

2009-01-01

A Lingering Grudge in the Face of a Power Transition; the French Canadian Movement in Perspective

Sergio Villarreal

University of Texas at El Paso, svillarreal1@miners.utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd



Part of the [International Law Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Villarreal, Sergio, "A Lingering Grudge in the Face of a Power Transition; the French Canadian Movement in Perspective" (2009).
Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 2805.
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/2805

This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

A LINGERING GRUDGE IN THE FACE OF
A POWER TRANSITION;
THE FRENCH-CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY
MOVEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

SERGIO VILLARREAL ALVAREZ

Department of Political Science

APPROVED:

Gaspare M Genna, Ph.D., Chair

Taeko Hiroi, Ph.D.

Timothy P Roth , Ph.D.

Patricia D. Witherspoon, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

Copyright ©

by

Sergio Villarreal

2009

A LINGERING GRUDGE IN THE FACE OF
A POWER TRANSITION;
THE FRENCH-CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY
MOVEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

by

SERGIO VILLARREAL ALVAREZ, BBA Economics

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO

December 2009

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	iv
List of Tables	vi
List of Figures.....	vii
Acknowledgement	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	3
Structural Theories.....	3
Dynamic Theories.....	5
Power Transition Theory	6
Chapter 3: Exploring the Québec Sovereignty Movement.....	7
Introduction to the Quebec sovereignty referendum	7
On Dissatisfaction.....	8
On Power	9
A Dissatisfied Power Transition.....	10
The Unit of Analysis.....	11
Hypothesis	12
Measuring Power	13
Measuring Dissatisfaction	14
Vote for Secession Variable	15
Income Variable.....	15
Dissatisfaction Variable.....	17
Interaction Variable	19
Ethnicity Variable.....	20
Political Interest Variable	22
Education Variable	23
Age Variable.....	24
Gender Variable.....	24
Political Ideology.....	25
Conclusion to Chapter 3	26

Chapter 4: Quantitative Test.....	27
Correlations.....	27
Regressing the Model	29
Looking at the Rate of Change	35
Conclusion to Chapter 4	36
Chapter 5: Qualitative Description	38
Group Dissatisfaction	38
Personal Accounts of group isolation.....	39
Personal Accounts of Québec not having a say.....	41
Personal Accounts with respect to Resource Allocation	42
Dissatisfaction and Embedded Beliefs	43
Chapter 6: Conclusion	45
Summary of Findings	46
Policy Recommendations	47
Implications of the findings for Texas.....	47
The Issue of Violence	48
References.....	50
Vita	55

List of Tables

Table 1: Annual Family Income in Quebec.....	16
Table 2: Votes captured by the survey.	15
Table 3: Quebec’s ethnicities captured by the survey.	21
Table 4: Quebec’s ethnicities captured by the survey, as recoded into a dummy variable.	22
Table 5: Respondents’ general political interest.....	23
Table 6: Respondents’ general political interest.....	23
Table 7: Respondents’ general political interest.....	25
Table 8: Respondents’ Ideology on a Left-Right Scale.....	26
Table 9: Pairwise correlations	28
Table 10: Model Specification.....	29
Table 11: Logistic regression at a given combination of ‘Power’ and ‘Dissatisfaction’	30

List of Figures

Figure 1: Real Domestic Income Per Capita, Québec as a percentage of Ontario, 1926-1999.....	10
Figure 2: Histogram Showing Individual Voter Preferences	17
Figure 3: Personal Dissatisfaction with Canada	18
Figure 4: Interaction of power and dissatisfaction in Québec	20
Figure 5: Age histogram for those respondents in Quebec.....	24
Figure 6: The Effect of an Increase in Dissatisfaction at different levels of Income.	32
Figure 7: The Effect of an Increase in Income at Different Degrees of Dissatisfaction.....	34

Acknowledgement

The University of Texas at El Paso's Graduate School is hereby acknowledged for the funding it provided to conduct ethnographic research for this paper. Thank you!

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1995, the Québec government launched a second referendum for independence that failed by an extremely slim margin--less than one percent. The result was 2,362,648 votes to remain in Canada against 2,308,360 votes to form a new country. The French Canadian Québécois were just waiting for the opportunity to do something about their situation; an uncomfortable situation that made them feel unwelcomed in their own country and threatened their stake in the federation. The result was that they lost their chance to change things by less than half of a percentage point.

. The rise of the separatists in Québec might appear as a surprise given Canada's democratic institutions, yet democracies may serve to institutionalize a group's status as a minority (see Bourgault et la souveraineté, 1980), a thing that in the presence of a power transition leads a group to see secession as a better-off alternative than political subjugation. This is because while it is true that a democracy might seek to guarantee equal individual power in the form of parliamentary representation, that same democracy may fail to address the issue of equal group representation.

Given that democracy is just an approximation to utopia, we must reconsider the way we look at domestic politics. The idea has long been that in domestic politics the underlying principles are different than those in international power politics. In domestic politics there is an emphasis on political philosophy and democratic principles, while in international politics there is a focus on anarchy and the lack of a hierarchically superior entity than may resolve disputes and enforce law. This is evident in the way we study both realms.

In this thesis, I discuss the domestic decision to secede from Canada through the eyes of an international relations theory. My goal is to test a hypothesis by using quantitative data gathered during the 1995 Québec sovereigntist referendum, and qualitative insights gathered as part of an ethnographic exploration in 2009.

I will show that the current trend in applying power transition theory (PTT) to international conflicts is also applicable for domestic confrontation within the Canadian subsystem; international conflict is not the only kind of conflict affected by a power transition in where the rising actor is dissatisfied with the status quo.

This thesis is organized as follows. First, a quick summary of the existing literature is presented. The theoretical assumptions are examined and their main points are argued to fit the PTT framework. After surveying the existing literature, I defend PTT as the best theoretical perspective from which to study secession, chapter 3 then presents the individual as the unit of analysis and explains my hypothesis. This chapter discusses in detail what the theory understands by ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction’ and justifies a handful of alternative explanations that will be used as control variables in chapter 4. In chapter 4 I move to a quantitative analysis of ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction’ through a statistical testing of the relationship between these variables and an individual’s way of voting. I then follow with the graphing of a secessionist barometer that illustrates secessionist support amongst individuals and show that both ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction’ explain much of an individual’s way of voting in the 1995 referendum.

In chapter 5 a qualitative description of ‘dissatisfaction’ is presented. I start by summarizing the overall group dissatisfaction with the federation within Québec, and then provide individual statements as evidence of status-quo dissatisfaction. Finally, chapter 6 concludes by restating the findings and presenting the general implications.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The literature on secession is not extensive, and the few theoretical perspectives can be grouped into two different avenues. Some scholars have presented the idea of secession as a series of steps, or dynamics that seek a goal—secession. Their main idea is to study social group processes and look at the interrelationship of various parts within the polity. Others--structural theorists--have taken a step back and sought an understanding of the source of these dynamics. Structural theorists provide no explanation for the internal decision making of the polity nor do they examine the interrelationships of actors. Instead, their aim is to understand how different contexts affect the integrity of the state.

In this chapter I will review the different theoretical perspectives in the study of secessionist support and conclude that PTT, albeit being a general conflict theory, serves best because it incorporates both dynamic and structural approaches into one perspective.

STRUCTURAL THEORIES

Structural scholars explore how power affects the decision to secede. They accomplish this by focusing on both the constraints as well as the triggers of a secessionist movement.

In the case of structural constraints, deterrence theory has long argued that an actor will be able to hinder an aggressor given its relative capability to make credible threats of destruction, where the ability to do so is a function of military power. In regards to secession, Milica Zarkovic, in his book *The Economics of Secession*, suggests that freedom from an external threat provides states with the option to secede without being deterred by the possibility of armed conflict. Zarkovic argues that “no longer restrained by a cold war polarization and encouraged by the winds of rapid change, subnational groups are seeking to free themselves from central authorities” (Zarkovic, 1993, pp 2). The idea is that the economic structure at the international level presents a deterrence of secessionist movements.

It has been argued that “the increase in deterrent effect is less than proportional to the increase in magnitude of potential destruction” (Brodie, 1959). In other words, if a threat is executed once, it will not be as effective the second time around. Brodie discusses this point as he states that “if we wish to visualize the situation graphically, we will think of a curve of ‘deterrence effect’ in which each unit of additional damage threatened brings progressively diminishing increments of deterrence” (Brodie, 1959). Therefore, deterrence is only a plausible explanation at first; after an aggression has been reciprocated deterrence becomes ever less effective, because “each unit of additional damage threatened brings progressively diminishing increments of deterrence” (Brodie, 1959). It is at these additional damage points that actors can be non-rational, “especially under high stress,” and then “rationality may be neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence.” (Jervis, 1979).

It is in the realm of non rationality where we find emotions. Emotions have not been given much consideration by structural theories who presume that an actor will conform to the rational structure within the international system. In the case of secessionist movements, Allen Buchanan’s book, *The Morality of Political Divorce*, states that it is “the cynic [who] assumes either that there is no such thing as moral reasoning and that there are no moral judgments and that only the lust for power determines behavior in the political realm” (Buchanan, 1991). The idea presented by Buchanan is that there is more than conforming to the structural system.

In this sense, there is an inherent feeling of right and wrong that serves as a necessary condition for conflicts. This suggests that ideas like distributive justice, political obligation, and the moral discourse in general will provide a judgment that brings about the underlying political preferences of an actor. Specifically, Buchanan sees secession as morally justifiable under some conditions and presents a repertoire of moral arguments for and against secession from which he cites empirical cases.

DYNAMIC THEORIES

Dynamic theorists look at how an actor's underlying preferences form. By following the way relationships evolve within a state. For example, it is commonly argued by dynamic theorists that secession support is built up as a series of steps amongst ethnically similar communities. Michael Hechter, in his essay entitled "The Dynamics of Secession" (1992), and Bartkus, Viva Ona in her book *The Dynamic of Secession* (1999), agree that high group identification is a necessary condition for conflict to emerge. Hechter presents an analysis based on ethnic homogeneity that suggests that the secession ought to be seen as "the outcome of a series of collective decisions made by regional leaders and populations" (pp 267-269). Later in her book, Bartkus sees the decision to secede as a rational choice that weights the benefits of continued membership with those of seceding. Specifically, she states that "a secession crisis occurs when the leaders representing a territorially concentrated and distinct community within a larger state translate discontent into demands for secession, and possess the power, either through sufficient strong internal community mobilization or through the use of force, to compel the central government to react to those demands" (Bartkus, 1999).

In both cases the assumption is that secession is the outcome of a series of collective decisions (or dynamics) that are made given a context of power and discontent by a distinct (or homogeneous) community. That is, according to both authors, secession is a decision, influenced by the political context, and that happens only within highly homogenous communities.

Yet the idea that only homogeneous communities will secede ignores the fact that homogeneity is a vague concept. Homogeneity is a concept that is interpreted by political and intellectual elites who "build around, or form among, preconstituted and resonant representations of community" (Duara, 1995). According to Christopher Wellman, a nation is just a cultural group of people who identify with one another and who either have or seek to have some degree of political self-determination. In addition he remarks that "it does not mandate that the separatist be a culturally distinct minority group"

(Wellman, 2005). Instead dynamic theories would do better by substituting ethnic homogeneity with a polity's level of dissatisfaction with the status quo.

POWER TRANSITION THEORY

Having seen that 'power' and 'dissatisfaction' are two variables that are common to both dynamic and structural theorists, I have chosen PTT to explain secession because of its emphasis on the levels of power and dissatisfaction illuminate both the goal and the constraint present in international conflicts. PTT equally considers the two variables when assessing conflict. In addition the theory presents us with a straightforward perspective that identifies both the origin of the secessionist goal (i.e. dissatisfaction with the federalist status quo) and its constraint (i.e. state power).

It has been said that when it comes to international relations "the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by 'structure' (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus 'process' (interaction and learning) and institutions" (Wendt, 1992). It is by considering those international contexts in where power will deter conflict, as well as by accepting that dissatisfaction is a necessary condition, that PTT provides a framework for the assessment of conflict.

Specifically, PTT would claim that in the presence of dissatisfaction there will be a secessionist conflict when the dissatisfied actor surpasses the dominant actor in power. DiCicco and Levy (2003) best describe this phenomenon by stating that "if a rising power is dissatisfied with its own place in the existing order, it may wish to challenge the existing order," were the probability of conflict "between the rising challenger and the dominant state, peaks near the point of power transition between them" (pp 115).

Chapter 3: Exploring the Québec Sovereignty Movement

In this chapter I present an introduction to the Quebec sovereignty referendum, affirm the unit of analyst and define my hypothesis. I also explore the concepts outlined by the theory through a discussion of the definitions and the measurements of ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction,’ as well as other variables of interest that might influence the decision to vote ‘Yes’ during the referendum. Finally I suggest that a mixed methods approach is the best approach to study their effects.

INTRODUCTION TO THE QUEBEC SOVEREIGNTY REFERENDUM

In the 1995 referendum the people of Québec were voting for a non-binding (advisory) referendum for independence in which the provincial government requested permission to secede from Canada. Specifically, the 1995 sovereignty referendum asked the following:

"Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?"

The June 1995 agreement mentioned in the referendum question was an agreement on the transfer of sovereignty between two of the three political parties in Québec, plus the *Bloc Québécois* political party at the federal level. This agreement was mailed to every household in Québec. The agreement stated the following:

"... our common project [the sovereignist project] departs from the Canadian status quo, rejected by an immense majority of Québécois. It is true to the aspirations of Québécois for autonomy and would allow Québec to achieve sovereignty: to levy all of its taxes, pass all of its laws, sign all of its treaties. Our project also reflects the wish of Québécois to maintain equitable and flexible ties with our Canadian neighbours, so that we can manage our common economic space together, particularly by means of joint institutions, including institutions of a political nature. We are convinced that this proposal is in the interests of both Québec and Canada, though we cannot of course presume to know what Canadians will decide in this regard" (extract from the June 1995 Agreement).

ON DISSATISFACTION

According to power transition theory, the interests and values of the dominant power shape the relationship, roles, and behaviors of international actors—unless successfully challenged by an emerging power. Specifically it is argued that “the patterns [the dominant state] creates and defends are the international projection of the political and economic resource allocation patterns it employs domestically” (as quoted in Lemke, 2002, pp 22). These patterns are said to become the prevailing status quo. Status-quo simply means the condition of “economic, diplomatic, and military relations between states” (Lemke, 2002, pp 22).

Given that the prevailing status quo is set by the condition of the relations between states, dissatisfaction with the status-quo has to do with relationships among states that go sour. In the case of secession, these failed relationships concern economic, diplomatic, and military issues that have not been satisfactorily resolved with the higher authorities from which the actor wishes to separate.

Dissatisfaction might arise because a balanced compromise in these issues cannot be achieved under the current political configuration. The dissatisfied actor simply ‘had enough,’ and in the presence of a power transition it might see secession as a better-off alternative than political subjugation. In the case of ‘dissatisfaction,’ Randolph Siverson (1996) a prominent scholar of power transition theory, has defined it as the access to benefits that “would include security, access to resources, trade advantages, and even something as simple as deference from other states.” (1996). In other words, dissatisfaction has been measured by the degree of benefit that an actor receives under the current arrangement, which in turn is determined by the dominant state. For example, under the definition of ‘Dissatisfaction’ it is expected that those populations of Québec that have been included in the access to federal resources will be less dissatisfied with the federal government than those who have been excluded.

Also concerning the definition of status-quo dissatisfaction, it has been argued within the power transition perspective, that “the gains provided to the dominant power from this status quo are more than material” (Lemke, 2002, pp 22). Specifically Lemke argues that when it comes to states, they may be dissatisfied with the status quo for a number of reasons:

“It is possible the existing informal rules of international politics are explicitly constructed to isolate and/or deny value to the dissatisfied state. It could more simply be the case that some states are dissatisfied because they had little or no say in the construction of the existing status quo, and enjoy no direct or indirect benefits from it. Still other states may be dissatisfied because they employ different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in their society from those used by the dominant power.” (Lemke, 2002, pp 24).

Subsequently, when considering ‘dissatisfaction,’ the current access to resources as well as historical aspects appear as relevant factors in determining its current level.

ON POWER

Power is important because of the idea that dissatisfied “states are more likely to fight at parity because under such equality both are more likely to expect they will not lose” (Lemke, 2002, pp 39). According to Lemke, power exists in the potential of the state, and consequently according to PTT, “those governments which prove effective in organizing this potential, by both penetrating their societies and extracting resources there from, will be the governments of developed powerful states” (Lemke, 2002, pp 26). This is seen when acknowledging that those governments that have a greater control over economic, diplomatic, and military relations between states, characterize themselves for penetrating their societies and extracting resources there from.

For example, in the world stage the governments of influential countries like the United States, those in Western Europe, Japan, and evermore China, distinguish themselves from less powerful countries by the fact that their national budgets are significantly larger than those of less powerful countries. The fact that the control over economic, diplomatic, and military relations between states is

correlated with a State's budget illustrates that 'power' can be measured by looking at the budget. In turn, one can determine the size and potential of a state budget by considering national income and the effectiveness of the tax system. It can be suggested that those governments with a solid tax system (which acts as a way of penetrating their societies) and a relatively richer population (which allows for an ability to extract resources) will be the governments of powerful developed states.

A DISSATISFIED POWER TRANSITION

Historically, taxable income in Québec has been lower than in the rest of Canada (due to a historically lower annual family income in Québec). Consequently Québec has not been considered a powerful actor. Yet since the 1940's the country "has been accompanied by faster per capita economic growth in Québec than in Ontario" (Fortin,2001). This increase in economic growth has been reflected in the size of the budget and consequently provincial power. According to Fortin, "in the last 40 years the standard-of-living gap between Québec and Ontario has shrunk; it fell to 14 percent in 1999 from 26 per cent in 1960. This translates into an average gap-narrowing rate of 1.8 percent per year over the last four decades" (2001). Summing up, Québec has been growing in economic power faster than the rest of Canada.




Figure 1: Real Domestic Income Per Capita, Québec as a percentage of Ontario, 1926-1999; Extracted from Fortin 2001.

The term Quiet Revolution was first used by the Toronto Globe and Mail to describe the mushroomed developments in Québec after 1960 (Andre, 1989). It was during this time that the change in the balance of power rendered this “no longer the traditional conflict between a majority and a minority. It [was] rather a conflict between two majorities: that which is a majority in all Canada, and that which is a majority in the entity of Québec.”¹

PTT tells us that “if a rising power is dissatisfied with its own place in the existing order, it may wish to challenge the existing order” (Levy, 2003), and this is what was cultivating in Québec at the time of the Quiet Revolution--a conflict between two majorities that was fueled by a lingering dissatisfaction and "a new ideology, born in the context of the quiet revolution, but largely influenced by the decolonization movements of the former Afro-Asian colonies and the socialist ideology.”²(Murria, pp17).

THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

It is worth noting that in the case of PTT the unit of analysis has traditionally been the dominant nation-state in the world system. Just like in many other international relations theories that ignore the individual, the PTT has relegated individuals to simple spectators, as opposed to political actors. In turn, states have been assumed to be the only actor worth looking at when using the PTT framework.

Here I attempt to extend the PTT postulations to the individual, this in an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the implications of the theory. Extending the PTT into deeper realms has already been a success. The theory has been proven to not only apply for those dominant actors in the

¹ Reported in 1962 by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Extracted from: Dion, Leon. *Québec: the Unfinished Revolution*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976. page 42.

² Originally, “une nouvelle idéologie, née dans le contexte de la révolution tranquille, mais largement influence par les mouvements de décolonisation dans les anciennes colonies afro-asiatiques et par l'idéologie socialiste” Murria, Vera. *Le Parti Québécois*. 4th ed Montreal, QC: Editions Hurtubise, 1976. Page 17.

world stage, but also within regional hierarchies. For example, Lemke (1996) in his paper “Small States and War” argues that the logic presented by the PTT can be extended to subsystems within the overarching international order. In addition, recent studies have presented a PTT analysis of conflict within groups in the interior of a state (for an example see Duffy 2007). Yet there is no instance, that I am aware of, that extends the PTT postulations to the individual.

The fact that an international politics issue like Quebec secession is delegated to the individual through a referendum for independence, urges that one shifts the unit of analysis from the state to the individual. I do this by recognizing that there is an undeletable link between the state and the individual, in where the actions of the state are dictated by those individuals in command. Specifically, I recognize that “any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat” (Putnam, 1988).

HYPOTHESIS

The idea being tested is whether the hypothesis posited by PTT can be applied to the individual. Specifically I will test the hypothesis that individuals will be more likely to challenge the federal status quo in the face of both dissatisfaction and a power transition.

H1: dissatisfied individuals higher in the power hierarchy, vis-à-vis other individuals, will be more likely to challenge the federal status-quo than those that are lower in the power hierarchy.

The hypothesis implies that secession support arises amongst those individuals that are dissatisfied with the federally imposed status-quo, and are at a higher power level than their peers.

The idea that a secessionist movement in Québec would be supported by the wealthy is not widely shared. On the contrary, the concept of Québec sovereignty is perceived as that of a fight engaged by the lower class against the rich elites and the powerful interests in the rest of Canada. The story behind the French Canadian sovereignty movement reflects this idea. The whole movement is legitimized by the idea that French Canadians have been treated as second class citizens and that Québec

has been negatively impacted by past economic colonialism. Until this day this hinders Québécois self-determination and the development of the French language. Even today when surveyed, the members of the sovereigntist parties tend to be of a working class background while those belonging to the Federalist Party are seen to be of upper middle class individuals who opt for tax breaks at the expense of national sovereignty. In contrast, PTT would argue that higher income individuals are more powerful and hence less likely to be deterred by Canadian repercussions—as opposed to the working class whose jobs can be swiped away by economic instability.

MEASURING POWER

It was said that an entity's level of power is determined by the size of its budget. This means that governments with larger budgets will be those governments of powerful states that can deter the emergence of a secessionist movement. For example, in the case of Québec we can see the power of the budget being used to deter the province from pursuing independence. Opponents of the secession movement deter Québec's idea of sovereignty-association with Canada by arguing that this is unacceptable under the current economic dependency of Québec.

“If Québec separates”, he stated, “Ontario would trade with it on no different a basis than it trades with other foreign country...We would have no special obligations tied to history or common national interest...if Québec separates, there would be international borders between Ontario and Québec. And borders do matter” (Ontario's Prime Minister).

"Québec would lose up to 10 percent of its GDP and up to 140, 000 people would emigrate. The rest of Canada would suffer its longest recession in 50 years, because of higher interest rates, reduced investment, and reduced exports to Québec" (a study revealed in 1994).

At the same time it is apparent that richer societies hold a larger budget potential because they have more resources to tax, an aspect that places a direct link between the budget potential and income per capita. That is, those who find themselves higher in the purchasing power hierarchy are expected to

be more likely to challenge the status quo when their interests are threatened. This is in contrast to an individual of low power that is equally as upset about the circumstances, but conforms to the status-quo.

It is true that the average participant in the 1995 referendum for independence does not know the size of the budgets and cannot make a certain assessment when it comes to defining his level of deterrence. But this does not mean that the structural context does not impact that individual's decision; rather an individual can still make (and does make) an assessment of the potential causes of his actions. Specifically, the individual uses his immediate experience as a proxy to assess the budget and the potential of his state. For example, one may compare how a family lives in Québec vis-à-vis those in Ontario, in an effort to assess an actor's relative capabilities.

MEASURING DISSATISFACTION

Deterrence is only part of the story; dissatisfaction with the federal status-quo must exist before any secession argument is considered. Looking at secession, Wellman argued that this does not only pertain to groups that deem themselves a nation. His moral theory considered in the literature review states that “it does not mandate that the separatist be a culturally distinct minority group” (Wellman, 2005), for as long as a group is able to perform the essential functions of the state, it has the right to secede and that no strong correlation exists between a group's right for self determination and the idea of being a nation. Anyone can be dissatisfied with a status-quo and choose secession as an option—irrespective of that actor being nationalistic or ethnically homogeneous. In summary, dissatisfaction must have different roots—not just national self determination.

According to PTT, dissatisfaction with a regime arises from the lack of access to resources, a say in the construction of the existing status-quo, and other issues that are argued to be more than material. The reason of dissatisfaction is an inherent lack of legitimacy and trust that becomes a reluctance to

cooperate, as well as a sense of otherness and alienation that differentiates that which is dissatisfied vis-à-vis the perceived source of dissatisfaction.

VOTE FOR SECESSION VARIABLE

In the case of my dependent variable (Vote in Referendum), this is generated by making a copy of the data set variable FQ8B which asked respondents “Will you vote "Yes", in favour of the referendum proposal, or "No", opposed to the referendum proposal?” The variable was coded as a categorical variable and for simplicity’s sake it is later recoded into a binary dependent variable in the form of a yes/no response.

Table 1: Votes captured by the survey.

VoteForSecession	Number of respondents
No	338
Yes	451

This was done by eliminating a third category for those responses that appeared as missing observations. So that a ‘Yes’ vote is coded as 1, and a ‘No’ vote is coded as 0.

INCOME VARIABLE

In the case of annual family income, this variable was generating by copying the dataset variable FQ57 ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME in where respondents were asked; “Into which of the following groups does the approximate annual income of your family fall--that is, the income or earnings, before taxes, of all family members who live in your household added together?” Originally, the variable had 13 categories, with number 1 to 11 being income groups, 12 being for those individuals who refused to answer, and 13 for those who did not know. Given that only those who accurately responded are of

interest, the last two categories are eliminated. The variable is comprised by eleven categories ranging from \$10,000 or less to a maximum category of \$100,000 or more.

Table 2: Annual Family Income in Quebec.

Income	Number of respondents
< \$10,000	39
\$10,000 < \$20,000	113
\$20,000 < \$30,000	115
\$30,000 < \$40,000	132
\$40,000 < \$50,000	101
\$50,000 < \$60,000	73
\$60,000 < \$70,000	60
\$70,000 < \$80,000	52
\$80,000 < \$90,000	30
\$90,000 < \$100,000	23
\$100,000 OR MORE	51

In the case of ‘power,’ it is important to remember I am examining whether individuals conform to the structural patterns set forth by the provincial budget. This in turn is a function of the annual family incomes across the province. The end result is to view ‘power’ by utilizing the annual level of family income and explore the effect that this might have on the decision to support secession. To accomplish this I use the *ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME* (FQ57) variable.

Figure 2 shows that those voters with a higher income held a slight preference for the secession side in the 1995 referendum, while those with a lower income had a preference for the "No" side. One can see that the darker "Yes" area has a mode that is to the right of the lighter "No" area. From these data it can be argued that there is a link between individual income and whether the individual supports (or does not support) the sovereignty movement.




Figure 2: Histogram Showing Individual Voter Preferences as Segregated by Annual Family Income

DISSATISFACTION VARIABLE

To measure the lack of trust, I use the variable F11C CANADA THERMOMETER, which asked respondents across the country to express their intensity of feeling towards the Canadian federation. Specifically, respondents were asked to “[t]hink for a moment about a thermometer scale which runs from 1 to 100 degrees” in which 50 was a neutral point in their feelings “in general about Canada” (Can Democracy Fail, 1995). The intensity ranges from 1 to 100 in the thermometer variable and from this I create a variable called ‘Dissatisfaction.’ I copied the dataset variable F11C CANADA THERMOMETER and dropped the missing values that were coded as 999. I created a mirror image of the observations so that an answer that was coded as 40 degrees out of 100 would appear as 60 degrees of 100, and a variable that was coded as 70 degrees in a scale to 100 appeared as 30 degrees in a scale to 100. This was done by first subtracting 100 from the observation and then multiplying by -1 to remove the negative sign³.

³ . replace Dissatisfaction = (Dissatisfaction-100)* -1

The variable is contrasted against observations in the rest of Canada in Figure 3. There one can see that In the case of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia the responses follow the same pattern and there are no responses manifesting a high level of satisfaction with the Canadian federation. The important thing is the difference in dissatisfaction across the provinces. Figure 3 indicates that most individuals across the Canadian provinces feel similarly about the Canadian federation, except for those in one province—Québec.

When we focus on Québec, we see that dissatisfaction is also present at high levels of dissatisfaction because the data is skewed to the right. Suggesting that there is a difference in the way Québec and the rest of Canada perceive their federation. For example, Quebec’s dissatisfaction data has its highest mode at around the middle of the range. This is in contrast to Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Nova Scotia that have a mode that is tended towards a low dissatisfaction with Canada.




Figure 3: Personal Dissatisfaction with Canada

This suggests that individuals in Québec feel significantly different about the Canadian federation than individuals in the rest of the provinces—as measured by the thermometer variable. The interesting part

is how different the responses between Québec and Ontario are compared to the patterns observed in other provinces. It could be argued that those in Québec have a lesser attachment that might be attributed to the historical and present policy differences across the two regions. But before arguing about the definite causes of dissatisfaction, I use the Canada Thermometer variable as a way to identify differences across individual's dissatisfaction with the Canadian federation.

INTERACTION VARIABLE

The interaction term captures the combined effect of power and dissatisfaction in assessing the way an individual voted in the referendum. This is constructed by multiplying both the income and dissatisfaction variables. By multiplying both these variables we are left with one variable that at its maximum level will represent a high income individual with a high dissatisfaction, while at its minimum level will represent an individual with a low income and no dissatisfaction. For example, an individual in the highest income bracket (i.e. the 11th bracket) and in the highest dissatisfaction level (i.e. a level of 100 points) will have a resulting interaction value of 1,100 points ($11 * 100 = 1,100$). Likewise, an individual in the lowest income bracket (the 1st bracket) and in the lowest dissatisfaction level (i.e. a level of 1 in a range from 1 to 100) will have a resulting interaction value of 1 point ($1 * 1 = 1$).

For all other respondents their score ranges somewhere in between 1 and 1,100 points, for example, an individual with a medium level of dissatisfaction (e.g. a level of 40 points in a scale of 1 to 100) and a medium level of income (e.g. a level of 5 in a range of 1 to 11) will have an interaction value of 200 (i.e. $40 * 5 = 200$). At the same time, an individual with a low level of dissatisfaction (e.g. a level of 20 points in a scale of 1 to 100) and a high income (e.g. a level of 11 in a scale from 1 to 11) will have an interaction value of 220 (i.e. $20 * 11 = 220$).

As seen in figure 4 the data is normally distributed and it follows the same pattern as that of the “Income” and “dissatisfaction” variables.




Figure 4: Interaction of power and dissatisfaction in Québec

ETHNICITY VARIABLE

Hechter (1992) argued that secession could be explained by looking at the correlation between ethnic identity and the way people voted. So in an effort to eliminate any spurious relationships, and hence to identify the explanatory power of the PTT variables, the variable “Ethnicity” is incorporated in the model.

To measure differences that may be attributed to a respondent’s ethnic background, I use the dataset variable FQ50S1 ETHNICITY in where individuals were asked “Can you tell me what ethnic or cultural group your forebearers belonged to?” The categorical answers for those individuals in Québec, varied for over fifty different groups in where observation ranged from a maximum of 329 observations for “French,” to 1 observation for “Portuguese.”

Table 3: Quebec's ethnicities captured by the survey.

Ethnicity	Number of Observations	Ethnicity	Number of Observations
French	329	Haitian	3
Quebecois	181	Croatian	2
French Canadian	174	Hungarian	2
Refused	88	Roumanian	2
Canadian	84	Iranian	2
Irish	46	South American	2
English/British	36	Portugese	1
Italian	22	Lithuanian	1
Dk	22	Greek	1
Scottish	19	Syrian	1
Canandian Indian	15	Swiss	1
Acadian	13	Russian	1
Not Stated	13	Austrian	1
White/Caucasion	12	East Indian	1
Indian (Unspecified)	11	Finnish	1
American	10	Japanese	1
Francophone	10	Phillippino	1
German	9	Metis	1
Spanish	8	Hutu	1
European (Unspecified)	7	Tutsi	1
African (Unspecified)	6	Latin-American	1
Belgian	6	Cuban	1
Jewish/Hebrew	4	Peruvian	1
Chinese	4	Armenian	1
Polish	3	Zairian	1
Dutch	3	Lebanese	1
Arabic	3	Mixture (Unspecified)	1
Bengali	3		
Egyptian	3		

To make the categorical data shown in Table 1 useful in a regression, I constructed a dummy variable for those observations that could be argued to represent French Quebecers. The dummy variable is labeled “Ethnicity” and is constructed based on the data found in the original dataset variable “FQ50S1 ETHNICITY.”

This is done by merging the French, Quebecois French Canadian and Francophone categories into a new category labeled French Quebecker, which is then coded “1.” The rest of the observations are coded as “0” and represent those respondents that can be said to not be French Quebeckers. The new variable is shown in Table 2. There it can be seen that French Quebeckers—those who were initially categorized into the French, Quebecois French Canadian and Francophone groups—make up a total of 694 respondents (or observations), while the rest amount to 484.

Table 4: Quebec’s ethnicities captured by the survey, as recoded into a dummy variable.

Ethnicity	Number of Respondents
Not French Quebecker	484
French Quebecker	694

POLITICAL INTEREST VARIABLE

Harold Clarke (2004) stated that the way the referendum question was worded may have impacted the outcome, implying that political awareness across individuals may impact the result. To control for an individual’s political awareness I use the dataset variable “FQ1 GENERAL POLITICAL INTEREST.” When coding this variable, respondents were asked: “Generally, would you say that you follow politics very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all?”

The responses collected show that 182 individuals in Québec answered that they followed politics “very closely,” while 492 said that they followed politics “fairly closely” and 330 confessed that they followed politics “Not Much At All.” The observations are coded from 1 to 4, and the closest followers are coded as “1,” the middle ones as “2” and the ones that did not follow politics as “3,” the number 4 was left for those that were not sure what to answer. Table 3 shows the number of respondents in the variable.

Table 5: Respondents' general political interest.

General Political Interest	Number of Respondents
Very Closely	182
Fairly Closely	492
Not Much At All	330
Don't know	1

EDUCATION VARIABLE

Because education is strongly correlated with income, this is measured independently when assessing an individual's decision to vote 'Yes' in the referendum. To measure an individual's level of education, I use the dataset variable "FQ48AS1 EDUCATION" in where individuals were asked "What is the highest grade or level of education you reached?" This variable ranges from 1 to 8 with "1" being some elementary up to "8" being for those that completed university. Missing values appeared as 98 and were subsequently recoded as "."

Table 4 shows the responses for the education variable in Québec. One can see that the highest category, with a total number of observations of 259, is for those that completed secondary (i.e. high school). This is followed by those that completed university with 230 observations.

Table 6: Respondents' general political interest.

Education	
Some Elementary	30
Completed Elementary	39
Some Secondary	199
Completed Secondary	259
Some Technical College	105
Completed Technical College	185
Some University	128
Completed University	230

AGE VARIABLE

Greenberg (1985) argues that age and crime have a strong correlation that should be considered when assessing conflict. Likewise, it can be argued that different age groups present different risk propensities. To measure an individual's age, I use the dataset variable "FQ56A AGE EXACT," which asked respondents to answer "What was your exact age on your last birthday?" The responses range from 18 years to 89 years and can be seen in figure 4. The mode in that data is around 40 years of age and is distributed across all age groups. This tells us that the value that occurs the most frequently in the Québec subsample is that of those individuals of 40 years of age, which happens to be the same as the average age in the province.




Figure 5: Age histogram for those respondents in Quebec

GENDER VARIABLE

There are also those that suggest that gender differences dictate how conflict is perceived and whether a resolution is sought (see Haferkamp, 1991). To measure gender differences independently

from other variables, I use the dataset variable “FGENDER,” which recorded the respondents sex. Initially males were coded as “1” and females as “2”. Yet to make the coding regression friendly, I recode the variable so that female is coded as “0” and male as “1” Table 4 shows that in Québec subsample 621 males and 554 were contacted by the survey.

Table 7: Respondents’ general political interest.

Gender	Number of Respondents
Male	621
Female	554

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

In the case of Québec the sovereigntist movement has been influenced by "a new ideology, born in the context of the quiet revolution, but largely influenced by the decolonization movements of the former Afro-Asian colonies and the socialist ideology."⁴(Murria, pp17). Here I control for political ideology as an alternative explanation for secession. To measure political ideology I use the dataset variable “HQ21 IDEOLOGY - LEFT-RIGHT SCALE,” which told respondent that “people often classify themselves as being on the "left" or on the "right" in politics. On a scale from 1 to 7 indicating left versus right, where would you place YOURSELF?”

For those respondents in Quebec one can see in Table 8 that there is a normal distribution in the answers presented for the Ideology variable. It appears that most individuals would consider themselves moderates, as seen by the 265 respondents labeled in number 4. Those that see themselves as of a leftinst

⁴ Originally, “*une nouvelle idéologie, née dans le contexte de la révolution tranquille, mais largement influence par les mouvements de décolonisation dans les anciennes colonies afro-asiatiques et par l’idéologie socialiste*” Murria, Vera. *Le Parti Québécois*. 4th ed Montreal, QC: Editions Hurtubise, 1976. Page 17.

ideology were 13 and those from the right were 29. The variable is kept as it is, and the “N.A.” are recoded as “.”

Table 8: Respondents’ Ideology on a Left-Right Scale.

Ideology Left-Right Scale	Number of Respondents
Left	13
2	35
3	64
4	265
5	97
6	45
Right	29
N.A.	43

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 3

In this chapter I delineated the research design for the rest of the thesis, where I will use a mixed approach to examine the relationship between a dissatisfied power transition and the decision to support a secessionist movement. The sovereignty referendum introduced the reader to the dependent variable by putting in context the question that was asked to the people of Québec. From this I hypothesized that those individuals dissatisfied with Canada and higher in the power hierarchy will be more likely to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum. This based on the expected relationship that PTT argues applies to states.

‘Power’ and ‘dissatisfaction’ were defined and operationalized by an individual’s annual family income and the expressed feelings towards the Canada, respectfully. In turn, a respondent’s ethnicity, political interest, education, age, and gender were justified as control variables that will be incorporated in the model presented in the following chapter. There I will proceed to test the relationships between the variables and explore the issue from a quantitative perspective. This is done by presenting statistical evidence for the argument posited by PTT.

Chapter 4: Quantitative Test

In this chapter I follow by executing a regression analysis that both tests the hypothesis posited by the theory and serves as a barometer for predicting secession support across individuals, I then calculate their relationship with the referendum vote through a regression analysis. The cross-sectional data used there were collected by a survey conducted two weeks before the referendum held in 1995. This as part of a larger study titled “Can Democracy Fail?”

Using this same data Harold Clarke (2004) wrote an essay named *Choosing Canada? The 1995 Québec Sovereignty Referendum*, which claimed that differences in the votes during the first and second referenda can be explained by differences in the wording of the question. This implying that little attention is paid to power or dissatisfaction with the federal status-quo. Instead of focusing on group dissatisfaction, Clarke states that "reinforcing cleavages nurtured the growth of Québécois nationalism" (2004, pp345-355). For Clarke, secessionist support occurs because people in Québec were nationalistic and not sure of what they were voting for. This suggests that he ignored the fact that the issue of secession has been much debated in Québec. In addition his nationalism argument ignores that a ‘nation’ is a vague concept that gets interpreted by the ideas of political and intellectual elites. In lieu of accepting Clarke’s explanation, below I test the hypothesis of whether a dissatisfied power transition increases the propensity of a secessionist movement. To accomplish this I first examine the existing correlations that look correspond to the variables outlined in the previous chapter.

CORRELATIONS

Table 1 shows the distinct correlations amongst the variables in the model vis-à-vis the dependent variable. Here dissatisfaction appears with a strong correlation (0.63) to the variable ‘vote for secession.’ This indicates that PTT is right in including dissatisfaction as a necessary condition for secession.

Table 9: Pairwise correlations

	Vote for Secession							
	Dissatisfaction	Income	Political Interest	Ethnicity	Education	Age	Gender	
Vote for Secession	1.000							
Dissatisfaction	0.6313	1.000						
Income	-0.005	-0.033	1.000					
Political Interest	0.0117	0.0398	-0.151	1.000				
Ethnicity	-0.055	-0.059	-0.13	0.069	1.000			
Education	-0.001	-0.059	0.408	-0.2	-0.074	1.000		
Age	-0.215	-0.153	-0.071	-0.191	-0.116	-0.216	1.000	
Gender	-0.092	-0.035	-0.111	0.155	0.077	0.007	0.017	1.000

On the other hand, my second variable—income—appears negatively correlated to the variable “vote for secession.” Thus indicating that a higher income is negatively correlated with secessionist support, a fact that follows with the idea that the secessionist movement in Québec is not supported by the wealthy—instead, as said, the concept of Québec sovereignty is perceived as that of a fight engaged by the lower class against the rich elites and the powerful interests.

Moreover, it is worth noting that PTT does not talk about ‘power’ or ‘dissatisfaction’ on their own. Instead, the theory hypothesizes about the effect that these variables have when they present themselves together which cannot be illustrated by a simple correlation. For an illustration of the effect of a dissatisfied power transition I rely on multiple regressions.

REGRESSING THE MODEL

The model that will be tested is one that includes the power transition hypothesis as operationalized by both the level of annual family income and the intensity of feeling towards the Canadian federation. In Table 5 one can see the relationship that each of the variable has in the model that will be regressed in chapter 4.

Table 10: Model Specification

Variable	Relationship
Vote for Secession	Dependent
Interaction	Independent
Ethnicity	Control
Political Interest	Control
Education	Control
Age	Control
Gender	Control

The dependent variable is “Vote for Secession” and is coded “1” for those individuals that vote Yes in the referendum, and “0” for those individuals that vote No. This dependent variable is in the form of a dichotomous variable that tells us how an individual voted in the referendum, and will serve to contrast a given vote with the different levels of income and dissatisfaction. The idea is to see measure across all respondents how their particular level of income and dissatisfaction influenced their voting behavior. If as expected most highly dissatisfied individuals voted for secession, then it can be said that dissatisfaction has a positive relation to a secessionist vote—i.e. that those that are upset with Canada will more likely vote for secession from Canada. In turn, if most high income individuals vote for secession, then it can be said that income has a positive relation to a secessionist vote. In the case of the hypothesis being tested I show that those dissatisfied high income individuals, as measured by the interaction term, are more likely to vote for secession.

The interaction term was presented in chapter 3, and is constructed by multiplying both the income and dissatisfaction variables. Table 2 presents the coefficients arising after regressing the model. The table's usefulness pertains only to the significance of the coefficients, which fall within the 95% confidence interval.

Table 11: Logistic regression at a given combination of 'Power' and 'Dissatisfaction'

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -261.23194						
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -197.49397						
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -191.57512						
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -191.23958						
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -191.23795						
Logistic regression						
LR chi2(7) = 139.99				Number of observations = 382		
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000						
Log likelihood = -191.23795				Pseudo R2 = .2679		
VoteForSecession	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Interaction	0.008	0.001	7.280	0.000	0.006	0.010
Political Interest	-0.057	0.191	-0.300	0.767	-0.431	0.318
Ethnicity	1.165	0.266	4.390	0.000	0.645	1.686
Education	-0.170	0.070	-2.430	0.015	-0.306	-0.033
Age	-0.036	0.010	-3.660	0.000	-0.055	-0.017
Male	0.278	0.256	1.090	0.277	-0.223	0.779
Political Ideology	-0.192	0.102	-1.870	0.061	-0.392	0.009
_cons	1.283	0.977	1.310	0.189	-0.633	3.198

Of special interest is the coefficient for the term which serves as an interaction term. In Table 11 it is seen that the coefficient for the interaction term is significant at the 95% interval level. This means that one can have a 95% certainty that the interaction term impacts an individual's voting behavior, as operationalised by the dependent variable. This then proves the hypothesis posited by PTT.

In figure 6 one can see the relationship between the dependent variable and the interaction term as plotted in a graph. Here that those individuals that vote "Yes" are skewed towards the high

power/dissatisfaction, while those that voted “No” are biased towards a low level of dissatisfaction and/or power.




Figure 6: Voting behavior as seen across the interaction of power and dissatisfaction.

To measure the strength of such a relationship one could see that the coefficient of the interaction term contributes 0.008 to the provability of secessionist support in the referendum, yet this value means nothing until it is translated into a probability value. To accomplish this I enrich the probabilistic logit model by using the `prgen` post estimation command found in STATA. In other words, to translate the coefficient into a probability value I use an equation in that allows us to calculate the likelihood of a dichotomous event occurring. Then I can explore how the independent variable affects the probability of a Yes vote in the referendum. This is possible, given “that the probability depends on the distribution of the error” (Long & Freese 2001).

From this estimation I can construct a barometer for the propensity of secessionist support. This is done by relying on multiple regressions of the model tested in Table 11, which will present the probability outcomes at distinct combinations of ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction.’ We can then explore how

each combination of income and dissatisfaction affects the probability of an event occurring. In other words, to successfully assess the probabilities of an event occurring under distinct levels of ‘power’ and ‘dissatisfaction,’ one must present a spectrum that can describe the rate of change at various points. This is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, which show the different propensities under multiple scenarios.

Figure 7 graphs the predicted probabilities of voting “Yes’ on the referendum under distinct levels of dissatisfaction, while controlling for different levels of income. In the figure below the diamond-shaped line illustrates those individuals with an income of \$10,000 or less and their increasing propensity to vote ‘Yes.’ As we move from a minimum dissatisfaction to a medium dissatisfaction, one can see that the propensity increases from 0.0 to 0.4 in this line, thus indicating that a higher dissatisfaction will result in a higher probability of voting ‘Yes’ for secession. One can see that those people that are most dissatisfied will more likely vote for secession. This is intuitive and was seen by the correlation presented in Table 9.




Figure 7: The Effect of an Increase in Dissatisfaction at different levels of Income.

What is not intuitive, and what could not be seen by the correlations presented in Table 9, is what happens after this relationship is replicated multiple times. That is, income alone will not bring about a secessionist vote, yet the increase in the likelihood of such a vote can be contrasted across income levels to show the effects hypothesized by PTT. For example, the blue diamond-shaped line (underneath all other lines) illustrates the lowest probabilities of any other line across the different points of dissatisfaction. Under this line, there are no other lines.

The square-shaped line represents those making between \$20,000 and \$30,000, and shows that these higher income individuals are more likely to vote 'Yes' at the same degree of dissatisfaction than their blue line counterparts.

The same thing can be said above the line above it, all the way until we reach the circle-shaped line that represents those incomes of \$100,000 or more. If we contrast the propensity of an individual in its highest income category--the orange line--with that of an individual in its lowest income bracket--the diamond-shaped line--we can see that at the same level of dissatisfaction (as illustrated by the vertical line) their propensities are significantly different; the lower (0.4) manifested by those with an income of \$10,000 or less is lower than the propensity (0.8) manifested by those with an income of \$100,000. Thus illustrates that at the same level of dissatisfaction, income has a significant effect on the decision to vote 'Yes' in the referendum.

This reflects the fact that when dissatisfaction is in the middle, those voters with low income will be less likely to vote for secession than those with a high income at the same level of dissatisfaction. As soon as we see dissatisfaction increasing we observe that all the lines move towards a higher propensity of a 'Yes' vote at different rates with those in a higher income level moving faster to increase than those with lower income. By examining the distinct rate of increase, one can assess the effect that income has on secessionist support at the individual level. PTT would argue that this difference in the rate of

increase represents a difference in the rate of deterrence across income levels—suggesting the rich are less deterred than the poor.

Figure 8 controls for levels of dissatisfaction, as oppose to income. Here one can see the effect of income for a given level of dissatisfaction. One can see that those individuals that are represented by the diamond shaped line at the bottom of figure 8, are those individuals that are not dissatisfied (dissatisfaction is at 10 points in a 100 point scale), and as a result their propensity of a Yes vote remains zero regardless of the increase in income.

The Effect of an Increase in Income under different levels of Dissatisfaction




Figure 8: The Effect of an Increase in Income at Different Degrees of Dissatisfaction

In a similar way, one can see in the top light blue star-shaped line, that the propensity to vote ‘Yes’ maintains itself steady at 1 (or 100% certainty). This line at the very top is representing those individuals that expressed 70 points of dissatisfaction towards the Canadian confederation. In turn, these highly

dissatisfied individuals all vote for secession irrespective of income. Instead, income becomes significant at middle points of dissatisfaction. For example, those individuals in the middle (i.e. those individuals that expressed 40 points of dissatisfaction) are illustrated by the triangle-shaped line, and present themselves as significantly sensitive to increases in income. One can see that for the individuals that hold 40 points in dissatisfaction, an increase in their annual level of income (as represented by a move from left to right) will significantly increase their probability for voting for secession.

Figures 7 and 8 show the effects of a dissatisfied power transition on the propensity to vote ‘Yes’ for secession. In figure 7 we see that an increase in dissatisfaction is not the same for every individual. Instead, the rate of increase in the propensity is dependent on an individual’s income level. This means that those that are higher in the purchasing power hierarchy will more likely vote ‘Yes’ than those that are low in power in the presence of dissatisfaction. In other words, figure 7 illustrates that a power transition, as operationalized by a higher income, will increase the likelihood of challenging the Canadian status quo. Figure 8 explores income from a more detailed perspective and leads to the same conclusion. Here one can see that as income increases the propensity also increases, yet only for those individuals that are averagely dissatisfied.

LOOKING AT THE RATE OF CHANGE

As seen in figure 7, there is a difference in the level of support at a medium point of dissatisfaction. This difference is dictated by the level of income and can also be seen in figure 8. In both illustrations the story is the same—as income increase the propensity to vote “Yes” increases faster for those individuals expressing a level of 30,40, and 50 points of dissatisfaction.

To quantify the rates of increase at different levels I look at the discrete changes in the predicted probabilities across the board. There it can be see that for the interactions term the change in predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum is of 0.77, as seen in figures 7 and 8.

More specific, when the term changes from 1/2 standard deviation below base to 1/2 standard deviations above the base, there is an increase of 0.312 in support for secession.

Table 12: discrete change in the predicted probabilities

	min->max	0->1	-0.5	+ sd/2	MargEfct	x=	sd(x)=
Interaction	0.770	0.001	0.002	0.312	0.002	210.071	168.929
Political Interest	-0.027	-0.013	-0.013	-0.009	-0.013	2.02356	0.700184
Ethnicity	0.276	0.276	0.269	0.133	0.275	0.620419	0.485919
Education	-0.263	-0.028	-0.040	-0.076	-0.040	5.38743	1.90362
Age	-0.525	-0.004	-0.008	-0.120	-0.008	43.1047	14.3757
Male	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.033	0.066	0.528796	0.499825
Political Ideology	-0.263	-0.034	-0.045	-0.057	-0.045	4.18063	1.26795
	0	1					
Pr(y x)	0.3809	0.6191					
Pr(y x):	probability of observing each y for specified x values						
Avg Chg :	average of absolute value of the change across categories						
Min->Max:	change in predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum						
0->1:	change in predicted probability as x changes from 0 to 1						
-+1/2:	change in predicted probability as x changes from 1/2 unit below base value to 1/2 unit above						
-+sd/2:	change in predicted probability as x changes from 1/2 standard dev below base to 1/2 standard dev above						
MargEfct:	the partial derivative of the predicted probability/rate with respect to a given independent variable						

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 4

In this chapter I test the hypothesis that those dissatisfied individuals with a higher income will be more likely to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum, this as opposed to equally dissatisfied individuals with less income. To do this I first recognized that in Québec a higher income is negatively correlated with secessionist support, and that the Québec sovereignty movement has historically been perceived as that of a fight engaged by the lower classes.

Then after recognizing what might appear as an obvious contradiction to the argument posited by PTT, I proceed to explore what happens when dissatisfaction is at a midpoint. By using a logistic regression and a probabilistic generator, I graph the calculated probabilities in figure 5 and figure 6. In turn, I find that the PTT postulations apply albeit the apparent inverse relationship between higher income and secessionist support. That is, I find that at middle levels of dissatisfaction “income” has a decisive role in determining an individual’s vote in the referendum.

The implication is that as long as dissatisfaction exist in the province, any increase in the living standard of the voters will result in an subsequent increase in secessionist support. In the next chapter I present qualitative evidence of the lingering dissatisfaction in Québec, this through a qualitative description of the issues is presented. This description includes interviews of top political figures in Québec, as well as a youth focus group, which are incorporated in the form of a qualitative study that allows for a description of dissatisfaction within Quebec.

Chapter 5: Qualitative Description

Having seen that when together, both power and dissatisfaction are strongly correlated with the decision to support the sovereigntist cause, in this section I present a qualitative description of how these two variables urge and deter support amongst individuals. I start by summarizing the overall group dissatisfaction with the federation in Québec, and then present individual statements as evidence of status-quo dissatisfaction as indicated by the theory.

GROUP DISSATISFACTION

The sovereigntists in Québec are dissatisfied with the federal status quo dictated by the majority in the rest of Canada. The June 1995 agreement specifically used the words 'Canadian status-quo' which as seen in chapter 3 the agreement was part of the referendum question.

In the case of Québec, a long history of subjugation vis-à-vis the rest of Canada has led to a sense of dissatisfaction with the status-quo. What is more, in the context of Canadian federalism, recent factors like changes to the constitution without Québec's consent, the threat of federal unilateralism, and differences over free-trade with the United States, have accentuated conflict in the political system (Simeon, pp147). Most importantly, the English language has been argued to be a main concern and a threat to Québec's regional culture. The sovereigntist argument is that the same economic forces which in the past have pushed towards the usage of English, over the use of French, may once again return to Québec, and with it a new subjugated status within the Canadian confederation. In the words of historian Alain Gagnon:

"That the British Conquest in 1759 was not marked by overt oppression or violence could not lessen the fact that the sizeable French population was subject to English laws. Conflictual relations were inevitable. More importantly they are still difficult to avoid because French Canadian culture and institutions are continuously threatened" (Gagnon, pp151)

Specifically, sovereigntists argue that Québec's ideas are consistently ignored because they appear as radical to the majority in the rest of Canada. This has resulted in a failure to attain a balanced compromise in the eyes of certain groups and led them to see secession as a better alternative to political subjugation (see Bourgault, 1996 and 2003). The consistent and historical failure to reach a balanced compromise has accrued a set of dissatisfaction issues that have polarized Canadian politics and subsequently "polarized choice between opting for the status-quo or for sovereignty" (Simeon, 2004, pp 116). According to Gagnon, the constitution has set forth a bad tone, wherein many Canadians still do not recognize or accept the importance of maintaining the rights and responsibilities that pertain to the French Canadians and the idea of Canada's two founding nations as the fundamental principle upon which the country was created (Gagnon, 1989, pp 151). This convinced many Québécois that throughout history they have been a besieged society whose only hope for sovereignty is complete independence. In other words, the "failure to settle the constitutional issue and recognize the special status of Québec fuelled Québécois nationalism anew" as it was seen to be "a tantamount rejection of Québec itself" (McKay, 2001, 55).

It was said that dissatisfaction has been defined by Siverson and Miller (1996) as the access to benefits, and that Lemke (1996) has extended the definition to include those feelings arising by isolation, having no say, as well as discrepancies within states' domestic pattern of resource allocation. Below I identify those experiences that lead to dissatisfaction. Interviews were conducted with members of Québec's political parties in the spring of 2009.

PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF GROUP ISOLATION

During a sovereigntist focus group session held in Montreal, representatives from the *Québec Solidaire*, *Parti Québécois*, and *Bloc Québécois* youth commissions expressed their feeling as Québécois or French Canadians. The main idea that was expressed was that French Canadians in

Québec see themselves as a linguistic, cultural, and political minority that remains isolated. According to the participants, this feeling has been cultivated because Québec's language and culture have been historically isolated from the rest of Canada. In the words of Francois Roberge, even today in Québec “there is too much English language on the TV and the English media ignores the French language events.” The idea that the English media ignores French programming makes François believe that “Canada is not a bilingual country” but that “Canada is an English country that tolerates the French language.⁵”

Furthermore, there are others that see the language issue as only one piece of a bigger puzzle. For example, Maxime Laporte, a member of the *Réseau de Résistance Québécois*, claims that Québec “is a country that was conquered and occupied by force” and the only solution is independence. This is an idea that many French Canadians were exposed to in high school,⁶ and is fueled today by the supremacy of the English language and culture.

In sharp contrast, Matthew Dumais, a French Canadian federalist from Montreal, claims that this independence rhetoric is just part of the “stupid rivalry that the French and the English have had forever.” Dumais remarks that he does not support Québec independence because of the provincial labor unions; that, according to him, monopolize provincial politics. In addition, according to Dumais, “I don't want those people running my country—there needs to be change before we can talk about independence.⁷”

From a different perspective but also against independence, Stephan, a young federalist from the *Parti libéral du Québec*, claims that “today culture does not depend on borders” and that in Québec “we need to accept differences” and stop being afraid of the rest of Canada. Stephan claims that for him borders are useless and we all need to open ourselves to the world. Moreover, Stephan believes that

⁵ Francois Roberge, from the Bloc Québécois

⁶ A majority of those interviewed agreed that their interest in the sovereignty movement started after their instruction in Québec history.

⁷ Interview Mathiew Dumais from the Liberal Party

“Québec and Canada have the same interests... and even if this was not the case we ought to change it from the inside,” and this is because in the case of cultural nationalism, in Québec “we have more in common with the USA than with France... we are North Americans before than Europeans,⁸” and in the case of geography “Montreal is closer to Ottawa than to Québec city.⁹”

PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF QUÉBEC NOT HAVING A SAY

Interviews with executive officers from the *Parti Québécois* and the *Québec Solidaire* shed some light into the feeling of ‘having no say,’ as well as its effects on the political climate. François Rebello, a deputy, and vice-president for political affairs under the *Parti Québécois*, claims that there is currently a “political coup” at the federal level that limits the province’s ability to construct a European style fast-train between Montreal and Boston. Rebello claims that “Ottawa is a government that only cares about oil and the interests of the western provinces,” and this is because “there is no such things as Canadian politics; there are only backdoor agreements.” Because of this, the vice-president has dedicated his career to arguing that secession is the only way to achieve self-determination. Rebello adds, “we need to control our own budget” after affirming that “the free markets do not work if only a few have all the power.¹⁰”

In a similar manner, Amir Khadir, also a provincial deputy and president of the *Québec Solidaire* political party, believes in the principle of Québec sovereignty, albeit not being ethnically French Canadian—his background is Iranian and he is fluent in Farsi. According to Khadir, if “self-determination were possible with the federal government, there would not be a need for secession.” Yet Khadir claims that emancipation does not fall within the interest of the federalist. Moreover, Khadir hints that the Canadian government might be corrupt and claims that “the Canadian elites do not want to

⁸ Stephane from the Liberal Party Youth Commission.

⁹ Stephane from the Liberal Party Youth Commission.

¹⁰ Interview with M. Rebello, Vicepresident for political affairs under the Parti Québécois

address Québec's demands" and that this reflects more than "an historical insensibility towards Québec," wherein the only solution is secession.

Concerning his party's ideology, Simon Tremblay, the communications director for *Québec Solidaire*, states that culture is a "community of experience" and that that Québec must have the ability to share that with the world. Tremblay identifies himself as a socialist and believes that culture is important because of history and identity. According to him, Québec and Canada do not have the same interests. Tremblay then adds that Québec has more in common with Latin America than with the United States, stating that "the United States had the opportunity to develop itself alone; we were colonized [by the rest of Canada] just like the rest of Latin America."¹¹

PERSONAL ACCOUNTS WITH RESPECT TO RESOURCE ALLOCATION

According to Christine, president of the *Université du Québec à Montréal* Law Student association, when she was little, her peers would call her patriot because she would sing separatist songs all day long. This was a time of idealism and nationalism. Yet Christine now affirms that "the romantic period has passed, and we now want sovereignty for economic and political reasons."¹² She strongly believes that an independent Québec will create more wealth because its economy is different from that of the rest of Canada. She believes that by attaining national sovereignty the province will be able to better direct public policy and benefit economically. Specifically she argues that the rest of Canada's economy revolves around oil and gas interests while Québec relies on hydraulic energy for most of its consumption, a dynamic that leaves room for economic rearrangement within Québec and its federal policies. Under the same argument, the *Bloc Québécois* claims that "Québec could make better

¹¹ Interview Simon Tremblay, Communications Director, for Québec Solidaire

¹² Focus group comment

decisions about its interests,” and that “federal investments are not convenient for the way Québec’s economy is structured.¹³”

On the opposing side of the argument, Martin Bourbonnais, the youth representative from the ADQ party claims that “before secession, there are many problems that should be fixed first. Like the provincial debt.” The issue here is to be fiscally responsible, claims Bournnais. His fear is that “it is difficult to know what will happen if Québec secedes.” An example he gives is the 1995 referendum’s effect in the financial markets in Québec, which plummeted after the beginning of the referendum campaign. But more than stopping secession, the “ADQ wants a reform of the state,” for they believe that former provincial governments have made “really irresponsible decisions.”

DISSATISFACTION AND EMBEDDED BELIEFS

In this chapter a short description of group dissatisfaction was presented first, then personal accounts of those issues that PTT outlines as the sources of dissatisfaction are examined. The result is a polarized response from both federalist and sovereigntist in where their calculations remain as beliefs that draw their conclusions from emotional appeals. This was first identified by Paul Howe (1998) in his paper “Rationality and Sovereignty Support in Québec.”

According to Howe “embedded beliefs and convictions are important determinants of Québeckers’ opinions about the likely effects of sovereignty,” (Howe, 1998, pp32). Howe performed a study that suggests that the estimated amount associated with the dollar cost and benefits becomes tainted by emotional sentiments and preferences about the outcome. Specifically, Howe explains the fact that individual opinions about the effects of Québec’s sovereignty are the same within party lines by arguing that former socialization and moral perspectives are positively correlated to the assessments of the actual economic costs of secession. His claim is that people who strongly favor secession will perceive low costs, while those who oppose it will expect high economic costs. In his own words, “rather than sunny assessments of the economic effects of sovereignty generating its support, it is

¹³ Émile Grenier Robillard from Bloc Québécois youth Commission.

enthusiasm for sovereignty that causes people to be optimistic about its economic consequences” (Howe, 1998).

In addition to Howe’s findings, Lemke later argued within the power transition perspective that “the gains provided to the dominant power from this status quo are more than material” (Lemke, 2002, pp 22). The idea is that the gains (and dissatisfaction) that arise from the status quo are more than material because they arise from subjective assessments as seen above. The fact that dissatisfaction is such a subjective matter places further importance in understanding its role in conflict, and urges that the issue be further explored.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The fact that a foreign policy issue is being discussed within a domestic perspective is of importance to those who believe that the domestic and international arenas operate under different principles. The Québec referendum challenges the assumption that domestic politics operate under different principles than international politics, this by directly asking the population to decide without the need of a legislative intermediary. In turn, to partially explain the Québec sovereignty movement an international relations theory is here used as a framework-- power transition theory (PTT) is used in this thesis. The theory tells us that “if a rising power is dissatisfied with its own place in the existing order, it may wish to challenge the existing order” (Levy, 2003). In where the underlying idea is that “a nation gaining on an adversary will try to make its advantage permanent by reducing its opponent by force” (Organski, 1980).

The PTT focuses on the role of “power” and “dissatisfaction” conditions, instead of strategies, when predicting the emergence of conflict. There is no explicit consideration to the thought process that a decision maker goes through, instead “they are simply expected to conform to the structurally induced pattern” (Lemke, 2002, pp 39). In turn, the Quebec sovereignty referendum is used in this thesis to test whether decision makers actually conform to the structurally induced pattern. This is done in an effort to test at the individual level the suggestion that adversary power will deter a potential challenger, and that status-quo dissatisfaction is a necessary condition for conflict to emerge.

Specifically, I hypothesize that an individual that has experienced a power transition, as measured by income, will be more likely to challenge the status quo than one that has not. The hypothesis is tested by relying on a mathematical probability model and is then corroborated through a qualitative analysis. The probability model that allowed for testing the effects that ‘power’ and

‘dissatisfaction’ had on an individual’s decision to vote ‘Yes’ for secession is presented in the quantitative section (chapter 4) of the thesis.

This analysis was accomplished by using a dataset that was collected in Québec during the time of the referendum; the final vote of each individual was contrasted with their relative income and dissatisfaction with the federation. In addition to this, other variables were used to check against for potential spurious relationships. Specifically, the model considered ethnicity, political interest, education, age, gender, and ideology as alternative explanations of secessionist support.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In the model presented in chapter 4 the changing probabilities of a ‘Yes’ vote were graphed for the different ‘Power’ and ‘Dissatisfaction’ endowments. These figures show that the rate of increase in the propensity to vote ‘Yes’ is contingent on an individual’s level of income—the rich were less deterred from voting in favor of secession under the same degree of dissatisfaction.

In other words, while income alone will not bring about a secessionist vote, the increase in the likelihood of such a vote can be contrasted across income levels to show the effects hypothesized by PTT. The result being that when we control for dissatisfaction at a middle point, those voters with low income will be less likely to vote for secession than those with a high income at the same level of dissatisfaction. Again, I find that at middle levels of dissatisfaction “income” has a decisive role in determining an individual’s vote in the referendum.

In chapter 5 the findings of the model were complemented by a qualitative study that summarized the overall group dissatisfaction with the federation, and then presenting individual statements as evidence of status-quo dissatisfaction. The idea was to show that dissatisfaction with the Canadian federation is latent in Québec. Interviews served as evidence of how dissatisfaction effected a person’s decision to support or not support the secessionist movement. The lingering dissatisfaction in

the province suggests that any increase in the living standard of the voters will result in a subsequent increase in secessionist support.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The finding that the richer will be less deterred from voting in favor of secession calls for a rethinking of the sovereigntist strategy, which has for long been presented as a battle between the power classes and powerful economic interests in the rest of Canada.

If I were advising the Quebec sovereigntist I would urge them to shift their efforts towards economic development and the improvement of individual family income amongst those that are unsure about the potential consequences of a sovereign Québec. A strategy that brings about access to politics and federal pork has already been implemented by the *Parti Québécois* political party and could be enriched by including a multiethnic approach like the one implemented by another sovereigntist party—namely *Quebec Solidaire*.

In the case of the federalist, they must focus more on responding to the lingering dissatisfaction that many people in Québec feel towards Canada. The group could emphasize historical circumstances in where Québec saw itself benefited by the federation as well as highlight the trend towards regional integration. In the case of the latter this is already being done, yet addressing a historical dissatisfaction has not been the strong of federalist parties like the *Parti Liberal du Québec*. The federalist must convince the Québec voter that the rest of Canada is not conspiring against Quebec.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR TEXAS

In the case of Texas, in April of 2009 the Governor hinted to the public that the state might secede to avoid paying higher federal taxes. At a press conference in Austin, Texas Governor Rick Perry was incited to vocalize the crowd's anger towards the federal government.

The event had been organized by a group of fiscal conservatives known as the Tea Baggers who draw their name in remembrance of the Boston tea party. Their aim to stop the growth of the federal budget deficit which some predict will have to eventually be adjusted by raising future taxes. Yet just like in the case of Québec, democracy fails to address the issue of equal group representation and has urged these people to see secession as a better alternative to political subjugation.

In the case of Québec the data showed that as long as dissatisfaction exists in the province, any increase in the living standard of the voters will result in a subsequent increase in secessionist support. If one is to presume that what is seen in Québec may be generalized to the situation in Texas, then an increase in family income in Texas would result in an overall increase in secessionist support amongst those individuals that might considering secession but as of now believe it is not worth the risk.

THE ISSUE OF VIOLENCE

Through the paper it was assumed that the electoral approach would be the only option for secession. Yet if one looks at the world one will see that those countries that achieve independence almost always do so through violence.

In Québec in 1970s *Le Front de Liberation Québécois* (FLQ), a revolutionary group (i.e. a terrorist group) that sought the independence of Quebec, confronted the federal government in what came to be known as the October crisis. The FLQ was a group comprised of “increasingly anti-capitalist as well as separatist” (Corbett, pp145) young people that engaged in terrorism acts. These acts ranged from detonating a bomb at the Montréal stock exchange that injured 27 people, to executing a high ranking British diplomat. These individuals advocated their actions as "the response to an aggression" from federal colonization that threatened the Canadian government with “100,000 "revolutionary

workers armed and organized.¹⁴ In turn, the federal government responded by deploying its military to the province. Moreover, "English Canada was unpleasantly surprised to find out that large parts of the population [in Quebec] sympathized with the F.L.Q.,¹⁵" albeit relying on violence.

I suggest that secession in the case of Québec did not turn violent after the attacks by FLQ because the province did not have the capabilities. In other words, the province approached an economic power transition vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, as opposed to a military power transition. The option to challenge the status-quo militarily was not at the table, while the referendum was.

That is, the fact that the Quebec independence movement operates under the context of a liberal democracy made armed conflict not a necessary condition for independence--instead it was an economic conflict. This assumption is in line with Lemke and Reed who argued that democracies evaluate the status quo similarly (see Lemke and Reed 1996), and therefore to expect a violent war for independence would be rare. Specifically, secession in Quebec needs not to be a violent one, for the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that:

"[t]he other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal" (Université de Montréal Faculté de Droit)

In sum, there are several forms in which a power can manifest itself. The economic power transition explored in this thesis illustrates only the results of such a transition. The military power transition is not explored here, but it is well known that the army and other Canadian capabilities are in control of the federalist. Thus Québec has not achieved a military power transition vis-à-vis Canada. Future research must further explore why the movement did not take a violent path.

¹⁴ They advocated their actions as "*la réponse a une agression*" from federal colonization and threatened the Canadian government with "100,000 *travailleurs révolutionnaires organisés et armés*" Rioux, Marcel. *La Question Du Québec*. Montréal, QC: Parti pris, 1980. page 210

¹⁵ As a consequence "[English] *Canada a été très désagréablement surpris de constater que plusieurs couches de population sympathisaient avec le F.L.Q.*" Rioux, Marcel. *La Question Du Québec*. Montréal, QC: Parti pris, 1980. page 224

References

- André, Paul. *Histoire du Québec Contemporain: Tome II Le Québec depuis 1930*. Québec, QC: Les Éditions du Boréal, 1989. Page 421
- Bartkus, Viva Ona, *The Dynamic of Secession*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Benson, Michelle, 2007. 'Status Quo Preferences and Disputes Short of War,' *International Interactions*. 33:271-288.
- Blais, Andre. *To Vote or Not to Vote; the merits and limits of rational choice theory*. University of Pittsburg Press. 2000
- Boulding, Kenneth. *Three Faces of Power*. London: SAGE, 1989.
- Bourgault et la souveraineté, 1980; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88HDmGKwZi4>
- Brodie, Bernard. 1959. Strategy in The Missile Age. Chapter 8.
- Buchanan, Allen, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Québec*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1991.
- Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman, *A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments*. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL: *Journal of Communication*, Volume 57 Issues 1, Pages 99-118. 2007.
- Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman, *Framing Theory*. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL: *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2007.
- Clarke, Harold and Allan Kornberg, *Referendum Voting as Political Choice: The Case of Québec*. *British Journal of Political Science*, 2004. Volume 34:2 Pages 345-355.
- Corbett, Edgard M. *Québec Confronts Canada*. Baltimore, MD., page 145
- Cwalina, Wojciech & Andrzej Falkowski & Bruce Newman. *A Cross-Cultural Theory of Voter Behavior*. New York: Haworth Press, 2008.
- Danilovic, Vesna, & Joe Clare, 2007. 'Global Power Transitions and Regional Interests,' *International Interactions*, Vol 33, pp. 289-304.
- De Melo, Jaime and Arvind Panagariya. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. New York, NY: Centre for Economic Policy Research 1993.
- De Vreese, Claes H. *Context, elites, media and public opinion in referendums: Why campaigns really matter*. In *The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns: An International Perspective*, 2007 - London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Deci, Edward and Richard M. Ryan, *Handbook of Self-Determination Research*. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2002.
- DiCicco, Jonathan and Jack S. Levy, *The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis*. In *Progress in International Relations Theory* by Elman and Elman. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003.
- Dion, Leon. *Québec: the Unfinished Revolution*. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976. page 42.
- Druckman, James, *Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects*. *American Political Science Review*, 2004. Volume 98:4 Pages 671-686
- Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. "Historicizing National Identity" in *Becoming National* by Eley and Suny
- Duch, Raymond & Randolph Stevenson. *The Economic Vote*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Duffy, Monica. *Population Shifts and Civil War : A Test of Power Transition Theory*. *International Interactions*, 2007. Volume 33 Pages 243-269.
- Esteban, Joan & Gerald Schneider, 2008. 'Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,' *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol 45, no. 2, pp. 131-141.
- Efird, Brian And Jacek Kugler And Gaspare Genna, *From War To Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory*. *International Interactions*, Volume 29, Number 4, Number 4/October-December 2003 , Pp. 293-313(21)
- Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman. *Progress in International Relations Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003.
- Filippov, Mikhail and Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova. *Designing Federalism*. New York: Cambridge, 2004.
- Fortin, Pierre. *Has Québec's Standard of Living Been Catching Up?* Published in: Patrick Grady & Andrew Sharpe (ed.) *The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater*, Centre for the Study of Living Standards, pages 381-402, 2001.
- Franklin, Mark; van der Eijk, Cees and Marsh, Michael (1995), '*Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht*', *West European Politics* 18 (3), 101-107
- Franklin, Mark. *The Economy and The Vote*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Gagnon, Alain. *Canadian Federalism: a working balance*. In *Federalism and Nationalism* by Forsyth, Murray. New York: Leicester, 1989.

- Geller, Daniel, 1993. 'Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads,' *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, pp.173-193.
- Greenberg, David. "Age, Crime, and Social Explanation" 1985
- Gunther, Richard, & Jose Ramon Montero, & Hand-Jurgen Puhle. *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Guindon, Hubert. *Québec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1988. page 89
- Haferkamp, C. (1991-92). Orientations to conflict: Gender, attribution resolution strategies, and self-monitoring. *Current Psychology: Research and Reviews* 10: 227 - 240.
- Hechter, Michael. *The Dynamics of Secession*. *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 267-283 (1992).
- Hodgkinson, Tom. *How to Be Idle*. New York: Harper, 2005.
- Howe, Paul. Rationality and Sovereignty Support in Québec. *Canadian Journal Of Political Science*, 1998.
- Houweling, Henk and Jan G. Siccama. Power Transitions as a Cause of War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1988
- Jacek, Kugler and AFK Organzki. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Jervis, Robert. 2003. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the debate," in Elman and Elman, Chapter 8, page 291
- Jervis, Robert. 1979. "Deterrence Theory Revisited." *World Politics*, Vol 31, No2.
- John A. 1996. "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory," in *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Page 37.
- June 1995 Agreement <http://207.61.100.164/cantext/modpolit/1995pqbq.html>
- Krueger, Anne. *Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn The American Economic Review* 1997.
- Kugler, Jacek and AFK Organski. *The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation*. *Handbook of War Studies*, 1989
- Kugler, Jacek and Frank Zagare. 1990 "The Long Term Stability of Deterrence." *International Interactions*, Vol 15, Nos. 3/4.
- Lemke, Doglas & Jacek Kugler. 'The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective,'.

Lemke, Douglas, & William Reed, 1998. 'Power is Not Satisfaction' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol 42, pp. 511- 516.

Lemke, Douglas, 'Small States and War: An Expansion of Power Transition Theory,'

Lemke, Douglas and William Reed. *Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace*. *International Interactions*, Volume 22, Issue 2, October 1996, pages 143-164.

Lemke, Douglas, 1997. 'The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 34, pp. 23-36.

Lemke, Douglas. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Levy, Jack S. and Jonathan M. DiCicco. 2003. "Power Transition Research Program: Lakatosian Analysis," in Elman and Elman (Chapter 4) Page 128.

Livingston, Donald, 1998. 'The Very Idea of Secession,' *Society* pp 30-28

McKay, David. *Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience*. Oxford; 2001

Moursund, Janet. *Evaluation: An Introduction To Research Design*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co, 1973.

Murria, Vera. *Le Parti Québécois*. 4th ed Montreal, QC: Editions Hurtubise, 1976.

Rioux, Marcel. *La Question Du Québec*. Montréal, QC: Parti pris, 1980. Page 12

Oneal, John, & Indra Soysa, & Yonh-Hee Park, 1998. 'But Power and Wealth Are Satisfying' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 42, pp. 517-520.

Organski, AFK. . *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Organski, AFK. *The Stages of Political Development*. University of Michigan Press, 1965.

Organski, AFK. *The War Ledger*. The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3.

Université de Montréal Faculté de Droit. "Reference re Secession of Québec." *Judgements of The Supreme Court of Canada*. August 20, 1998. <<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html> >.

Simeon, Richard. *Canada: federalism, language, and regional conflict*. in Amoretti, Ugo and Nancy Bermeo's *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Sirkin, R. Mark. *Statistics for the social sciences*, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2006.

Siverson, Randolph M. and Ross A. Miller. 1996. "The Power Transition: Problems and Prospects," in *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Page 59.

Soysa, Indra & John Oneal, & Yong-Hee Park, 1997. 'Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 41, No. 4, pp 509-528.

Stone, Deborah. *Policy Paradox and Political Reason*. 1988

Study revealed in 1994 http://www.uni.ca/library/ontario_rii.html John McCallum and Marcel Cote

Vasquez, John A. 1996. "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory," in *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger*. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Page 39.

Wellman, Christopher. *A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination* Cambridge University Press, 2005

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* Vol 46 No 2

Yi Feng and Gaspare M. Genna "Domestic Institutional Convergence and Regional Integration: Further Evidence. *Aspects of Globalization, Regionalization and Business* (2004).

Young, Robert. *The Secession of Québec and the Future of Canada*. Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998.

Zagare, Frank, 2007. 'Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict,' *International Interactions*, Vol 33. pp. 305-327.

Zarkovic, Milica. *The Economics of Secession*. St Martin's Press New Yor 1993

Young, Robert. *The Secession of Québec and the Future of Canada*. Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998.

Vita

Originally from Ciudad Juarez, Sergio Villarreal is a BBA in Economics and Finance from the University of Texas at El Paso. In conjunction with his undergraduate degree, Sergio participated in academic exchanges at Columbia University in New York City, NY, and Bishops University in Lennoxville, Québec. Some awards that he has received are a scholarship from the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States to participate at the North American Model Parliament in Montreal, Québec, and an award by the Mexican foreign ministry (*Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores*) to conduct research at the University of Texas in Austin, as well as a grant from the University of Texas at El Paso to conduct ethnographic research on the French Canadian independence movement. In addition to these awards, Sergio performed as a legislative fellow under State Senator Robert Duncan in the Texas Senate State Affairs Committee during the 2009 session.

Permanent address: 3012 E. Yandell
El Paso, Texas, 79903
(915) 892-8089