful of “mercenaries and corrupt speculators”.80

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79 Terrell to Clarendon, May 5, 1845, DCTx, 1186-1189. Clarendon subsequently rejected Terrell’s interpretation of his statement, explaining that he had been referring to the Texians in a prospective sense: they would engage in a boundary dispute with Mexico should they decide to become part of the United States. See: Clarendon to Terrell, May 10, 1845, DCTx, 1192-1193.
80 Saligny to Guizot, April 30, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 105-110.
another occasion, Terrell referred to speculators’ yearning for annexation, in hopes that their land would increase tremendously in value, as “a mere chimera of the wild brain; a mere ignis fatuus of the disordered immaginations [sic]”. In the same letter to Daingerfield, Terrell wrote that he hoped “that a better fate awaits [Texas], and pray to that God who controls the destinies of Nations in his infinite mercy to avert such a calamity, for I should look upon its consummation as the death knell of the prosperity of Texas”. Terrell argued that Texas had established its own nationality, and surmised pessimistically what was to come if annexation took place:

It would prove a very poor encouragement to you and myself and the few others who with us have borne the burden and heat of the day, who have laboured and toiled for Texas, without any prospect or hope of reward other than the good of the country, to know that this beautiful country now of such high promise was shortly to be merged within the national limits of another – and that all the sacrifices of her Patriotic Sons, all the glories of her revolution, all the achievements of her gallant Sons on the battle field yea the splendid hallo [sic] which encircles the heights of San Jacinto itself were doomed so soon to droop and wither and fade and that Texas itself was destined to fill about half a Page in the work of some future Gibbon of America, and in a few more ages to be entirely lost in the mouldering ruins of extinguished nations and swept from the recollections of mankind forever.81

Events such as the Texian Revolution and the events at San Jacinto made Texas unique and distinguished the republic from the United States. Terrell assumed that Texas would not play a large role on the international stage once it ceased to be independent, and hence rejected incorporation into the United States. In another letter to Smith, Terrell compared the U.S. offer of annexation to the Stamp Act, which had symbolised the thirteen colonies’ patriotism and desire for independence, asserting that Texians would see annexation, once it was offered by the United States, as similarly objectionable and that they would fight for their independence and for principle.82 For Terrell, the sacrifices he and others had made defined Texas’ nationality and the Texian nation, which became meaningful for him. In another letter to Daingerfield, he declared

81 Terrell to Daingerfield, January 21, 1845, DCTx, 1173-1175.
82 Terrell to Smith, May 9, 1845, DCTx, 1190-1992.
that he “shall go to the stake with as much resignation as old Polycarp did for his religion”, and would accept “political martyrdom for [his] opposition to the doctrine of national annihilation”. Nevertheless, as Terrell unfortunately highlighted, only a select few had made such sacrifices – many settlers in Texas retained a U.S. Southern identity, having taken part neither in the Texian Revolution nor in any of the republic’s other initial struggles. Terrell admitted again in another letter that “there were few” Texians that clearly rejected annexation. Even many statesmen were sceptical towards Terrell precisely due to his strong feelings for independence: In early 1845, Smith told Terrell that the Texian Senate had refused his nomination as chargé to England because of his opposition to annexation.

Ashbel Smith, one of the predominant Texian representatives in Europe, sought to convey in Europe an image of a stable and gladly-independent Texas, writing to Aberdeen and Guizot that “Texas enjoying stable institutions at home, has been and continues to be rapidly increasing in population and all the elements of strength […] The policy and the wishes of Texas are for peace. She expects and desires to become an important Nation”. Shortly thereafter, Smith reported that he had “the satisfaction to state that frequent evidences are presented that our country and institutions are rapidly becoming more highly and more justly appreciated both in England and on the Continent”. In early 1843, Smith moreover emphasised to Jones that he had persuaded the British government that Texas’ annexation to the United States was “extremely improbable”, surmising that the incorporation of Texas would “endanger the existence of [the U.S.-American] Union” and thus prevented this measure from taking place.

83 Terrell to Daingerfield, March 22, 1845, DCTx, 1183-1184.
84 Terrell to Smith, February 13, 1845, DCTx, 1177-1181.
85 Smith to Terrell, DCTx, 1177.
86 Smith to Guizot and Aberdeen. In this case: Smith to Guizot – Copy, August 15, 1842, DCTx, 1387-1388.
87 Smith to Jones, November 30, 1842, DCTx, 1399-1403.
88 Smith to Jones, January 28, 1845, DCTx, 1415-1417.
Like Daingerfield, Terrell, and other Texian diplomats, Smith knew that Texas’ reputation abroad could be improved if the annexation matter were taken off the table. “Our national character it must be confessed does not stand high in Europe”, the Texian wrote. Because of events such as the failed Santa Fe mission and negative press in Texas, Europeans’ confidence “in our ample ability to maintain independence” had been diminished.89 Because Europeans were sceptical, Smith regarded it as imperative that Texas be represented abroad by very able diplomats, asserting that “the credit of Texas abroad is greatly influenced by the personal character and local consideration of persons exercising its consular functions”.90 Initially, Smith received the news of renewed annexation proposals in early 1844 negatively, lamenting that “the resolutions [sic] in favor of annexation produces rather an unfavorable impression relative to our country; they are regarded as an expression of our inability to take care of ourselves”.91 Smith surmised that Texians’ desire for annexation came almost exclusively from their fear of renewed hostilities with Mexico, not an earnest longing to join the U.S.-American Union.92 Nevertheless, when the resolution for annexation was approved in 1845, Smith did not resist this step as Terrell, viewing things rather pragmatically in much the same way as Daingerfield had done.

Houston, as one of the republic’s key statesmen, communicated to both British and French agents that Texians would prefer independence if Texas could only achieve security. In a letter to Elliot, Houston asserted that 90 percent of Texians were in favour of annexation solely for the reason that it would finally give Texas peace and protection from Mexican attacks. Annexationist sentiment could easily be curbed if England mediated between Texas and Mexico.

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89 Smith to Jones, March 31, 1843, DCTx, 1427-1430.
90 Smith to Jones, August 31, 1842, DCTx, 1385-1387.
91 Smith to Jones, February 26, 1844, P.S. February 29, DCTx, 1479-1482.
92 Smith to Jones, June 2, 1844, DCTx, 1485-1488.
and thus brought peace to Texas through that measure, Houston argued, writing to Elliot that “upon this point of our National existence I feel well satisfied that England has the power to rule!” Houston combined English desires for Texian independence with a Texian desire for foreign recognition and support by suggesting that England could effectively decide over Texas’ fate and maintain the latter’s independence through an intervention in Texian-Mexican affairs.93

In response, Elliot told Pakenham that he believed that Houston was indeed “anxious to secure the Independence of the Country”.94 In another letter, Houston assured Elliot that Texas had, despite proclamations of U.S.-Americans to the contrary, a separate nationality, founded on “her enterprise, daring, sufferings and privations. The blood of her martyrs has been sufficient to give cement to the foundation of a great nation”. Thus, Houston started to outline on what grounds Texas had a separate identity from that of the United States, but suggested once more to Elliot that this nationality could only be maintained if England mediated between Texas and Mexico.95

Several Europeans noticed that Texian affirmations of sustained independence were not always reliable. Rumpff’s views on Daingerfield’s optimism have already been outlined, but there were other European agents who were unsure of how to receive and evaluate Texian pronunciations of reassurance. Cramayel expressed his doubts on several occasions, believing that several Texian statesmen promoted the incorporation of their state into the United States behind the scenes: In March of 1843, Cramayel suspected that an intrigue was taking shape in Washington D.C., where Texans Isaac Van Zandt and James Hamilton, together with U.S. statesmen, were searching for a legal means of Texas’ annexation to its northern neighbour that would circumvent the U.S. Senate, whose consent for this endeavour pro-annexationists had

93 Houston to Elliot: Extract from a private letter dated January 24, 1843, CBA, 163-164.
94 Elliot to Pakenham, April 14, 1843, CBA, 172-178.
95 Houston to Elliot, May 13, 1843, CBA, 208-213.
already been refused several times before. By claiming that Texas had been a part of the Louisiana Purchase, the Senate’s approval would not be necessary, for it could be argued that Texas had been part of the United States all along and that its status as a state of Mexico (and previously, a territory of New Spain) had been faulty for over four decades. Cramayel viewed this complot with disdain, and given his belief that Hamilton and Van Zandt were involved in this scheme, one can infer that he doubted their sincere interest in an independent Texas.96

Saligny moreover stressed that he perceived Smith to be inclined towards annexation despite the latter’s insistence that annexation seemed unlikely, writing that Smith “does not conceal his preferences for annexation were it probable or even possible”.97 Saligny also outlined a discussion he had had with Houston that left the Frenchman with the impression that the Texian had characteristics that were not quite trustworthy: When Houston manifested that he was largely in favour of independence and believed in the Texian people’s choice, arguing that “neither the executive power nor Congress had the right to alienate our nationality. That right belongs to the people alone”, Saligny expressed doubt, informing Houston of the U.S.-American press’ claims that Houston was in favour of annexation and had done everything that the Texian executive could do to encourage that measure. Houston emphatically rejected this allegation, going as far as to say that even those of his friends that spoke of his commitment to the U.S. government were mistaken. In response, Saligny described the president as “extremely circumspect” and as exhibiting both a “feline prudence and a shrewdness that sometimes amounts to wiliness and trickery”.98 Klaener shared to a certain extent Saligny’s impression, writing to the Hanse Towns that Houston’s strategy was one of trickery, for “it seems to have

97 Saligny to Guizot, February 7, 1845, FLTx, 618-619.
98 Saligny to Guizot, May 17, 1844, FLTx, 527-536.
been the policy [Politik] of Houston to seemingly deliver the fate of Texas into the hands of England in order to achieve the influence of the United States, that is why the relationship [of Texas] with that country [England] is such a friendly one”.

Overall, Texian officials spoke fairly little of their countrymen’s nationality, and many believed that they could work towards annexation whilst using European diplomatic relations for their benefit. Secretary of State Ebenezer Allen, for instance, was a supporter of annexation, showing himself pleased with the Texian people’s decision to accede to the United States. In a letter to Smith, he spoke of the people’s “unanimity and cordiality” on the issue, “adopted in accordance with plain and satisfactory indications of the national desire – measures presenting an unobjectionable mode for the free and effectual expression of the People”. Writing to Kaufman, Allen asserted that Texas’ diplomatic ventures had never been in opposition to the project of annexation; rather, they had been an endeavour to obtain peace with Mexico and that country’s recognition that it had lost Texas. Prior to his election as president, Jones likewise announced that Texas should pursue a speedy peace settlement with Mexico, for annexation, a “desirable” event, could still take place afterwards. Van Zandt’s replacement as chargé in the United States, Charles H. Raymond, was instructed in February of 1845 to “use [his] most strenuous exertions in every proper manner to accomplish the annexation of Texas to the American Union – a measure earnestly desired by this [Texian] Government”. In March of 1845, Raymond consequently wrote that he had regarded it as one of his primary duties to achieve Texas’ incorporation into the United States, showcasing that the Texian diplomatic effort

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99 Klaener to Smidt, November 21, 1843, StA HB: Acta C. 26: Texas.
100 Allen to Smith, May 10, 1845, DCTx, 1193-1196.
101 Allen to Kaufman, July 10, 1845, DCTx, Part II, 382-386.
102 Jones to van Zandt, December 13, 1843, DCTx, Part II, 232-235.
103 Smith to Raymond, February 11, 1845, DCTx, Part II, 358-359.
in the United States was seen by several statesmen in the light of Texas’ accession to the Union rather than as a means by which Texas could build its international credibility.\(^{104}\)

What much of the correspondence between Texians and Europeans showcases is that Texians strove to use European diplomats as political tools to improve Texas’ position, be it to achieve peace with Mexico, improve Texas’ financial stability, garner immigration, or incite U.S. jealousies. But the correspondence also unveils another important aspect of Texian nationalism: both European and Texian statesmen believed that it was up to Europeans to take action to sustain Texian independence. This makes Texian independence different from Spanish American or U.S.-American independence: whereas the latter maintained their independence on their own, Texas seemed to need incentives in order to be convinced to remain its own nation.\(^{105}\)

Whereas Europeans struggled to implement informal-imperial strategies in Mexico in part due to patriotism on behalf of Mexico’s citizens and officials, both of which resisted European commercial penetration and maintained suspicion toward foreign influence, Europeans faced the opposite problem in Texas: there, they encountered a population that identified so strongly with a foreign party that it considered surrendering its country’s independence in favour of annexation to the other party – in Texas’ case, the United States. Kennedy asserted that “the tendency of Texas is towards annexation with the […] [U.S.-American] Union, unless she is sustained by the friendly offices of England”.\(^{106}\) This belief can be seen among many of the statesmen under consideration: Prussian von Bunsen and Count Armin reported repeatedly on the uncertain state of Texian independence, which could only be saved through Franco-British action.

\(^{104}\) Raymond to Smith, March 31, 1845, DCTx, Part II, 367-369.

\(^{105}\) This does not refer to the actual revolutions, where e.g. the thirteen colonies did have help from France, but rather to the maintenance of independence after it had been established. Neither Spanish America nor the United States sought independence in order to annex themselves to another state.

\(^{106}\) Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 12, 1842, CBA, 53-55, and Kennedy to Aberdeen, January 28, 1842, CBA, 55-57.
Elliot manifested that U.S.-Americans believed that “the influx of foreign Capital and principles to this Republic from other parts of the world, particularly from England, would pretty rapidly modify present sympathies. Men, they think, would soon begin to feel Texian, as well as to call themselves, Texians”.107 Aberdeen outlined Britain’s official policy as one designed to improve the chances of Texian independence as much as possible through British mediation with Mexico without raising U.S. fears of British interference.108 De Cramayel had recognised early on during his stay in Texas that Texians acted as if they had only two options, either an independence bolstered through European mediation with Mexico and loans to stabilise Texas’ dire financial situation, or annexation.109 Saligny reported the same several months later, citing Terrell as having asserted that Texas could stay independent only if Britain and France united to form a counterweight to the intrigues of the U.S. and Texian governments.110 Texians like Houston strove to encourage the perception that European action was needed to sustain Texas’ independence; Houston wrote to Elliot that annexation to the United States could never take place if Texian independence were recognised by Mexico through the influence of England.111 Nevertheless, Britons and Frenchmen, as last chapter has shown, were hesitant to fully engage in such tremendous interference in Texas due to fears that doing so would only spur U.S. xenophobia in regard to Texas.112

Neither the majority of Texians nor Europeans were thus confident in the maintenance of Texian independence through a Texian nationalism. Rather, most statesmen believed that European interference was essential to encourage Texians to remain independent. This sets

107 Elliot to Pakenham, April 14, 1843, CBA, 172-178.
108 Aberdeen to Elliot, December 31, 1844, CBA, 404-407.
109 De Cramayel to Guizot, February 5, 1843, FLTx, 406-408.
110 Saligny to Guizot, April 30, 1844 and May 6, 1844, AAE: Texas, Vol. 7, l. 105-110 and 118-121.
111 Houston to Elliot, May 13, 1843, CBA, 208-213.
112 See also: Kennedy to Aberdeen, June 18, 1844, CBA, 338-342.
Texas apart from Spanish American states, which did not need European assistance to remain independent. What is more, several European agents considered countries like Mexico as difficult to control, because Mexico was intent on exercising its sovereignty and disinclined to bow to a foreign power, whereas Texas proved resistant to informal-imperial ambitions because of its readiness to surrender its sovereignty to the United States. Given the European resignation that Mexico could not reconquer the territory, preventing U.S. aggrandisement became a primary concern for Europeans in the Texas Question. Even Prussian diplomats, though they did not view Texas as vital to their state’s interests, regarded the annexation of Texas to the United States as one of the less favourable outcomes of this issue. Ultimately, European agents were torn between stabilising the Republic of Texas through immigration, loans, and commerce on the one hand, and fearing that their efforts would be for naught due to Texas’ annexation to the United States on the other. This struggle stymied European action. At the centre of this struggle was thus a lack of confidence in the maintenance of Texas’ own nationality.

Lang and Nackman have both discussed a uniquely Texian – or Texan – nationalism. Interestingly, both tie this nationalism to the Confederacy of the 1860s, arguing that Texans were inspired by their state’s earlier history in the decision to secede from the Union at the beginning of the Civil War. Nackman in particular asserts that a Texian nationalism emerged through the independence years and cites several factors as having shaped this national identity: the attacks, plundering, and raids of Native Americans and the defence against them; the fear of Mexican reconquest and redefinition of a Mexican territory as Anglo-American; an attachment to land; the martyrdom of several of their leaders; a romantic sense of adventure; and the feeling that Texas was an escape for those who had hit rock-bottom; all shaped Texians’ nationalism. Much like
Winfrey, Nackman also focusses heavily on the Lamar administration. As several critics, including Stanley E. Siegel, Alwyn Barr, or Billy D. Ledbetter have pointed out, however, Nackman does not adequately show how these factors were unique to Texas or indeed applied to all Texians in a significant measure. Barr suggests that Nackman’s characteristics of a Texian seem much like those of many U.S. frontiersmen, whereas Siegel notes that Nackman exaggerates some of his conclusions.

**THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS AND THE DIVISION OF THE U.S.-AMERICAN NATIONALITY**

Rather than seeing the Texian identity that developed in the Lone Star Republic as uniquely Texian, one could identify the Republic of Texas as an engine that sped up the divisiveness between a Northern and Southern U.S.-American nationalism. European observers identified in Texas a culture defined by expansionism and a desire for land; a feeling of racial superiority vis-à-vis Africans, Native Americans, and Mexicans; an adventurer cult; and the presence of slavery. These are many of the aspects Nackman regards as fundamental to Texians’ identity. Rather than viewing these characteristics as solely Texian, Europeans instead regarded them as Anglo-American in general and sometimes as found in the South in particular. In his letters, Elliot spoke of the Anglo-American “races” and their tendency to “fight with any people for profits sake”. Kennedy also wrote the U.S.-Americans were “a people so shrewd, so land-loving and so anticipatory”. The Briton saw these characteristics as transcending party lines and regional differences, stating that “whatever professions may be put forth by American Statesmen

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115 Elliot to Pakenham, April 14, 1843, CBA, 172-178.
of the East, or the West, the North, or the South, it ought not to be forgotten that, for forty years, the heads of each party have laboured in turn to extend the South-Western flank of the Republic towards the Rio Grande”.

Aberdeen likewise viewed U.S.-Americans’ land-grabbing nature and their subsequent desire for Texas’ annexation as partly national, yet also borne from party differences and being used for party purposes. Though the “National vanity of all the States” of the Union would be satisfied by Texas’ annexation, Aberdeen saw this as an issue related to the “peculiar interests of the South”.

Kennedy also reported that U.S. newspapers had proposed the replacement of U.S. chargé d’affaires to Texas, Howard, with a Barton of Lousiana, a man opposed to English abolitionism and a representative of Southern interests. This shows that Kennedy was not unaware of the fact that Southerners in particular pushed for annexation.

Elliot moreover seems to have viewed the Anglo-Americans living in slave states in the South as much more objectionable than their counterparts from free states: the latter he viewed as “orderly people that come to work for their bread in peace”, whereas the former “idle[d] away their time in the hope of profitable adventure in Mexico” and brought slavery with them to Texas. Elliot hoped that Texas would finally make a determined stance towards sustained independence and “place Itself in a really independent attitude, as respected the S. W. [South-Western] States of America, instead of one advanced post of aggression against Mexico, which it will continue to be till Mexico has the sound wisdom to sever the tie that connects Texas with those States”. The British chargé also expressed his hope that the U.S. government would reject “any attempt of the S. W. States to force on a War with

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116 Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 23, 1844, CBA, 364-367.
117 Aberdeen to Elliot, December 31, 1844, CBA, 404-407.
118 Kennedy to Aberdeen, September 23, 1844, CBA, 364-367.
Mexico”, and that the U.S. would recognise that the expansion of slavery “in a S. W. direction” would not be beneficial to the interests of the Union.119

Sometimes, correspondence with Texians increased these perceptions. Houston spoke to Elliot of a division between the “Yankees” of the North, supplying the Union with manufactures, and the South, which supplied raw materials and was home to slavery, and the West, interested in increased trading routes. Houston also identified a party divide on the matter.120 In another letter to Elliot, Houston asserted that “the Continent of North America is regarded by the people of the U. States as their birth-right”, and that Texas would threaten this U.S. scheme of expanding across the entire continent. The related fear of British interference in Texas Houston believed to be a Southern one.121 Kennedy reported that General Hamilton, a Texian who had also travelled to Europe to obtain recognition of Texas as an independent republic, was “a follower of Mr Calhoun’s” and staunchly in favour of annexation. General Hamilton identified himself with Southern interests, and sought, in a letter to Webster, to showcase why even the North would benefit from an annexation of Texas. In another display of ties between U.S. South and the Texians, Kennedy summarised that the “Polk party, or rather the Jackson party, are in the ascendant here [in Texas], as well as in the United States”.122 The divisiveness of U.S. Northerners and Southerners on the matter of Texas, and many Texians’ allegiance to the South caused Elliot to surmise that in “this strange Scheme”, i.e. the entire Texas affair in U.S. politics, there may have been “some speculation of preparing for the disruption of the South from the North in the United States, and ultimately for the Establishment of a great Confederacy extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the possession of the Californias”. This scheme

119 Elliot to Doyle, October 10, 1843, CBA, 268-270.
120 Houston to Elliot: Extract from a private letter dated January 24, 1843, CBA, 163-164.
121 Houston to Elliot, May 13, 1843, CBA, 208-213.
122 Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 5, 1844, CBA, 379-385.
Elliot associated with anti-Mexican and anti-Indian sentiment, both characteristics that defined Anglo-Texians’ identity.\textsuperscript{123} Aberdeen also underlined that Texas independence would benefit the national unity of the United States and prevent the excitation of “discord in the bosom of that great Country”. British interests, he argued, “require that the United States should remain peaceful and united amongst themselves”, but expansionism jeopardised this national unity.\textsuperscript{124}

Elliot, indeed, said that he feared what was becoming of the United States, manifesting that negative attributes were beginning to dominate that country’s identity. Slavery was one such subject, and one that was related to annexation. Moreover, the Texas Question was “founded on mixed feelings of ill will and envy against Great Britain, and a rapacious spirit against Mexico”. Such sentiment he identified as “a dangerous purpose against the integrity of the present Union”, and contrasted it with the U.S. nationality of the Founding Fathers:

The Fathers of the United States when they imagined, and shaped the Scheme of society under which that people live, and might live so flourishing and respected, knew that it could only subsist by the maintenance and improvement of the great and good qualities of the race from which they sprung. There was no hatred, no malice, or uncharitableness in their hearts towards Great Britain, or any Country […] They knew well, indeed, what would follow from the prevalence of envy, and aggression, and cupidity, and dishonest fulfilment of engagements, and political intrigue, and the vulgar devices of Electioneering knavery, and the postponement of the claims of the great and the good to the clamour of demagogues […] Watchful observars in the United States and elsewhere, must remark with anxiety that the race of their great Statesman [sic] is rapidly passing away, and their influence is almost gone, that men of incomparably meaner dimensions are taking their places, and that there are other painful evidences of the grave truth that whilst elements of durable power and happiness are of slow growth in Nations […] the decay of lights, and virtue, and the spirit of compromise is fearfully rapid.\textsuperscript{125}

Elliot saw that the spirit of expansionism and the support of slavery led to a formation of a less agreeable nationality in the United States, and the annexation of Texas was central to this development. The British chargé reiterated this belief after annexation had been decided,

\textsuperscript{123} Aberdeen to Elliot, December 31, 1844, CBA, 404-407.
\textsuperscript{124} Aberdeen to Elliot, July 3, 1845, CBA, 508-510.
\textsuperscript{125} Elliot to Aberdeen, January 15, 1845, CBA, 410-428.
proclaiming that this consummation strengthened the negative aspects of the U.S.-American nation and its nationality: the territory claimed by the U.S. was larger than that actually settled by Texians, showcasing an excessively aggrandising nature, and Elliot spoke dismayed of “Texas’ “prospective influence on America, that is in fact, the prospective influence on America of continued violation of compact, and increasing spoliation by the Government of this Country on feeble Powers”. He criticised “the means by which [annexation] has been accomplished; that is means which cannot bear light”.\(^\text{126}\)

Saligny frequently spoke of the Texians’ characteristics in terms of their overarching racial identity, which he labelled as “Anglo-American” and used in reference to both U.S.-Americans and Texians. Saligny’s racial views have already found discussion in chapter four, but it is relevant for this chapter to recall that the attributes of the “Anglo-American race” included a desire for land, a thirst for conquest, particularly of Mexican and Native-American lands, industriousness, adventurism, and vanity. From Saligny’s accounts, one can thus see that the episode of the Texas Republic, rather than solely influencing Texians’ identity, had an impact on U.S.-American nationalism overall. De Cramayel had called the Anglo-Americans a “Go a-head” nation, calling them an “active, industrious, restless people”.\(^\text{127}\) Whereas de Cramayel believed that Texians as such did not exist – rather, they were U.S.-Americans – he noted that the Texas Republic shaped this nationalism, particularly in regard to Mexico. De Cramayel surmised that the vigour with which U.S.-Americans pursued the incorporation of Texas, and the arguments – of which the French diplomat said he understood not the logic – used to justify it revealed “the real way of thinking [façon de penser] of the United States on Texas” and “the new policy of the Anglo-American people”. As a result, de Cramayel feared that if Mexico tried to

\(^{126}\) Elliot to Aberdeen, January 20, 1846, CBA, 585-589.
\(^{127}\) De Cramayel to Guizot, December 23, 1842, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 108-112.
reconquer Texas, the former would encounter “an entire untameable race, animated by national hatred, greed, and ambition”.\textsuperscript{128} This sentiment de Cramayel saw concentrated in the South and in Texas, “formed as it was from the dregs of the southern states which themselves contain all that is worst in the United States”.\textsuperscript{129} Like his diplomatic counterparts, Saligny concluded in early 1846 that “the annexation of Texas is inciting and encouraging still more the insatiable avidity and spirit of conquest of the American democracy”.\textsuperscript{130}

The racialised references to Texians as Anglo-Americans, voiced particularly by Saligny and de Cramayel but also by other Frenchmen, Germans and Britons, offer another perspective for analysis. The racial attributes of U.S.-Americans and Texians – identical, given that they were those of an ‘Anglo-American’ people or race – further cemented the idea of and European scepticism of a Texian nationality that was, in reality, a mere extension of its U.S.-American counterpart. Many of the components of the Texian nationality described by Nackman centred on westward expansion and frontier life; these factors were discussed by Europeans in a racialised way and applied overarching to Texians and U.S.-Americans, whose national differences were already ambiguous but diminished further through the reference of both parties as “Anglo-American”. Thus, the independence of the Republic of Texas caused Europeans to rethink the meaning of nationality and cast it in a racial way, i.e., the low faith in Texas’ unique nationality was in part motivated by Europeans’ conclusion that Texians were racially identical to U.S.-Americans. The Mexican nationality, too, was seen increasingly through a racial lens as Mexico’s integrity became threatened by the expansionism of an Anglo-American race. The conflict of Anglo-Americans and Mexicans in Texas encouraged Europeans to view their own

\textsuperscript{128} De Cramayel to Guizot, February 10, 1843, AAE: Texas, Vol. 5, l. 199-210.  
\textsuperscript{129} De Cramayel to Guizot, March 25, 1843, FLTx, 417-419.  
\textsuperscript{130} Saligny to Guizot, April 20, 1846, FLTx, 676-677.
nation-states and nationalities as racially uniform identities: At times, for example, the French got involved in Spanish America as a racially ‘Latin’ nation opposed to Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American expansion, as Maike Thier has outlined.\textsuperscript{131}

The question of a Texian nationality and the existence of a ‘Texian nation’ also reveals another aspect of European imperialism and international relations in the nineteenth century: Europeans increasingly came to expect the existence of nations overseas. The emergence of a large volume of works on the ‘law of nations’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showcases that expectations for the existence of nations became popular among Europe’s philosophers and statesmen. De Vattel’s and von Martens’ works demonstrate that some thinkers sought to apply the concept of the nation to all societies, including also the tribal societies of North America or the dominions of Indian kings.\textsuperscript{132} As de Vattel’s discrediting of North America’s tribal societies has shown, however, these nations were not considered the full equal of those of Europe.\textsuperscript{133} Rather, ‘civilised’ nations were expected to meet certain European criteria, such as the presence of Christianity. Christianity occupied in the perception of many statesmen and thinkers an elevated position vis-à-vis other religions, thus elevating Christian nations vis-à-vis non-Christian nations. Von Martens emphasised that “the powers of Europe look upon themselves as having a more general right to espouse the cause of the members of their religion, and even to lend them military aid”, illustrating the importance of Christianity to the development of the Law of Nations.\textsuperscript{134} Another excerpt from von Martens’ works likewise


\textsuperscript{133} De Vattel, 109 and 310.

\textsuperscript{134} Von Martens, 118.
showcases the criteria Europeans used to assess other nations: von Martens considered the idea of precedence or rank among nations, i.e., “the right of occupying the place of honour, when several powers assemble, either personally, by themselves, or their representatives, or when their names or titles meet in the body and signature of public acts”. In order to determine this place of honour, to which “all powers have put in their claim” the nations of Europe have resorted to “pleading the antiquity of their independence, the antiquity of the reigning family, their prior profession of Christianity, their power, their form of government, the number of their crowns, their dignities, titles”. North American tribal societies, thus, were not considered proper nations by von Martens, who referred to the “discovery of America” and the acquisition of colonies by European nations as positive events in European commerce.

The field of nations was thus an unequal one, despite the fact that thinkers like de Vattel and Marten aspired to create just and fair codices that would protect weaker nations from being brutalised or conquered by others. By the nineteenth century, these ideas of the nation changed through the idea of the nation-state. Though European statesmen expected to find their states in a community of other nations, many regions of the world did not fit the idea of the nation-state. Empires in Asia and societies in Africa did not fulfil the criteria of a common language, culture, and religion, and consequently no longer fit into earlier treatises of international law. Just as German statesmen and thinkers increasingly considered the foundation of a German nation-state a necessity if Germany wanted to prove itself on the international stage next to powers like France and Britain; just as German diplomats lamented that their fragmented political confederation was not taken as seriously as nation-states Britain and France by states like Mexico; Europeans begun to see it as beneficial that commerce abroad was conducted with

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135 Von Martens, 136.  
136 Von Martens, 147.
nation-states. States that were generally not regarded as nation-states – many states in Asia and Africa – became subject to formal imperialism rather than the informal methods used in Spanish America, i.e. a region constituted by entities regarded as nation-states. Several historians have analysed the modern nation-state of the past 200 years as a capitalist construct designed to facilitate and promote commercial processes, production, and exchange.\footnote{See: “The Nation-State” in Otto Bauer, \textit{The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 139-155, Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein, “The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001” \textit{American Sociological Review}, Vol. 75, No. 5 (Oct., 2010), 764-790, and Sven Beckert, \textit{Empire of Cotton: A Global History} (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), particularly pp. 76 ff.} Meyer’s World Polity Theory argues that a new world culture that emerged in the nineteenth century has forced various groups – both colonisers and colonised, state elites and political challengers, liberals and conservatives – to adopt nationalism and the nation-state as the most legitimate and effective form of statehood.\footnote{Mentioned here in Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein, 796.} It is noteworthy that European imperialists left behind a landscape of nation-states after decolonisation in the twentieth century – this phenomenon started with the United States in the 1770s and the Spanish American states in the 1810s-20s. When Texas joined the world increasingly defined by nation-states in 1836, Europeans classified it as a nation-state despite the existence of doubts about the Texian nationality.

Ultimately, many Europeans did not see the Texas Question as leading to the rise of a uniquely Texian nationality. Rather, they regarded it as a factor that both shaped the U.S.-American nationality and led to its continued division between Southern and Northern interests and identities. The annexation of Texas thus, as has been established by scholars, set up the United States more firmly on the road to disunion and the Civil War. Many of the attributes Nackman regards as uniquely Texian were discussed by European observers as U.S.-American or Southern in nature. Nevertheless, as Lang has shown, Texians – by the 1860s, Texans – did
use their state’s period of independence to justify secession, making them unique from their Confederate counterparts. Indeed, the Republic-era did therefore shape how Texans perceived themselves, but it did so in large part after independence had been surrendered in 1846. Even today, one can identify among Texans a pride in their state’s nine years of independence: the Texas Nationalist Movement continues to push for renewed Texan independence, and on the side of the state’s highways, there are billboards (erroneously) reminding Texans that their state still has the power to secede from the Union or split into several smaller states. In Europe, too, Texas is identified as one of the most iconic U.S. states: Next to New York and California, many Europeans seem to have the most illustrious image of Texas, often picturing the state as the “Wild West” of horses, outlaws, and the Texas Rangers. The appeal of Texas dates back in part to the plethora of travel literature on Texas authored by Europeans such as Scherpf, Kennedy, Sheridan, and others.

Though Texian independence has shaped Texans’ patriotism today, the analysis of Europeans’ perception of Texian nationalism showcases that most European agents and observers saw little that made Texians distinct from their U.S. counterparts – instead, Texians seemed to represent many of the U.S. Southern attributes that many Europeans detested, such as the perpetration of slavery and a thirst for conquest, as well as U.S.-American characteristics in general, such as vanity, expansionism, political unreliability and dishonesty, and anti-Europeanism. It was ultimately in large part this lack of faith in Texas’ sustained independence and unique nationality that broke the back of Europeans’ dreams and ambitions in Texas, because it prevented vigorous European action. As much as Europeans hoped that Texians would choose independence and their nationality over annexation, they were confronted with the resignation that this hope was rather a European rather than a Texian vision.
Texas’ independence falls into an interesting time period that confronted the young Republic with a new and continuously changing form of imperialism practiced by Europeans, one that centred on new ideas of commerce, liberal thought and international law, and diplomacy. The emergence of new states like Texas in the Americas led European states to apply new strategies in their imperial projects across the Atlantic. Philanthropic thought encouraging the abolition of slavery garnered tremendous attention on both sides of the Atlantic, as did the theory of free trade as propagated by Adam Smith. Trade, which itself had been changed by and continued to change because of industrialisation, formed a crucial component of informal empire. The fact that Europeans operated using a double-standard – or, in other words, the fact that Europeans did not always practice what they preached – formed a key component of the informal type of empire that emerged, in theory and in practice, in the Americas in the 1830s and 1840s. Europeans found themselves at the junction between protectionism and free trade, outwardly pushing for low trading barriers whilst maintaining many of their own up to the middle of the century; they desired the abolition of slavery, yet continued to purchase cotton from one of the last countries in the Americas to grow its cash crops on the backs of slaves. European officials and legal minds used the emerging codex of the law of nations to define their countries’ relationship to states in the Americas but frequently rejected Mexican officials’ use of or efforts to shape international law. Texas likewise became a place where European agents applied their new understandings of international law, slavery, free trade, nationalism, and race in order to create an informal-imperialist presence.
Many of the agents hoping to establish such a presence were agents in the periphery. At times, their ideas seemed to conflict with the instructions they were receiving from the European centres of power and the leading state officials therein: Aberdeen emphasised continuously that Elliot’s position was more that of the observer rather than that of the sweeping actor, and the Prussian government distanced itself from the overtly imperial project of the Adelsverein. In Mexico, also, many European diplomats and consuls were instructed to maintain their country’s neutrality. Core state officials’ reticence on active involvement in American states’ affairs does not mean that informal empire was rejected by core entities. From the Hamburg Commercial Deputation’s astute observation that the outflow of silver from Mexico disempowered the latter country whilst enriching Europe’s, to the rejection of protectionist barriers imposed by American states, and finally, the support that European governments extended to their merchants, who themselves, as peripheral agents, sometimes harboured informal-imperial aspirations, one can identify contradictions in European centres’ official declarations of their countries’ neutralities and some of their actions that defined European relations to American states.

Though Europeans were moving towards free trade in the nineteenth century, this shift did not happen fully until the middle of the century. Britain was a pioneer in this pursuit of free trade, repealing all major tariffs on foreign agricultural products in 1842 and repealing the Corn Laws in 1846. Nevertheless, most scholars agree that Britain was quite protectionist prior to the 1840s, as were Continental Europeans. At the same time, Europeans pushed for low trading barriers on behalf of the new Spanish American states, seeking to extend foreign recognition in exchange for trade. This European double-standard was met with resistance on the part of states such as Mexico, which sought to protect its own fledgling industries and prevent the outflow of precious metals to Europe. Though many European diplomats saw Mexico as a state of
significant commercial interest, in part due to its comparatively large population in Spanish America and its metal wealth, they were vexed by Mexican protectionism and their inability to overcome it. As the literature on informal empire has shown, European peripheral agents’ informal-imperialist ambitions were generally greater than those of their counterparts in Europe’s centres of power. The former were the ones who exerted pressure on the Mexican authorities, threatening state intervention and sanctions from their respective governments if Mexico did not acquiesce to their demands. Here, diplomats and consuls worked closely together with merchants, who had a vested interest in accumulating as much wealth from their transactions in Mexico as possible. Though Europe’s core officials, such as foreign ministers, rejected the idea that their diplomats in Mexico and Texas unduly influence the latter’s governments, they did desire strongly that commercial connections be kept as open and liberal as possible, and they supported reclamation efforts based on principles of international law. This, in combination with diplomats’ and consuls’ actions and merchants’ pleas, led to the establishment of a new type of imperialism in the nineteenth century, one dominated by informal tools.

Rather than seeing informal empire as a system enforced or envisioned by just one entity, it is helpful to analyse it in the same way in which Wallerstein constructed the world-system centred on capitalism: this world-system manages to maintain core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states as well as unequally distributed measures of power because it is a system upheld by capitalism with caveats. There is no absolute capitalist competition in the world-system; rather, core states manipulate capitalism by the use of laws and other regulations. The use of free trade, abolitionism, international law, and diplomacy to establish an informal-imperial presence is no different: Europeans pushed for lower trading barriers in the Americas than they themselves possessed, international law was an outgrowth of European legal thought and
dominated by strictly European ideas on the concept of the nation and its rights, and politically weaker countries were pressured much more intensely by England to sign slave trade treaties, even if their vessels no longer or had never engaged in the slave trade. Another conclusion by Wallerstein can also be applied to informal empire: whilst a world-empire is prevented by the incomplete power on behalf of even the most powerful core states, such as hegemons Holland, Britain, and the United States, scholar David MacLean also points out that informal imperialism was utilised by Europeans because of the limits to their imperial power and ultimately, possibilities: MacLean argues that Britain initially sought to intervene beyond the scope of informal empire in South America by use of naval strength and military might, and that the primary reason for Britain’s use of informal imperial strategies was the fact that Britain found itself unable to implement more formal measures of imperialism or enact the political circumstances which its officials had ideally desired. MacLean thus raises the question whether informal empire was indeed a government strategy based on the communication between politics and commerce, or rather a strategy that emerged as a result of a network of decisions, interactions, and choices made by merchants and politicians. Much like the capitalist world-system, informal empire did not have to be borne from conscious choice on behalf of key state officials in Europe. Rather, it was the network of actors and various tools of empire – including commerce, diplomacy, international law, and abolitionism – that made informal imperialism possible.

Informal-imperial aspirations on behalf of European states were not always successful, of course. Mexico in the first half of the nineteenth century confronted Europeans with many challenges. The country continued to uphold high trading barriers, frequently rejected reclamations, and did not provide for the security of foreigners, which caused peripheral agents
to exert pressure. Many of their labours did not earn them copious fruit: Mexico was insulated from European influence by its high level of instability, including the frequent changes in government, the insurgencies, rebellions and secessions in many parts of the country, and the dire financial situation; as well as a degree of xenophobia among the Mexican population. European diplomats in Mexico often felt unable to wrestle Mexico’s officials into concessions for their countries, and direct interference in the form of the Pastry War were ineffective in subjugating Mexico on an informal-imperialist level during the 1830s and 1840s. European – and U.S.-American – attempts to incorporate Mexico into their imperial spheres became more successful in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly during the Porfiriato.

When Texas became independent, it quickly became an imperial vision for many Europeans, particularly those who were engaged in the periphery. Travellers to Texas, such as Scherpf, Kennedy, Sheridan, and de Baradère, spoke positively of the new republic, as did merchants, such as Power, and peripheral diplomats, such as Mexican consul Crawford. Many of them approached their respective governments to encourage them to extend recognition to Texas with the expectation that trade with the young country would serve their own; in other cases, the literature written by these individuals served as a source of information for Texas enthusiasts such the *Adelsverein*. Once recognition was extended and diplomats sent to Texas, these agents also had high hopes in Texas. People like Elliot, Saligny, or Klaener, wanted to form ties to Texas in the most advantageous manner possible in order to enhance their own state’s interests and power. Unlike Mexico, whose trade was dominated by Hamburg, Texas’ trade with Germany was conducted via Bremen, giving the latter Hanse Town an opportunity to further its wealth within the Hanseatic League as well as the German Confederation. Even officials of the Hansa closer to home, located in Hamburg, Bremen, or Paris, aspired to use Hanseatic relations
with Texas to augment the Hanse Towns’ position in the German *Bund* and to resist Prussian extensions of power. The Society for the Protection of German Immigrants in Texas even had the vision that Texas could become a Germany outside of Germany, a stronghold of German power in the Americas and hence a source for German power vis-à-vis the great maritime traders, France and Britain.

Elliot, Kennedy, and Saligny highlighted the possibilities of an informal-imperialist influence in Texas on behalf of Britain or France, respectively: Elliot was a staunch advocate of abolitionism and aspired to utilise British influence to promote the eradication of slavery in Texas, whereas most British agents in Texas foresaw the establishment of a firm British commercial hold on that country. Texas could serve as a cotton supplier, a market for British manufactured goods, and a buffer between Mexico and the United States, thereby curbing U.S. expansionism. The agent of France – Britain’s commercial and imperial runner-up during the nineteenth century –, Saligny, had similar goals for his own country, and advocated for one of the most debated informal-imperialist measures, the Franco-Texienne Bill. Though an independent Texas damaged European interests in Mexico, as particularly the diplomatic correspondence of Europeans in the latter country showcases, European recognitions of and interest in Texas grew in the late 1830s and early 1840s for primarily three reasons. The first and second were the lack of faith in Mexico’s ability to reconquer Texas and the desire to prevent the young state’s annexation to the United States. The third was founded on what Europeans believed Texas could become if placed under their influence: Under English, French, or German influence, Texas could shape power relations both in North America and globally. Texas thus became a vision of empire for several European actors, a place where international relations –
including diplomacy, commerce, the law of nations, nationalities, philanthropy, and racial identities – could be redefined.

Unfortunately for Europeans, these ideas remained mere visions for Texas. Though hopes for informal empire in that republic were present among most peripheral agents and even some statesmen in Europe, the official dictum of non-intervention, the fear of U.S. influence, and the lack of Texian nationalism in favour of an identification with the United States prevented the realisation of informal imperialist endeavours in Texas. Scepticism regarding Texas’ independence and a suspicion that Texas could be annexed to the United States were present among Prussians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Hanseates, who also dreaded that European influence in Texas, no matter how small, would urge the United States to incorporate Texas. This made Texas a difficult candidate for informal empire, for any diplomatic negotiations with that state were overshadowed constantly by the looming prospect of annexation. Exerting too much pressure on Texas could have led to its ‘suicide’, as von Bunsen referred to it, and Texians continuously reminded European diplomats that Texas would choose incorporation into the United States if Europeans did not mediate between Mexico and Texas. Annexation was thus Texians’ primary power tool in their interactions with Europe. This tool was particularly potent for a uniquely Texian nationalism was absent among many Texian citizens. Though some officials, including Terrell, were fiercely in favour of independence and began to build a Texian nationality built on founding myths and commonalities, most of Texas’ population and many of its politicians desired annexation. Europeans, though they hoped that most Texans were ambivalent on the issue and could be convinced to remain independent through more favourable conditions – predominantly, peace with Mexico –, were adamant to stay largely uninvolved in Texas’ internal politics so as not to drive Texians into the arms of the United States, where
statesmen, particularly Southerners, raised their voices against and stoked fears of foreign, especially British, interference.

It was partially because of these fears that European informal-imperial ambitions in Texas remained without much success. Elliot’s dream of ridding the Republic of Texas of slavery never came to fruition; Saligny was disappointed by the intense rejection Texans expressed regarding the Franco-Texienne Bill; and the Adelsverein’s demand for commercial advantages for it and the German states in exchange for the Society’s provision of immigrants to Texas remained unanswered. On many occasions, European agents lamented that there arrived only seldomly a European vessel in Texas, whereas most commerce – particularly contraband trade – continued to be dominated by the U.S.-Americans. The Hanse Towns, who operated in the imperial web without being its primary players, likewise encountered difficulties in their negotiations with Texas. Though they, with Bremen at the forefront, desired to conclude a treaty with Texas in order to attain the same trading benefits as the most favoured nation, the debates on the Hanseatic-Texian treaty dragged on both in Texas and in the Hanse Towns. Thus, Bremian vessels were never afforded the advantages of the most favoured nation and had to pay additional duties. Politically, the Hanseates remained stymied in their relationship with Texas due to their comparative powerlessness vis-à-vis states like Britain, France, the United States, and even Mexico, which did not honour all stipulations of the Mexican-Hanseatic treaty. The Prussian government’s resignation that an exertion of German influence in Texas exceeded Prussia’s maritime, political, and military possibilities caused it to reject any imperial projects in Texas from the start. Ultimately, Texas’ commerce and trade, its customs and culture, its legal frameworks, its racial and national affiliation, and its politics, were dominated by the United States throughout much of the independence years.
Despite the fact that European trade with Texas was not very substantial, and despite the country’s annexation in 1846, Texas is significant to the histories of empire, nationalism, and international law for several reasons. First, it confronted Europeans with international legal and commercial challenges. Treaties with American states raised fears among German politicians that the “most favoured nations” clause could give the contracting American states the same advantages given to other German states in customs unions designed to stabilise and strengthen the German economy vis-à-vis other states’, especially England’s. If American states with whom treaties using the ‘most favoured nation’ clause were furnished had these same advantages, the purpose of these intra-German customs unions would be defeated. Thus, trans-Atlantic trade confronted German officials with the question of how much free trade they really desired. The Hanseatic-Texian treaty was revised several times in part to prevent the eradication of protective Hanseatic trading barriers; yet next to this restrictive component, the Hanseates pushed for a very liberal treaty that could set precedence for other Hanseatic treaties with foreign countries. An international legal challenge for the Prussian government was the umpireship it assumed in 1839 to mediate between the United States and Mexico, a thankless task through which Prussia risked offending either or perhaps both of the contesting parties. But the Prussian decision also posed a challenge for Mexico: von Rönne engaged with ideas of de Vattel, Büllau, and Pinheiro-Ferreira to determine the status of Mexico’s nationality and the resulting culpability of the Mexican regime for damages and loss of property incurred by foreigners, and ultimately concluded that there did not exist within Mexico a national will and that Texas was an independent nation whose government needed to be consulted in regard to any U.S.-American claims in Texas. These decisions angered Mexico’s authorities, for they questioned Mexico’s nationality, suggested the country was in the midst of a civil war, and that it had irrevocably lost Texas, now
its own nation with its own ‘national will’. But such analysis, based on, and illustrative of the growing importance of, the law of nations, gave rise to new questions. How could Texas be acknowledged as a nation when it lacked a nationality? Could a nation simply elect to commit suicide, as Aberdeen questioned? Would it be forced to uphold its agreements with foreign nations even after it had been absorbed by another? For these questions, Texas was a case of precedence.

The Republic of Texas also had a lasting impact on U.S.-American nationalism. Texian settlers based their identity on negative sentiment toward Native Americans, which was quite common among U.S.-American frontiersmen. But many Anglo-Texians were also fiercely anti-Mexican, and became increasingly so as the republic headed toward annexation. At the same time, and largely in response to the Texas Revolution and secession from Mexico, many U.S.-Americans became more dismissive of and antipathic towards Mexicans as well. This development was especially noticeable among those in favour of expansion as well as Southerners – often, these two aspects dovetailed. In Texas, racial hierarchies were also created and redefined: European observers saw a racial conflict brewing in the new country, one that pitted the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American race against the Spanish, Mexican, or Spanish-Mexican race. Whereas the Anglo-American race was increasingly defined as expansionist, aggressive, pioneering, successful, vigorous, industrious, and vain in regard to other racial groups, the Mexican race was seen more and more as weak, debilitated, unproductive, and prone to conquest at the hands of the Anglo-American race.

As such views of the Anglo-American race became more popular among European statesmen, they also began – or were encouraged to continue – to redefine their own racial identities vis-à-vis the other races of the North American continent. The French saw in Spanish
America a race of Latins who had a natural affiliation with European states using Romance languages, such as Spain, the Italian states, or France. Given that France considered itself the predominant Latin power in the world, several French philanthropists, philosophers, and officials began to believe that it was France’s rightful privilege and its duty to elevate these Latin races of Spanish America and establish a bulwark to Anglo-American expansion. Germans identified in Texas an opportunity to establish a Germanic element insulated from Anglo-American influence. German officials argued that the German race was very susceptible to its Anglo-American counterpart, pointing out that thousands of Germans emigrated to the United States each year, cutting their ties to their homeland, which meant a loss of wealth and influence for Germany and the Germanic race. In Texas, with its smaller population, several German entrepreneurs and nobles considered it possible to build a German presence which maintained its connections to the fatherland, thus promoting the industrious, reliable, and honest Germanic race in the Americas. Moreover, Europeans’ impressions of Native Americans were changed in Texas: whereas many German (and also French) travellers spoke rather positively of Indians, those Europeans who visited Texas were confronted with the formidable Comanches, a tribe that many called savage and barbaric.

Beyond shaping racial hierarchies, Texas – and North America more broadly – became a place for European nation-building, especially for Germans. German merchants found unity in the periphery, where intra-German differences gave way to an overarching national identity. To a certain extent, this was born of necessity, as German diplomats emphasised: Prussian and Hanseatic agents were met in Mexico with a plethora of difficulties associated with the lack of a German nation-state, including the absence of maritime power, diminished political might and financial resources, and the complexity of diplomatic undertakings as not all German states had
representatives who were classified as diplomats and/or capable of handling reclamations. This often led to Prussian officials’ assumption of duties to which they could not lay legal claim, e.g. when they presented reclamations of non-Prussian merchants. These challenges in Mexico informed how the concept of the nation-state was perceived by many Germans situated in that country. This development dovetailed with the new type of imperialism centred around trade, which emerged around the same time as England assumed a hegemonic position and threatened the German economy. These new types of commercial relationships likewise encouraged Germans, particularly merchants and officials, to see the nation-state as important. In a world dominated by industrialisation and the power of maritime commerce, free trade, the law of nations, and diplomacy, German politicians, philosophers, merchants, and economists realised that a German nation-state was crucial if Germany wanted to compete internationally with Britain and France.

On the other hand, Texas was also a place where Hanseates resisted Prussian designs for a Germany consolidated under Prussian leadership: A Hanseatic-Texian treaty was supposed to elevate the Hanse Towns’ prestige in the German Confederation and cement their position as primary traders and windows to the trans-Atlantic world. The periphery, in this case, Mexico and Texas, was thus used by various German states to shape intra-German developments and contest the power of other German states, at the same time as German diplomats and merchants became increasingly aware of the need for cooperation and collaboration abroad in order to augment Germany’s competitiveness with England, the United States, and France. The Americas are also interesting for they are evidence of an early disparity between Austria and Prussia. Whereas Austria waited a long time to extend recognition and send representatives to Spanish America, Prussia was involved in trans-Atlantic trade much earlier on and thus became the political leader
of German commerce with the Americas. Texas is also an episode in the history of German
imperialism and colonisation: There had been, prior to the Adelsverein’s efforts in Texas, several
projects to colonise a region of America in order to elevate Germany into the ranks of powers
like Britain and France. Gernot Lennert describes the desire of the ruler of Brandenburg to see
his state participate in overseas trade and colonialism in the seventeenth century, hoping that
such endeavours would boost his country’s international status and power. Two colonial projects,
however, in West Africa and the Caribbean, remained unsuccessful. Even through its union with
Prussia, the new Prussia-Brandenburg had very little sea access, and that which it did possess
was frequently controlled by other smaller imperial powers, such as Sweden. Lennert regards
these seventeenth-century ambitions as stepping stones to the German Empire’s colonial desires
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.¹ Indeed, much like these former missions, the
Adelsverein’s Texas project failed to establish a German colony that continued to hold
significant political, economic, or imperial relevance to Germany. This desire for colonies
becomes a recurring theme in German history, culminating in the Scramble for Africa of the late
nineteenth century, where Germany, finally united as the Second German Empire, acquires a few
colonies and ‘a place under the sun’ of its own.

The independence of Texas from Mexico and its annexation to the United States accelerated
the course that the North American continent was on. Shortly after Texas’ incorporation into the
Union, the U.S.-Mexico War commenced, and by 1848, Mexico had lost roughly half its territory
to its northern neighbour. This event had a large impact on Mexicans’ identity, which developed
in part in opposition to the U.S.-Americans. The United States, on the other hand, found itself

¹ Gernot Lennert, “Kolonialversuche Brandenburgs, Preußens, und des Deutschen Reiches in der Karibik“, in
Preußen und Lateinamerika: Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur, ed. Sandra Carreras and Günther
Maihold (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 9-30.

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heading closer towards disunion. The annexation of Texas was hotly debated between abolitionists and slaveholders, Northerners and Southerners, manufacturers and raw material producers, and those opposed to and in favour of expansion. Slavery indeed was once more at the forefront of U.S.-American politics. Southerners sought to make this institution a domestic policy issue rather than an international one, thus rejecting English abolitionism as undue interference of a foreign empire. English designs for abolition in Texas were perceived by Southern statesmen as a threat to their rights and their country’s integrity; this Anglophobia was used by Southerners to define themselves and slavery became an increasingly integral part of their identity. Though Northerners were not as concerned about undue British interference in regards to slavery in Texas, they likewise engaged with ideas of Anglophobia, fearing the expansion of British industry and commerce in North America.

The annexation of Texas was a success for U.S.-Americans who feared British, or any European, influence in the Americas. Indeed, European conduct in Texas was shaped heavily by the knowledge that the U.S. government followed the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, a declaration that rejected European involvement in the Western hemisphere. Though the United States was not in any position to enforce this doctrine in the entirety of the Americas or even just North America, the policy did have teeth in Texas. Due to Texians’ inclination toward annexation, the United States had the upper hand in Texas vis-à-vis Europeans, and the latter were thus stymied in taking vigorous action in Texas for fear that the new republic would accede to the Union. The Republic of Texas was thus one of the first episodes in which European states were confronted with an effective Monroe Doctrine, one that limited their possibilities of exerting imperial, commercial, or diplomatic influence in North America. When Tyler echoed the Monroe Doctrine’s tenets in late 1842, Elliot expressed his disdain, commenting that “this pretension of
United States policy may not be equally acceptable to all ‘the States of the American Continent’”, for many Spanish American states probably lacked confidence in the purposes of Washington. Surely, Spanish America would not wish “to cast off all other friendships in peace, or alliances in War”. Elliot critiqued Tyler’s declared “Bon Soir” of European influence in the Americas by highlighting that “there is no objection to as much of United States influence on the Continent of Europe […] but Great Britain must pretend to no influence on the Continent of America”. The English agent in Texas had little understanding for U.S. pronouncements “drumming us all off this Continent”, but Europeans’ fear of Texas’ annexation proves that this episode was one where the United States could repel European interference in a region of the Americas.²

But this was only the beginning: The United States desired to become the primary imperial power on the North American continent, and Britons were aware of this sentiment. What is more, the U.S.-American imperialism applied to Texas and the other territories in northern Mexico was a formal type of imperialism; the United States sought territorial conquest and annexation rather than an informal control through commerce or diplomacy. Its imperial vision was also built on older strategies of empire that many European powers had largely discarded, such as the reliance on plantation slavery, the aggressive subjugation of Native peoples in the regions they conquered, and, as British correspondence and President Tyler’s use of Monroe Doctrine principles reveal, the rejection of foreign commerce. After hearing that General Hamilton had coaxed Webster to view Texas’ annexation positively because this would enable the United States to exclude British commercial competition in Texas, Kennedy told Aberdeen that “the American imagination eagerly anticipates the day, predicted by Humboldt, when the products of

² Elliot to Addington, December 28, 1842, CBA, 145-148.
European industry should be excluded from this Continent. – It takes at times even a more self-exalting range, and, by means of Settlements on the North Western Shores of the Pacific, dreams of creating a commercial dominion in India and China”.

Texas is symbolic of the changes that occurred on the North American continent. Not only is it prophetic for the power that the Monroe Doctrine would gain by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not least due to the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary, but the historic episode of the Republic of Texas showcases the rise of the United States as a global imperial power. Europeans wanted to maintain an independent Texas not merely for their own economic benefit, but also to curb U.S. expansionism, commercial growth, and imperial strength. Though the United States was only a little over a half-century old, it was already identified by European states as a major rival. De Cramayel observed that it was “England especially, who daily watches her former colonies burgeon into a rival nation endowed with the same qualities and made of the same stuff that have constituted her own strength” who anxiously hoped to prevent annexation, knowing that this would strengthen the United States. Saligny’s admiration for and critiques of the Anglo-American race, German agents’ misgivings regarding the quick assimilation of the ‘Germanic element’ into the Anglo-American mainstream, and the overall awareness of the United States’ growing industrial output and commercial successes demonstrate that the United States was perceived as a formidable rival by Europeans as early as the 1830s.

Rafe Blaufarb has shown that as early as the French Revolutionary Wars, internal European strife enabled U.S. expansionism by forcing Spain and Britain to abandon their restrictive policies. Samuel Flagg Bemis’ book on the matter is aptly named America’s Advantage from

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3 Kennedy to Aberdeen, December 5, 1844, CBA, 379-385.
Europe’s Distress. Blaufarb concludes that the disengagement of Europeans on the North American continent during and after the French Revolutionary Wars “led to the emergence of the United States as a respected actor on the international stage and was one of the factors that led to its eventual rise to superpower status.” Another such factor was the annexation of Texas, for to a certain extent, the same mechanics that were at work during the French Revolutionary Wars were also at work during the era of the Republic of Texas. Though France and England were not at war with each other between 1836 and 1846 – which consequently means that war between these two parties was not the reason why Texas’ annexation came to pass –, the two powers were unable to prevent the incorporation of Texas into the Union in part because their alliance to mediate between Texas and Mexico was incredibly fickle and marked by a measure of mutual distrust. The correspondence of the two Prussian representatives in London and Paris, von Bunsen and Count Armin, respectively, illustrates this. Armin wrote to his government that France ultimately did not see within the Texian affair a *casus belli*, largely because French officials did not perceive France as an American power in the same manner as Britain was.

Thus, French statesmen feared that their engagement in the Texas Question would lead their rival England to accrue the fruits of French labour, or as Kossok summarised: “Guizot did not have the inclination to rescue the English chestnuts from the American fire with French pliers”. This European disunion was thus to the United States’ advantage; Texas was annexed without European resistance, and the historic episode of the Republic of Texas ended up joining a line of

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6 Blaufarb, „The French Revolutionary Wars“, 162.
factors that promoted the U.S.-American global ascent. The annexation of Texas was also a major victory for the United States vis-à-vis Britain, the hegemon of the nineteenth century.

The nineteenth-century North American continent was thus a space for heated imperial contestation, commercial rivalry, and competition over diplomatic-political pre-eminence and influence. Many states had interest in Texas, aware of the fact that this territory had the potential of reshaping power relations in North America and indeed, globally. Countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, the Hanse Towns, Prussia, England, France, the United States, and Mexico, all sought to use the existence of the new state of Texas in order to obtain personal benefit and enhance their position on the international stage. Be it through emigration, discussions of philanthropy in the form of abolitionism, commerce and trade, or diplomacy, all of these states, in addition to some non-state actors, such as the Adelsverein, aspired to exert their influence in Texas. The looming prospects of Mexican reconquest or U.S. annexation as perceived by Europeans, or European intervention or interference as feared by the United States, meant that the Texas Question was also a race against time. Though European powers had initially been so reluctant to recognise Texas, the latter years of Texian independence turned into a scramble for influence: Britain and France, eager to maintain Texas’ independence, scrambled to obtain Mexico’s recognition of Texas before U.S. annexation could take place, whereas the members of the Adelsverein scrambled to commence German colonisation as quickly as possible despite the Society’s unpreparedness. The Hanse Towns, eager to use the Texian treaty as precedent for their other trans-Atlantic treaties, receive the commercial benefits of the ‘most favoured nation’ clause, and forge an additional agreement combining trade and emigration, scrambled to determine a common course at a time when Lübeck’s and Hamburg’s reluctance was opposed with Bremen’s greater enthusiasm on the Texas matter. What informal-imperialist
ambitions in Texas illustrate is that an imperial scramble was not just characteristic of the late-nineteenth-century colonialism, an outgrowth of formal empire. Rather, informal empire was characterised by a scramble as well: the power to come first in recognising a new state could potentially achieve the most commercial benefits and diplomatic influence, inciting other states to take similar steps, et cetera.

Overall, the Republic of Texas was, for many European actors, particularly those in the periphery, a large ‘what could have been’. Europeans had high hopes in an independent Texas, a new state that would have suited European designs for North America very well. What then, could have happened if Texas had remained independent? Though nobody can answer this question, one can surmise that the United States’ continental and global ascent could possibly have been delayed. It is dubious whether this could have entirely been prevented – as Blaufarb has shown, the road to U.S. power had already been paved by events such as the French Revolutionary Wars. Moreover, the United States’ great proximity to Texas may have made it impossible to maintain an independent republic between Mexico and the United States even if Texians had chosen against accession. However, the Republic of Texas is significant to the history of international relations and imperialism: For a period of almost a decade, several Europeans envisioned a North America not dominated by the United States. They saw in Texas a state that could elevate their own state’s prestige and status in a world-system centred on capitalism and commerce. Thus, the history of the Texas Republic and Europeans’ engagement therewith demonstrates that a discussion of informal empire can be fruitful even where such designs ultimately failed, for the visions of empire offer tremendous insight on developments of international law, nation-building and nationalism, commerce and trade, diplomacy, racial hierarchies, and the history of slavery.
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Vita

Penelope L. Jacobus was born in Hamburg, Germany. In 2009, she moved to El Paso, Texas, USA, with her family. In 2014, she began studying history at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). There, she earned her Bachelor of Arts and her Master of Arts in History in 2016 and 2018, respectively. As a result of her international background, Penelope Jacobus was able to use archival materials in German, English, French, and Spanish for her dissertation. She received several grants so that she could conduct research in Germany, the United States, England, and France. During her graduate studies, she also worked as a Teaching Assistant in the History Department of UTEP. In June of 2020, Penelope Jacobus returned to Germany to study law. She believes that her background in history has provided her with the essential prerequisites to become a successful law student and lawyer, for her experiences as a doctoral student and not least her writing of this dissertation have enabled her to develop the research skills, linguistic finesse and clarity, perseverance, and knowledge of scientific methods necessary for a career in law.

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