2011-01-01

# Political Socialization Through Education as a Form of State Building

Aldo Lopez
*University of Texas at El Paso*, aalopez6@miners.utep.edu

# POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THROUGH EDUCATION AS A FORM OF
# STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION

ALDO LOPEZ

Department of Political Science

APPROVED:

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Cigdem V. Sirin, Ph.D., Chair

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Kathleen Staudt, Ph.D.

---
Timothy Cashman, Ph.D.

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Patricia D. Witherspoon, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

by

Aldo Lopez

# Dedication

To my parents

# POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THROUGH EDUCATION AS A FORM OF STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION

by

ALDO LOPEZ

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at El Paso

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO

May 2011

# Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Cigdem V. Sirin, Dr. Kathleen Staudt and Dr. Timothy Cashman, for their invaluable guidance and support throughout the course of this project. Thanks also to my family for their encouragement, support, patience, and love.

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**Introduction**

The study of political socialization and its use as a tool for state-building investigates how state regimes pass on expected ideals and beliefs to the younger generation. Therein, many scholars point out that the most effective way to implement a particular form of political socialization is through educational policy administered in the school system. In fact, civic education plays a key role in determining what ideals get passed on to students and whether those students will become active or passive participants in the political system of their home state. Building upon and extending earlier research on political socialization and state-building, this thesis argues that greater emphasis on civic education and political participation by youth will lead to a more democratic state regime.

Despite the abundance of research in the field, the role that political socialization through education plays in newly created and democratizing states is a relatively overlooked topic that calls for scholarly attention. To address this gap in the literature, the objective of this thesis is to explore the level of attention newly created states place on their educational systems for the purpose of political socialization (specifically, vis-à-vis civic education) when enacting state-building policies. I also examine whether the values and practices to which students are exposed (such as civic versus ethnic nationalism) correlate with the type of regime a state seeks to become, particularly in terms of democratization.

This thesis proceeds in the following order. First, I provide an overview of the literature on political socialization theory, civic education theory, and prior studies on the countries that I focus on, and I describe the historical context of each country. Then I state the importance of this study in terms of its theoretical contributions. Next, I discuss the theoretical basis of the study and my hypotheses. I then present the methodology of my study, reviewing the methods of analysis I employ along with the basics of my model. In the section that follows, I present the

data I use. I then make observations within the data and present my findings. Last, I discuss the implications of my findings, the limitations to the study, and my conclusions.

As I will show in the literature review, a number of studies have been conducted regarding political socialization theory as well as the importance of civic education in terms of fostering democracy. With that said, most such studies are dated and in need of updating. There has been some recent interest in the subject, but such studies seem to go case by case, or at most compare only two states. Numerous articles mention political socialization through education as a tool for state building, but the topic itself has been only slightly researched since the end of the Cold War. Much existing literature has to do with socializing students into communist or Marxist ideology during the 1960s and 1970s. Regarding how communist political socialization played a part in the states I examine, I also review the literature that discusses political socialization in Communist Yugoslavia. When it comes to the subject of state building, there does not seem to be much literature that examines new states using their education system as a basis for building up the values they want their future citizens to believe and practice. Few studies have focused on education (in particular, civic education) that a state provides in regard to how democratic or un-democratic a state has become within a certain period after independence. As a final note, the vast majority of the studies on political socialization within newly created states have focused on former European colonies in either Africa or Asia. My study attempts to fill these gaps.

My study applies the theory of political socialization to the experience of three newly created states of the former Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I briefly describe each state's experience under Yugoslav communism, and compare each of the cases with one another to analyze what impact, if any, political socialization through their educational systems has made in terms of how civically engaged their youth are. As mentioned

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in the literature review, many studies argue that education leads to an increase in participation in politics; but my study intends to explain what particular factors within education (particularly, primary and secondary education) cause increased participation.

## Literature Review

Political socialization as a topic has been around since the time of the ancient Greeks, but the field came to the forefront of scholarly attention and research during the second quarter of the twentieth century (e.g., Sigel 1970; Slomeczynski 1998). The focus of the early research was on how Western nations were implementing civic norms through their educational systems to promote democracy (e.g., Prewitt 1970; Slomeczynski 1998). Sears (1975) contends that the modern study of political socialization began in the United States in the 1920s with American studies in civic education. This is important, because from the beginning of American studies in political socialization, the importance of civic education was at the forefront of the research. Of greater interest, Danoff (2010) mentions that many politicians, such as President Lincoln and President Wilson, had all suggested that leaders in America should make instilling democratic attitudes one of their main priorities.

I will discuss Eastern and Central European countries under communist rule further on, but it is important to note here that a substantial amount of literature on political socialization during the Cold War years was about the way in which communist regimes socialized their students into the Marxist-Leninist (and for a while, Stalinist) system (see, for example, Bertsch and Ganschow 1976; Jambrek 1975; Volgyes 1975).

The remainder of those earlier studies throughout the Cold War era focused on other aspects of political socialization. Although these other forms will not be the subject of this study, it is essential to mention them briefly. For instance, Sears (1975) states that aside from political participation, attachment to the political system and partisan attitudes are the other two main areas into which political socialization could be subdivided. What makes these three areas different is that attachment and partisanship involve attitudes, while participation involves overt

behavioral acts (Sears 1975, 94). Since I am focusing my study on actual results, that is, the behavior of people, my focus is on participation although this does not mean that other areas of political socialization are less important. Similarly, Dennis (1968) approaches the concept of political socialization by adopting a more nuanced perspective that includes cross-cultural aspects of political socialization, sub-group, and sub-cultural variations, as well as the political learning process. Also mentioned are the varieties of content of political socialization and its agents and agencies (Dennis 1968, 88).

The content of political socialization along with its agents and agencies are important to this thesis because I treat these two sub-fields as being attached to the political learning process. This is because content can matter a great deal in the learning process, such as explaining to students what ideals they should follow and practice. The agents and agencies are important because this sub-field may set and facilitate the type of political socialization through education that the state regime requires.

Political socialization can be defined as the process through which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system (Sigel 1970, xii). This process assumes that individuals will make these norms and behaviors their own through passive or active behaviors. Throughout the literature, many scholars make a connection between the learning process and actual participation: in other words, the learning outcome must correspond to what citizens are being taught (see, for example, Dennis 1968; Hollygus 2005). For instance, Peefley and Rohrschneider (2003) point to the connection between learning civic norms as the process and political participation as the output. They find that citizens may easily endorse democratic regime ideals, but putting such ideals into actual practice may require more work. To exemplify, they refer to the cases in which seemingly tolerant states that espouse

democratic views may not actually practice "tolerance" when it comes to accepting the views of the minority (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003). Other factors such as differences in generational norms may influence political participation. Putnam (2001) notes that "baby boomers and their children are less likely to vote than their parents or grandparents" (p. 34). Related to this is the generational hypothesis, which posits that a younger generation might reject or rebel against the attitudes of the generation that preceded it (Westby and Braungart, in Sigel 1970). This might show that even societal norms and values are subject to change over time.

A number of works written during the Cold War discuss political socialization in communist states. Volgyes (1975) mentions that politics and values are brought into nearly every subject, from mathematics to languages, and this was certainly true of most Eastern European states under communism, including Yugoslavia. Volgyes' (1975) study on Eastern Europe demonstrated that formal structures of political socialization are more important in communist countries than in non-communist countries. The most important of these structures, which oversees all agencies of formal political socialization, is the Communist Party, which "determines the norms and values which will be stressed in schools to students" (Volgyes 1975, 14). Youth leagues were considered as other important tools in an effort to instill desired behavior in youth, but the author finds that the effectiveness of such leagues was usually low in most countries (Volgyes 1975, 15).

When looking at works specifically related to Yugoslavia, one observes that Volgyes' general argument fits into the Yugoslavian context. In a study done by Denitch, the author maps out five characteristics of Yugoslav socialism (Denitch in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976, 269). Of those, the political, historical, and sociological characteristics are most important when one is talking about political socialization. The author mentions that politically, Yugoslavia was a

multi-national state with no dominant nationality and was therefore marked by political decentralization, with different ethnic majorities holding political power (Denitch in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976, 269). This point became influential when the member states of Yugoslavia began declaring independence. The historical aspect is important, because nationalism does not play a role until Yugoslavia breaks apart. Instead, cohesion was based on history, specifically the successful war for national liberation against the Nazis. The sociological aspect simply refers to Yugoslavia's political culture, which focuses on self-managing bodies in institutions and in the communes. This latter part is especially important when one discusses how students were expected to practice the ideals they were taught. In Yugoslav socialism, students are like workers in a factory, responsible as a unit for work performance. This means that students were to micro-manage themselves, be responsible for one another, and were taught that if one of them failed, then the class as a whole failed. Therefore, they were putting into practice the communal way of succeeding by working together as a group.

Perhaps the most relevant findings to my work in Woodward's study are what resulted when these communist ideals were put into practice. Students in Yugoslavia would also send representatives to authoritative decision-making bodies, such as the school council, to put into practice participation at the decision-making level (Woodward in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976). The author finds mixed results within secondary school students in Yugoslavia, because students were instead learning to support an oligarchic, personal pattern of participation (Woodward in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976, 310). Finally, Woodward (1976) says that teachers are the ones upholding this type of view by maintaining that students are not sufficiently mature or knowledgeable to take part in self-management. This type of system remained in place until the late 1980s, which Yugoslavia began to break apart. This is important because the results of this

study may be similar to what I might find in my own research—that there may be an illusion of participation without any real increase in democracy.

As a result of the regime changes that occurred in Europe at the end of the Cold War, research in the field of political socialization changed from focusing on different political ideologies to focusing on democratic values and norms (see, for example, Prewitt 1970; Torney-Purta et al. 1999). Many works focus on political socialization through education and the implications for democracies. In an earlier study, Lipset (1959) states that the philosophy of democratic government sees increased education as a basic requirement of democracy. The author also mentions that the higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and to support democratic practices (Lipset 1959). Woodward draws a similar conclusion (1976), stating that the more educated a person is, the more he or she is capable of self-management, referring to Yugoslav socialism.

In a more recent study, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) point out that democracy is strengthened through civic education, a topic that I will address fully further on. A correlation is therefore drawn between education and democracy. The authors define a "good citizen" as an individual who would be personally responsible, participatory, and justice-oriented" (Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Miller (2002) says that voting is an expression of an informed citizen. An additional correlation attributed to works by Lipset and Coleman is that of modernization and democratization (Almond and Verba 1989). On the origins of a citizen's political interests, Shani (2009) finds that if one understands the current political system, one will likely take an active part in that system. However, Shani (2009) contradicts Lipset and Woodward by finding that the effects of educational attainment correlate minimally to political engagement. Kenworthy and Malami (1999) in their study about gender equality came to a

similar conclusion in terms of education and participation by women. In their analysis, the authors found that there is little confirmation within the data to suggest that higher education among women will lead to the election of more women into national legislatures (Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Their study also finds that prior studies on the topic have not found any evidence supporting that same relationship. Almond and Verba (1989) allude to a possibility of a spurious relationship between economic development and democratization, since a number of significant cases exist that cannot be explained by Lipset and Coleman's methods. Therefore, while early works made a correlation between education and political participation, more recent studies seem to suggest that some other factors should be included in such a connection.

With further research into what specifically in education impacts levels of political participation, the term "civic education" emerged. Defined broadly, civic education means educating a nation's youth about the civic ideals and standards expected of them by society. Macedo (2005) states that civic education takes place in schools, unions, voluntary associations, and places of worship. Citizens acquire knowledge about political affairs by reading the newspaper, watching the news, listening to the radio, and talking with friends (Macedo 2005, 8). Therefore, civic education is not only received at school, but also can be viewed as a continuing process of collecting political information. However, for the purposes of this study, emphasis will be on civic learning through schools.

Hollygus (2005) tests the link between higher education and political behavior. Specifically, the author mentions that there is a lack of empirical evidence as to why education increases political participation (Hollygus 2005, 25). Hollygus' contribution is the civic education hypothesis, stating that education provides the skills necessary to become politically involved and the knowledge to understand and accept democratic principles (Hollygus 2005, 27).

The condition she introduces, then, is that formal education must include civic education or a social science curriculum for students to learn those values. Hollygus (2005) also finds that higher education might help citizens understand the relationship between political action and preservation of a democratic system. Furthermore, the author finds that a social science curriculum does affect voter turnout and political participation positively. She shows that higher educational attainment without the civic component does not result in higher political participation, an example being that the relationship between SAT math scores and political engagement is negative (Hollygus 2005, 40). Hollygus' study is therefore important to mine because she introduces and tests a civic education hypotheses, which is part of what I intend to do in my study.

As already mentioned, the current political regime in some states might not be completely "democratic" as it is understood in its western form. Nikolayenko (2007), for example, mentions that several regimes are in transition between a prior political order and a more democratic system. In such cases, a civic education curriculum could have an effect on such a transition. First, it is important to define what constitutes a democracy. For the purposes of my study, I find adequate the definition that Freedom House espouses: "concept of democracy is the idea that government exists to secure the rights of the people and must be based on the consent of the governed." Nikolayenko's (2007) study notes a hole in prior works in that there has been slight research concentrated on the political attitudes of adolescents in Europe, which would be important to the future of regimes in transition. In relationship to civic education, Nikolayenko (2007) finds that an open classroom climate may foster the actual practice of democratic values, but it weakens national pride. Thus, it may seem that in some regimes in transition, a heightened sense of nationalism among students decreases upon their exposure to and actual practice of

democratic norms and ideals. Perhaps the factors involved that mark this transition to democracy in countries are ethnic and civic nationalism.

Nationalism is made up of two components: emotion or sentiment and political doctrine (Taras and Ganguly 2008). Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) refer to two different forms of nationalism—ethnic and civic nationalism—when it comes to political policies within a country. The authors describe how such national policies make their way into the public school systems to pass on such values to the next generation of citizens. This is relevant to civic education and participation because it indicates to what degree membership in a nation is open or closed (Kunovich and Deitelbaum 2004). Civic nationalism is best defined as the "nation-state and one's membership in and loyalty to it in terms of citizenship, common laws, and political participation regardless of ethnicity and lineage" (Taras and Ganguly 2008, 3). Ethnic nationalism is defined as "an individual's membership and loyalty to the nation-state in terms of lineage and vernacular culture" (Taras and Ganguly 2008, 3). We can see that in terms of political participation, civic nationalism is more inclusive than is ethnic nationalism. These two terms are integral to this thesis because nationalism was integral in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and I intend to show to what extent each type influenced the type of participation observed in each country.

There remains a noticeable gap in the literature. There have been a few studies about state-building in this region, and among these few studies, most concentrate on state-building in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (see, for example, Burg and Shoup 2000; Cousins and Cater 2001). Specifically regarding the themes of education as a tool for state-building, Fischer (2005) looks into the role that civic education plays in building up a post-war society in Bosnia. The author notes that ideals of multi-ethnicity and interethnic tolerance are important to the

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government of Bosnia to socialize students of all backgrounds to be able to work well with one

another (Fischer 2005). However, curriculum reform is an ongoing issue because certain

subjects, notably history and the humanities, remain highly stereotypical between the three

constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fischer 2005). Especially present in middle

school curriculums as of 2000 are subjects of "introduction to democracy" and "civic education"

(Fischer 2005). Peefley and Rohrschneider (2003) apply a multi-level model of democratic

learning that focuses on exposure to democratic practices as a way of increasing political

engagement. What makes this study stand out is that the authors see "engagement as not simply

as voting, but actually using one's own civil liberties" (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003, 246).

This study included Croatia and Bosnia, and finds that among people surveyed, 2 percent of

Croatians and 1.4 percent of Bosnians would allow minorities to hold office (Peefley and

Rohrschneider 2003). Additionally, they found that 8.5 percent of Croatians and 4 percent of

Bosnians would allow minorities to have demonstrations (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003).

These numbers are surprising, but reflect the author's conclusion that there remains a disconnect

between wanting a democratic system and actually practicing democratic ideals, something that

can be aided by a stronger presence of civic nationalism instead of what appears to be ethnic

nationalism. In Ramet and Matic (2007), the presence of nationalism is further apparent in

Croatia, where the authors note that "nationalism of the 1990s had a major impact on the

interpretation of (Croatian) history" under the rule of President Tudjman (Ramet and Matic 2007,

366). A different scenario emerged in the development of Slovenia, according to Strajns' (1999)

study of citizenship there. Upon examining national political discourse, the author finds a

strengthened sense of national or Slovenian ethnic identity among the right-wing parties (Strajn,

in Torney-Porta et al. 1999). Since the middle class dominates Slovenian society, its views of

pluralism and democracy have come to dominate the Slovenian educational system. It is interesting that in Strajn's study, Slovenia's transition from a communist regime to a democratic one was facilitated by its better economic situation and because its populace had experienced a relatively free flow of information from abroad (Strajn, in Torney-Porta et al. 1999). Additionally in regards to Croatia, Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) point to another factor playing an important role to state-building, which is the Catholic church. As in other countries in the region, the church managed to gain a great deal of influence upon the collapse of communism, and succeeded in influencing the shape of the new Croatian society. Most importantly, the authors note that ethnic nationalism was present in Croatia during and following its war of independence (Kunovich and Deitelbaum 2004). From these prior studies on the countries that are the focus of my thesis, some common themes can be found, such as the importance of social studies curriculum and ethnic nationalism. There are gaps in these studies, and since most were done during the first decade of independence, I expect my thesis to shed new light on the current impact of education on democracy in these countries.

Briefly, some studies provide arguments against the value of political socialization's impact on the activities of younger generations. Prewitt (1970), for example, says that new states are increasing their attention to their own educational systems for the purpose of political socialization. However, Prewitt's (1970) case study on Uganda found no evidence that the school system can be used effectively for programmed political education (Prewitt in Sigel 1970). Although the background and experience of a former colony in Africa might hold little in common with a country in Europe, the case study does present empirical results of political socialization through education in a newly created state. Other studies have also mentioned that pure political indoctrination in schools tends to bore students and lessens their interest in actively

participating in the current system. We saw this when discussing the impact of political socialization through education in communist states (see, for example, Volgyes 1975). In Ulc (1975), this type of political indoctrination in Czechoslovakia led to boredom and fatigue among students. In Woodward (1976), students also responded passively or negatively to how the education system was socializing them politically. The author finds that students learn early to obey their "superiors," which led to a culture of passive participation in the Yugoslav communist system. Since the evidence is mixed, further studies in this area are clearly needed, specifically to test the impact of civic education on political socialization.

Tourney-Purta et al. (1999) point to the lack of research in the field of civic education. In an effort to address this issue, they conduct a comprehensive study on civic education, posing the following question: "Should civic education be oriented towards enduring social or political values, towards rights and principles for current institutions and a stable political order?" (Torney-Purta et al. 1999, 13). The premise of this question, which closely relates to the purpose of this thesis, is that civic education is not universally viewed as teaching a uniform set of democratic values. Even though instruments measuring the impact of civic education on democracy exist, they are not being weighed to produce new data.

**Historical and Political Background**

I would like to now turn to discussing the historical period of each country from independence up to the period where my study begins to give some historical context. After the death of Marshal Tito in 1980, who as President of Yugoslavia managed to keep the multiethnic country together, ethnic tensions began to rise as Serbian leaders tried increase their relative power within Yugoslavia. This resulted in the Slovene and Croat delegations to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, out of their disagreements with the Serbian faction, leaving that institution. On June 25, 1991. both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Fighting was brief in Slovenia, and after some international pressure, Yugoslavia recognized the independence of Slovenia. In Croatia, ethnic Serbs in the Krajina province broke away from the rest of Croatia in anticipation of Croat independence and formed the Republic of Serb Krajina in April 1991. Yugoslavia also began to support the ethnic Serbs within Croatia, which would begin the Croatian Independence War that lasted until a formal agreement was signed in November 1995. In this context, in April 1992, the Bosniaks and ethnic Croats within Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their independence, which was soon recognized by most of the international community. Almost immediately, Yugoslavia took issue with the Bosnians[1] declaring their independence, which did not have the support of ethnic Serbs within that newly created country. This early alliance between the Croats and Bosniaks dissolved, as immediately several disagreements arose between the two groups and a three-way civil war erupted, with the Bosnian Serbs on one side, the Bosnian Croats on another, and the Bosniaks on a third. Each group dominated a specific region, and the Croats and Serbs benefited from support by Croatia and

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[1] In this thesis, the term Bosnian refers to a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The term Bosniak refers to the ethnic group within Bosnia which is almost entirely made up of adherents to Islam. The other ethnic groups that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina are the Croats which are predominantly Roman Catholic and the Serbs which are predominantly Eastern Orthodox.

Yugoslavia, respectively (Coppieters et al. 2008). In several ways, clashes in the Bosnian war could be considered part of the Croatian Independence war.

From the start of the Bosnian War, three attempts were made by European mediators to end it. Each, however, failed to produce a real breakthrough from the peace talks (Paczulla 2004). Both the Croatian war and the Bosnian war proceeded, with intermittent fighting, for the next three years. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, the United States began to turn more attention what was occurring in the Balkans. The Clinton administration realized that both the Croatians and Bosniaks would be in a better position if they would end the war and focus on fighting the Serbians in Bosnia (Shrader 2003). With the help of Croatia, the Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a formal agreement ending their conflict on February 25, 1995. With that, the war turned into one of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs within their own respective territories (Shrader 2003). By 1994, NATO also began to increase its involvement in the war by enforcing UN mandates. However, the war escalated in the summer of 1995 when the Croatians launched a military offensive, re-taking Krajina from the Serbs (Paczulla 2004, 261). A joint offensive with the Bosnians led to several military defeats for the Bosnian Serbs, which together with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force compelled the Bosnian Serbs to enter into peace talks (Coppieters et al. 2008). The agreement that ended hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Dayton Agreement, which created a power-sharing structure between the three main ethnic groups. There still remained, as I show in my observations, great distrust between all three ethnic groups due to the number of atrocities committed by all sides during the conflict. I will discuss in greater detail the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a later section.

It is also important to discuss the leaders who were key actors in establishing independence in each country. Each also played an important role in the formulation of a state regime that would significantly influence the development of each state. Milan Kucan, President of Slovenia, was initially known as a leader of the faction that wanted to gradually federalize and democratize Yugoslavia, as opposed to the goals of the Serb faction of Slobodan Milosevic. After declaring independence, he made sure that Slovenia quickly transitioned toward a European style democracy. He was formally elected president of Slovenia in 1992, and was re-elected to a second term in 1997. In contrast to the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kucan could be classified as a civic, not ethnic, nationalist leader. Croatia, since independence, was led by President Franjo Tudman, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was led by Alija Izetbegovic. These leaders were nationalists, and much of their actions can be viewed through that context. More specifically, Tudman was an ethnic nationalist (Bass 1998, 96) who wanted to create a larger Croatia that would incorporate ethnic Croat areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, territories that he believed had historic ties to Croatia. He founded one of Croatia's major political parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, or HDZ, in Croatian), which was to dominate Croatian politics until 2000. President Tudman's presidency had authoritarian characteristics, in part due to the strong control his political party exerted, and he remained in office until his death in November 1999. President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Bosniak, and his goal was to create an independent state in which Bosniaks would not be subordinate to Serbs or Croats. After the Dayton Agreement, Izetbegovic was the Bosniak member of the presidency. He retired from politics in 2000.

I find it important to briefly mention the type of political system in each country, and how they relate to my study. At the time of its independence, Croatia's political system was

structured as a semi-presidential system, with the president and parliament roughly holding similar authority within the government. The semi-presidential form of government was changed to a parliamentary system by an amendment to the constitution in November 2000 (Burglund et al. 2004, 485). The first three parliamentary elections were organized under different electoral systems, first as a majority system, then as a segmented system, and finally as a proportional system (Burglund et al. 2004, 483), which is the current system in Croatia. Under the current system, the president is elected for a five year term, and can serve a maximum of two terms. The prime minister is the head of the government and holds executive power. Parliament is elected every four years. Its members are elected from twelve electoral districts within Croatia, with the eleventh district representing the Croatian Diaspora and the twelfth representing ethnic minorities within Croatia. To be eligible to vote, Croatians living abroad must have Croatian citizenship, or be a child of at least one Croatian parent (Siaroff 2000, 204). Most of the Croatians living abroad are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and are considered strong supporters of the Croatian Democratic Union party (Burglund et al. 2004, 484; and National Endowment for Democracy). There have been noted discrepancies in regards to the number of voters for each electoral district. As it is noted that some voters are registered in two electoral districts, while those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina can easily vote in the district for the Diaspora and then vote within Croatia (National Endowment for Democracy). A further point in regards to Croatia is that it reserves eight seats in parliament for ethnic minorities, three for ethnic Serbs and five for other ethnic minorities (Burglund et al. 2004, 483). Slovenia is also a parliamentary democracy in which the prime minister holds executive power. The president is elected by popular vote every five years, serving a maximum of two terms. Parliament has eighty-eight members elected by proportional representation, plus one more member each for the Hungarian

and Italian minorities (European Election Database). As in Croatia, Slovenians living abroad may vote in elections (Siaroff 2000).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary republic, operating under a political structure first established under the Dayton Agreement. There, it established the office of the High Representative, who oversees the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and has the power to remove members of the government or veto laws the high representative sees as favoring one group over the others. Two entities form the country, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The council of ministers is the executive branch of the government, and the presidency is made up of three members, each representing the three main ethnic groups and serving a four-year term. The presidency rotates every eight months between the three presidents. Parliament itself is made up of two chambers: the House of Peoples has fifteen members in total, five members for each ethnic group, and the House of Representatives has fourteen members for each ethnic group. The former group is appointed, while the latter is elected through open party lists to four-year terms (Belloni 2007).

## Theoretical and Methodological Framework

As to the theoretical framework of this study, I merge basic political socialization theory with more recent civic education theory. Political socialization theory posits that through socializing actors (such as schools or the media), people will acquire political attitudes and values and make them their own. This theory is general enough that it is not limited to democracies, but can be applied to almost any regime type, since the theory assumes that all regimes seek continuity by politically socializing its citizens. Civic education theory narrows the topic of political socialization in that it focuses on how democratic regimes socialize their nations' youth. Specifically, civic education theory proposes that education provides the skills for understanding and accepting democratic principles so citizens can meaningfully participate in the political process, therefore creating a more democratic state. This theory is important to the field of political socialization because it states that formal education must include civic education or a social science curriculum for democratic ideals to be properly learned. It is therefore significant in using both theories together, since the nations considered in the study did not start out as full-fledged democracies, but are regimes in transition, and the result of such transition may not necessarily be to a full "western" type democracy.

Accordingly, this thesis will utilize data to make observations in two hypotheses about the impact of political socialization through education on participation and democracy in newly created countries. I expect that a greater emphasis on civic education (via promotion of civic nationalism and political participation of youth) will lead toward a more democratic state regime. In other words, I anticipate that *civic education is likely to promote civic nationalism and political participation (rather than ethnic nationalism and passive obedience to political authority) among a state's youth within a recently created state, leading to a more democratic*

*citizenry* (Hypothesis 1). I also argue that *higher levels of education do not necessarily lead to a more democratic state if ethnic nationalism is present in the national discourse embedded in education* (Hypothesis 2).

In this model, I do not expect to find that participation will be greatly affected by an increased presence of ethnic nationalism. However, I do recognize that it has some impact, since active participation by all ethnic groups within a country, and not just of the majority, is also a factor in determining how democratic a state may or may not be. Here, my major independent variable is the form of political socialization through education policy conditioned by (1) the type of nationalism (ethnic versus civic) and (2) the level of political participation promoted in the education system. My dependent variable is the level of democracy within a state.

To make observations regarding my hypotheses, I elected to comparatively analyze the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on a certain criteria. First, the states had to have been recently created. By "recently," I mean the state had to have come into existence as an independent nation in the 1990s. Second, the state had to have emerged from a communist regime. Third, the states being analyzed had to have started a transition toward democracy. At least some semblance of establishment has had to have occurred, as opposed to having attained its independence or its government facing continued instability. This latter point is especially important, because it facilitates access to previously collected data from the state since its independence. Additionally, what helped me choose these three states is the fact that they all shared a common history and that they emerged out of the same political entity, Communist Yugoslavia. Of the successor states of Yugoslavia, I choose these three because each state's particular ethnic make-up lent it well to this comparative study. My aim, in part, is to account for the impact of civic and ethnic nationalism, so obviously the

ethnic make-up of a nation is a major factor. Slovenia is largely homogenous in ethnic composition; Croatia has a large majority of ethnic Croats, but also a significant minority of Serbs; and Bosnia and Herzegovina is very diverse ethnically and culturally. The Republic of Macedonia, as the other successor state of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro formed the basis of Yugoslavia, and therefore cannot be considered recently created states), would have also qualified for this study, but available data for this country were lacking.

My research employs a comparative case study analysis of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to my qualitative analysis, I also descriptively analyze quantitative data on these three states. Specifically, I gather the data on the (a) type of education (civic versus ethnic, as well as active participation versus passive obedience), (b) levels of education, (c) amount of funding for education, and (d) levels of literacy for each state. I also gather data on the level of democracy for each state. Regarding the type of quantitative analysis, I had intended to run a time series analysis regarding levels of education, political participation, and levels of democracy over the period that is being studied. However, data from the mid-1990s are not available in their entirety for all three states, so I have limited my analysis to a period of ten years, from 1998 to 2008. The start date for such analysis is also significant, because it was the first year after the Dayton Accords (which ended the Bosnian War) were put into practice, so armed conflict would not be a factor in this study. Another reason for not doing a time series analysis was the lack of data on a month-by-month level. With only a ten-year period to analyze, this would have not been sufficient for an in-depth analysis, and thus is functional only for descriptive purposes. To find any correlation of the above factors, as well as include additional factors, I utilize cross-tabulations and comparison tables. Specifically, I break down the level of democracy in each state over the time period of this study. I then look at the polity score of each

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country during the time period. This is followed by observing different factors that influence how democratic or autocratic a state may be, which encompasses political competitiveness, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of political participation.

To increase confidence in my inferences, I consider a number of additional factors. Specifically, I consider the impact of fragmentation on level of democracy. Fragmentation concerns how divided a country is in terms of the political control the central government has on the entirety of the country. As I mentioned earlier, I specifically chose these three countries because their independence has been fully established, and this will allow me to observe whether this is really so. Additional variables can best be separated into two categories. I use indicators for income inequality and GDP to identify any relationship between the relative wealth of a nation and its level of democracy. To further observe any correlation, I use expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. I also take into consideration demographics (ethnic and religious) of each state to check how these variables might affect, if at all, the presence of ethnic or civic nationalism and subsequently the level of political participation. Finally, I consider the levels adult and youth literacy along with average years of education for adults of each country to observe basic education's impact on political participation.

**Data**

The data I use for this study come mainly from the following sources. The first is

UNESCO's Institute for Statistics in Education. The data the institute provides goes by year, and

it should be noted that the data collected from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia all

begin in 1999. Furthermore, the information gathered from UNESCO along with the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP) is primarily used for the additional factors I consider

apart from the ones included in my hypotheses. The figures that this study uses include the

starting and ending age of compulsory education; school life expectancy (primary and

secondary); and public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of

government expenditure. Furthermore, adult literacy rates, youth literacy rates, and GDP per

capita for each year and average years of education for adults were also collected from these

sources.

The second data source is the Civics Education Study (CIVED), which was conducted by

the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The Civics

Education Study measures global understanding of civic concepts, including but not limited to

civic knowledge and skills. Civic attitudes of students, which are related to political

participation, are also an important part of CIVED.

The last three sources of data are especially important for making observations regarding

participation and level of democracy. The third source is from the International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which provides a voter turnout database, broken

down by presidential and parliamentary elections. It also provides statistics on the percentage of

voter turnout, the number of registered voters, the voting age population, the percentage of the

voting age population that actually voted, and the percentage of voters who voted for the first

time. Additional information in this dataset came from a related site, Democracy Web, which offers comparative studies in freedom. Data from Democracy Web that is incorporated into this dataset include the type of government, the political rights score (from one to seven, in which one is the highest score in terms of political rights), and the civil liberties score (also from one to seven, with one being the highest for civil liberties) of each country. Further data provided by Democracy Web are mostly descriptive, in which certain laws or circumstances within the country are listed to explain why a change in political rights or civil liberties scores occurs from one year to the next. This represents a more complete dataset than that provided by UNESCO, which means the data begin from when all three countries became independent. The data from IDEA are supplemented by the European Election Database (EED) to further ensure the accuracy of election data. These data are significant to this study because it allows me fully observe the correlation between voting participation and level of democracy, and cites specific reasons as to why these levels might change from year to year.

The Polity IV dataset is the most significant source of information that allows me to make further observations about political participation and levels of democracy quantitatively. This dataset was also one of the most complete used in this thesis, though each country is missing some data. Significantly, the Polity IV dataset provides indicators of democracy, including competitiveness of political participation and regulation of participation. Each of these indicators is based on an eleven-point scale (from zero to ten). Significant to this study is the polity indicator, which measures how authoritarian or democratic a state is. The scale ranges from ten, which signifies a state being strongly democratic, to negative ten, which signifies a state being strongly autocratic. Polity itself is a general scale, and specifically I utilize the individual indicators that measure democracy and autocracy separately. Another important

indicator that I use as a sort of control factor is that of fragmentation of a state. This ranges from

zero, which indicates no overt fragmentation, to three, which indicates serious fragmentation. It

is noted, however, that information for this variable starts in 2000. Additional data that I use for

this study come from the World Bank and the World Development Indicators (WDI), from

which I got additional figures for income inequality, GDP, and demographics.

**Analysis**

Before going through the data with regards to my hypotheses, I first look for the presence of a civic education curriculum within the primary and secondary schools in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This data came from the *All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies*, which documents all forms of political education in each of the states in this study. Here, I found that civic education in various forms is present throughout primary and secondary education in all three countries. The type of civic education largely focuses on civil rights and entitlements. Further descriptive analysis in regard to the presence of a civics education curriculum is performed by examining the data provided by CIVED.

I then proceed to observe data which relates to the first correlation I propose, that an increase in civic education leads to increased voter participation. Thus, I combine the data from CIVED, and look at the voter participation percentages gathered from the IDEA dataset. Since IDEA provides different numbers than actual voter participation, I will focus on three numbers: the number of voting age population, the number of registered voters, and the percentage of registered voters who actually voted. I will use the latter two numbers to observe the proposed correlation between education and participation. Because this is a time series analysis by year from 1998 to 2008, I note any differences in participation as new laws or curriculums are put into place. I will also track any differences in participation in presidential and parliamentary elections, because I want to avoid a spurious relationship if any pattern does exist in those figures.

I then seek to observe the second correlation that I propose in my hypothesis—that increased political participation among the populace has a positive effect on the level of democracy. To make the observation, I use both the IDEA dataset and the Polity IV dataset,

thereby increasing the reliability and robustness of my results. In the IDEA dataset, I draw a correlation between the number of registered voters and the number who actually voted with the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores. Because the data provided are separated between presidential and parliamentary elections, this provides me further data points to consider. I then follow up by addressing issues that may indicate a possible disconnect between voter participation in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Here, I expect to answer any issues relating to the change of political rights or civil liberties scores through the information provided by Democracy Web, which lends insight into why the score may have changed from one year to the next. It should be noted that Democracy Web lists a country's political rights and civil liberties scores for every year, not only during elections. Since the data I analyze from IDEA only have scores for election years, it is necessary to further examine whether changes occurred in the level of democracy for the years between each election. Moving from a qualitative approach to a more quantitative approach, I run a number of cross-comparative analyses through STATA on Polity IV to see the levels of democracy in each country. Because my time series analysis runs only for eleven years, from 1998 to 2008, without any data available by month, I resort to analyzing the results in a descriptive manner. Furthermore, I start my time series analysis when each country became independent in 1992. (Slovenia gained independence in 1991, but I chose 1992 as the starting point to have data simultaneously for each country.) This enables me to note possible trends, or lack thereof, in the level of democracy prior to when my actual analysis begins. These figures, however, will not be included for reasons that I will explain in the results section. Because Polity IV allows me to account for democracy and autocracy separately, I will run correlations for both variables to ensure the validity of the individual polity score. I then consider the indicators of democracy to increase the robustness of

my results. Thus, I run cross-tabulations for each state, by year, to determine the level each indicator presents for each country. The results of the analyses from the IDEA dataset and the cross-tabulations from the Polity IV dataset will then be compared side-by-side, to check whether the results are the same or if they differ.

To make observations in my second hypothesis, which proposes that the presence of ethnic nationalism within the educational system (holding the level of participation at a constant) will not lead to an increase in the relative level of democracy, I first check through CIVED and Democracy Web to find mentions of curriculum that may emphasize or re-enforce ethnic divisions and/or ethnic nationalism. Accordingly, I will again look to see how these data, if present, correlate with voter registration and actual voting through data from IDEA. I then compare the respective polity scores and relative levels of democracy and autocracy.

I will then look at data from additional factors. First, I will seek to show that general levels of education do not cause increases or decreases of voter participation and levels of democracy. This will be done by gathering the literacy rates for youth and adults, along with the rates for secondary school completion. These data will then be compared with the results of earlier correlations for each state, specifically looking at the number of people registered to vote and how many actually do vote. I then look at data relating to levels of national wealth. I will do this by gathering data describing each country's GDP for each year in the time series, along with expenditures on education as percentages of GDP. I will then compare this information to each state's level of democracy without looking at levels of participation. Finally, I will take into account political fragmentation within each country to ensure there is no major political division that would affect the level of democracy.

## Findings

As I mentioned, the first step I take to analyze my first hypothesis is to determine whether the social studies curriculum in each state promotes civic or ethnic nationalism. At this point, I take a look at data collected from the "All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies." Here, I find that in all three countries, especially after 2000, numerous educational policy changes focused the social studies curricula toward education about democratic principles. For example, in Croatia, there is a focus on human rights and democratic citizenship. Such curricula exist at both the primary and secondary level of education, and are considered cross-curricular, meaning such content is not limited to civics courses. In Slovenia, the civic education curriculum is divided between a focus on civics and one on social studies. Civic education, ethics, and civic culture are mandatory at the primary level (grades seven and eight) and at the secondary level (grade nine). While social sciences are taught throughout the secondary level (grades nine to eleven), no particular emphasis on civic education can be noticed aside from that one mandatory course. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, major reform to include civic education did not occur until the 2000-2001 academic school year. This is when "introduction to democracy" and "civic education" were introduced as separate subjects into the curriculum at the middle-school level. It appears that within the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is an effort of continuous curriculum reform to break down ethnic stereotypes and segregation within the school system. In the 2003-2004 academic school year, the subject of "human rights and democracy" was introduced to the curriculum for seventh and eighth grade students. Clearly, civic education is present at both the primary and secondary level in each state. This does lead to the conclusion that, especially after 2000, teaching skills for democratic behavior, which moves youth toward civic nationalism, is present within each state.

Some information on the curriculum of each country also shows that ethnic nationalism was the dominant factor, specifically in the 1990s. This is not as overtly evident in Slovenia, at least in terms of the educational system, although because it is a state with an ethnic supermajority, there have been some noted problems regarding ethnic minorities from other areas in the former Yugoslavia. These will be discussed further in the section that presents the findings on the strength of democracy in Slovenia.

In Croatia, a more ethnically diverse state, nationalism and ethnic (Croat) nationalism were present since its founding in 1992. The subject of history was especially the focus of such nationalist rhetoric, largely being considered the result of the strong influence of President Franjo Tudjman and his political party, the Croatian Democratic Union, which continued to be of major importance after Tudjman's death. The party is considered a center-right party, but its primary ideology is the promotion of Croatian nationalism, although such rhetoric is thought to have declined since 2002. Since that year, nationalism in the curriculum has gradually been replaced with a genuine focus on democratic principles. These findings are relevant because they not only provide background to the findings within the time series, but also because for the years 1998 and 1999, ethnic, and not civic, nationalism is considered the dominant factor in the Croatian education system.

Perhaps the most persistent presence of ethnic nationalism appears in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although still considered a culturally divided state, in the 1990s, which would include the first two years of the time series used in this thesis, it was very much ethnically divided. The three dominant cultures are Bosniak, Croat, and Serb, each of which dominates a certain region within the country, and which is consequently noticeable in the local school system. In some of these regions, especially in Herzegovina, students are segregated by different

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ethnicities and faiths into separate schools. The entire social studies curriculum is most resistant

to reform, because such studies are taught differently depending on the school, which further

reinforces cultural distinctions within the country. Despite this, because of mandates placed upon

it by the European Union (EU) and a significant presence of NGOs, Bosnia and Herzegovina has

made the most strides in integrating its fractured educational system into a more unified model.

To see if the data support my first correlation—that presence of civic education within

the school curriculum leads to an increase in voter participation—I use statistics from the voter

turnout database from IDEA to construct a chart using the statistics important to this thesis (see

Table 1). Having established that after 2000, civic education, and thus civic nationalism, was

prominent in the school curricula, I make further observations regarding the first part of my

hypothesis with data from elections after 2000. However, I feel it is best to go through all the

data presented to first identify any trends in voter participation

Table 1. Voter Participation by Election Year

| Country | Election type | Year | Voter Turnout (%)* | Registration* | Voting age population |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Parliamentary | 2006 | 36.75 | 2,736,886 | 3,539,921 |
| | | 2002 | 55.45 | 2,342,141 | 3,178,427 |
| | | 2000 | 63.7 | 2,508,349 | 3,053,221 |
| | | 1998 | 70.74 | 2,656,758 | 3,256,197 |
| | Presidential | 2006 | | 2,736,886 | 3,539,921 |
| | | 2002 | 55.45 | 2,342,141 | 3,178,427 |
| | | 1998 | 70.74 | 2,656,758 | 3,256,197 |
| Croatia | Parliamentary | 2007 | 59.58 | 4,229,681 | 3,557,272 |
| | | 2003 | 61.65 | 4,087,553 | 3,501,832 |
| | | 2000 | 76.55 | 3,685,378 | 3,484,951 |
| | Presidential | 2005 | 51.04 | 4,392,220 | 3,533,725 |
| | | 2000 | 60.88 | 4,252,921 | 3,484,951 |
| Slovenia | Parliamentary | 2008 | 63.1 | 1,696,437 | 1,645,967 |
| | | 2004 | 60.64 | 1,634,402 | 1,622,422 |
| | | 2000 | 70.36 | 1,586,695 | 1,543,425 |

| | | 2007 | 58.43 | 1,720,481 | 1,641,161 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Presidential | 2002 | 65.24 | 1,610,234 | 1,604,505 |

**Source:** *Voter Turnout Database from IDEA.*

\* Including registered voters of Slovenia and Croatia living abroad.

The first evident trend is that the number of registered voters is consistently rising in both Croatia and Slovenia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, one can see that from 1998 to 2002, the number of registered voters decreased, but then began to rise by the 2006 presidential election. For the same country, the consistent decrease in voter participation is noticeably apparent in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Thus, there is an obvious disconnect by 2006, in which voter registration is at a relatively high level not seen since 1998, but voter participation is considerably lower. I turn to the data provided by Democracy Web to determine why this is the case. Out of a few possible explanations, continued existence of ethnic divisions within the government and in the education system throughout the time period might be a primary cause for voter dissatisfaction. Another possible explanation is that Democracy Web shows that political rights within the country fluctuated, from a high rank of five in 2002 to four in 2003, and further dropping to three in 2005 before rising again to four by the next year.

Upon looking at the other two states, Croatia and Slovenia, I find a generally higher voter participation in parliamentary elections than in presidential elections. A slightly similar disconnect is noted between registered voters and participation, with the former increasing but the latter initially decreasing. Although statistics for participation are not available for the 1997 Slovenian presidential election, they were available for the 1997 Croatian presidential election, and those numbers showed that 54.62 percent of registered voters turned out. As discussed in the

historical and political background section, the political system of this country was set up to favor the ruling political party of Croatia, HDZ, including the policy of allowing the Croatian Diaspora to vote in such elections. This is also a reason why the number of voters registered is higher than the voting age population within Croatia. For example, according to the National Endowment for Democracy, there were 360,000 voters from abroad who cast their ballots in the 2000 parliament election. While in the 2003 election for parliament, the number of voters from abroad was at 396,617. These voters from abroad are noted as being strong supports of the nationalist HDZ, however as also noted previously, there is no system in place to prevent voters from Bosnia and Herzegovina from going to vote within an electoral district in Croatia. In regards to Slovenia, its electoral law also allows Slovenes abroad to cast their ballots in these elections. The rather large turnout for the 2000 election could be viewed as a turning point for independent Croatia following the death of Franjo Tudjman, which appears to have led to an increase in participation. Information from Democracy Web further supports this conclusion, stating that by 2002, greater political freedom was noted in national elections. The fact that in 2000 Croatia switched to a parliamentary system from a semi-presidential system might also explain why more registered voters cast their ballots in elections for parliament than they did for those for president. To summarize, for most of the time series, voter participation has actually been decreasing until the 2007 election for Croatia and the 2008 election for Slovenia. I believe this can be explained by the fact that the first generation that went through both primary and secondary school in independent Slovenia and Croatia began to come of voting age around 2005. These students, especially the Croatians, would have gone through both ethnic and later civic nationalist curricula, and this could be why voter participation has begun to increase. Students who would have gone through both primary and secondary education that included a civic

education curriculum will begin to come of voting age in 2012. According to my hypothesis, I propose that this trend of increased voter registration and participation will continue to increase.

I now move to see if the data support the second correlation in my hypothesis, in which increased voter participation leads to a more democratic state. I first use the data provided by the Polity IV dataset to look at the degree of democracy and the factors that cause the relative strength or weakness of the level of democracy in each state. The Polity IV dataset measures democracy in two ways. The first is through a polity variable, which takes into account autocracy and democracy and scores those levels from negative ten to positive ten. Second is the democracy variable, an eleven-point scale from zero to ten. I also include the autocracy variable, as the polity score is made up of combining both the democracy and autocracy scores. In Table 2, the democracy and autocracy scores for each election of year of all three countries are shown. After making a correlation table, I find that data for Bosnia are not available for most variables, as it is considered by Polity IV a state in transition. To explain what each score signifies, for the democracy variable, its score is dependent on the indicators for democracy which track competitiveness of the system and composition of political participation, whose own variables go from one to five, therefore a democracy score of ten means both indicator variables are those which were coded as five. The autocracy score is based on factors such as fragmentation of a system, coded from zero to three ranging on percentage of state fragmentation, and regulation of participation. Therefore, an autocracy score of ten would mean that the indicator variables determining the autocracy score are at their highest levels, an example being serious fragmentation. As Bosnia and Herzegovina was a regime in transition for the entire period under review, a score of negative sixty six appears which signifies that the regime is in transition. For Slovenia, the polity score remained a consistent ten from 1998 to 2008, showing a robust

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democracy. The variable that looks at democracy supports the polity score, although it starts at an eight for most of the period in review, and then rises to a score of nine from 2005 to 2008. At this point, I want to examine some of the underlying factors that contribute to such a rating. The two variables I look at are regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation. For both variables, Slovenia scores a consistent five from 1998 to 2008. This means that different political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions, and that the political system is competitive. For Croatia, the polity score fluctuates greatly, moving from a negative five in 1998 to an eight in 2000. No score was recorded for 1999 because it was considered a year of transition. Since its democracy score was zero, but its autocracy score was a negative five, I look to other variables that might explain why this is so. Croatia's regulation of participation score for that year is three, which means it is labeled as sectarian. According to Polity, this means is that multiple identity groups move between intense factionalism and government favoritism. Also included under this label is that significant portions of the population have historically been excluded from positions of power. By 2000, it is obvious that regime transition had occurred. No scores were reported for the variable representing competitiveness of participation in Croatia for the years 1998 and 1999. From 2000 onward, Croatia's democracy score is consistent with that of Slovenia's. The difference is that its regulation score stays at two, which is coded as a multiple identity system. Its competitiveness score is a consistent four, which means it is a system in transition, usually toward a fully regulated system, as is the case in Croatia. Based on these observations from the Polity data, I can establish that Slovenia is a strong democracy throughout the time period in review, Croatia is a regime in transition toward a more robust democracy, but insufficient data on Bosnia and Herzegovina make it difficult to fully test my hypothesis.

To elaborate on these findings from Polity IV, I turn to the database from IDEA and to Democracy Web. I again use the voter turnout database from IDEA, this time to show the political rights and civil liberties scores for each election year in each of the countries. This data can be seen in Table 2. To mention, the political rights and civil liberties scores are based on a seven point scale. For political rights, a rating of one means a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections; a rating of two means there exists political corruption, and foreign or military influence; a rating of three, four or five denotes that a government moderately protects almost all political rights. Six and seven are not present in the table, but these would denote a heavy restriction, or lack of political rights. For civil liberties, a score of one signifies a country has a wide range of civil liberties; a score of two means there are limits on media independence, and discrimination is present; a score of three, four, or five signifies that the government moderately protects almost all civil liberties. A score of six or seven is not present in the table below, but those signify limits on rights of expression and association; and there being present few or no civil liberties, respectively.

Table 2. Political Rights and Civil Liberties Scores

| Country | Election Type | Year | Freedom house - Political Rights | Freedom house - Civil Liberties | Polity IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Parliamentary | 2006 | 4 | 3 | . |
| | | 2002 | 4 | 4 | . |
| | | 2000 | 5 | 4 | . |
| | | 1998 | 5 | 5 | . |
| | Presidential | 2006 | 4 | 3 | . |
| | | 2002 | 4 | 4 | . |
| | | 1998 | 5 | 5 | . |
| Croatia | Parliamentary | 2007 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| | | 2003 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| | | 2000 | 2 | 3 | 8 |
| | Presidential | 2005 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| | | 2000 | 2 | 3 | 8 |
| Slovenia | Parliamentary | 2008 | 1 | 1 | 10 |

| | | 2004 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2000 | 1 | 2 | 10 |
| | Presidential | 2007 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| | | 2002 | 1 | 1 | 10 |

**Source**: *Voter Turnout Database from Idea and Polity IV Dataset*

By viewing the table, we can formulate general ideas and draw conclusions by combining data from both datasets. Slovenia is mostly consistent in having the best scores for political rights and civil liberties, aside from 2000, in which a score of two in civil liberties means that there were limits on media independence, and some discrimination was present. Further information provided by Democracy Web states that Slovenia's civil liberties score changed in 2003, although no elaboration is provided about why that occurred, and I could not independently find any further data to provide insight about that change. Interestingly, Slovenian law provides the Hungarian and Italian minorities one seat each in the lower house of the national assembly, while the Roma ethnic minority is given seats in twenty municipal councils. Croatia's political rights score of two is, according to Democracy Web, a result of political corruption and military influence in government affairs. The improvement of civil liberties from 2000 onward can be attributed to the transition from complete government control by the Croatian Democratic Union to freer elections that led to other parties gaining power. It is also notable that Croatia reserves eight seats in its national legislature for ethnic minorities. We can see that the increase in level of democracy with regards to the polity scores is mirrored in the political rights and civil liberties scores.

The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, seen in Table 2, can be best described as elucidating a regime transitioning steadily toward democracy. From the start of the time period to 2002, the country's political rights score was five because it remained divided along ethnic

lines, along with the fact that ethnic Croats were left out of the government from 2001 onward. Throughout the considered time period, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained ethnically divided, with those divisions being institutionalized. As mentioned previously, students in Herzegovina are segregated by ethnicity, and furthermore, educational appointments are highly politicized and subject to ethnic favoritism. However, with improving conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the attempt to reform and standardize different subjects of the primary and secondary curriculum, it does appear that the country is moving steadily toward a more democratic system.

Therefore, this leaves the question of whether civic education increases participation which in turn increases democracy within a state. Based on the analysis of the data available, Croatia best supports this hypothesis because its voter registration not only continues to climb, but its recent elections also have begun to see an increase in voter participation. This correlates well with an increase in democracy on all variables included in it. The case of Slovenia also supports my hypothesis, as it has consistently been a strong democracy throughout the years included in the study. The fact, however, that it started out with high levels of voter participation that gradually decreased over time, but then began to rise again by 2008, is something that cannot be explained by the available data. I can at best conclude that it has to do with generational differences. Further research must be conducted to determine whether this is indeed the explanation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the research shows, is the most ethnically diverse country, but also is the country that has invested the most effort in educating its youth for democracy with a variety of civic education subjects. Despite low ratings in terms of how democratic the state was in 1998, it has gradually moved to being more democratic throughout the time period. What excludes it from fully supporting my hypothesis is that voter participation was consistently decreasing by large percentages.

I now turn to my second hypothesis—that the presence of ethnic nationalism, while not taking into account participation, may contribute to a state regime being less democratic. In Slovenia, which has the most ethnic homogeneity with more than 90 percent of its population being ethnic Slovene, I could not find any strong support to show that there was any sizable ethnic nationalism influencing the educational system. Even on a national scale, political parties that support such rhetoric are considered fringe parties with little influence on government policy. Therefore, since it does lack this variable, the Slovenia case cannot prove or disprove this hypothesis. In the case of Croatia, which has an ethnic makeup of about a quarter Croat and about 10 percent Serb, strong ethnic nationalism was evident throughout the first decade of its independence. As described previously, nationalist leader Franjo Tudjman made sure that an especially Croatian nationalistic point of view was present in the social studies curriculum, and civic education courses that emphasized democracy did not come about until after the HDZ lost power in 2000. As late as 2003, discrimination against minorities was still present, but indeed, as shown by the civil liberties score, restrictions on such liberties were being lifted from 2000 on. Since the sample from IDEA includes only two election years in which ethnic nationalism was still dominant in national rhetoric and school institutions, I can only say that my findings are inconclusive. There certainly appears to be some correlation, since a decrease in ethnic nationalist rhetoric and presence in the school system began to immediately show in terms of relative democracy in Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the most heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and cultural diversity, provides partial support for this hypothesis. I say "partial" because officially, the national government is made up of a coalition of the three main ethnic groups in a power-sharing agreement. The government also has officially promoted democracy, tolerance of ethnic diversity, and other civic values being taught in primary and secondary

schools. What slows this progress is regional dominance by the different ethnic groups, which allows them to teach the subjects within social studies their own way, despite the inclusion of civics courses. Aside from segregated schools in Herzegovina, each ethnic group is taught subjects such as history and literature in a separate way that includes using different textbooks. Also, corruption within the higher echelons of the education system further bogs down progress. Such issues might help explain the country's rankings of five and four in political rights and civil liberties throughout the time period. In summary, with a lack of data and mixed findings from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I cannot disprove this hypothesis, but I cannot fully say there is enough to support what it proposes.

Having observed the data relating to both hypotheses, I go on to observe the additional factors to see if my findings can be explained by any other factors. I first see if GDP per capita, as some scholars have proposed, has any effect on the growth and development of a democratic regime. It is clear from looking at the figures that Slovenia has led the other two states in relative wealth since the start of the time series, followed by Croatia, and then by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Judging by this, one can propose a correlation between national wealth and democracy. However, such inference, I believe, would be spurious, since relative national wealth cannot alone explain why participation levels fluctuate as they did. Consequently, I now turn to the data of how fragmented each state is, since that had been one of the bases of selection for the three cases. Upon going through a year-by-year listing for state fragmentation in the Polity IV dataset, I find no fragmentation within either Slovenia or Croatia. I do find serious fragmentation, coded with a number three, for each year under study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that over 25 percent of its territory is separated from central authority. This might explain why both levels of registration and voting have gone down, but it does not explain why

Bosnia's voting participation rate was as high as Slovenia's and Croatia's at the beginning of the time series. This might also explain why Bosnia's numerous civic education programs are slowly starting to show some results as the younger generation comes of age and makes its presence felt in both voter registration and participation.

Table 3. Education Statistics

| Country | Adult Literacy Rate | Youth Literacy Rate | Compulsory Education Age Range | Expenditure on Education as % of GDP | Expenditure on Education as % of total Government Expenditure | Average Years of Schooling For Adults Over 25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 96.7 | 99.8 | 6-15* | N/A | N/A | 8.7 |
| Croatia | 98.1 | 99.6 | 7-14 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 8.8 |
| Slovenia | 99.7 | 99.8 | 6-14 | 5.8 | 12.6 | 8.9 |

**Source:** *UNESCO Institute for Statistics and UNDP Human Development Report*

*For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ending age for compulsory education changed to 14 in 2008.

The last factor which I observe is central one of the oldest propositions made by scholars, including Lipset: that education in general increases the relative strength of democracy within a country. Table 3 shows the factors involving education which I include in my observations relating to education in general. Slovenia had a 99 percent literacy rate for adults and youth for the entire period. Croatia had a 98 percent literacy rate for adults and a 99 percent literacy rates for youth through the period. Bosnia and Herzegovina's literacy rate for adults went from 96 to 97 percent during the time period, while its youth literacy rate was maintained at 99 percent. The starting and ending ages of compulsory education are similar enough to allow me to conclude that this particular factor has little explaining affect over levels of participation and of democracy. I would have liked to have included further educational measures to fully observe

any correlations between general education levels and democracy, but lack of data for Bosnia and Herzegovina meant that I cannot. Going on literacy rates alone, one can see that they mirror the relative strength of democracy in each state, but to add further depth I also look at the average years of schooling for adults, the data for which was collected from the UNDP Human Development Report. These numbers again appear rather ordinal in regards to their slight differences from the respective countries. Therefore, upon considering these two education measures, I cannot fully conclude that the relationship between general education and level of democracy is a spurious one. I also wanted to observe in depth expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, but data was insufficient for each country, specifically there was no data reported by UNESCO for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as seen on Table 3. Consequently, without additional data, these additional factors mentioned do not seem to provide any alternative explanation for the results I have observed for both of my hypotheses.

**Conclusion**

This thesis investigated the determinants that make a state more or less democratic through the political socialization strategies that such a state employs with its education policies. Specifically, I aimed to explore whether any empirical support exists for the link between the civic education process and political participation as the result of such process, as well as whether civic versus ethnic nationalist ideals imposed on the youth through the education system affect the democratization efforts in a newly created state. I began with a review of the relevant literature. I examined the literature that is important to the field of political socialization, going through the different stages to which it has historically been applied. I then included works on the impact of political socialization specifically in Yugoslavia, which provides background for study into its successor states of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I then moved to more recent studies into the field of civic education, as well as their implications into modern studies of how societies educate toward democracy. I then reviewed prior research that applied civic education to the countries considered in this thesis. I explored whether empirical support exists for the link between the civic education process and political participation as the output of such process, as well as whether civic versus ethnic nationalist ideals imposed on youth through the education system affect democratization efforts in a newly created state. I found that most research applying political socialization to specific case studies is out of date and does not consider the condition of civic education. Furthermore, I found a lack of comparative studies utilizing the civic education theory outside of the United States, where the theory appears most popular among researchers.

Theoretically, my research adds to prior studies on political socialization by examining how education affects increased political participation by youth and, in turn, democratization in

newly created countries. Given my focus on Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, this thesis also adds to the research on state-building and political socialization within Eastern and Central Europe. Methodologically, the major contribution of my study is the use of a qualitative approach, as well as a descriptive analysis of quantitative data. More specifically, as opposed to using either a single case study or quantitative analysis, I employ a comparative case study design. As such, I attain a more refined theoretical framework by including a wide range of data. I make observations of data relating to my main hypothesis and find that in all three states, civic nationalism exists, with the strongest civic education programs in the ethnically diverse countries of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I find that participation is actually decreasing despite the presence of civic education programs, and has only begun to rise by the last data point in the series. My explanation is that the younger generation that had experienced most of these civic education programs would have just started to come of voting age around 2005, and therefore their real impact on elections would then start to be evident. I also find that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not fully support my hypothesis, since despite having the most civic education programs, its democracy score and supporting variables that denote levels of democracy are the lowest among all three cases. Slovenia and Croatia, however, do support my hypothesis in which steady levels of democracy are noted. I believe that further research must be continued on this subject to gain further data, especially as the first generation to go entirely through civic education in all countries examined will come of voting age in 2012. Therefore, it would be important to note how these new voters will impact levels of participation, which I believe will be in a positive manner, which should then impact relative levels of democracy.

As to the hypothesis that posits that the presence of ethnic nationalism within the system of education will have a negative effect on the level of democracy, I find my results inconclusive

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because of lack of data. Croatia comes closest to supporting this thesis, but with insufficient data, and with Bosnia and Herzegovina providing mixed results, I can neither completely confirm nor reject this hypothesis. Further research must be done, especially throughout the first decade of independence of each state, in which a strong ethnic nationalism was noted in all three countries that would, according to my thesis, affect the growth and level of democracy. In my observations of the additional factors included in my study, I find no major correlation that could explain their connection to both participation and level of democracy. I do feel that further data must be collected about money invested in the education system to further test any possible link with levels of democracy.

I would like to address the limitations of my study. Although political participation can be broadly defined, I limited political participation in my study to voter registration and voter participation because of the limit of available data relating to other activities of political participation in each respective country. Specifically, I believe adding numbers and participation in each of the political parties of each country would have made my findings more robust in my proposed correlation between civic education and participation. The other limitation of importance in my study is the lack of in-depth data relating to the type of curriculum being taught in each specific region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As noted, each region is in charge of implementing its own curriculum, and significant differences are apparent from region to region. Furthermore, it would have been useful to have had access to what exactly is being taught in these civic education courses in each country, since many times the names of these civic education courses may not exactly mirror what is being taught in individual classrooms. Taking these two features into full effect, I believe my findings could have been more robust in the

testing the correlation between civic education, conditioned by civic nationalism, leading to an increase in democracy.

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## Vita

Aldo Lopez is a native of El Paso, Texas. He graduated from Montwood High School in 2005. He attended the University of Texas at El Paso, where he received his Bachelors of Arts degree in social studies with a minor in secondary education in the spring of 2009. He was accepted into the political science graduate program in the fall of 2009. He was also employed as a graduate assistant in the same department from the fall of 2009 to the spring of 2011.

Permanent Address:    11736 Francis Scobee

El Paso, Texas 79936

This thesis/dissertation was typed by Aldo Lopez.