LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE
IN HEGEL, MARX, AND
ROSENZWEIG

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MASTER’S PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

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LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE
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by

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis is to open a conversation regarding the role of grammar in two areas of philosophy: interpretation and normative philosophy. The task is divided into three chapters, each of which focuses on one major issue. The first is a demonstration of the use of grammar in understanding and interpreting works of philosophy, namely those of Hegel and Marx. The second chapter is an interpretation of Franz Rosenzweig’s renovated grammar, as seen in *The Star of Redemption*. The last uses an analysis of grammar to challenge the role of empirical knowledge in community building. The last chapter is an application of the method discussed in chapters one and two, but its objective is to raise the fundamental question of this thesis: is it morally beneficial to rely on an empirical approach to understanding community formation? My claim is that perhaps we should because it would be better, acknowledge that individuals stand for themselves and not as a representative of a category. If we premise our moral decision making with this in mind, which is actually to say, if we disregard what we think of others based on their contingent qualities, we might not be predisposed to act towards them in an immoral way.
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CHAPTER 1: USING GRAMMAR TO INTERPRET COMPLICATED SYSTEMS OF LOGIC

A will that concludes nothing is not an actual will; a characterless human being never comes to conclude. The ground of indecision may also lie in a faint-heartedness that knows that, in willing something determinate, it is engaging with finitude, positing a restriction for itself and forsaking the infinite… only by resolving do human beings step into actuality, however bitter this may be.¹

In this chapter, I take an in-depth look at the structures of some of the logical developments and claims in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. As will become apparent, his description of the will is a direct result of the application of his logic. My aim is not to defend Hegel’s claims nor explain them on his terms. Instead, I move forward under the premise that those descriptions used by Hegel serve us well in our examination of what I term the voice of grammar to come. There is not a clear-cut discussion of grammar in either the *Logic* or the *Philosophy of Right*. In these works, Hegel makes no mention of the grammatical categories of active and passive living—though he alludes to the idea.² What results from my analysis of Hegel’s view of the will is not an all-encompassing definition of the will, but a description of Hegel’s will that is in line with the notion of renovated grammar.³ The discussion of Hegel’s notion of the will, in this case, does not lead to the political philosophy of Hegel’s state, but to a discussion of the possibility of understanding personal and intrapersonal relationships through a grasp of the language we use to create those relationships. In other words, by demonstrating the parallels between Hegel’s logic and view of the will, I will be able to demonstrate that grammar

¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 26
² In the latter part of this argument I demonstrate how Hegel’s notion of concluding and the free will are actually comprehensible through the grammatical distinction of the active and passive voice.
³ This concept will be developed in detail in chapter two of this work. My claim here is that Hegel’s view of the will can be understood through an analysis of the meaning that is conveyed by grammar.
can serve a similar function to logic. In the second part of this first chapter, I will look to Marx for the same purpose, namely to identify some of the possible applications of the method I am here using.

In Hegel’s *Logic*, he describes and applies several concepts that are paramount to understanding how he will develop his view of the will. Hegel presupposed that those who undertook to understand the *Philosophy of Right* had a working knowledge of his *Logic*.4 Perhaps dedicated readers of Hegel’s work will opine that the following exposition of the parallels is superfluous. This thesis requires the explanation for two reasons: a) the *Logic* describes a set of rules needed to establish a working definition of the will; and b) having seen how these terms work in two different contexts allows us to see how grammar is capable of creating a similar understanding of the will without taking on the entirety of Hegel’s system.

The standard defining character of idealism is that being, as an ontological category, is but the contents of the mind.5 Criticism of Hegelian idealism has been by and large grounded on the interpretation of the following mischaracterization: *being = thought*. Tucker, in his *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, argues that Hegel’s notion of truth is that reality becomes content of subjectivity. He says, “[man’s] desire to know…is a craving in man to pierce the seeming objectivity of the world that confronts him and grasp it as subjective in nature […].”

It should be noted that this reductive interpretation is not necessarily a deliberate misrepresentation, for Hegel does use the term idealism because, after all, he is a self-proclaimed idealist. However, if considered without further consideration of the whole system, we might be inclined to believe that being and thought are interchangeable. I would argue, however, that

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4 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 36
5 I am here referring to the accepted notion of idealism as defined by the Stanford encyclopedia entry on idealism as “something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality…” see Guyer, *Idealism.*
applying such a sorry label of idealism to Hegel is not only shameful but comes off as lazy. Thus, to conclude from Hegel’s use of words like mind, spirit, idealism, reason, etc., that he is an idealist without further ado, is to say no more than that Hegel’s idealism is no different from that of Berkeley’s.

The key to Hegel’s thinking is the dialectic because applying it allows us to see how concepts develop and change over time. As I lay down some central points in the *Logic*, we will see that it is not the case that being=thought. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that being serves a similar function to thought, i.e., they are parallels when we abstract them. In the latter case, we are left with the simple characterization, being || thought. It describes the mental process that considers how thinking itself is involved in the way we experience the world around us. On a macro-scale, Hegel claims that world history is the rational understanding of the development of a people, their ideas, and their nation-states. Below we will see an example of this process by considering the logical concept of determination in two distinct contexts: logic and political right. The development of these concepts in Hegel’s work is dialectical because old tired concepts do not lose significance as a society, and people move beyond them. They live on in the sense that, having been overcome, they still premise newer (and more current) conclusions, even if only to avoid the negative consequences those ideas had in the past. In other cases, world-historical cultures and religious ideas preserve these ideas. According to Hegel, when talking about logic—and as we will see, this extends to grammar—imposing an *a priori* definition is a mistake. He maintains that dialectical thinking is best able to avoid positing for

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6 Hegel, *Logic*, 59. Hegel suggests that pure being and thought are equal, but I argue they are more conceptual parallels in that they both serve as starting points, than analytically identical.
ourselves external labels\textsuperscript{7} by allowing us to see how cognition can discover a concept’s meaning from the contradicting experiences that surround it.

For my thesis, I need to say more about the dialectic. Hegel himself points out conceptual change at every step of his work and I will follow his lead. The following chart lays out some of the concepts he develops dialectically in each of the works considered here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Logic</th>
<th>The Philosophy of Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logical Abstraction</td>
<td>Abstract Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Being &amp; Nothing</td>
<td>Universality &amp; finitude (§5&amp;6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination</td>
<td>Free will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Personhood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The chart is structured to show that “logical abstraction” is to the left of “thought” to represent the claim that Hegel uses both terms for the same reason and at the same point in his argument in different contexts, the Logic and The Philosophy of Right respectively. To remain consistent with what I called the macro-scale of applying the dialectic, Hegel often cites historical developments in philosophy to structure his narrative. For this reason, he opens his Logic with the concept of pure being considering them as the Eleatics did, abstractly.\textsuperscript{8} Hegel’s starting point in the Philosophy of Right is the same starting point he chooses in his logic—abstract thought, meaning that the starting point for dialectical thinking is abstract thought as well. As I noted in the chart above, the logical abstraction of being and thought are both concepts without determinations. Hegel says it in this way: “the will contains the element of pure

\textsuperscript{7} Hegel, Logic, 34
\textsuperscript{8} For Hegel’s commentary of the Eleatics and their use of the concept of pure being see Hegel, Logic, 60
indetermination…” 9 As I noted above, thinking dialectically, history gives testimony to the importance of “pure being” and “thought qua thought.” According to Hegel, this is verifiable if we look at the development of abstract thought—as a concept—in the religious zeal of the Indian culture:

Historically, this form of freedom comes forth often. In India, for example, what is held to be the highest is for one to persevere merely in the knowledge of one's simple identity with oneself, to abide within this empty space of one’s interiority as in the colorless light of pure intuition, and to renounce every activity of living, every goal, every representation. 10

Moving forward, what is of interest is how he describes and moves from these starting points and not whether he was justified in choosing that point, to begin with.

This process demands that Hegel’s readers are willing to think about thinking because he proposes that when we think about something, by the fact that we thought about it, give that something a determination. In other words, to think of something is to give it a type of determination. Hegel asks us to think about pure being, a concept he considers without determination, but at the same time, he argues that this concept cannot be defined because it has no determination. This process of abstraction is paradoxical because: to define an un-determined thing is impossible because the definition implies determination. This is what Hegel says on the matter, “being, pure being—[is] without further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy, it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor outwardly.” 11 He adds: “there is nothing to be intuited in it if one can speak here of intuiting; or it is only this pure empty intuited itself… it is equally only this empty thinking.”

The paradoxical nature of such an abstraction should be apparent as I have explained it.

9 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 20
10 Ibidem. See remarks
11 Hegel, Logic, 59
Additionally, Hegel’s description serves a point carried forward by my thesis that being is not equal to thought, but parallel to it.\textsuperscript{12}

As it pertains to the dialectic, it is essential to note that Hegel will equate pure being and pure nothing, meaning that both concepts have no determinations. As far as pure being and pure nothing is concerned, Hegel has his readers consider the difference in looking at a blinding white light as pure being and a pitch blackness as nothing. In each case, there is nothing distinguishable within the blinding white light nor pitch blackness. Consequently, we can assert that given the lack of determination in both, we can see that equating one to the other is not indefensible. It seems as if Hegel has said only two things: first, that being cannot be defined because doing so means giving it determination in thought. Second, that one can think of thought of as a vessel which itself cannot be defined until it has content. The parallel should be clear, from a logical standpoint, pure being and pure nothing are indeterminate starting points. As we move towards the will, thought will take the place of the starting point.

It might be difficult to imagine why some philosophers make use of undefinable concepts. Rudolph Carnap argued that “…the logical analysis of the pretended propositions of metaphysics has shown that they are not propositions at all, but empty word arrays, which on account of notional and emotional connections arouse the false appearance of being propositions.”\textsuperscript{13} Despite the reasons marshaled against such a starting point, Hegel uses “logical abstractions” to show that cognition can understand change when we observe historical narratives of this change or when our conception of certain concepts evolves.\textsuperscript{14} Dialectical thinking is the conceptualization of the idea that we experience an objective world that appears

\textsuperscript{12} See footnote number 7 above.
\textsuperscript{13} Carnap, \textit{On the Character of Philosophic Problems}, 5
\textsuperscript{14} Here we might think of how our concept of social justice has changed over time. The very idea of social justice is dialectical in this context because it is anchored to a particular epoch. I will revisit this notion in chapter three.
to be, in a sense, static. Moreover, the difference within things is only a difference for a third thing that notices those differences. The understanding is the third thing to which difference belongs.\textsuperscript{15} The dialectic is useful because it gives us one way through which to understand the role of reason in knowing something about the world.

The dialectical claim that pure being and nothing are the same is the chief example \textit{[Beispiel\textsuperscript{16}]} in Hegel’s \textit{Logic}. He maintains that if we point out their difference, we have already created in them some determination, these concepts do not have, which is the paradox that I mentioned previously. If being and nothing are the same, how is it that things have or do not have being? The dialectical moment appears in our thoughts, as if it were an epiphany, in the realization that \textit{being} and \textit{nothing} exist as moments belonging to another concept. What do these logical abstractions have to do with what we call reality? Hegel tells us that we do not have to look for being and nothing in the world. Instead, we must always learn to see how seeming contradictions always seem to resolve themselves through their unity. In this context, \textit{experiencing} the concept of becoming is the transition out of the metaphysics of pure idealism. We can grasp the whole of the Hegelian dialectic if we wrap our mind around how he says being, and nothing come together in thought to understand things we experience as something determined. Namely, that as logical abstraction, they cannot be defined, but, in their unity, in becoming, things have determination. The coming together of being and nothing, Hegel suggests, denotes the process of \textit{coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be}. Following the pre-Socratics,\textsuperscript{17} Hegel maintains, “…there is nothing which is not an intermediary state between being and [not being]),”\textsuperscript{18} and the dialectic is the lens through which we capture it. Hegel takes this notion that

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15} Hegel, \textit{Encyclopedia}, 180
\textsuperscript{16} Bei =with/in & Spiel = play
\textsuperscript{17} Reference Pre-Socratics for their concepts on movement.
\textsuperscript{18} Hegel, \textit{Logic}, 80
\end{flushright}
everything is in flux unapologetically, saying, “such dialectic is, however, at least more consistent than ordinary reflective thought.”

Language complicates our discussion of the dialectic because we tend to use finite verbs that produce sentences that paint a static picture of a state of affairs. Arguably, the case could be made that the present progressive can convey the moment to moment present passing of time. Nevertheless, the actual movement from one state of affairs to the next is not experienced by reading or hearing language. Thus, “today is day,” is true—until it is not. The dialectic demands that our focus shift from the static nature of statements to an experience of movement. Marx understood that this was the nature of the dialectic. In the Economic Manuscripts, he wrote of Hegel’s view of the family, society and the state, “they have become moments of motion.”

Furthermore, since truth cannot lose anything by the passing of time, truth—for Hegel—is to be found in the movement we experience, literally in the passing of day to night, and not in the statement of a fact, like “today is day.” The dialectic demands a focus on this shift while not losing sight of the moments that make up point a and point b. Thus, we derive the very definition of Aufhebung or sublation, which is perhaps the most important term in the Hegelian lexicon.

To sublate and being sublated constitute one of the most important concepts of philosophy. It is a fundamental determination that repeatedly occurs everywhere in it, the meaning of which must be grasped with precision and primarily distinguished from nothing.—what is sublated does not thereby turn into nothing. [Pure] [n]ething is the immediate; something sublated is on the contrary something mediated [my emphasis]; it is something non-existent but as a result that has preceded from a being; it still has in itself, therefore the determinateness from which it derives.

To sublate is the act by which the understanding applies the cognitive process of dialectical thinking. The result of this action is the mediation that brings about the determination

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19 Ibid., 79
20 Hegel will use this phrase in his phenomenology of spirit to convey the notion of movement when discussing truth.
21 Hegel, Logic, 81
of a concept which necessarily arises from considering the multiple sides of things. In the *Logic*, Hegel used being and nothing to show how the concept of becoming is not arbitrarily defined. *The Philosophy of Right* demonstrates Hegel’s masterful application of dialectical thinking in its context—the context of the political right. Hegel describes the dialectical progression of political history—what he calls universal/world history—to the concepts of universality and finitude. The dialectic can be identified when one grapples with two opposing features of a third unifying concept. In the context of his political work, we can identify the dialectical juxtaposition of “every self-consciousness [knowing] itself as universal—as the possibility of abstracting from everything determinate—and as particular, as having a determinate object, content, and aim.”22

In this quote, the two opposing features are a) self-consciousness and b) consciousness of something other than itself. The religious zeal of the Indian religion and the idea that determination defines by negation represent these features. At this point, progressing through the chart above, I suggest that determination is an activity of the understanding which can be at work through language structures.

It is the function of focusing our attention on something other than oneself that prompt Hegel to develop his view of the concept of *constitution*:

> Constituted in this or that way, the something is caught up in external influences and in external relationships. This external connection on which the constitution depends, and the being determined through another, appear as something accidental. But it is the quality of the something to appear as something accidental. But it is the quality of the something to be given over to this externality and to have a constitution.23

Constitution is the recognition that dialectical thinking guides the understanding to see that things are defined not only from what is their essence but from their relationship with other

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22 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 22
23 Hegel, *Logic*, 96
things. Through the dichotomy of finite and infinite Hegel develops the concept of the will, because, as I pointed out before, it is a function of the mind to recognize the difference in things. Moreover, once recognized, limits are themselves negated when we come to understand them. Hegel means that it is the will that reconciles a positive and a negative. By accepting the notion of finitude, Hegel is rejecting Spinoza’s notion of substance on the basis that limits are something to overcome, not explain away. Constitution is that external and contingent thing one must make one’s own—come to know—if one is to be considered free, free from negation, that is. It is in this sense that Hegel’s famous “negation of negation” makes sense.

At this point in the logic, Hegel’s readers can choose a path: continue thinking about thought or take a turn into a discussion of the application of it. The former entails the further reading of Hegel’s work on logic and nature; the latter means working through the Philosophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes the development of the “self-conscious spirit,” that is, human beings. The process of thinking I have been describing Hegel attributes to humans in general. It allows Hegel to say that “[h]uman beings, […] stand above their drives wholly undetermined, and can determine and posit them as their own.”  

Through the voluntary activity, we can move beyond the limits.

The dialectical shift from the will as purely a cognitive process to personhood goes beyond the two moments of the will described above. When we think, we eventually consider the object of our thought as our own, as if we appropriate the thought as our self-given thought, and we think we give ourselves this or that thought. Hegel, however, maintains that some of the contents of our thinking are “natural drives,” such as hunger. While at the same time, he suggests

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24 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 25 POR
25 Hegel claims that the understanding the will as two moments of different cognitive activities is the work of the understanding. Given the position of the understanding in the phenomenology of spirit, we can speculate that he doesn’t believe this bifurcated understanding of the will is as important as the what comes after it.
feeling hungry does not constitute freedom—because it is a natural drive—but recognizing hunger as one’s own imposed state of being that is a step in the right direction. Here the choice to eat is a moment of self-determination, a seemingly free act of cognition. The difference I am pointing to is that between eating instinctively and planning ahead of time to satisfy one’s cravings and bodily needs. As Hegel develops this logic, we arrive at personhood as the sublation of both self-imposed and external limits placed on the will. The will can posit restriction as its own and then cross that limit is becoming free. The most noteworthy claim in Hegel’s view here is that making limits one’s own is a particular form of thinking.

The distinction between thinking and willing is only that between theoretical and practical component, but there are not two faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking, thinking is translating itself into existence, as the drive to give itself existence. For only in thinking am I at home with myself. 26

I want to call attention to Hegel’s choice of words. The descriptions found in Hegel’s work lend themselves to a grammatical rendition of the same concepts. The words, “drive to give itself existence” suggests that there is something about human thinking, a form of subjectivity, that becomes objective or constituted by material reality. As Hegel identifies more and more external constitutions that consciousness can make its own, he reaches the idea of personhood.

What follows from personhood is that I, as this person, am completely determined in all respects (in terms of inner willfulness drives and desires as well as by existence that is immediate and external.) I am thus finite, yet nevertheless pure relation to myself, so that I know myself within this finitude as infinite, universal, and free.27

The development of the logic and the will happen almost hand by hand. Hegel develops one by developing the other; this is how Hegel can create a systematic philosophy. My

26 Hegel, Philosophy of Right 18
27 Ibid., 40
claim in this chapter is that having seen Hegel develop his logic and will on the same principle, we are now able to compare how grammatical concepts roughly align with crucial parts of Hegel’s work. Consider the chart below where I have added the new concepts that I consider paramount:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Logic</th>
<th>The Philosophy of Right</th>
<th>This Thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logical abstraction</td>
<td>Abstract thought</td>
<td>Grammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure being and nothing</td>
<td>Universality and finitude</td>
<td>Spoken language and symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination</td>
<td>Free will</td>
<td>Nouns and verbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Personhood</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hegel himself makes a case for the first parallel in the Logic:

He who is beginning to make his acquaintance with grammar finds in its forms, and laws dry abstractions, arbitrary rules, quite, in general, a disconnected aggregate of definitions that have no other value or meaning than what they immediately signify; at the start, there is nothing to be known in them except themselves.²⁸

My point is that grammar, like the dialectic, rules over the cognitive process that allows us to understand how concepts develop. The changes that Hegel says that consciousness understands through proper thinking may be the result of the nature of spoken languages and symbols. Language grammar allows us to see how different parts of speech relate to each other. Hegel believes that language expresses universals,²⁹ which suggests that the meaning of these concepts exists beyond language. I am demonstrating that language contests with dialectical logic in this ability to bring about determination, i.e., meaning.

²⁸ Hegel, Logic, 36
²⁹ Hegel believed that language only expressed universals, historically this is connected to Plato’s forms.
Talking about developed languages presupposes how languages came about, but we must not answer the question of how to point out some of its obvious uses. For instance, nouns, verbs, and other parts of speech are given semantic meaning in part by syntactic order. The grammatical order gives us analytic truth as in the sentence, “the stork ate the frog,” for example. The most elementary understanding of Nouns, for example, is that they get meaning from their determination. Quite literally, they allow the speaker to point out a person, place, thing, or idea. The function of dialectical logic to bring determination to concepts through sublation is similar to the function of nouns—as grammatical concepts—to determine particular things. If we do not determine nouns, they are like being and nothing, pure abstractions. I am only pointing to the difference between an utterance and an utterance we call a noun; the difference is that the latter has determination.

Consider the nature of a verb: one of the principal parts of a verb is its infinitive form. In this form, the verb denotes an act but as unrelated to anything but itself. In other words, this form of the verb is undetermined, much like being and nothing are pure abstractions that are undetermined. For example, to eat has no determination because it is not conjugated. The conjugated form of the verb gives it determination and meaning because it determines the who and when of the verb. For example, he, she, it, eats. Dialectically, the unity of undetermined concepts, like being and nothing, comes into being with grammatical structure. Words begin to determine each other in ways they cannot without their context, meaning that grammar brings determination to the set of words: “you the reader are reading this sentence.”

30 Rosenzweig, Star, 119
Having seen that determination has its place in grammar, we arrive at constitution as the moment of the dialect dealing with outer limits. In the *Logic*, we see that “[t]his external connection [i.e., the externally imposed limit] on which the constitution depends, and the [subject’s] being determined through another, appear as something accidental.”

Outer limits are those imposed on something by something other than itself. In a political sense, the constitution outlines the scope of government drawing a line separating matters of the state and private matters. The corresponding concept, Personhood, is the moving about of a subject among its internal and external limits. Hegel spells this out more concretely in *The Philosophy of Right*. There the reader must understand that Hegel is no longer talking about thinking—as in the *Logic*—but he is describing a subject as experiencing the dialectic’s progression. Hegel is a phenomenologist!

In §35 of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel makes this phenomenological point explicit. He says that a “‘person’ is essentially different from [a] ‘subject,’ since ‘subject’ is only the possibility of personhood; every living thing of any sort is a subject.”

The shift I described above is Hegel’s shift from talking about logic to talking about the will leads this conversation to the concept of personhood. This was appropriate because by talking about Hegel’s work, works like this one use subjective judgment to think and talk about what Hegel has been saying. So, it is the person that deliberates and judges not only of these ideas but on the material world.

As immediate individuality, a person in making decisions is related to extant nature, and thus the personhood of the will stands over against this world of nature as something subjective. But because personhood is in itself infinite and universal, the restriction of being only subject is for it contradictory and nullifying. Through its

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32 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 41

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deeds, personhood suspends this restriction by giving itself reality, or, in other words, by positing that that existence as its own.\footnote{33} Personhood, in this sense, is expressed through the grammatical voice. Grammatical voice is “an indication, with transitive verbs (those that can take direct objects), of whether the subject performs the action (the active voice) or receives it ([the] passive voice]).”\footnote{34} Hegel claims that “[w]hat is rational about property is not that it satisfies needs but rather that it suspends the mere subjectivity of personhood.”\footnote{35} It is as the author of this thesis, my intellectual property before you, that I have transcended my subjectivity and have created an objective state of affairs: “You the reader are reading this thesis.”

I intend to demonstrate the way that Hegel put these concepts together creates ideas that language grammar is capable of conveying. What we have in personhood is a complex organization of concepts; Hegel is not just dropping it in unadorned. The same can be said of grammatical voice. Subject nouns, through actions, i.e., verbs like eating, express phenomenological realities like taking a natural drive, e.g., hunger, and determining them as one’s own. Craving a particular food is the subjective activity of taking hunger and expressing it as one’s desire. At the same time, if understood through the question of how language functions, the subjective experience of going beyond one’s limits, enables us to understand better how transcending subjectivity is not a mystical conception. This transcendence is further de-mystified when we give the language its proper position. Hunger and cravings seem like an arbitrary comparison, but the voice of the verbs allows us to have a visual of the relation between subject and verb. \textit{Nota bene:} grammatical voice allows us to see the semantic direction.

\footnote{33} Hegel, \textit{Philosophy of Right}, 42  
\footnote{34} Wheelock, \textit{Wheelock’s Latin}, 2  
\footnote{35} Hegel, \textit{Philosophy of Right}, 44
• Active voice: Noun (subject) \(\rightarrow\) Action (verb) \(\rightarrow\) Noun (object)
  - I am eating this [because I am hungry].

• Passive voice: Noun (subject) \(\leftarrow\) Action (verb) / agency requires a prepositional phrase in English.
  - I am struck with hunger [by a physiological need].

This thesis opened with a quote by Hegel, which should now have a more apparent significance. “A will that concludes nothing is not an actual will…”\(^{36}\) This is because personhood thinks, speaks, then surpasses its limitations. The physiological need for hunger is not something one has a say in. In that sense, we consider it something that takes action upon us: “I am hungry” is a realization, not a choice. Similarly, with love, we are struck with cupid’s arrow and can no longer resist that person that commands our love. The voice of a verb is not difficult to express because it merely asks who affects and who is affected. Sublation, on the other hand, as a cancellation and upbringing is far more difficult to express with arrows, so I do not attempt that. Despite that difficulty, sublation is no less a type of movement we understand through language. Language has the superb capacity to express the idea that personhood transcends its self-determination like being struck by a love arrow or craving a sandwich. In both cases, we see ourselves as affected and then choose whether to transcend the affection with some kind of active action, like sending a letter or making a sandwich. In the next chapter, I will discuss how grammar plays a role in personhood in the context of the work of Franz Rosenzweig.

For the remainder of the present chapter, I will be considering language in some of Marx’s work. Before interpreting Marx, I want to make an historical point: it seems that Marx

\(^{36}\)Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 26
wrote about Hegel in the same way that Aristotle wrote about Plato. Both Marx and Aristotle seem to deny a metaphysics wherein the immaterial precedes material reality. Aristotle said of Plato’s *Forms*, “[…] of the ways in which we prove that the *Forms* exist, none is convincing…” In *On the Terminology of ‘Abstraction’ in Aristotle*, John Cleary describes the traditional view of abstraction in Aristotle’s corpus. Namely, “[t]he traditional view has been that he is referring to some epistemological process of abstraction from matter, by means of which mathematical objects (along with other universals) are isolated from sensible particulars for the purposes of scientific knowledge.” Despite Cleary’s opposition to this view, I think this expresses what Marx was doing quite well.

In *De partibus Animalium*, Aristotle argues that a study of nature cannot begin with the counting of the individual peculiarities of each kind of animal. Doing so, he argues, would create an analysis that shows too much repetition. Instead, he proposed that:

> The best course [of action] appears to be that we should follow the method already mentioned and begin with the phenomena presented by each group of animals, and when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the causes of those phenomena and to deal with their evolution.

Aristotle describes a two-part process: first, a scientific study should begin with “the phenomena” or the way things are; second, proceed to explain the evolution or process by which these things came to be.

Marx’s early work is characteristically Aristotelean in the sense that it is a study of nature concerned with the phenomena itself. Marx proclaimed, “Man is a natural being,” and he studied him as such. Moreover, just as Aristotle laid down a critique of

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40 Marx, *Marx and Engels Reader*, Economic and Philosophic manuscripts, 115
Plato’s *Forms*, Marx says, “the entire *Logic* is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself; that the Absolute Idea is nothing in itself, that only Nature is something.”\(^4\) The historical point I am making serves to exemplify the analytic relationship of categories to history, its present, and the future. It is evident that Marx is not an exemption. He did not create a system by which to analyze nature and categorize her. It is my position here that Marx exemplifies a masterful application of the conceptual way that science categorizes our world.

It is noteworthy to say again that Marx famously criticized Hegel for filling the contents of his dialectical logic with mysticism and abstractions of thought. Then Marx presented his alternative and defined it in this way:

> [Historical materialism] has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period [sought] to look for a category, but constantly remains on the real ground of history; it does not explain from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism…\(^4\)

This move to a more material understanding of the world does as Aristotle suggested. Namely, it begins with the material phenomena and proceeds to create an explanation of how such a state of affairs came to be. For my purpose, it will suffice to do two things: to show that despite his claims, Marx indeed used categories to explain economic and historical phenomena; and to explain the role of language grammar in conveying these ideas through the declension of nouns.

As Marx attempts to describe the world scientifically, he avoids categories. In *The German Ideology*, he says,

> The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the

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\(^4\) *Ibid.*, 122

\(^4\) Marx, *Marx and Engels Reader*, The German Ideology, 164
real individual, their activity, and the material condition under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.\textsuperscript{43}

What Marx empirically verifies is the conditions of the working people in the advent of the industrial revolution; in these premises, Marx had the phenomena to be explained. In each case, he asserts, that these conditions had a beginning, and therefore, a history. He remarks, “[t]he first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.” I should point out that I am not focused on whether this claim is correct. Instead, I want us to think about the possibility that Marx was indeed engaged in what I will now call the \textit{scientific image of the world}.\textsuperscript{44}

This \textit{scientific image} in every case leads down the same road. I will say more about this view in the next chapter; here I need only point to one of the features of this world view: despite Marx’s focus on the material reality of individuals and the hardships that the working class endured during the industrial revolution, etc., his analysis eventually abstracts to the point where categories, and not individuals, are the subject at hand. What I am not doing here is raising objections or challenges to his conception of history, his labor-theory of value, nor his call for revolution. Instead, I am drawing attention to the use of categories and the worldview they tend to create. Given this interpretation of Marx, I find it difficult to support using this knowledge as a means to create normative ethics. That will be the topic for the next chapter in this thesis.

Previously, we saw that Hegel guides his readers from the consideration of logical abstractions to a discussion of personhood. In terms of progression, I want to ask how Marx begins with the definite individual—this empirical reality—and ends with

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 149  
\textsuperscript{44} This is a reference to Rosenzweig’s understanding of a world view informed by scientific knowledge.
categorical representations? The matter is complicated because Marx asserts that “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”\textsuperscript{45} History, as the “production of material life,” admits of uncritical use of the linguistic modes of empirical descriptions. Thus, Marx moves from the individual to a collective category because of the nature of his empirical inquiry. He resists considering the individual in a Hegelian fashion (as noted above) because, among other things, the scientific method itself, i.e., individual peculiarity, admits of far too much repetition.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, Marx maintains that it is not what individuals do \textit{qua} individuals, but what and how they do it together that defines them.

The human being is in the most literal sense a [political animal], not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society—a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness—is as much of an absolute absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other.\textsuperscript{47}

The social component in Marx is essential and that will become more and more apparent as we advance. We have seen that Hegel believed that subjectivity and consciousness becomes objective—something material—through the actions of the will. Hegel, like others before him, thought this is how property came about. Marx sees things fundamentally different from Hegel. He maintains that human activity is like language in that it cannot develop outside of social interaction. Therefore, action, which is necessarily collective action, objectifies not one individual, as such, but a society.

\textsuperscript{45} Marx, \textit{Marx and Engels Reader}, The German Ideology, 155  
\textsuperscript{46} Aristotle, \textit{The Basic Works of Aristotle}, Parts of Animals, 645  
\textsuperscript{47} Marx, \textit{Marx and Engels Reader}, The Grundrisse, 225
Independently of whether Marx was interested in doing so, I suggest that it is the process itself that makes it difficult to remain faithful to the unique material circumstance of the individual. Nevertheless, I believe that what is lost is an adequate rendition of the unique lived experience of the individual. I make this claim on the basis that, regardless of what can be said empirically, each person may experience the same (e.g.) working conditions differently. Whether my claim applies in every case is not the point; rather, my point here, is to show that this is the case for Marx. The common denominator, therefore, between “the early Marx” and the scientific Marx who authored the “critique of capitalism,” is his consistent use of categories. As I noted above, Marx does not shy away from employing this use of categories to create a view of all recorded history. Famously he wrote,

The [recorded] history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.49

The Manifesto is undoubtedly consistent with his view that the individual and their labor is social. Nevertheless, it is equally valid to point out that there he uses categories, i.e., types of people and types of work, to construct an intellectual history. For example, we see in The German Ideology when Marx writes,

In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages…50

48 The division is used in “The Marx and Engels Reader” edited by Robert C. Tucker.
49 Marx, Marx and Engels Reader, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 473
50 Marx, Marx and Engels Reader, The German Ideology, 192
The level of abstraction in this passage is evident because Marx points to nothing particular. To put this in the Aristotelian notation, I outlined above: the phenomenon is the mischief and the burdens felt by one class of people, the proletariat. Marx deals with this evolution by pointing to the intercourse of productive forces in society to explain the evolution of this state of affairs.

Finally, in perhaps the most scientific of Marx’s work, Capital, Marx confirms what I suggested above. Namely, despite beginning with empirical observation, one must use language abstractly to make statistically verifiable claims. The language itself demands abstraction at varying levels. In Capital, Marx advises the reader to be willing to learn something new despite the difficulty of his method. We may ask, if it is based on observations, for the premises must be evident to the senses, the reader would expect the contents of Capital to be plain and obvious. If the reader is well acquainted with the mathematical equations used in the description of capital, it need not be complicated work. However, the scientific method itself, as I suggested, requires specific language.

Moreover, Marx, who previously had only pointed us toward material circumstance, had to admit, “But here [in Capital] individuals, are dealt with only in so far as they are the personification of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests.”51 What we see is that scientific knowledge necessarily abstracts from what is immediately available to the senses and proceeds to use the tense and person of language to describe a world view. Because I set out only to show that the use of categories is nothing strange for Marx’s empirical scientific inquiry, nothing more

51 Marx, Marx and Engels Reader, Capital Volume one, 297
needs to be covered. Thus, we arrive at our second task: to explain how language
grammar does convey these ideas through the declension of nouns.

In the context of this thesis, Marx is due some praise. He believed that the corrupt
nature of social relations made out of a man one thing in life, for example, a fisherman. A
fisherman is an individual who represents a category of those who pursue the act of
fishing often or by trade. As a member of a category, the subject-noun, fisherman, does
not form a typical sentence composed of a noun and verb. The word fisherman is a type
of noun that denotes a type of being not action. Language can convey this difference
through the form of nouns. That is to say, you can be a specific type of person, or you can
do certain acts. Categories do this explicitly for the sake of knowledge. It is useful for a
king to know how many fishermen are under the employ of the generals, for example.

Marx, in *Capital*, attempted to understand the working of capital and the role of the
laborer in its creation. Laborer, however, is a type of being, and while it may seem trivial
that we can say “a laborer” instead of “a person who works,” Rosenzweig shows that it is
no small thing to categorize people. One example in the Marxist lexicon is the term
*lumpenproletariat*, which denotes the “rag-like” characteristics of those oppressed by
the capitalist system. I will talk about the issues with this in a later chapter. For my thesis,
when individuals are categorized—outside of the context of scientific inquiry—I will
refer to that as using their genitive being.

My concern with the use of categories in moral contexts is in line with the
communist vision in Marx. He complained that the capitalist mode of production
reinforced this notion that individuals represent a category or sector of labor. He, too,

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clearly saw this as a negative thing, and for that, I applaud his work. Whereas Hegel praised such actualization of universals, i.e., that people be fishermen, hunters, etc., Marx thought this label was “an alien power opposed to [man], which enslaves him…”\(^{53}\) Here is Marx’s vision:

While in a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today. Another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.\(^{54}\)

Marx had the intent of describing humans in the nominative case—as the doers of actions. Marx’s use of categories overlooks that his language is categorial, and as we will see in the following chapters, problematic. Nonetheless, his vision is something quite remarkable and praiseworthy. It encourages us to focus on what people do and not on what category we might feel they belong to. To put it grammatically, people ought to exist, and consequently be recognized, as subject nouns which do verbs. At the same time, he is saying that people should not have “one exclusive sphere of activity” nor be considered “hunter” or “fishermen.” Marx is arguing that no person is merely a representation of a category. Consequently, communities are different from categories of people identified by any science.

\(^{54}\) *Ibidem*.
CHAPTER 2: THE GRAMMAR OF THE STAR

Franz Rosenzweig’s *The Star of Redemption* provides for us a working example of the application of the idea of “renovated grammar.” Namely, the analysis of the performative function of grammatical structure, developed by Rosenstock-Huessy.\(^{55}\) The analysis consists of exploring the power of grammatical structures to convey or transmit meaning alongside the semantic and pragmatic capabilities of language. The idea itself is not unique; for instance, developments in the field of linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century likewise explored the ability of language to do more than describe the world. Pragmatism, a field that studies the capacity of speech utterances to cause a change in the world, comes to mind when there is mention of speech-act theory. However, as Gibb’s shows,\(^{56}\) Rosenzweig’s use of language in *The Star* only somewhat correlates with the field of pragmatic linguistics.

Contrary to Rosenzweig, someone like J.L. Austin—a significant figure in linguistics—believed that “there is no directly binding correspondence between the grammar of a sentence and its performative force.”\(^{57}\) In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated how grammar is capable of conveying similar ideas in both Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism. Moving forward, I focus on Rosenzweig’s unique application of this “renovated grammar” through *The Star* to propose a way of applying Rosenzweig’s philosophy of language to modern moral concerns. To do this, I present a secular reading of some essential parts of *The Star* by focusing on the human role in Rosenzweig’s account of reality. In continuation of the discussion of the will in chapter one, I use the structure of language, in the context of Rosenzweig’s work, to

\(^{55}\) Gibbs, *Correlations*, 62
\(^{56}\) *Ibid.*, 63
\(^{57}\) *Ibidem.*
further explain how I believe humans can live actively and passively. Following Rosenzweig, I propose that language has the capacity of both categorially grouping individuals by type, i.e., the genitive being I discussed with Marx, and of explaining how individuals willfully come together as a community. More importantly, for my thesis, I assert that we ought to be cognizant of how grammar, primarily the noun’s declension, seems to predispose our actions. I will return to this in the latter half of this chapter.

Benjamin Pollock’s entry in the Stanford encyclopedia notes that Rosenzweig’s intentions with *The Star* were not religious. He writes, “Indeed, Rosenzweig insists in numerous contexts that the Star be understood ‘only as a system of philosophy,’ that is, as committed to the very task of systematic thinking to which the German Idealists were committed.”58 Theological as it may be, *The Star* can be more than mere religious doctrine. When read secularly, *The Star* is a meaningful contribution to philosophy. In this way, we can set our sights on two significant points running through it: Rosenzweig’s notion of a renovated grammar and the ethical implications of its use in moral circumstances. In Rosenzweig’s view, the systematic understanding of the world comes about through the “configuration of reality”59 in terms of three “Elements” along with these elements respective “Courses.”60 My thesis requires that I explain how the theological concepts in *The Star* align with a relatable experience of reality. In each of the “courses” –creation, revelation, redemption—language is the organon through which we arrive at a description of how these theological categories reflect certain kinds of experience.

58 Pollock, *Franz Rosenzweig*, 2019
59 See Simon, *Art and Responsibility*, 19 for uses this phrase to explain Rosenzweig’s use of the Elements and their course.
60 I will frequently use the word [maybe use course as a road or is course as the experience of narration] trajectory to describe Rosenzweig’s transition from the concept of creation, revelation, to redemption. This is because I describe the experience of them as a journey through each as if they were experienced one after the other. I maintain that they must not necessarily be experience this way, but nonetheless describing them that way makes it easier to describe secularly. Rosenzweig himself calls the part of The Star dealing with these concepts “the course or the ever-renewed cosmos.”
Rosenzweig uses these theological terms as categories that correspond to certain grammatical concepts. For this, the following table is beneficial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theological Concept</th>
<th>Mood</th>
<th>Tense</th>
<th>Pronouns</th>
<th>Voice/Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Indicative</td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>He, She, It</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td>Imperative</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>You, I</td>
<td>Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redemption</td>
<td>Cohortative, <em>(Subjunctive)</em></td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>We, Ye—HE</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If indeed, these categories represent real relationships, they ought to align with how we experience the world. Otherwise, it is hard to justify the corresponding grammatical categories, as charted above. Rosenzweig is not merely claiming that language describes such relationships. He claims the nature of each of the relationships is, at least in part, determined and structured by the grammar of the speech that forms the respective relationships in question.

**CREATION**

The chart above illustrates the correlations between a grammatical category and the theological category listed on the far-left column. Take, for example, creation, which is the activity of describing how the world became the place that it is; revelation is the experience of the present moment from the perspective of the I; the future as redemption is that which we experience as something we must take upon ourselves to make through creating communities and fulfilling a purpose. The notion of a renovated grammar does not begin with a paradox to

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61 The table is an adaptation of the table provided by Gibbs and is useful because it gives us a proper description of the way in which Rosenzweig uses grammar to structure the reality. My additions are italicized.


63 Gibbs, *Correlations*, 77. This is Gibbs understanding of the use of the cohortative case represented by Redemption.
be solved by logic or otherwise. It begins with the presupposition that historical narrative-building presupposes language. My task here is to address the question: in what way can we experience creation, revelation, or redemption?

To experience the theological categories is not merely some religious experience. Rosenzweig’s renovated grammar is innovative because it does not struggle to explain the phenomenology of experiencing god’s creation. Instead, it lays out the grammar involved in seeing the world as created. The argument for a secular understanding of this theological category is: if creation is only a certain way that we use language to explain the world, and everyone uses language, then everyone can experience creation. To make creation something meaningful, Rosenzweig pits it up against another world view, which necessarily uses the same type of language: Scientific Image of the World.”

[t]o be recognized, the world is projected every time into the past… Occurrence is not reduced to the changeable present. Rather, as in differential calculus, everything must be brought down to the at-rest form, that is, the past tense, even the present, the instant of movement…

My position is that Marx has a world view which presupposed a scientific image. His work exemplifies the objective sense of knowing the world. If we take a look at the claims in Part One, Book Two of The Star, we find that Rosenzweig gives us reason to analyze Marx as we did in the previous chapter.

For species and genus are concepts which are unconditional universalities only vis-à-vis their particularity, and so are community, nation, and state, if we may pass into the human sphere; for the rest, however, all these concepts are units which can very well unite among themselves into pluralities of categories, nations, states. Just so, for its part, the individuum too is an individuality pure and simple only vis-à-vis its category and for all that capable of representing a category—its category—only because it already represents a plurality vis-à-vis the naked, blind particular.

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64 Rosenzweig, Star, 132
65 Ibidem., My emphasis.
This plurality consists of at least two stipulations: the criteria of species and its own peculiarity.\textsuperscript{66}

Thinking in categories as Marx does, is indeed the result of knowing the world as philosophers do. In Hegel, we have the culmination of all philosophic thinking in that Hegel’s intention was to create a system in which all prior positions have a role to play in \textit{everything} is. What results is what we have seen in the last chapter, universal categories giving temporal meaning to the material realities of the world. For example, for Marx, a worker is not one who chooses to act in a certain way or under the direction of another, but someone who represents the particular relationship among categories defined by thinking about the capitalist mode of production. The problem with this view, as Rosenzweig sees it is that the concept of the proletariat is something that can be validated insofar as reason contents that this is the way things are. Creation admits only of a world “thus,” already here to be talked about and not generated from the logical discourse of systematic philosophy.

Marx and Hegel both based their ideas on a system with which to understand all of history. In so doing, their subject-matter is the product of logical generation. The claim is that a universal concept gives rise to temporal material realities like the \textit{lumpenproletariat}. In other words, each system creates a world view which depends on the underlying logic. Rosenzweig says that “Idealism, gave itself over completely into the power of its creature, logic.”\textsuperscript{67} Although Marxist materialism is not idealism per se, it is nonetheless a system in which the individual loses themselves within the presupposed logical structure. In the case of Marx, his judgment that “[t]he [recorded] history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”\textsuperscript{68} only

\textsuperscript{66} Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 49. The mathematical theory of sets is informing Rosenzweig’s understanding of the scientific world view.

\textsuperscript{67} Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 146

\textsuperscript{68} Marx, \textit{Marx and Engels Reader}, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 473
makes sense under the conditions that he is following a certain logic. For Rosenzweig, this means that since they are entirely dependent on whatever logic they posit, their worldview at the same time, “[loses] touch with that living existence [i.e., the person] which it had undertaken to substantiate and to comprehend.”

Grammatically, both creation and the scientific world view use the perfect indicative tense. The difference is that creation uses speech to describe how the world came to be as it is. The subtle distinction is that the spoken word replaces the symbolism of logic and, as Rosenzweig understood it, mathematics. The spoken world comes to be through the narratives that are formed by the sentences and dialogues we engage in. Rosenzweig’s Midrash of the book of Genesis is significant because it points to the grammar of the spoken beginning. Such a created world depends on sentences composed on the most elementary level of nouns, verbs, and adjectives. I want to emphasize this is why, in the previous chapter, I suggested that nouns and verbs were conceptual parallels to some of the logical concepts in Hegelian logic.

Language is uniquely suited to explain how we constructed the world because our stories created it. The idea of creation rivals the concept of generation used in the principles of idealist logic. Language allows us to see the world as “thus” because making sentences begins with attribution. By predicating, we are affirming materiality, that something is there to be “the bearer of the attributes.” Nouns are not representative of a presupposed category inherently, but instead, this noun is dependent on language for its proper determination: is the subject of a

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69 Rosenzweig, *Star*, 146
70 Simon, *Art and Responsibility*, 111-151. “Thus, and not otherwise” refers to a logical sentence structure that has with Rosenzweig’s underlying speech act logic. How to make sense of the speech acts? We have to include the thus, because it presupposed that language makes sentences with attribution. Creation is a relationship between nouns and verbs and adjectives. Moving from indefinite to definition.
71 Being the bearer of attributes already shifts our attention back to Aristotle. What does it mean to be the subject of a sentence?
committee member or *the* committee member. The work of the article is to fix a noun in space, “it is this member here specifically, *the* member.” To come back to Marx, by considering the language involved in narrative-telling, we differentiate the concept of the worker, i.e., this or that person, from a subject representative of some category. Furthermore, describing the functions of language, we are keeping our attention on the individual, without succumbing to the critique, Rosenzweig has for systems thinkers like Hegel and Marx:

Really as this individual thing? It had, after all, been recognized only as a representative of a category, and was a dark abstraction vis-à-vis the reality of the attributes. How little it is in itself, an individual becomes clear as soon as we consider the proper noun, the name.72

It has been language and how we choose to use it that gives us the ability to form an attitude to have towards the world.73 The noun presupposes a case and becomes supremely important because its article, whether definite or indefinite, tells us how particular of a subject we mean, and the proper name is the most specific. The definite article points to the third grammatical person. The subject’s role in our sentence is always relative to the case of the noun. In creation, the language of narration, the noun must be an object, because it is what we are talking about. We can think about indirect statements here: “the author of this thesis said, ‘the member of the committee was given this thesis to judge.’” So long as my language describes that you were given this thesis, the subject of the sentence “the member of the committee” is the indirect object—in the *dative* case—who was given this thesis—in the *accusative* case—as the direct object. This thesis is not the generation of some logical system, but a story about how, as the author, I asked that *you* judge this work. This narrating activity is how Rosenzweig keeps in touch with the world. Indeed, every country, culture, and society have their history.

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72 Rosenzweig, *Star*, 128
73 World [Veltumshemung] a view on the world versus the claim is that our language will have an effect on how we act in the world as such.
As the reader, to whom I gave this thesis, you represent only yourself. “The reader” is “the pinnacle of [...] objectiveness”\textsuperscript{74} because, in my narrative, it can only mean precisely one person, you. The story of this thesis is simple, but it is not the result of the logical development of the Idea, nor could the modes of production predict that it would be coming about. We may ask, why should we care that such a simple story could not be resultant of any system of logic? We should not, but posing such a question is, at the same time, an admission that these “systems” do not consider the creative power of our speech-acts.

Returning to my example, I not only identified a particular person, namely, you, the reader, but also created a relationship for you with the language I used. Rosenzweig’s point is that mere identification does not in itself form a sentence. The case of the noun in this context is of utmost importance because it creates several possible relationships. These grammatical functions are challenging because we are no longer acquainted with the grammatical concept of the declension and cases of nouns. In English, we know these forms of nouns simply as subject, object of possession, object, and the indirect object. Namely, the nominative, genitive, accusative, and dative forms of the noun. The cases of nouns allow language to relate words to each other.

The final grammatical consideration here is time. In its infinitive form, the verb depicts the concept of motion. It informs the listener that the act could have occurred in the past, is occurring now, or that it will occur in the future. Much like nouns, verbs need determination through which they are fixed to time by their tense. The objectivity of the third person is matched only by the perfected state of the past tense. In creation, “[t]he perfect tense completes the

\textsuperscript{74} Rosenzweig, Star, 131
objectiveness of occurrence, as that of being is completed by the definite article and its thing like character.” Together the perfect and the third person mean “double objectiveness.”

Creation means that the “world possesses creatureliness, where ‘creatureliness’ means a creature’s capacity to be continuously re-created.” Creation is the story we tell ourselves through language about how we got to the place we are now. It naturally points to the perfect indicative and rivals in purpose the scientific image of the world, which generates a logic to explain it in this or that way objectively. The use of indirect statements here is entirely appropriate because, even though I created the narrative of your being given this thesis, I referred to myself in the third person, as the author. Thus, Rosenzweig says, “[s]omething new has dawned. But something more than a self too—a soul?” By using the term soul, Rosenzweig is alluding to an idea also found in Locke’s Essay,

1. Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear.

In the context of the concept of creation, the unrelated self takes the place of an object that is observed, known, or talked about. The soul (Seele), however, is active in the sense that it breathes out by speaking. In my example, this would be the hypothetical case that I utter with speech, “you the reader are reading this thesis,” instead of writing it. The theological concept renders the idea as such:

The breath of life has been breathed into man, but does he really exhale it too? Does he speak? He is created speech-less. And again, we run up against that wall which separates portent form sign, prophecy from miracle.
I mean not to imply that Locke and Rosenzweig have a similar theory of meaning, but that they, in the excerpts I quoted are referring to the same quality to language: that, “[t]he comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts…[conveyed to others].”81 As a matter of theology, Rosenzweig captures these ideas in two ways: for internal thought—or ideas, as Locke calls them—he points to God’s monologue in the Genesis myth; regarding speech, he points to the dialogue of in the Song of Songs. I find that the notion of indirect statements is helpful because such language allows us to know that we are using a language’s narrative function.

**REVELATION**

As we leave behind the indirect statement of the fixed past, we move to what must come before something is completed: a present moment. It is in this sense that Rosenzweig asserts that “[h]e who has not yet been reached by the voice of revelation has no right to accept the idea of creation as if it were a scientific hypothesis.”82 No one can narrate the past without having lived the present beforehand because the past is a present moment that is standing still. In this sense, Rosenzweig is correct in saying you have to have revelation before creation. The completed present moment is the perfect indicative or the simple present of the ever-changing present; we try to capture this through the present progressive.

Revelation seems to be the most difficult of the theological categories to explicate secularly because the concept of god is such a central part of Rosenzweig’s explanation. In sharp contrast with Hegel, who said, “[r]eason is the certainty which consciousness has of being all reality,”83 Rosenzweig suggests that we leave behind logical or casual determination and look for

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81 Locke, *Essay*, 333
82 Rosenzweig, *Star*, 135
83 Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 137
something which causes things to occur only from the present moment. What sort of language can create a present “here and now”? Previously I used indirect statements to make the point that creation is about the testimony. As a theological concept, revelation seeks to identify which parts of speech can fix our experience in the present. Rosenzweig explains the difference in our experience of the present as action connected to the past but as more than mere testimony; this is why indirect statements served us well before. In creation, the theological concept brings to light the language of bearing witness, giving evidence.

Contrary to Augustine’s account of time, revelation as the language of the present is much more than attention. The present tense is the experience of creating the perfect tense. Rosenzweig’s view of the present also leaves behind any notion of “eternal laws;” instead, revelation looks for the most present of experiences. Language is a temporalizing phenomenon that summons the personal name of the subjects.

The theology is helpful here because the story of creation itself wonderfully describes the coming to be of the past as something promised by the language of the present. Take for example, “And God said ‘Let there be…”’ While this phrase is in the simple past tense, it tells of a past, “God said,” that can only be created by a present act, “let there be.” The claim is not as brilliant as it might seem, but the distinction it makes is essential. I propose that Rosenzweig’s view of the present is incompatible with the notion of causal determinism. Because what the story in the biblical narrative of Genesis teaches us is that the present is continuous. It is creating the past moment by moment. The concept of revelation tells us that the present is not as we tend

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84 This is a historical reference to Augustine, who in Confessions, suggests this is how we might understand time.
85 “let there be” is in the present tense of the subjunctive mood.
86 Hoefer, Causal Determinism, 2016. According to the Stanford encyclopedia causal determinism is “is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.”
to think of it; it is not the case that all immediate actions are determined by events that proceeded them.\(^{87}\)

The question is, what sort of actions are done without having been determined by past events? The answer is loving one’s neighbor.

For Love alone is at once such a fateful domination of the heart in which it stirs, and yet so newborn, initially so without a past, so wholly sprung from the moment which it fulfills, and only from that moment.\(^{88}\)

The question from a theological perspective is whether humans can act with divine love. My response is simple, and here I agree with Gibbs on the matter, “Rosenzweig does not claim that we will hear voices or see visions, that we will have some religious experience of the numinous.”\(^{89}\) In terms of interpreting *The Star* and theologically, this might be up for debate, but for my thesis, it is not a pressing issue.\(^{90}\) The question from a grammatical perspective is which elements of grammar explain the present in terms of a loving relationship.

The first condition is the movement away from testimony; this implies moving into the first and second person because the third person does not speak for itself. Love fits this condition because it cannot be testified. For example, “the lover told his beloved that he loves her,” is not an act of love is obvious. From a theological perspective, God could not declare his love through a prophet because such love would be indirect speech. What Rosenzweig seeks instead is the function of a direct statement. Gibbs accurately describes this situation, saying that Rosenzweig moves to the imperative mood—from the indicative of creation—by the use of speech in the imperative mood because this mood “orients me to another’s command of me.”\(^{91}\)

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\(^{87}\) Rosenzweig, *Star*, 182

\(^{88}\) *Ibid.*, 160

\(^{89}\) Gibbs, *Correlations*, 99

\(^{90}\) The different interpretations from someone like Elliot Wolfson or Samuelson would help the reader on this point.

\(^{91}\) Gibbs, *Correlations*, 104
the voice of another, which commands me, the imperative orients us to an existent relation, one is directed to another’s voice; the command gives me direction. Rosenzweig’s insight is that his analysis in revelation focuses on the imperative and not the present indicative. The preference is not arbitrary, though Rosenzweig does not address this issue in *The Star*. If one is familiar with *The Star*, it is clear enough why the indicative will not do in the context of the category of revelation. Simply put, the present indicative allows for the subject to speak in monologue, and we cannot create communities through monologue.

Therefore, engaging in dialogue becomes paramount for revelation because, while monologue can be internally self-referential, dialogue includes another person. In other words, dialogue cannot remain silent because it is an utterance from within to command another to recognize one in a particular way. It is a matter of how the first and second persons, while relating to each other, are limited to referring to the third person as an object. At its core, the claim is that in dialogue, *I* is always opposite and responding to *you*. Simon explains the grammatical relationship between the grammatical persons by saying,

> The I, as subject of experience, is not a thing under things, as in creation, but is determined to be radically individual, that is, so chaotically individual that it is not capable of being classified as merely one among other things of the same species.92

And so, Marx’s attempt to understand the working person, the *lumpenproletariat*, is completely inadequate in the context of Rosenzweig’s revelation.

Revelation is the claim that love is a dialogue expressed in the imperative mood that captures a moment of the present that only exists as a pure moment. As I noted earlier about the references to the speech acts of creation, revelation opposes to the objectivity of the past tense and even the present tense testimony. Rosenzweig claims that “…the presentness of experience

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92 Simon, *Art and Responsibility*, 97
is only satisfied by the form of the command, originating, spoken, perceived, and carried out all at one blow.”

This “one blow,” in the context of an analysis of the subject of love, means that “[a]ll true statements about love must be words from its own mouth, borne of by the I.”

What I consider meaningful about the suggestion about love by Rosenzweig is his claim that it must come by way of personal testimony but, more importantly, that it must be a command expressed in the imperative mood. In the imperative mood, there is no past, no future, only the present. The alternative, the hortatory subjunctive, might exhort one to love, but this mood is not limited to addressing another in the second person and therefore is not uniquely tied to the personal expression of the I. And the subjunctive mood, relates far too much to uncertainty and even points ahead to the future. The imperative mood is limited to the present, and there is no ambiguity of time for the command; “love me!” means “do it now.” What is further implied by saying “do it now” is an important part of the argument, namely that the uttering the command implies the concepts of space and time. Specifically, the response to the command of love means for the beloved that she is no longer is concerned only with herself. The beloved faces another who demands of her all of her attention in the present moment. The significance of this should not be understated; it points to the possibility for the beloved to choose her actions based on her present reality, not on her experience.

Space is just as important as time, and we can reiterate how the imperative command calls our attention to another’s command of me. We can conclude that love is a present moment that cannot be testified about but only experienced. The experience of love attends to the present moment when another person responds to another’s expression of love. This expression is an imperative command to leave behind one’s past and attend to the cry of the inner self as one

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93 Rosenzweig, Star, 186
94 Ibid., 102
person recognizes another. In this dialogue, we move to the use of grammar that attempts to give a phenomenology of the personal name. As we move from a world of things among things, e.g., the workers among capitalists, we find that through Marx’s view, an individual is no more than a thing that is part of the world, it does not yet “have its place in the world.” In revelation, however, a lover's place in the world is now front and center; it is the beloved who has a particular name and a particular history. And for the beloved, it is otherwise, the lover. At this point, space, time, and grammar come together in one concept: the proper name.

Hegelian logic and Marxist materialism are indifferent to the proper name because reason determines everything that is the case. From a grammatical perspective, we see that love, as an imperative command, is perfectly suited for the demand of another personal name. The imperative mood itself welcomes the use of the vocative case, which formally summons another by name. The nominative I finds in the vocative (the proper name of another) its recognition in another as more than a body to be named or categorized later. And so, through this dialogue wherein another becomes my focal point, “…there can be no category for [my interlocutor] to belong to; it is its own category.” But the imperative mood is more important than one might believe at first glance even though the indicative also calls a person by their name. The grammatical difference is that the use of the proper name in the indicative is not limited to speaking to the person named. The vocative is limited to directly addressing the person whose name is called. This grammatical distinction is lost in modern English, but the Latin exemplifies this grammatical phenomenon perfectly:

- Quintus (nominative) writes the poem.

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95 Rosenzweig, *Star*, 187
96 Etymological root is *Sonder* which means to distinguish one thing from another.
97 Rosenzweig, *Star*, 187
Quintus poema scribit.

- Quintus (vocative), write the poem!

Quinte poema scribe.

Note how the Latin tells the reader and listeners that Quintus’ name changes when he is addressed directly. In the English, the name remains unchanged despite the change in its grammatical function. The difference between the declension of personal names is significant for Rosenzweig.

The second reason why Rosenzweig is emphasizing the personal name is that the person always takes up their own particular time and determinate space; Rosenzweig refers to the former as midpoint and the latter as a beginning.

In the intricate world of things, there was no midpoint or beginning at all; the I, however, together with its proper name, introduces these concepts of midpoint and beginning into the world...[this person] The I, longs for orientation, for a world which does not lie there in any old arrangement, nor flow past in any old sequence, but a world which supports the inner order inherent in the sequence, but a world which supports the inner order inherent in the I’s experience on the solid base of an external order. One proper name demands others.98

In other words, through the use of objective language, which is a world where everyone is a he-she-it, we would have a world in which the person always feels out of place. The claim is not difficult to grasp; Rosenzweig asserts that grammar is used to connect one person to another in more than just syntax.

If we create an objective world where everything is at odds with each other (instead of in a relationship) people stand face to face in a battle to the death99. Grammar gives us insight into the function of personal names. Understood through the theological category, Rosenzweig’s point is that such an attachment for objectivity prevents one from

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98 Rosenzweig, Star, 187
99 See Hegel’s comments of the master and slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
seeing the other as they see themselves. The alternative view, the one considerate of the personal name, is one where you are no longer just a reader to me; You are the reader who has been called to judge this thesis by your name. The importance of dialogue is that individuals are not spoken about but spoken to.

REDEMPTION

Throughout my interpretation of the first two theological categories, I referred to you the reader either by using indirect statements or literally by using the personal name. Given the nature of Rosenzweig’s work, it was quite appropriate that I do so. The preceding two sections use the passive voice and indirect statements to explain the human role in creation and revelation respectively. In creation, the human is the creation of God or the representation of an empirically verifiable category. In revelation, the human subject is the beloved, whose attention is called to the present in dialogue by the imperative command. And now, in redemption, we point to the future to two additional grammatical concepts: the active voice and the cohortative (subjunctive) mood. The active voice represents the activity of moving beyond being an object of knowledge (creation) and an object of love (revelation). In our context, it means engaging others through the transitive verb to love. For this reason, Rosenzweig described redemption as the departing from the paternal home of divine love and setting forth into the world.¹⁰⁰ In the previous section, I alluded to the cohortative mood by pointing to our—Jules, Steve, and Josiah¹⁰¹—future coming together. I did so because the cohortative mood allows us to distinguish one particular way in which communities of individuals come together. Through the view of redemption, we understand those communities as something other

¹⁰⁰ Rosenzweig, Star, 205
¹⁰¹ The thesis committee is listed on page i.
than categories with representative members. I will return to this with the idea of limiting ourselves to considering only our genitive being.

Redemption is likewise associated with the cohortative mood and future tense because the activity of loving our neighbor and creating communities anticipates a future spoken world wherein “the we and the ye [ihr]\textsuperscript{102} sink back into one single blinding light.”\textsuperscript{103} With the experience of anticipation, we arrive at the grammatical analysis of the future tense and the cohortative mood. We began with narration and found our way to dialogue, but as we look to the future, our speech is now something more:

This time grammar emerges, not as narrative striving to proceed from the narrator to the matter, nor as dialogue oscillating between two partners, but as a chant which is enhanced with every stanza, and as an archetypal chant which is always the chant of several parties.\textsuperscript{104}

The language associated with coming together for singing is important for my thesis because it provides us an alternate form of understanding the world around us. As Samuelson explains, “…the critical feature here noted about redemption from this single line of the prayer is that redemption is an expression of people formed into community who no longer function in the world as isolated individuals.”\textsuperscript{105}

Language grammar is unique in that it allows us not only to describe the hard-working people of the industrial revolution as exploited victims of a new mode of production, but it also allows us to question our genitive being. However, that we can question a category used to identify us is nothing unique to redemption, I will explore this in more detail in the final chapter. In the previous chapter, however, I praised Marx for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{102}{You all over there.}
\footnotetext{103}{Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 238}
\footnotetext{104}{Ibid., 231}
\footnotetext{105}{Samuelson, \textit{Guide}, 197}
\end{footnotes}
believing this was possible. The history of philosophy is no stranger to such ideas, like Rosenzweig, we can understand the notion of challenging our being by Sartre’s famous notion of “mouvaise foi.” In the context of redemption, this means that the future is the anticipation of a better world through the active creation of communities, not the passive representing of categories. The creation of communities is a task associated with the future tense in a grammatical sense: the subjective mood differs from the indicative in that it does not point out something that is the case. Instead, it is “the mood of potential, tentative, hypothetical, ideal, or even unreal action.”\textsuperscript{106} The subjective mood has several uses and forms, among which is the cohortative and the jussive subjunctives. Though slightly different from each other, what I want to point out about them is that they allow for commands in the first and second person, unlike the imperative mood. “Thus, the concluding stanza of the chant of redemption begins with the We.”\textsuperscript{107}

We create communities when we use speech to do two things: 1) identify the widest conceivable circle of subjects and 2) identify the boundary of this circle through the use of purpose. The theological categories are apt for the description of this process because through the shared purpose of thanksgiving, they create a community to come together and give thanks to God. The first premise, to identify a community occurs through the speech-act, “let us,” because the subjunctive verb used here does not identify a subject. Rosenzweig focuses on the idea that the subject is no addition of individuals under a more extensive set because such a structure would be too much like the indicative language of math and logic.

\textsuperscript{106} Wheelock, \textit{Wheelock’s Latin}, 186
\textsuperscript{107} Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 237
In this context, the phrase “let us” is an act that brings together those who willingly identify with the “us.” Rosenzweig’s idea is that those coming together remain in the nominative case retaining their right not to be objectified. Grammatically, the claim is that the plural subject wherein the individuals lose their uniqueness occurs in the third person plural; that is, where the he-she-it becomes they or those or these. In a community, the many persons do not become “they” because they are not objectified: “The one who exhorts joins in the thanks,” in their way of giving thanks, so this group is not “they” but “we.” The grammar used in forming a community is as follows; we have a plural subject (nominative), transitive verb (in the subjective mood), an object (accusative), and an indirect object (dative). Our speech act is “let us give thanks to god.” The idea that “[a]ll thanksgiving unites in the dative” is simple, those who come together to offer something to a third person does not objectify another. The givers never become objects themselves. The grammar is not overly complicated on its own, but in the theological context, it points to the power of our speech acts to create communities. These communities are those I will place head to head with communities created by empirical analysis. In chapter three, I use the chicano community, which is defined by empirically verifiable characteristics to exemplify this concept of empirical communities. In chapter one, I referred to the communities as grouped by their genitive being.

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108 There are some ways of forming communities that asks us to give up myself. Self to Soul, I don’t give up myself, but I transform myself while retain my experience of having been singled out. The previous dialogue. Negation=objectified or Affirmation=I am this person.
109 Rosenzweig, Star, 232
110 The verb in the subjunctive is an exhortation to the community of persons with personal names to do something together.
111 The accusative is the object of the sentence that is offered from the nominative to the dative.
112 The dative is the indirect object that is given the object by the nominative subject.
113 Rosenzweig, Star, 233
114 The student of Chicanos studies goes out into the world to create Chicanos out of people who themselves do not believe to be in that community.
The theological categories are each connected to a grammatical tense. Whereas creation was a narration of the past, redemption is concerned with the future. Through his view of redemption, Rosenzweig answers the critique brought forth by Marx: “The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men is a demand for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition that requires illusions.”\textsuperscript{115} Despite its religious nature of Rosenzweig’s work, the concept of the future kingdom that Rosenzweig talks about is not an illusion; it is a call to create a better world out of the present world. The Neoplatonic dualism of \textit{The City of God}\textsuperscript{116} misses the point of redemption because we are supposed to move beyond the idea of such a dichotomy. “Redemption or The Eternal Future of the Kingdom” is not synonymous with sit there and wait on God. Grammatically we are in the language of acting not experiencing, in the active, not the passive voice.

The analogy of prayer and praise is quite fitting even in a secular context. If redemption were an outcry for a better future, Marx would have raised a valid critique. But the future is not about prayer because “all prayer, even the individual lament, subconsciously cries out for the coming of the kingdom…”\textsuperscript{117} Praise, however, as we outlined above, is a unison of voices, a chant. Rosenzweig says that “the [coming] kingdom of God is nothing other than the reciprocal union of the soul with all the world.”\textsuperscript{118} As a community, the individuals together sing in anticipation of future accomplishments. The grammar agrees, the subjunctive mood is related to future uncertainty. But if redemption were merely religious dogma, it would not produce a

\textsuperscript{115} Marx, Marx and Engels Reader, Contribution to the Critique: Introduction, 54
\textsuperscript{116} A work by St. Augustine of Hippo.
\textsuperscript{117} Rosenzweig, Star, 233
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 233
theory of social wellbeing that redemption turns out to be. I find my view is also in line with Gibb’s, who says, “Redemption is the forming of a universal community, the emergence of a true community that can say ‘we.’”\textsuperscript{119} And the active voice begins with the opening lines of the book on revelation: “Love thy neighbor.”\textsuperscript{120}

Once again, the theological question is whether a secular reading is appropriate. The answer cannot be a negative one because, on the one hand, the language of redemption excludes the possibility of the individual taking sanctuary in religious devotion: “Loved only by God, man is closed off to all the world and closes himself off.”\textsuperscript{121} On the other hand, redemption is about creating a community through the love of our neighbor. There is a significant connection with Hegelian logic and our grammatical analysis of the voice of grammar. The passivity of a subject in both creation and revelation seems to correlate with the Hegelian concept of the unhappy consciousness.\textsuperscript{122} In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses the need for consciousness to recognize and to be recognized. In that context, consciousness, certain of itself, remains in seclusion resulting in a state of dissatisfaction. In other words, this is a person who can experience the world with its perspective but remains unhappy; they could never leave their mark on the world. Rosenzweig’s words towards this passivity are stern. They come in revelation after the individual has become self-certain through dialogue in revelation: “The world must close itself off against the arrogant seclusion of man. And instead of coming to life

\textsuperscript{119} Gibbs, Correlations, 111
\textsuperscript{120} Rosenzweig, Star, 205
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 207
\textsuperscript{122} The reference here is from sections section 197ff of Hegel, The phenomenology of spirit.
as discoursing figure, man, whom we already saw opening up [in dialogue], is swallowed back into seclusion.”\textsuperscript{123}

The opposing person is not, of course, the happy consciousness, it is the moral one. If we look at the language-related with the command to love one’s neighbor, we will find three subjects to consider: the lover, the neighbor, and the world. In this context, too, we must keep in mind the developments of the previous sections, namely, the personal name and grammatical voice. In common English usage, a neighbor is a person who lives near or next to another; a person who occupies an adjoining or nearby house or dwelling; (more widely) each of several people living close to each other, esp. in the same street, village, etc. Given our ability to choose where we live, we might add, a person one chooses to live next to.

Ironically, it is often the case that we build privacy fences to live as if these neighbors did not exist. For this reason, in this context, we aren’t satisfied with this definition of neighbor. Perhaps the book of Matthew in the Bible expresses the right responsibility we should have towards others. The second definition is better than the first, but we remain unsatisfied, for neither seems to cover the technical term Rosenzweig uses to identify the neighbor. The latter definition, though it is a moral command, it is only a “rule of conduct.”\textsuperscript{124} As we saw in the section of revelation, love must be a new and undetermined act in the present moment. Moral laws are grammatically different from engaging in the speech act of love that revolves around the imperative command. The neighbor we ought to love is our locum tenens, according to Rosenzweig.

\textsuperscript{123} Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 208. The unhappy consciousness comes after the master and slave dialectic as redemption comes after revelation.

\textsuperscript{124} Rosenzweig, \textit{Star}, 239
Returning to grammatical analysis, the verb in the phrase, *tenens*\(^{125}\), is a nominative present participle of the verb to hold, to continue, and to keep on; thus, a neighbor is one who continually and persistently (present tense) holds fast. While *locum* is referring to a position or point in space, this noun is in the accusative case. Therefore, anyone who presently holds a location is related to me as an object; they are there for me to act upon like any other person or thing because *locum* is in the accusative case and thus necessitates a position in the sentence as an object of the verb. The Latin here is helpful once more because the verb in the phrase *locum tenens* is a present participle. Unlike verbs, which must agree with the tense and number of the subject, present participles decline like nouns. Rosenzweig’s definition of neighbor suggests that while the person is an object to me, they can remain in the nominative case. This neighbor there for me to choose whether to objectify has a personal name! Rosenzweig’s point is that whether to do so is a moral choice.

The question of who can take the place of *locum tenens* is equally clear because the grammar dictates that place belongs to a person with a personal name. This *anyone* is the place holder, who, notwithstanding their category, is neighbor. With a proper understanding of the term “neighbor,” the following interpretation of the old imperative “man is to love his neighbor like himself” comes to life.

Love goes out to whatever is nighest to it as to a representative in the fleeting moment of its presents, and thereby in truth to the all-inclusive concept of all men and all things which could ever assume this place of being its neighbor.\(^{126}\)

The significance of the use of the nominative case for the neighbor cannot be understated. The nominative case determines the subject who has a personal name. The command to love one’s neighbor is the active participation and instigation of dialogue with others who

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\(^{125}\) Present participle of the Latin verb *Tenere*.

\(^{126}\) Rosenzweig, *Star*, 218
I willfully see others as I see myself. The grammar is clear about it; my neighbor is nothing less than I am myself:

Out of the endless chaos of the world, one highest thing, his neighbor, is placed before his soul, and concerning this one and well-nigh only concerning this one he is told: he is like you. “Like you,” and thus not “you.” You remain You and you are to remain just that. But he is not to remain a He for you, and thus a mere It for your You. Rather he is like You, like your You, a You like You, an I—a soul.\(^{127}\)

Redemption comes to a close by bringing together the various concepts we have considered in this section. The claim, “The effect of love of ‘neighbor,’ is that ‘Anyone’ and ‘all the world’ thus belong together…”\(^{128}\) describes how speech creates communities through the act of loving one’s neighbor. And lastly, the future tense associated with redemption is the idea of bringing in what is to come to the present. The acts of redemption should be understood through our language, but more specifically, our speech. Because by creating a community, we at the same time constitute the limit of such a community. But speech, and therefore love as well, are not limited to our intention. He or she that is closest to me, is not an object but a person with a name. In our redemptive attitude, our speech must indeed anticipate –look forward to the opportunity to create—a future wherein Ye—those whose name I do not know—no longer stand as opposed to “we.” With his speech Marx created the *lumpenproletariat*, with our speech, we bring about a redemptive community: Redemption is the future realization of the unity that Hegelian philosophy vainly claimed already existed, viz., the unity of the one and the all (Der Eine und das All).\(^{129}\)

\(^{127}\) *Ibid.*, 240
\(^{128}\) *Ibid.*, 236
\(^{129}\) Samuelson, *Guide*, 200
CHAPTER 3: CATEGORIES AND PURPOSE: BUILDING COMMUNITIES

The final chapter of this thesis is a narrower focus on the community (Gemeinschaft\textsuperscript{130}). How do they come about, and what is the role of the individual in the community? The answers, however, are not definitive; rather, they further the discussion on the connection between language and communities. Marx\textsuperscript{131} taught the political scientist, sociologist, and economist a particular way of conceptualizing the world. The grammatical consideration described in the previous two chapters about this conceptualization does not challenge the virtues of such conventionalization; it recognizes that its merits are a strength for the sociologist and the political scientist, etc. However, if our interest is a moral one, does a Marxist conceptualization of the world give us an edge? Tucker raises this question about Marx, saying, “[w]hat was the ‘philosophical opinion’ of Marx and Engels in regard to morality?”\textsuperscript{132} Then answers,

And, in truth, even if some may be able to write on the theory of knowledge according to Marx, to write on the principles of ethics, according to Marx, seems to be a somewhat hopeless undertaking…Marxism was strictly a demonstration [a scientific image of the world] of certain historical cause and effect relations.\textsuperscript{133}

Marx was too scientifically minded to consider himself an ethicist, but his ideas inspire action and a vision for the future. Why else would the workers of the world unite, if not to lose their perceived chains? Given that vision, I believe we are justified in showing the shortcoming of Marxist ethics in the context of communities. As a counterpoint, I have offered an interpretation

\textsuperscript{130} Rosenzweig is concerned with what draws individuals together or that they \textit{hold in common}. Gesellschaft is society in relation to the Polis (state).
\textsuperscript{131} see chapter one for my rendering
\textsuperscript{132} Tucker, \textit{Philosophy and Meaning}, 12-13
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid.},13
of the theological categories of *The Star* because I believe they, too, are meant to inspire change through moral action.

I believe that non-theological sources collaborate with Rosenzweig’s position. For instance, in his book *Sapiens*, historian Yuval Noah Harari gives “A Brief History of Humankind.” His work demonstrates that based on historical empirical evidence that myths play a significant role in the life of all humans. In a short but broad history of humans, Harari begins with “The Cognitive Revolution.” This “revolution” was nothing short of miraculous if, by miraculous, we mean defying the laws of biological nature. Harari writes of the ability of sapiens to “bypass their genome.” One could compare this “revolution” with the concept of creation. Both ideas focus a human’s “… ability to create an imagined reality out of words [which] enabled large numbers of strangers to cooperate effectively.”

Specifically, concerning my thesis, I want to draw attention to Harari’s point about the plus side of the cognitive revolution, namely, cooperation. Furthermore, given the secular interpretation of Rosenzweig’s theological categories, I suggest that this comparison is appropriate on two levels, in the context of community formation and in that it demonstrates that my thesis about the secular application of Rosenzweig’s work is valid and useful.

Harari said that “[e]ver since the cognitive revolution, sapiens have been able to change their behavior quickly without any need of genetic or environmental change.” And he is correct to highlight that change that occurs against the genetic and environmental disposition of a species is an essential quality of the species. The historical accounts of such changes, like those argued by Harari, supports Rosenzweig’s explanation of human speech acts—our ability to change ourselves and our world through language. This ability to create “imagined realities” is

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134 Harari, *Sapiens*, 32
135 *Ibid.*, 34

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more significant than mere storytelling. Both Rosenzweig and Harari argue that such language
can create communities. In the Philosophy of Right, the corporation can be understood in similar
ways; it is the logical progression of the family on another level.

Based on my interpretation of Rosenzweig’s theological categories, I gather that we can
assume that if early humans created these “imagined realities,” it was because they anticipated
some type of future. For instance, we tell the myth of the corn god, so that in the present, we are
willing to pray to this god with the hopes of a future with abundant corn. In this sense, dialogue
can often point to the future. Such a rendering of Harari’s description of the cognitive revolution
is only one possible interpretation. However, I suggest that this historical take is not only
relevant but appropriate given the consequence of such activity: “Large numbers of strangers can
cooperate successfully by believing in common myths.”

Without such communication, ancient and modern sapiens would not be able to cooperate in numbers above 150, given that humans
today cannot effectively gossip about 150 human beings, much less create the world we know
today without these shared “invented realities.” On Harari’s account, without the cognitive
revolution, our world would not be what we consider to be.

It is noteworthy to point out the degree of convergence there is among our various
sources on this aspect of human nature. Consider Hegel’s phrasing, “[a]s spirit, the human being
is a free essence that is in the position of not allowing itself to be determined by natural
impulses.” Hegel does not use the language of the historian but says something remarkably
similar. There is something about humans that allows them to use their capacity as conscious beings to act against the grain of the principles of their natures. Given the similarity in their

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136 Ibid., 27
137 Ibidem.
138 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 29
139 I use conscious beings as a middle term between Harari’s Sapiens and Hegel’s designations of humans as Spirit.
claims, it is equally plausible that by nature of the stories, humans tell themselves they, in so doing such a thing, “reconstruct” themselves. In the case of a historical account, we can then envision humans, through their myths, become beings capable of creating a global system of interdependence, although their biology allows for limited cooperation. In a Hegelian sense, “[les humains] se concevoir soi-même en se comprenant.”

The relevance of Harari’s perspective is the apparent ability of humans to transmit larger quantities of information about the world, their social relations, and perhaps most importantly, that they possess “the ability to transmit information about things that do not really exist, such as tribal spirits, nations, limited liability, and human rights.” Interpreted secularly, the theological concept of creation gives a linguistic account of the same activity, namely using speech and language to tell ourselves about ourselves and our world to shape it. The relevance for communities is much clearer: it is through convincing ourselves that we come together for a purpose that we demonstrate the types of community participation that we can consider.

In order to say more about communities in general, I will describe two ways in which one finds themselves in a community: 1) through their categorization as a member of such a community and 2) through willful participation in a specific community. For the remainder of this thesis, I will use the context of the Chicano community to describe some of the passive criteria for membership in the community. I will show how such passive being serves the ends of empirical scientists but perhaps not the ends of individuals facing moral choices. By describing the conditions that make one a Chicano, I demonstrate that the criteria for participation in this

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140 Hegel, *Principes de la Philosophie du Droit*, 366. (Eng. “[humans] design themselves by comprehending themselves.”)

141 Harari, *Sapiens*, 37 My emphasis.

142 See Simon, *Art and Responsibility*, 111-151 for Simon’s perspective this is the messianic aesthetic. The point is to shape the world.
community are not always obvious. Thus, perhaps passive participation in a community may not be relevant for the normative charge of community building through the engagement in dialogue. After all, building communities is what Rosenzweig means by the concept of redemption. Community building should look past passive membership because of the limits it places on our disposition to close the gap between “we and ye”—us and them.

My claim is that perhaps we should because it would be better, we should act towards others, acknowledging that they stand for themselves and not as a representative of a category. We should avoid being predisposed to avoiding a conversation with others based on arbitrary features like those of skin color, native language, or place of birth. We might avoid being negatively predisposed to engage in a conversation with them. If loving one’s neighbor is truly a helpful guide to ethics, our willingness to have a conversation in the first place is quite relevant. In this sense, maybe it is better to treat others as a neighbor and not reduce them to a category they might passively represent. This thesis is not opposed to the study of culture and peoples; it is clear that there is beauty in diversity. My claim is a response to our self-conditioning and predisposition to see others as categories. The question of whether or not to dialogue with my neighbor can be affected by this or that category; I have been conditioned to assigned to assign to them.

The experience of being chicano in the era of the Donald Trump presidency is a unique one. That administration has demonstrated just how vague—and by that fact, unhelpful—categorizations are in a political and moral context. As far as chicanos are concerned, the political tensions sparked by the use of these categories exemplify a reason to suggest that the categorical representation of people is not useful in moral contents. The Human Relations Area

Comment on the complexity
Files, compiled by researchers at Yale University, defines Chicanos “[as] a diverse group of Mexicans born in the United States.” They add to this simple definition a very important qualifier for my argument by stating that, “[m]any Mexican immigrants, especially children educated in the United States, also identify with the term. However, many from both populations refuse to identify with the label Chicano.” The question is whether it is valid to categorize individuals by types when they may deny membership in this class? The answer to that question is outside the scope of this thesis because it is possible to exercise a separate action without strictly denying that categorization has value in areas other than ethics. The point is that maybe if non-chicanos behaved towards chicanos as if they were not so, there would be no valid reason for anyone to “refuse to identify with the label.” Yet, we insist on using these categories to classify people.

Previously I talked Marx, how he set out to know the world scientifically to change it. Marxism created of our social, political climate a dichotomy still alive and well today; this is obvious from the strength of the political movement of a Vermont state senator, B. Sanders, who said, “there is something profoundly wrong when the rich keep getting richer, and virtually everyone else gets poorer. That is unacceptable, and that has got to change.” After Marx, tied into what I am doing, given the tools, we have discussed in the previous chapters. We have a political worldview understood through a bifocal lens of rich and poor. Marx wrote plenty describing what made each man a capitalist. He observed them and learned the stories they told themselves to justify their way of life. Similarly, I can now develop a phenomenon of chicanos.

As a chicano, I describe some ways in which I participate in the community. We have a language; it is Spanish, but it is not the same as central American Spanish because our Spanish screams, “I am not from your part of the world.” We speak English most of us, but with a certain accent that confesses to others, “I am not from your part of the world.” Through our language, we pass on stories about our ancestors, which mostly take the form of journeys to the United States. It is the myth of social and economic prosperity that moved us here. To carry on this interpretation, we could say that our natural animalistic drive for survival was tossed aside by our ancestors in light of the great myth of the American Dream. Harari’s point will age well, we believe things that are not real, and yet, we act based on them. My parents, like those of many countless others, arrived in this country without speaking the language. Thus, many chicanos, including myself, speak Spanish at home.

Using the tools of the analysis of this thesis, we can see that there are two ways that a chicano participates passively in the community. Being born of a certain last name and geographical area are passive activities. Note the grammar involved in this expression, “I was birthed by my mother of Mexican descent in the United States.” In this case, it should be clear why calling such community membership passive is entirely appropriate. However, there is a sense in which, most, if not many, chicano people actively participate in their cultural activities. In such cases, it is quite right to say that these people are actively participating in community membership. For instance, the art of making tortillas is one that was sacred to the indigenous people of Central America before the arrival of the Europeans to the continent. Notwithstanding the lost devotion to the Aztec and Mayan gods, many chicano families practice the tradition of making tortillas at home.
The process, while simple, is quite involved. I mix flour, baking powder, salt, lard, butter, and water. Then I knead the dough until smooth before parting out the mass into equal pieces and roll them to a ball that fits in the palm. After a period of rest, my mother takes the dough and stretches it out with a rolling pin. One by one, she stretches them as I lay them out on a hot pan to cook. After they are all cooked, the entire family enjoys them in the meals to come. The tortilla making, alongside all the other passive considerations of chicano culture, are sure signs that I am a chicano. And in so far as I take part in the practice of making the tortillas, in the context of learning from my parents for cultural reasons, I am actively taking part in being chicano. The need for a different form of understanding communities is apparent from the fact that despite all of the chicano culture I take part in, I can at any moment feel as if I am not part of this community.

The circumstances I have laid out above are but two straightforward examples of both passive and active participation of what I called “genitive being” in chapter one. Communities based on possession of certain empirically verifiable qualities—such as skin color, native language, and family origin—are all around us. For instance, the idea of the “token” person is an effort to create the optics of inclusion of all categories of people. Furthermore, it seems as if those studying cultures and peoples, develop these categories solely for the sake of knowing. Non-chicano people can major in chicano studies and know more about this category than someone who fits the empirical criteria for membership. The phenomenon is called cultural appropriation. To what degree they find data about chicanos is useful outside of their field is for the sociologist to say.

An attempt at creating a normative theory from social data is not a strange concept. Many of the issues related to the use of categories hide under the guise of social justice. This concept in
itself is an issue outside of the scope of this thesis, but it is helpful because it highlights the issue at focus here: generalizing categories (genitive being) are not an ideal guide for moral choices. In an article called *What Is Social Justice? Implications for Psychology*, Thrift and Sugarman, discuss the complicated nature of social justice and the problems this concept brings for their field. At its core, the problem is that progress is difficult because the issue is far too complex and historically anchored to its epoch. Non the less, I think the APA took the right approach because they asked the right question:

How does psychological theorizing, research, or interventions help create social, cultural, political, and economic arrangements that permit individuals to participate on an equal level with their peers?147

The question demonstrates that at its core, an individual promotes social justice and is better able to make moral choices in general, when they view people as individuals and not parts of collectives. The underlined section of the APA’s question is the point. Our grammatical analysis shows that treating people rightly—a moral issue indeed—is a question of whether we are willing to dialogue with them in the first place. As Rosenzweig would agree, how individuals act toward their neighbor, i.e., the person standing closest to them, is the underlying structure behind true social justice. The phrase, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”148 explains the nature of supervening relationships. It would seem this concept helps us to understand one way to measure social progress and social justice. However, my position is that in terms of the larger ethical picture, whether ethics supervenes upon some kind of empirical data—like the creation of capital or estranged labor—is irrelevant because that would suggest that there is some a total sum of ethics in the first place.

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An ethics based on the analysis of language suggests that hypotheticals cannot solve morality because the question of whether we would, has nothing to do with the spontaneous nature of sparking up a conversation with whoever happens to be closest to us. To rephrase my thesis in another way, this is a question of whether I am willing to have a conversation with the person standing next to me. For this reason, the idea of a measurable level of social justice, whatever that may be, is problematic because we cannot show that a total sum account of the state of our morality exists.

Rosenzweig’s concept of community is better suited because it locates morality with the individual. After all, redemption is a moral prescription that has two essential components: the cohortative and the dative. In chapter two, I interpreted these grammatical components to show how it is that communities come together. It is important that creating communities focuses on the right side of the supervening relation; that is, on the one-to-one relationship. As it relates to the chicano these concepts are important because one cannot act in any way towards the chicano community per se. The position that I am defending is that one can only act towards individuals who might actively or passively participate in chicano community.

Similarly, in this interpretation of the spirit of redemption, an important point to consider is that one does not primarily—or morally—create communities by identifying common features of external contingencies, like a place of birth and primary language. The theological categories in Rosenzweig’s philosophy are one example of using language to explain how humans build communities. Harari’s work is one example of the overlap between Rosenzweig and secular scholarship that corroborates my position. In my example, both sources agree, we should, because it would be better, act towards others by acknowledging that they stand for themselves and not as a representative of a category. I mean that we ought to act in such a way because it is
the first step we take in building a community. Harari would argue that speech-acts and creating common myths and purposes allows for the kind of cooperation that allows humans to build the communities they have historically.

The famous trolley problem can demonstrate our attachment to what I am calling a ‘genitive being’ if we could show that the person with the lever made their decision based on what type of people might be harmed if the lever was pulled. If one of our students responded to this ridiculous thought experiment with “I’d pull the level in this or that way, depending on the type of people that would be harmed as a consequence,” we would be appalled. The thought experiment I find of little value except to show that my conclusion could be said to lack an interest in sparking dialogue with your neighbor. The moral point is that basing our moral choices on categories is ridiculous when we think about it but goes unnoticed in our daily lives.

Among other things, the use of categories to understand the people around us leads us to rely on stereotypes to guide our moral choices. In a comedy skit entitled, Racist Grandmother comedian George Lopez says, “my grandmother was a racist, la cabrona. Like all your grandmothers, racista!” What Lopez is pointing out is the general disapproval of Mexican grandmothers to invite people of dark skin into their families or homes. I find this to be the case, particularly when a female family member dates a person of color, and how in such cases, grandma would disapprove. In cases of this sort, although anecdotal, grandma bases her judgment on contingent factors, like skin color, and most people disapprove of these attitudes. That is, they laugh because of the recognition of their common humanity, namely, feeling guilty about the fact that such is the case with their grandmothers. The disposition to have a conversation and whether or not someone of a different color is welcome in our home—even in a

149 For a discussion on the ethical application of the problematic nature of the trolley problem in moral philosophy see, Appiah, Experiments in Ethics, “Trolleyology, 89-92.
home of people who, ironically so, brown-skinned is a problem. I suggest that our conclusion to the trolley problem illuminates this point. Our answer to the trolley problem matters because it might show us our disposition to talk to certain types of people so that it does not go unquestioned.

The APA and Rosenzweig are both right to approach social issues from the individual and then upward. I suggest that even if the state of social justice supervenes the one-to-one relationship among individuals, we ought to focus on the latter. Consequently, I think Rosenzweig’s theological concepts are more useful in moral contexts, particularly when the alternative is a focus on understanding people by their externally contingent qualities. In *The Star*, interpersonal relationships begin with dialogue. Through language, we have the appearance of the immaterial subjectivity of those who speak to each other. Immaterial can be misleading, but it is nothing mystical: I am talking about the grammatical person, not what some might call the ego, *soul*, or *spirit*. The normative charge of the theological concepts revolves around the consequences of our ability and willingness to dialogue with others. Through dialogue, I discover that “I am”—the first grammatical person; the dialogue allows me to see myself as “I” because through my speaking “I,” I address a “you”—the second grammatical person. From an analytic perspective, the grammatical persons are immaterial categories; however, they are grounded in the material conditions of an interpersonal relationship. The problem for the empirically minded, or those mindlessly thinking of others as types, is that their approach to ethics does not recognize the other as its nominative subject:

“Like you,” and thus not “you.” You remain You and you are to remain just that. But he is not to remain a He for you, and thus a mere It for your You. Rather he is like You, like your You, a You like You, an I—a soul.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{150} Rosenzweig, *Star*, 240
If I fail to engage in dialogue with the person that is next to me at any given moment, how can I be expected to create communities? If I see myself as chicano, how is it possible to feel as equal to the chinos who operate the shops downtown? The answer, if I were to point out the empirical data, is no. At the very least, I am inclined to say so because I do not share in their skin tone, place of origin, and facial features. The chinos may feel the same way about me. Under the prescriptions of revelation and redemption, they sell me their goods, or providing me a service does not exactly lead to creating a community. If I am to approach the chino as a neighbor, I must be willing to approach this person not as a type, but as a nominative subject—that is, as one who has a personal name. Doing so might be difficult when we are conditioned to see the world around us as categories.\textsuperscript{151} In a sense, we automatically see the subjects as different, even on a grammatical level. Consider that the nouns would be in a difference declension were English to decline nouns. In the sentence, “The chino sells the chicano the soccer ball.” The subject, chino is in the nominative case, the object, the soccer ball, is in the accusative case, and the indirect object, the chincano, is in the dative case. For that reason, my claim is a moral one. We ought to see them as nominatives, because they are, even if they can take the place of the object in the accusative case or indirect object in the dative.

Hegel maintained that the treatment of property through contracts, like my paying for the chino’s merchandise, is a moral affair. Although I believe Hegel made a valid point, he possibly overlooked one important aspect of dealing with property and contracts: that contracts themselves presuppose dialogue.\textsuperscript{152} Hegel wrote in The Philosophy of Right that,

\begin{quote}
Reason makes it just as necessary for human beings to enter into contractual relations—giving, exchanging, trading, etc.—as to possess property. Although what they are conscious of is that they are led to make contracts by need in general,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{151}Chino is Spanish for Chinese person. The term is used by Chicanos who wish to refer to a person of Asian descent. In my community of El Paso, TX chinos are usually the shop operators who sell imported good wholesale. \textsuperscript{152}Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 65
by benevolence, utility, etc., what does the leading, in itself, is reason namely, the idea of the real existence of free personhood (‘real’ here meaning ‘present in willing’). Contract presupposes that the parties entering it acknowledge each other as persons and property owners. Because this is a relationship of objective spirit, the moment of acknowledgment is already contained within it and presupposed by it.\textsuperscript{153}

What I am suggesting is that generally, contracts do indeed presuppose that the parties entering it acknowledge each other as persons, but this recognition occurs before the development of the property. In the previous chapter, I gave an interpretation of the grammar of dialogue because I believe this is what Hegel overlooked.

[Contract] by an isolated individual outside society […] is as much of an absolute absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other.\textsuperscript{154}

The quote above is from Marx’s Grundrisse, but I have replaced “production” with “contract,” to assert that language is needed to make contracts. But more specifically, to raise the question for Hegel of whether the sale of goods in a chicano community by a merchant of Asian descent creates a moral community? As a work in political theory that is grounded in or leads to a particular kind of ethics, my point is that The Philosophy of Right overlooks the importance of dialogue. I suggest the same is the case with Marx’s political theory and the ethics derived from it. Consequently, if I see the merchant as it (a subject in the third person), I could still do business with them without offending right or law. However, only by recognizing their proper name—by considering them an I with a personal name and history—am I able to begin the foundations of a moral community. If

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\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibidem.} In this context Hegel means that one’s subjectivity (their willfulness) is objective because it is now recognized by another through the recognition of their property.
\textsuperscript{154} Marx, \textit{Marx and Engels Reader}, The Gruindrisse, 223
\end{flushright}
any science, be that political or biological, gets in the way, we must recognize it as counterproductive to the moral end of building communities.

Moral communities have one thing in common: the dative case. The declension of nouns is uncommon now, so it will be more practical to say that communities come together for a reason. The dative case denotes the recipient of a direct object. Rosenzweig was correct in using the religious context of thanksgiving to make this point. The congregation comes together to give thanks to god. It is in this sense that where I was born could not create a moral community. Take, for example, the chicano civil rights movement of the 1960s. The many people of the movement were not a moral community because they were chicanos. Quite the contrary! They came together to give authorities a piece of their mind: “we will not be treated as a lessor because of our heritage!” Understood in this way, such movements are fighting the very thing I argue, the categorization of individuals by type. The grammar is clear, the chicanos who are born of Mexican parents and make tortillas are a passive community: “they have brown skin and make burritos.” But the chicanos that came together to fight their categorization as a type of people are a moral community. Unfortunately, these chicanos themselves, despite activity participating in a moral community with a purpose, have been conditioned to miss the point being made here. This might explain such battle cries of chicano people like, “Viva la raza!” (let our race prevail!).

Finally, we can conclude by pointing out the major themes of this thesis. The first chapter demonstrated how the work of both Hegel and Marx could be understood in terms of grammar. In other words, the logical concepts at work in the philosophy of both

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155 I have rendered the Spanish in English as such to show the subjunctive mood of the phrase, which despite its aim of uniting the people, does so with a blind focus on the external contingency of race.
philosophers have correlating concepts in the logical structure of language. The second chapter explains the concept of renovated grammar developed by Rosenzweig in *The Star of Redemption*. Through a secular reading of his work, we can identify the role of language in three important aspects of human life: our history, our neighbors, and our community. In so doing, I explain in what way tense, mood, and voice relate to our moral responsibility.

The point of identifying the reasons why we use the perfect indicative tense is a moral one: the past ought not to determine the present, it is our present that makes the past. The difficulty of capturing the present is difficult because it is always passing us by. According to Rosenzweig, the imperative mood can give an account of experiencing the most present moment. The nature of the imperative mood is such that it does not rely on the past; the imperative is a timeless tense because it must be born of the moment. In the context of love, the grammatical analysis becomes a moral affair because it involves a second person. It is through this dialogue with another that one can recognize the relationship between the persons of grammar, i.e., the first and second persons, I and You. As indicated in chapter two, redemption is the process of creating communities by actively sharing a purpose. In this final chapter, I have given an account of the difficulty of creating these communities under the scientific worldview. Empirical verification necessarily focuses on the contingent aspects of a person’s being. I have called this the genitive being.

Given Rosenzweig’s background in theology, it seems only natural that he chose the context that he did, that is, religion, to express his ideas. In fact, for those who share his faith, there is no question about whether this text has a religious application. From a
linguistic approach, a secular reading seems just as likely because nothing about using language to understand our past, present, and future seems exclusively religious. This thesis demonstrates that language has a place in semantic interpretations of a speech utterance. Grammar, like logic, should be considered by the philosopher if there is even the slightest possibility that it could help us achieve the best possible moral outcome. Thus, the conclusion to the three-part argument is not a definitive, normative “ought.” Instead, it is a question: “if our scientific approach to understanding communities is blinding us to the reality of how communities are built in the first place, should we not reconsider the level of influence these sciences have on our moral choices?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


VITA

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Upon completion of his military service, Omar was accepted to the University of Texas at El Paso. From 2016 to 2018, Omar achieved his first college degree, Summa Cum Laude, a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy with a minor in French. During his time as an undergraduate, Omar was a member of the National Society of Leadership and Success and was recognized with the National Engaged Leader Award. Omar tutored for the University’s Athletic Academic center. During his participation in the MA philosophy program, Omar served as a Teaching Assistance and presented a paper at an international conference; as of May 2020, Omar was completing this thesis for the successful completion of the master’s program.

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