Porfirismo during the Mexican Revolution: Exile and the Politics of Representation, 1910-1920

Nancy Alexandra Aguirre
University of Texas at El Paso, naaguirre@utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd

Part of the History Commons, Latin American Languages and Societies Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/1773

This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.
PORFIRISMO DURING THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: EXILE AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION, 1910-1920

NANCY ALEXANDRA AGUIRRE

Department of History

APPROVED:

______________________________
Samuel Brunk, Ph.D., Chair

______________________________
Cheryl E. Martin, Ph.D.

______________________________
Sandra McGee Deutsch, Ph.D.

______________________________
Frank G. Pérez, Ph.D.

______________________________
Benjamin C. Flores, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School
Copyright ©

by

Nancy Alexandra Aguirre

2012
PORFIRISMO DURING THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: EXILE AND THE
POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION, 1910-1920

by

NANCY ALEXANDRA AGUIRRE, B.A., M.A.

DISSIDATION

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
December 2012
Acknowledgements

Writing this dissertation has been a dream of mine since I found my passion for history as a seventh-grade Texas History student. It has been a long journey, and I am thankful for everyone who has offered their encouragement along the way. I could not have accomplished this goal without your support.

First, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, who have challenged me as a scholar while offering their friendship and guidance over the past five years. Samuel Brunk has served as my advisor, advocate, and mentor for over five years. Thank you for always being open to my ideas, and for being critical when necessary. I always enjoyed our conversations on our way to class (and at Starbucks), and I know that I would not have enjoyed the writing process as much as I did without your collaboration. I began the doctoral program with almost no knowledge of Borderlands History, and I am grateful to Cheryl Martin, who taught me to broaden my thinking about political, temporal, cultural, and imagined borderlands. Cheryl, I would not have been able to frame this project as a borderlands study without this training. Sandra McGee Deutsch prompted me to incorporate gender analysis in my coursework, in this dissertation, and in other scholarly endeavors. Sandy—thank you for your continuous enthusiasm about my work. Frank G. Pérez’s graduate courses in communication helped me to consider the relationship between media, identity, and culture along the borderlands. Frank, I am especially thankful for your comments on the fourth chapter of this dissertation and for your suggestions about expanding my work in the realm of media studies. Overall, I could not have asked for a better dissertation committee, and my project has benefitted immeasurably from your input.

I had the privilege of working and interacting with the wonderful faculty and staff of the UTEP History Department. Thank you to Julia Schiavone-Camacho for serving on my Cultural Studies Portfolio Committee and for challenging me to place my work in an interdisciplinary context. I would also like to thank Charles Ambler, Adam Arenson, Ernesto Chávez, Yolanda Chávez-Leyva, Maceo
Dailey, Paul Edison, Keith Erekson, Joshua Fan, Yasuhide Kawashima, Dana Wessell Lightfoot, Charles Martin, Jeffrey Shepherd, and Michael Topp. I have always valued our academic discussions, and our conversations about Odessa, sports, and life helped to get me through the most difficult moments. I would also like to thank Edith Yañez, Alma Acosta-Valles, and Iliana Rosales for their dedication to the department, for their helpfulness and advice, and for always greeting everyone with a smile and warm “hello.”

Thank you to Brenda Risch in the Women’s Studies Department. Your course on Feminist Theory and Methodology fundamentally changed my worldview and my work. Thank you also to Claudia Rivers and the staff at UTEP Special Collections for help as I wrote the dissertation.

Over the years, many graduate students have shared their ideas, critiques and insight with me. I have learned much from our conversations, and I am happy to be a part of such a dynamic group of Borderlands Scholars. In particular, I would like to thank Susannah Aquilina, Mayra Ávila, Jennifer Beeler, Mike Bess, Joanna Camacho-Escobar, Braulio Cañas, Sheron Caton, Selfa Chew-Smithart, Scott Comar, Frank DeLaO, Eduardo García, Nancy González, Pamela Krch, Gene Morales, Juana Muriel-Payne, Antonio Reyes López, Aaron Margolis, Irma Montelongo, Erin Quevedo, Yvonne Realivásquez, Michael Reese, Cynthia Rentería, Melanie Rodríguez, Daniel Romero, David Romo, María Schrock, Heather Sinclair, Jared Tamez, Mario Villa, Aaron Waggoner, and Abbie Wieser. I owe special thanks to Cristóbal Borges, Jill Constantín, John Paul Nuño, Eva Nohemí Orozco, Alejandro Rodríguez-Mayoral, Jaime Ruiz, and James Starling. Thank you for your camaraderie; I will always cherish our friendship.

The dissertation could not have been completed without generous financial support. The UTEP Cotton Graduate Scholarship, the UTEP Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant, and the Phi Alpha Theta Doctoral Scholarship provided funding for the research trips. The UTEP Woman’s Auxiliary Fellowship and the Frances G. Harper History Dissertation Research Award were invaluable, as they
allowed me to focus entirely on writing. Thank you to Patricia Witherspoon, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, for providing support for various conferences, research, and writing.

In the eight months in which I embarked on my research trips, I encountered many people who shared their lives, homes, stories, and advice with me. This was one of the happiest and most fruitful periods of my life, and thanks to you I grew as a scholar and as a human being. I would like to thank the staff at the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection and the Dolph Briscoe Center for American History at UT Austin. I am also grateful for the hospitality and generosity of the Campos family in Austin.

I received help from the staff at numerous archives in Mexico City, including: el Archivo General de la Nación, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO, and the Hemeroteca Nacional at the UNAM. I am indebted to the staff and residents at the Casa de los Amigos. Thank you for your company, especially when I felt homesick, for your friendship, and for enriching my experience en el DF. I would also like to thank my cousin, Professor Víctor Grovas Hajj, for posing challenging questions, taking me on walking tours of important sites related to the Porfiriato, and for encouraging me in my academic endeavors. I feel very fortunate to share this accomplishment with you.

During my time in San Antonio, I spoke with many people who helped me to get a deeper understanding of San Antonio’s history. First and foremost, I want to express my gratitude to Arturo Madrid for his support these past two years. Thank you for providing a forum to present my work to others who are equally invested in the history of San Antonio. Antonia Castañeda offered highly insightful and thought-provoking comments about my work, particularly on the issue of gender analysis. Lance Aaron at the Museo Alameda helped me to come in contact with numerous descendants of Porfirista exiles. Also, our conversations about the impact of Porfiristas on modern Mexican American thought were valuable as I formulated my argument for the dissertation. Lionel Sosa shared his
experiences working on the documentary *The Children of the Revolución*, and he helped me gain a
better understanding of the complexities of the Mexican Revolution in San Antonio. The staff at the
Institute of Texan Cultures gave me direction in the initial phase of the research. At Special Collections
in Trinity University’s Coates Library, Amy Roberson helped me to access important primary sources. I
would also like to offer special thanks to the Claretian Missionary Sisters of Mary Immaculate for their
hospitality at Villa María, and for the residents who made my stay in San Antonio extra special.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the input of numerous descendants of
Mexican exiles who fled to San Antonio. I would like to thank the following: María Alicia Brochmann,
Francisco Cigarroa, Joaquín Cigarroa, Jr., George Cisneros, Henry Cisneros, Mary Alice Cisneros,
Henry B. González III, Mónica Lozano, Mark McMunn, Aureliano “Bud” Urrutia, and Elise Urrutia
Barenblat. Our conversations added a personal element to my research, and your enthusiasm and belief
in this project keeps me motivated.

Over the years, I have received an immeasurable amount of love and support from teachers and
professors, friends, and family. They say that completing a doctoral education is a community effort,
and I know for a fact that it is. My teachers at Gale Pond Alamo Elementary, Bowie Junior High, and
Odessa High School in my hometown of Odessa, Texas, encouraged me in my pursuit of becoming a
teacher. They also believed that it was perfectly acceptable for a teenager to want a Ph.D. in history.

My professors at the University of Texas of the Permian Basin taught me how to bridge the
fields of history and communication in my work. They also supported me personally as I prepared for
graduate school, and they continue to offer their help and advice. In particular, I want to thank: Ana
Martínez-Catsam, Derek Catsam, Diana Davids Hinton, Lee McGavin, Jon Paulson, and Marianne
Woods. I am indebted to Jaime Águila and Roland Spickermann; I would not have made accomplished
my goal without your belief in me.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the faculty and graduate students with whom I worked at the University of Chicago. Emilio Kourí served as my M.A. thesis advisor, and his critiques were helpful as I expanded my thesis into this dissertation. Also, thank you for your advice and candor, and for your constant willingness to discuss my work. Raúl Coronado introduced me to the Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage Project, and his work on Spanish-language media and the public sphere in the United States continues to inspire me. Kristine Jones and Joshua Beck at the Center for Latin American Studies guided our master’s cohort through the personal and intellectual challenges of a one-year program. José Ángel Hernández and Julia Young offered insight on the potential importance of this project in both the United States and in Mexico. Also, thank you to the 2005-2006 CLAS cohort. I will always cherish our weekly breakfasts at Salónica.

My wonderful friends have cheered me on, listened to my complaints, and shared in my struggles and joys. So many of you have been a part of this journey, but I am especially grateful for: Karina Ligón, Erica Soldano, Gabriela Federico, Anthony Garza, Faustino and Cora Rodríguez, David Duarte, Carol Márquez, Joe Campos, Dayna Perkins, Melissa Lambert, Alicia Lawniczak, Alma Hernández, Daisy Solís, Danielle Coronado, Beatriz Merino, Daniel Rodríguez, Fr. Joseph Uecker, Fr. Mark Miller, the St. Joseph’s CYM Youth Sponsors, the SEARCH Team, my Cursillo Friendship Group, the staff at the Ector County Public Library, the staff at Heap Equipment, my community at St. Matthew Catholic Church in El Paso, and the Gaby Sundays Group. To my I-house family—I hope I made you proud.

Writing can be an isolating process, and I would not have completed it without the support of the Starbucks baristas who have literally been at my side for the past year and a half. You kept my coffee mug full, asked me what chapter I was on, encouraged me when I did not meet a personal deadline, gave me many high-fives, kept me awake when I needed it, and told me to go home and sleep when you saw that I needed it, as well. You counted down the days to the final deadline with me, and you were ready
to call me “Dr. Nancy.” I shared my excitement about this project with you, and you reminded me of that excitement when it became difficult for me to sit another day in front of my computer screen. For that, I will always be grateful.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. *A mis tíos y tías, y a mis primos—gracias por todo su apoyo a través de los años. Gracias por hacerme reír, por darme ánimo, y por el tiempo compartido cuando necesitaba distraerme y dejar de pensar en el trabajo. A mis abuelitos—Pita María, Pito Beto, Pita Elba, Pito Rafael, y Pita Hermelinda—gracias por sus sabios consejos y por enseñarme el valor de la educación y del trabajo. Yo sé que todos ustedes están compartiendo este logro conmigo. A mi hermana Cristina—gracias por tu infinita paciencia y por acompañarme en las buenas y en las malas por más de dos décadas. Y a mis padres Tere y Javier—mami, gracias por todas la veces que me dejaste en el aeropuerto o la estación de camiones, por siempre escuchar mis quejas, por asistir a mi defensa, y por preocuparte por mi más que cualquier otra persona. Papi, gracias por todas las veces que me dijiste que el esfuerzo valdría la pena, por ser mi buen compañero en mis viajes, por estar conmigo en los momentos importantes de mi carrera, y por correr por los aeropuertos en el Distrito Federal y en Dallas con mi mochila llena de libros. Los quiero mucho, y a ustedes dos les dedico esta tesis.*
Abstract

This work broadens the narrative of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) by incorporating the perspective of the supporters of dictators Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta. I focus specifically on urban professional Porfiristas, examining the changes and continuities in their identity over the course of the revolution. Identity formation is the central theme of this study, and I rely on memoirs, newspapers, government documents, and oral history interviews in order to analyze the motivations of Porfiristas as they fought to sustain their worldview during a decade of global conflict.

My study draws upon the frameworks of post-colonialism, feminist theory, cultural studies, migration/diaspora studies, and historical memory. I analyze the complex reasons for which Porfiristas supported Díaz and Huerta, even though it cost them their homes, jobs, and separated them from their homeland. Porfiristas collectively went into exile in mid-1914, and this work traces the attempts at military and political counter-revolution in the latter part of the decade. Many exiles settled in San Antonio, Texas, and they relied on the publications La Prensa and Revista Mexicana to present their political views and cultural ideals to the Mexican immigrant population, referred to as el México de afuera. Porfiristas promoted education, patriarchy, and Catholicism, while also privileging whiteness. However, Porfiristas in the United States were forced to contend with Anglo racism, and this group became active in support of the immigrant community.

Furthermore, this group dealt with the effects of exile, displacement, and nostalgia; sharing their values helped them to cope with their struggles. Porfiristas understood that they were characterized as the villains of the revolution, and many spent the remainder of their lives defending their reputations. By presenting the narrative of the revolution from their perspective, this study challenges this homogenous view. This project also broadens the scholarship on Mexican, Mexican-American, Borderlands, and U.S. Spanish-language Media History.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................. iv

Abstract .......................................................................................... x

Table of Contents ........................................................................... xi

Introduction ......................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Modern *Mexicanidad*: Constructing a National Identity during the Porfiriato, 1876-1910 ................................................. 22

Chapter 2: The Mexican Revolution and the Struggle for “La Patria,” 1910-1914 ................................................................. 64

Chapter 3: The Porfirista Diaspora and Attempts at Counter-revolution, 1914-1920 ................................................................. 112

Chapter 4: *La Prensa, Revista Mexicana*, and the Public Sphere ................................................................. 152

Chapter 5: “El Incendio del Viejo Mundo”: Displacement, Nostalgia, and Identity ................................................................. 199

Chapter 6: Porfiristas and the Politics of Representation after 1920 ................................................................. 245

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 286

Bibliography ..................................................................................... 291

Vita ................................................................................................. 301
**Introduction**

“Since I know that a great number of readers will search these Memoirs for the apologies they assume I will give for...[opposing] the Revolution, I feel it necessary to say right now that I am not apologizing for anything.”

- Nemesio García Naranjo, *Memorias*, 1952

The 1910s were a complex decade during which global war prompted societies to redefine empire, the nation-state, nationalism, and patriotism. World War I also directly challenged Eurocentric views on modernity, and by the end of the war in 1918, Western civilization had proven that it was no more civilized than the ‘oriental’ groups that it considered inferior. In Mexico, this process took place against the background of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). At its core, the revolution was a struggle to define “Mexico” and to determine which of the competing factions acted as the ‘authentic’ purveyor of Benito Juárez’s legacy of liberalism. Porfirio Díaz and his advisers, known as the científicos, used monuments and rewrote official history in order to cast the dictator as Juárez’s political descendant. However, various revolutionary factions claimed that dictator had betrayed Juárez’s ideals by denying legitimate democratic elections. The revolutionaries also accused the científicos of disregarding most of the Mexican population by denying peasants the right to ejidos (communal property), and allowing foreign investors to take control of Mexico’s economy at the expense of the lower classes. Díaz supporters, on the other hand, believed that the regime achieved unprecedented political stability and economic growth for Mexico. From the perspective of these Porfiristas, the revolution destroyed their thriving modern nation.

Porfiristas openly rejected the revolution and its initial leader Francisco I. Madero. After Madero’s assassination in February 1913, they supported General Victoriano Huerta because they perceived him as a strongman who could restore order in Mexico. However, backing Huerta’s

---

dictatorship turned out to be a mistake that cost Porfiristas their homes, jobs, families, and in certain cases, their lives. When Venustiano Carranza overthrew Huerta in July 1914, he ordered all supporters of the Díaz and Huerta regimes out of Mexico. The exiled Porfiristas attempted to organize several counter-revolutions, but all of their efforts failed. By 1920, the revolution had triumphed, and the new regime soon began to rewrite official Mexican history to essentialize the Porfiriato as a period of tyranny and Porfiristas as traitors to democracy. The national government used the revolution to claim hegemony, and society organized around a culture that celebrated the heroes of the revolution and vilified the Porfiristas.

This study examines the revolution from the Porfirista perspective, and I argue that this group faced triple displacement. They were banished from their homeland, they became the racialized “other” in the United States although they considered themselves to be white, and the European world they idealized as the center of civilization self-destructed in a war that killed millions. This group faced intense political, ideological, and personal challenges in these ten years, but their identity as Porfiristas served as a point of reference, a way to find personal stability in the midst of chaos. This group based their collective and individual identities on their veneration of Díaz, and they put themselves at risk to fight for the Mexico that he created. In exile, Porfiristas held on to their identity in spite of the cultural and political changes that threatened their way of life. They formed a network that stretched from several points in the United States, to Havana, and Europe, but they were most active in San Antonio, where they developed newspapers and encouraged political activity, education, and literacy in an effort to “elevate the masses” as the Díaz regime had done. Although the world significantly changed after 1910, Porfiristas remained faithful to Díaz for the rest of their lives. They also worked to defend their reputations and prove their patriotism despite having opposed the revolution.
Historiography

This dissertation is a transnational study that bridges three major fields of scholarship. First, it broadens the literature on identity formation during the Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution. Secondly, it contributes to Borderlands History by addressing the political and cultural influences of Porfiristas in the United States. This project also adds to the work on the Spanish-language press in the United States by examining the Porfirista newspapers La Prensa and Revista Mexicana, established in San Antonio in the 1910s.

A number of scholars have examined the construction of nationalism and Mexican identity by Porfirio Díaz’s regime. Víctor M. Macías-González analyzes the influence of the aristocracy on this process. This group revered European (specifically French) culture and whiteness, and upheld patriarchy. The Díaz regime adopted these cultural values as characteristics of Mexican identity in order to project the image of Mexico as a modern nation, while simultaneously hiding or exoticizing the nation’s indigenous heritage. Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo carefully traces this process in Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation. The author focuses on the performance of Mexican national identity for the European gaze, and the importance of these fairs in Mexico’s acceptance as modern by Western nations. This performance of modernity took place on a domestic level, as well. Tenorio and Barbara A. Tenenbaum study urban planning, the edification of monuments, and renovation of the Paseo de la Reforma (Reforma Boulevard) in preparation for Mexico’s centennial in 1910. The authors examine public spaces and their importance for Mexico City’s image as a clean, organized, and modern

---


city. They also analyze the historical, cultural, and political symbolism of the monuments commissioned by the Díaz regime along Reforma Boulevard, and their influence on national identity.4

Scholars have also addressed elite gender relations during the Porfiriato. Macías-González addresses masculinity and femininity among Porfirista aristocrats. Gabriela Cano focuses on femininity in her essay entitled “The Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution: Constructions of Feminism and Nationalism.”5 This piece examines the competing influences of feminism, patriarchy, and patriotism in the definitions of Porfirista femininity in the 1910s. Other scholars have examined the influence of media on gender. Cristina Ramírez and Lorraine Dipp de Holaschutz analyze the Porfirista women’s newspaper Las Hijas del Anáhuac (1886-1887) and its role in opening the public sphere to women, albeit in the literary realm.6 Pablo Piccato’s The Tyranny of Opinion: Honor in the Construction of the Mexican Public Sphere analyzes the importance of journalists in the construction and proliferation of ideals of masculinity and honor in late nineteenth-century Mexico.7 The author argues that during the Porfiriato, men did not have as many opportunities to display their masculinity on the battlefield; therefore, newspapers and the public sphere served as the space for literate men to negotiate their honor and defend their reputations. These studies on media are important because they emphasize the relationship between literacy, power, and identity.

---


Scholars interested in conservative factions during the revolution have increasingly paid attention to the Huerta regime and the activities of its participants in exile. Mario Ramírez Rancaño’s *La Reacción Mexicana y Su Exilio durante la Revolución de 1910* is a political history of the counter-revolution by what he (and revolutionaries at the time) called “la reacción,” or the reactionaries against Carranza. This work is important because the author focuses on the various groups of exiles, including politicians, military generals, and Catholic Church officials. He lists all of the major characters and offers information about where they relocated in exile and what happened to them. However, Ramírez Rancaño bases his work on Jean Meyer’s argument that “all of…Mexico was Huertista,” including the political, intellectual, military, religious, and business sectors. The author adds that “what is difficult to understand is how a government strongly supported” across Mexico ultimately failed.³ This assertion is highly problematic because he assumes that acceptance from members of the upper and professional classes equated to widespread support. If this had been the case, Huerta would not have been driven out of Mexico less than two years after assuming power. Moreover, the author does not consider the complex and sometimes contradictory reasons for why these men joined the Huerta regime, or even what constituted “support” during this tumultuous period. My work challenges these claims by suggesting that it is difficult to define “Huertista” and that “Huertismo” as a cohesive ideology or political agenda did not exist.

Ramírez Rancaño and other historians have also paid specific attention to Aureliano Urrutia, Minister of the Interior under Victoriano Huerta, and the myths surrounding his identity. Ramírez Rancaño and Manuel Servín Massieu describe Urrutia as a complex figure who has been (sometimes

unfairly) characterized as a murderous villain. They contrast this with Urrutia’s reputation as a world-renowned surgeon, and both authors let readers form their own conclusions about Urrutia’s role in the Mexican Revolution. Cristina Urrutia Martínez, meanwhile, published a biography of her grandfather Aureliano, relying on an extensive collection of family documents for her research. Urrutia Martínez, like Ramírez Rancaño, demonstrates that some of the popular stories surrounding Aureliano are based on inconsistencies in the sources or outright myths. She does not devote much attention to Urrutia’s life in exile after 1914, but scholars Kathryn O’Rourke and William Hoar have undertaken this task. They carefully examine Urrutia’s mansion in San Antonio, Miraflores, and analyze the ways in which the surgeon used art, public space, and monuments to take control of his identity in spite of the rumors, myths, and accusations against his character.

My study contributes to this literature by tracing the construction of Porfirismo during the Díaz regime, and the complex ways in which Porfiristas (specifically the urban professionals) upheld their identity as the revolution attacked their worldview. In exile, Porfirismo served as a coping mechanism for displacement and nostalgia. I examine the ways in which Porfiristas, particularly in the United States, attempted to impart Porfirismo to the Mexican immigrant community. I also analyze the continuities and changes within Porfirismo after the exiles were forced out of Mexico.

Gloria Anzaldúa describes the borderlands as “una herida abierta, where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country- a border culture.” During the revolution, people, weapons, money, and ideas constantly intersected at the borderlands, sometimes violently, and Porfiristas took part in

---


these interactions. These exchanges shaped international relations, changed the cultural dynamics in border communities, and impacted thousands of families. Such historians as Rodolfo Acuña, Manuel G. González, David G. Gutiérrez, David Montejano, Vicki Ruiz, and George Sánchez, have published studies tracing the general history of the Mexican community in the United States. Their work offers important information on the demographic, political, cultural, and economic changes that occurred as hundreds of thousands of immigrants entered the United States between 1900 and 1920. More importantly, these authors tie immigration to broader dynamics in the twentieth-century United States. As barrios grew, Mexican culture spread throughout U.S. cities while acculturation created generational conflicts in Mexican families. Immigration also resulted in rising racial tensions between immigrants, Mexican Americans, and Anglos, and these are dynamics still present today. These studies contextualize Mexican immigration in the 1910s within the broader history of Mexicans in the United States, and they complement the historiography that focuses specifically on the Mexican Revolution in the United States.

The earliest studies of revolutionary activity in the United States were political histories. In *Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, 1910-13*, Peter V.N. Henderson examines “the activities of… these Mexican exiles,” specifically Ricardo Flores Magón and Francisco I. Madero, “in their immediate attempts to overturn the incumbent… regimes from 1910-1913.” Ward S. Albro undertakes extensive research on Flores Magón, his relationship with the U.S. government, and the impact of Regeneración and the PLM (Mexican Liberal Party), on the Mexican communities in the United States. In *Always a

---

12 I use the term “Mexican” to refer to all people of Mexican descent in the United States. I use “Mexican immigrant” and “Mexican American” to distinguish between these two groups in the U.S. Mexican community.

Rebel: Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Revolution, Albro argues that Flores Magón’s revolution ultimately failed because he was too radical in comparison with more centrist figures such as Madero.\textsuperscript{14}

W. Dirk Raat’s Revoltosos: Mexico’s Rebels in the United States, 1903-1923 attempts to expand on these political histories by studying “insurgents and political refugees on the Right and the Left.”\textsuperscript{15} He offers the example of Enrique C. Creel, Minister of Foreign Relations under Díaz in 1910 and 1911, who had a spy network during this time in cooperation with the U.S. government. When Creel moved to Los Angeles in 1915 as an exile during the revolution, he was not treated as a “revoltoso,” demonstrating the U.S. government’s biased attitudes and behavior towards the Mexican regimes and political leaders that favored their northern neighbor. This is important information, but it is an extremely limited example of right-wing activity in the borderlands during this period. Instead, Raat focuses mostly on the Magonista rebels.

These early studies also emphasize key events, particularly the Plan of San Diego revolt in South Texas in 1915. The plan called for a no-quarter race war against Anglo men by ethnic minorities in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California. The plot was discovered before its implementation began, but it sparked widespread racial violence between Mexicans, Tejanos, and Anglos. Charles H Harris III and Louis R. Sadler offer an overview of the violence in the region, suggesting that Venustiano Carranza’s regime manipulated these racial tensions, offering to help stop the raids in exchange for formal U.S. recognition.\textsuperscript{16} Scholars since then have revised this work, giving less credence to the assertion that the Carranza government was completely behind the Plan of San


Diego revolt. James Sandos suggests that Magonista ideas about liberty (spread through *Regeneración*) inspired Mexicans in South Texas to fight against Anglo oppression. The author’s hypothesis is problematic, however, because it equates rebellion with anarchy and Magonismo, and it simplifies race relations in South Texas within the dichotomy of Mexicans versus Anglos. In a more recent study, Benjamin Johnson examines the complex political and ethnic tensions that contributed to the violence in South Texas. He argues that the violence against Mexicans by the Texas Rangers in South Texas encouraged *Tejanos* in the region to organize for full inclusion as U.S. citizens. In 1929, these *Tejanos* formed the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), a Mexican American civil rights organization.

In addition to studies on South Texas, there is also a growing body of literature on the revolution in El Paso. Macías-González examines Porfirismo in El Paso during the 1910s, focusing on the Chihuahua elites and how they influenced El Paso’s development. Macías-González argues that as proponents of modernity, these elites helped to establish successful businesses and a Eurocentric Mexican culture in the city, which they upheld throughout the Revolution. Sadler and Harris recently published *The Secret War in El Paso*, an extensive political history of the revolutionary activity in El Paso between 1906 and 1920. This text offers useful information on the politics of the revolution in this region, but it does not examine the broader cultural implications of the war the way David Dorado Romo did earlier in *Ringside Seat to a Revolution: An Underground Cultural History of El Paso and Juárez: 1893-1923*. Romo engages cultural and public history to depict daily life in El Paso during this period.

---


More importantly, he demonstrates the ways in which the revolution impacted the city’s Anglo, Mexican, African American, Japanese and Chinese inhabitants.

San Antonio was at least as significant to the revolution as El Paso. Flores Magón, Madero, General Bernardo Reyes, Venustiano Carranza, and other exiles from all factions conspired in this city between 1905 and 1920. There is limited scholarship on San Antonio politics during the revolution; historians have instead focused on the cultural influence of the Mexican exiles. The most comprehensive study on this topic is Richard A. García’s *Rise of the Mexican American Middle Class: San Antonio, 1929-1941*. García devotes one chapter of his study to a group he calls the *ricos*, the wealthy “conservative…politicians, generals, businesspeople, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and government officials.”

Although the author analyzes this group’s influence on the San Antonio community in the 1930s, it is useful for this study because the *ricos* included exiled Porfirista elites who chose to remain in the United States. García refers in particular to Porfirista Ignacio E. Lozano as the leader of the *ricos*, and his Porfirista newspaper *La Prensa* (1913-1963) as the most important medium for the proliferation of Mexican identity in the United States during this period.

Much of the work on the revolution north of the U.S./Mexico border focuses on specific regions. Arnoldo De León’s edited volume, *War Along the Border: The Mexican Revolution and Tejano Communities*, marks a shift in the historiography. The volume focuses on the effects of war and other forms of violence on identity formation across the borderlands in Texas. It includes important chapters on elite women in San Antonio, race relations in El Paso and Chihuahua and between Anglos, Mexicans, and African Americans, revolutionary activity in the Big Bend region, and the impact of the war on the development of Mexican American identity.

---

Taken together, this work by Borderlands scholars is important because it considers the complex relationship between politics and identity formation during a decade of significant turmoil. Scholars of the Spanish-language press engage these issues within a media context. In 1977, historian Richard Griswold del Castillo published the landmark article entitled “The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish-Language Press in the Borderlands.”\(^{21}\) He outlined the major publications established by revolutionaries of varying factions, arguing that the immigrant press thrived because of a strong demand for propaganda and reports from the homeland.

Since then the exile press has received attention from historians including Juan Bruce-Novoa, Ramón D. Chacón, Onofre Di Stefano, Francine Medeiros, Michael M. Smith, Roberto R. Treviño, and Nicolás Kanellos, director of the “Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage Project.” Bruce-Novoa and Di Stefano have published analyses of *La Prensa*, the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in the United States by 1920.\(^{22}\) Their studies provide an important overview of the publications, but are limited in several ways. Bruce-Novoa wrote about the general legacy of *La Prensa*, and Di Stefano offered a thorough examination of the newspaper’s “Página Literaria” from 1913-1915 in his doctoral dissertation.\(^{23}\)

A significant problem with these studies is that they contextualize this newspaper within the framework of the U.S. nation-state. Revolutionary leaders including Emiliano Zapata and Álvaro Obregón wrote to *La Prensa* from Mexico in an effort to promote their agendas to Mexicans in the


\(^{23}\) Onofre Di Stefano. “*La Prensa* of San Antonio and its Literary Page, 1913 to 1915” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1983).
United States. *La Prensa* was also smuggled into Mexico, demonstrating that it had an audience south of the U.S./Mexico border. No scholar has critically analyzed the impact of *La Prensa* in Mexico.

Meanwhile, the San Antonio Porfirista newspaper *Revista Mexicana* is almost entirely missing from the historiography. Nemesio García Naranjo, Minister of Public Instruction under Victoriano Huerta, established this newspaper in 1915 as part of the counter-revolutionary efforts against Venustiano Carranza’s government. *La Prensa* presented itself as politically neutral, but *Revista Mexicana* harshly criticized the regimes of both Carranza and Woodrow Wilson. Both newspapers were highly significant because they allowed Porfiristas to express themselves without fear of the censorship that was then being exercised in Mexico. My project will examine these publications as transnational media that influenced Mexican politics and identity in Mexico and the United States in the 1910s. Moreover, I will use these sources to draw attention to the importance of San Antonio during the revolution.

**Defining “Porfirismo” and “Huertismo”**

Díaz supporters were known as “Porfiristas,” but in this dissertation, I focus primarily on the urban professionals. The científicos were also Porfiristas, but in order to address the tension between this group and the urban professionals, I will refer to Díaz’s advisers as the “científicos” and the professional class as “Porfiristas.” The latter group resented the aristocratic científicos for their elitism, detachment from Mexican society, holding on to their positions of power despite advancing age, and their allegiance to foreign investors. This division became especially marked during the revolution, when Porfiristas blamed the científicos (but not Díaz) for sacrificing Mexico by giving in to Madero. In exile, Porfiristas took an active interest in the counter-revolutionary efforts, while the científicos preferred to stay away from politics and live the remainder of their lives in relative peace, a choice that

---

24 Ramírez Rancaño, *La Reacción Mexicana*. The author relies extensively on *Revista Mexicana* in his study of the exiled members of the Díaz and Huerta regimes. However, he does not analyze the magazine itself.
contributed to the bitterness between the factions. Although the urban professionals and científicos all experienced difficulties resulting from exile, this study focuses primarily on the urban professionals because they were the ones who remained most engaged with Mexico, opposing the revolution while defending Díaz’s vision for their nation.

Not all opponents of the revolution were Porfiristas, at least initially. Querido Moheno, a lawyer from Chiapas, was imprisoned in 1892 after speaking out against Díaz for violating the no-reelection principle in the Constitution of 1857. In 1912, Moheno was elected senator, and he became friends with Porfirista senators Nemesio García Naranjo, José María Lozano, and Francisco M. de Olaguíbel, who all disliked Madero and his policies. The four men formed the “Cuadrilátero,” a bloc that opposed Madero in the federal legislature and joined the Huerta cabinet in late 1913. They shared several ideals, including a belief in liberalism and apprehension of the U.S. government under Woodrow Wilson. Despite his collaboration with the Cuadrilátero, Moheno did not characterize himself as a Porfirista. However, during the protest against the 1917 Constitution, Moheno and exiles from various factions (including Maderistas) joined the Porfiristas in their defense of the Constitution of 1857. Moheno also supported General Félix Díaz (Pórfirio’s nephew) after 1917, making him what we might call a latter-day Porfirista.

I use “Porfirismo” to describe Porfirista identity. Porfirismo was the national identity constructed by the Díaz regime in its effort to maintain hegemony over Mexican society. This identity was based on positivism, a theory that favored science over religion and ideology as the basis for modernity and progress. As a result, an emphasis on public education became a fundamental feature of Porfirismo. The Díaz regime restructured the public school system to focus more on the sciences, and it doubled the number of public schools in Mexico.

Porfirismo also had racial, class, religious, and gender components. Positivists believed in the racial superiority of whites, an attitude that legitimized the colonialist enterprise of Western European
expansion in the late nineteenth century. Adherents to Porfirismo could not fully deny Mexico’s indigenous roots, but they downplayed them while simultaneously emphasizing the country’s European heritage. From their perspective, whiteness was a privilege, and light skin was more appealing and conducive to social mobility. Furthermore, Porfirismo was inherently patriarchal, and gender roles were directly tied to Catholicism. Women were supposed to become educated in order to produce better offspring, but they were only allowed to participate in literary circles, where they could express their emotions. Porfirista notions of femininity also called for women to model their lives and behavior after the Virgin Mary, a mother who personified “sweetness, submission and domesticity.” Catholicism also played an important role in Porfiriista and broader Mexican masculinity. During the revolution, Emiliano Zapata’s forces carried a banner with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe to demonstrate their devotion to her as well as their nationalism. When U.S. forces occupied Veracruz in 1914, *El Imparcial* published an illustration of Huerta holding this same banner as he protected Mexico from the foreign invader. When Mexican men appropriated this feminine nationalist symbol, it was to prove their patriotism as they defended the homeland. The Virgin of Guadalupe became a motherly symbol of hope for Porfiriistas in exile.

Porfiriistas faced a collective identity crisis when Díaz was ousted from power in 1911. The group quickly fragmented after Díaz left Mexico, but according to Alan Knight, Huerta “pandered to the hopes of those many Mexicans – and foreigners – who believed that a ‘strong man’, a new Díaz, could restore peace through authoritarian means.” However, Porfiriistas did not necessarily wish to revert to the Porfiriato, and Porfirismo did not simply evolve into “Huertismo.” For example, as Minister of Public Instruction, García Naranjo moved away from positivism by expanding the arts within the public

25 Cano, 111.


school curriculum. Also, Ireneo Paz, the Porfirista editor of the Mexico City newspaper *La Patria*, initially supported Huerta, but then actively criticized him after he dissolved congress and declared himself dictator in October 1913. The dynamics within the Huerta administration were volatile, at best, with most cabinet members lasting less than six months in office. Moreover, Huerta’s decision to suspend congress and imprison over one hundred legislators severely hurt his credibility and support. The internal problems of the regime and U.S. intervention in Veracruz in April 1914 ensured the rapid decline of the regime before it could create any sort of ideology through which it could attain hegemony.

In other words, the term “Huertista” has been used to describe the supporters of Victoriano Huerta, but the word “support” in this context is problematic. The original members of Huerta’s cabinet resigned because of their tense relations with the dictator; yet, they were all sent into exile in 1914 for “supporting” Huerta. Other members of the cabinet, including the Cuadrilátero, claimed that they did not know Huerta before he invited them to serve as ministers. According to Moheno, he and his three colleagues accepted Huerta’s offer because they knew that rejecting it might cost them their lives. This differed from the experience of Minister of the Interior Aureliano Urrutia, who gladly served with his *compadre* Huerta. Since it is difficult to pinpoint who exactly constituted a “Huertista,” I refer to this group as the members of the Huerta cabinet or regime.

**Methodology**

Porfiristas produced an extensive collection of written material, published in newspapers and memoirs. My aim is to critically analyze these sources in order to trace their experiences. The dominant theme throughout this study is identity formation through the “politics of representation.” Cultural studies and feminist scholars have used this concept to probe the ways in which individuals and/or groups compete for the privilege of constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other.”

---

According to Amy Hinterberger, “these practices of representation are directly tied to the production of knowledge and power and are thus ethical and political.”29 Indeed, the exiles used media and other forms of discourse to sustain Porfirismo and their vision for Mexico, and it became the most important strategy for dealing with displacement.

I examine the politics of representation on three levels—the Porfirista public sphere, the exile memoirs, and oral histories of Porfirista descendents. First, I use the concept of the public sphere as a framework to analyze Porfirista media and their relationship with Mexican society during the Porfiriato and the revolution. Díaz and the científicos understood the relationship between information, literacy, and power, and Díaz heavily censored media in order to manipulate public opinion and create the illusion of hegemony. The Mexico City newspapers El Imparcial, La Patria, and Las Hijas del Anáhuac are important to this study because they demonstrate the ways in which Porfirista media helped to carry out Díaz’s modernization project while promoting specific ideas about race, class, and gender in Mexico. El Imparcial and La Patria also played a significant role in identity politics during the revolution, highlighting the divisions within Porfirismo after Díaz’s resignation as Díaz supporters used the public sphere to voice their opposition to the revolution. The realm that had been censored by Díaz became a space for political dissent.

The Carranza regime shut down all Porfirista media in Mexico in August 1914. Immediately thereafter, the Porfirista public sphere reemerged in San Antonio through La Prensa and Revista Mexicana, newspapers with readerships in the United States, Mexico, Cuba, and Europe. Ignacio E. Lozano, García Naranjo, and their colleagues used media to impart Porfirista cultural norms to their transnational audience. All of these newspapers embodied certain elements of Porfirista identity, and a comparison of these sources will reveal the continuities and changes within Porfirismo during the 1910s.

The exile memoirs are also important in understanding the politics of representation. In analyzing these texts, it is necessary to consider the context, what was said, and what was not. The exiles understood their position as the villains of the revolution, and they used the memoirs to justify their political stance and defend their reputations. These texts also served to keep Porfiristas and their experiences in the historical record despite the efforts of the revolutionary regime to diminish their place or erase them from the official history. The memoirs are valuable because they provide insight into the mindset of the authors and the role of memory, especially since they were written in different decades. For example, Federico Gamboa, Minister of Foreign Relations under Díaz and Huerta, began keeping a diary (with the intention to publish it) in 1892. Other memoirs were written in the 1910s and 1920s, and García Naranjo wrote his autobiography in the 1950s. This broad variation in time is useful for studying the politics of representation. The memoirs produced in the 1910s and 1920s were written when the authors had much at stake politically because they opposed the revolution. By the 1950s, however, the Mexican government had reconciled with García Naranjo and he was free to express his thoughts, which happened to be much different from his attitudes as a younger man in the 1910s.

In engaging the memoirs, my goal is not to answer whether or not Porfiristas were justified in their support for the Díaz and Huerta regimes. In fact, this would not be possible since the authors of the memoirs offer various (and sometimes contradictory) versions about each other and the events of the decade. Instead, my aim is to broaden our understanding of the revolution by adding a different set of voices to the narrative. This also includes the descendants of Porfirista exiles who lived in the United States. As the revolutionary regime claimed hegemony in Mexico and worked to replace Porfirista culture, Porfirismo thrived and reproduced itself in the United States. Porfirista exiles in the United States (and more specifically, in San Antonio) became prominent leaders in media, medicine, and education. Their descendants remain active in these fields today, while holding on to the cultural values
that their parents and grandparents taught them. More importantly, the politics of representation remain at play in the ways in which the descendants remember and commemorate the Porfirista exiles today.

A final consideration is the way in which a politics of representation approach offers a framework for studying the limitations of these primary sources. The newspapers, memoirs, and oral histories offer important insights into Porfirista identity, but with the exception of Las Hijas del Anáhuac, all of the primary sources that inform this study were produced by men. This is a testament to patriarchal Porfirista society, where the public sphere was a space for literate men. Porfirista women became increasingly active in the United States in the 1920s, establishing charity organizations and participating in media through La Prensa’s “Ladies’ Page” beginning in 1924. In Mexico, right-wing women also became more active in the 1920s, organizing, for instance, the Mexican Catholic Women’s Union in defense of Catholics during the Cristero War against the Mexican government (1926-1929). However, during the 1910s, Porfiristas expected men to display their patriotism on the battlefield and in the public sphere while women defended the homeland by producing strong, healthy, and educated children. Although women’s voices and perspectives are difficult to assess in the sources I use, a gender analysis is still possible and necessary. As the world descended into war in the 1910s, societies were contesting modern notions of race, class, empire, and gender. An examination of patriarchy and Porfirismo demonstrates the ways in which this group attempted to uphold the gendered status quo before the feminist movements of the 1920s in Mexico and the United States.

**Chapter Outline**

The first two chapters of this project focus on the Porfirista experience in Mexico. The story of the Porfiristas begins in the 1850s with the ratification of the Constitution of 1857 and the “triumph” of Benito Juárez and the liberals. The ideals of these liberals helped shape Porfirismo, the identity and worldview of Díaz supporters. Chapter 1 begins by tracing the evolution of nineteenth-century liberalism in Mexico. Díaz adopted elements of both liberalism and conservatism in his efforts to
sustain political cohesion in his government, but he and his supporters called themselves liberals in the tradition of Juárez.

This chapter continues by exploring the background of the nation-building project undertaken by Díaz and the científicos. They believed in achieving “order and progress” through education and a curriculum based on science, and the public education system grew substantially. The científicos also encouraged foreign investment in the nation’s economy. Between 1890 and 1907, Mexico experienced unprecedented economic growth and increases in infrastructure, but these advancements came at the expense of Mexico’s lower and indigenous classes. The científicos also took advantage of the nation’s indigenous heritage to appeal to the Western gaze at the world’s fairs, while simultaneously privileging whiteness and European culture in Mexico. During Mexico’s centennial in 1910, Porfiristas celebrated the Díaz regime’s accomplishments, the supposed political stability throughout the nation, and the acceptance of Mexico by white Western society. In reality, hegemony and peace were only illusions, and Madero successfully launched his revolution only two months after the centennial.

Chapter 2 examines the period from the beginning of the revolution in November 1910 to Victoriano Huerta’s resignation in July 1914. The first section addresses the identity crisis that Porfiristas faced when Díaz went into exile. A comparison of El Imparcial and La Patria demonstrates the conflicts that existed between the científicos and the urban professionals. These sources also demonstrate how Porfirista media created new heroes in Huerta and Félix Díaz to replace Don Porfirio. This chapter next reconstructs this time period through a critical analysis of the memoirs of Huerta’s cabinet. These sources illuminate the complex political and personal dynamics that influenced the decision to join the Huerta administration. More importantly, the memoirs complicate notions of Mexican patriotism that tied love for the homeland with the revolution. Although the members of the Huerta regime had different experiences, they all justified their actions as patriotic and accused the revolutionaries of being the real traitors for plunging Mexico into civil war.
In July and August 1914, Venustiano Carranza ordered all people with ties to the Díaz and Huerta regimes out of Mexico. Chapter 3 begins the story of exile in the United States, Havana, and Europe, focusing on the counter-revolutionary efforts undertaken against the Carranza regime. San Antonio was a center for exile activity, and the first major attempt to organize the exile took place in February 1915, with the formation of the Asamblea Pacificadora Mexicana, or Mexican Peace-Making Assembly. The group was short-lived, and any hopes for counter-revolution were severely diminished after Huerta’s death in January 1916 because he was considered the strongest military leader in exile. However, the ratification of the Constitution of 1917 angered exiled Porfiristas as well as some Maderistas who considered themselves Juarista liberals. They rallied together to protest the new constitution, and García Naranjo used Revista Mexicana to lead the charge. Again, their efforts failed, since the group had limited finances and lacked a strong military leader on whom to pin their hopes—this problem grew even worse after General Aureliano Blanquet’s death in 1919. By this point, the exiles faced definitive political defeat.

Chapter 4 tells the story of exile from a cultural perspective. In addition to their counter-revolutionary politics, Porfirista exiles felt a duty to elevate the Mexican masses in their new communities. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana served this purpose. The contributors upheld patriarchal gender roles and Catholicism, advertised skin bleach and whitening products, and encouraged education and participation in the public sphere. Porfiristas also had to face the realities of living outside of Mexico, and they worked against Anglo discrimination. Both newspapers continually expressed love and nostalgia for the homeland, but by 1918, they had drifted apart to represent two different sectors in the immigrant community. La Prensa was considered the “voice” of el México de afuera and appealed to a broader base of Mexicans who chose to permanently settle in the United States. Revista Mexicana, on the other hand, had a smaller audience of political exiles; as members of this readership returned to Mexico in 1919, the newspaper lost its audience and was forced to shut down in January 1920.
While chapter 4 focuses on media and community formation, Chapter 5 addresses the personal implications of exile in the midst of the turbulent 1910s. The Huerta regime fell just as World War I began in Europe. The exiles had difficulty dealing with the abrupt changes in their lives, leaving them angry, embittered, and in certain cases, in precarious psychological conditions. This chapter will explore Porfirista reactions to World War I, their animosity against the Carranza and Wilson regimes, and Anglo discrimination in the United States. Some Porfistas relied on humor to overcome their struggles, others on their faith in God, and the most resistant continued to venerate the memory of Díaz as if the general would somehow save them. Meanwhile, the modern world that these men idealized during the Porfiriato violently disappeared, and by 1920, the exiles had to contend with a globally dominant United States, the increasing influence of communism, and the cultural changes in Mexico resulting from the revolution.

The final chapter analyzes the continuities and changes within Porfirismo after 1920. I argue that the Porfiristas who returned to Mexico encountered different circumstances than their counterparts who remained in self-imposed exile in the United States. Porfiristas in Mexico challenged the new revolutionary culture that embraced the nation’s mestizo, or mixed, ethnic identity. They also continued to criticize the Mexican government, defend their reputations, and honor the memory of Díaz. In the United States, Porfiristas and their descendants have worked to combat acculturation and improve immigrant communities north of the border. Chapter 6 also includes a case study of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, who remained in San Antonio and is most remembered as a murderer who cut out a man’s tongue during the Huerta dictatorship. Urrutia purposely never clarified whether or not this story was a myth, and he enjoyed the notoriety, but his family has taken on the task of separating fact from myth. Overall, this chapter examines the act of remembering from 1920 to the present, and the ways in which time, family ties, politics, and collective memory continue to shape the ways in which Porfiristas are perceived.
Chapter 1: Modern *Mexicanidad*: Constructing a National Identity during the Porfiriato, 1876-1910

The Constitution of 1857 and the Ideological Foundations of the Porfiriato

On February 11, 1917, Nemesio García Naranjo, Victoriano Huerta’s former Minister of Public Instruction, commented on the ratification of the Constitution of 1917 that had taken place six days earlier in the city of Querétaro. García Naranjo, a staunch Porfirista, considered the ratification “the most horrendous act of sacrilege that Mexico had ever witnessed.” He added that “the Constitution of 1857…was the flag of the grandest men in our History, and it infiltrated the popular consciousness and become a symbol. It [was] as sacred as [Agustín de] Iturbide’s banner, the image of La Guadalupana, [José María] Morelos’ uniform, as all of the relics that materialize national creeds.” He continued by stating that the replacement of Mexico’s “Magna Carta” by the Carrancistas was the equivalent of substituting the national anthem with the popular song “La Cucaracha.” For García Naranjo, Mexico’s Constitution of 1857 contained guiding principles necessary for the nation’s political and economic development; ideologically, it formed the basis for a Mexican national identity carefully crafted by liberals since the period of *La Reforma* (1855-1861).³⁰

This idealizing of the former constitution reflects the process through which nationalism and *Mexicanidad* were negotiated in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Mexico. Supporters of the Constitution of 1857 had much at stake in early 1917, since a new constitution threatened Mexico as they defined it and marked them as the “old regime.” García Naranjo drew upon popular cultural and Catholic symbols that manifested *lo mexicano* in order to insist on the legitimacy of the Constitution of 1857 and the “Mexico” created by Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz, and other liberals. He also used the rhetoric of patriotism to construct a “hero/villain” binary that formed the basis for his critiques of the

---

Carrancistas. In doing so, he practiced the “politics of representation,” in which individuals and/or groups work for the privilege of constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other.”

The politics of representation and the development of national identity have been important elements in the course of state formation in Mexico since independence. Political, military, and clerical leaders depended on the use of cultural symbols to garner support and establish hegemony. In early nineteenth-century Mexico, internal political turmoil, foreign and civil wars, and economic stagnation limited the ability of leaders to construct effective hegemonic relationships that would unite the country through the popular acceptance of a common identity. At the core of this struggle was a conflict between conservatism and liberalism, the two dominant political philosophies of the period.

Charles Hale defines liberalism as a product of the Enlightenment that “embraced a vision of social progress and economic development” based on the individual’s right to property. It also supported the freedom of the press, federalism, republicanism, a secular state and individual political freedom. The emphasis on private property resulted in a strong anti-clerical stance among liberals in Mexico, since the Catholic Church was the largest land-owner in Mexico. Conservatism, on the other hand, favored a strong centralist government that brought “order” to Mexico through the institutions of the Catholic Church and the military. These factions had fought for control of Mexico since the 1820s, but liberalism seemingly won out during La Reforma, a period of extensive political reform. It was also a period of renewed civil war, which began with the rebellion of the Plan of Ayutla, in which liberals

31 Collins, 10-11.


34 Hale, “The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexican Thought,” The Americas 14, no. 2 (Oct. 1957): 166.
fought conservatives and expelled the dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna in 1855. Once in power, liberals including Juárez, Juan Álvarez, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, and Ignacio Comonfort, took control of Mexico City, they passed a series of laws and drafted the Constitution of 1857, thus setting what they believed to be the foundation for “modern Mexico” and the consolidation of a national identity.

The liberal project during La Reforma centered on establishing democracy while breaking down the power of conservative institutions such as the Catholic Church. In 1855, the Ley Júarez abolished military and ecclesiastical *fueros*, or special courts. The Ley Iglesias (1857) forbade “clergy from charging exorbitant fees for the sacraments” including marriage, funerals, and baptisms. The Ley Lerdo (1856) prohibited “corporate landholding.” Finally, the new constitution, ratified on February 5, 1857, established legislative, executive, and judicial branches within the federal government. It abolished slavery, eliminated the death penalty, called for universal male suffrage, and freedom of speech and the press. Liberals who supported these policies believed that Mexico was headed in the direction of progress. However, the Constitution of 1857 and the Reforma laws alienated conservatives and, in their democratic provisions, even some moderate liberals.

The ensuing “Guerra de la Reforma” (1857-1860) began as a reaction against the radical liberalism of the constitution. As Mexico’s leaders fought for power, Mexicans of different classes debated the meaning of “Mexico,” nationhood, and citizenship. The Constitution of 1857 defined citizens as all people “born within or outside of the territory of the Republic, with Mexican parents,” naturalized foreigners, and foreigners who owned property in Mexico or had children born in Mexico, as long as they did not “conserve their nationality.” Although this was an effort to incorporate all Mexicans into the nation, it was not immediately effective. In Yucatán, Maya Indians had launched a war for independence (known as the Guerra de Castas, or Caste War) against elite landowners in 1847.

---


which was still ongoing. In the northern borderlands in Sonora, Yaqui Indians claimed their own national sovereignty. Both of the groups represented factions living within the Mexican political state that did not identify as Mexican. Furthermore, there was a marked contradiction between liberalism in theory and practice. The constitution called for mass political participation and universal male suffrage. Most of Mexico’s leaders, however, did not want the lower classes to act as political agents, not only because they were perceived to be intellectually incapable but also because they might threaten elite hegemony. Nevertheless, the promises of democracy and incorporation into the nation were attractive, especially for those who saw in Juárez, a Zapotec Indian who had become president of Mexico, the possibility of upward mobility.

At the local level, the struggle between liberalism and conservatism was much more complex. The Ley Lerdo was aimed directly at the Church, but it also targeted ejidos, indigenous communal landholdings. Liberal secularism also opposed religious celebrations and religious education. These policies threatened what Francie Chassen de López calls “usos y costumbres” (cultural practices).37 Indigenous communities in the nineteenth century “represented societies where identity tended to be collective rather than individual.” In describing the Nuyoo community in Oaxaca, Chassen de López writes that “they did not erect boundaries between the economic and social, or the political and social, the specializations so characteristic of modernity.”38 This worldview conflicted with liberal notions of economic progress, private property, and individualism, but conservatism was not a much better alternative. Conservatives were pro-clerical, and the Church had a history of economic, cultural, and corporal exploitation of indigenous populations. The fundamental problem was the necessity, from the perspective of Mexico’s political leaders, for campesinos to choose between the two philosophies that


38 Ibid., 284.
threatened their way of life. Perhaps, it was a necessity if there was to be any hope for Mexico’s political consolidation and economic expansion.

The ten years following the ratification of the Constitution of 1857 continued the tradition of war and political instability. Juárez and his administration were forced out of Mexico City after the French intervention in 1861 and the Hapsburg Maximilian was established as emperor in 1864 (with conservative support). Republicanism failed to bring peace to Mexico and it failed to foster economic development. Mexico was no more united; in fact, it was now ruled by a foreign monarch. Yet Juárez and his supporters, who lived as far north as Paso del Norte in the state of Chihuahua by 1865, claimed constitutional legitimacy and authenticity—Mexico for Mexicans. These years were crucial in the development of a national identity because they positioned Juárez as a symbol of mexicanidad, freedom, and democracy within the popular consciousness. Erika Pani argues that foreign intervention resulted in the creation of a “patriotic myth,” in which Juárez and other leaders of the Reforma became heroes engaged in a battle of good versus evil.39 Within the collective memory, this became a period of “liberal idealism and conservative foolishness…overwhelmingly dominated by the personality of Benito Juárez.”40 The myth of Juárez eventually overshadowed any legitimate criticisms against the president and his administration.

Mark Wasserman suggests that liberals also gained greater support than conservatives because they were more active at the grassroots level (which coincided with their emphasis on local autonomy). Liberals created the National Guard and juntas patrióticas, and they encouraged members of the lower classes to participate in these organizations that gave individuals a sense of national identity. More importantly, this set in motion the development of civil society in Mexico, which in turn helped the state establish hegemony, albeit very slowly. The juntas patrióticas organized commemorations for important

40 Ibid, 35.
events such as the *Grito de Dolores*, which sparked the independence movement, and *Cinco de Mayo*, the anniversary of the defeat of French troops during the Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862. Wasserman notes that these “fiesta days had an educational component, because they invariably included the participation of school children. While music and fireworks hardly indicated a sense of citizenship, these celebrations certainly were beginnings for tying local with national concerns.”\(^{41}\) The celebration of Cinco de Mayo was especially important since it asserted Mexican nationalism and patriotism in opposition to the monarchy and imperialism. Ultimately, liberals garnered enough support to defeat imperial troops and overthrow Maximilian, who was executed in June 1867. A month before then, Juárez returned to Mexico City in order to resume the liberal project and transform Mexico into a modern nation-state. According to Guy P. C. Thompson, this represented the “triumph of Liberalism,” since the defeat of Maximilian “also condemned the Conservative Party, deeply implicated in this ill-fated European imperial adventure.”\(^{42}\) However, characterizing this period of the Restored Republic (1867-1876) as the “triumph of liberalism” is overly simplistic. Although liberals succeeded militarily, they faced the same political and ideological conflicts they had encountered in the previous decade.

During the Restored Republic (the decade between Juárez’s victory over Maximilian and Díaz’s presidential victory) the inconsistencies between liberal ideology and practice became increasingly clear, and Mexico’s leadership grappled with the problem of sacrificing idealism for the sake of political stability. Moderate liberals, unlike their radical counterparts, “advocated a strong executive and central state, primarily to bring about order and to encourage economic development.” This demonstrates the blurred lines between political ideologies in Mexico, since centralism was a conservative principle. Juárez and other moderates believed, in fact, in the necessity of limiting democracy, and they established

---

\(^{41}\) Wasserman, 128.

an increasingly authoritarian system. According to Wasserman, Congress suspended constitutional rights nine times between 1867 and 1876, and Juárez (re-elected president in 1871) was granted extraordinary powers for all except fifty-seven days of his final presidency.\(^{43}\) The “triumph of liberalism” was certainly not a triumph for democracy.

Meanwhile, radical liberals united under the banner of “no re-election” and they criticized the Juárez administration for limiting the progression of democracy. They were especially indignant about the 1871 presidential elections. Juárez ran against Lerdo and General Porfirio Díaz, but none of them won the majority vote. In this scenario, the constitution granted Congress the authority to select the president, and since Juaristas had won the majority of congressional seats, Juárez became president. Díaz accused the government of voting fraud and launched the Plan de la Noria rebellion. This conflict, which proclaimed the illegitimacy of the Juárez presidency, quickly ended after one battle because of Juárez’s death in 1872 (after which Lerdo assumed the presidency). A stronger rebellion broke out in 1876 under Díaz’s Plan de Tuxtepec. The general had the backing of former military officers, Catholics offended by Lerdo’s attacks on religious orders, vows, and holidays, and people who supported democracy. The rebels (who also included Supreme Court president José María Iglesias) overthrew Lerdo, and Díaz was elected president that year.

The new executive faced the same task as his predecessors, but why did he succeed in establishing peace, creating a progressive nation-state, and forging a national identity, while all other presidents before him failed? Díaz, part of a new generation of liberals, would build on Juárez’s beginnings to adeptly incorporate liberal and conservative elements into his policies in order to finally establish a “modern Mexico.” He was also a star general who led Mexican troops to victory against French forces on May 5, 1862, and April 2, 1867. As such, he became known as the hero of May 5 (Cinco de Mayo) and April 2 (Dos de Abril), and his widespread popularity helped him ascend to the

\(^{43}\) Wasserman, 129.
presidency. The changes that took place during his regime provide insight into the process of political, economic, and ideological state formation during the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries and thus explain why Porfirio Díaz continued to have a following after the outbreak of the revolution.

As Díaz took over the presidency in 1876, Mexicans struggled to recover from decades of civil war that weakened an already unstable economy. Díaz understood the need for political stability, and during his first term (1877-1880) he began the process of stabilizing Mexico through conciliatory measures. He removed regional caciques (bosses) that had supported Lerdo, but did not attack them financially by taking their property. Díaz also allowed the Church to “publicly practice religion and to clandestinely obtain property.”44 Most importantly, he stepped down after one term in office, seemingly adhering to the constitutional principle of no re-election. Díaz did not fully alienate his detractors as a result, and he set the foundations for the peaceful transfer of power to his successor Manuel González, president from 1880-1884. In essence, González was an extension of Díaz because he implemented many policies set forth by Díaz without actually posing as a political threat.45 At this point, however, no one else was a serious contender for the presidency besides Díaz, who was the most popular choice in 1884 despite having already served as president. The foundations of political stability and economic growth were set, and when Congress amended the constitution to allow presidential re-elections, Díaz began what would become a dictatorship legitimized by popular, military, and Congressional support.

**Imagining Mexico during the Porfiriato**

Under Díaz, Mexico was able to look outward in a way it had not been able to before. The constant civil wars and political struggles left Mexico vulnerable throughout the nineteenth century. There was no possibility for Mexico to be incorporated into a global economy; in fact, Juárez had

---

44 Ibid., 211.

45 Some pieces of legislation passed by González include the Commercial Code of 1884 that established banking codes, the Mining Code of 1884 which privatized subsoil rights, and the abolishment of internal tariffs.
suspended the repayment of Mexico’s international debt in 1861, resulting in military intervention from Great Britain, Spain, and France. Mexicans were deemed incapable of ruling themselves or fulfilling their obligations to other nations, and the placement of Maximilian in power demonstrated this. Mexico was certainly not considered among the world’s modern Western nations when Díaz began his second term. However, Mexico was not the only country facing political and ideological conflicts. Throughout Latin America, countries including Argentina and Brazil faced similar problems of underdevelopment and instability. There was a growing consensus across Latin America in the late nineteenth century that liberalism had not succeeded, and political leaders and intellectuals began to consider positivism as method for achieving liberal goals.46

William D. Raat defines positivism, developed in France by Auguste Comte in the 1850s, “as a philosophy of science- or rather, a synthesis of the particular ‘truths’ of the individual sciences [mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, and social physics] which were all considered to be manifestations of natural phenomena.”47 Positivism suggests that “truth” can only be found and understood through scientific practice, and humanity can only advance through science. This philosophy was introduced into Mexico by Gabino Barreda, Comte’s “Mexican disciple” and founder of the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria, or National Preparatory School, in 1868.48 His students formed a generation of adherents to positivism who would apply this philosophy to Mexico during the Porfiriato. They became part of the científicos—Díaz’s closest advisers after 1884. Justo Sierra, the intellectual leader of the científicos, saw himself as part of a new generation of liberals that “[superseded] the ‘old’


48 Ibid., 5.
According to Charles Hale, this new generation criticized the “metaphysical politics” of their predecessors, which were based on the idea that “society…should be molded to conform to the rights of man.” The científicos believed that science, not doctrine, would solve Mexico’s economic and social problems.

The Díaz administration’s central goal was to achieve modernity. As Díaz stabilized the nation politically by personally selecting state governors and other local leaders who were loyal to him and posed no threat, the científicos forged a modern Mexico that could achieve global admiration. Economic progress was crucial, but Díaz’s advisers also understood that Mexico needed to act like a modern nation. Thus, the científicos also set out to transform Mexico culturally. Liberals during La Reforma had attempted this in their secularization policies, but científicos took this a step further by “Europeanizing” Mexico, particularly the nation’s capital. Científicos imagined Mexico as a civilized nation on par with Western Europe, and they inscribed the nation’s landscapes and urban centers with elements of modernity including the railroad, grand boulevards, and monuments honoring historical figures. They also inscribed modernity onto the bodies of Mexicans through public hygiene measures and eugenic practices. Because there was no opposition until 1910 with enough political power to assert a competing vision for Mexico, científicos defined Mexico’s national identity during the Porfiriato.

Nationalism is a collective consciousness in which members of a community accept certain characteristics of their nation-state, which then becomes a national identity. Ernest Gellner argues that nationalism is a product of modernization, as a society shifts from agrarian to industrialized, and it can manifest itself in a society with “universal literacy…committed to economic growth through its formal commitment to social mobility—both horizontal and vertical.” Gellner also suggests that nationalism can only be spread to the masses by the educated class, the purveyors of “high culture.”

---

49 Hale, The Transformation of Liberalism, 245.

50 Ibid., 28.
societies, “nationalism is an essential part of the cultural atmosphere…educating persons in a culture that mostly frees them from familial and corporate ties” present in pre-agrarian and agrarian societies.\(^{51}\)

Gellner’s definition of nationalism describes the way in which the científicos conceptualized their nation-building project. They viewed nationalism as unilateral, resulting strictly from a movement of high culture from the elites to the lower class. This did not account for nationalistic sentiment formed at the grassroots level, or dependent on cultural markers such as religious symbols.\(^{52}\) It also downplayed the important ethnic or provincial affiliations that could also contribute to a heterogeneous Mexican national identity.

The científicos did correlate modernity with industrialization and a “commitment to social mobility.” Education was a central component to their national project, and Sierra, the Minister of Public Instruction, promoted literacy and education on an unprecedented level in Mexico. Sierra “became an ardent defender of the positivist curriculum at the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria” after 1877, and he endorsed the use of textbooks on logic.\(^{53}\) Sierra pushed for reforms of the Mexican public education system, and for mandatory public education, “resisting the widespread Darwinist skepticism regarding the capacity for Indians to become educated.”\(^{54}\) Like Gabino Barreda, Sierra believed that a modern liberal nation should have educated citizens. The number of primary schools doubled during the Porfiriato, from 5,194 in 1878 to 12,068 in 1908, and enrollment increased from 141,780 to 658,843.\(^{55}\)

---


\(^{52}\) David A. Brading suggests that a distinctly “Mexican” identity developed as early as the 1730s, when *mestizos* and *criollos* began to embrace a devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe. Brading argues that Our Lady of Guadalupe became a cultural icon that united Catholic clergy, religious, and lay persons, regardless of ethnicity and class. See *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 357.


\(^{54}\) Ibid., 17.

Furthermore, Sierra helped to establish the Universidad Nacional in 1910. Two other científicos, Enrique C. Creel (governor of Chihuahua) and Ramón Corral (governor of Sonora) formed state boards of education and expanded the number of normal schools to train teachers. Creel even set out to educate the Tarahumara Indians of Chihuahua. The expansion of secular public education was one of the far-reaching accomplishments of the Porfiriato, since more Mexican children and young adults were be exposed to modern ideals and science, rather than religious catechism. Education also became a way to encourage nationalism, promote civic participation and forge a sense of inclusion and national identity in Mexican children. In the case of the Tarahumaras, education became a tool for “incorporation and betterment,” an effort to assimilate this group (though with limited success) into the Mexican nation. The científicos were far from reaching their goals, however, and since most schools were in urban areas, Mexico “still had 2 million Indians not speaking Spanish” by 1910. Still, they set the foundation for the modern national education system.

As the public education system expanded, Mexico’s economy, under the direction of José Yves Limantour, moved towards modernity, with three decades of unprecedented, if uneven, growth in Mexico. One of the major economic successes of the Porfiriato was the construction of over 20,000 kilometers of railways, which connected Mexico’s urban centers such as Mexico City and Veracruz, and facilitated access to U.S. border cities including Laredo and El Paso. For the first time, Mexico was tied together by a relatively inexpensive mode of transportation. The following industries expanded during the Porfiriato: cotton, livestock, coffee, henequen, rubber, tobacco, beer and liquor, glass, cement, soap, meat-packing and tobacco. By 1904, textile plants across the country had an annual production of 45.5 million pesos. A mining boom began in 1892, in part because of technological advances. Electricity

---

56 Ibid., 21.
58 Ruiz, 10.
powered pumps and lit mines and the use of cyanide sped up the refining process. Between 1891 and 1910, silver production increased from 1.08 million kilograms to 2.42 million kilograms. Lead production rose from 30,187 metric tons to 124,292 metric tons, and copper rose from 5,650 metric tons to 48,160 metric tons. Economic expansion was widespread, but uneven. As Ramón Ruiz points out, the northern states (Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas) experienced the most rapid development because of their proximity to the United States and increased opportunities for foreign investors.

In 1895, Mexico experienced its first budget surplus, and the modified banking system provided a stable national financial system. Banamex, the Banco Nacional de México, was formed in 1884 to “establish and maintain a uniform national currency…[and] ensure a stable banking system and prevent financial panics.” Foreign investors obtained credit through Banamex, which increased Mexico’s trustworthiness and helped it become incorporated into the global economy. Domestically, the Díaz administration passed semi-protectionist policies in an effort to stimulate industrial growth. Limantour, who became Finance Minister in 1892 and supported high tariffs, “decreed that no bank could open without approval from the Treasury Minister.” He established a limited number of state banks to keep Banamex from becoming a monopoly.

The key to Mexico’s growth was foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. Wasserman notes that between 1884 and 1900, almost $1.2 billion U.S. dollars were invested in Mexico primarily by British, U.S., and German investors. Scholars suggest that the Díaz administration sacrificed domestic development because they catered so much to foreign business owners. John Coatsworth calls this

59 Wasserman, 176.


“growth against development.”  

Railroad construction resulted in the expropriation of ejidos and property of small landowners. Public land was purchased by foreign businessmen and Mexican hacendados such as Luis Terrazas, who owned over 10 million acres of land in the state of Chihuahua. Moreover, before 1900, two U.S. railroad corporations—the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, and the Denver-Rio Grande owned the Mexican Central and Mexican National railways, respectively. The British company Interocianic owned the line connecting Mexico City and Veracruz. Although Limantour officially nationalized the Central and National lines in 1908, they remained under the control of foreign investors.

Economic expansion initiated Mexico’s entry into the “modern” world, but it also underscored the problems with applying modernity at the domestic level. Bank charters, privileges, and profits were divided among a select few elites, and “banks made financing decisions based on the personal connections of their directors.”  

This limited the number of people that could obtain credit, open a business, and profit from the economic growth. Moreover, it created a financial system with minimal competition, which had the long-term consequence of stunting Mexican industrialization. Certain families rose to prominence during the Porfiriato, including the Terrazas-Creel family in Chihuahua, and the Maderos in Coahuila, making millions of pesos from banking, mining, and other endeavors, but Mexico’s lower and campesino classes were not successfully integrated into the growing capitalist system. Haber argues that the “productivity of Mexican labor was far lower than that of workers in the advanced industrial countries. As had been the case in Europe in the early nineteenth century, Mexican

---


63 Wasserman, 172.

workers actively resisted the routinization and discipline of the factory system.”

Lower productivity meant that Mexico could not compete with developed nations with higher production rates, despite protectionist policies meant to aid Mexican industries. Científicos perceived this as a problem of the Mexican worker. Foreign laborers (especially Europeans) were perceived as more productive; consequently, foreign laborers often earned higher wages than Mexican obreros.

Científicos viewed Mexico’s lower classes as economically ‘backward’ (especially because of their desire to maintain ejidos), but also as racially and culturally uncivilized. The idea of “civilization” was a fundamental component of the way in which científicos imagined and constructed Mexico. Western Europe, particularly France, was the epicenter of the civilized world in the late nineteenth century. Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo suggests that although Mexican liberals in the 1860s remained resentful because of French intervention, the growing popularity of positivism (a French philosophy) in the 1870s moved intellectuals in favor of France, leading to Mexico’s afrancesamiento, or Francophilia. He adds that

France, as arbiter of late-nineteenth-century culture and politics, was a process of colonization and homogenization of which the ostensible center was Paris but which in fact had no center. Ideas, products, and people circulated throughout the world in an uncontrollable fashion. Mexican and French elites, as well as those of other Western nations, were simultaneously colonizers and colonized in this process.  

The científicos in the 1880s willingly became colonized subjects, positioning the Mexican population as inferior to Western Europeans because they were Mexicano—non white, and worst of all, Indian.

Colonialism defined what it meant to be human by violently creating subjectivity, the ‘self’ versus the ‘other.’ In Latin America, the European slave trade, the Catholic Church, and capitalism were among the colonial institutions used to dominate the bodies and cultural practices of non-

---


Westerners. Judith Butler suggests that domination actually begins with the speech act; objects and people cannot exist unless they are recognized through speech, which can result in “linguistic death.” Consequently, speech can injure and silence people. In late nineteenth-century Mexico, where the majority of the population was illiterate, literacy equaled power. The científicos used the rhetoric of civilization and modernity, which deemed a person fully human if she/he became Western European, to impose their own subjectivity onto the Mexican population, in effect, re-colonizing Mexicans.

Modernity was an economic and political ideal dependent upon national unity. Nationalism was an expression of this unity, and the world’s fairs became the center stage for the performance of modernity. According to Tenorio-Trillo, developed nations used the world’s fairs to demonstrate their superiority, while developing nations (including Mexico) sought to prove their worth in the eyes of the civilized world. For científicos, or “wizards of progress,” these events provided an opportunity to present the Mexico they were creating.

As the Díaz administration prepared for the world’s fairs, it faced a conflict between its goals and Mexico’s reality. Científicos wanted to represent Mexico as a white, progressive, and civilized nation, despite its predominantly Indian and mestizo population that had not been fully integrated into the capitalist system. To deal with this conflict, científicos engaged in what Homi Bhabha considers “colonial mimicry,” the “desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite.” A mimetic relationship is based on the ambivalence of “difference and desire.” The colonizer gazes upon the colonized in an act of surveillance, while the colonized subject desires what she/he can almost become. When colonized subjects perform the mimicry,

---


70 Ibid., 131.
colonizers must face what they partially are, turning the “ambivalence of colonial authority…from mimicry…to menace- a difference that is almost total but not quite.”

Mexico’s científicos dealt with a dual ambivalence as both the colonizer and colonized. They fetishized Europe but could only mimic the object of their desire because they were Mexican. In turn, as they gazed upon the Mexican population, científicos could not escape the reality that under the nationalism they constructed, they were as Mexican as the poorest campesino. Científicos resolved this issue by exoticizing Mexico and becoming a desirable ‘Other,’ proving that Mexicans could be modern, in spite of their differences with Europeans.

The world’s fairs were the ideal setting for científicos to put mexicanidad on display, to be gazed upon and judged by the Western powers. Science was the integral component of Mexico’s exhibition. At the 1889 Paris World’s Fair, Mexico showcased advances in media, work from public schools, and metallurgy. The científicos also presented statistics, which “were an important part of a larger social, cultural, and physical topography of the nation which included, in addition to statistics, maps, photographs, and natural history studies.” Finally, a display on public health and hygiene highlighted advances in medicine. Science in the 1880s emphasized the importance of individual and social hygiene in order to combat disease and clean urban spaces. Tenorio-Trillo notes that for Mexico public hygiene was important for these reasons, but also because it needed to combat the “country's long-standing image as an unhygienic and unsanitary place.” At the fair, científicos presented plans for a drainage system in Mexico City, a sanitary code, and the National Medical Institute.

71 Ibid., 132.
72 Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation, 55-57.
73 Ibid., 130.
74 Ibid., 147.
Moreover, Mexican hygienists attended congresses on syphilology, leprosy, dermatology, and mental health.\textsuperscript{75} Hygienists from around the world also discussed hymenology, and women’s bodies became the site for debates about cleanliness and public health, nationalism, and modernity. However, women who studied this subject were not allowed to participate in these congresses. Public health campaigns were aimed at cleaning urban spaces of trash, disease, and also from prostitutes, who were “proven” to be the primary transmitters of syphilis. Officials used science to explain women’s sexuality and justify measures to control it. For example, Francisco Flores, author of \textit{El Himen en México}, studied the hymens of 181 Mexican women, concluding that the “ring-shaped hymen” was the “normal” type for them. He argued that his study was important because it “would help forensic medicine to protect female virginity.” The author’s work was an indirect extension of an earlier study performed in 1881 by Dr. Florencio Flores, which compared the pelvises of Mexican and European women. He considered the differences between Mexican women and “normal” European women to be a consequence of an inherent “physical defect” in the Mexican women.\textsuperscript{76} Although \textit{Mexicanas} were ‘defective,’ Flores’s study demonstrated that they did have distinctive “Mexican” physical characteristics. Through the modern practice of hymenology, Mexican scientists seemingly proved the existence of unique Mexican traits, albeit inferior to European ones. More importantly, modern science legitimized patriarchy and the development of policies used to control women’s bodies and behavior for the benefit of public health and the national image. Mexican men proved they were civilized enough to keep women clean and pure.

Regardless of colonialist scientific studies that determined Mexicans to be biologically flawed, the delegation to the 1889 Paris World’s Fair attempted to positively portray Mexico’s uniqueness by

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 148.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 150.
highlighting the nation’s “glorious” Aztec past.77 The Aztec Palace, Mexico’s pavilion at the fair, resembled an “ authentic” Aztec temple and it served as a text through which científicos claimed the authenticity of Mexican nationalism. This monument to Mexico’s past formed the bridge between modernity and the indigenous past, and became emblematic of the Mexican national identity. More importantly, it counteracted the scientific discourse that positioned Mexicans as inferior to Europeans. The Aztecs, from whom the “Mexican race” originated according to this narrative, succeeded in commerce, philosophy, poetry, art, and war; they were civilized. Mexicans, however, also had Spanish blood; in essence, 
mexicanidad
was based on two traditions of civilization, which set them apart from other cultures.

Tenorio-Trillo argues that the Aztec Palace was part of a larger project in which intellectuals reconceptualized and rewrote Mexico’s history during this decade. México a Través de Los Siglos, written under the direction of Vicente Riva Palacio, synthesized Mexican history from the pre-Columbian period to the present day. According to Tenorio Trillo, this history “put special emphasis on two central issues: on one hand, the creation of a civic religion with a well-delineated chronology and hierarchy of events and a demarcated set of heroes; on the other, the reconstitution of the Indian past as an inherent component of Mexican nationhood.”78 Riva Palacio and other historians were not the first to give importance to Mexico’s indigenous heritage, however. “Criollo patriotism,” a sense of pride in a mixed European/indigenous ethnic heritage, developed among criollos across Latin America in the eighteenth century, as Enlightenment ideals about nationalism gained popularity among intellectuals. Historian David Brading argues that this sense of common identity, a “proto-nationalism” which emphasized a “national character” (Catholic, anti-Spanish) and a “national [Aztec] past,” influenced the

77 Ibid., 64.

78 Ibid., 66.
independence movements of the 1810s.\(^79\) Mexico’s liberals relied heavily on this sense of patriotism to unite Mexicans during the French intervention. The científicos took this a step further by writing a national history with three central figures—Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juárez, and Porfirio Díaz. Hidalgo was the hero of the independence movement, Juárez fought for liberty, and Díaz peacefully consolidated the nation.\(^80\) These men, a creole, a mestizo and a full-blooded Zapotec Indian, guided Mexico through its difficulties and set the foundation for modernity. The científicos were pushing Mexico toward its full potential.

At the Paris World’s Fair of 1889, científicos defined Mexico as a nation with civilized European and indigenous roots. Though Mexicans were not fully European, they were capable of engaging the sciences and progressing economically. The Díaz administration set out to prove that Mexico was just as modern as Western European nations, and it based Mexican nationalism on the sense of pride in achieving modernity. Tenorio-Trillo argues that “the national image that Mexico was at such pains to project was received either with indifference or with an ostentatious paternalism that is so often the imitator’s reward.”\(^81\) Nevertheless, the Díaz regime persisted in its efforts to have its national identity validated and accepted among the Western community.

**Nationalism, Colonial Mimicry, and the Emergence of Porfírismo, 1890-1910**

By 1890, *the pax porfiriana* had begun: Mexico achieved political stability and economic growth, it became increasingly interconnected through railroad lines, and Díaz, now dictator, oversaw intricate relationships in which everyone in Mexico seemingly owed him allegiance. The nation was finally taken seriously by the Western powers, and Díaz became well-respected among international diplomats. The científicos developed a national identity that placed Díaz alongside Hidalgo and Juárez

---

\(^79\) Ibid., 602.

\(^80\) Ibid., 66.

\(^81\) Ibid., 158.
as a national hero, and they used the image of Díaz to maintain legitimacy. However, the Mexico that
the científicos presented in Paris in 1889 and at subsequent world’s fairs masked the political, economic
and social realities in Mexico. Díaz and his advisors maintained an uneasy balance between appealing
to foreign investors and seeking to attract white European immigrants (one of the goals of the Mexican
debuns to the world’s fairs), while dealing with Mexico’s mostly “uncivilized” masses.

Because they were modern, educated, and civilized, científicos laid claim to Mexican
nationalism, purporting to act in the nation’s best interests. They positioned Mexico’s elites as
colonizers, even as they performed the colonial mimicry before European powers. In essence, they put
on what Frantz Fanon calls a “white mask,” which allows non-whites to come closer to achieving
subjectivity by mimicking the act of being white, or fully human.82

At the turn of the twentieth century, Mexico was in the midst of its belle époque, a “neo-
colonial” period of “cultural dependency” on Britain and France.83 The Porfirista aristocracy (including
the científicos) enjoyed the fruits of Mexico’s modernization and set the standard for cultured and
civilized Mexican society. The aristocrat class grew as Díaz increased the number of diplomats sent to
Europe through Mexico’s foreign service. According to Macías-González, “by 1890, members of the
leading [aristocratic] families occupied practically all of Mexico’s top posts at its legations in Europe.”84

These diplomats adopted Western high culture and sometimes married into upper-class European
families, and they acted as arbitrators between the Díaz regime and high society in Mexico and in
Europe. For example, male foreign investors were invited on tours of haciendas and organized hunts,


83 Jeffrey D. Needell uses these terms in his description of elite culture in Rio de Janeiro in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. Across Latin America, aristocrats idealized and fetishized Western European culture. See A Tropical
“Belle Epoque” Elite Culture and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio De Janeiro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987), xii.

which “dispelled fears about banditry in the countryside” while demonstrating the masculinity, class, and manners of Mexican hacendados.⁸⁵

The upper-class also exhibited gentility by speaking numerous languages, particularly French, by organizing extravagant social functions (largely a woman’s task), and introducing the latest European cultural trends that Mexico’s professional classes “rushed to adopt.”⁸⁶ The National Theatre hosted opera performances, the development of shopping districts promoted European-style consumer culture, and aristocrats began riding in automobiles (or at least in fancy horse-drawn carriages). Women wore imported European dresses and they received help with their children from foreign nannies and tutors. Most children (both male and female) of the “conservative criollo aristocracy and noveaux-riches plutocrats” studied abroad in Spain, France, or Great Britain.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, children of aristocratic hacendados or business owners studied in the United States, where they were trained in the fields of finance and entrepreneurship. Mexico’s upper classes disregarded the public education system, in effect perpetuating class differences by separating their children from the lower classes and offering them a seemingly superior education.⁸⁸

Eurocentric cultural values influenced the aristocratic and urban-professional Porfiristas, who internalized notions of class, race, and gender based on Francophilia, Social Darwinism, and positivism. Social Darwinism, a theory prevalent during the period, sustained the superiority of the “white” European race; scientific studies at the time confirmed it. Nancy Leys Stepan argues that the growing field of eugenics offered a solution for “race improvement.” The científicos relied on positivism and


⁸⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 23.
scientific studies to legitimize their race-betterment policies and validate their increasing xenofilia towards Western Europe.⁸⁹

The burden of race-betterment fell disproportionately on women as Mexican nationalism became increasingly tied to patriarchal notions about motherhood. Women during the Porfiriato were active participants in the modernization project, and they worked at becoming modern as much as their male counterparts. However, they did this primarily through the domestic sphere, focusing on improving their families for the benefit of the national “family.” Scientific studies, eugenics, and public health campaigns prompted women to care for themselves in order to give birth to healthy Mexican children. Advertising in newspapers aimed at the female audience promoted vitamins for women in their child-bearing years. Moreover, women needed to take care not only of their bodies, but also their minds and spirits. Gabriela Cano notes that the Porfirista feminine ideal consisted of “domesticity, modesty…sentimentalism, and submissiveness.” Marriage was important, and a woman’s purity was considered her “most precious treasure,” since it symbolized her family’s honor.⁹⁰ Prostitutes posed a danger in that they would not reproduce the Mexican race within the holy union of marriage.

Femininity also had direct ties to Catholicism. Although Mexico’s liberals were anti-clerical, Catholicism was widely popular among all social classes. Carmen Romero Rubio de Díaz, the president’s wife, was attributed with influencing her husband’s conciliatory efforts with the Church. Catholics considered the Virgin Mary the ideal woman who exemplified domesticity, piety, and

⁸⁹ Nancy Leys Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 11. Social Darwinism gained popularity throughout Latin America as intellectuals and political leaders moved towards modernity. In Buenos Aires, for example, intellectuals supported heavy European immigration. This was not a new development, since the “Europeanization” of Buenos Aires had been encouraged as early as the 1830s by the intellectuals in the Generation of 1837, including Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. Another example was Rio de Janeiro in the early 1900s, as Brazilians prepared for the visit of Belgium’s King Albert and Queen Elisabeth. Officials moved prostitutes and the poor (and predominantly black) residents to designated areas, in order to keep the urban center clean, civilized, and “white.” See E. Bradford Burns, The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), and Sueann Caulfield, In Defense of Honor: Sexual Modernity, Morality, and Nation in Early Twentieth-Century Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), respectively.

⁹⁰ Cano, 109.
submissiveness. In Mexico, devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe united Mexicans since before independence; as preacher Miguel Sánchez stated in the 1730s, “the Mother of God had chosen Mexico as her patria.” La Guadalupana became the symbol of criollo patriotism since she appeared to a Mexican, not a Spaniard. The image of the Virgin of Guadalupe was carried by Hidalgo in battle, and it was the one cultural marker that represented the indigenous, European, and Catholic roots of Mexican nationalism, despite the efforts of anti-clerical liberals. In the context of the Porfiriato, criollo patriotism was important because it justified the acceptance of the dark-skinned Virgin Mary in a society that privileged whiteness.

The Virgin of Guadalupe defended Mexico as the nation’s patroness. She was not a passive figure within Catholicism, nor were Mexican women expected to be passive. Women needed to be educated and refined according to European standards culturally “whitened” in order to pass these qualities to their children. As mentioned earlier, Cano argues that women during the Porfiriato were allowed to participate in the literary sphere, as long as they expressed “sweetness, submission and domesticity.” Literature, particularly poetry, provided an outlet for women’s emotions. Women were also allowed to express their creativity through artwork, and crafts from Indian women became popular during this period. Indigenous tapestry, pottery, and embroidery exuded “an element of exoticism and a symbol of a heritage destined to disappear” as the Mexican race whitened. On the opposite end of the social strata, elite women engaged civil society through activism in charities. They practiced what Gabriela González calls the “politics of benevolence,” with the “idea that women bore moral responsibility for society.” These women justified their social activities using the rhetoric of

\[91\] Brading, 357.

\[92\] Cano, 111.

nationalism. Though they stepped outside the domestic sphere, it was for the benefit of the national family.

If the Virgin of Guadalupe represented the feminine ideal, Díaz was her masculine counterpart—a warrior in defense of the national family, willing to sacrifice himself for la patria, or the homeland. In regard to race, however, Díaz occupied a contradictory position within Mexico’s racial hierarchy. His mother, Petrona Mori, was a Mixtec Indian from Oaxaca, and she raised five children after Porfirio’s father, José Faustino Díaz (a criollo), died in 1833. Their son attended the Instituto de Ciencias y Artes, where he became Benito Juárez’s protégé. Although Díaz and Juárez eventually had a falling out during the Restored Republic, the two “native sons” of Oaxaca were a source of pride for Mexico’s lower classes because they demonstrated that social mobility was possible.94 Chassen de López suggests that while Juárez “laid the groundwork for the transition to a more mestizo nation,” Díaz “witnessed the emergence of the mestizo as a symbol of Mexico and the transition of power from the Indian south to the more mestizo Centro and north.”95 This transition, however, became possible at the expense of Mexico’s indigenous population. During the Porfiriató, Díaz violently repressed Yaqui Indians in Sonora and Mayas in Yucatán for the sake of national unity and capitalism. Business owners and developers attempted to take over Yaqui territory considered ideal for railroad expansion, commercial agriculture, and mining. As the Yaquis fought the ‘colonists’ for their land and for their sense of national sovereignty, Díaz authorized the deportation of thousands of Yaquis to the Yucatán peninsula to work on the henequen plantations. At the same time, the Caste War continued in Yucatán, and Díaz appointed General Victoriano Huerta, known for his ruthlessness in battle, to defeat the Mayas.

As Díaz used violence to subjugate indigenous populations who had different conceptions of nationality than his, the dictator literally and symbolically whitened himself in order to appear more

94 Chassen de López, 355.
95 Ibid., 546.
European. Díaz biographer Carlton Beals commented on the changes in the dictator’s appearance as he increasingly emphasized his criollo heritage. When Díaz assumed the presidency in 1877, he was “bronzed as an Indian,” and “the gilt buttons on the vest of his three-piece gray suit were half unfastened revealing his shirt front, mussed and wrinkled.” In 1882, he married socialite Carmen Romero Rubio, who transformed his image from that of a “rude, heavy…provincial,” to a man with “dignified gray hair, formerly so unruly and coarse but at last obedient to brush and comb [which] made even his skin seem much lighter.” Famed Mexican novelist Federico Gamboa commented on the change in the Díaz’s appearance upon his first meeting with the president in 1893, stating that Díaz “was not the same man that I once saw, scruffy, with the aspect of a warrior, of a veteran soldier; this was now a proper gentleman, with English manners and skills, clean-shaven, very serious, irreproachable.” In his portraits, Díaz was depicted with lighter skin, which he used alabastrum talcum to whiten. The hero of Cinco de Mayo, the mestizo from humble origins in Oaxaca, the son of an Indian woman, was now a dignified, whiter-skinned statesman, the leader of a developing modern nation who lived in Chapultepec Castle, hosted galas, and was a member of Mexico’s civilized society. Yet Díaz never learned to write correctly or use proper spelling and grammar, and he was unable to “erase” his Oaxacan accent.

Meanwhile, he supported the breakdown of ejidos and sometimes the massacre of Indians and their expulsion from their land, all for the sake of modernity, economic development, and Mexico’s civility. Carlos Tello Díaz, a descendant of Porfirio Díaz, suggests that for his tatarabuelo, “the concept

96 Wasserman, 163.
97 Ibid., 164. Carmen Romero Rubio (who was thirty-five years younger than Díaz) was the daughter of Manuel Romero Rubio, who became Secretary of the Interior in 1884 and held the position until his death in 1895. Manuel supported Juárez during La Reforma, fought against Maximilian, and served as Foreign Minister under Lerdo de Tejada. Before his death, he was considered the leader of the científicos, an unofficial position later assumed by Limantour.
100 Wasserman, 164.
of nation was different- and far superior- to the concept of pueblo [people].” In a letter dated February 28, 1912, Díaz (then in exile) lamented not suppressing the Mexican Revolution in 1910 because of his desire to respect the wishes of the pueblo at the expense of “national happiness.”101 Don Porfirio felt this was the first time he placed Mexico’s people ahead of the interests of the national body, and it would lead to Mexico’s ruin. Tello Díaz notes that in retrospect, the exiled president understood that he had established “order and progress” by sacrificing democracy, the ideal that prompted his break with Juárez in the 1870s. Díaz spent the rest of his life “conscious…of the fact that he had not known- because he did not want to- how to resolve once and for all the problem of his succession” and move Mexico towards democracy.102

Díaz’s thoughts on democracy and nationalism exhibit the fundamental characteristics of Porfirismo. In exile, Díaz rarely regretted sacrificing democracy or Mexico’s lower classes in order to improve the nation’s image, establish peace, and improve infrastructure and the public education system. He considered himself a patriot who understood the necessity for Mexicans to place the nation above their religious and political differences. Porfiristas supported these ideas and believed that Díaz’s wise leadership saved Mexico. In 1901, Gamboa, a self-proclaimed Porfirista, wrote “yes! General Díaz has shed human blood, of brothers and strangers; he has infringed on our rights, yes! He has mutilated liberties, yes! He has perpetrated his share of reprehensible acts, yes!...but, is there any area in the world where there has been a ruler who has not committed these sins?...And what has Porfirio Díaz given Mexico?” The president “above all else, was a builder” who would be remembered for his “firm and grand labor; uniting and mending a destroyed land.”103

---

102 Ibid., 33.
103 Gamboa, 3: 19.
Gamboa’s praise exemplifies the Porfirista nationalism that developed during the Porfiriato. Científico nationalism was based on improving Mexico through science and promoting Mexico as a modern Euro-centric nation, but it was only a subset of a broader Porfirista nationalism centered around a cult of personality of the charismatic Díaz. Max Weber defines “charisma” as

a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, super-human, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader...How the quality in question would be judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his “followers” or “disciples.”

Charismatic authority derives from the public recognition of a leader’s charisma, a psychological expression “of complete personal devotion” to this leader, “arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair or hope.” Weber argues that a true charismatic leader rules by what he/she says, not according to any established laws or socio-political norms. Moreover, charismatic leaders counter bureaucratic and/or traditional authority because they base their hegemony not on rational laws but on emotional ties to their followers.

In Mexico (and throughout Latin America), caudillos, or regional strong-men, manifested this charismatic authority. According to Ariel de la Fuente, caudillos “were perceived as the highest authority.” They gained this power through military leadership and by uniting people against certain institutions or political factions. Moreover, “popular culture underscored not only their position as political leaders but also distinguished the caudillos as moral authorities and role models in the communities they ruled over.” Charisma was integral for caudillos because it helped them to form

---

105 Ibid., 49.
different types of connections with their supporters. *Compadrazgo*, for example, was an important cultural relationship established between parents and the godparents of their children. Caudillos used these types of cultural ties to “mobilize support through family and friends as well as through patronage networks that linked them to people below them in the social hierarchy.”

On a national level, caudillos often ruled as dictators, gaining legitimacy through this popular support. Macías-González argues that Díaz relied on a “cult of personality” in his quest for absolute power. In order to attain this goal, the general and his advisers created “the Díaz myth” based on Díaz’s image as an indispensable, messianic héroe de la paz—“hero of peace”…publicized in biographies, music, poems, texts, etiquette manuals, films, and sound recordings, the myth cultivated deference toward Díaz, establishing him as the fountain of political legitimacy and authority. Photographs, paintings, and other images placed Díaz at the center of the nation’s struggle against internal and external enemies. Accordingly, Díaz and his entourage modified his image as necessary; he appeared in uniform when his military glory needed to be highlighted and dressed in civilian attire to underscore his government’s stability.

Díaz’s charisma served as the foundation for his legitimacy, but his mythical status grew (at least initially) as he brought peace and economic development to Mexico.

Public spaces became important in constructing this myth while showcasing Mexico’s transformation into a modern nation, and the Díaz administration made extensive efforts to Europeanize the capital. Cosmopolitanism inspired the transformation of Mexico City, and officials inscribed modernity onto Mexico’s urban landscape through the use of monuments to memorialize Mexico’s historical narrative. The most important architectural achievement of the Porfiriato was the construction of the Paseo de la Reforma (Reforma Boulevard) in Mexico City. The boulevard, commissioned in the 1870s, was inspired by Parisian boulevards. It included the Monument to Independence (*El Ángel*) and statues of Cuauhtémoc and Christopher Columbus. Like the Aztec Palace, Reforma Boulevard served as a space uniting Mexico’s European and indigenous pasts. The monument to Cuauhtémoc includes a


108 Macías-González, 84.
depiction of the Aztec leader having his feet burned by Spanish conquerors, symbolizing his heroism against the invaders. The Díaz administration used this statue to “reconfirm the power of Mexico City and its right to rule the nation by inheritance.” \(^{109}\) Government officials laid claim to the status of direct descendants of the Aztecs through the design of the boulevard. The statue of Columbus included a quote in which the navigator described his success in the new colonies in a letter to King Ferdinand. This statue was a tribute to Spain, but also to the Catholic Church, since the colonial project was promoted by the Church as part of its evangelical efforts. These statues and the Monument to Independence form a straight line which ends at Chapultepec Castle, Díaz’s home, thus symbolizing a linear progression from Columbus to Cuauhtémoc, to Hidalgo, to Díaz. As Barbara Tenenbaum suggests, Riva Palacio and those involved in the renovation of Reforma Boulevard justified including these different (and conflicting) symbols by positioning them as markers of “creole nationalism.” \(^{110}\) The Aztecs were glorious leaders, but the Spanish helped the Indians evolve into a more civilized Christian population. Hidalgo and the leaders of the independence struggle established the Mexican nation, and Díaz moved the nation toward modernity.

In addition to Reforma Boulevard, government buildings were renovated in order to better represent Díaz and the “Republic.” For example, in the 1890s, the bell used by Hidalgo during his “Grito de Dolores” was placed above the central balcony of the National Palace. The Treasury purchased existing palaces in order to house different government agencies, and they were equipped with commodities including electrical wiring, telephones, and lighting. Throughout Mexico City, advances in transportation led to the paving of major boulevards, which were also lined with flowers and decorated with monuments. The ultimate goal was for Mexico City to become a well-respected center of civilization and modernity—the “Paris of Latin America.”


\(^{110}\) Ibid., 136. “Creole nationalism” is similar to David A. Brading’s term “criollo patriotism.”
All of these changes brought about by modernity elevated Mexico, its upper classes, and the capital, but Porfirio Díaz would not be outdone. If aristocrats showcased gentility and class, the president had to be more genteel, elegant, and distinguished. Thus, Don Porfirio and Doña Carmen used the “Burgundian ceremonial model” to give the presidency an air of monarchical grandeur. This model, “developed in the court of the medieval dukes of Burgundy, whereby petitioners were made to approach the monarch through a succession of magnificently appointed halls or antechambers.”

The couple “employed light, sound, as well as temporal and spatial mechanisms to awe those in their presence.” If anyone (regardless of status) approached the dictator, he/she had to pass through spaces with elaborate ornaments, trophies, and other symbols of Díaz’s power—a reminder of who the supreme leader was.

Petitioners to the president underwent an elaborate process for the privilege of visiting with Díaz. Macías-González notes that once petitioners submitted proper documentation (letters of introduction from acquaintances, and the actual request) and had it approved, they could meet Díaz during his public audiences on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. After crossing the National Palace’s largest patio, the visitor climbed the “escalera de honor” or grand staircase to the executive suite, after which it was necessary to pass through three antechambers before reaching the president. However, acceptance into the second antechamber was not guaranteed, though social standing and personal connections improved a person’s chances. Even then a person could wait for weeks in the second room. The fortunate few (approximately ten) who were called daily for a personal audience with Díaz had twenty minutes to present their case before the president. Gamboa recounts the experience of his first interview with Díaz in 1893.

Mr. [Ignacio] Mariscal [Minister of Foreign Relations] indicates for me to wait for the president in a spacious lounge, after having crossed several rooms and antechambers that were deserted and cold... The minister disappears through a thick door to the left, antique and artistic; once I adjusted to the semi-darkness of the room, I was surprised by its beautiful tapestry. In the

---


112 Ibid., 86.
background I see our eagle inscribed on a red satin background, with a crown and imperial crest; below it, the motto of Archduke Maximilian’s government...”Equality in Justice”...I am happy that the tapestry survived, yes, it proves that Mexico does not destroy for the sake of destruction...we are one grade above the victorious assailants of Tuileries Palace...My enthusiasm wanes as I see...horrible Chinese spittoons and on top of two tables, petroleum lamps, grossly modest...Suddenly, almost without sound, I see before me the president of the Republic, arbitrator of the destinies of the nation’s 14 million inhabitants...We sit down, he in the shadows, and I in the light, a trait that I do not dislike in a wise leader, in an observer and manipulator like him. We speak of generalities for ten or fifteen minutes...his sudden silence indicates that our interview is finished.\textsuperscript{113}

Díaz purposely sat his guests in direct sunlight, so that he could see them while making it difficult for them to see him. Such manipulation perpetuated the “cult of personality” surrounding Díaz. Mexicans from all social classes could aspire to a personal meeting with the benevolent president, who gave the impression that he was accessible to the masses. In reality, Díaz forced everyone who went to visit him via this path to humble themselves before him, acting out his position of power while keeping his visitors in place.

Mexico’s aristocrats and científicos based their identities and their sense of nationalism on acting as European as possible, while other Porfiristas (among them the urban professionals that are the focus of this study) aspired to reach this ideal. Although the two groups held similar cultural values, the tension between them increased during the first decade of the twentieth century. As the nation faced economic problems with the world recession in 1907, and Díaz refused to select a successor, Mexicans became increasingly disenchanted with the Porfiriato. This disenchantment turned into open resentment and hostility as Mexico’s problems worsened while Díaz and the científicos continued congratulating themselves for modernizing Mexico.

“El Derrumbamiento Porfirista,” 1906-1910

On January 1, 1909, Federico Gamboa noted in his memoirs “today, it is an honor for a person to declare that he is Mexican; if we look to the past we see this was not always the case, and perhaps it will

\textsuperscript{113} Gamboa, 1: 130-131.
not be in the future, since we can not discern what lies ahead in the unknown and mysterious future. The omens, therefore, must be of optimism and strength.”  

Exactly one year later, the novelist wrote “my mind, intermittently, looks through a window and sees a dark and foggy field of omens, conjectures, and premonitions…I hear the muffled echoes of a storm…[the field’s] darkness divided by flashes of lightning…General Díaz is now very old, and though he tries, he cannot defy the laws of nature…There is much hatred in the air against his prolonged administration.”

In the last years of the Díaz regime, as the dictator and his advisors alienated members of almost every sector of the population, the Porfiriato became a spectacle, ridiculed, mocked, and openly contested. In 1907 a world-wide recession drastically affected Mexico and stopped the economic growth of the previous decades. The agrarian sector faced problems with crop yields during droughts, and conditions in haciendas worsened. The purchasing power of peones declined as prices for basic food staples such as corn and chile rose. In fact, harvests were so poor that corn had to be imported. As exports decreased, unemployment rates grew and the rural population faced widespread poverty.

These problems were not limited to the peones, however. Lower-class urban Mexicans lived in terrible, unsanitary conditions with high levels of disease, malnutrition, and child mortality. Mexicans in the urban sector also dealt with unemployment, racial discrimination and stagnant wages. Employers viewed this problem differently, however, and employers in the northern states in particular complained of labor shortages. The Mexico City newspaper El Imparcial attributed this to “the shiftless character of the Mexican worker who, accustomed to just getting along, lacked the incentive to improve himself” unlike foreign employees. The conflict between laborers and employers resulted in two

---

114 Ibid., 5: 11.
115 Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds, 453.
116 Ibid., 442-443, 452-453.
major strikes. The first protest took place at the American-owned copper mines of Cananea, Sonora, in 1906. Mexican workers demanded an end to discrimination and a wage of five pesos per day, the same as their American counterparts. In 1907, workers at the Rio Blanco textile mills (owned by a Frenchman) in Veracruz and Puebla made similar demands. Díaz not only sided with the foreign company owners; he sent the military to violently suppress the strikes. Before these events, Díaz had generally relied on the rurales, rural police, to settle these types of local disputes. The fact that he used military force in these two cases demonstrates that he knew they posed a genuine threat to his authority. Suddenly, the pax porfiriana had begun to deteriorate.

In addition to Mexico’s economic problems, the population was growing weary of the dictatorship. At the turn of the century, Mexico experienced a “revival of Juarista liberalism,” and Mexicans reevaluated the liberal project of the 1850s-1870s in relation to Díaz’s policies. Groups opposed to Díaz formed liberal clubs across the nation in an effort to restore the democratic principles set forth by the Constitution of 1857. In Oaxaca, Díaz critics established the Liberal Regeneration Club “Benito Juárez” in 1900. The club’s mission was to use the press and “public denunciations” to “regenerate [the masses] from the barbarian state which…the nefarious, retrograde [científico] party [had] tried to submerge them.” That same year, engineer Camilo Arriaga led the opposition in San Luis Potosí, where they organized the Liberal Club “Ponciano Arriaga” and the First Liberal Congress in 1901. Women also participated in this opposition movement. In Mexico City, they established the Feminine Antireelectionist Club “Daughters of Cuauhtémoc” in 1909 and the Feminine League of Political Propaganda in 1910.

---

118 Chassen de López, 460.

119 Ibid., 455.

120 Camilo Arriaga was a descendant of Ponciano Arriaga, the leader of the Constitutional Congress that ratified the Constitution of 1857.
The opposition press also expanded during this period. The most prominent anti-Porfirista newspapers included Mexico City’s *Diario del Hogar* and *El Hijo del Ahuizote*, and *Regeneración*, published by Oaxacan brothers Ricardo, Jesús, and Enrique Flores Magón.121 The editors of these newspapers often met with persecution, and Filomeno Mata (director of *Diario del Hogar*) was incarcerated for acting against the Díaz regime. The Flores Magón brothers were also imprisoned for seditious activity, and they fled to the United States in 1904, where they continued to publish *Regeneración*.

In 1905, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón helped to organize the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM, or Mexican Liberal Party). Ricardo had participated in the First Liberal Congress in San Luis Potosí, and the influence of the earlier liberal clubs was evident within the PLM. Like its predecessors, the PLM claimed that Díaz betrayed Juárez, his liberal ideals, and democracy. However, the PLM differed from other liberal clubs because it acted primarily in exile, and *Regeneración* circulated across the U.S. borderlands and other cities such as St. Louis, Missouri. The Flores Magón brothers demonstrated that in spite of their exile, they could effectively act against the Díaz regime. More importantly, the dictator could no longer quell the growing opposition against his regime by imprisoning or banishing his critics.

In 1908, Díaz addressed the issue of democracy during an interview with American journalist James Creelman. The president stated that Mexico was ready for democracy, and he made the critical mistake of saying he would not seek re-election in 1910. The interview generated extensive buzz as Mexicans began discussing potential presidential candidates. This moment also exposed the differences between the científicos and other Porfiristas. As the elections approached, Díaz announced his run for re-election in 1909, though the vice-presidential candidate had not been determined. The dictator was

---

121 Filomeno Mata established *Diario del Hogar* in 1881, Daniel Cabrera founded *El Hijo del Ahuizote* in 1885, and the Flores Magón brothers launched *Regeneración* in 1900. The brothers were given control of Cabrera’s newspaper in 1902, after the Díaz regime censored *Regeneración*. However, they were forced to shut down *El Hijo del Ahuizote* in 1903, shortly before fleeing to the United States.
almost eighty years of age, and speculation that he would probably not live through another term in office made the vice-presidential candidate a central concern in debates about Mexico’s future. General Bernardo Reyes, a Porfirista from the state of Nuevo León, was the favorite candidate nation-wide.**122** Reyes supporters believed that he was capable of ruling the nation because he fostered peace and economic growth in Nuevo León (and the important capital city of Monterrey). Díaz, however, backed Ramón Corral, a científico and the current vice-president. Corral represented the status quo, and his opponents believed that Díaz and the científicos (many of them now in their seventies) only looked after themselves and their own longevity in office. They received the nickname *las momias*, or “the mummies.”**123**

The conflict over the vice-presidential candidate highlighted the growing rift between the urban professional Porfiristas and the científicos. Both groups accepted Díaz’s repressive tactics as a patriotic necessity and neither openly questioned the dictator’s wisdom and authority. However, middle class Porfiristas were ready for the “mummies” to step down, and most feared that Díaz would perpetuate the status quo by selecting another científico as his running mate. García Naranjo, originally from Nuevo León, became caught up in the dispute between supporters of Reyes and Corral. García Naranjo was in a unique position; he did not consider Corral an ideal successor, but he could not support the general because of a feud between the Reyes and Naranjo families.**124** Choosing the lesser of two problematic

---

**122** According to Michael J. Gonzáles, Reyes “wanted to be vice-president…but he had not encouraged big rallies or other forms of popular manifestation. General Reyes was comfortable with Porfiran authoritarianism and uncomfortable with popular democracy.” See *The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 72.

**123** García Naranjo, 5: 94.

**124** Ibid., 1:120-125. In his memoirs, García Naranjo relates the story of his birth to Díaz and politics in Nuevo León in 1883 and 1884. On March 8, 1883, Díaz and his wife Carmen stopped in Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo León, as they traveled to Monterrey. Nemesio García y García (García Naranjo’s father and mayor of Lampazos), organized a celebration to honor Díaz. Nuevo León’s leading caudillos, Generals Jerónimo Treviño and Francisco Naranjo (García Naranjo’s uncle), also took part in the festivities. Treviño was Díaz’s compadre, and Francisco Naranjo was the acting Minister of War under President Manuel González. As the town waited for General Díaz and Doña Carmen, García y García received the news that his pregnant wife was in labor. He arrived home in time for the birth of his son, Nemesio, and then rushed back to greet Díaz, who congratulated the mayor and praised him for prioritizing family before his political duties. Nevertheless, when Díaz assumed the presidency in 1884 and began restructuring the system of *caudillaje*, he placed Bernardo Reyes as the
candidates, García Naranjo joined a delegation of *Corralistas* on a trip to the city of Guadalajara in July 1909 in order to promote Corral’s vice-presidential bid.\(^\text{125}\) Reyistas gathered around the delegation’s hotel and threw stones at the windows, threatening the group’s safety. Later, during the Corral delegation’s public appearance, they were met with protests and insults.\(^\text{126}\) As the public shouted “¡Viva Reyes!” and for death to Corral, García Naranjo imagined the beginning of a revolution. These shouts were “a transcendental cry – down with *las momias*, and since President Díaz would soon turn eighty years old, everyone understood that this attack was against him.”\(^\text{127}\) These protestors “showed the elderly Dictator that his former agent [Reyes] approached the horizon as [a] possible rival.”\(^\text{128}\) Consequently, Díaz sent Reyes into unofficial exile in Europe and rigged the presidential elections, effectively “bringing a cold shower down on the fire” that was the growing revolutionary movement.\(^\text{129}\)

Problems increased within the federal government as well, as congress became increasingly divided. In 1910, Díaz appointed García Naranjo as a *diputado*, or deputy, to the Federal Congress at the age of twenty-seven. In his memoirs, García Naranjo recalled “the euphoria” he experienced when he took office, believing that “it was exceptional that a twenty-seven year old man, who was not the son, nephew, or godson of an influential person” was granted a congressional seat. He also thought he could energize the aging congress in which “almost all members had passed the half-century mark.” In retrospect, the deputy realized that his excitement and optimism in early 1910 resulted from naïveté, and

governor of Nuevo León, effectively overthrowing Treviño and Francisco Naranjo. García y García opposed this move and defended his brother-in-law, and Díaz exiled him to Texas. This was the origin of the feud between the Reyes and García y García/Naranjo families. García Naranjo states that his father, in spite of his exile, admired Díaz for his service to Mexico, always called him a “great man,” and taught his children to do the same. Any resentment was aimed at Reyes, and not at Díaz.

---

\(^{125}\) García Naranjo was joined by Hipólito Olea, José María Lozano and Francisco González Mena.

\(^{126}\) García Naranjo, 5: 93-95.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., 94.

\(^{128}\) Ibid., 114.

\(^{129}\) Ibid., 98.
he soon learned that instead of enjoying his triumph, he would face “a series of storms.” The twenty-fifth federal legislature began on September 1, 1910, and the majority of the deputies “were exclusively porfiristas…who…followed Caesar unconditionally.” Contrary to popular belief, these Porfiristas “were notoriously anticientíficos,” and did not waste any opportunity to criticize them and their policies. In fact, the científicos were now the scapegoats for Mexico’s problems. Though the Mexican government was rapidly dividing, Díaz and his advisors insisted on remaining in power for the rest of their lives without establishing any mechanism for the transfer of power.

Despite the growing discontent in all sectors of society, the Díaz administration embarked on celebrating the Mexico they created as they prepared to commemorate the centennial. As they did at the world’s fairs, científicos put Mexico on display for the international community. In 1910, however, Mexicans rejected the white mask placed upon the nation. This did not mean that the population did not celebrate Mexico’s independence. On the contrary, it became an opportunity for the population to reevaluate the meaning of Mexican independence and nationalism while enjoying the patriotic milestone.

For the organizers of the centennial celebrations, the months leading to the commemoration in Mexico City were a period of “rehabilitation” and “hope.” Ireneo Paz, director of the Mexico City newspaper *La Patria*, discussed the importance of preparing the city for the centennial, particularly by cleaning its streets. He stated that in September, “many guests [would] set foot in Mexico for the first time, and without a doubt…leave with an unpleasant impression if they [saw] the streets magnificently adorned…but dirty and untidy.” Furthermore, schoolchildren organized a parade, poets wrote odes to

130 Ibid., 169.
131 Ibid., 201.
132 Gamboa, 5: 124.
their nation, artists depicted Mexico’s history and heritage in elaborate works, and the Díaz cabinet prepared to host diplomats from around the world. In August 1910, the government unveiled commemorative postage stamps with the images of the heroes of independence, including Ignacio Allende and Juan Aldama.\(^{134}\) Regardless of Mexico’s problems, the preparations seemingly united Mexicans through their love of the *patria*. Unlike the world’s fairs, Mexicans *in Mexico*, from various classes and of all ages, could partake in representing Mexico with pride to the global audience.

The festivities took place for several weeks. On September 7, *El Imparcial* published images of 38,000 children gathered around the national flag to express their “love for the homeland.”\(^{135}\) Their program was directed specifically to Díaz and Justo Sierra. On September 8, *El Imparcial* reported the arrival of diplomatic delegations from Belgium, Spain, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia.\(^{136}\) Three days later, Díaz hosted the French ambassador and delegations from Bolivia, Holland, Perú, and Ecuador.\(^{137}\) Overall, a total of thirty-two delegations visited Mexico City, all received by Gamboa, now the Minister of Foreign Relations. *El Imparcial* also published congratulatory letters written to Díaz from ambassadors of Italy, Japan, Spain, France, and China.\(^{138}\) The various delegations offered gifts to Mexico, and in an effort at historical reconciliation, Spain returned the uniform of independence leader José María Morelos, an action that greatly moved Díaz.\(^{139}\)

Mexicans expressed nationalism through these public displays and other symbolic imagery. The Sunday supplement of *El Imparcial* included patriotic drawings used to represent Mexican national identity. Carlos Alcalde’s “Alegoría de ‘La Paz’” depicted a female angel with the eagle and serpent

---


\(^{135}\) Ibid., Sep. 7, 1910.

\(^{136}\) Ibid., Sep. 8, 1910.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., Sep. 12, 1910.

\(^{138}\) Ibid., Sep. 16, 1910.

\(^{139}\) Gamboa, 5: 127.
perched on her head, surrounded by a halo with “1910” inscribed inside it. She had her arms stretched out and her gaze toward the heavens. This angel spread her wings, which resembled those of archangels but also of an eagle. The central figure, with two other female angels on each side, stood above a crown, an imperial crest, a sickle, and a cart wheel. These angels, symbols of good, were surrounded by light. One of the angels to the side was writing, while the other looked out at a campesino plowing a field in the background. The angel was the dominant symbol for Mexican nationalism during this time. Always female, she looked over Mexico and granted God’s favor to the nation. She was also pure and represented the ideal female. In this particular allegory, the central angel is “peace,” illustrating women’s roles as peacemakers, gentle and pure of spirit.

Female angels were a popular symbol during these festivities, and they became iconic of lo mexicano. In an advertisement for the Toluca y Mexico Beer Company, female angels rode chariots up to the heavens, and the caption read “as the Mexican nation celebrates the first centennial of its liberty and independence, the Toluca y Mexico Beer Company unites joyfully with its people, as an act of gratitude for the preference given to our beer.” The most popular was El Ángel- the angel atop the Monument of Independence, unveiled on Reforma Boulevard on September 16. It “contained four seated women representing Peace, Law, Justice, and War,” and the base of the monument was inscribed with the names of twenty-four leaders of the independence movement. Italian Enrique Alciati sculpted the angel at the top of the monument as Nike, the goddess of victory, holding laurels and broken chains, honoring triumph and the abolition of slavery. In Porfirian society, men were warriors. Women, on the other hand, improved the nation through their proximity to God and heaven, and by leading Mexico to peace, tranquility, and ultimately divinity.

---

141 El Imparcial, Sep. 16, 1910.
142 Tennenbaum, 147.
The weeks of parades, odes to national heroes, and diplomatic visits reached a peak on September 15. Don Porfirio and Doña Carmen planned to host a ball for the foreign delegates and a total of 1,500 guests. The night culminated with the “Grito,” which was now pronounced on September 15 (Díaz’s birthday) rather than the sixteenth (the actual anniversary). Díaz celebrated his eightieth birthday in grand fashion; in the midst of the endless accolades, the president reached the apex of his career.

Yet, Mexico’s problems had not disappeared, though public officials attempted to ignore them. In *La Patria*, Paz proclaimed that regardless of any national problems, he and his staff would “put a lock on [their] mouths this month” and not comment on national problems.\(^ {143}\) The night of the “Grito,” Gamboa and German Ambassador Karl Bünz watched from the central plaza (the Zócalo) rather than from the National Palace. As the public began to disperse, the two spectators saw a group form, yelling loudly and firing gunshots. The group, increasingly disorderly, headed towards the National Palace. Gamboa and Bünz, now curious, approached the group, and Gamboa clearly heard the shouts—¡Viva Madero! Bünz did not understand what was happening, so Gamboa explained that the group yelled “long live the dead heroes and President Díaz.” He lied again when Bünz asked for the name of the man on the banner the group carried—“Diaz...who wore a beard as a young man.”\(^ {144}\) In reality, the man on the banner was, again, Madero. The following morning, September 16, Díaz and his cabinet met in the presidential office before the day’s festivities. Gamboa told Díaz about the incident from the previous night. The rest of the cabinet chided Gamboa for his “imprudence,” and Díaz responded without emotion, telling the gentlemen that it was time to go.\(^ {145}\)

\(^{143}\) “Estamos en el pleno goce de los regocijos por nuestro Centenario,” *La Patria*, Sep. 12, 1910.

\(^{144}\) Gamboa, 5: 128.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 129.
During the centennial celebrations, Díaz and his closest friends, family, and advisors looked back at the modern Mexico they had constructed over the previous four decades with a sense of pride. Porfiristas-both científicos and their opponents- believed that despite the lack of democracy, Díaz had ruled Mexico correctly, and that the nation owed all of its present success to the president. However, any sense of security this group had began to vanish two months later, as revolts broke out in northern Mexico and Madero launched the Plan de San Luis Potosí, officially beginning the Mexican Revolution. For almost forty years, Díaz controlled the definition of “Mexico,” reconciling liberals and conservatives and bringing a new kind of order. At the end of 1910, the issue of democracy created an ideological division that would again lead Mexico to civil war. Between November 1910 and May 1911, Mexicans unleashed their resentments against the aging regime, and the científicos and other Porfiristas experienced a crisis, facing life-changing and potentially dangerous consequences for their adherence to the dictator. During the course of the Mexican Revolution, Porfiristas would face political and ideological banishment, and even death, as they fought against the revolution to uphold the Mexico Díaz created.
Chapter 2: The Mexican Revolution and the Struggle for “La Patria,” 1910-1914

“Unity is what we ask for, unity that sets aside all discord, because the Homeland is not on the right path. There is ruin at its feet.”

-La Patria, March 1, 1911

By late 1910, it was clear that Díaz and the científicos had no intention of stepping down from their positions of power. Díaz also refused to establish any process for presidential succession. When the Mexican Revolution began on November 20, 1910, the weaknesses of the regime were exposed. Díaz supporters became increasingly divided as civil war spread across Mexico, and Porfiristas were forced to confront a popular movement that threatened their way of life and worldview. Within six months, Díaz resigned and went into exile; the crisis within Porfirismo was augmented after their hero (and the symbol that united them) abandoned the nation.

This chapter traces the formation of anti-revolutionary ideologies by Porfiristas in the period between November 1910 and July 1914, which ended with the fall of the Huerta regime. These ideologies shared a number of commonalities. Porfiristas claimed adherence to Juarista liberal values, and they relied on the rhetoric of honor and masculinity to position themselves favorably against the revolutionary leaders and U.S. government under Woodrow Wilson. Porfiristas developed these ideologies through the press, and in their memoirs. These texts demonstrate that anti-revolutionary ideologies were not homogenous, and that they were heavily influenced by politics and personal loyalties.

The Porfirista press in Mexico City opposed the Madero government, but it presented sometimes conflicting anti-revolutionary ideologies while underscoring the tensions between the científicos and urban professionals. El Imparcial, directed by Rafael Reyes Spíndola, was a científico publication, and La Patria, directed by Ireneo Paz, represented the urban professionals among the Porfiristas. These two newspapers frequently attacked each other, illustrating the growing resentment between the factions.
Despite their differences, however, Porfiristas had something important in common—they needed a hero-figure. No one would replace Díaz, but they believed that Mexico could only be governed by a strong authoritarian leader. Thus, both newspapers supported Victoriano Huerta when he assumed the presidency in 1913. During the U.S. military intervention in Veracruz in April 1914, both emphasized the heroic qualities of Huerta in order to garner support for the dictator. They differed, however, in that *El Imparcial* fully backed Huerta throughout his regime, while *La Patria* shifted its support to Félix Díaz (Porfirio’s nephew) after Huerta began ruling as a dictator in October 1913.

The memoirs complicate the analysis of anti-revolutionary ideologies because the authors (especially those who wrote in hindsight) had to address the issue of morality as they justified their political stance. Gamboa, García Naranjo, former senator Querido Moheno and Rodolfo Reyes (son of Bernardo Reyes) chronicled their experiences between 1910 and 1914, and they defended their actions and their participation in the Huerta regime as patriotic. These memoirs warrant careful analysis for a number of reasons. The information in these texts is contradictory at times, and they were written in different time periods. Gamboa and Moheno wrote as the events took place, Reyes wrote his memoirs in the 1920s, and García Naranjo penned his autobiography in the 1950s. The differences in context are crucial in understanding the motivations of the authors, as well as the discrepancies and similarities among their narratives. But despite the challenges of interpretation, together these memoirs help to explain why these men and their colleagues opposed the revolution.

**A Brief Overview of Mexican National Politics: 1910-1914**

The primary sources I engage throughout this chapter give different accounts of revolutionary events between 1910 and 1914. It is therefore necessary, for the sake of clarity, to first provide a general overview of the revolution during this period. Francisco I. Madero, who would become known as the “apostle of the revolution,” was a member of the landowning upper-class, educated in France and the University of California at Berkeley. His family (wealthy hacendados in the state of Coahuila)
supported Díaz and looked down on Madero’s idealism and calls for democracy. However, Madero became increasingly popular across Mexico, and he was selected as the presidential candidate of the Partido Antireeleccionista (Anti-Reelection Party). Díaz had Madero imprisoned during the election, but he was freed and then fled to San Antonio, Texas. There, he drafted the Plan of San Luis Potosí, a manifesto that declared Díaz’s reelection to the presidency in 1910 illegitimate. The plan also marked November 20 as the official start of the revolution, and groups across Mexico slowly began to take up arms against the Díaz regime after that date. Madero’s troops (under the command of Francisco “Pancho” Villa and Pascual Orozco) fought the federal army in the north. Meanwhile, Emiliano Zapata led the uprising in the state of Morelos in central Mexico. In April and May 1911, Villa and Orozco won a definitive victory in Ciudad Juárez, and Zapata’s forces drove the federal army from Morelos. As the political and military pressure mounted against the eighty year-old Díaz, he agreed to negotiate with Madero.¹⁴⁶ The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez was signed on May 21; all revolutionaries were granted general amnesty, Díaz and vice-president Corral stepped down, and Minister of Foreign Relations Francisco León de la Barra became the interim president. On May 25, Díaz and his family left Mexico for Paris.

Alan Knight argues that “Maderismo, successful on the battlefield in 1911, failed in the political arena in 1911-1913.”¹⁴⁷ Madero, elected president in November 1911, turned out to be an idealist without the strength of character to pacify Mexico. The general population expected widespread reform, particularly in the agrarian sector, and Madero’s disregard for this issue quickly hurt his credibility. He became increasingly unpopular, and the press mocked his personal “weaknesses” such as his adherence to spiritism, his short stature, and his public displays of emotion that went against traditional notions of machismo.

¹⁴⁶ García Naranjo, 5: 347-359. According to the author, the federal legislature had largely turned against Díaz in early 1911.

Madero also faced problems with the twenty-sixth congressional legislature, which began in September 1912. Though the Maderista Progressive Constitutionalist Party won the majority of the 250 deputy seats, the Catholic Party, the PLM, and the Antireelectionist Party were also represented in the legislature, winning at least thirty seats. Although these deputies were not numerically significant, they symbolized a rejection of Madero’s revolution on a congressional level. Also, deputies Nemesio García Naranjo, José María Lozano, and Francisco M. de Olaguíbel received the nickname “El Triangulo” (The Triangle) because they formed an independent coalition that frequently spoke out against Madero.148 Another deputy named Querido Moheno joined this group in late 1912, and it then became known as the “cuadrilátero luminoso.”149

All four members of the Cuadrilátero were lawyers, but the similarities ended there. García Naranjo was a norteño, part of a powerful military and political family in Nuevo León. He found a passion for journalism, and directed the Mexico City anti-Maderista newspaper La Tribuna. Lozano, a Reyista from Jalisco, was García Naranjo’s “political adversary” when they met in law school in 1903.150 However, in 1909, Lozano became disenchanted with Reyes and formed part of Vice-President Corral’s re-election campaign. He and García Naranjo also became writers for the anti-Reyista newspaper El Debate.151 Olaguíbel, born in Mexico City, was a writer and poet. According to García Naranjo, he was part of a generation of writers who, influenced by French culture, “ennobled and aristocratized Mexican poetry.”152 Moheno, a politician from the state of Chiapas, formed part of the anti-reelection movement against Díaz in 1892, and though his antagonism towards the dictator lessened

148 García Naranjo, 6: 155-156.
149 Querido Moheno, Mi Actuación Política Después de la Decena Trágica (México: Ediciones Botas, 1939), 18.
150 García Naranjo, 6: 197. Lozano was disappointed because Reyes peacefully acquiesced when Porfirio Díaz sent him to Europe on a diplomatic mission (in reality, exiling Reyes).
152 Ibid., 174.
over the years, he was not a Porfirista in 1912. The four men were united, however, by their disillusionment with Madero, and they led the criticism against the president at the parliamentary level.

On the military front, Madero made the mistake of alienating many of his initial supporters, including Zapata, Bernardo and Rodolfo Reyes, and Orozco. In November 1911, Zapata signed the Plan of Ayala, a manifesto that accused Madero of betraying the principles of the revolution by breaking his promise to enact agrarian reform. The plan also denounced Madero for sustaining many of the same government officials and institutions from the Díaz regime, which continued working for the interests of the upper classes. Zapatistas united under this plan and waged war on the Madero administration.

The president also faced opposition on the northern front. In late 1911, Bernardo and Rodolfo Reyes plotted a revolt. Bernardo believed he would be appointed Minister of War; instead, the Madero government forced him to leave Mexico because it feared his popularity. Bernardo and Rodolfo moved to San Antonio, where they conspired against Madero with the help of Francisco Chapa, an adviser for Texas Governor Oscar B. Colquitt. Unfortunately for them, Mexican authorities found out about the plan and arrested Bernardo when he crossed into Mexico in January 1912. Around the same time, Orozco launched his own revolt in the state of Chihuahua. Orozco expected a government position as a reward for his military service, and when Madero failed to follow through, Orozco and his troops turned against the president. After months of fighting, Orozco was defeated by Huerta, Madero’s trusted leader of the federal army.

Huerta continuously expressed his loyalty to the president, but the general may have been conspiring against Madero as early as 1912. Michael C. Meyer refutes this, arguing that Huerta declined an offer by Bernardo Reyes’s agents to take part in the plans for a coup (cuartelazo). However, more recent scholarship by Cristina Urrutia Martínez suggests that Huerta did consider turning against Madero in 1912. Aureliano Urrutia, Huerta’s personal physician and compadre, worked in the Sanatorio

Urrutia, a sanatorium he commissioned in Coyoacán, a town south of Mexico City. Urrutia and Huerta spent a significant amount of time there in 1912, as Huerta recovered from cataract surgery. Urrutia Martínez suggests that Huerta and Urrutia discussed the plans for a coup against Madero and unlike Meyer, she does not consider the rejection of Reyes’s offer as evidence that Huerta was not conspiring on his own.\footnote{\textsuperscript{154}}

These revolts and conspiracies exposed the weakness and unpopularity of the Madero government. Even Félix Díaz attempted to start an uprising in Veracruz in October 1912, albeit unsuccessfully. The general was known for his ineptitude, especially in comparison with his uncle, Porfirio. Despite these negative characteristics, Félix continued to fight against Madero, seeking the presidency for himself. Peter V.N. Henderson argues that Díaz was motivated by ambition and his family name, but his stubbornness made him relentless in the face of defeat.\footnote{\textsuperscript{155}} Díaz was sent to Lecumberri prison, where Bernardo Reyes was also held. Together, they planned the cuartelazo with Rodolfo Reyes, Generals Manuel Mondragón, Gregorio Ruiz, and Manuel Velázquez, and civilians Cecilio Ocón, Luis Liceaga, Miguel Othón de Mendizábal, Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, and Rafael Zayas Enríquez. The coup took place from February 9-18, 1913, and became known as the \textit{Decena Trágica}, or Ten Tragic Days. On the first day of the coup, Félix Díaz and Bernardo Reyes escaped from prison and Reyes was killed in the initial advance against government troops. Madero and Vice-President José María Pino Suárez then moved into the National Palace, and Mexico City experienced bloody combat between the conspirators and the federal army led by Huerta. During these ten days, U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and Huerta joined the conspiracy, even as Huerta continued to “fight the rebels.” Wilson, Huerta, Rodolfo Reyes, Díaz, and their co-conspirators eventually agreed to the “Pacto de la Embajada,” or Pact of the Embassy. It called for Madero and Pino

\footnote{\textsuperscript{154}} Ibid., 87.  
\footnote{\textsuperscript{155}} Peter V.N. Henderson, \textit{Félix Díaz, the Porfirians, and the Mexican Revolution} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981).
Suárez to be overthrown, Huerta to become interim president, and the subsequent transfer of power to Díaz under the guise of legitimate elections.

On February 18, Huerta ordered the arrests of Madero and Pino Suárez, and the two were forced to resign. Pedro Lascuráin, Minister of Foreign Relations, became interim president on February 20, and he named Huerta to the Foreign Relations post, which was next in line to the presidency. Within an hour, Lascuráin resigned, and Huerta became president of Mexico. Meanwhile, Madero and his associates faced a tragic end. Gustavo Madero, Francisco’s brother and one of the intellectual forces behind Maderismo, was brutally tortured and killed under Huerta’s orders. Francisco and Pino Suárez were assassinated on February 22. The deaths of the president and vice-president were intended to look accidental, but it was clear to most people that the murders were planned. However, it is still unclear as to who exactly ordered the executions.

The new regime was initially supported by both Porfíristas and foreign interests, but Huerta faced military pressure from Villa, Zapata, Governor of Coahuila Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles in Sonora. Huerta dealt with this pressure by displaying his capability for brutality against his opponents. Leaders such as Governor of Chihuahua Abraham González and Senator Belisario Domínguez were executed in 1913 at Huerta’s orders, and political assassinations and disappearances became increasingly common. Huerta also carried out another coup in early October 1913. He oversaw a fraudulent presidential election that was nullified because no candidate won the majority vote, dissolved congress, and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of over a hundred members of the legislature.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{156} The first Huerta cabinet consisted of Francisco León de la Barra as Minister of Foreign Relations, Toribio Esquivel Obregón as Minister of Finance, Manuel Mondragón as Minister of War, Alberto Robles Gil as Minister of Development, Alberto García Granados as Minister of the Interior, Rodolfo Reyes as Minister of Justice, Jorge Vera Estañol as Minister of Public Instruction, and David de la Fuente as Minister of Communication.

\textsuperscript{157} Meyer, 152-154. Huerta manipulated the elections, scheduled for October 26, 1913, in various ways. Because he was interim president, he could not legally run for office. Huerta publicly denied the rumors that he would run for president, but he persuaded his supporters to campaign on his behalf anyway in order to give the appearance that the public wanted him to
This contributed to growing concerns about Huerta’s legitimacy in Mexico, where the general became known as “el usurpador,” or “the usurper,” for the manner in which he rose to power. The United States government under President Woodrow Wilson refused to grant the Huerta administration formal recognition, and diplomatic relations deteriorated further in April 1914, when U.S. forces invaded Veracruz. The subsequent peace conference was held in Niagara Falls and mediated by delegates from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Knight suggests that these negotiations were important for the Huerta regime because they presented an opportunity to determine the future of the administration. The members of the cabinet understood that the regime would fall. However, if there was a mediated transfer of power from Huerta to a provisional president, at least it would be a political move rather than a revolutionary overthrow. These negotiations also gave the Huerta regime hope (ultimately unrealized) that it could “co-determine” the political future of Mexico.158

Huerta also faced pressure domestically, as Constitutionalist and Zapatista forces defeated the Federal Army across Mexico. The dictator resigned on July 15, and Minister of Foreign Relations Francisco S. Carvajal became the acting interim president. Carvajal resigned in August, and Carranza (the “First Chief” of the Constitutionals) established a provisional government in Mexico City. Huerta and his cabinet understood that their lives were in danger, and they fled Mexico along with hundreds of others threatened with death for collaborating with Huerta or Porfirio Díaz.

The Porfirista Press Develops Anti-Revolutionary Ideologies

According to Pablo Piccato, by 1880 “more than 20 percent of Mexico City’s population, which totaled approximately a quarter of a million” read newspapers. Because of the popularity of these...
publications, male journalists became the opinion leaders in late nineteenth-century Mexico, particularly in the capital. Piccato suggests that these men did not see news reporting as their top priority; instead, they used the press to negotiate public and personal honor. Newspaper readers witnessed “disputes over public matters [that] were authentic precisely because they involved both common interests and personal reputations, giving each debate greater intensity and deeper meaning.”159 These editors and reporters, whom Piccato calls “combat journalists,” were not always supportive of Díaz. Ireneo Paz, for example, was “briefly incarcerated in the latter years of the Porfirian regime because [La Patria] upset President Díaz and members of his inner circle” (though Paz expressed his respect for Díaz by 1910).160

These journalists used their publications to criticize and/or insult their peers, to use the framework of masculinity and honor to make personal and political statements about society, and to challenge each other to duels. In 1879, Santiago Sierra, brother of Justo Sierra, used his newspaper La Libertad to criticize journalists who exhibited the “feminine defect” of vanity by wasting their energy on petty arguments in the press. When “serious matters [needed] to be addressed,” these vain journalists did so with a “noticeable lack of virile backbone.”161 These comments were directed at Paz, leading to the most famous duel between journalists. After months of dispute between Paz and Sierra, the two met on April 27, 1880. Paz shot and killed his adversary, and this event contributed to the tensions between Paz and the científicos.

Piccato adds that journalists were generally not rich since their businesses rarely generated profits. They were, however, socially wealthy; men such as Gamboa (who began his writing career as a journalist) frequently interacted at restaurants, cafés, and bars, and attended the theatre, and engaged in other cultural activities that enhanced their status. These interactions, both positive and negative, elevated the social position of journalists during the Porfiriato, particularly in the capital. They were

159 Piccato, 71.
160 Ibid., 83.
161 Ibid., 86.
seen as the purveyors of public opinion, men who could be trusted because they were honorable (or vice versa).

When the revolution began in 1910, Porfirista newspapers attempted to use this same rhetoric of honor to attack the rebellion, deal with the fall of the Díaz regime, and criticize the Madero administration. For example, in an editorial entitled “Madero is a Fraud,” El Imparcial called the rebel an

imposter who sought legitimacy through the fraudulent manipulation of literature, oratory, intelligence, bravery…and even revolution…we all know he signs books that he did not write; copies the speeches he shouts; hires scatterbrains who enlarge his mental vacuity; invites danger only to hide from it…since his small sanchopansesque body includes all impotencies and inabilities.162

The newspaper added that Madero, a “ghost, from the darkest limbo of spiritism, surged…to resurrect the era of barbarism,” and his revolt would “never be forgiven” for resorting to violence and sacrificing honorable men as a means of promoting democracy.163

La Patria took a different approach by paying little attention to the revolt in its early phase. Then in January 1911, Paz wrote an analysis of the “uprisings” after realizing that despite their “insignificance” they would not end soon. Paz lamented that after three decades of peace, the Díaz regime now had to deal with “unjustified” acts of violence. According to the editor, Díaz, “beloved, always acclaimed, and always popular,” did not provide any reason for the current “disorders that deeply sadden us.”164 Paz believed that even though the reasons for the rebellion were unclear, the uprisings were not directed at Díaz, and that even the rebels respected the dictator. The author seemingly could not fathom why the revolutionaries would fight against the man he considered one of Mexico’s most respected war heroes.

162 “Madero es un Timo,” El Imparcial, Mar. 1, 1911.
164 “Algunas Consideraciones Relativas á los Levantamientos,” La Patria, Jan. 17, 1911.
La Patria expressed its disdain for revolutionary leaders such as Villa, Orozco, and Zapata, but applauded Madero in early 1911 for fighting for democracy. The newspaper even compared Madero to Jesus Christ the Messiah.\textsuperscript{165} As the months progressed, however, La Patria became increasingly disenchanted with Madero as he became seemingly corrupted by his advisers.\textsuperscript{166} By late 1911, La Patria wrote that the “leader of the revolution, who should be modest, cautious, prudent, and astute” now acted “like a schoolboy…[and] the most trivial politician…throwing tantrums and lashing out against his competitors like a spoiled child.”\textsuperscript{167}

Although El Imparcial and La Patria agreed in calling into question the honor and masculinity of Madero and those involved in the revolution, the two newspapers also reflected the growing rift between científicos (represented by El Imparcial) and the urban professional Porfiristas (represented by La Patria). In one piece, La Patria condemned El Imparcial for referring to the rebels as bandits and murderers who only sought loot. La Patria made it clear that it did not justify the revolutionary activity, but the rebels were Mexican and still members of the national family. Therefore, “out of respect for our leaders, who are making efforts and sacrifices in order to restore peace, and also out of respect for our country,” La Patria would not “consent” to El Imparcial’s harsh words against their compatriots. La Patria also pointed out that Díaz and other national heroes were at one time considered rebels for acting against the government. This critique demonstrates two different reactions to the revolution. El Imparcial completely detached itself from the revolutionaries, stating that “on the northern border there has always been an abundance of people of the worst kind, smugglers who are used to a life of risks…and delinquents who dodge law enforcement and justice by crossing the border.” La Patria, on

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., “Ecco Homo,” Jun. 7, 1911.

\textsuperscript{166} “El Señor Madero Sigue los Mismos Pasos del General Díaz,” La Patria, Sep. 1, 1911.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., “Geringa Distinta con el Mismo Palo,” Sep. 11. 1911.
the other hand, reinforced the idea of Mexican nationalism and the need for all Mexicans to work for peace, not “add fuel to the fire” as *El Imparcial* did by insulting a large sector of the population.¹⁶⁸

*La Patria* became increasingly aggressive toward *El Imparcial* when the científicos fled Mexico after Díaz’s resignation on May 25, 1911. Journalist Manuel J. Hernáiz criticized the científicos (whom he referred to as mice) for taking advantage of Mexico while they were in power and for cowardly running away and showing little empathy for the “rivers of Mexican blood” flowing across the nation. He added that the “fallen hyena...in its imposing spite” wanted to “poison [the nation] with its fetid and disgusting slobber.” The only way to restore peace and stability in Mexico was to “immediately expel every last Científico mouse from the country.”¹⁶⁹

That same day, *La Patria* published a much more radical attack on the científicos entitled “The Gallows for the Científico-Traitor League.” In this piece, the author referred to the “Científico-Jew League,” a “sinister association” whose victims included Díaz, Corral, and even Madero. The author seemed to believe that this organization controlled Mexican politics (and even Díaz). He even accused this league of an unsuccessful attempt to use bribery to convince the rebel leaders in Ciudad Juárez to betray Madero. Since these plans failed, this group now wanted to assassinate Madero.¹⁷⁰ The Jewish allies of the científicos (the *liga judía*) had “suffered a large series of defeats in the last year...its vile medium, *El Imparcial*, has come close to dissolving itself...yet they persist in larceny and assassinations...they conserve their jars of poison, their newspapers full of lies, their expensive suits, and their collections of daggers.” The author classified the Madero government as naïve for being merciful to the traitors, adding that the leaders of these leagues “needed to die.”¹⁷¹ These anti-Semitic

---


¹⁷⁰ Ibíd., “Horca para la Liga Científico-Traidora.”

¹⁷¹ Ibíd., “Una Bellisima Horca.”
accusations were certainly outlandish, but they reflected the resentment and hatred against the científicos.

*El Imparcial,* on the other hand, turned its attention to the Mexican population, holding the public accountable for the present state of the nation. The newspaper questioned why Mexicans were suddenly opposed to Díaz, after supporting him and his policies for decades. One editorial stated that “nobody with their heart in the right place [could] accuse the President of the Republic of any errors he committed, since the majority of Mexicans accompanied him in those errors and even induced him to commit them.” The author witnessed “a scene of ingratitude” as people who proclaimed their loyalty to Díaz (usually in exchange for a job or government post) now spoke out against the dictator in order to “save themselves from any potential danger.”

Porfiristas struggled with the collapse of the Díaz regime and they remained indignant, blaming everyone but themselves for the dictator’s fall. During the De la Barra and Madero presidencies, *El Imparcial* and *La Patria* voiced the sentiments of conflicting factions of Porfiristas, and they continued to comment on national politics and the honor (or lack thereof) of the nation’s leaders. Despite the differences among Porfiristas, they agreed on the need for an authoritarian leader to restore order and peace in Mexico. In 1913 they found two possible alternatives to Don Porfirio—Victoriano Huerta and Félix Díaz. *El Imparcial* and *La Patria* took on the task of supporting one (or both) of these men in an effort to counteract the revolution.

**Media and the Formation of Counter-Revolutionary Heroes: Victoriano Huerta**

When Victoriano Huerta assumed the presidency in February 1913, he received the support of the majority of state governors and was formally recognized by foreign nations across the globe. Scholars including Cristina Urrutía Martínez, Mario Ramírez Rancaño, and Alan Knight argue that this

---

172 “¡Ahí Duele, Precisamente!” *El Imparcial,* May 13, 1911.
demonstrated widespread approval of the general by the upper classes. Huerta’s close friend Nemesio García Naranjo pointed out that Porfirio Díaz, Bernardo Reyes, and Francisco I. Madero had all at some point placed their trust in General Huerta. However, by July 1914, Huerta resigned from the presidency in disgrace, and all who had participated in his dictatorship were cast as the villains of the revolution, unpatriotic murderers, traitors, and monsters. Huerta became known as “the usurper,” and his opponents (including the U.S. government) appropriated this image and made Huerta the “common enemy” and primary threat against Mexico in 1914. Mexico’s leaders, particularly Carranza, decided that the villains of the Huerta regime needed to be purged from the nation, through execution or exile.

The image of the treacherous Huerta dictatorship remains pervasive in Mexican popular memory and the scholarship on the revolution. The members of the regime were fully aware of the negative views of them even before their exile, and they spent the rest of their lives attempting to rectify what they perceived as an unfair characterization. Their memoirs served this purpose in retrospect (none were published until the 1920s), but in the midst of the political chaos of 1913 and 1914, news media were the primary instruments through which the Huerta regime constructed and negotiated its position in revolutionary Mexico. *El Imparcial* and *La Patria* supported Huerta and praised him throughout his administration (and most importantly, during the U.S. intervention) for being a patriot serving the nation’s best interests. These media also created an idealized image of the dictator and used it to justify Huerta’s actions.

The two Porfirista newspapers embodied different visions for Mexico. *El Imparcial* continued to be widely regarded as a remnant of cientificuismo. *La Patria* represented a segment of Porfiritas who, while they never wavered in their support of Don Porfirio, believed in progress and democracy and understood that the científicos represented political and cultural stagnation. Perhaps the principal commonality between the two was a disdain for the revolution. Both newspapers criticized Madero and other revolutionary leaders for creating an unnecessary civil war. While Zapata, Villa, and Carranza
fought for specific political and social reforms, those who opposed the revolution wanted a restoration of peace and stability, even at the expense of living under an authoritarian government. Porfirista media expressed nostalgia for the era of prosperity under Porfirio Díaz. Knight argues that the sectors of the population who benefitted the most during the Porfiriato welcomed the coup against Madero. He adds that for most Porfiristas, Huerta was the ideal choice for president because the other viable option (Bernardo Reyes) was dead, and Félix Díaz could not even launch a successful rebellion on his own. According to Knight, Huerta “pandered to the hopes of those many Mexicans – and foreigners – who believed that a ‘strong man’, a new Díaz, could restore peace through authoritarian means.”

Huerta relieved Porfirista nostalgia by promising a return to better times.

After the Decena Trágica, El Imparcial published an article entitled “Pro-Patria!,” which called upon Mexicans to fight their passions and lack of obedience and discipline, “those germs of disunion that have separated us.” The following week, it expressed its support for the interim government set up through the Pact of the Embassy, and encouraged the new administration to work for peace and stability regardless of any opponents who sought to sacrifice the nation for their own personal interests. La Patria was clearer about its sentiments after the Decena Trágica. On February 24, 1913, an editorial entitled “Problem Solved” reflected a sense of relief after the assassinations of Madero and Pino Suárez. The author stated that as long as the two men lived (in exile or otherwise) they would be a “nuisance, a threat, and a difficulty for the pacific organization of the new government” because they would never fully accept defeat. Their deaths were unfortunate, but necessary in order to end the chaos of the Madero administration and prevent more deaths through continued civil war. The author ended

173 Knight, *Counter-revolution and Reconstruction*, 1.
174 “¡Pro-Patria!,” *El Imparcial*, Feb. 26, 1913.
175 Ibid., “Labor de Todos,” Mar. 6, 1913.
by expressing his hope that “no more Mexican blood be shed.”¹⁷⁶ These media considered that the ends justified the means, and that the new government would finally end the revolution. Thus, the rebels involved in the cuartelazo were Mexico’s true heroes and patriots, while Zapatistas and the revolutionary factions in the north remained “bandits and criminals” who continuously threatened the well-being of the nation.¹⁷⁷

Both newspapers also accepted Huerta’s ascent to the presidency as constitutionally legitimate. Throughout 1913, they continually emphasized Huerta’s good intentions to step down after the presidential race in October, for which he was ineligible because he was the interim president. According to El Imparcial, Huerta declared that he had met with each candidate for the October presidential elections, including Díaz, and they all agreed to peacefully acquiesce to the election results, whatever they might be.¹⁷⁸ But when on election day no candidate won the majority of the popular votes—which according to the constitution, nullified the election—the Huerta government declared that it would schedule new elections. According to El Imparcial, the dictator “nobly and persuasively…with sincerity and loftiness” demonstrated an “elevated concept of civility, and plausible reverence for the law.” Of course, the presidential elections were never rescheduled.

By November, Huerta had dissolved congress and begun ruling as a dictator. El Imparcial stated that most people believed that Huerta was the only man who “[possessed] enough grandeur of spirit, necessary splendor and prestige, and sufficient force of character” to restore peace.¹⁷⁹ The newspaper admitted that he was what Mexico needed at the moment, “an energetic man…of indomitable character,


¹⁷⁸ “Solo el Actual Gobierno Puede Cumplir con el Sagrado Deber de Consultar Nuevamente la Voluntad Nacional y Consagrar Así, Por el Sufragio al Mandatario que Definitivamente Haya de Regir los Destinos del País,” El Imparcial, Nov. 9, 1913.

an iron fist, and of frank and quick resolve.” It seemed that Huerta was taking a position similar to that of Porfirio Díaz, that once he established peace, the nation could then move towards more progressive politics.\(^{180}\)

On November 20, *El Imparcial* published Huerta’s explanation for dissolving the twenty-sixth legislature. He spoke of the three branches of government and the need to maintain equilibrium between them. When one branch disrupts this equilibrium, “disturbing the workings of the constitution, [and] putting the life of the political State in danger,” the other branches must act to restore balance within the government. The dictator called the twenty-sixth legislature an unpatriotic entity with ties to the rebellious factions in northern Mexico. This congress was attempting to “strangle” the executive and judicial branches in order to give power to the northern rebels. Huerta argued that he did not disrupt the “constitutional order” by dissolving the legislature; on the contrary, his patriotic actions prevented a state of anarchy.\(^{181}\) This article exemplified the ways in which Huerta manipulated the media to emphasize his adherence to the Constitution of 1857 and promise to restore peace, thus pandering to Porfirista identity.

Porfirista media overlooked the brutality of the regime. On December 23, *El Imparcial* published an image of the dictator, and the caption read, “We ask God to conserve this great man, to whom the hopes of the Nation are linked. We present these lines, assured that we express the sentiments of all good patriots, who have the conviction that only the current President of the Republic can, due to his grandness of spirit and heart, and to his effectiveness of prestige and strength, save the country, and restore order and prosperity.”\(^{182}\)

\(^{180}\) “La Fórmula Huerta-Blanquet,” *La Patria*, Nov. 4, 1913.

\(^{181}\) “El Primer Magistrado de la Nación Explica al Nuevo Congreso las Causas Verdaderamente Patrióticas que Determinaron la Disolución de la Legislatura Precedente,” *El Imparcial*, Nov. 20, 1913.

\(^{182}\) Ibid., Dec. 23, 1913.
As diplomatic relations with the United States deteriorated in 1914, *El Imparcial* and *La Patria* went to Huerta’s defense and urged Mexicans to unite in support of their president. On April 22, after the U.S. military occupation of Veracruz, *El Imparcial* published an illustration of the dictator standing before the national symbol of the eagle and the serpent. Huerta stood with one arm raised and a banner with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe in the other. At his feet was a woman, seemingly imploring his help. Huerta’s stance in this drawing was reminiscent of popular images of Father Miguel Hidalgo going into battle while carrying an image of the *Guadalupe*. The illustration also reminded readers of the religious devotion expressed by Huerta, who was Catholic.\(^{183}\)

From April until July, both newspapers carefully chronicled the details of the confrontation against U.S. forces and the subsequent negotiations in Niagara Falls. They drew upon nationalist and patriotic sentiments, and never wavered in their support of the dictator. However, the writing was on the wall for the Huerta regime. On July 15, *El Imparcial* published an extra edition which announced Huerta’s resignation. Two weeks later, Salvador Díaz Mirón, director of *El Imparcial*, also resigned.\(^{184}\) Carrancista Félix F. Palavicini took control of the newspaper on August 13, and he replaced the staff and changed the tone of the publication in favor of Carranza.

As Carranza entered Mexico City on August 14, 1914, *El Imparcial* likened it to Juárez’s triumphant entry into the capital after the defeat of Maximilian’s forces in 1867. *El Imparcial* celebrated Carranza as “another Juárez” who was carrying on the principles of the 1910 revolution launched by the “apostle” Madero.\(^{185}\) However, *El Imparcial* lasted only three more days. On August 17, the article entitled “R.I.P.” signaled the end of the publication. The author stated that “the

\(^{183}\) Ibid., Apr. 22, 1914.

\(^{184}\) “Cria Cuervos,” *El Imparcial*, Jul. 31, 1914. Díaz Mirón went into exile in Spain and then Havana. Rafael Reyes Spindola, the previous director of *El Imparcial*, also went into exile in Havana. Both men retired from journalism. Paz also retired, but remained in Mexico, while his son Octavio Paz Solórzano moved to Los Angeles in 1915 to promote the Zapatista cause in the United States.

Revolution, strong and implacable like the sword of Justice” had finally taken control of the government, and it was time to eradicate all vestiges of the old regime, including *El Imparcial*, which its new staff would “bury…with [their] own hands, in the pantheon of journalistic history.” He added that “the death of *El Imparcial* would serve as a great lesson for all…conservatives and reactionaries, for all creators of obstacles…that the intentions of the constitutionalists to heal Mexico’s Public Administration would not be deterred by any obstacle.” With this message, the largest-selling newspaper of the Díaz and Huerta administrations was killed by the new Carranza regime. Nine days later on August 26, the Carranza regime would also shut down *La Patria*. The public expression of pro-Díaz or Pro-Huerta sentiments was effectively silenced.

**Media and the Formation of Counter-Revolutionary Heroes: Félix Díaz**

Knight argues that the Huerta regime was wholly counter-revolutionary, but he downplays the symbolic importance of Félix Díaz during this period. Information from Oaxaca complicates Knight’s assessment by revealing that Díaz was more popular in his native state. His followers believed he would come closest to restoring the glory of the Porfiriato. More importantly, Félix catered to a sense of nostalgia for his uncle Porfirio and Benito Juárez, who were the primary symbols of Oaxacan regional and national identity.

Díaz supporters belonged to various classes. According to *La Patria*, a delegation from the state of Oaxaca traveled to Mexico City on March 17, 1913, to congratulate Félix Díaz for his triumph in the coup against Madero. This group consisted of a commission “representing industry and commerce” in Oaxaca.187

---


Furthermore, according to Patrick J. McNamara, the Zapotec community in Ixtlán supported Félix as early as 1902, believing he was a better alternative for governor than the científico incumbent Emilio Pimentel. The indigenous community and more radical liberals believed that Pimentel embodied the stagnant, elitist científico policies. Worst of all, Pimentel and the científicos were perceived as traitors to the memory of Benito Juárez, the authentic liberal and champion of liberty and democracy.\(^{188}\)

On the other hand, Félix was a member of the Díaz family. McNamara states that “Félix Díaz’s father had led many of [the Zapotecs] in battle against the French. They assumed that the son of this illustrious general would maintain the bonds of patriarchal reciprocity.”\(^{189}\) The Zapotecs believed that Félix would serve their interests, unlike the científicos.

In Oaxaca, the images of Juárez and Porfirio Díaz were appropriated in contradictory ways. Porfirio Díaz commemorated the centennial of Juárez’s birth in 1906 with a lavish ceremony, and he positioned himself as the legitimate descendant of Juárez, despite having rebelled against him in 1871.\(^{190}\) The dictator’s opponents in Oaxaca, including the Flores Magón brothers, formed liberal clubs such as the Asociación Juárez, and they pointed out the failure of the Díaz regime in fulfilling the promises of the 1857 Constitution. However, as McNamara points out, attacks against the científicos did not necessarily equate to attacks against the dictator. Díaz was considered a paternalistic figure among the poor classes, and they often believed the dictator and his family would protect them. As the Zapotecs worked to convince Don Porfirio to back his nephew instead of Pimentel, they wrote a letter to the dictator signed by “the Félixistas and the Serranos,” demonstrating organized support for Félix.\(^{191}\) The

---


\(^{189}\) Ibid., 170.


\(^{191}\) McNamara, 173.
Felicistas addressed the dictator as an equal in an effort to remind him of his humble origins. More importantly, they asserted their position as legitimate political actors. However, the dictator backed Pimentel in 1906 and again in 1910, when Pimentel defeated Benito Juárez Maza (son of President Juárez).

McNamara and Francie Chassen de López point out that despite Porfirio Díaz’s inconsistencies in the latter part of his regime, “Oaxacans’ first loyalties were to Juárez and Díaz.” This also ensured the popularity of family members, and helps to explain why the Zapotec community supported Félix for governor in 1906 and Juárez Maza in 1910. When Juárez Maza passed away in 1912, Félix became the symbolic purveyor of the legacies of Júarez and Porfirio. During the revolution, many Oaxacans maintained a fierce loyalty to Félix. In July 1914, Felicista Guillermo Meixueiro launched the Plan de la Sierra, which denounced “tax increases…the graft [and] political murders.” This Felicista rebellion succeeded in gaining control over state politics despite Carrancista efforts against them.

Like his uncle, Félix embodied the complexities of memory and myth in Mexico. He represented not only a return to Porfirismo, but a symbolic return to Juarismo, especially for his Oaxacan supporters. Moreover, Félix appealed to the anti-científico faction comprised of a younger generation of political hopefuls frustrated because of Porfirio’s insistence on keeping the científicos in power. According to Henderson, these anti-científicos were usually liberals who believed that the científicos “defiled the sacred tenets of nineteenth-century liberalism.” For them, Félix represented a move away from the stagnation of the late Porfiriato and a return to its liberal, Juarista roots. Anti-científicos seemingly forgot about the historic conflicts between Porfiristas, Juaristas, and Felicistas (as

192 Chassen de López, 507.
193 Knight, Counter-revolution and Reconstruction, 240.
194 Henderson, Félix Díaz, 19.
even Don Porfirio chose to do when he commemorated Juárez’s birthday), demonstrating one way in which these figures were reconstructed to fit certain ideals and political agendas.

Félix was aware of what and who he represented, and he did not hesitate to use this in his favor. As a presidential candidate in April 1913, he relied on liberal rhetoric to appeal to his supporters. In a speech delivered to the Felicista National Party (Partido Nacional Felicista), Díaz stated that he “could not accept the radicalisms that transformed liberal theory,” and that he planned to restore liberty, the essence of liberalism and the Constitution of 1857. His goals were broad and included the restoration of peace, increasing the effectiveness of the justice system, enhancing the public education system, especially in rural areas, and having accountability between the nation’s leaders and the public. Díaz did address the problem of agrarian reform, stating that he and Huerta were in the process of developing a Ministry of Agriculture. He also called for freedom of religion, in a politically conciliatory move similar to the one made by his uncle.195

La Patria closely followed the elections, and it showed excitement for the democratic process, unlike El Imparcial.196 During October 1913, La Patria analyzed each of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The newspaper criticized the Catholic Party (which Paz opposed) for backing the liberal duo Gamboa and General Eugenio Rascón, suggesting that the party was taking advantage of these “two honorable, intelligent, and patriotic Mexicans” in an effort to gain the sympathy of liberals.197 Next, La Patria examined Manuel Calero and Jesús Flores Magón, the candidates for the Mexican Liberal Party. The newspaper stated that Calero and Flores Magón were good candidates because of their pure liberalism.198 However, La Patria placed its full support behind Díaz and his running mate

José Luis Resquena. The newspaper described Díaz as the ideal president, “a prudent, reflective man, justified in his actions and capable in his determinations.”

Díaz’s actions immediately following the nullified elections alienated many of his followers, including Paz. Henderson states that Díaz mistakenly believed that Huerta had ordered his assassination in late October. Consequently, he asked for protection from William Canada and John Lind at the American Consulate, and Díaz fled Mexico with Cecilio Ocón (who was complicit in Madero’s assassination) and José Bonales Sandoval aboard an American vessel. Díaz “guaranteed American authorities that he would not engage in political activity while in protective custody” in return for safe passage to Cuba.199 *El Imparcial* mocked Díaz, pointing out that he was so inexplicably frightened and in a rush to leave the country that he did not even pay the bill at the Hotel Alemán where he stayed.200 *La Patria* was more damning, proclaiming that Díaz “would never be forgiven” for collaborating with U.S. authorities, especially Lind, and for fleeing Mexico like a coward aboard an American ship. The newspaper added that Díaz proved all of his critics correct.201 From that point forward, *La Patria* supported Huerta, which is what many Felicistas did after Díaz’s self-imposed exile.

During the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, *La Patria* followed a similar trajectory as *El Imparcial*, but the two newspapers differed after Huerta’s resignation. *La Patria* was initially skeptical of Carranza, but throughout July and August 1914, it quickly accepted the new Constitutionalist regime. On August 17, the newspaper expressed that it was founded in 1877 “to sustain…the liberal creed supported in the Constitution” and advanced by Juárez. The new *La Patria* would support Carranza, “who valiantly threw a glove at militarism, and raised the banner that should be the most appealing for young patriots: that of the Constitution, and who…knew how to defeat the formidable usurper’s power,


201 “El Caso Félix Díaz,” *La Patria*, Oct. 31, 1913

86
a victory which must be applauded by those of us in the liberal community.”

Considering the Huerta regime’s hatred of Carranza, especially after its exile, it might seem odd that Paz, a Huerta supporter and opponent of the revolution, would suddenly (and gladly) accept the Constitutionalists. Supporting the winner might benefit Paz and his business, but he justified his adherence to Carranza by drawing upon his liberal ideology.

Paz denounced anyone who threatened the Constitution of 1857, order, and peace, for which Juárez, Porfirio Díaz and the liberals valiantly fought. He understood the realities of the civil war, and had backed the Huerta regime since he perceived the dictator as the only man who could restore order. But his disappointment in Mexican politics was evident, especially after Félix Díaz’s debacle in October 1913. Carranza seemed to have the qualities Paz admired; he was a strongman who courageously upheld the constitution. More importantly, now that a revolutionary government was in place, the various factions across Mexico would have no excuse to continue fighting a civil war. In its final issue, La Patria challenged the Carranza government to prove itself capable of acting in Mexico’s best interests. Despite its positive reactions to the new regime, Paz’s newspaper suffered the same fate as El Imparcial. La Patria abruptly ended its circulation on August 26, when Carrancista General Pablo González ordered the closing of the newspaper’s offices. Another Porfírista medium was silenced by the Constitutionalist regime.

The revolutionaries claimed Juárez for themselves, casting Félix Díaz, Huerta, and all of their supporters as traitors to the ideals of liberty set forth by Juárez and then Madero (not Porfirio Díaz). In terms of Mexican national and political identity, Juárez had become an instrument for hegemony. The various factions would continue to proclaim their adherence to Juarista principles in order to gain legitimacy, especially when the Carranza government decided to draft a new constitution. Members of


the now exiled Huerta regime united against Carranza in defense of their vision for Mexico, but as the
decade progressed and the exiles faced military and political defeats, they were forced to confront their
position as Mexico’s vilified “old guard.”

Loyalty, Honor, and Patriotism in the Exile Memoirs

From the end of the Madero administration beginning in late 1912, to the resignation of
Victoriano Huerta in July 1914, massacres, assassinations, a military coup, an oppressive dictatorship,
and U.S. military intervention shaped politics in Mexico City. Many of the political actors of this period
wrote memoirs in which they discussed their actions and decisions during this time, and all of these men
defended themselves by proclaiming their love and concern for the homeland. Like El Imparcial and La
Patria, the memoirs account for different anti-revolutionary ideologies among Porfiristas. However, the
newspapers expressed opposition to the revolution and support for Huerta and Félix Díaz in a public
forum, constructing heroes and symbols of Mexican masculinity and patriotism for public consumption.
The memoirs, on the other hand, revealed the public and private struggles among the members of the
Huerta regime. The authors had much at stake personally, and they used their memoirs to defend their
personal honor and that of their family and close friends. Though they all shared disdain for the
revolution, they differed significantly on their reasons for participating in the Huerta administration.
Nevertheless, the authors argued that they always acted for the benefit of the patria, regardless of the
moral and ethical implications, and they relied on loyalty, honor, and patriotism as rhetorical tools to
justify their actions between February 1913 and July 1914.

John Kleinig argues that loyalty is the basis for patriotism, and loyalty to the patria is “morally
legitimate.” The scholar defines loyalty as a “virtue…of our relationships and associations.” It is
generally a “default” virtue and an “executive” virtue which “helps us do what we ought, or want, to
do.” The patria is a “political, rather than merely geographical entity,” making loyalty to the homeland
a political act.\textsuperscript{204} Moreover, patriotism is an expression of self. According to Kleinig, “\textit{patriae provide the conditions for our flourishing [and] that for many of us, our individual \textit{patria} is partially constitutive of our flourishing.”\textsuperscript{205} When a patria (which could be a nation) becomes a part of a person’s being, she/he develops a loyalty which requires certain obligations, which “depend on the merits and demerits of the country and polity, on the one hand, and on the character, plans and aspirations, and circumstances of the patriot, on the other.” A person could potentially express patriotism through what some might consider questionable means, but be morally justified if this was done on the basis of personal loyalty. Kleinig considers this problem and clarifies that patriotic duties may also “be overridden by another moral consideration.”\textsuperscript{206}

Aleksandar Pavković further examines the relationship between morality and a patriot’s desire to kill for his/her country, suggesting that for a patriot, a “conception of justice” exists “that is tacitly incorporated in the patriotic conception of one’s \textit{patria}…a \textit{patria should} be ruled only by patriots: any other political arrangement is unjust…[and] rectification of an injustice is a morally right act.” Some patriots also have a sense of “radical altruism…[a] readiness to sacrifice their lives in the liberation of their country.”\textsuperscript{207} However, Pavković notes that there are instances in which willingness to kill for the \textit{patria} is not considered morally acceptable. If a patriot is part of a force invading another country, for example, this radical altruism “does not appear [to be]…a universal moral value or morally praiseworthy quality,” because there is no rectification involved.\textsuperscript{208} The memoirs of middle class Porfiristas show that the members of the Huerta regime were constantly negotiating patriotism and morality. These texts


\textsuperscript{205} John Kleinig, “Patriotic Loyalty,” in \textit{Patriotism: Philosophical and Political Perspectives}, 47.

\textsuperscript{206} Primoratz and Pavković, xiv.


\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 234.
provided a space for the men to sort through these issues while depicting themselves as honorable, moral, always patriotic, and justified in their actions as a result.

The memoirs offer a variety of personal and chronological perspectives that complicate the narrative of this period. Gamboa kept a diary beginning in 1892, and he published it every few years. This text is important because it chronicled the author’s reactions as the revolution began and then spread across Mexico. It also provides an outsider perspective, since Gamboa worked as a diplomat in Belgium from 1910 until August 1913, when he accepted an invitation from Huerta to join his cabinet as Minister of Foreign Relations. However, the diary offers no evidence about Gamboa’s time in the Huerta administration. According to his son Miguel, the diary manuscripts from August 1913 to April 1914 disappeared, and there is no way of verifying what happened to these texts. Perhaps it is no coincidence that what is not missing is a brief discussion of Gamboa’s thoughts about Huerta as he debated whether or not to accept the cabinet position. Gamboa disliked Huerta and “condemned” the way he came to power. Nevertheless, he accepted, basing this act on a “devotion to Mexico, desire to contribute to its relief, a great sense of vanity over being offered a high position…[and] jubilation for returning [to Mexico].” Gamboa was patriotic but not naïve, and he understood what type of regime he would be participating in; he entrusted himself to “the will of God,” adding that “if [God] takes me to that hell, only He knows why, and He will provide, as He always has.”

Moheno wrote Mi Actuación Política Después de la Decena Trágica in mid-1914. His narrative began as he went into hiding during the Decena Trágica and ended as he went into exile. The author wrote his memoirs as soon as he resigned from Huerta’s cabinet in order to set the record straight about his involvement in the regime. Because the section from this time period is missing from Gamboa’s diary, Moheno’s account is the closest to chronicling the events as they took place. Furthermore, this

210 Gamboa, 6: 110.
memoir provides a sense of the chaos of the late Huerta period, since Moheno compiled this text as he and his colleagues fled Mexico.

The author clarified the misconception that the members of the Huerta regime joined because of personal connections with the general or because they supported him. For example, the author explained that when Huerta invited the Cuadrilátero to join his cabinet, the four men had to decide between an alliance with Huerta or Díaz. García Naranjo corroborated this story. None of the members of the Cuadrilátero knew Huerta well (García Naranjo had only briefly encountered him once), but they believed that Mexico would be worse off with Díaz. Moreover, García Naranjo could not support Díaz because of his ties to Reyes. Olaguíbel disliked both Huerta and Díaz, but Lozano and Moheno told him that he could not “vacillate, because vacillation was equivalent to suicide.” Hence, the group accepted Huerta’s invitation. Like Gamboa, these four men did not support Huerta, but they nevertheless accepted to join the regime in spite of the risks. Moheno justified his actions as patriotic, but he also accepted a level of agency and did not claim to act on behalf of anyone else.

Rodolfo Reyes, on the other hand, expressed his lack of agency throughout his memoirs, which he wrote when he lived in exile in Madrid in the 1920s. The first volume of memoirs served to tell the story of Bernardo. The father/son relationship is an important theme throughout the text, and Rodolfo wrote as a son who completely venerated his father. When he discussed Bernardo’s conspiracies against Madero, Rodolfo characterized the general as a patriot whose actions were completely motivated by his love for Mexico and his belief that Madero was an inadequate leader. The second volume began immediately after Bernardo’s death during the Decena Trágica, and traced Rodolfo’s experience in the Huerta regime. Rodolfo presented himself as a patriot like his father, and claimed loyalty to his father and then to Félix Díaz as a justification for all of his decisions. However, Rodolfo did not consider this

211 Moheno, 18-19.
212 García Naranjo, 7: 50.
as having agency. On the contrary, he described how he constantly denied himself in order to carry out his father’s plans and then to support Díaz. These contradictions complicate Rodolfo’s story and call into question his honesty. Nevertheless, Rodolfo’s perspective is valid because it demonstrates his attempts to use memory to repair his and Bernardo’s reputations. It also reveals one way in which Rodolfo projected his masculinity. He was not a general like his father, nor had he achieved (former Minister of War) Bernardo’s political status. Yet Rodolfo could attempt to defend his father’s legacy and thus bring honor to their family.

García Naranjo was the last to share his experiences, writing his autobiography beginning in 1951. Like his peers, he also wanted to share his perceptions of the Huerta regime. However, García Naranjo’s text was different because the author now had forty years of hindsight; he was older, admittedly less “belligerent,” and not as angry about the revolution as he had been in the 1910s. García Naranjo was also unapologetic about his friendship with Huerta. He had never denied this bond, but writing about Huerta in the 1950s had different political ramifications. Gamboa, Moheno, and Reyes wrote their memoirs when they still had much at stake personally and politically, and they wrote to defend themselves against the Mexican government that labeled them as traitors. García Naranjo made peace with the government under Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s, and he was given the right to freely express himself. By the 1950s, his project was more about setting the historical record straight than defending himself. His recollections about this period were often broader commentaries on how the official history unfairly treated the Huerta regime.

Patriotism serves as the overarching theme within all of these memoirs, but the authors often presented their accounts in contradictory ways. This section will focus on four historical moments—the cuartelazo, the struggle for power between Huerta and the Felicistas, Huerta’s dissolution of Congress, and U.S. occupation of Veracruz. I will examine ways in which the Huerta regime remembered these

213 Ibid., 1: 92.
events and how they used the rhetoric of patriotism to prove that opposing the revolution did not diminish their patriotism.

Rodolfo Reyes wrote that his father fell into a deep state of depression when he was imprisoned in 1912. Bernardo would say “I want to leave [prison] and fight”; this was his only phrase and his obsession.” Bernardo’s patriotism was paradoxical. This obsessive need to fight for his country (likely motivated by a desire to become president) led him to violent measures in his efforts to restore order and stability in Mexico. Rodolfo, the loyal son, stated that after exhausting all legal options, he saw the “terrible convulsion” of the cuartelazo as the only way to free his father from prison. Rodolfo declined to explain his role in planning the cuartelazo, despite being one of the primary conspirators. He wrote that he was a “simple channel and cooperator” (though he balanced at least eight different plans simultaneously), and that he was only a go-between between the military men and the civilian conspirators. Rodolfo also wrote that he and Bernardo accepted the possibility that this coup could cost them their lives. These details are contradictory because Rodolfo described himself as both an insignificant go-between and willing martyr. Also, these assertions, written in retrospect, downplayed the embarrassment of Bernardo’s failed attempt to storm the National Palace by suggesting that the general wanted to die for Mexico.

The cuartelazo was set for the early hours of Sunday, February 9. Bernardo asked his son to write down his plans for Mexico on the night of February 8, “categorically declaring that the movement was not a reaction, but went against the personal orientation of the Government.” A committee would be “in charge of the Executive Power in order to call together an Assembly of all of the revolutionary elements and leaders who would then organize a provisional Government.” Furthermore, “the lives of the deposed functionaries were guaranteed, all disorder would be repressed, and [Bernardo] would fulfill

214 Ibid., 201.

215 Ibid., 198. The conspirators also included Generals Manuel Mondragón, Manuel Velázquez, and Gregorio Ruiz, and civilians Cecilio Ocón, Luis Liceaga, Miguel Othón de Mendizábal, and Rafael Zayas Enríquez.
some of the serious promises of the revolution of 1910.” The plan also stated that none of the members of the committee could act as provisional president.

The existence of this written plan is questionable—Rodolfo claimed he could not gain access to the one existing copy. In retrospect, Rodolfo made sure to emphasize that the cuartelazo was not a counter-revolution or a reaction. He also made no mention of any personal resentment his father may have had against Madero, which might explain why Bernardo rebelled against him and not Porfirio Díaz (who sent him into exile), as well as the possible influence of personal grudges on anti-revolutionary ideology. Throughout his memoirs, Rodolfo exalted his father and all of his actions: Bernardo sought glory by fighting against Madero, and Rodolfo sought his father’s glory within the historical memory. Thus, Rodolfo constructed a narrative in which both men believed that Madero betrayed the ideals of the revolution, and it was their duty to bring the revolution to fruition. They knew their conspiracy was illegal, but their patriotism would not allow them to desist in their efforts. In essence, they were more revolutionary than the revolutionary regime, and though the cuartelazo would be violent, it would benefit the nation in the long-run. As Rodolfo described the storming of the National Palace on February 9, he told the story of father and son riding side-by-side into battle. Bernardo was killed almost immediately by Madero’s forces. He and Rodolfo fell off their horses, and the general died in his son’s arms.

The nation’s capital fell into a state of chaos and constant bombardment, businesses and communication lines shut down, and residents hid in their homes or fled the city in fear. García Naranjo and Moheno explained that the members of the Cuadrilátero were forced into hiding because they were

---

216 Rodolfo Reyes, De Mi Vida, Memorias Políticas, 2 vols. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929) 1: 216-217. Rodolfo stated that his father asked him to write the document, and he did so in the house of Rafael de Zayas, Jr. Supposedly, the original document was lost during the cuartelazo, and the copy was kept by Rafael de Zayas, Sr., who refused to return it to the Reyes family. There is no such document in the Marius de Zayas papers, which contain personal records and letters belonging to Rafael de Zayas, Jr.

217 Ibid., 239.
considered complicit in the coup, but in reality they took no part in the cuartelazo. García Naranjo recounted how he published an editorial in *La Tribuna* on February 8 in which he satirized the various rumors about Madero’s impending overthrow. Because an actual coup began the following morning, readers assumed that García Naranjo was involved in the cuartelazo. The deputy denied this in retrospect, arguing that “one did not need to be a prophet to know that the government was in agony.”

On February 8, as a result of this editorial, General Samuel García Cuéllar called him, asking if it was true that “a fire would be lit” that night. García Naranjo responded by saying he did not know.

Later that night, Lozano mentioned that several deputies also assumed that García Naranjo was involved in a plot against Madero. The following morning, as they began hearing cannon shots, the two members of the Cuadrilátero went to the home of their friend Dr. Manuel Olea, where they were informed about Bernardo Reyes’s death and the attack on the National Palace. Moheno arrived shortly thereafter with news about the Felicista takeover of the Ciudadela and Madero naming Huerta leader of the federal forces. From that point, the Cuadrilátero went into hiding until the end of the Decena Trágica on February 18.

Meanwhile, Reyes, Díaz, Mondragón, Huerta, and Henry Lane Wilson helped to form the Pact of the Embassy. In his memoirs, Reyes immediately disassociated himself from Huerta, stating that he always had misgivings about the general. Reyes also used honor to differentiate himself from Huerta. He stated that he and his father had rebelled against Madero for the sake of the nation, but Huerta betrayed Madero for personal gain. Reyes wrote that even during the formulation of the pact, he believed that it was a serious mistake for the soon-to-be president to be a man capable of treachery. I suggest that there was an underlying dynamic here that Rodolfo never explicitly stated in his memoirs.

---

218 García Naranjo, 6: 285. *La Tribuna* did not reappear after the Decena Trágica.

219 Ibid., 286.

220 Reyes, 2: 67.
Bernardo was supposed to be president of Mexico, and after his death, the position should have gone to Díaz. Now Huerta (who did not take the same risks as Bernardo and his co-conspirators) was president, and Rodolfo clearly resented him for it.

Once the conspirators agreed to the Pact of the Embassy, they had to decide the fate of Madero and Pino Suárez. The memoirs present different versions of the assassinations, and the authors blamed each other while simultaneously taking credit for attempting to spare the president and vice president. Furthermore, this moment represented a turning point for Gamboa and Moheno. The assassinations of Madero and Pino Suárez showed them that participating in the Huerta administration could be a dangerous and possibly deadly endeavor, a point they kept in mind when they agreed to join the regime.

Gamboa had a particularly strong reaction to the Decena Trágica, stating that the news he received from Mexico had a profound effect on his mental and physical state. On February 19, he wrote in his diary

I feel ashamed, unhappy, like an accomplice, guilty, impotent…I do not know what I feel!...I have a fever and my heart jumps out of my chest…The possibility that the government…DESTROYED FOUR OR FIVE BLOCKS OF OUR CAPITAL! has wounded me physically, has destroyed my spirit…Matricides! The doctor came in the afternoon…his diagnosis [was] cardiac neurosis and nervous fever, produced by deep moral shock…And when he asked me about the news from my homeland, I broke into tears like a woman.221

Less than three years prior, Gamboa had taken part in commemorating Mexico’s modernity and civility, but Mexicans in the capital were now destroying the city, assassinating government officials, and the country was on the brink of anarchy. By using the term “matricide” Gamboa likened the participants in the Decena Trágica to children capable of assassinating their own mother. He also used gendered rhetoric to demonstrate how events in Mexico produced his feminized display of emotions resulting from a weakened physical condition. Gamboa placed all blame on Huerta, whom he considered a “dark,

---

221 Gamboa, 6: 65-66.
very dark” figure, and days later the author implied that Huerta was responsible for the assassinations of Madero and Pino Suárez.222 From this point forward, Gamboa perceived Huerta as a dangerous man.

Moheno claimed having a similar epiphany. The night of February 18, Moheno returned to his home after the announcement of a cease fire. He wrote that as he ate dinner with his family, a number of deputies arrived and ordered him to follow them to the home of Deputy Thomas Braniff in order to discuss Mexico’s political situation. At Braniff’s home, the deputies formed two groups: one would speak with Huerta and the other with Díaz in order to assess Mexico’s political situation. Moheno, Braniff, and the other members of their group set out to find Díaz at two in the morning on February 19. Although peace had seemingly been restored, their journey to the Ciudadela was dangerous because of the “profound darkness…torn power lines and the drunk soldiers who blocked [their] path every few blocks and threatened [them] with their rifles.” The group met with Díaz’s cousin, Colonel Ignacio Muñoz, who led them by foot to the Ciudadela. When they arrived at the front of the plaza, they saw the statue of José María Morelos and the tortured remains of Gustavo A. Madero, whose only eye had been taken out by a bayonet. According to Moheno, Cecilio Ocón, the man in charge of the assassination, exclaimed that Francisco I. Madero and Pino Suárez were next.223

Moheno recalled having a moment of clarity in which he understood the delicate situation he and his colleagues faced. He and Braniff fled the Ciudadela as quickly as possible, unsure as to whether they had been sent there to be tortured and executed. Moheno claimed that afterward, the two worked to spare the lives of the former president and vice-president, and in his memoirs, he included transcripts in which he and Braniff testified to this before congress in October 1913.224 Moheno stated that he did not know the conspirators involved in the cuartelazo well or at all, but Braniff did. Moheno and Braniff

222 Ibid., 67-68.

223 Ocón, a friend of Félix Díaz, carried out Huerta’s orders to assassinate Gustavo A. Madero and Adolfo Bassó, the superintendent of the National Palace.

224 Moheno, 56-60.
attempted to convince the conspirators to exile Madero, who would continue to alienate supporters “with his uncontainable verbosity and terrible oratory.” Assassinating Madero would make him a martyr.225

Reyes also described his attempts to spare Madero. The author wrote that Huerta held a meeting with his cabinet on February 21. The cabinet (consisting mostly of lawyers) decided that a trial against Madero and Pino Suárez would be more effective in neutralizing them than exile or incarceration in a prison or an insane asylum. Alberto García Granados and Reyes were put in charge of exploring legal options, and the cabinet agreed that the former president and vice-president would not be executed.226 However, their efforts were in vain, and Madero and Pino Suárez were executed on the night of February 22.

The Pact of the Embassy established momentary peace in Mexico City, but subsequent accusations surrounding these murders split this group between the supporters of Díaz and Huerta. No one in the Huerta cabinet took responsibility for the assassination orders against Madero and Pino Suárez, and in retrospect they all blamed each other. In his memoirs, Reyes accepted a measure of accountability because the conspirators actively worked against Madero, but they were “rebels, not traitors,” and their goal had been to establish a new government through legal means.227 Moreover, they knew that Madero’s assassination would turn him into a martyr. García Naranjo, for instance, stated that though it was an “unnecessary holocaust” that “wounded the most rudimentary moral sentiments,” it represented an even worse “offense against common sense.”228 Huerta provided an official version of the murders in which Maderistas stopped the vehicles in an effort to save the prisoners, and Madero and Pino Suárez were “accidentally shot” in the ensuing scuffle. Nobody believed this version, and popular


226 Ramírez Rancaño, 29.

227 Reyes, 2: 94.

228 García Naranjo, 6: 338.
blame was placed on all members of the Huerta regime (including Díaz), despite the fact that members of the cabinet and other prominent government officials were seemingly unsure of the actual details surrounding the assassinations.

Other sources corroborated that to some degree. In 1926, the Mexico City newspaper *Excélsior* published testimonies from members of the Madero and Huerta administrations, in which they presented their theories regarding the Madero and Pino Suárez assassinations. Gamboa stated that the public would never know for sure, but he believed the perpetrators were “on the other side of the grave” (likely alluding to Huerta), and those indirectly responsible “naturally” blamed the dead.\(^{229}\) According to Reyes’s memoirs, Rafael L. Hernández, Madero’s cousin, and Juan Sánchez Azcona, Madero’s personal secretary, both expressed their belief in Reyes’s innocence. Azcona also cleared Díaz of all responsibility.\(^{230}\) Ricardo García Granados also wrote to *El Universal* on March 4, 1926, in defense of Reyes. His brother Alberto had been executed on October 9, 1915 by the Carranza government for his participation in the Huerta regime and supposed complicity in the Madero assassination. Ricardo named Huerta as the mastermind behind the murders (Alberto had also named Mondragón), and he argued that Huerta shrewdly manipulated the circumstances to make the cabinet (all Felicistas) appear guilty. Reyes agreed with this assessment, and throughout his memoirs, used this argument to justify his actions and those of his friend Díaz.

In contrast, Congressional Deputy Luis Manuel Rojas, Lozano, Moheno, and García Naranjo defended Huerta, suggesting that he had no direct knowledge of the plans to assassinate Madero and Pino Suárez. Rojas, who voted against Madero’s resignation, asserted that Huerta could not have ordered the executions without the approval of Henry Lane Wilson. Rojas also suggested that Díaz and

---

\(^{229}\) Ibid., Feb. 23, 1926. See also Reyes, 2: 146.

\(^{230}\) Reyes, 2: 154-155.
Mondragón were complicit, since they “were the principal men on whom Madero’s luck depended.”\textsuperscript{231} Lozano stated in \textit{Excélsior} that during his time as Huerta’s Minister of Communication, he asked the president to publicly clarify his role in the assassinations. Huerta said that “he was not guilty,” but members of his administration were, and he did not “want to hurt them through any categorical declarations.”\textsuperscript{232} Lozano offered his own opinion, and without mentioning any names, accused the military command (headed by Blanquet) and Ministry of War (led by Mondragón).

Moheno stated in his memoirs that it was “absurd to attribute President Madero’s assassination to General Huerta,” since he was a pawn controlled by the Felicista cabinet, especially Reyes. In an addendum to his memoirs written in the 1930s, Moheno suggested that Reyes’s memoirs inadvertently “absolved” Huerta. Moheno was correct to a certain degree. He pointed out that Reyes consistently used the word “impose” to describe the way in which Díaz and his colleagues acted towards Huerta in February 1913. Díaz “imposed” his own cabinet, opposed any suggestions from Huerta, and gave Reyes and Mondragón political authority in his name.\textsuperscript{233} Moheno also noted that the key participants in the cuartelazo and the political assassinations were Felicistas. Ocón was a close friend to Díaz and Mondragón, and even Reyes expressed his belief that Mondragón was directly involved in the deaths of Madero and Pino Suárez. Moheno argued that by attempting to explain his loyalty to Díaz, Reyes demonstrated that he and the Felicistas had more power than he admitted in his memoirs. This claim was valid but problematic because Moheno essentialized the participants as victims or villains, either completely powerless and lacking agency, or in full control of Mexico’s destiny. Reyes constructed his narrative in a similar manner, claiming that he and Díaz had no power against Huerta, who seemed to outsmart them both using Machiavellian maneuvers to take over the presidency.

\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Excélsior}, Feb. 25, 1926. See also Reyes, 2: 144. Rojas mentioned Reyes in this statement, as well, but on Apr. 9, 1926, \textit{Excélsior} published a letter in which Rojas wrote that he did not believe that Reyes was involved in the assassination plot.

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{Excélsior}, Feb. 23, 1926. See also Reyes, 2: 146.

\textsuperscript{233} Moheno, 137-140.
García Naranjo went a step further in his memoirs and castigated society for placing the entire burden of the evils within Mexican politics on Huerta. The author used religious metaphors to described how members of the regime “washed their hands, and it was their right to do so, but they forgot Christ’s warning, and without being pure or clean, they cast stones.” He added “of course it was more comfortable and easier for everyone to make firewood of that fallen tree. As if one devil could reign for seventeen months in a country full of angels.”

The quarrels among these men continued after the assassinations, and the Huerta cabinet became characterized by internal division, betrayal, and questions about loyalty. Even with another strongman in power, the regime was unable to unite the opponents of the revolution under on cohesive ideology. The division between the supporters of Huerta and Díaz proved to be a fundamental problem, and the cabinet members chose to support one faction or the other based on ideological, personal, and political motivations. These men also confronted the question of patriotism versus morality. Regardless of which of these two factions each man supported, they all understood that they would become associated with political assassinations and other morally objectionable actions. Yet they agreed to participate in the Huerta regime and justified it by declaring their patriotism and a desire to improve Mexico.

Furthermore, though Pavković focuses on a patriot’s actions against foreign intervention in his discussion of morality, his notion of justice is important in the case of supporters of Huerta and Díaz. Bernardo Reyes fought against the perceived injustices of the Madero administration, and he and his son rebelled in order to replace Madero with a more “just” government. The conspirators of the cuartelazo agreed that their actions were morally justified because they rectified the blunder of the Madero presidency. Moheno, García Naranjo, and others who joined the Huerta regime after the cuartelazo did so because they viewed it as an opportunity to correct the problems created by Madero. In this sense, these men were acting as patriots, replacing a failed administration for Mexico’s benefit. However,

---

234 García Naranjo, 6: 312-313.
Huerta would become increasingly unstable in the months that followed, forcing his supporters and the members of his cabinet to redefine patriotism and decide how far they would compromise their morality in support of this violent regime.

Tensions between the Huerta and Díaz factions intensified almost immediately, and Huerta’s reputation worsened in the months following the Decena Trágica. The memoirs as a whole become more difficult to follow at this point because the authors began accusing each other and presenting different versions of the events that took place during the Huerta administration. This is useful because it challenges the homogenous official history of the period while also humanizing the regime. These men were not simply puppets blindly following Huerta’s orders. The memoirs demonstrate that they had their own aspirations, political inclinations, resentments, and reasons for participating in and/or leaving the regime as it descended further into chaos.

Throughout his memoirs, Reyes asserted that Huerta did everything he could to sabotage the Felicistas. Moheno agreed, stating that Huerta embarked on an obsessive campaign to destroy Felicismo. García Granados (Minister of the Interior) was the first to “become desperate,” and he resigned in April. On June 11, 1913, Huerta replaced him with Urrutia. Although the Felicistas respected Urrutia as a medical professional, they questioned his political ability. Jorge Vera Estañol (Minister of Public Instruction) resigned next, and was replaced by Manuel Garza Aldape. Reyes explained that by June 1913, it was clear that Huerta would not hand power to Díaz. Consequently, Díaz and Reyes officially dissolved the pact in order to sever ties with Huerta and keep him from deflecting responsibility for his actions onto the remaining Felicistas in the cabinet. This break with Huerta had immediate ramifications. Huerta exiled Díaz through a position as ambassador to Japan, and he removed Mondragón from the Ministry of War and exiled him to Europe. This allowed Huerta to

235 Moheno, 22.

236 Reyes, 2: 193.
effectively gain political control over the federal government and military. Reyes claimed that he presented his resignation at this moment, but it was denied.\textsuperscript{237} It would seem that Huerta would have gladly accepted it, or that Reyes would have resigned anyway if he could not tolerate his position anymore. Reyes did not offer a clear explanation in his memoirs as to why he remained in the cabinet. Huerta exiled Díaz and Mondragón, and it is likely that he would have done the same with Reyes. Perhaps he was being dishonest in his memoirs about his attempt to resign in order to explain why he was not removed from his post.

According to Moheno, once the Pact of the Embassy was broken, “the administration, which for one moment seemed to have the support of the grand majority of Mexican society, anxious to return to peace, fatally advanced down a road to ruin…a dictatorship.”\textsuperscript{238} Urrutia Martinez argues that Huerta, a military man whose nature was to use force rather than persuasion, quickly alienated his allies and consistently changed cabinet members (most only lasted one or two months). In their memoirs, all members of the Huerta regime attested to this. Furthermore, Huerta’s enemies now faced the possibility of political assassination, and various deputies began to “disappear.” Because he was personally close to Huerta and positioned as Minister of the Interior, Urrutia became the primary suspect for the disappearances that took place during his three-month tenure, and even after. Between June and October 1913, deputies Edmundo Pastelín, Serapio Rendón, and Belisario Domínguez disappeared, and the evidence (some of which was fabricated by Carrancistas) pointed to Urrutia.\textsuperscript{239} These murders became symbolic of what Reyes called the “reign of terror” of the Huerta dictatorship, since they

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 195.

\textsuperscript{238} Moheno, 22.

\textsuperscript{239} Ramírez Rancaño, “Aureliano Urrutia, ¿el asesino de una república castrense?,” 238-239. Domínguez’s death occurred after Urrutia’s resignation. The author notes that after Urrutia’s exile, Carrancista Alfredo Robles Domínguez, with the help of Colonel Octavio Bertrand, found a “mysterious archive” in Urrutia’s home where he kept records from his tenure as Minister of the Interior. Supposedly, this archive contained evidence that Urrutia ordered 104 murders. This fabricated evidence was used to construct Urrutia as an assassin and one of the first “villains” of the Mexican Revolution. Ramírez Rancaño suggests that Urrutia was Huerta’s accomplice, but also a victim of Carrancista propaganda.
represented the silencing of the parliamentary opposition. Reyes, the only remaining Felicista in the cabinet, resigned in September after the disappearances. He stated that as Minister of Justice, he attempted to save as many lives as possible during the “reign of terror.” Consequently, he was “spied on and encircled,” and all his phone calls, conferences, and mail were closely monitored. Reyes described his life during this period as a “horrific calvary,” and when he told Huerta that he would work with congress to investigate the disappearances, Huerta responded by telling Reyes that he was better off not becoming involved and asked for the minister’s resignation.240

The members of the cabinet could not stop the administration’s decline into anarchy after Huerta nullified the presidential elections and dissolved the federal legislature.241 On October 9, the dictator explained to his ministers his plans to close congress, and Moheno claimed to have vehemently opposed it, arguing that it would “cause a scandal across the world.”242 García Naranjo and Lozano also later claimed to have opposed Huerta. They had devoted years of service to the legislature, and perceived it as a sign of democracy. They stated that the dissolution of congress ended the Cuadrilátero’s plan for “social transformation through government action.”243 Huerta ordered the arrest of 110 members of congress, along with Reyes and other political enemies. Moheno recalled feeling “profound disgust” over the situation, especially since he was Mexico’s unofficial vice-president. He also acted against Huerta’s order by working to liberate as many deputies and senators as possible, resulting in a formal complaint by Garza Aldape. Moheno stated that he wrote numerous drafts of his resignation during this

240 Reyes, 2: 212-213. The popular story surrounding the death of Domínguez was that Urrutia cut off his tongue in order to literally silence him, and the deputy died of blood loss. However, when Domínguez’s body was exhumed in late 1914, his tongue was intact. See Chapter 6 for a more thorough discussion on the construction of this myth.

241 The Huerta cabinet now consisted of the following: Enrique Gorostieta as Minister of Justice, Adolfo de la Lama as Minister of Finance, García Naranjo as Minister of Public Instruction, Aureliano Blanquet as Minister of War, José María Lozano as Minister of Communication, Manuel Garza Aldape and Minister of the Interior, and Leopoldo Rebollar as Minister of Development. Since there was no vice-president, Moheno, Minister of Foreign Relations, would become president in the moment of Huerta’s death or resignation.

242 Moheno, 44.

243 García Naranjo, introduction to José María Lozano en la Tribuna Parlamentaria, xxvii.
period, but close friends convinced him to remain in office because “he was the best shield” against the dictator.244

This second coup made it clear that Huerta’s cabinet had no authority and that the dictator was willing to use any necessary measures to gain total control of Mexico. The memoirs also present a different version of this period than El Imparcial, which continued to praise Huerta. Moheno and Reyes reflected a sense of helplessness from the cabinet. From their perspective, this was the moment in which Huerta attempted to make them puppets in spite of their resistance, and they lost hope for reestablishing order in Mexico. These accounts differ significantly from García Naranjo’s, which emphasized the progressive policies implemented by the regime. This was possibly due to the time in which he wrote his memoirs. Moheno and Reyes reflected upon their experiences while they suffered the political and personal consequences of participating in the Huerta regime. They had reason for expressing bitterness against the dictator. García Naranjo, on the other hand, defended his friend Huerta decades after the events took place. In his memoirs, he wrote that he knew that Huerta made many errors, as any other human did.245 But instead of offering specific examples, he drew attention to the positive aspects of the administration.

García Naranjo claimed that in spite of the growing problems with the dictatorship in late 1913, the Huerta cabinet attempted to work for peace and reform—a stark contrast from the “reign of terror” presented by Reyes. Meyer supports this assertion, noting that Toribio Esquivel Obregón presented a plan to congress for land redistribution, in which the government would “create a proper set of circumstances so that a major subdivision of land could occur on the basis of individual initiative.” Eduardo Tamariz also suggested that the legislature raise taxes on large estates while lowering or

244 Moheno, 54-56. In retrospect, Moheno realized that Huerta probably invited him to join the cabinet in order to draw him out of the legislature and diffuse his ability to create significant opposition block. See p. 107.

eliminating taxes on small farms. Meyer states that these plans were rejected by congress, but they demonstrated the cabinet’s attempt to implement agrarian reform.246

Moreover, Urrutia, the former Director of the Faculty of Medicine at the National University, focused on public health. He frequently canvassed the city with Dr. Eduardo Liceaga, director of the Consejo Superior de Salubridad. Urrutia addressed the growth in prostitution by passing a health code calling for weekly and free medical checkups for prostitutes. Furthermore, the surgeon suspended the sale of fish in unsanitary markets, and he worked to develop regulations for meat sales. He and Liceaga also prompted corn vendors to have tiled, rather than dirt, floors in their businesses. They also targeted pulquerías and bars, popular locations for socializing, but also prone to outbreaks of tuberculosis because of the prevalence of flies, dirt, unsanitary cleaning rags, and milk handled by workers who did not bathe or wash their hands. Urrutia decreed that pulquerías be tiled and thoroughly disinfected, that pulque be sold in clean, closed bottles, and that employees needed to dress in white and wash their hands. Also, in a controversial move, Urrutia closed these and all other businesses on Sundays, in order to promote worker productivity on Mondays.247 In an effort to enhance cultural development among the masses, he promoted social activities for Sundays, including sports and theatrical events.

The cabinet also focused on education. Jorge Vera Estañol proposed a plan approved by the legislature to build 5,000 schools in rural regions in Mexico.248 García Naranjo worked with Genaro García, the Director of the National Preparatory School, to modify the curriculum by incorporating “moral culture” that moved students to consider “love and virtue” and aesthetics.249 This represented a stark move away from positivism, which was precisely García Naranjo’s goal, since he wanted to

246 Meyer, 166-167.
247 Urrutia Martínez, 119- 124.
248 Meyer, 160.
249 García Naranjo, 7: 188.
expand the curriculum rather than limit it to the sciences. In retrospect, he used this example to demonstrate that he (and the Huerta cabinet on a broader scale) did not “defend the banner of stagnation and backwardness.”

Although Huerta focused on military pacification, his cabinet had concrete goals for Mexico’s development and improvement. The regime has often been accused of setting Mexico back to conditions and policies prevalent during the Porfiriato—in essence, labeled a counter-revolution. The reality was more complex. The Huerta regime reacted to Madero’s inadequacies; its members believed they were more capable of running the country, and that is what they set out to do. Men such as García Naranjo and Urrutia represented what might be characterized as the beginning of a post-revolutionary ideology. They were Porfiristas who believed that Madero’s revolution had failed, and they implemented policies that they believed would move Mexico further into modernity. The concept of a post-revolutionary ideology in 1914 is problematic because the revolution was still underway across Mexico. Nevertheless, it provides a framework for examining how Porfiristas conceptualized Mexico’s development in a way that continued the process of “order and progress” without returning to the status quo of the Porfiriato.

In his attempts to highlight the positive actions of the Huerta cabinet, García Naranjo demonstrated an overall tendency to be apologetic for the regime, unlike Reyes and Moheno, who were at least able to admit to the severity of the problems within the administration. Furthermore, Moheno discussed the role of the United States in the regime’s collapse, but García Naranjo blamed Huerta’s fall entirely on the U.S. government. By late 1913, Huerta’s inability to gain recognition from the U.S. government had become a significant problem for the administration. In the final entries of 1913, Gamboa described his confrontation in August with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and his envoy John Lind, both of whom had called for Huerta’s resignation. Gamboa expressed that Mexico would not allow the United States to continue to intervene in its affairs, as it had clearly done during the Decena

\(^{250}\) Ibid., 201.
Trágica. He was applauded throughout Mexico for his patriotic stance, and though he had a promising career ahead of him as minister, he resigned the following month in order to pursue his presidential candidacy with the Catholic Party.  

The hostility between Huerta and Wilson increased over the next eight months. Though certain ministers felt antagonism against the dictator, the cabinet defended his stance against the U.S. government and applauded Huerta’s patriotism in the final months of the regime. Moheno argued that the Wilson administration had imperialistic tendencies which the U.S. president made clear through his consistent threats of military intervention through the beginning of 1914. When U.S. forces invaded Veracruz on April 21, Huerta met with his cabinet for the final time. García Naranjo recalled speaking privately with Huerta, and the dictator “maintained [his] serenity and completely dominated his nerves. With the asiatic fatalism that seemed to invade his spirit in the transcendental moments, he said to [García Naranjo] calmly: ‘What was supposed to happen has happened.’” Huerta announced to the cabinet that he had ordered a retreat in Veracruz because it was not sufficiently fortified to fight U.S. forces, but that two armed military divisions were being organized through the Ministry of War. The dictator asked each respective cabinet member to do whatever he could within his own ministry. Huerta had re-instated congress in November 1913, but a number of legislators remained imprisoned. Moheno helped to pass a measure which granted amnesty to these men in order to improve relations between Huerta and the legislature while promoting unity within the government. García Naranjo began working with schools to develop intensive basic training courses for nurses who wished to participate in sanitary brigades in Veracruz. Despite their efforts, public opinion against the regime was at an all-time low, especially since naval cadets and civilians ended up fighting the U.S. forces when Huerta ordered his

---

251 Ibid., 133-134. In this edition of the diary, the editor explained the positive reaction to Gamboa’s stance against Wilson and Lind. Reyes also stated that Gamboa joined the Huerta regime with the best of intentions, and that he was a genuinely good man, full of “dignity and patriotism.” Reyes seemed relieved that Huerta allowed Gamboa to resign peacefully, without attacking him for running for the presidency. See Reyes, 2: 209.

252 García Naranjo, 7: 274.
forces to withdraw. Regardless, Huerta supporters believed he was doing his best to combat Wilson in defense of the nation, and his staunchest allies, particularly García Naranjo, would blame Wilson entirely for Huerta’s collapse.

Moheno recounted that the dictator became increasingly paranoid, and the government quickly disintegrated, despite efforts by the cabinet to maintain some sort of unity. García Naranjo stated that by May “it was clear that Huerta’s regime was experiencing a downfall, but worst of all, [we] could see the inevitable defeat of the Federal Army.” When peace negotiations began in Niagara Falls, Huerta’s opponents viewed this as an unpatriotic betrayal because he was negotiating with the United States. Emilio Rabasa, Agustín Rodríguez, and Luis Elguero served as the delegates from Mexico. García Naranjo noted that none of the delegates were Huerta’s friends or associates, but Minister of Finance Adolfo De la Lama selected them because of their “intelligence, wisdom, and honorability.” Journalist José Elguero (Luis Elguero’s brother) argued that the three delegates failed in the negotiations because these three good men were asked to negotiate with unscrupulous “tramps.” With mounting diplomatic and military pressure, Huerta resigned on July 15.

Moheno expressed that for the members of the regime, “their condition could not have been more pitiful and dangerous.” Like De la Barra, Carvajal was an intelligent man, but not politically adept. Huerta met with García Naranjo on July 10, and the dictator told his friend that he forced Carvajal to wait several days for a final decision regarding whether or not he would be named minister. “With his Indian malice,” García Naranjo wrote, Huerta explained that he did this because “he wanted

253 Moheno, 103-104. Moheno argued that by this time, Huerta suspected betrayal from members of his cabinet, and possibly believed that if the cabinet met again, it would ask for the dictator’s resignation.

254 García Naranjo, 7: 293.

255 Ibid., 313-314.

256 Ibid., 316. Moheno resigned as Minister of Foreign Relations in early June 1914. He was succeeded by José López Portillo, who resigned within a month and was replaced by Carvajal.

257 Moheno, 109.
his successor to meditate profoundly on the adventure he was about to undertake.” The dictator made it clear that Carvajal freely agreed to enter “the storm.”\textsuperscript{258} The members of the regime (including former ministers) understood that the government would have a catastrophic end, and García Naranjo recalled that he “could not imagine Mexico burning like Troy, but did suppose that the ending would be tragic.”\textsuperscript{259} They did not believe Carvajal had the power to act against the revolutionaries, and an alliance with them, particularly Carranza, could be disastrous, if not deadly. Thus, in July 1914, most of the remaining members of the Huerta regime began their exile, fleeing Mexico in shame as villains and traitors.

The newspapers and memoirs recount the narrative of the Huerta regime, from the perspective of its participants, as the events took place and in hindsight. An analysis of these sources reveals these men’s contradictory motivations, and the influence of honor, loyalty, and patriotism in their public and private decisions and struggles. When the members of the Huerta regime accepted their positions, they understood the risks of acting against the revolution. However, the memoirs seem to indicate that the cabinet members did not anticipate the levels of chaos, violence, and anarchy brought on as Huerta became increasingly authoritarian. The participants in the regime initially united under an anti-Madero stance, but the divisions among this group (beginning with the conflict between the urban professional Porfiristas and the científicos) made it impossible to sustain any cohesive anti-revolutionary ideology. *El Imparcial* and *La Patria* attempted to unite the opponents of the revolution by substituting Porfirio Díaz with Huerta and Félix Díaz, but even these newspapers clashed ideologically.

In hindsight, because of Madero’s declining popularity, February 1913 proved to be an ideal time for Porfiristas to attempt to defeat the revolution and establish any sort of post-revolutionary government. However, personal ambitions, miscalculations (particularly Madero’s assassination),

\textsuperscript{258} García Naranjo, 7: 324.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., 305.
resentments, conflicting visions for Mexico, and lack of U.S. support under Wilson impeded any possible success. Although the revolution was also ideologically and politically fragmented during this period, its military leaders proved to be stronger than Huerta and the federal army.

The Huerta regime went into exile along with others who were considered threats by the provisional Carranza government; almost immediately, they attempted to organize a counter-revolutionary movement against the First Chief. The exiles continued to oppose the revolution and now had a common enemy in Carranza, but their efforts were hindered by the same political, class, and ideological conflicts they dealt with in 1913 and early 1914. After Huerta’s death in 1916, there was no Porfirista military leader strong enough to launch a successful counter-revolution in Mexico. These men used media to construct Porfirio Díaz and Huerta as heroes and martyrs for their cause, and they briefly set aside their differences to collectively protest the ratification of the Constitution of 1917. However, their efforts were not enough to avoid definitive defeat when the military phase of the revolution ended in 1920.
Chapter 3: The Porfirista Diaspora and Attempts at Counter-revolution, 1914-1920

In July 1914, the members of the Huerta regime fled Mexico and settled across the United States, Havana, and Europe. The exile community included Porfiristas and other factions opposed to Carranza. Almost immediately, they began to discuss the possibility for a counterrevolution, but their efforts were disorganized and poorly funded. The exiles also faced significant political setbacks after the death of Huerta in 1916, the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, the death of Aureliano Blanquet in 1919, and Félix Díaz’s definitive military defeat in 1920. Although displacement affected the exiles personally and professionally, this chapter will address the political ramifications of their banishment from Mexico. Primarily, I will examine the complex exile politics of the period, relying on the memoirs, government documents, and the San Antonio Porfirista publications La Prensa and Revista Mexicana.

When the Carranza regime officially threatened the exiles with execution for treason in late 1914, it was a way of negating the political legitimacy of all who had participated in the Huerta regime, regardless of whether or not they were Porfiristas. The exiles faced an even greater challenge with the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, which put their vision for Mexico at stake. An analysis of the counter-revolutionary efforts after the fall of the Huerta regime reveals the various ways in which the exiles defined Mexico, challenging the notion that all those who opposed the revolution wished to return to the Porfirian status quo. It also shows how the exiles continued to use patriotism as a political and rhetorical tool to justify their actions.

The Politics of Exile, 1914-1916

The first significant wave of exile during the revolution took place in 1911, when Díaz, the científicos, and much of the aristocracy fled Mexico. The second wave took place after the fall of the Huerta regime in 1914, and included members of the military, the Catholic Church, artists, intellectuals,
and politicians. In *La Reacción Mexicana y Su Exilio durante la Revolución de 1910*, Ramírez Rancaño provides a detailed study of the prominent exiles, where they settled, and their political activity after 1914. Therefore, I will offer only a broad overview in the first part of this section. Secondly, I will examine the first attempts to organize a counterrevolution, particularly in San Antonio. Ramírez Rancaño correctly asserts that the exiles from the various political factions had a common enemy in Carranza. However, he also argues that “all of Mexico was Huertista” when the dictator was in power, suggesting that Huerta had broad support when he was in office, then in exile. This section will problematize the definition of “Huertista” while demonstrating the complex ideological and political dynamics that the exiles faced between late 1914 and 1916.²⁶⁰

The Carranza government worked to curb the power of the institutions that had been loyal to Huerta. The First Chief dissolved the federal army, but in exile many former military leaders still looked to Huerta, Mondragón, and Blanquet for direction. According to Ramírez Rancaño, many members of the military lived in El Paso, New Orleans, Havana, and New York.

The Catholic Church was also considered an anti-revolutionary institution. García Naranjo offers the simplistic explanation that Carranza turned against the church because of Huerta’s personal relationship with José Mora y del Río, the archbishop of Mexico. Mora y del Río loaned fifty-thousand pesos to the dictator, “sealing the fate” of the Catholic Church and intensifying the anti-clerical position of the revolutionaries.²⁶¹ Manuel Calero, Minister of Foreign Relations under Madero, argued that Huerta did attempt to garner political support from the Catholic Church by presenting himself as a pious man and appointing Catholic Party member Eduardo Tamariz president of the legislature.²⁶² Ramírez Rancaño and Knight suggest that the relationship between Huerta and the Catholic Church was complex, 

---

²⁶⁰ Ramírez Rancaño, 31.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 68.

and that there were several possible reasons for Constitutionalist anti-clericalism. A number of political Catholics, including Gamboa and De la Barra, joined the Huerta administration. The federal government also allowed the Catholic Church to consecrate Mexico to the Sacred Heart of Jesus in January 1914. Knight argues that although these examples demonstrate favorable relations between the church and the government, the “Catholic constituency” across Mexico “was heterogeneous,” and its response to Huerta and to the revolutionary factions was often influenced by local conditions.263

Nevertheless, the Constitutionalists embarked on an anti-clerical campaign that forced Catholic leaders into exile. According to Jesús María Echavarría y Aguirre, Bishop of the Diocese of Saltillo, Coahuila (Carranza’s home state), Bishop John Shaw sent a telegram in July 1914 offering all Mexican bishops refuge in San Antonio. At least thirty-five bishops, including Echavarría y Aguirre, accepted the offer and crossed into Texas by August 1914.264 The Catholic Church in the United States responded to what it perceived as the violent persecution of Mexican Catholics. In 1916, an American priest named Francis Clement Kelley wrote The Book of Red and Yellow, a harsh critique of the abuses of the revolutionary forces (specifically, the Carrancistas) of Catholics in Mexico. Kelley was known for establishing the Catholic Church Extension Society in 1905, a charity organization designed to reach out to isolated (often rural) communities, and he was important in the efforts by the U.S. Catholic Church to help Mexican refugees during the revolution. The Book of Red and Yellow contains testimony from “lay and clerical” refugees about “the murder, exile, imprisonment, rape, and robbery of the innocent” across Mexico.265 Kelley also defended the exiled clergy from the Carrancistas, and

263 Knight, Counter-revolution and Reconstruction, 203-204.


condemned the Wilson administration’s support for the Mexican government.\textsuperscript{266} Moreover, he stated that “if the United States [was] to be a friend and sister of Mexico,” U.S. citizens needed to “rid themselves of a multitude of inherited prejudices, and substitute a spirit of understanding for a spirit of greed.”\textsuperscript{267} The exile memoirs focus almost exclusively on the efforts of Mexican exiles against the Carranza and Wilson administration, but Kelley’s text exemplifies one way in which U.S. leaders worked to counteract the Constitutionalists.

In addition to members of the military and clergy, artists with Huertista sympathies were expelled from Mexico. Actors Leopoldo Beristáin and Emilia Trujillo, playwright José F. Elizondo, and musicians Rafael Galindo, Manuel M. Ponce, and Julián Carrillo were among the artists who fled to the United States or Havana.\textsuperscript{268} García Naranjo recounted that the slightest attachment to the regime could be cause for banishment. For example, Huerta’s Minister of War Miguel Lerdo de Tejada selected Galindo (Mexico’s premier cellist) to organize an official musical ensemble for the \textit{Rurales}, or Rural Corps. The orchestra serenaded Huerta on his birthday, and the dictator thanked Galindo and shook his hand while photographers captured the moment on film. Galindo “paid for that handshake with seven years in exile.”\textsuperscript{269}

The intellectuals such as García Naranjo posed the most significant threat to the Carranza regime and to the revolution. They were educated in the Porfirista traditions of Justo Sierra and positivism, and Urrutia and Gamboa achieved global renown in their respective fields. The intellectuals constituted Mexico’s urban professional class of doctors, journalists, lawyers, and writers, and they fervently expressed their critiques of the Carranza regime. Though the “reaction” primarily referred to the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Antimaco Sax, \textit{Los Mexicanos en el Destierro} (San Antonio, 1916), 14; García Naranjo, 7: 331.}
\footnote{Kelley, 74.}
\footnote{Ramírez Rancaño, 126-131.}
\footnote{García Naranjo, 8: 116-117.}
\end{footnotes}
supporters of Porfirio Díaz and Huerta, it also included the exiled members of the Madero government, and they were also targeted in Carranza’s efforts to purge his opposition from Mexico.

Ramírez Rancaño makes an important connection between the Madero and Huerta regimes, since many Maderistas (including Pedro Lascuráin, Calero, and Jesús Flores Magón) aligned with Huerta, or at least contributed to Madero’s fall. Calero, for example, did not have a position in the Huerta government. Yet he felt complicit because he claimed to have convinced Madero to place Huerta in charge of the forces fighting Orozco in Chihuahua in 1912. Without this opportunity, Huerta might not have gained Madero’s trust enough to lead the federal army during the Decena Trágica. These connections help to explain the difficulty in defining Huertismo and Huertistas. Calero, for example, wrote about his connections to Huerta in hindsight. There was no way for him to know the long-term consequences for backing Huerta in 1912. Even though he did not consider himself a Porfirista or Huertista, he was forced into exile like self-proclaimed Porfiristas who joined the Huerta cabinet, including García Naranjo, Gamboa, and Urrutia. Furthermore, men such as Flores Magón seemingly acted according to the political climate, not through an adherence to a particular ideology. Flores Magón may have served in Huerta’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 1913, but then ran as a PLM candidate (alongside Calero) against Huerta in the presidential elections of October 1913. Gamboa acted in a similar manner. He did not support Madero or Huerta, but he accepted diplomatic and cabinet positions under their administrations for the prestige and the opportunity to serve Mexico.

The politics of the exile community were further complicated by the presence of Villistas in the United States, particularly in El Paso, across the border from Villas’s base in the state of Chihuahua.

270 Calero, 132. Knight suggests that Jesús Flores Magón participated as a member of the Huerta cabinet. However, the memoirs written by Calero, Moheno, and García Naranjo do not mention Flores Magón in their lists of the Huerta cabinet. Also Roderic Camp’s *Mexican Political Biographies, 1884-1935* includes an entry for Flores Magón, but does not discuss his direct participation in the Huerta cabinet. Camp only mentions the candidacy of Calero and Flores Magón against Huerta in the 1913 presidential elections. See Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1884-1935* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 86.

271 Sax, 63. Calero went into exile in New York City.
The primary source with the most detailed information on the exiles is a book written in 1916 by
“Antimaco Sax,” entitled *Los Mexicanos en el Destierro*. García Naranjo stated in his memoir that Sax
was a pseudonym used by José Elguero, the exiled director of the pro-Huerta newspaper *El País*. Sax
wrote this text in an effort to “provide an account of what [had] been done in exile [by] the Mexican
émigrés expelled from their country by the “constitutionalist” revolution.” He added that he wanted to
focus on a select few exiles who had been “victims of false characterizations” by the Carranza regime.
Sax discussed the Huerta cabinet and men belonging to other factions, including Francisco and Emilio
Vázquez Gómez, brothers who supported Madero in the early stages of the revolution but broke ties
with him in 1912 and moved to San Antonio. Sax believed that these prominent intellectuals would use
their skills to “reconstruct” Mexico. Sax also included pieces critiquing Villistas such as General
Felipe Ángeles, who lived in exile in El Paso. Sax made it clear that these exiles were wrong for
supporting the “bandit” Villa, but he nevertheless included them in his work because they belonged to
the exile community. Ramírez Rancaño argues that Villistas and Huerta supporters “numbered in the
thousands” in El Paso and “hated” each other.

Regardless of these complex political dynamics, the Carranza regime labeled these men *la reacción*
(or “the reaction”) and cast them as a homogenous group of traitors. On December 12, 1914,
Carrancista General Salvador Alvarado compiled a list with the names of people who could be
prosecuted as traitors under the Juarista law of January 25, 1862, which “punished those who disturbed
public order with the death penalty.” The list contained 364 names, including all of the members of
the Huerta cabinet, surviving científicos, ex-presidents Díaz, De la Barra, and Lascuráin, members of the

---

272 Sax, 3. Sax includes biographical information on men including Gamboa, Moheno, Urrutia, Mondragón, García Naranjo, Calero, General Felipe Ángeles, and the Vázquez Gómez brothers (who had formed part of Madero’s first cabinet).

273 Ibid., 69.

274 Ramírez Rancaño, 269.

275 Ibid., 5. The author includes the complete list of names as an appendix in his book. See pp. 435-439.
military, and prominent intellectuals. In theory, anyone who helped Huerta in any way, however minimal, could be prosecuted as a traitor. In their memoirs, the exiles depicted the First Chief as a vindictive man set on removing any possible threat to himself from Mexico. García Naranjo noted that many innocent people (such as himself) were persecuted unjustly and sent into exile.276 Those who remained in Mexico seemed to fare just as badly, if not worse. Alberto García Granados, Huerta’s first Minister of the Interior, was implicated in the murders of Madero and Pino Suárez and executed in October 1915. According to Ramírez Rancaño, the Carranza regime used this as an example of what could happen to traitors, but the exiles viewed García Granados as a “victim,” and his execution seemed to strengthen their resolve against the Mexican government.277

In their memoirs, Gamboa, Moheno, Reyes, and García Naranjo indicated that during the final months of 1914, their priorities were to settle down, find employment, and carry on with their lives. García Naranjo explained that the Cuadrilátero and other members of the Huerta cabinet (including Huerta himself) did not flee with an excessive amount of money, as it was widely believed; after losing their homes, jobs, property, and other assets, they faced the difficulty of finding a safe place to live and gainful employment to support their families. Nevertheless, the exiles maintained their connections through friendly visits, chance encounters, and political action.278 Gamboa initially settled in Galveston, Texas, Moheno in New Orleans, García Naranjo in New York, and Reyes in Madrid. Ramírez Rancaño states that the vast majority of exiles lived in these cities, as well as in San Antonio, El Paso, Havana, and Los Angeles (to a lesser extent). I argue that these areas formed “borderlands,” spaces where the

276 García Naranjo, 8: 113.

277 Moheno, Sobre el Ara Sangrienta (México: Editoriales Andrés Botas e Hijo, 1922), 5.

278 García Naranjo lived with his wife Angelina and two children in New York City in the latter part of 1914. In the eighth volume of his memoirs, he recounted running into José María Lozano in a subway station there, and visiting Querido Moheno in New Orleans (and vice versa). García Naranjo also received help from his friend Rubén Valenti (Huerta’s Sub-Secretary of the Ministry of Public Instruction), who set up a meeting with dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera in order to obtain permission to move to Guatemala in December 1914.
exiles converged, dealt with their displacement, and simultaneously challenged the revolution’s efforts to become hegemonic.

All of these cities were important for the exile network, but San Antonio continued to be the center of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity in the United States. It was a strategic location because of its proximity to the U.S./Mexico border, but it also had a strong Mexican presence and large immigrant community. Between 1900 and 1930, the city’s population increased from 51,321 to 231,542, and the Mexican immigrant community rose from 25.7% to 37.2% of the total population during this period.²⁷⁹ In San Antonio, the Flores Magón brothers launched the U.S. version of *Regeneración* in 1904, Madero drafted and published the Plan de San Luis Potosí in 1910, Bernardo and Rodolfo Reyes conspired against Madero in 1912, and Carranza conspired against Huerta in 1914. Porfiristas also lived in San Antonio, and two of the most prominent were Ignacio E. Lozano and Leonides González. Lozano, born in Nuevo León, had worked as a journalist in the mining town of Mapimí, Durango. He moved to San Antonio with his mother and sisters in 1908, following the death of his father. In 1913, he launched the Porfirista newspaper *La Prensa*, which circulated throughout the United States. González was the mayor of Mapimí and had close ties to the Díaz regime. With the onset of the revolution, he and his family were forced to flee in order to avoid execution. They settled in San Antonio, and González became the business manager for *La Prensa*.

Ramírez Rancaño argues that the exiles did not collectively discuss plans for a counter-revolution until late 1914/early 1915, after the Carranza regime threatened them with execution for treason. When they did, they chose San Antonio as their meeting place. Their first attempt at organizing the exile community took place in January 1915, as members of “the reaction” gathered in San Antonio to discuss the creation of the Asamblea Pacificadora Mexicana (Mexican Peace-Making

Assembly), an organization whose goal was “to work for the reestablishment of order and harmony” in Mexico. Though it was willing to negotiate with the revolutionaries, it would resort to counter-revolution if confronted with “intransigence” from Villista, Zapatista, and Carrancista leaders.  

Sax stated that Gamboa presided over the first meeting of the assembly on February 6, 1915, which was attended by approximately forty men, including Emilio Vázquez Gómez, Jesús Flores Magón, Miguel Bolaños Cacho (former Felicista governor of Oaxaca), Generals Ignacio Bravo and Juvencio Robles, and former Huerta cabinet members Moheno, Enrique Gorostieta, and David de la Fuente. At the meeting, Moheno gave a “sentimental, patriotic, and eloquent” speech that moved the nostalgic audience to tears. Moheno considered it symbolic that they gathered in San Antonio, “the piece of land that was once Mexican, where they could, for a moment, shake the hands of compatriots, of all who were sincerely willing to work for the homeland and bear the fruit of peace and harmony for [their] children.” The assembly agreed to reach out to the revolutionary factions in an effort towards peace. Gamboa appealed to Villa, Zapata, Carranza, Álvaro Obregón, Felipe Ángeles, Eulalio Gutiérrez, and José M. Maytorena, in a telegram stating that it was time to end the fratricide and set aside their “mutual defects.” He added that “our children, all innocent…have a right to inherit an honorable homeland…let us not leave them a land covered in skeletons and ruins, bathed in blood, drenched in tears.” Only Villa, Obregón, and Ángeles responded; each denied Gamboa’s request and blamed the exiles for fostering the civil war with the coup against Madero. The exiles had no one to blame but themselves for their present situation.

280 Antimaco Sax, 17.
281 Ramírez Rancaño, 135.
282 Sax, 17; Moheno, Sobre el Ara Sangrienta, 24.
283 Moheno, Sobre el Ara Sangrienta, 264.
284 Sax, 18-20. The author included the full text of the telegrams between Gamboa, Villa, Obregón, and Ángeles; Ramírez Rancaño, 139-141.
Despite the assembly’s efforts, the “reaction” remained divided. Sax and Moheno cited class differences as a major obstacle for the counter-revolution. In a letter to García Naranjo (who did not attend the assembly), Moheno bitterly described how some of the participants, including himself, made financial sacrifices to travel to San Antonio because they genuinely believed in the assembly’s goals. At the meeting, however, Moheno found “egoists.” Despite the presence of millionaires, he and others struggling financially “offered five or ten pesos of the miserable [amount of money saved] for the trip” in order to fund Gamboa’s telegrams. Moheno added that after the assembly, members of the exiled upper-classes expressed their solidarity with him, but that they could not become politically active for fear of losing their property in Mexico. He exclaimed that “these rich men…sick from the fear that the revolution would someday take their haciendas…do they not seem to you [García Naranjo] like miserable rats grabbed by the tail who cannot even run away for fear of losing their entire tail?...our selfish rich men and intellectuals are worthy of pity. They hate the revolution because it deprived them of their comforts,” he continued, but then they acted like cowards unwilling to fight back.\(^{285}\)

The internal division within this group weakened the short-lived Peace-Making Assembly. Sax claimed that the organization was also weakened when U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan declared Gamboa a “persona non grata” and expelled him from the United States in June 1915. Gamboa was extremely vague about the assembly and his problems with the U.S. government in his diary, understanding the danger it posed to write about these issues. He was also cautious when speaking to the press. For example, as Gamboa arrived in San Antonio for the assembly in February 1915, he was asked for an interview by a staff member of La Prensa. He hesitated since “feelings were running high” and the city was full of “aggressive” spies for the revolutionary factions. It was best to keep quiet since an open mouth “was the way through which fish were killed.”\(^{286}\) Gamboa correctly assessed the


\(^{286}\) Gamboa, 6: 213.
political climate in San Antonio. The Consuls and other Mexican government officials in the United States tracked the decisions, movement, and mood among the exile community, which helped the revolutionary forces to effectively counteract any organized opposition. Also, many of Huerta’s political enemies took advantage of the opportunity to expose the injustices carried out by the Huerta regime, either for genuine rectification or economic or political gain.

The information was often convoluted and contradictory. For instance, García Naranjo was accused of ordering the execution of Mariano Duque, a staff member of Gustavo A. Madero’s newspaper, *El Defensor del Pueblo*, during the Decena Trágica. The author asserted that García Naranjo had escorted soldiers to arrest and execute Duque, which contradicted García Naranjo’s claim that he was in hiding throughout the Decena Trágica. The Mexican government also received a letter stating that Gamboa and Félix Díaz formed an alliance with Villa and Zapata, which was not true. Another implicated Gamboa, Moheno, and writer José Vasconcelos in supporting Ángeles for the Mexican presidency, even though Ángeles had dismissed the efforts of the Peace-Making Assembly. Despite the inaccurate reports, the Carrancista surveillance system was so entrenched in the United States, the Mexican and U.S. governments foresaw any major threat. In April 1915, the Carranza government received a letter that accurately described a sense of excitement among the exiles for Huerta’s return to the United States from Europe.

287 Catalina González vda. De Cuevas to Venustiano Carranza, México, D.F., Feb. 14, 1915, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO, Mexico City, Archivo del Primer Jefe del Ejército Constitucionalista Venustiano Carranza (hereafter cited as AVC) XXI. 27. 2867. 1. The author wrote to Carranza asking for financial assistance since her sons were serving him in the military, and her family had been a victim of the Huerta regime. It is unlikely that García Naranjo had the authority to oversee any arrests or executions, especially on Huerta’s behalf, since he was not yet a close friend of the general. Blanquet would have been more likely to carry this out, since he had extensive military authority and support from Huerta; María O. Romero to Venustiano Carranza, México, D.F., Aug. 4, 1916, AVC, XXI. 90. 10132. 1. The author also asked for financial assistance and for a personal meeting with the First Chief. Romero, a teacher, claimed that she was denounced during the Huerta regime for supporting the revolution, and was accosted and almost banished to Quintana Roo. She claimed to have information on Blanquet’s secretary, who was a patient in the same Military Hospital as Romero.


Enrique C. Creel (who lived in exile in Los Angeles) traveled to Spain in February 1915 to personally invite Huerta to act as the military leader of the counter-revolution. Creel told Huerta that “his participation was essential for the repatriation of all the Mexicans who helped him during his regime.” The support of the exile community was crucial for Huerta, who was in the process of negotiating an alliance with Germany. According to García Naranjo, Kaiser Wilhem II’s contact Captain Franz von Rintelen offered Huerta financial support, hoping that war along the U.S./Mexico border would divert Wilson’s attention away from the war in Europe. Friedrich Katz supports García Naranjo’s account, stating that Carranza developed an “anti-German attitude…strengthened when the conspiracies with Huerta became known, conspiracies whose discovery, according to American reports was apparently made in part by Carranza’s secret agents.”

This seemed to be the ideal moment for Huerta’s return to power. He traveled to the United States in April, with plans to launch a counter-revolution from the state of Chihuahua. In New York City, he called a meeting with García Naranjo in order to ask for his friend’s support as one of the most influential exiles. García Naranjo described the meeting in his memoirs, claiming to have denied Huerta’s request for support. He explained to Huerta that the plan was dangerous, reckless, and an impossible task. Huerta did not accept this, so García Naranjo attempted to appeal to the general’s vanity. He told Huerta that he would fail because he did not have the character of a revolutionary caudillo, who would work through extralegal means to achieve his goals. In García Naranjo’s opinion, Huerta “did not know how to impose forced loans, emit paper money, give up defenseless populations to the excesses of the military…conceal abuses brought on by banditry…[nor] tolerate a violation of the fundamental principles of social order.” Huerta would not gain a following similar to that of the

290 Ramírez Rancaño, 147.


292 García Naranjo, 8: 138.
rebels because he would not sacrifice civilians and the spoils of war the way his adversaries did. Despite García Naranjo’s pleas, Huerta chose to move forward with his plan to invade Mexico.

Unfortunately for Huerta, by May 1915, the Mexican and U.S. governments were fully updated on his plans, including his recent alliance with Orozco and an offer from Germany to supply money and arms.\(^{293}\) Orozco was charged with violating U.S. Neutrality Laws in June and was murdered in his sleep in August by the Texas Rangers in the deserts of West Texas. The official story was that Orozco and his men were caught stealing horses, so the Texas Rangers shot them and dragged their corpses across cacti and other “hostile plants.”\(^{294}\) Huerta was apprehended by U.S. officials outside of El Paso in June 1915 and also charged with violating U.S. Neutrality Laws. His incarceration and death in El Paso shortly thereafter profoundly changed the counter-revolutionary efforts. Ramírez Rancaño and Henderson note that before Huerta’s death, the Porfirista exiles were divided between choosing Huerta or Félix Díaz as the supreme leader of the counter-revolution. In the United States, Díaz counted on the support of Gamboa and only a few other friends. Most of the Porfirista exiles believed “in the efficient former dictator rather than in the pusillanimous General Díaz.”\(^{295}\) After Huerta’s death, the Porfiristas “turned to Díaz as a last resort.”\(^{296}\)

According to Henderson, “as long as Huerta lived, he controlled Díaz’s essential core of supporters, the…[Porfirista] anti-científico faction.”\(^{297}\) After Huerta’s death, Díaz had the opportunity to spearhead the fight against the revolution. In March 1916, Félix launched a rebellion in Yucatán and in his wife Isabella’s native state of Veracruz, where he had support among the wealthy landowning

\(^{293}\) Consulado General de México, New York, May 7, 1915, XXI. 41. 4460. 2-8.

\(^{294}\) García Naranjo, 8: 147-148.

\(^{295}\) Ibid., 117-118.

\(^{296}\) Ibid., 121.

\(^{297}\) Henderson, Félix Díaz, 107.
classes. He pronounced the Plan de Tierra Colorado, a liberal manifesto through which he promised a restoration of ejidos, land for soldiers who sided with him, but also a respect for private property. The manifesto also guaranteed freedom of religion. Through his manifesto, Díaz upheld the fundamental facet of Porfirista political identity, the liberal constitution. Like his previous rebellions, the 1916 uprising failed due to lack of widespread support in Mexico and Díaz’s incapacities as a military leader. Nevertheless, he earned him the reluctant trust of the Porfirista exiles. Henderson argues that this was due in part to Díaz’s stubbornness and persistence for the Porfirista cause, but also because Díaz capitalized on his name and gained sympathy after Don Porfirio’s death in July 1915.

Porfirismo after the Deaths of Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta

Huerta died in January 1916, six months after Porfirio Díaz passed away in Paris at the age of eighty-four. These men, who both died outside of their homeland, subsequently became martyrs for the Porfirista cause. Félix Díaz was not the only exile to benefit politically from this; other Porfirista exiles used media and the images of Porfirio and Huerta to promote their agendas to the broader Mexican immigrant community. Just as El Imparcial and La Patria constructed Huerta and Félix as counter-revolutionary heroes during the Huerta regime, La Prensa and García Naranjo’s Revista Mexicana took on the role of crafting the posthumous images of Porfirio and Huerta for public consumption. Revista Mexicana, in particular, attempted to promote a collective sense of nostalgia for the Porfiriato, reminding its audience that they lived in peace under Díaz, and that Huerta had attempted to restore order. These newspapers helped the Porfirista exiles to reaffirm their Porfirismo; they also attempted to unite exiles from different factions under the banner of nationalism, while giving them a common sense of purpose after the failure of the Peace-Making Assembly.

---

298 Ibid., 162-164; Félix Díaz, “Proclamation of General Félix Díaz, Chief of the National Reorganizing Army, to the Mexican People,” Feb. 23, 1916, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO, Mexico City, Manuscritos del General Félix Díaz (hereafter cited as MGFD) DCXXI. 1. 99. 2.
By early 1915, Lozano’s *La Prensa* was the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in the United States, and the most important Porfirista medium. Although it claimed to be politically independent, its pro-Díaz stance was evident. The newspaper published articles celebrating important milestones in Díaz’s military career, including the anniversaries of the battles against French forces on May 5, 1862, and April 2, 1867. Cinco de Mayo was an important celebration of Mexican culture and identity in San Antonio’s barrio, and *La Prensa* described the annual festivities. The newspaper also described Díaz’s sadness resulting from his exile and nostalgia for his Mexico. The general died on July 2, 1915. The following day, *La Prensa* published a tribute to “the Man of Mexico,” in which an anonymous Porfirista accused the revolutionaries of being traitors and compared them to dogs for overthrowing Díaz.

Because *La Prensa* attempted to maintain a semblance of impartiality, it did not offer extensive commentary on Díaz’s death or the reactions of *La Prensa*’s staff or audience. This void was filled by García Naranjo, who developed a magazine in San Antonio through which he attempted to speak for and on behalf of the Porfiristas. In August 1915, García Naranjo launched the first issue of *Revista Mexicana*, a thirty-six page weekly magazine that catered to the Mexican immigrant community. This first issue was dedicated to Díaz. The last known photograph of the dictator graced the cover, and the magazine included tributes to Don Porfirio and his wife Doña Carmen. A piece entitled “Final photograph of General Porfirio Díaz” described this image as the most accurate illustration “of the bitterness of his exile.” The author stated that Díaz no longer “had the imposing expression of a ruler.

---


The directory cited *La Prensa*’s circulation figures for 1916 at 9,616 per day. *La Prensa*’s readers could subscribe to a weekly Sunday edition, which circulated 13, 891 copies per week.


but rather the look of anguish and suffering.” The dictator, “once sober and calm,” seemed melancholic “with the same offended dignity of the last months of Marie Antoinette.” His eyes, once “dominating,” now “appeared tired, dejected, with a vehement desire to close forever.” The author lamented the final plight of the dictator, who “dedicated his entire existence to the Homeland” only to be repaid with exile and abandonment by the millions of compatriots who enjoyed the peace of the Porfiriato. Adding insult to injury, Díaz did not receive a proper military salute at his funeral because the French government needed all of its troops to guard its national borders.302

Díaz’s death was not unexpected, but the circumstances were certainly ironic. The stoic man who rose to prominence based on his own skill and strength of character, depending only upon himself, was deaf and partially blind at the end of his life. When Díaz was born in 1830, Mexico was entrenched in constant civil war and the threat of foreign intervention—the same conditions the nation faced in 1915. Even in exile, Díaz did not escape chaos, as Europe, the center of civilization, ravaged itself in an escalating global conflict. Díaz’s insistence on remaining in power and upholding científico rule demonstrated an illusion of infallibility on the dictator’s part. In 1910, the Díaz administration congratulated itself for fostering modernity, peace, economic progress, and scientific advancements that impressed Western Europe and the United States. Five years later, Díaz and almost all of the científicos were dead and vilified by the revolutionary regimes, their achievements marred by their ultimate failure to put a political system in place to prevent war. Díaz’s death as an old, defeated man, away from the country he served (and that turned its back on him) would serve as a metaphor for the Porfirista experience as of 1915.

As it glorified Díaz, Revista Mexicana’s premier issue called for unity among the Mexican immigrant population based on their common sense of nationalism. García Naranjo included “Pro Patria,” a piece he wrote honoring Mexico on the one-year anniversary of his exile. He expressed that

“one sad year of wandering exile has nobly convinced [us] that Mexicans cannot live except for Mexico…Our nationality forms part of our being and there is no…force capable of tearing out our thoughts of the homeland…We are Mexicans.” The editor explained that he included the photo of Díaz on the cover so that readers could “contemplate” Mexico’s glorious history and one of the nation’s greatest heroes. The tribute to Díaz incorporated nostalgia, patriotism, and nationalism, and García Naranjo positioned Díaz as a symbol of these three elements with great success. The first edition of Revista Mexicana circulated in the Texas cities of San Antonio, Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso, as well as Los Angeles, and the 3,000 copies sold out within a few hours. In fact, on October 17, 1915, the magazine reprinted the photo of Díaz due to popular demand, and in Revista Mexicana’s five years in circulation, this was the image that most frequently graced the cover.

For the Porfirista exiles, Díaz had become a cultural marker along with the Virgin of Guadalupe, Benito Juárez, and the heroes of the independence movement from Spain. After Díaz’s death, the exiles used his image to remind Mexicans of the prosperous, peaceful times they enjoyed before the revolution. However, it is important to note that Revista Mexicana referred to Díaz as “General,” not “President,” emphasizing his military service (perhaps to avoid alienating readers who did not support Díaz’s policies). Díaz’s exemplary military career demonstrated his masculinity, patriotism, courage, and honor, which were considered the ideal qualities of a Mexican man. The veneration of Díaz contradicts the notion that Mexicans overwhelmingly perceived him as a villain in 1915.

It also sheds light on the impact of exile on the creation of Mexican myths and heroes. When El Imparcial and La Patria constructed counter-revolutionary heroes, they did so to affirm their patriotism and justify their opposition to the revolution. Porfirista exiles cast Díaz and Huerta as heroes in order to

---

303 Ibid., “Pro Patria.”
304 García Naranjo, 8: 149.
305 Cano, 108.
express both patriotism and nationalism. Porfiristas were now politically stateless, since they were enemies of both the U.S. and Mexican governments. Their rights as citizens ended with their expulsion from Mexico and subsequent blacklisting under the Law of 1862. Luis Roniger and Pablo Yankelevich argue that

exile implies a permanent tension between the principle of belonging to a nation and the principle of citizenship. Both principles are mixed within the framework of the nation-state…but, once a person is exiled, in other words, expelled from the national territory…a rupture is produced between the principle of citizenship sustained by the State and the national project that the exiles imagine being able to construct.306

The authors suggest that in spite of this disconnect, exile provides the opportunity to redefine and reaffirm nationalism, especially since the exiles now share a common experience. The Porfiristas and other political exiles unsuccessfully attempted this through the Peace-Making Assembly. García Naranjo perceived the moment of Díaz’s death as another opportunity to unite his compatriots through nationalism. He turned the reason for their banishment into a source of pride and used Revista Mexicana to proclaim that despite efforts from the U.S. and Mexican government to silence the exiles, they were Mexican and would continue to act in their nation’s best interests.

Nationalism was not the only motivating factor in reclaiming the heroic image of Díaz. As Gabriela Cano points out in her discussion of gender in early twentieth-century Mexico, patriotism and masculinity were directly linked in Mexican society. Men defended the home, their families, and the nation. By characterizing the exiles as cowards and traitors, Carranza carried out a political castration through which he emasculated his enemies by denying their patriotism. During the Porfiriato, Díaz represented the ideal Mexican man. After his death, supporters emphasized his masculine qualities, especially his military service. Thus, honoring Díaz and his memory became an act of patriotism which legitimized Porfirista notions of masculinity. It also allowed the exiles to use the same gendered

rhetoric to critique the ‘savage’ revolutionaries who did not display the same composure, elegance, strength of character, and courage as their hero.

*La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* specifically targeted Carranza, Villa, and Zapata. For example, in an article in *La Prensa* entitled “Carrancista Zapata,” the author called Zapata “Don Chancla” (*chancla* is a popular term for an old shoe). The article also mockingly described him as “the illustrious Zapata, the brave Zapata...[and] the unbeatable Zapata,” who never lost because he often switched alliances depending on who was in power.307 *Revista Mexicana* often described Villa as a bandit, and it also characterized him as “vulgar, entirely vulgar,” with a propensity for “pillage, concubinage...treachery, and crime.”308 The magazine also insulted Carranza by continuously calling him and his supporters traitors. One piece compared the Carrancistas to Judas and Pontius Pilate, willing to sell and then kill Christ. The author added that the Carrancistas acted like “hyenas,” and they were in no way comparable to Díaz, General Ignacio Zaragoza, and other patriots who demonstrated “valor” and “lack of fear” in their efforts against Mexico’s enemies.309

The two publications also cast Huerta as a patriot. In early 1913 *La Prensa* openly supported Huerta during his struggles with the Wilson administration. One article in *La Prensa* described Huerta as honorable and a man of his word, and the article criticized the Carrancista press for questioning Huerta’s honor, since Carranza and his supporters had none.310 However, after Huerta dissolved congress in October 1913, *La Prensa* turned against him and expressed disgust at the political events in Mexico. As Huerta declared himself dictator, *La Prensa* wondered if Mexico was a lost cause, and if the nation “was condemned to disappear” because of the matricidal crimes committed against it (though


La Prensa did not express the same indignation after the coup against Madero). Perhaps the newspaper criticized Huerta at this point because of his actions against the legislature, demonstrating that his regime would not even attempt to function under the façade of a democratic system. This article also implicated the United States in Mexico’s problems and stated that the revolution would not save Mexico; on the contrary, revolutionary leaders would place the nation’s fate in the hands of its greatest enemy. The author lamented that the world “laughed at their misfortunes,” and that the Huerta regime would become “one of those bloody dictatorships that arrived out of a damned necessity after a period of anarchy.”  

Despite its critique of the Huerta administration, La Prensa discussed what it perceived to be a plot between the United States, Carranza, and other revolutionary forces to bring further destruction to Mexico following the occupation of Veracruz in 1914. The newspaper blamed Mexico’s problems, an “inheritance of tears,” on the revolution, and it predicted that Carranza would attempt to take power with help from the Wilson government. In various articles, Lozano (using the pseudonym “Pipo”) recognized Huerta’s stubbornness and defiance toward Wilson as honorable traits. Pipo believed that Huerta would never resign, and instead would tell Wilson that “they would both go to hell before he resigned.” La Prensa now emphasized Huerta’s more likeable traits, such as his “fervent” Catholicism and pilgrimages to the Basilica of Guadalupe, in contrast with the anti-clericalism of the revolutionaries. Ultimately, La Prensa again sided with Huerta because he stood up to the United States.

311 Ibid., “¿No Tenemos Remedio?” Oct. 16, 1913.
In mid-1915, *La Prensa* published an article in which Huerta explained his actions and his belief that he had been a victim of conspiracies by his enemies. The general also stated that the public had “called him everything. [He was] for many a monster, extraordinarily evil…but nobody could take away [his] nationalism, a feeling [he] upheld with pride.”

*Revista Mexicana* also published a letter written by Huerta during his imprisonment in El Paso. The general stated that life’s great “difficulties…pain…and afflictions [were] predestined by the Almighty only for those who could withstand them.” Huerta attested to this, stating that his own suffering did not “perturb [his] spirit.”

When Huerta wrote this document his health was rapidly deteriorating, and he positioned himself as a martyr by describing how he courageously dealt with his struggles (resulting from providence and not his own errors).

These articles provided a space for Huerta to present himself to the public as a patriot who had attempted to act in Mexico’s best interests. García Naranjo took this a step further by memorializing Huerta as a Mexican hero after his death on January 13, 1916. In *Revista Mexicana*, the editor wrote a tribute in which he clearly expressed grief over the loss of his friend. He stated that “the most extraordinary man produced by Mexico in the last years [had] just descended into his tomb…He was a rebel, an indomitable spirit…General Huerta believed in the Homeland and in his destiny…He dreamed—because there was a romantic hidden behind his bronze mask—that under his iron rule Mexico would be liberated from the North American influence.” García Naranjo described Huerta’s bravery in accepting the constant challenges from the Wilson administration. He also blamed the revolutionary forces for the dictator’s downfall, using a classical analogy and comparing Huerta to Julius Caesar, who was killed by his compatriot Brutus. García Naranjo expanded this metaphor, stating that Huerta did not fit in “the glorious caste of triumphant Caesars.” Instead, he belonged with

315 “Yo Llamé a los Revolucionarios para Combatir al Invasor y Ellos Contestaron que No Se Trataba de Una Ofensa a México, Sino a Victoriano Huerta.” *La Prensa*, Jul. 4, 1915.

Cuauhtémoc and other heroes who “in the midst of their defeat [had] an attitude of sublime pride, a gesture of imperturbable greatness that they [flung] as a punishment against the insolent [faces] of the victors.” Huerta exhibited this gesture during his imprisonment in Fort Bliss in El Paso. He was isolated, abandoned, and without access to troops or arms. Yet he “continued to strike fear in all of the United States. The entire nation was uneasy because Huerta spoke, because he moved, because he existed.” García Naranjo then proclaimed that Huerta had such a significant impact on Mexico that the nation would disappear before Mexicans forgot him.317

*La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* constructed Díaz and Huerta as martyrs who were unjustly separated from the homeland by revolutionary forces that launched Mexico into a state of violence and chaos. These publications also used nostalgia to remind readers of the time of peace before the revolution. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* relied on the rhetoric of patriotism and masculinity in their critiques of the revolution and the Wilson administration, but more importantly, they attempted to convince readers that Díaz and Huerta were not the villains that the revolution characterized them to be.

**The Rejection of the Constitution on 1917**

The exiles may have had ideological, class, and political differences that prevented them from uniting in 1915, but they finally came together in late 1916, when Carranza called a meeting to discuss the drafting of a new constitution. This act shook the core of Porfirismo more than any other during the revolution, and *Revista Mexicana*, played an important role in the fight against the new constitution. The ratification of a new constitution also angered exiles from other factions, since it directly threatened the Mexico constructed by Juárez and the liberals of La Reforma. The exiles who united in protest against the Constitution of 1917 were self-proclaimed liberals, fighting what they perceived as an illegal and treacherous political move against the political system established in 1857. The exiles also

---

understood that a new constitution would diminish their political relevancy and position the revolution as the dominant hegemonic force in Mexico.

When Porfirio Díaz and the científicos fled Mexico in 1911, the dictatorship became characterized as the “old regime,” headed by “dinosaurs” that represented political backwardness and an obstacle to the authentic liberalism and democracy espoused by Benito Juárez. The Mexican Revolution began with the goal of restoring the principles of the Constitution of 1857. Immediately after the coup against Madero in February 1913, Carranza and his associates signed the Plan de Guadalupe, which declared the Huerta regime illegitimate, called for presidential elections, and named Carranza the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. When Carranza entered Mexico City in August 1914, he did not organize elections as the manifesto required. Instead, he established a “Preconstitutional” government in 1915. García Naranjo wrote a critique of the concept of preconstitutionalism in late 1915. According to García Naranjo, Carranza “worked outside of the Law” since the term “preconstitution” implied “that the regime had nothing to do with the Constitution.” He added that this was a “mask through with Carranza hid his impotence.” It was a diversion to postpone a reorganization of the government, because the First Chief knew that once he allowed that, Obregón, a more popular candidate, would have a legitimate chance at power. According to García Naranjo, U.S. recognition and Obregón’s victory against Villa’s Northern Division removed all obstacles against the Carranza government. Peace had not fully been restored, but there was no need to continue suspending the rule of law through preconstitutionalism.

The supporters of the Constitution of 1857 considered it a source of pride and national identity. It represented modernity and progress, and it set the foundation for Mexico to become a secular nation.

---

318 García Naranjo, 8: 170.

with a legal system fashioned after Western democracies. More importantly, it had provided the framework for Juárez and his peers to establish a stable political system, a project that Porfiristas believed was fulfilled by Díaz. According to García Naranjo, Preconstitutionalism did the opposite, as it allowed Carranza to govern “as a constitutionalist with no constitution.” He added that Carranza’s actions conflicted with the ideals set forth by the revolutionaries of 1910, including Madero and the Flores Magón brothers, who argued that Mexico’s problems resulted from a lax adherence to constitutional principles. Also, Article 128 of the Constitution of 1857 stated that establishing a government outside constitutional parameters was illegal and punishable as “high treason.” Carranza threatened his enemies by implementing the Law of 1862, but ignored Juarista laws when they did not suit his needs.

In September 1916, Carranza convened the constituyente, a constitutional convention, which met in Santiago de Querétaro from December 1, 1916 to January 31, 1917. The initial purpose was to amend and reform the Constitution of 1857. Jürgen Buchenau argues that Carranza presented a “bland draft” to the convention, since he believed that “social reform should be left to Congress.” Minister of War Álvaro Obregón believed that social reform needed to be incorporated within the new constitution. The general was not a delegate at the convention, but he was the most popular leader at the meeting. He worked as an unofficial negotiator between the various factions present at the convention in order to incorporate the demands of the labor and agrarian sectors. On February 5, the delegates ratified the Constitution of 1917, exactly sixty years after its predecessor. It was celebrated as a progressive, nationalistic document that finally put in place the ideals of the revolution. Knight describes the constitution as “one of the most radical of its time,” particularly because of articles 27 and 123. Article

321 Ramírez Rancaño, 318.
27 stated that subsoil rights belonged to the nation, which qualified the previously sacred nature of private property. Article 123 offered rights to the working class, including an eight-hour work week and the right to strike, a significant victory for laborers who constantly fought against favoritism for foreign employees and unfair wages during the Porfiriato.

Ramírez Rancaño argues that in reality the new constitution was not much different from the 1857 version, except for articles 27 and 123. As Knight also points out, both constitutions included “a federal system, separation of powers, no re-election, provision for individual rights, [and] restrictions on the Church.” Regardless of the similarities between the two documents, the Constitution of 1917 represented a symbolic rejection of the liberal plan for Mexico from sixty years before. In Revista Mexicana, García Naranjo called the ratification “the most horrendous act of sacrilege that Mexico had ever witnessed,” and likened it to replacing the national anthem with the plebian tune “La Cucaracha.” He also lashed out against Carranza for his hypocrisy, stating that the First Chief wanted to replace the constitution because it resulted in numerous dictatorships, despite the fact that he had been appointed senator by Porfirio Díaz in 1904.

The Porfiriista exiles and a number of their colleagues from the Madero administration found common ground in their disapproval of the new constitution, and they immediately began expressing their disgust at the constitutional convention. Calero wrote a petition which formally protested the newly ratified document. Revista Mexicana published the protest on March 18, 1917, and García Naranjo frequently updated readers about the reactions of the exile community to the protest and the new constitution. The protest stated that the authors of the 1857 code personified “the highest concepts that a conscientious people” could uphold: “civil liberty, political liberty, institutions, [and] Patria!” More importantly, the Constitution of 1857 established a legitimate Mexican nation with a stable political

323 Knight, Counter-revolution and Reconstruction, 470.
foundation. The protestors argued that the instability of the early nineteenth century resulted from a
disregard for the Constitution of 1824, leaders who sought personal power instead of the good of the
nation, and foreign powers who did not take Mexican sovereignty seriously. Although the liberals of the
1850s and 1860s were imperfect and at times violated constitutional principles, they set goals to move
the nation towards democracy and progress. The Constitution of 1857 “saved the republic during its
struggle against the [Hapsburg] monarchy…and the foreign invader.” Sixty years after its ratification, it
continued to serve as the primary outline of Mexican ideals and a dominant symbol of Mexican national
identity. Calero emphasized the importance of the constitution in maintaining national unity. He wrote
that the exiles who protested the Constitution of 1917 were not united under a single political faction.
On the contrary, they were often divided by “deep” ideological differences, but they “were all liberals,
determined to prevent the death of the glorious work” of La Reforma.

Calero and the other opponents of the new constitution (many of them lawyers) pointed out the
illegality of the Carranza regime and the constitutional convention. Legally, the Constitution of 1857
formed the basis of the nation and its institutions, and Mexico achieved peace because the public
accepted to live under this law. Anyone who acted outside of the law, who disrupted social and political
order, could be classified as a rebel and a traitor. Calero condemned Carranza and his associates as
“corrupt” participants in the “grotesque [and] farsical” constitutional congress. He also stated that
Mexican population “would never accept that the symbolic and sacred Code that saved the republic
against the [French] invader be substituted by a fraudulent code, formed by men devoid of
patriotism.”

Calero, a former Maderista, argued that the revolutionaries before Carranza sought to
work within the parameters of the law, and Díaz was overthrown because he did not respect the
constitution. Even Huerta upheld the Constitution of 1857, if only rhetorically. Carranza, on the other

---

hand, nullified the law and replaced it. From the legal standpoint presented by the protestors, Carranza was the real usurper, not Huerta.

This argument may have helped Porfiristas to reconcile some of the ideological differences they had with the other exiles. For example, García Naranjo completely opposed the revolution, but he agreed that Díaz had been in power for too long, which led to his downfall. He and other urban-professional Porfiristas criticized the científicos precisely because of their reluctance to step down from their positions of power. Porfiristas and other exiles may have disagreed on the attributes and flaws of Díaz and Madero, but they agreed that the Constitution of 1857 gave Mexico its legitimate political foundation.

The protesters staged a year-long effort against the Constitution of 1917, beginning with the publication of Calero’s petition. This document was signed by exiles from various factions, including members of the Madero and Huerta cabinets, former governors who had aligned with Huerta, and other Porfiristas such as Leonides González, *La Prensa’s* business manager. Aureliano Blanquet, Pedro del Villar (Félix Díaz’s official representative), and General Luis Fuentes (Huerta’s son-in-law) also asked to be included. *Revista Mexicana* encouraged participation from its readers, and the magazine included a form which readers were to sign and return to the magazine’s office in order to have their name included on the petition written by Calero.

Moheno also criticized the new constitution. He wrote a series of articles in which he questioned the new amendment that prohibited clergy from teaching at any school, arguing that it went against

---

326 “*La Protesta y Sus Firmantes.*” *Revista Mexicana*, Mar. 18, 1917. *Revista Mexicana* published the names of the men who signed the protest, including: Moheno, García Naranjo, Gorostieta, Jesús Flores Magón, De la Fuente, Rafael Martínez Carrillo (former Sub-Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior), Salomé Botello (former governor of Nuevo León), Ramón Rosales (former governor of Hidalgo), José Catellot (former governor of Campeche), Carlos García Hidalgo (former governor of Aguascalientes), former senator Carlos Castillo, former deputy Pascual Alva, Colonels Francisco de P. Álvarez and Eduardo Fernández Guerra, Dr. David Cerna, Dr. Andrés Tamez, Dr. Leopoldo Calvillo, Leonides González, Eduardo I. Martínez, Guillermo Castillo Nájera, Antonio Elizondo, Jorge B. Warden, Perfecto Irabién Rosado, Jose Mondragón (brother of General of Manuel Mondragón), Guillermo Rosas, Jr., Manuel Escudero, Guillermo Aguirre y Fierro, Federico García y Alba, Carlos Serrano, José Rebollar, and Luis Reyes Spíndola (son of the former owner of *El Imparcial*).

327 *Revista Mexicana* did not indicate whether anyone submitted this form.
common sense. Catholic priests and missionaries had always been an important element of public instruction in Mexico. The federal budget could not effectively cover the costs of funding educators for the entire nation, which meant that removing clergy would drastically reduce the number of teachers and severely undermine the Mexican education system. Moheno wrote that he expected nothing more from the constitutional congress, full of men “lacking real culture and free of any spiritual integrity, but full of haughty self-importance.”

Furthermore, Moheno attacked the censorship of the press in Mexico by the Carranza regime, which went against the new constitution’s provisions for freedom of the press. On April 10, 1917, the government issued a decree prohibiting the publication of any slander, libel or “false or altered information.” Breaking this law could result “in a fine of fifty to five-hundred pesos, or one to eleven months in prison.” Moheno sarcastically responded to this rule by exclaiming that “in Mexico there is complete freedom of the press…for everyone who publishes whatever pleases the government. Admirable!”

The federal government strictly censored Mexican media and prohibited anti-Carranza U.S. newspapers such as La Prensa and Revista Mexicana from circulating in Mexico, though smugglers still managed to move the newspapers across the U.S./Mexico border.

The Catholic Church also protested the Constitution of 1917 because of its anti-clerical reforms. The exiled members of the clergy were spread out across Havana, Chicago, San Antonio, and Los Angeles, and the church leadership developed and signed its own petition. Supporters included: Archbishops José Mora y del Río, Leopoldo Ruiz, Martín Tritschler, Francisco Mendoza y Herrera, and Francisco Plancarte, and Bishops Ignacio Valdespino, Francisco Uranga Sáenz, Jesús María Echavarría y Aguirre, Juan Herrera y Piña, Miguel de la Mora, Vicente Castellanos, and Maximino Ruiz y Flores.

---

328 Moheno, Sobre el Ara Sangrienta, 229-230.
329 Ibid., 249-250.
330 Ramírez Rancaño, 75.
They protested Article 3, which kept clergy from public instruction, Article 24, which banned public religious displays, Article 27, which prohibited the Church from acquiring property, and Article 130, which among other things, outlawed any political parties affiliated with any religious institution (such as the Catholic Party).331

The Porfiristas generally took the same conciliatory approach to church/state relations as Díaz had. Those who supported Calero’s petition criticized the Church for reigniting the old conflict between conservatives and liberals instead of working with the broader exile community. In their protest, the bishops stated that they would not question the legitimacy of the Constitution of 1917 because “their purpose was not to be political;” they only wanted to “defend…religious liberty.”332 Revista Mexicana pointed out that the bishops were, in fact, being political in their own media, Revista Católica (El Paso) and Ecos de la Catedral (San Antonio). Each journal called the liberal exiles hypocrites for wanting the clergy to act politically, when they had been forced “to live a parasitic life in the corners of sacristies” by liberal politicians. The clergy also stated that liberalism was fundamentally anti-clerical; why would they help “the children of those liberals who half a decade ago burned churches and convents, stole Church property, [and] executed priests?” The Diocese of San Antonio also complained because the liberals pressured the Church to become involved in the political conflict. García Naranjo stated that this was not true, and that the liberals only criticized the bishops for not acting in solidarity with the rest of the exiles. He added that the selfishness of the Church, “the lack of a spirit of sacrifice [and its] traditional egoism,” caused its downfall, not liberal policy.333

The conflict between the Church and the Porfiristas was further complicated by the religious leanings of the exiles themselves. For example, García Naranjo and Gamboa were practicing Catholics.

331 Ibid., 320.
332 “Las Dos Protestas,” Revista Mexicana, Aug. 11, 1918.
333 Ibid., “El Clero Mexicano y la Política.”
They respected the memory and legacy of secular liberals such as Juárez, but these men also
demonstrated religious fervor; for them, liberalism and Catholicism did not conflict. These men were
products of the Porfiriato, negotiators who believed that Dáaz’s conciliatory policies toward the church
had been ideal practice. Leaning too much in one direction in favor of or against religion resulted in
chaos and civil war. When Revista Católica and Ecos de Catedral attacked Revista Mexicana, an
unnamed author came to García Naranjo’s defense. This person wrote a piece for Revista Mexicana
entitled “Conservative Intelligentsia,” which contained a list of conservative Catholics who were given
important posts by García Naranjo during his tenure as Minister of Public Instruction. This article
also agreed with García Naranjo’s sentiments that if the Church faced struggles and problems, it only
had itself to blame. García Naranjo expressed his gratitude for the support he received (though he did
not specifically name anyone), and took another opportunity to denounce the Catholics “who organized
a crusade” against him and his colleagues. He wondered why the Church had not openly spoken out
against liberalism in the previous years of exile, and why so many Catholics in Mexico now supported
the anti-clerical Carranza after having been granted legal and economic benefits by Díaz under the
Constitution of 1857. According to García Naranjo, Catholic liberals were not anti-clerical; they wanted
“virtuous Clergy” and “honor and prestige in all institutions.”

The protests against the Constitution of 1917 brought together Mexicans of various political and
religious factions in a debate about the ideological foundations of Mexico. These disputes showed that
despite the efforts of Juárez, Díaz, and other nineteenth-century liberals, Mexicans remained deeply
divided about how to structure and rule Mexico. For Calero, García Naranjo, and other self-proclaimed
liberals, there was no question that it should be done within the framework of the Constitution of 1857.

334 Ibid., “Intelectualidad Conservadora,” Sep. 8, 1918. García Naranjo named Bishop Valverde Téllez and Father Mariano
Cuevas to the National Academy of History. He also named conservative Francisco Pascual García Secretary of the Superior
Council for Public Education, and he offered the position of Director of the School of Medicine to conservative Dr. Fernando
Zárraga after conservative Dr. Urrutia resigned.

335 Ibid., “Homenaje de Gratitud;” “El Clero Mexicano y la Política.”
This document represented the foundation of Mexican nationalism, a symbol of Mexico’s entry into the civilized world. These exiles would continue their protests and counter-revolutionary efforts against the Carranza regime, but their political unity would not last more than a year. As their resources became exhausted, the exiles fought an increasingly uphill battle until the revolution decisively triumphed in 1920.

**The Politics of Exile, 1917-1920**

The exiles took advantage of the momentum of the 1917 protests to develop counter-revolutionary coalitions, and Félix Díaz and Blanquet formed an alliance for military action in Mexico. However, they faced similar problems as they had in 1914 and 1915. The Mexican government now employed Secret Service agents in the United States along the U.S./Mexico border, at the request of the Mexican Consuls. The Carranza government was especially careful to trace political activity in San Antonio, though Secret Service Agents also worked in cities including Los Angeles and El Paso. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice kept surveillance on exile activities. Despite the obstacles, the exiles remained diligent in their efforts against the Carranza government.

A number of Porfiristas continued to support Díaz, who had become a symbolic leader of the protest against the Constitution of 1917 because his father, Félix Díaz, Sr., had helped frame the Constitution of 1857. Henderson argues that men including Gamboa and Rodolfo Reyes were among the “converts” who had lost faith in Díaz but “regained their enthusiasm” for him in 1917. However, Henderson does not take into account the friendships between Díaz and these men from decades before.

---

336 Pedro del Villar to Guillermo Rosas, Apr. 12, 1916, MGFD, DCXXI. 1. 102. 2. The Carranza government received reports of an alliance between Díaz and Blanquet as early as 1916.


Gamboa expressed support for Díaz throughout his memoirs (written as the events took place), particularly after the Decena Trágica, and Reyes remained friends with Díaz even after the fall of the Huerta regime.  

Díaz’s supporters helped him in various ways in strategic locations, including New Orleans (his home base), New York, and Guatemala, where he had the backing of the Manuel Estrada Cabrera dictatorship. Pedro del Villar lived in New York City, and was in charge of the finances of the Felicista movement.  

The Felicistas attempted to raise funds through alliances with American businessmen, but their efforts backfired. Cecilio Ocón, one of the main conspirators in the cuartelazo of 1913, convinced a group of Chicago bankers to exchange $600,000 U.S. dollars for $2 million in worthless Felicista bonds, but the U.S. State Department quickly caught on to Ocón’s schemes. Moreover, the Felicistas were betrayed by a New Orleans businessman Charles E. Jones. According to Michael M. Smith, “Jones had played a dangerous and still largely undetermined role in Mexican and Central American revolutionary affairs.” Jones worked in arms trafficking and served as an agent for the U.S. Department of Justice as a spy against Díaz and Villa. He infiltrated the Felicista movement by 1917, frequently corresponding with Del Villar, Blanquet, and the Díaz family to discuss personal, political, and financial information. In March 1918, Jones offered to sell all of the information he

340 Rodolfo Reyes and Pedro del Villar to Guillermo Rosas, New York, Jul. 22, 1916, MGFD, DCXXI. 1. 107. 2; Reyes to Guillermo Rosas, New York, Jul. 23, 1916, MGFD, DCXXI. 1. 108. 1; Reyes to Pedro del Villar, New York, Jul. 22, 1918, MGFD, DCXXI. 2. 131. 1[1-2]; Reyes to Félix Díaz, Bilbao, Spain, Nov. 13, 1920, MGFD, DCXXI. 2. 189. 1

341 Ramírez Rancaño, 180-190. The author offers a thorough analysis of Estrada Cabrera’s ties to the Mexican counter-revolutionary efforts in chapter 9 of his work; Antonio Hernández Ferrer to Ministry of Foreign Relations, Nov. 1917, SRE 17-7-264: 1. This document was written by the Mexican Consul in San Salvador, asking for surveillance on Díaz supporter Enrique Olvera, demonstrating a possible Felicista connection in El Salvador.


343 Henderson, Félix Díaz, 134.


345 Charles E. Jones, New Orleans, 1917, MGFD, DCXXI. 2. 214. 1a; Pedro del Villar to Félix Díaz, New York, Jul. 21, 1921, MGFD, DCXXI. 2. 213. 2.
gathered to the Mexican Consul in New Orleans, but opted instead to disclose everything to a Senate Committee led by Albert B. Fall in 1920.346

Despite these setbacks, Díaz and his allies continued their efforts. The Carranza government believed to have evidence that Ocón communicated with Francisco Carvajal (in New Orleans) and his former Minister of Foreign Relations and of the Interior José María Luján (in El Paso), Creel and his brother-in-law Alberto Terrazas (in Los Angeles), and Urrutia, Lozano, and the Vázquez Gómez brothers (in San Antonio).347 García Naranjo used Revista Mexicana to promote the Felicista cause, and Díaz frequently appeared on the magazine’s cover. The editor also published pro-Díaz articles, including one written by Dr. Ignacio Alcocer entitled “Why I am a Felicista.” The author applauded the general for his consistency in defending liberalism and religious freedom since the onset of the revolution.348 Revista Mexicana also published “To My Friends in Chiapas,” in which Querido Moheno (a former anti-Felicista) asked his compatriots to support Díaz.349

However, not all Porfirista exiles supported Díaz. In September 1917, García Naranjo wrote a letter to Francisco León de la Barra (who lived in Paris) expressing his belief in the decline of Carrancismo, especially after the ratification of the new constitution.350 However, in early 1918, García Naranjo’s tone had changed. He expressed his disappointment at the ineffectiveness of the protests against the Carranza regime, stating that “many times [the exiles] attempted to make their voice heard” though no one bothered to listen. He asked De la Barra to act as the “moral ambassador” of the exile community, since he was respected internationally, and García Naranjo gathered letters of support from

346 Smith, 83.

347 Mexican Consul General of New York, May 7, 1918, AVC, XXI. 122. 13766. 1


350 Nemesio García Naranjo to Francisco León de la Barra, San Antonio, Sep. 19, 1917, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO, Mexico City, Manuscritos de Francisco León de la Barra (hereafter cited as FLB), X-1. 7. 736. 1
exiles in cities including New York, New Orleans, Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso.\(^{351}\) De la Barra used his legal training to discuss the problems in Mexico on an international level, and he declined offers from the exiles to join any specific political faction because he believed it would hurt his credibility.\(^{352}\) In early 1919, he met with President Wilson, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and Wilson’s advisor “Colonel” Edward M. House.\(^{353}\) De la Barra also formed part of the Committee for International Law at the end of World War I, and he took part in the peace negotiations at Versailles, unlike Alberto Pani, the representative from the Carranza government. As Henderson points out, to the chagrin of the Carranza administration, a former member of Porfirio Díaz’s administration became the accepted representative of Mexico in international relations.\(^{354}\)

De la Barra represented a sector of the Porfirista exiles that chose to remain neutral to the factionalism within the counter-revolutionary movement. Henderson suggests that this was a result of the lack of confidence in Díaz’s political and military leadership, but it also reflects the influence of geography and class on the exile community. The members of the Porfirista diaspora faced certain obstacles and advantages specific to their location. The first wave of exiles, the científicos and aristocrats who left with Porfirio Díaz, settled in Europe and detached from the chaos in Mexico. The exiles that moved to Europe during the second wave of the diaspora also distanced themselves from Mexican politics. De la Barra and Reyes, for example, articulated their support for the counter-revolution, but did not directly take part in it. Instead, they focused on French and Spanish politics, respectively. They now had jobs in Europe and they were supporting their families far from the

\(^{351}\) Nemesio García Naranjo to Francisco León de la Barra, San Antonio, Jan. 2, 1918, FLB, X-1. 8. 772. 1.


\(^{353}\) Francisco León de la Barra to Tomás Macmanus, Paris, Dec. 9, 1918, FLB, X-1. 8. 850. 1.

homeland. Reyes even expressed his excitement about returning to the country he considered to be his motherland, and when his fourth son was born in Madrid, Reyes was happy to say that he was the father of a Spaniard.

The exiles in Havana criticized and conspired against the Carranza regime, but they did not have direct access to Mexico the way their counterparts in the United States did. Havana was also a less volatile location, where Mexican residents did not have to deal with the violence and racism prevalent along the U.S./Mexico border. Those who chose to live in the southwestern United States faced a greater amount of uncertainty and surveillance. It would have been difficult to live in a city such as San Antonio or El Paso and remain neutral to political events. On the other hand, proximity to Mexico allowed these exiles to retain cultural unity both among themselves and with the general immigrant population.

As the decade came to an end, Porfiristas in the United States continued the political struggle against Carranza, despite the mounting obstacles. Although they united with exiles from various political factions in protest against the Constitution of 1917, by late 1918, the exiles developed organizations that again marked their political divisions. The Alianza Liberal Mexicana (Mexican Liberal Alliance) formed in New York on November 7, 1918, with the goal of uniting the “distinct liberal factions” for the purpose of implementing the “ideals of redemption” of the revolution of 1910. The Liberal Alliance stated that it was not a “militant political party,” and that it wanted to secure individual rights and work for labor and agricultural unions. However, the by-laws stated that the alliance promoted “tolerance of all opinions,” but expressly prohibited the membership of anyone affiliated with the Huerta regime.

---

355 Reyes, De Mi Vida, Memorias Políticas, Vol. 3 (México: Jus, 1948), 31-32; Ramírez Rancaño, 233.

The Liberal Alliance was in fact a largely Villista organization that included Felipe Ángeles and Miguel Díaz Lombardo (“Villa’s highest civilian official”). Not all members were Villistas, though. Calero participated because he shared the view that “the constitution of 1917…was undemocratic, and that Mexico should return to the liberal constitution of 1857.” Vasconcelos and Jesús Flores Magón were also reported members. Ángeles presented the Liberal Alliance’s manifesto to Villa in an effort to convince him to adopt it as his official plan. According to Friedrich Katz, “Villa was quite willing to accommodate his old comrade in political terms. Even before Angeles joined him, he had agreed to accept a [similar] program.” However, this did not make much of a difference among Villa’s followers in Mexico. Katz argues that by 1918, the dynamic of the revolution had changed, and “the time when a manifesto could mobilize the whole people, as Madero’s Plan of San Luis Potosí had done in 1910 or Zapata’s Plan of Ayala had done in 1911, had long passed. Plans and manifestos were a dime a dozen in revolutionary Mexico,” and had little relationship to military power.

In response to the Liberal Alliance, the Porfiristas formed the short-lived Asociación Unionista Mexicana (Mexican Unification Association) in January 1919, under the motto “Unity and Constitution of 57.” According to Carrancista reports, the organization was headquartered in El Paso. The organization’s members, however, were spread across the United States and Havana. They included: former members of the Huerta cabinet such as Blanquet, VeraEstañol, Gorostieta, Moheno, Olaguíbel, García Naranjo, and other distinguished exiles such as José Mondragón, Luis Reyes Spíndola, De la

---


358 Ibid., 691.


Fuente, Elguero, and González. Calero and Jesús Flores Magón also participated, and the association named De la Barra an honorary member in September.\textsuperscript{361}

The Carrancista surveillance carefully monitored the Liberal Alliance and the Unionist Association, and the government was pleased with the growing division among the exiles. In February 1919, Carlos Contreras reported to the Mexican Consul in El Paso that Vera Estañol formed his own group, the Alianza Nacionalista (Nationalist Alliance), in Los Angeles, writing that he creators of the first two organizations disapproved, believing that the new alliance “completely vulgarized the principle of ‘union.’”\textsuperscript{362} A few days after Conteras’s report, however, Revista Mexicana published the Nationalist Alliance’s manifesto, and the magazine actually applauded this group for uniting liberals in California. The staff of Revista Mexicana did not criticize Vera Estañol or the other founders; on the contrary, the magazine expressed solidarity between the Committee for National Unity, which had recently formed in San Antonio, the Unionist Association in El Paso, and the Nationalist Alliance in Los Angeles. García Naranjo even traveled to El Paso to speak on this topic to his compatriots there. However, Revista Mexicana did question why the Nationalist Alliance wanted to work with the Liberal Alliance, since the latter did not collectively seek the restoration of the Constitution of 1857.\textsuperscript{363} Meanwhile, Contreras’s report likely heightened Carrancista paranoia, and it demonstrated the potential unreliability of the surveillance.

Despite their efforts, these groups faced a terrible setback in April 1919 when Blanquet was killed in a Felicista revolt in Veracruz. Henderson suggests that Felicismo began to decline in 1918 after Manuel Peláez, Díaz’s most important financier, a rebel who controlled the oil fields in Tampico,

\textsuperscript{361} Carlos Contreras to the Mexican Consul General, El Paso, Jan. 27, 1919, SRE, L-E-804: 3: 9; Joaquín Téllez to Francisco León de la Barra, El Paso, Sep. 28, 1919, FLB, X-1. 10. 1169. 1.

\textsuperscript{362} Carlos Contreras to the Mexican Consul General, El Paso, Feb. 8, 1919, SRE, L-E-804: 3: 21.

\textsuperscript{363} “La Alianza Nacionalista,” Revista Mexicana, Feb. 16, 1919.
abandoned the cause. Nevertheless, Blanquet and Díaz conspired and decided to launch an offensive in Veracruz in early 1919. Ramírez Rancaño argues that Blanquet used this opportunity to seek revenge against Carranza. As Huerta’s running mate in the October 1913 elections, “Blanquet believed he was the vice-president of the republic.” When he was forced to resign from the Ministry of War (and the unofficial vicepresidency), he left Mexico “with hurt pride.” By 1919, Blanquet retained the respect of the Porfirista exiles, but he was now a sixty-eight year old man in failing health. Even if Blanquet had the strength to effectively carry out a revolt, U.S. and Mexican authorities were fully aware of his movements across the United States and into Mexico, as well as his plans to meet Díaz in March. In Veracruz, General Guadalupe Sánchez surprised Blanquet, General Pedro Gabay, and their men, and Blanquet was killed on April 7, 1919.

The international press covered the story, sensationalized when the Mexico City newspaper *El Universal* published a photo of Blanquet’s head, which Sánchez severed and carried to the city of Veracruz as his trophy. *El Universal* was directed by Félix F. Palavicini, the man who shut down *El Imparcial*, and it was the primary Carrancista medium in Mexico City. The newspaper celebrated Blanquet’s death, especially since he was the “most important figure in Huertismo” following Huerta. Meanwhile in San Antonio, *Revista Mexicana* mourned Blanquet. The newspaper dedicated a section to the fallen general on March 30, listing all of his military and political achievements, although it was no

---


365 Ramírez Rancaño, 350.


367 “La Circular de Nuestro Director a los Periódicos Cubanos,” *El Pueblo*, Apr. 19, 1919. Staff member Gregorio A. Velázquez sent the report of Blanquet’s death to the directors of various Cuban newspapers, including: *La Discusión*, *La Lucha*, *El Heraldo de Cuba*, *El Imparcial*, *El Mundo*, and *El Diario de la Marina*.

The exile community then dealt with the political repercussions of the attempted revolt in Veracruz. In late April 1919, García Naranjo was charged with violating U.S. neutrality laws as a co-conspirator with Blanquet, Díaz, and Gayón (who was also arrested in New York City). In his memoirs, García Naranjo explained that he and Gayón communicated in late March and early April. Gayón wished to meet up with Blanquet, and he was considering contacting some associates in northern Mexico in order to obtain information on him. García Naranjo discouraged this idea because of the constant surveillance in the border region, and he told Gayón that he believed Blanquet was in Veracruz. Nonetheless, García Naranjo obliged Gayón’s request for a letter of presentation for his trip into northern Mexico. The letter was intercepted and used as evidence against the two men, although García Naranjo claimed that he sent it to Gayón after Blanquet died. Initially, García Naranjo’s attorney Marshall Hicks believed that his client would be found not guilty because only the letter (and not *Revista Mexicana*) could be taken into account as evidence, since journalistic endeavors were not punishable under U.S. neutrality laws. However, when the trial approached the following year, the prosecutor informed Hicks that all of García Naranjo’s articles criticizing Wilson, former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, and other U.S. officials would be translated to English and admitted as evidence of conspiracy. Johnson suggested that García Naranjo plead guilty and pay a fine; otherwise, a trial by jury could result in a more severe punishment. Arturo García Naranjo convinced his brother

---


371 García Naranjo, 8: 360; Telegram to Venustiano Carranza, Laredo, Tamaulipas, Apr. 25, 1919, SRE, 17-16-199.
Nemesio to plead guilty in order to avoid a scandal that would hurt the exile cause, and because being charged with a political crime was “always relative and sometimes honorable.”

Blanquet’s death dealt a final blow to the exile efforts against the Carranza regime. Huerta and Blanquet were deceased, Manuel Mondragón was sixty years old, and the younger Díaz continued to prove he was an inept military officer. There was no possibility for the exiles to successfully overthrow the Carranza regime without a strong military leader. More importantly, Blanquet’s death shed light on a problem specific to the Porfirista community. In 1919, most of the científicos were dead, and most of the military officers who served during the Porfiriato were also dead or advanced in age. Most of the remaining Porfiristas were significantly older, and there was no new generation of soldiers, lawyers, doctors, politicians, or writers who adhered to the values of Porfirismo in Mexico. The exiles would have to pass their values on to their children and to the Mexican community-at-large, or else Porfirismo would die out.

The intellectuals took on this task, but by 1920, Porfirismo had lost its steam and hopes for a counter-revolution were mostly gone. In January, García Naranjo was forced to shut down Revista Mexicana due to financial difficulties. Four months later, Carranza was assassinated. Villa negotiated a cease fire with the interim president Adolfo de la Huerta in July, and Díaz surrendered to Sánchez and went into exile in October. Álvaro Obregón assumed the presidency on November 30, 1920, and the revolution definitively triumphed. Despite their defeat, the Porfirista exiles remained committed to their nation, and they worked with and against the Mexican government as they saw fit throughout the following decades. They also remained true to their identities despite being cast as Mexico’s villains, and they continued to use the exile press to share their Porfirista values.

---

372 García Naranjo, 8: 362-367.
Chapter 4: *La Prensa, Revista Mexicana, and the Public Sphere*

“While I addressed the exiles, [Ignacio E.] Lozano formed a tie with the [group] that he liked to call ‘México de afuera’ and who had nothing to do with our political and social convulsions. I was a migratory bird, supported and sustained by other migratory birds…when the flock [returned to Mexico], I lost my clientele and was…condemned to suspend my effort when I desired to fight the most. Lozano, on the other hand, by connecting to a permanent audience, gave *La Prensa* an…unshakeable foundation.”

- Nemesio García Naranjo

This chapter will analyze *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* as products of their volatile environment, and as texts that set specific cultural and political norms for their transnational audiences. I will first situate them within their historical context by exploring the ways in which these media continued the tradition of the Porfirista newspapers *El Imparcial, La Patria, and Violetas del Anáhuac*. Journalists and writers helped to establish what Jürgen Habermas calls a “modern public sphere” in Mexico. Lozano and García Naranjo continued this process in el México de afuera and contributed to the burgeoning “U.S.-Mexican literary culture” on the border.

This newspaper and magazine formed an integral part of the exile network spanning the United States, Havana, and Europe, and Mexico’s most prolific intellectuals of the early twentieth century contributed to the two San Antonio publications. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* sought to instill Porfirista values in their audiences, but each took a different approach in reaching out to their readers. *La Prensa* called itself politically neutral, and it focused on reporting news from Mexico to all immigrants, regardless of their ideological position. *Revista Mexicana* was a more reactionary publication that used editorials and satire to openly criticize the revolution. Both media initially found great success, but *Revista Mexicana* shut down in 1920, while *La Prensa* circulated until 1963. The similarities and differences in the trajectories of these publications can be explained by analyzing their content using the framework of political economy. Media scholars such as Douglas Kellner use political economy to examine “cultural texts within their system of production and distribution.” According to
Kellner, “the system of production often determines what sort of artifacts will be produced, what structural limits there will be as to what can and cannot be said and shown, and what sort of audience effects the text may generate…and it can also help determine the limits and range of political and ideological discourses and effects.”

Political economy explains how certain media become hegemonic, or “mainstream,” how institutions use media to promote notions of class, race, and gender, and the ways in which audiences use their consumer power to consent to, or oppose, the messages presented by media. The news reports, editorials, and advertising within *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* were the primary texts used in efforts to assert Porfirista cultural hegemony in the borderlands. A close analysis of this content will offer insight into the challenges and successes that Lozano, García Naranjo, and their colleagues faced and enjoyed as they worked to sustain their identity in the chaotic 1910s.

**The Porfirista Press, the Public Sphere, and National Identity**

Habermas defines the public sphere as that in which “private people come together as a public” and use reason and logic to discuss and contest the political authority of the state. In mid- to late-eighteenth-century Europe, the literary public sphere developed in salons and coffee houses in which the bourgeoisie (the literate and often wealthy members of society) gathered to discuss art, theatre, and literature. These media were commodified in institutions such as museums for the bourgeoisie’s consumption in the public realm, and newspapers became the primary tool for expressing cultural criticism. Habermas argues that the existence of “institutions of the public…with forums for

---


discussion” helped the “world of letters” to evolve into a political, and masculine, public sphere.375 As men gained access to power by becoming property owners and participants in growing capitalist and industrial societies, they engaged in dialogue and criticism to discuss the regulation of the private realm. Public opinion served as the expression of this new political consciousness, which countered the absolute sovereignty of monarchs, “articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws,” and asserted itself “as the only legitimate source of this law.”376

Habermas conceptualized the public sphere as a republican space through which all rational members of society could voice their opinions in order to achieve general consensus and check the power of the state. Geoff Eley argues that this is problematic because it consists of “an ideal of critical liberalism that remains historically unattained.”377 Problems with the public sphere arose because it established normative, patriarchal structures for civil society which justified inclusion and exclusion. Women, men who did not own property, and the illiterate population (all non-rational) were excluded from political dialogue, though educated women could participate in the literary sphere. Ideally, as literacy expanded within a liberal nation-state, the growing rational population would use dialogue to peacefully influence politics, but the opposite was actually true. As people with more diverse opinions entered the public realm, the possibilities for conflict and violence increased. In order to avoid these tensions, the state and the rational members of society sought to control literacy and information, defeating the original intent of the public sphere.

375 Ibid., 51.

376 Ibid., 54.

These were the conditions in late nineteenth-century Mexico, where Porfirio Díaz censored the press in order to maintain peace and achieve hegemony. The científicos believed that by creating a homogenous nationalistic discourse through media, they could control the masses (even in a mostly illiterate society) and sustain their power. Ernesto Laclau calls this the “hegemonic operation,” through which the group in power convinces civil society that it has its best interests in mind. The established “hegemonic relation” relies on “the production of tendentially empty signifiers” which members of the power structures use to “take up the representation” of civil society. Michel Foucault argues that when a power structure uses discourse to give these signifiers specific meanings, this knowledge becomes an accepted truth and the basis for ‘authentic’ identity. However, the concept of hegemony also accounts for the agency of civil society, which also uses discourse to accept these signifiers and a community identity. According to Benedetto Fontana, as power structures and civil society engage in discourse and the politics of representation, a circular power struggle develops in which the members of society are constantly negotiating the discursive formation of their identities.

In order to construct the signifiers necessary to claim legitimate representation over the Mexican population, the Díaz administration needed the help of Mexico’s writers and journalists. In the 1890s, José Y. Limantour suggested to Díaz that they align with a newspaper that would allow the científicos to “treat certain issues with the public” in an unofficial manner. El Imparcial was chosen to “explain and defend the actions, projects, and determinations” of the government to its broad audience. In return, the

---

378 The same dynamic occurred in post-revolutionary Mexico in the 1920s. The state supported art and cultural initiatives that emphasized Mexico’s indigeneity in order to carry out its nation-building and hegemonic efforts. See Rick A. López, Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 129.


administration rewarded *El Imparcial* with a subsidy, though Limantour claimed that Director Rafael Reyes Spíndola never asked for any compensation for his service to Díaz.³⁸² Reyes Spíndola soon became part of the influential group of publishers, journalists, and writers which Ángel Rama refers to as *letrados* (or “men of letters”). Leetrados had been essential for the development of Latin America since the colonial period, and their purpose was to “prescribe an order for the physical world, to construct norms for community life, to limit the development of spontaneous social innovations, and to prevent them from spreading in the body politic.”³⁸³ These men displayed a “penchant for entrenching themselves within the administrative structures of state power,” which was especially important in counteracting the influence of the Catholic Church.³⁸⁴ By controlling literacy, the men of letters upheld class structures in which they maintained their privileges. They also manipulated the production of knowledge and used it to construct national identities and histories, claim and rename urban spaces, and grant authenticity to oral traditions.

Rama suggests that Mexico’s modernization in the late nineteenth-century represented a “triumph of the lettered city.” As letrados such as Justo Sierra helped to spread education and literacy, “the proliferation of the written word permitted [them] to discipline the countryside, imposing homogeneity and social hygiene.”³⁸⁵ Rural customs were allowed to exist, but only within the context of modern Mexican history and literature. At the same time, letrados used the press to whitewash Mexican national identity and incorporate high European culture within Mexican identity in order to “elevate the masses” and create a rational, positivist society.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 22.
³⁸⁵ Ibid., 66.
El Imparcial became the primary científico medium during the Porfiriato, but La Patria also privileged the positivist, modern Mexican national identity despite its opposition to the científicos. El Imparcial published news from around the world, as well as cultural content such as sports and fashion. La Patria focused on social commentary, and between 1884 and 1896, Paz published La Patria Ilustrada, a weekly magazine consisting of literature, satire, and illustrations. The political differences between the two newspapers were evident from the beginning, and Paz consistently criticized the científicos and their elitism, appealing to Porfiristas increasingly resentful of the class disparities in Mexico. Nevertheless, both publications supported Díaz and his modernization efforts, and applauded the changes that took place during the late Porfiriato. In the late 1910s, La Prensa and Revista Mexicana would exhibit similar dynamics: both newspapers were ideologically Porfirista, but Lozano emphasized global news, and García Naranjo used his magazine as a medium for political commentary.

Women also participated in the Porfirista press, and Violetas del Anáhuac became the most important woman’s newspaper of the Porfiriato. Violetas del Anáhuac (1887-1888), published by Ignacio Pujol, was directed by Laureana Wright de Kleinhans, “the most brilliant and radical defender of women’s emancipation” of her time. Gabriela Cano argues that Wright de Kleinhans “believed the most important task for women was to work for moral and intellectual education and moral strength, since they were the only tools with which they could achieve independence and leave behind the narrowness of the domestic sphere.” Mexican modernity was inherently patriarchal, and the success of individuals, families, and the national body depended on the practice of specific gender roles that determined the function of the public and private spheres. Femininity was defined by domesticity, but

386 As demonstrated in chapter two, the animosity between Paz and the científicos was also a result of the duel between Paz and Santiago Sierra Méndez.

387 Cano, 112.
women began to assert their place within the world of the men of letters, while simultaneously blurring the line between the public and private.

Each issue of *Violetas del Anáhuac* began with a biography of a woman prominent in society and/or literature, and the first edition featured Carmen Romero Rubio de Díaz, who was considered the ideal Mexican woman because she epitomized propriety, beauty, and elegance. This publication celebrated femininity and granted women a space to claim their agency. *Violetas del Anáhuac* discussed religion, art, history, and literature, as well as science and hygiene. The newspaper published a series in 1888 on positivism, in which the writer contemplated issues such as materialism, science versus spirituality, and the theories set forth by men, including Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin, relating to the nature of the world and humanity. The contributors to *Violetas del Anáhuac* were *letradas* actively engaged in current intellectual discourse, and they encouraged their readers to emulate them. While positioning women as equals to men in their importance to society, they also celebrated the differences between the genders. As mothers, Mexican women had the duty to raise healthy, strong, intelligent children that would improve the nation and the race. They could also step into the public realm through philanthropy and civic participation, which coincided with their “motherly” role for improving society.

Cano and Cristina D. Ramírez suggest that *Violetas del Anáhuac* represented an early form of Mexican feminism in which women used discourse to fight oppression. However, both scholars point out that women were limited in their approach, and the rhetoric in *Violetas del Anáhuac* represented a “form of mimicry.”388 The publication was written using the elevated language of the elite, a “florid European style” that did not make the newspaper accessible to the uneducated masses, but did grant it acceptance among Mexican intellectuals. Wright de Kleinhans and her peers worked within the patriarchal system to increase women’s presence in the public sphere. They also politicized the private sphere by redefining the home as a space in which women could carry out the national modernization

---

388 Cristina D. Ramírez, 13.

158
project. Nevertheless, men continued to control the press while relegating women to their domestic role and commodifying femininity.

The Porfirista press catered to the growing upper-class, and its gendered advertising and women’s columns demonstrated how women were also allowed to participate in society as consumers. As Kyla Schuller argues in her discussion of the “cosmetics of whiteness,” “the beauty industry was both structured by and produced ideas of race” in the early 1900s. In Mexico (and throughout the western world), women’s bodies became the site on which society imposed racial and class standards that marked whiteness as pure, and non-whiteness as dirty and/or evil. Although the científicos did not succeed in creating a widespread consumer base for their industrialization project, the elites and professional classes demanded products such as clothing, and cultural goods including opera and theatre in order to satisfy their desire to look, act, and be modern. Violetas del Anáhuac included a section in each issue detailing the latest play, opera, or social event, including visits from foreign dignitaries (and their wives) and balls hosted at the National Palace. In addition to being educated, women were supposed to participate in social events and be updated on the latest in fine arts. Again, Doña Carmen served as the primary example in this realm; she was the ideal hostess and intermediary between the private and public, the sacred and profane spheres. Daniel Thomas Cook argues that Émile Durkheim’s dichotomy of the “sacred and the profane” is problematic because “passage or communication between them is unavoidable in practice, making contamination of one by the other an ongoing concern…[thus] ritual interdictions are required to render contact between the two domains rare and safe.” In order to achieve modernity, the Díaz administration needed a cultured female population that could move


390 Daniel Thomas Cook, *The Commodification of Childhood: The Children’s Clothing Industry and the Rise of the Child Consumer* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 9-10. Although Cook is referring to the moral implication of creating the child consumer, it is also applicable to women in the late 1800s, since women needed to become consumers before their children could.
between the spheres and participate in the growing economy. It sought to deal with the potential moral problems of women’s presence in the public realm by turning them into consumers of fashion and beauty products. These would make women more feminine, beautiful, clean, modern, and white.

By 1910, *El Imparcial* included a “Página para las Damas” (Ladies’ Page), which included advice from aristocratic women for female readers regarding the latest health trends and solutions for beauty problems. The newspaper published the “beauty secrets” of Madame Lina Calieri, an Italian opera singer considered the most beautiful woman in the world. She suggested that women sleep less during the summer, and take time to exercise and shower twice a day, though “very robust” women should shower three times (Calieri did not explain why). Calieri offered a number of recipes for face washes and creams, which included ingredients such as lemon juice, rose water, cucumber juice, and vaseline. Furthermore, women should be careful not to eat meat more than once a day, and to stay away from candy because sugar produced body heat. Calieri recommended that women eat fruit, as long as it was washed and showed no sign of rotting.\(^{391}\)

The Ladies’ Page also published a column by Lucille, Lady Duff Gordon, one of the most prominent European fashion designers of the early twentieth century. Lady Duff Gordon offered her “philosophy” on fashion accessories. For example, she noted that it was acceptable to wear bird feathers in French hats, but not in English hats because Queen Mary opposed the destruction of birds.\(^{392}\) In addition to Lady Duff Gordon’s column, *El Imparcial* published the “design of the day” from Europe, and the newspaper advertised dresses from Parisian designers such as Madame Rosinne Robert.\(^{393}\) The Porfirista press illustrated women’s beauty as European and aristocratic, clearly marking class

---

\(^{391}\) “Mis Secretos de Belleza,” *El Imparcial*, Aug. 21, 1910.

\(^{392}\) Ibid., “Mi Filosofía en los Accesorios,” Aug. 28, 1910.

\(^{393}\) Ibid., Aug. 29, 1910.
distinctions between Mexican women who could afford this standard and lower class **mestizas** and indigenous women who did not have the time or the money for such luxuries.

Although the Ladies’ Page upheld the link between beauty and purity, women were sexualized in the advertising throughout *El Imparcial*. Advertisements for Les Corsets Perséphone and the herbal supplement Pilules Orientales displayed a woman in a suggestive pose, wearing only a corset. The ad for Pilules Orientales promised women beautiful breasts like those of oriental women, since this part of the female anatomy was considered “the most perfect expression of feminine beauty” in the orient.\(^{394}\) Furthermore, herbal supplements and medicines were advertised by doctors as a solution for acne and other skin problems; one doctor even suggested that “skin eruptions resulted from bad blood.”\(^{395}\) These advertisements positioned all Mexican women as inferior because they were Mexican. “Bad blood,” including any traces of indigenous, African, or Asian ancestry, could literally disfigure a woman and destroy her beauty and worth. Women with financial means could hide their Mexican features by covering their bodies with European clothing, while correcting their blemishes with medicine and European creams and body washes. Moreover, Mexican women were not considered sexual unless they wore imported French corsets or enhanced their breasts like those of exotic oriental women. Mexican women were desirable only if they changed their appearance to look less Mexican.

This was a more conservative posture compared to the rhetoric in *Violetas del Anáhuac* two decades before, which celebrated the indigenous identity of its readers. The newspaper’s original name, *Las Hijas del Anáhuac*, displayed pride in Aztec ancestry, since “Anáhuac” was the name of the Valley of Mexico in Náhuatl. These women, like the Díaz administration, had to contend with Mexico’s indigenous past, and these publications demonstrate ways in which Porfiristas attempted to reconcile their ethnic heritage. The científicos resolved this “problem” by claiming Díaz’s descendancy from

\(^{394}\) Ibid.

\(^{395}\) Ibid., Aug. 28, 1910.
Cuauhtémoc and constructing a monument to the Aztec leader on the Paseo de la Reforma. The *Violetas*, on the other hand, incorporated their indigenous and European pasts into their womanhood, albeit as daughters of an Aztec fatherland.

The Porfirista press celebrated Mexico’s progress and Díaz’s leadership, and helped the dictator to sustain hegemony and control over the formation of Mexican national identity. However, as literacy and education spread and the public sphere expanded, so did counter-hegemonic discourse that exposed the fragility of white, positivist, and Eurocentric nationalism. Although Díaz exiled the Flores Magón brothers, they published *Regeneración* in the United States, which became the ideal location for the flourishing revolutionary press. After the revolutionaries defeated Huerta in 1914 and *El Imparcial, La Patria*, and all other Porfirista newspapers were closed down, the Porfirista press resurfaced in the United States. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* continued to promote patriarchy (particularly through advertising), whiteness, Catholicism, and Eurocentrism. These two media united Mexicans through patriotism and nostalgia and, by 1920, created a public sphere in the United States in which Mexican immigrants had a greater opportunity to express their opinions than they had in Mexico.

**La Prensa Becomes the “Voice” of el México de Afuera, 1913-1914**

Before 1910, newspapers produced by Mexican Americans dominated the Spanish-language press in the southwestern United States. These newspapers formed part of what Raúl Coronado calls the “U.S.-Mexican literary culture” in the borderlands in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Spanish-language newspapers “were used to intervene in the formation of political subjectivities, alter attitudes about the public sphere, and defend the interests of competing groups.”396 In San Antonio, the Spanish-language press was important for the political and cultural development of the *barrio* in the early 1900s.

---

Elizabeth Shannon Barker states that “by the late nineteenth century, the cultural landscape of [San Antonio] was carefully divided between Tejanos on the West Side, Blacks on the East, and Whites on the North.” These divisions resulted from the de jure segregation of African Americans and de facto segregation of ethnic Mexicans, and “these separate ethnic enclaves…became permanent by the 1930s.” Barker states that class differences were evident in the Mexican West Side ward, which was divided between “wealthy Mexican exiles” seeking to return to Mexico, “middle class entrepreneurs who found their way to success in the American capitalist economy,” and “working class immigrants,” but that the “common thread of lo mexicano…held these disparate groups together.” The San Antonio Spanish-language press reflected a more complex reality. These newspapers had the important function of maintaining cultural unity in the barrio, but they also marked a division between Tejanos and Mexican immigrants, as well as the inability of Tejano journalists to fully separate themselves from Mexican politics.

Pablo Cruz’s El Regidor and Colonel Francisco Chapa’s El Imparcial de Texas were among the local Spanish-language newspapers that updated readers about news from San Antonio, the United States, and Mexico. They had a distinct Tejano identity. Cruz used his medium to enhance his community activism. Beginning in the 1890s, he “raised money for the legal defense of Tejanos,” worked with other South Texas publishers for improved conditions for Tejano schoolchildren, and encouraged voting among the population in Mexican American barrios.

Ana Luisa Martínez-Catsam argues that Cruz also formed part of a “transborder coalition of liberal journalists who condemned Díaz

397 Barker, 81-82.
398 Ibid., 21-22.
399 Coronado., 392.
for violating the Constitution of 1857.\textsuperscript{400} Cruz consistently criticized the Díaz regime and supported Catarino Garza, a journalist who launched a revolt against Díaz along the border in 1891.

In 1901, Cruz worked to fund the legal defense of Gregorio Cortez, who was accused of murder and famously evaded the Texas Rangers for ten days. Cortez was sentenced to life in prison in 1904, and Cruz continued to work in his defense. Chapa took on that role after Cruz’s death in 1910. Chapa was a wealthy businessman and owner of a drugstore in San Antonio, and he had extensive political connections. He was friends with Governor Oscar B. Colquitt (who pardoned Cortez in 1913) and Bernardo Reyes, whom he had offered to help during his rebellion against Madero in 1912. Chapa served as treasurer of the San Antonio board of education, and he was a member of the Business Men’s Club. Because of his visibility in both the Anglo and Tejano communities, Governor Colquitt and other Anglo politicians relied on Chapa to gain the Tejano vote.\textsuperscript{401} Chapa’s primary business was his drugstore, but he decided to publish a newspaper in order to “capitalize on the Spanish-speaking population,” despite his lack of journalistic experience.\textsuperscript{402} He launched \textit{El Imparcial de Texas} in 1908, demonstrating his support for Díaz by using the same name as the Mexico City newspaper. Chapa needed a business manager for his publication, and in 1911, he hired Lozano.

Lozano had worked as a journalist in Mapimí, Durango, before moving to San Antonio in 1908. The city was a center for the revolutionary exile press, where the Flores Magón brothers published \textit{Regeneración} in 1904 and Madero published his Plan de San Luis Potosí in 1910. Lozano had no difficulty finding work as a journalist, and he became the business manager for Adolfo Duclós Salinas, who fled to Texas in 1883 because of his opposition to Díaz. Salinas owned \textit{La Revista Mensual} and \textit{El}

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{401} Nicolás Kanellos, \textit{Hispanic Periodicals in the United States, Origins to 1960: A Brief History and Comprehensive Bibliography} (Houston: Arte Público Press,1999), 102.

\textsuperscript{402} Di Stefano, “Venimos a Luchar”: A Brief History of \textit{La Prensa}'s Founding,” 103.
\end{flushright}
Noticiero, and after his death, Lozano took charge of the latter publication. *El Noticiero* was not a successful newspaper, and Lozano decided to shut down the business and devote his attention to his bookstore. Di Stefano suggests that “during the period spent in running the bookstore, the young entrepreneur was able to accurately gauge the pulse of the San Antonio community. Lozano determined which books were the most requested, which themes were of interest, and which authors were popular with the city’s Spanish-reading public.”\(^{403}\) More importantly, Lozano observed the political dynamics within the city, and he sold a variety of Mexican newspapers in his store, including the Maderista publication *El Monitor Democrático*. His growing knowledge about politics and social dynamics in San Antonio, Mexico, and the border region would help him become a legitimate and respected leader of opinion.

Lozano’s reputation as a business manager and journalist impressed Chapa, and Lozano worked for *El Imparcial de Texas* in 1911 and 1912, during which time the newspaper became the largest-selling Tejano publication in San Antonio. This job gave Lozano more advanced training in newspaper production, and he was soon prepared to launch his own business. The official reason for Lozano’s “abrupt” resignation was an illness, but as Di Stefano points out, Lozano established his new business within two months after leaving *El Imparcial de Texas*, which would have been difficult if he was ill. Di Stefano also suggests that the two split because Lozano wanted to reach a broader audience than he could with *El Imparcial de Texas*, which catered to local readers.\(^{404}\)

This partially explains Lozano’s resignation, but scholars have not taken into account the political implications of his timing. Lozano worked for Chapa during the period in which the colonel helped Bernardo Reyes with his counter-revolutionary efforts in San Antonio. Chapa escorted Reyes, his “old friend,” from New Orleans to San Antonio in October 1911, and helped with “recruiting men,

\(^{403}\) Ibid., 100.

\(^{404}\) Ibid., 104, 116.
and in acquiring weapons and equipment and moving them to the border.”\textsuperscript{405} When the conspiracy was discovered by federal authorities, Chapa was tried for violating neutrality laws in January 1912, and it was revealed during the trial that Reyes’s manifestos had been printed on the presses of \textit{El Imparcial de Texas}.\textsuperscript{406} It is likely that Chapa continued to closely monitor Reyes’s situation throughout 1912, and that he knew about the plans for the cuartelazo. Lozano resigned and quickly prepared his newspaper’s premier issue, which he launched during the Decena Trágica. His timing may have been purely coincidental, but it seems likely instead that Lozano knew about the coup and foresaw the potential for a sensationalist opening headline for \textit{La Prensa} on February 13, 1913.

\textit{La Prensa} began as a weekly four-page newspaper. It circulated on Thursdays, the same day as \textit{El Imparcial de Texas}, in order to directly compete with Chapa. \textit{La Prensa}’s staff was small and included Porfiristas Teodoro Torres, a respected journalist from San Luis Potosí, and Leonides González.\textsuperscript{407} In its first month, \textit{La Prensa}’s headlines kept readers informed on the chaotic drama unfolding in Mexico. In its second issue, \textit{La Prensa} reported the resignations of Madero and Pino Suárez; the following week, the newspaper published details of their assassinations. Although it presented itself as politically neutral, \textit{La Prensa} included a column entitled “Coscorrones,” in which the characters “Bachicha” and “Pipo” (both presumably Lozano) offered commentary on events in Mexico and revealed the newspaper’s Porfirista orientation. For example, before Madero’s assassination, Bachicha made fun of the deposed president for speaking to spirits who did not answer him during his last attempt to remain in the presidency.\textsuperscript{408} Di Stefano argues that the use of fictional characters was a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{406} Ibid., 336. Chapa was convicted of a felony for violating neutrality laws. He paid a $1200 fine, but served no jail time. Governor Colquitt successfully petitioned William Howard Taft for a presidential pardon for Chapa.
\item \textsuperscript{407} Torres worked as editor of \textit{La Prensa} in the 1910s, and González acted as business manager of the newspaper until 1953.
\item \textsuperscript{408} \textit{La Prensa}, Feb. 13, 1913.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
way for *La Prensa’s* staff to circumvent their commitment to impartiality, relying on satire (rather than news reports or editorials) to comment on the revolutionary figures.

These characters also made observations about Mexican society, including traditional gender roles. For example, Pipo shared a story of two ex-girlfriends with whom he cut ties because of their political leanings. One woman supported Madero, and it put Pipo in a worse mood “than when all of the callouses on [his] precious feet hurt at once.” His second ex-girlfriend, “dear God! [She] was a Carrancista.” The two fought every day “and hurled more insults at each other than a panchovillista in the thirty-third degree of drunkenness.” Pipo vowed never again to become involved with a woman “who smelled like dynamite with her effective suffrage…constitutionalism, revolutionary plans, and that bunch of calamities” that Pipo called “redemptory stupidities.” He ended his story by advising readers that women should never become involved in politics, in order to prevent so many “bitter love affairs and broken marriages.”

Patriarchal views were also present in *La Prensa’s* Literary Page, published from 1913 to 1915. This section included the pieces by Bachicha and Pipo, as well as poetry and prose from authors in Europe, Mexico, and South America, and it served two purposes: to distract readers from the bleak news reports, and promote patriarchal Porfirista values to the barrio audience. It was critical to maintain social order in the midst of the volatile political conditions in the borderlands, and Porfiristas believed that order began in the home. Thus, many of the pieces included in the Literary Page discussed patriarchal notions of gender and the reasons for upholding them. *La Prensa* published a piece by Victor Hugo in which he wrote that man “was the most elevated of all creatures” while “woman was the most sublime of all ideals.” Hugo described men as strong, intelligent, with aspirations for “supreme glory.” Women, on the other hand, were angels, pure and virtuous. One piece specified that “the Ideal Woman…never [contradicted] her parents, siblings, relatives, or friends…[did] not shed abundant tears

---

409 “Las Mujeres en Política,” Jul. 17, 1913.
at every step...[did] not pronounce more than 100 words per minute...[did] not spend hours fixing her hair...[and preferred] her home rather than the street.”410 If women adhered to these principles, they would easily find husbands, which was another concern of the male authors whose work was included in the Literary Page. In late 1913, La Prensa published a poem written by Luis Álvarez Méndez from the perspective of an “old” forty year-old woman. The narrator desperately offered a prayer to Saint Anthony, imploring him to help her find a husband.411 The message to La Prensa’s female readers was clear—they should be quiet, virtuous wives and mothers.

Femininity was a great concern within the Literary Page, but Mexican masculinity was addressed throughout the rest of La Prensa. Pipo’s comic, satirical observations entertained readers, but also reinforced women’s submissiveness to men. Furthermore, La Prensa celebrated the birthdays of significant national heroes, including Hidalgo, Juárez, Ignacio Zaragoza, and Díaz, by printing their biographies on the front page of the newspaper. The stories recounted the heroism of each of these leaders and emphasized their military service and willingness to fight and die for their country. La Prensa used these symbols to lay claim on authentic Mexican identity. The issue of authenticity was important for La Prensa, and it created tensions between the newspaper and the Tejano press. La Prensa made it clear to readers that it had absolutely no ties to El Imparcial de Texas, and it criticized this newspaper for promoting “false mexicanism.” Chapa and other unnamed members of the Tejano press were hypocrites for calling themselves Mexican in order to attract a Spanish-reading audience, but then presenting themselves as “red-blooded Americans” to the Anglo press.412 La Prensa was unsympathetic to the ambivalent position of Tejanos, who were simultaneously Mexican and American, yet not Mexican or American enough. Questioning the Mexican identity of the Tejano press helped La

410 Ibid., “La Mujer Ideal,” Apr. 24, 1913.
412 Ibid., “La Prensa y El Imparcial de Texas,” Apr. 17, 1913.
*La Prensa* to present itself as a leader, or the voice, of the Mexican immigrant population. The producers of *La Prensa* sought to demonstrate that they understood the struggles of recent immigrants and exiles, and that they could maintain cultural ties to Mexico by reading this newspaper.

The problems in Mexico formed the basis for *La Prensa*'s relationship with its audience. In its premier issue, the newspaper stated that its mission was to serve readers as a “true friend,” and that it would “applaud all good and condemn all evil” for the benefit of the patria.413 Readers who fled Mexico could sympathize with the frustration evident in reports on the revolution, and *La Prensa* vocalized the sentiments of Mexicans who wanted peace in their nation. *La Prensa* sought to unite el México de afuera through a sense of solidarity and common struggle. Together, they witnessed their nation self-destruct, and together they would attempt to move forward and uphold their patria in exile.

In December 1914, *La Prensa* sponsored a writing contest for readers to submit their proposals for solving Mexico’s problems. By the end of the year, it had received 241 entries from various cities, including Los Angeles, El Paso, Eagle Pass, and San Antonio, and the newspaper published a number of them. The topics varied, and *La Prensa* printed submissions that did not necessarily match the newspaper’s Porfirista ideology. For example, an author by the name of J.G.C. suggested that Mexico’s problems were economic at their core, and that the Plan of Ayala was the best option because of its emphasis on agrarian reform.414 The three judges for the contest were José Elguero (“Antimaco Sax”), Eduardo Tamariz (Huerta’s former Minister of Public Instruction), and Mariano Viesca y Arizpe (former Porfirista mayor of San Pedro, Coahuila). On February 17, 1915, *La Prensa* announced the contest winners and the judges’ comments. They stated that readers succinctly analyzed Mexico’s problems, but none of the potential solutions satisfied the judges. The participants were either too idealistic or they only focused on military solutions. The judges clarified this point, noting that this did not make the


ideas any less valid; on the contrary, this contest demonstrated the complexity of Mexico’s problems, and the diversity of viewpoints regarding the subject matter.

Elguero, Tamariz, and Viesca y Arizpe congratulated Lozano and La Prensa’s readers for participating in such an important project, “the first in the history of Mexican journalism to open a public debate on such a highly transcendental topic.” The judges admitted that it was difficult to select the winners, but their biggest challenge was confronting the magnitude of Mexico’s social, political, and economic troubles as they read the hundreds of entries. The winning article, entitled “This is a Matter of Life or Death: ‘To Be or Not to Be,’” argued that Mexico’s troubles resulted from a century of passivity from Mexico’s masses, who accepted their subjugated position as caudillos, politicians, hacendados, and other leaders took advantage of them. The judges critiqued the author for not proposing any specific way to combat the cycle of exploitation, but they appreciated the historical context and the author’s understanding that the revolution stemmed from long-term problems. This is an interesting position taken by the Porfirista judges, since a fundamental characteristic of Porfirismo was the belief that the Díaz regime had established order and progress in Mexico. Perhaps the judges accepted that Mexico’s problems were so extensive that even Díaz had been unable to fully resolve them.

The exiled intellectuals took a genuine interest in public discourse, and the judges seemed excited that so many of La Prensa’s subscribers contributed to the debate. For the first time in decades, perhaps in as long as most Mexican immigrants could remember, they could freely express themselves without fear of state reprimand. La Prensa provided a safe environment for the proliferation of opposing viewpoints. More importantly, this contest encouraged critical thought and validated the opinions of all participants regardless of their political, class, or educational background. However, the

---


416 Ibid., “La Cuestión es de Vida o Muerte. ‘To Be or Not to Be.’”
judges and winners were all men, and there was no indication as to how many, if any, of the submissions were from women. Although the Porfiristas expanded the public sphere to include Mexican communities across the United States, it continued to be a male-dominated realm.

La Prensa’s commitment to el México de afuera resulted in widespread popularity, though it is difficult to assess the level of cultural hegemony it attained because of the limited data on the demographics of La Prensa’s audience. By June 1913, La Prensa doubled in size from four pages to eight. In 1914, its circulation reached 10,000 copies per week, surpassing El Imparcial de Texas as the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in San Antonio.417 However, while N.W. Ayer & Son’s American Newspaper Annual and Directory published national circulation figures, it did not reveal readership by city or region. There is also limited information available on La Prensa’s readership according to class or nationality.

La Prensa’s growth in readership can nonetheless be explained as a result of its commitment to the immigrant community. As García Naranjo pointed out in his memoirs, La Prensa also succeeded because Lozano built it as a long-term business that focused on the community development outside of Mexico. This ensured that La Prensa would be able to sustain itself regardless of the political events in the homeland. According to David Gutiérrez, “at least one million, and possibly as many as a million and a half Mexican immigrants entered the United States between 1890 and 1929.”418 The majority of the immigrants were pacíficos, not involved in the political struggles of the revolution, but they chose to leave their homeland regardless. La Prensa catered to this audience by presenting itself as a politically independent news source. It also reinforced Mexican culture within the barrios across the southwestern


United States and gave a “voice” to the immigrant community in the midst of growing nativism in the 1910. Readers presumably placed their trust in what they believed to be a legitimate news source that had their best interests in mind without explicitly siding with a particular faction. The demand for seemingly impartial news also helped La Prensa in mid-1914, when Carranza shut down all opposition newspapers, including El Imparcial and La Patria. In October 1914, La Prensa began circulating as a daily newspaper, and from that moment it became the largest-selling Mexican newspaper in the United States.419

Revista Mexicana, on the other hand, did not establish the foundation to be a long-lasting business because, as political propaganda, its success depended on the course of the revolution. García Naranjo launched his magazine in August 1915 just as Huerta and Orozco’s plans to invade Mexico failed, and the publication served as another attempt to organize the political exiles. Moheno, José María Lozano, Francisco M. de Olaguíbel, Jorge Vera Estañol, Ricardo Gómez Róbelo, and Emilio Rabasa, all writers for Revista Mexicana, had been directly involved with the Huerta administration. Other contributors such as Calero and Elguero were considered enemies of both the Mexican and U.S. states. Their reputations preceeded them, and readers knew why these men had been expelled from Mexico. This meant that the writers for Revista Mexicana had less to lose by freely expressing themselves, unlike Lozano, whose reputation depended on his image as an impartial journalist. In his memoirs, García Naranjo recalled feeling unsure about the public’s reaction to Revista Mexicana because of its political stance, but the magazine was initially successful. On November 15, 1915, Revista Mexicana stated that two thousand copies of the premier issue were printed, and the five hundred copies in San Antonio sold out in two days. Revista Mexicana had a circulation of 5,000 issues

419 N.W. Ayer & Son’s directory published the circulation figures for La Prensa beginning in 1915, but only the number of daily and weekly issues circulating in the United States. There is no breakdown of these figures according to city or state. See N.W. Ayer & Son’s American Newspaper Annual and Directory: A Catalogue of American Newspapers, 1915, vol. 2, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc9278/m1/269/?q=%22N.%20W.%20Ayer.
per week from late 1915 to 1918. This represented less than half of La Prensa’s figures, but the number was nevertheless impressive because Revista Mexicana was so adamantly against the revolution.

Porfirista Identity in the United States

Lozano and García Naranjo had different goals for their newspapers, and the two publications differed in terms of style and content, but ultimately La Prensa and Revista Mexicana embodied a similar vision for Mexicans living outside of the homeland. Both wanted to uphold Porfirista identity in el México de afuera. Efforts to promote their racial, class, and gender values were similar to those of their predecessors, including El Imparcial, La Patria, and Violetas del Anáhuac. However, the exiled Porfiristas worked to impart their ideals within the context of living in the United States, where Mexicans were the racialized ‘other.’

The contributors to La Prensa and Revista Mexicana continued the modernization project that had been so important to the Díaz administration and the Porfirista press. They encouraged political participation, literacy, and education. They believed that Mexicans were not passive consumers of information and entertainment, and were capable of engaging in critical debates and politics, becoming educated, and having successful careers and businesses. Women, in particular, could actively demonstrate their patriotism by raising strong, healthy children who would improve the Mexican race. Both publications idealized European culture, advertised products that endorsed European standards of beauty and whiteness, and encouraged readers (particularly men) to aspire social mobility through education.

Two important dynamics manifested themselves in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana. The news reports and editorials functioned as political texts, the words used to fight the revolution and maintain the unity of el México de afuera in the ambivalent position of exile. At the same time, the visual content of the newspaper, the advertisements and illustrations, upheld the cultural status quo of the Porfiriato that emphasized modern, positivist, and patriarchal notions of race, class, and gender. These dynamics
complimented each other because they combined nostalgia, the community’s uncertainty about the future, and patriotism. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* understood readers’ anxieties and fears; together, in spite of their obstacles, they would celebrate national holidays and keep the spirit of the homeland alive. Readers responded positively to the publications, and between 1915 and 1920, *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* circulated a combined average of 15,000-18,000 copies for their Sunday editions.

In his memoirs, García Naranjo stated that his magazine appealed to Mexicans and Mexican Americans because *Revista Mexicana* was not afraid to call out Anglos and the Wilson administration for their hypocrisy and racist attitudes. In August 1915, *Revista Mexicana* reported the lynching of a black man named Stanley in Temple, Texas. Stanley was burned alive in the presence of women and children, and then his body was hung in the town plaza. The magazine included the gruesome details of women picking up charred bones and taking them home as souveniers, and the author sarcastically commented, “this is culture. This is mercy. This is humanity. No wonder President Wilson, representative of such a moralized nation…has constituted himself as the defender of International Law.”

*La Prensa* also addressed racial discrimination An author by the name of “Chitón” wrote “Greasers,” an article that also questioned the civility of the United States, given the prevalence of racism. Chitón wrote that people who used the derogatory word “greaser” were “uncultured” and unfit to be called American. Although many Americans did not discriminate against Mexicans, the ones who did were categorized as “the waste of the Old Continent…imbeciles who [were] unfortunately abundant in all places…. [and] ‘civilized’ people who loved justice when they apply it by their own hand through lynchings.” Chitón also attacked the stereotype of the “cowardly…drunk, lazy and servile” Mexican popularized in films. He ended his piece by thanking non-racist Americans on behalf of the Mexican

---

community, but stating that “for those who at every step ‘grease’ us, we send our most significative scorn, accompanied by a piece of advice:…. ‘degrease’ the ‘greasers.’”

During the Porfiriato, the científicos understood that not being perceived as Other by Western Europe had significant political and economic implications for Mexico. As the nation became incorporated into the modern, civilized world, Mexico reaped the benefits of foreign investment, economic expansion, and Eurocentric cultural renewal. More importantly, it avoided being militarily colonized by European imperial powers. However, Porfiristas in the United States had to contend with the consequences of being perceived as the Other in Anglo society. By moving into the U.S. nation-state, Porfiristas became colonized objects in a predominantly Anglo society in which U.S. Mexicans were politically and economically disenfranchised. In San Antonio, for example, Mexicans were confined within one sector of the city, and most Porfiristas lived and/or worked in the barrio, a space that fostered Mexican culture, but where poverty and disease were common. Porfiristas may have migrated to San Antonio with intellectual capital, but they could not fully disassociate themselves from the problems seemingly related to the lower classes.

*La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* reacted to these conditions by taking a stand against racist language and practices among Anglos, while continuing to privilege whiteness within the U.S. Mexican community. These messages complicate the narrative on eugenics and Anglo/Mexican relations in the 1910s. Natalia Molina points out that in California public health officials dealt with a 1916 outbreak of typhus in Mexican railroad worker camps by “using cyanide gas to destroy lice, ticks, and other pests.” Residents of these camps were often forced to bathe in coal oil once a week. That same year, *La Prensa* published a report given by Dr. Theo Y. Hull to the Bexar County Medical Society on

---


422 The offices for *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* were located in San Antonio’s Mexican ward.

tuberculosis among children in San Antonio. Dr. Hull stated that the rate of infection was greatest among children whose “families depended on charity” (which might implicate lower-class Mexicans), and that the most “progressive” way to contain tuberculosis was to “segregate” infected children and adults.424 Furthermore, Alexandra Minna Stern describes how U.S. Public Health Service officials in Texas “branded” the arms of immigrants, “in permanent ink, with the word ‘ADMITTED’ after being bathed and physically examined.” The officials claimed that “the ink branding was necessary to defend Texas from the lice, smallpox, and other germs usually carried by ‘Mexican paupers.’”425 In 1917, officials worked to contain a Typhus epidemic by examining immigrants for lice, and bathing them with “a mixture of soap, kerosene, and water.” Men with lice would have their heads shaved, and women had “a mixture of equal parts kerosene and vinegar applied to the head.”426

Stern and Molina argue that these eugenic policies were a way of racializing Mexicans, controlling their bodies, and casting them as the dirty ‘other’ who could infect white U.S. citizens. However, Porfiristas projected a similar message in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana. The advertising in these publications reveals the importance placed by Porfiristas on the male and female bodies, and the ways in which Mexicans were supposed to stay clean and healthy in order to be considered acceptable in society. Mexicans needed to strive for good hygiene and appearance, even if it meant changing their body structure or the color of their skin. Women, in particular, were obligated to produce healthy children in order to improve the Mexican race.

Phenotype standards were evident throughout the advertising in both publications. La Prensa advertised the Parisian skin bleach Blancher Cream, which promised men and women that it would

424 “El Niño y el Problema de la Tuberculosis,” La Prensa, Apr. 9, 1916.


426 Ibid., 62.
reduce skin darkness caused by genetics or sun exposure and remove dark spots. An advertisement for Gouraud’s Oriental Cream guaranteed that it would give skin “accentuated beauty and pearly whiteness,” and the French Perfume Agency claimed that Crème Simon would restore skin’s whiteness, remove imperfections, and restore beauty, important because the face was “the window to the soul.”

Although these advertisements appealed to consumers’ vanity, some companies used the science of hygiene as a marketing strategy. An ad in Revista Mexicana for “Hierro Nuxado,” an iron supplement, had three illustrations of the same female/male couple. The first showed them young and happy at age twenty, the second showed them at age thirty; the man looked slightly older, but the woman was not smiling and looked tired. Finally, the couple was shown at age forty. The man was smiling and looked healthy, but the woman looked elderly and haggard, with a wrinkled complexion. The copy stated that anemia (caused by an iron deficiency) led to a loss of “youth, beauty, and charm, making [women] coleric, nervous, and downtrodden.” Medicine could prevent premature aging of the face, and it could also make other body parts beautiful. Revista Mexicana published advertisements for “GETS-IT,” a medicated callus remover. One of the illustrations depicted a happy man watching a woman (presumably his wife) removing calluses on her feet with a smile on her face. Regardless of whether or not these advertisements specified gender in their copy, they all contained illustrations of women benefiting from the products, indicating that these creams were marketed for a female audience.

Other merchandise was gender-neutral, including “Trados,” an apparatus advertised in Revista Mexicana used to change the structure of the nose. The copy stated that it was “absolutely necessary for one to care for her/his physiognomy if she/he [expected] to be something and succeed in this life,” since

429 Revista Mexicana, Aug. 31, 1919.
430 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1918.
“as a general rule, the world [would] judge a person” by her/his appearance. The advertisement illustrated a man and a woman wearing the device, which consisted of a metal nose covering held in place by a strap around the forehead and another that wrapped across the cheeks and behind the neck. This product was a “fast...safe and permanent” alternative to surgery, and the testimonials from men, women, and a doctor stated that they saw positive results within two weeks. “Before” and “after” illustrations of a facial profile showed a nose with a bump on the tip and then completely straight.431

James B. Twitchell argues that advertising “is selling the oppression of consumption. The weak and marginalized, especially the female and the black, are trapped into a commodifying system, a “false consciousness” and “fetishism.”432 He also states that advertising in the early twentieth century colonized the human body by selling the message that the body needed to be cleansed and purified. Jean Kilbourne adds that

sexual images in advertising...define what is sexy and, more important, who is sexy...women are portrayed as sexually desirable only if they are young, thin, carefully polished and groomed, made up, depilated, sprayed, and scented...we never see eroticized images of older people, imperfect people, people with disabilities. The gods have sex, the rest of us watch...[and] we can never measure up.433

The advertising in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana set a model for personal appearance that was potentially attainable only by people who could afford these beauty products. Moreover, the dominant message in this advertising was that people with certain facial features, skin color, and “deformities” such as calluses were ugly, dirty, and sick. They needed to fix themselves, spending as much money as possible on European products if they wanted to be acceptable members of society. Porfiristas denounced Anglo colonization, but set standards that internally colonized el México de afuera.

Calluses, for example, would be more prevalent among people with jobs requiring manual labor, and in


San Antonio, approximately three-fourths of the immigrant population worked in unskilled jobs.\textsuperscript{434} The advertising within \textit{La Prensa} and \textit{Revista Mexicana} fetishized whiteness while directly associating social mobility (and happiness) with a middle- to upper-class standard of consumption and appearance.

Furthermore, \textit{La Prensa} and \textit{Revista Mexicana} used the rhetoric of cleanliness and hygiene in advertising in order to promote patriarchal gender roles and justifying them with science. One of the products frequently advertised in \textit{La Prensa} was “Compuesto Mitchella,” a supplement for women in child-bearing age. Women were advised not to “fear maternity,” since this natural product would alleviate the pain and discomfort associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Women who took this supplement were promised “robust, healthy, and strong” children. One of the ads for this product featured a woman wearing an elegant dress and pearls, carrying a healthy infant, demonstrating that mothers were happy and fashionable. Advertising targeted men’s health issues as well, and another frequent advertiser in \textit{La Prensa} and \textit{Revista Mexicana} was Chicago physician James Russell. His company promoted a ninety-six page book for men suffering specifically from syphilis or gonorrhea. This free book offered home remedies for these ailments and “impure blood, skin diseases…impotence, cerebral debilities, and diseases of the kidneys and bladder.”\textsuperscript{435} One version of the ad included an image of Dr. Price, but another illustrated a man with boils all over his face, a symptom of syphilis. This particular ad stated that Dr. Price’s book could help with “secret vices” and numerous sexual disorders, and that by ordering this book men could find a cure for their diseases in the privacy of their home.\textsuperscript{436} The messages presented to women and men differed significantly. Women had to bleach their skin, bear children, and change their body structure in order to be publicly accepted. Men were also encouraged to

\textsuperscript{434} Barker, 125, 127. In comparison, approximately of two-thirds of the Tejano population worked in unskilled occupations.

\textsuperscript{435} \textit{Revista Mexicana}, May 20, 1917.

\textsuperscript{436} \textit{La Prensa}, Dec. 18, 1916.
change their appearance if necessary, but if they experienced an ailment resulting from a “secret vice,” it could be dealt with privately with no public shame attached. Of course, women had no such vices.

Men’s and women’s bodies were the primary sites on which Porfirista ideas about race and hygiene were negotiated, but the Mexican body also became an important patriotic symbol in the midst of the Mexican Revolution and World War I. During the Porfiriato, the media were responsible for marking gender roles as part of a larger peace-time modernization project. In the 1910s, however, Mexicans faced the daily reality of civil war and an unprecedented global conflict. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* made it clear to readers that although they faced uncertainty, they would overcome their hardships together if every individual carried out her/his patriotic duty.

Male readers were asked to emulate the nation’s heroes, particularly Díaz. The dictator died on July 2, 1915, and *La Prensa* offered its homage by publishing what other newspapers wrote about Díaz’s historic legacy, in an effort to appear impartial.437 *La Prensa* also included a letter from an anonymous subscriber who expressed that Mexicans turned their backs on the hero, but that now Díaz would experience ultimate glory in heaven.438 The newspaper honored Díaz in a seemingly objective way, showing respect for the former president and general, but not too much. *Revista Mexicana* had less restraint, and its premier issue included the final photo of Díaz on the cover. García Naranjo dedicated the issue to the fallen dictator, and lamented the dishonorable way in which he was treated by the nation he served for decades. *Revista Mexicana* also included a poem by Luis G. Urbina honoring Doña Carmen, the “ideal princess” who continued to be the epitome of elegance, whiteness, and femininity even after her husband’s death.439

437 “¡Que No Vuelva el Gral. Díaz!,” “Porfirio Díaz,” *La Prensa*, Jul. 4, 1915. These articles were originally published in *El Imparcial de Texas* and *The San Antonio Express News*, respectively.


The cover page was perhaps the most important element of *Revista Mexicana*, since it was the first part of the magazine that people saw, and it offered a full-page visual that summarized the theme of the issue. More importantly, it made *Revista Mexicana*’s political orientation clear. Of all the men featured on the cover of *Revista Mexicana*, Díaz was featured the most in the magazine’s five-year history. On April 2, 1916, *Revista Mexicana* celebrated the forty-ninth anniversary of Díaz’s victory in Puebla by printing a speech given by García Naranjo in 1912, in which he asked for April 2 to be declared a national holiday. The following year, on May 6, *Revista Mexicana* commemorated Díaz’s other important victory against French forces in Puebla by publishing a portion of *The Porfirian Epic*, a biography written by Ricardo Gómez Robelo, the former Attorney General under Huerta. *Revista Mexicana* only included the section on Díaz’s military service during the French Intervention. As previously discussed, both *Revista Mexicana* and *La Prensa* focused on Díaz’s heroism on the battlefield rather than his political activities.

Two other Porfirista heroes, Huerta and Félix Díaz, were the second and third most prominent figures on *Revista Mexicana*’s cover. Their depiction on the cover ensured that large photos of Huerta and Porfirio and Félix Díaz were seen on newsstands and anywhere else the magazine was sold, keeping their images alive within the collective memory. The photos commemorated important dates and political moments, including the anniversaries of the deaths of Porfirio and Huerta, and Félix’s photo graced the cover every time he published a political manifesto. In October 1915, García Naranjo reprinted Porfirio’s final photo due to popular demand, and the following year *Revista Mexicana* took advantage of this in order to increase subscriptions.440 The publisher stated in May 1916 that it could no longer meet the demand for the premier issue, since only a few copies remained. However, if a reader submitted the names and addresses of ten potential subscribers, she/he would receive the anniversary issue of the Decena Trágica with a photo of Bernardo Reyes on the cover. Fifteen submissions

guaranteed an issue with Félix’s photo, eighteen submissions guaranteed any issue with Porfirio or Huerta on the cover, and with twenty submissions, the reader would receive the Revista Mexicana’s second issue, which had a photo of the Angel of Independence on the cover, and other images of the Paseo de la Reforma and Mexico City.441

Revista Mexicana succeeded in its first years by selling nostalgia, images from the homeland, and photos of Mexico’s most prominent military men of the previous decade. The magazine also honored the nation’s intellectuals, but never on the cover. The section entitled “Our Intellectuals” featured a series of interviews with Mexico’s exiled intellectuals who lived scattered across the U.S. and Havana, including Moheno, Francisco Vázquez Gómez, Ricardo García Granados, Urrutia, Fernando López (who helped to organize the Mexican Red Cross in 1909), and Gonzalo Garita, an engineer who worked on the plans for the Angel of Independence. Each man gave his opinion on current events, particularly the global wars. López, for example, expressed his certainty that the “strong and vigorous” German Empire would be victorious in Europe.442 García Granados discussed his work as a historian, which included writing the sixth volume of México a Través de los Siglos, an encyclopedia of Mexican history.443 Revista Mexicana emphasized the importance of these men and their contributions to Mexico, but none of them were memorialized in a similar way as Mexico’s generals. Though the intellectuals represented Mexico’s progress and success, Porfirio and Félix Díaz, Huerta, and Reyes symbolized the physically strong, stoic, courageous, and masculine nation. These were the men that Mexican boys should look up to. With the exception of Félix, all of these generals were dead. Revista Mexicana could now manipulate the memory of these heroes and present them in a positive light.

441 Ibid., May 14, 1916.

442 Ibid., Feb. 27, 1916.

Readers who admired Díaz, Huerta, and Reyes were encouraged to display their photos in their homes, just as they might do with images of the Christ, the Virgin of Guadalupe and other Catholic saints.

Of course, *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* also used and built on Mexican Catholicism more directly. Richard Dyer discusses the “motif of embodiment” prevalent in Western Christian discourse, which allows people to think “of bodies containing different spiritual qualities, or of some having such qualities and others not having them (a trope of white racism).”\(^444\) Dyer argues that “the body is the basis of Christian imagery, notably in the two great set pieces of the birth and death of Christ.”\(^445\) However, there is a duality within Christianity between the body and the spirit, and “Mary is a vessel for the spirit; she does nothing and indeed has no carnal knowledge, but is filled with God…Christ on the other hand is God, fully divine and fully human.”\(^446\) Just as Christ suffered by allowing the torturing of his body, Mexican warriors who sacrificed their bodies for the homeland carried out the redemptive sacrifice.

Mary continued to be the utmost representation of Mexican femininity, and women who nourished their spirits and remained pure acted as vessels that elevated the spirit of the nation. The Virgin of Guadalupe was the dominant national symbol that helped immigrants remain attached to the homeland. San Antonio had Catholic churches for the German and Anglo Catholic communities, and Our Lady of Guadalupe Church was built specifically to meet the needs of the immigrants living in the city’s West Side ward.\(^447\) Thus, the Virgin of Guadalupe became a cultural marker which distinguished Mexican Catholics from Germans and Anglos. Ideally, Guadalupe might have also served as unifying symbol for Mexicans and Mexican Americans living in the barrio. However, *Revista Mexicana* marked

---


\(^{445}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{446}\) Ibid., 16-17.

\(^{447}\) St. Mary’s Catholic Church in downtown San Antonio served the Anglo and German population, and St. Joseph, also downtown, was constructed specifically for German Catholics.
the difference between immigrants and Mexican Americans. On December 12, 1915, the magazine gave homage to the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe by publishing an image of a celebration at the Basilica of Guadalupe in Mexico City. Yet the magazine made no mention of any festivities in San Antonio. *Revista Mexicana* stated that “the Virgin of Guadalupe [was] more than Mexican: she [was] all of Mexico.” The author praised this icon because her “supernatural light of celestial goodness” offered “a merciful ray of hope, [alleviated] hunger and thirst, [refreshed] the sweat from anxiety and fatigue, and [gave] peace to the simple souls.” *Revista Mexicana* acknowledged that this cult and the legend of her apparition to the Indian Juan Diego did more to bring the masses together than any theory or logic. For this reason, the Virgin of Guadalupe became a symbol used by Mexican warriors going into battle.

This appropriation of the Virgin of Guadalupe as a nationalist symbol demonstrated that she was not perceived as a passive figure within Mexican Catholicism. She provided hope to Mexico’s oppressed groups, particularly the peasants, and she gave them protection as they fought for liberty. However, this was the relationship between the Virgin of Guadalupe and Mexican men. Mexican women were supposed to emulate her domesticity, though this was not a passive quality either. One article in *Revista Mexicana*, entitled “Conversation with the Mexican Woman: Pro Patria,” explored the relationship between patriotism and the domestic sphere, stating that “the home could exist without the homeland” but not the other way around. It added that an “intimate relationship” existed between women and their homeland, and the “daughter of Mexico” needed to “meditate on the importance of the role she could carry out in the life of the nation.” The author stated that women should to reject “radical” and unnatural ideas such as suffrage and feminism, and that they needed to model their lives and homes after those of Mary of Nazareth. The “redemptive doctrine” sprung from her home, “breaking the chains of Sparta and elevating the woman, formerly a slave, to her present dignity as the

---

companion of man.” The author emphasized this last point: that women were cooperating with men in the Creator’s grand plan, and that their role was to foster the spirits of their children.⁴⁴⁹

As Mexican men fought on the battlefield or in the political realm, women were called to use their femininity to support the cause and produce healthy and strong children. *La Prensa* projected a nationalistic image of women in a patriotic drawing published on the anniversary of Mexican independence in 1916. The newspaper included a full-page illustration portraying an image of Mexico’s past, present, and future. The caption under the drawing read

All of modern Mexico’s history is condensed here…The Past is the sun…The Past shines with the transparent clarity of a star. 1810 has the splendor of a firmament that comes together in one point on the horizon…But, without transitions, abruptly, the perspective changes and we feel as if we are descending into a limbo where all beauty vanishes and, in the midst of the fire’s smoke, only the grim outline of Tragedy appears. That is the Present…Disaster seems to have blown through the untilled field…But, once again…the scenery changes. It is no longer the sun of 1810 that fills the firmament with clarity, rather…the Future that points to the first light of dawn…The Homeland is on foot…[she is] erect and robust in spite of her [pregnancy] pain, with her swollen breasts ready to nourish new humanity and her womb erect, as if ready to give birth to the robust children of tomorrow.⁴⁵⁰

The woman was described as “La Patria,” which could be translated as “The Homeland” or “The Fatherland.” Within the Mexican context, “La Madre Patria” referred to Spain; “La Matria,” or “The Motherland,” was not commonly used. In this illustration, motherhood was presented as Mexico’s salvation, and women who endured the pain of childbirth made the ultimate patriotic sacrifice. Men gave up their bodies and their lives for the nation; women produced life and generated Mexican bodies. This illustration, the advertising telling women not to fear childbirth or motherhood, and the literature that consistently reinforced patriarchy demonstrated the gender roles that Porfiristas continued to perpetuate within Mexican society.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., Feb. 25, 1917.

La Prensa and Revista Mexicana directly tied Porfirista identity to patriotism and continually reinforced the message that readers had the duty to act for the benefit of the nation. Even though they lived outside of the homeland, Mexican immigrants could still contribute to the patriotic cause while preparing for Mexico’s future. The Porfirista press served el México de afuera by promoting cultural nationalism and assuaging the community’s nostalgia for the homeland. As the decade progressed, La Prensa and Revista Mexicana also increased their activism in order to deal with the realities of discrimination and war.

The Porfirista Press Politicizes el México de Afuera, 1915-1920

In La Prensa’s premier issue, the staff introduced itself to readers by stating that its “program could be amply explained with these words: we came to fight.”

451 The Spanish word used was “luchar” which translates to “fight,” but in this context meant that La Prensa’s staff would work to succeed in spite of their displacement in a new country. García Naranjo and his staff, meanwhile, embarked on a “nationalistic campaign,” putting themselves in “a combative position, which is what all of the exiles wanted in 1915.” Revista Mexicana focused on editorials, commentary, and satire rather than straightforward news reports, and contributors expressed their anger, frustration, and sadness regarding events in Mexico. This magazine offered a glimpse into the mindset of a group of men whose worldview was constantly under attack, and it revealed the bitterness of exile, the stress of constant surveillance and harassment from U.S. and Mexican government officials, and the trauma of defeat.

La Prensa became a more activist medium during this period, and it increasingly reflected the realities of life in the United states. For example, the newspaper’s staff took a special interest in improving social conditions for local Mexican children. Beginning in 1917, the newspaper sponsored an annual Christmas celebration for children living in poverty in San Antonio, and the first of these events

took place in the National Theatre.\textsuperscript{452} Furthermore, \textit{La Prensa} published a series of articles on the topic of “Mexican children and the schools in the state of Texas,” which was “a serious and transcendental problem.” This series included a speech given by Professor W. J. Knox at a teacher’s convention in Corpus Christi, in which he spoke about the unique conditions faced by Mexican children. According to Knox, Mexicans were sentimental and had “a rare attachment to the history, language, and customs of their homeland.” They also exhibited “admiration for the way in which [Americans] did things,” and wanted American ideals such as democracy for their nation. Knox commented on how “nobody [exceeded] Mexican parents in their love for their children,” and education was very important for the immigrant community. The speaker argued that it was necessary for Mexican children to learn English and to have the same access to a quality education as Anglos and children of other nationalities.\textsuperscript{453}

\textit{La Prensa} denounced segregation in Texas schools as racist, but it also stressed the importance of bilingualism among the immigrant population. The newspaper frequently advertised \textit{English without an Instructor}, a book for anyone wanting to learn English, which was sold at the Casa Editorial Lozano. \textit{La Prensa} supported Knox’s assessment that teaching English to Mexican children was essential, but for a different reason. Knox contextualized immigrant education within a broader assimilationist project that taught children “American values.” \textit{La Prensa} strictly opposed assimilation and always stressed the importance of retaining the mother tongue, but Porfiristas understood the political, economic, and cultural benefits of fluency in more than one language, particularly English and French. \textit{La Prensa’s} activism against segregation in Texas schools demonstrated a commitment to the community, but also signaled recognition of the possible permanence of el México de afuera in the United States, as the children of immigrants entered schools that would expose them to the culture and customs of the United States, and not Mexico.

\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., “Para la Navidad de Los Niños Pobres,” Dec. 1, 1917.

Although *La Prensa* paid greater attention to local issues than *Revista Mexicana*, it was surprisingly quiet about the escalating violence in South Texas throughout 1915. In January, rebels drafted the Plan of San Diego, called for the liberation of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and Colorado, “of which states the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American Imperialism.” The plan would also create a “Liberating Army for Races and Peoples,” proclaimed “the liberty of the individuals of the black race,” and promised to return ancestral land to indigenous groups who supported the plan.\(^{454}\) The conflict was designed as a no-quarter race war, since the rebels specifically targeted all Anglo males ages sixteen and older. U.S. officials immediately discovered the plot, and the ensuing war between Texas Rangers and ethnic Mexicans resulted in the deaths of twenty-one Anglos and approximately 300 Mexicans. The rebellion also damaged the local economy, as Mexican workers returned to Mexico and Anglo farmers fled the area as well. While this was primarily a rural movement, the deteriorating race relations in South Texas had important implications for cities in the region with similar tensions between Anglos, Tejanos, and Mexican immigrants. Regardless, *La Prensa* did not closely follow the conflict, and took a neutral stance when it did. For example, *La Prensa* reported in August 1915 that the Wilson administration was concerned about the violence and was prepared to send reinforcements to the Rio Grande Valley. *La Prensa* made no comment regarding this position, despite its potential for worsening the race relations in the region.\(^{455}\)

In fact, when problems arose in the United States because of the Mexican Revolution in Texas, *La Prensa* generally maintained its neutrality. This rebellion presented a complex dilemma because *La Prensa* did not support the violence related to the revolution, which would have positioned it against the rebels. At the same time, consistency with other positions would have suggested opposition to the violence against Mexicans by the Texas Rangers. Neutrality was the best course of action for Lozano

\(^{454}\) Johnson, 72.

and his colleagues because it kept them from alienating readers and prevented any problems with the U.S. government or the Carrancista surveillance.

Although Carranza had triumphed militarily in Mexico and taken some steps to consolidate power, he had certainly not gained the full consent of the masses, and hegemony was still being contested among the revolutionary factions in Mexico and among the exiles. In the United States, the debate about hegemony in Mexico took place through the press. Michael M. Smith notes that both Spanish and English-language newspapers across the Southwest widely opposed Carranza, including *La Patria* and the *El Paso Morning Times* in El Paso, *Regeneración* and *El Heraldo de México* in Los Angeles, and *La Prensa, Revista Mexicana*, and *El Imparcial de Texas* in San Antonio.456 The Carrancistas responded to that situation when Carranza agent Roberto V. Pesqueira formed the Pan American News Service (PANS) in 1914, which became “an international wire service operating as a division of Carranza’s department of foreign affairs. Utilizing the international cable and telegraph system, Pesqueira sought to link the Constitutionalist government to all sections of the United States by establishing local offices of the PANS in every city containing a Mexican consulate.”457 Two other agents, Modesto C. Rolland and Carlo di Fornaro, developed the Mexican Bureau of Information in New York, where they published articles and bulletins for free distribution to approximately 500 newspapers across the United States.

Despite their best efforts and the ties to the Wilson administration that they developed, Carrancista agents could not contain the “enemy press” in the United States and elsewhere. Printed media and communication and transportation networks became the most important weapons against the Carranza regime because the oppositional texts circulated beyond the reach of the Mexican state. What


457 Ibid., 162.
was worse for Carranza, the exile press also had access to international telegraph services within the United States. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* gave el México de afuera access to distinct viewpoints and arguments. In 1916, for example, *La Prensa* included a section entitled “Overview of the Press,” which published articles from other newspapers such as the *New York Times*. The Porfirista press also exposed readers to other types of media. *La Prensa* included a list in every issue of the holdings in Lozano’s bookstore, Casa Editorial Lozano. The listings included novels, books on religion and history, and math and science textbooks.

*La Prensa* spoke out against the Carranza government’s censorship of the press while simultaneously calling journalists in Mexico “ignorant, uncouth, servile, [and] obscene” pawns of the First Chief. The newspaper also called the revolutionary press “a disgrace from any point of view,” unlike the exile press which actually “constituted the homeland.” Lozano, García Naranjo, and their colleagues positioned themselves as superior to journalists in Mexico because they believed themselves to be more courageous than their counterparts. Such a claim was questionable, of course: they faced constant surveillance, but they enjoyed the relative safety of living north of the U.S./Mexico border. From their perspective, however, they all made a greater sacrifice than any journalist living in Mexico, since they lived displaced from the homeland.

Perhaps because they now had a solid readership, *La Prensa’s* staff began to take greater liberties in expressing their political views, and the newspaper critiqued other aspects of the Carranza government. In particular, the newspaper blamed Carranza for the widespread hunger and misery across Mexico. On June 9, 1916, an article stated that “while Mexico [died] of starvation, Carranza [sent] beans to Europe.” A ship from Mexico had arrived in New York the previous day en route to Europe,

---

and the author wrote that exporting a basic dietary staple such as beans was the final straw from the Carrancistas, who were flinging the nation “into infernal misery.”

*La Prensa’s* critiques of the First Chief were tame, however, in comparison with those of *Revista Mexicana*. *Revista Mexicana* was willing to launch attacks against anyone perceived as Mexico’s enemy, and García Naranjo noted in his memoirs that “what [readers] liked the most was that the arrogance with which we threw darts at Carranza and Villa inspired us to throw flaming arrows at [Wilson].” In its second issue, the magazine asked “tu quoque, Brutus?” in reference to the Latin American countries that had seemingly betrayed Mexico by negotiating with the United States in Niagara Falls to hasten Huerta’s resignation in 1914. The author wondered why these nations were surprised that Mexico was in a state of disgrace. *Revista Mexicana* also implicated the Wilson administration in the execution of the former Villista mayor of Torreón, Coahuila, Santiago Ramírez, in July 1916. Before joining Villa, Ramírez had been “one of the blood brothers of Carranza”; therefore, despite their ideological differences and “regardless of his [Ramirez’s] crimes,” Carranza owed him some consideration. *Revista Mexicana* defended Ramírez for fighting against General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and the magazine called Carranza a traitor for ordering the execution of his former friend despite offering amnesty to accused criminals battling Pershing. The author wrote that not even “the Apache, the Hooligan, [or] the Mafioso…invoked the sacred name of the Homeland for murder” as Carranza did. He also blamed the Wilson administration, the “defender” of

---


460 García Naranjo, 8:150-151.

human rights, for recognizing and legitimizing the Carranza regime and marking Mexico with the “curse of Judas.”

In fact, Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 and the subsequent Punitive Expedition received widespread attention from both publications. *La Prensa* responded by publishing telegrams with information about the negotiations between the Wilson and Carranza governments, and an article stating that “the majority of the Mexican population [opposed] the entry of [U.S.] troops.”

*La Prensa* did not directly comment on the conflict in the editorial section, but did include a front-page article in which Manuel Calero stated that it was “embarrassing that a bandit like Villa precipitated an international crisis.” *Revista Mexicana* shared Calero’s sentiments, but placed the blame for the crisis on Carranza. An editorial in the magazine entitled “An Acceptable Solution” argued that after almost a month, it was time for Pershing to withdraw from Mexico, and the Wilson administration should be content with having scattered Villa’s forces. Carranza, however, committed treachery against Mexico because he all but welcomed U.S. troops into Mexico and demonstrated that he was willing to sacrifice the nation in order to maintain favor with Wilson. Worst of all, Carranza exposed his inability to deal with the “demented and criminal acts of Mexico’s bad sons” such as Villa.

Although the Porfirista press kept readers updated on the political conflicts in Mexico, *La Prensa* shifted its attention to local issues when the United States entered World War I in April 1917. According to *La Prensa*, Mexican immigrant men who had no proof of their nationality began to panic when faced with the possibility of being drafted into the U.S. military. In May, *La Prensa* assessed the situation and stated that many immigrants did not register in Mexican consulates because they lived in rural and

---

462 Ibid., “¡Traidores!” Jul. 30, 1916. One of the crimes that Ramírez was accused of was overseeing the death of Elizardo Gutiérrez, the mayor of Múzquiz, Coahuila.


inaccessible areas, or because they did not trust the Carrancista consuls. *La Prensa* urged readers to register at the nearest consulate, but if they had lived in the United States for more than six years, they needed to prove that they had not voted or run for political office. It seemed that the panic among immigrants became increasingly widespread in San Antonio, where troops gathered at Fort Sam Houston to form the Fifty-ninth Infantry Regiment in July.466

According to *La Prensa*, Mexican Consulates were overwhelmed with requests for documentation. In an effort to compel Mexican nationals to obtain all of the necessary documentation to reside in the United States, the consul in San Antonio declared in January 1918 that he would no longer grant Mexican passports to anyone who could not prove Mexican citizenship. This angered Mexican immigrants, who believed that their U.S.-born children were also Mexican nationals because of ethnicity. One article asserted that “none of these individuals consider American citizenship to be inconvenient; rather, the love for the homeland that beats in their hearts made them profoundly sad” because their children could not legally be considered Mexican.467 The sons of Mexican parents now had the obligation to fight for the United States if called to serve, and Mexican families were legally divided by nationality. *La Prensa* did not explicitly state whether or not U.S.-born Mexican men should serve in the U.S. armed forces. Instead, the newspaper argued that these men should not be forced to serve because of a lack of documentation.

Several exiles formed the “Committee of Mexican Citizens” in order to deal with this problem. The officers of this organization were former Huerta cabinet members Tamariz and David de la Fuente, Salomé Garza Aldape (brother of Manuel Garza Aldape), Lozano, and Valentín Rivero. The committee received word in September 1918 from Major General Enoch Crowder and the U.S. Department of Justice that “subjects or citizens from neutral countries, including Mexico” would not qualify for

---

466 Ibid., May 31, 1917.

467 Ibid., “Queremos Seguir Siendo Mexicanos,” Jan. 24, 1918.
military service “even if they had their first papers or had voted in the United States.” Although the war in Europe was approaching its end by this time, the cooperation between these Mexican leaders and U.S. government officials represented an act of solidarity. The meeting also helped to establish a legal process through which immigrants could obtain the necessary documents to prove their nationality. The committee, in conjunction with the Mexican Consul in San Antonio, Teódulo Beltrán, developed questionnaires accepted by the U.S. government that would validate Mexican citizenship. In September and October 1918, *La Prensa* reminded readers of the importance of filling out the questionnaires, and over 1,500 immigrants in San Antonio submitted them. Mexican consuls in El Paso, Dallas, and Ft. Worth followed similar measures. *La Prensa’s* staff, Mexican authorities, and the broader exile community worked together to ensure the legal protection of el México de afuera and the children of Mexican immigrants. The committee’s work was patriotic because it encouraged immigrants to assert their national identity, but it was also a matter of self-preservation, since the questionnaires were a tool used to avoid military service.

Until this moment, *La Prensa* had focused primarily on the wars in Mexico and Europe. It continued to do so, but it now paid more attention to local issues in an effort to help the Mexican community confront new legal realities of living in the United States. Compounding the challenge of the draft was a new immigration law in 1917, which included provisions stating that Mexicans could enter the United States “without prerequisites” only if they proved that they were going to work in agriculture. Immigrants would have a much more difficult time freely crossing the U.S./Mexico border, and they needed to be better educated about the requirements for residency in the United States.

469 Ibid., “1500 Cuestionarios Llenó el Comité Consultivo,” Oct. 6, 1918.
There also needed to be cooperation between immigrants, Mexican officials, and the U.S. government in order to ensure the protection of immigrants, and Lozano used his newspaper as part of this broader network.

The Porfirista press was not, however, against the war effort. In fact, the U.S. government bought advertisement space in both publications to promote it. Readers were presented images of Uncle Sam and families looking at soldiers carrying the American flag as they were asked to “help the cause of Democracy” by purchasing U.S. savings bonds.\textsuperscript{472} Another advertisement asked Texans to work in factories.\textsuperscript{473} Regardless of their criticism of the Wilson administration, the Porfirista publications supported democracy, which was the rhetoric used by the United States to justify its participation in the war. And of course from an economic perspective, both publications benefitted from this advertising, especially \textit{La Prensa}, which printed more of these ads and generated more revenue.\textsuperscript{474} The publications could have been adversely affected politically and economically by choosing not to print the government ads, but in doing so the complexity of their transnational position became clear. As much as \textit{La Prensa} and \textit{Revista Mexicana} attempted to protect Mexican nationalism, Lozano, García Naranjo, and many of their readers lived within the boundaries of the U.S. nation-state. They may not have been U.S. citizens, but these ads projected a message to readers that they owed a measure of loyalty and patriotism to their host nation.

This complicated Porfirista politics in various ways. This group often criticized President Wilson and the United States for acting as the aggressor in Mexican affairs. However, by supporting the war effort, \textit{La Prensa} and \textit{Revista Mexicana} backed U.S. involvement against the Central Powers. This might seem like an ironic shift, since Porfiristas now demonstrated a level of trust in the United States’s

\textsuperscript{472} Revista Mexicana, Oct. 6, 1918.

\textsuperscript{473} La Prensa, Nov. 4, 1918.

\textsuperscript{474} La Prensa also printed advertisements for Helmar Turkish Cigarettes, which used images of happy U.S. sailors to promote their products.
ability to resolve global problems. However, García Naranjo stated in his memoirs that when World War I began in 1914, he and others (including José María Lozano) believed that U.S. involvement was inevitable, and that the United States would likely emerge as a dominant global power.\(^{475}\) Perhaps the Porfiristas living in the United States believed that it was in their best interests to support what they believed would be a U.S. victory, especially since they lived in that nation. Critiques of the U.S. war effort might also be considered seditious activity.

As Porfiristas dealt with the U.S. war effort, they also continued to fight the Carranza regime. *Revista Mexicana* devoted 1917 and much of 1918 to the protest against the Constitution of 1917, asking readers to demonstrate their opposition by signing the petition printed in the magazine. This gave el México de afuera the opportunity to join Mexico’s top exiled military leaders and intellectuals in a public protest against the Mexican government. Of course, there was no way to force agreement, and even Porfiristas reacted differently to the petition. *La Prensa* made no mention of it, and according to a list in *Revista Mexicana*, González signed the petition, but Lozano did not.\(^{476}\) The reasons for Lozano’s reaction are unknown. *La Prensa* did not support the new constitution, and it made a political statement by publishing a photo of Juárez on the front page on February 5, 1917, but perhaps Lozano did not want his name and that of his business attached to the protest.

In February 1918, *Revista Mexicana* reprinted the petition and stated that even Carrancistas publicly scoffed at the new, fraudulent constitution, and that the “authentic” constitution would soon be restored. But ultimately the protest failed, and the Constitution of 1857 became a historical document with no legal validity. This reality became increasingly apparent throughout 1918 and 1919, and *Revista Mexicana*’s contributors reacted by writing articles tying the Constitution of 1917 to Bolshevism. This reflected the fact that, as the decade ended, Porfiristas had to face not only a Mexico, but a world in

\(^{475}\) García Naranjo, 8: 44.

which positivism and their ideas about progress and modernity were no longer relevant. The revolution became the hegemonic force in Mexico after the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, and within the context of the Mexican nation-state, Porfiristas and the supporters of the “old regime” became decidedly counter-hegemonic.

In addition, Europe, the center of their idea of civilization and progress, had ravaged itself in a barbaric war. García Naranjo referred to these years as “the burning of the old world,” and many of the exiles would have a difficult time adjusting to these changes.\(^{477}\) The Porfirista exile experience between 1914 and 1920 was shaped by geography, profession, class, gender, race, and personal temperament. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* represented two exile trajectories. Lozano’s newspaper increasingly catered to the Porfiristas and broader immigrant community who chose to remain in the United States, and García Naranjo’s magazine decreased in popularity as the military phase of the revolution came to an end.

Despite these differences, both publications were important in the development of the Mexican community in the United States. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* succeeded (at least initially) by selling nostalgia and providing a sense of “home” away from the homeland. They also engaged the community through a sense of common struggle, which Mexicans could overcome by adhering to their proper gender roles and emulating Mexico’s national icons. The Porfirista exile press attempted to educate its audience and act as the purveyor of culture as its predecessors had during the Porfiriato. It also acted as an oppressive force by presenting messages on the importance of whiteness and specific physical features, particularly for women. *La Prensa* and *Revista Mexicana* worked to incorporate el México de afuera into a broader global community and expand its worldview. While it is difficult to ascertain the level of cultural hegemony achieved by Porfiristas through the press, these publications

\(^{477}\) García Naranjo, 8: 43.
(through writing contests, political activism, and social work) helped to open the public sphere to el México de afuera in a way that was not possible in Mexico.
Chapter 5: “El Incendio del Viejo Mundo”: Displacement, Nostalgia, and Identity

“Do not worry Federico; those who left us homeless and without a country will someday face God’s punishment for the horror they have done and will continue to do under the pretext of vindicating the nation…”

- José María Lozano to Federico Gamboa, November 11, 1916

During the 1910s, Porfiristas faced triple displacement: World War I destroyed their idealized conceptions of progress, they were forced to leave their homeland, and they confronted Anglo discrimination as ethnic minorities in Texas. This chapter will shift the analysis from San Antonio to the broader Porfirista diaspora, exploring the effects of displacement and the ways in which this group reacted to the global conflicts and changes of the late 1910s and early 1920s. Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur argue that “diasporic traversals question the rigidities of identity itself – religious, ethnic, gendered, national.” They add that diasporic movements also represent “a nomadic turn in which the very parameters of specific historical moments are embodied and – as diaspora itself suggests – are scattered and regrouped into new points of becoming.” As the Porfirista exiles dealt with their geographic and political dispersal, they also worked to identify themselves within the context of a new Mexican nationalism that marked them as “villains.”

Porfiristas resented being forced into “new points of becoming,” and an analysis of the primary sources reveals that the exiles resisted the changes in their lives in various ways. The more outspoken writers continued to use the press in the United States, Mexico, and Cuba to fight the Mexican government’s efforts to destroy their reputations and question their patriotism. Other authors, such as Francisco M. de Olaguíbel used poetry to express their sentiments. Gamboa kept track of the psychological effects of exile on family members and close friends in his diary, and García Naranjo commented on his experiences in retrospect in the 1950s. In San Antonio, Aureliano Urrutia and his

family defied racism by proudly expressing their Aztec heritage. Regardless of these differences, the reactions contained elements of nostalgia for Mexico, but more importantly, for the Porfiriato, which they considered Mexico’s prime (and bygone) era.

**Porfirista Reactions to World War I**

Hamid Naficy examines the concept of exile within the framework of the “ethnoreligious, sexual, and nationalistic atrocities worldwide” in the postmodern, late twentieth-century. Naficy argues that the conflict in the Balkans, in particular, prompted a “radical redefinition of the term ‘exile’” from “a homogeneous, unitary, and monolithic conception,” to “one that consists of multiple and variegated exiles.” The author suggests that exile no longer constitutes “strictly political expulsion and banishment” from one nation-state to another. Instead, it is now a “more nuanced, culturally driven displacement.” In the Balkans, the policy of ethnic cleansing, religious conflict and persecution, rape of females as a weapon of war, and the use of concentration camps left millions without “house, home, and homeland.” Moreover, the “physical violence and psychic ruptures of war, exile, rapid change, disease, and other factors…led to a crisis of the body.” Exiles lost their homes and were forced to leave their homelands. They were also “evicted from their own eviscerated bodies…the first and most intimate home of humans,” through the violence imposed on them, which left them without control over their bodies.479

Although Naficy challenges the one-dimensional conception of exile as political banishment from a nation-state, his argument is problematic because it considers “culturally driven displacement” as a strictly postmodern phenomenon.480 Globalization and electronic media have indeed changed the ways in which groups interact within and across national boundaries. Arjun Appadurai suggests that the


World is currently undergoing a process of “deterritorialization,” as “money, commodities, and persons are involved in ceaselessly chasing each other around the world.” The implications of deterritorialization on exile are significant because the “homeland” can be an abstract space and no longer limited to a geographic location, specifically a nation-state. Exiles also have easier access to modes of communication, as well as artifacts from “home.” However, the Porfirista experience in the 1910s was not so different from the nuanced, multilayered exile described by Naficy. The Mexican Revolution overthrew a political regime while reacting against positivism and the Eurocentrism that privileged a small sector of the population. The members of the Huerta regime left Mexico as political exiles, but they also represented the final vestiges of the Porfirista way of life, purged to make way for a new national identity. Inadvertently, their exile became part of a larger global experience as the modern world succumbed to war. Porfiristas were displaced politically and culturally, and though they escaped the violence in Mexico to save their lives, some of them suffered the physical and psychological effects of exile in the form of depression, anxiety, and even suicide.

This unprecedented global conflict weighed heavily on many Porfiristas, who saw it as mankind’s rapid descent into a state of barbarism. The exiles found ways to use humor, poetry, and prose in their reactions against the Carranza regime, but they did not know how to deal with World War I. Their writing expressed fear and increasing helplessness with each passing year, and the stress of the uncertainty manifested itself in various ways, including physical and mental illness. In their memoirs, Gamboa and García Naranjo expressed shock and horror, and La Prensa updated readers daily on the disasters and tragedies taking place across Europe. World War I proved to be an interstice, an “in-between” moment where competing visions about the world violently clashed, devastating societies and  

---

killing and displacing millions of people. Though the war took place immediately before radio became a commodified medium, newspapers such as *La Prensa* took advantage of telegraph networks and had correspondents in Europe who provided a daily chronicle of the war. Porfiristas were directly caught in this interstice, and they were forced to defend their cultural and political identities while simultaneously adapting to the conditions in exile.

On July 30, 1914, numerous exiles aboard the “Buenos Aires” stopped in Havana after fleeing Mexico. They accessed the day’s *Diario de la Marina*, which reported that Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph had declared war on Serbia, and that Russia, Germany, and France prepared to mobilize their armies. García Naranjo described this poignant moment forty years later in his memoirs, but the exiles understood at the time that the news foreshadowed what they believed would be a much greater tragedy than the one they were presently living. He and José María Lozano discussed the political situation in Europe with mixed reactions. They believed that the United States would take the upper hand in global events, leaving Mexico at its complete mercy. On the other hand, they were relieved because the war in Europe offered them some respite. García Naranjo stated that the world quickly forgot about Mexico’s civil war and turned its attention to the “giant hurricane” in Europe. After arriving in New York, García Naranjo realized that reporters were no longer interested in sensational declarations from the exiled members of the Huerta administration. He and Lozano were grateful for that, since it provided them opportunity to “lose [themselves] in complete anonymity” and escape reporters and politics, albeit briefly.

---

482 Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 2. Bhabha defines “interstices” as “the overlap and displacement of domains of difference.”

483 García Naranjo, 8: 43.

484 Ibid., 44. Edgar Sisson, the editor for New York’s *The Cosmopolitan* had offered García Naranjo a job as a contributor, writing articles on the political situation in Mexico. However, once García Naranjo arrived in New York City, Sisson asked him to write his opinions on the war in Europe. García Naranjo did not feel adequately knowledgeable about European politics, and he declined the offer. Although this left him jobless, García Naranjo was happy to escape politics of any kind.
Gamboa expressed his strong reactions to the European conflict throughout his diary. On August 2, 1914, he wrote “Europe burns. Germany has thrown itself on France!...another tragedy begins! And civilization?...The European fire is proof that human savagery is universal and incurable. *Homo homini lupus!* [man is man’s wolf].”\(^{485}\) Three years later, he commented again on the seemingly endless war.

On December 31, 1917, he wrote

> What a year, Lord God, what a fateful year! Where there is no war…there are the complications and consequences of these…catastrophes—or plague, or misery and hunger, or terrifying problems with extremely difficult solutions—, [sic] socialism is advancing…and no one knows what it will demand through violent means after the conclusion of the European conflict—everywhere there is pain, pain, infinite and eternal pain that is man’s fatal partner in the forced pilgrimage to the cradle of the tomb; but an intensive, quintessential, implacable pain…And throughout the entire world, even in its most obscure corners, human rights…suspended and mocked…[two men] act as the supreme arbitrators of the world’s destiny, two dictators, two despots, two delirious and egocentric ideologues, two Lucifers…these two monsters are Kaiser Hohenzollern and President Wilson. Deliver us, Lord, from these sinister characters!...*Miserere nobis* [have mercy on us] if Wilhem II of Germany and Woodrow I of Yankeeland continue to [use their power] for the misfortune of the species. *Miserere nobis!*”\(^{486}\)

This passage represented a stark contrast from his optimistic entries written seven years earlier. Gamboa organized the Mexican centennial celebrations and rejoiced in the pomp, visits from foreign dignitaries (including German diplomats), and patriotic displays of Mexican progress and inclusion in the civilized world. 1910 represented all that was good in the world, the pinnacle of civilization; by 1917, Gamboa witnessed how base and evil humanity could be, and only God’s mercy could save them.

Gamboa’s conceptualization of the world through the dichotomy of good versus evil needs to be considered as a product of the times. The writer was born in 1864 and grew up during the peaceful Porfiriato and before the existence of “world war.” He became an important part of Mexico’s literary culture as the western world celebrated its accomplishments through extravagant world’s fairs. Modernity was supposed to alleviate humanity’s problems through advances in science and technology. These same advances were now being used to kill millions of people across the world. For a man such

\(^{485}\) Gamboa, 6: 152.

\(^{486}\) Ibid., 516.
as Gamboa, who stood with Díaz during Mexico’s glorious centennial celebrations, watching the world self-destruct was utterly heartbreaking, and it worsened his depression and anxiety.

Porfiristas articulated their sentiments in other ways. *Revista Mexicana* published numerous pages of photos of the war in its first issues, displaying a wounded soldier carried by members of the Red Cross, children in the Prussian city of Königsberg tending abandoned fields, and soldiers saying goodbye to their wives and children.\(^{487}\) The magazine even presented wartime fashion in late 1915 and the ways in which French designers created women’s clothing inspired by military uniforms.\(^{488}\) *La Prensa* reported the latest news from the European warfront on a daily basis, as well as a column entitled “From the Battlefield,” which included photographs. Readers could “watch” the war almost daily, seeing images of the Fokker aircraft and its inventor Anthony Fokker, French military officers observing the front lines in Germany, British artillery, and Pershing visiting with Belgium’s King Albert I after the United States entered World War I.\(^{489}\) The newspaper also published a photo of the “caterpillar tank,” followed by an interview from *La Prensa*’s correspondent in San Francisco with British Colonel Ernest Swinton, the inventor of the weapon.\(^{490}\) Throughout 1915, readers could glimpse at scenes such as Italian soldiers shooting at Austrian forces from the trenches, German troops gathering a wheat harvest for provisions, and wounded Turkish soldiers.\(^{491}\) *La Prensa* did not use adjectives to describe these photographs; the newspaper only included subject headings. In 1916 and 1917, however, these headings incorporated adjectives, making them more dramatic. Readers could now witness the “Echoes of the Romanian Disaster,” “The Terrible Effects of the Austrian Artillery,” and “The Terrible


\(^{488}\) Ibid., Sep. 12, 1915.


\(^{490}\) Ibid., Apr. 28, 1918.

Maritime Campaign,” which portrayed burning ships at sea.\textsuperscript{492} \textit{La Prensa} even depicted “Picturesque Scenes from the War,” such as a group of soldiers struggling to pull a cannon up the Vosges Mountains in France (since it was “impossible” to do with horses or mules), and smiling American troops who were going to fight alongside French forces.\textsuperscript{493}

A number of the newspaper’s editorials, particularly at year’s end, reflected a growing sense of despair as the war progressed. On December 31, 1914, \textit{La Prensa} published the editorial “1914,” describing the “agony of the Red Year,” and calling for peace in Mexico and throughout Europe.\textsuperscript{494} The following year, the editor (either Teodoro Torres or Ignacio E. Lozano) likened the war in Europe to a battle between the titans, and he called each battle a stanza in “Death’s poem” acted out by man. The author noted that it was unfair to criticize Europe for its savagery when Mexico could not resolve its own civil war. At least the war in Europe offered a “grandiose spectacle;” Mexico had spent the previous five years involved in “the most dreadful and unfruitful of all wars,” whose “horrors…exceeded all those witnessed during the black year of 1915.”\textsuperscript{495}

In 1916 and 1917, the year-end reflections focused on the civil war in Mexico, but with the end of World War I in late 1918, \textit{La Prensa}’s editor took the opportunity to comment on the effects of the global struggle. He stated that it was not the end of a year, but rather “the end of an era, tragic, osseous, and adverse for humanity.” The author likened this to a death on a hospital bed, alluding to fate of many soldiers, but he also expressed hope for the future, calling 1919 the “year of rectifications.” Humanity had a second chance at life and nature would restore equilibrium. Moreover, a transformation was taking place that would “consolidate societies upon new foundations with more humane, equitable,


\textsuperscript{493} Ibid., Dec. 12, 1916, Dec. 22, 1917.

\textsuperscript{494} Ibid., “1914,” Dec. 31, 1914.

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid., “1915,” Dec. 31, 1915.
moral, and universal orientations.” The editor also placed his utmost hope in the homeland and stated that “apart from her, we [the exiles] have learned to love her more and better, and we make an effort to teach [others] to love her…all of our cares, all of our aspirations, all of our loves rise upright in favor of the homeland urging to redeem [us from our] state of affliction…like a martyred matron.” He ended his reflection by calling upon all Mexicans to use reason and come together harmoniously to “save and exalt [their] Homeland.”

Because the newspaper circulated daily, readers could get the sense that La Prensa was constantly with them, partaking in their struggles. La Prensa suffered and rejoiced alongside its audience, and after years of following World War I every single day, there was finally hope for the future. The newspaper demonstrated awareness that the world was inherently different compared to 1914, and it considered this as a positive circumstance.

However, Revista Mexicana did not. Throughout World War I, García Naranjo’s publication focused primarily on the civil war in Mexico and the problems of the Carranza regime, referring to the European conflict sporadically in the editorials. After 1915, the magazine also stopped printing photos from the warfront. At the end of World War I, Revista Mexicana addressed the increasing global prominence of Bolshevism and its negative influence on the Mexican Constitution of 1917. Throughout 1919, the magazine published a seventeen-part series written by Jorge Vera Estañol entitled “Why the Constitution of 1857 is National, Why the Constitution of 1917 is Bolshevik.” As the title of these articles suggested, Bolshevik ideology had no place within Mexican political or national identity. Vera Estañol claimed that the “bastard constitutional congress” of 1917 destroyed the principles of the 1857 document, and the attempts to implement communist principles in Mexico posed a threat to the nation. Like Moheno, Vera Estañol criticized the secularization of the education system, since it reduced the

497 García Naranjo offered no explanation for this in his memoirs.
498 Vera Estañol’s articles in Revista Mexicana became part of a larger project entitled Carranza and His Bolshevik Regime, published in 1920.
number of teachers in an abundantly illiterate society.\textsuperscript{499} He also pointed out that the right to own private property was what propelled Mexico’s economic growth, and he argued that Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 “was neither properly individualist…nor communist” because although it upheld the value of ejidos, it did not give Mexicans collective access over all national territory.\textsuperscript{500} Even if the Constitution had taken the latter measure, “modern collectives that subsisted organically and reached maximum efficiency” could not exist because they required complete equality among members, which went against human nature.\textsuperscript{501}

The critiques of the Constitution of 1917 demonstrated a genuine apprehension about communism. Vera Estañol’s use of Bolshevism as a framework for attacking the new constitution underscored a more serious fear—that the ideas about progress that shaped the Porfirista worldview were in decline. Monarchies were toppled across the globe and capitalism and positivist notions of modernity were seriously challenged by communism. The United States now posed as the dominant world power (to the dismay of Porfiristas), and not only was Mexico’s position in the civilized, modern world compromised, it became difficult to define the “civilized world.” The supporters of the Constitution of 1857 had to face the reality that the Constitution of 1917 now gave Mexico its political legitimacy, especially since it was accepted by the United States. Porfiristas, particularly those involved with the Huerta regime, were considered reactionary after Huerta’s resignation in 1914, when it remained unclear which faction would win control over Mexico. With the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, the revolution became the hegemon from which Mexico’s leaders claimed legitimacy for the remainder of the twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{499} “Por Qué la Constitución de 1857 es Nacional, Por Qué la Constitución de 1917 es Bolshevique,” \textit{Revista Mexicana}, Apr. 16, 1919.

\textsuperscript{500} Ibid., “El Bolshevismo de la Constitución Queretana,” Jun. 22, 1919.

\textsuperscript{501} Ibid., May 11, 1919.
The Exiles Chronicle the Displacement from Mexico

Porfiristas were now decidedly counter-hegemonic, part of the “old regime” that had waning relevance in Mexican and broader Western politics and society. They were also cast as traitors because of their opposition to the revolution. In an effort to defend themselves, their families, and their reputations, Porfiristas kept track of their experiences in exile, as they had during the Huerta regime. The memoirs recount the story of a group defeated in almost every way possible, and their fall from grace reads like a tragedy. The texts were highly political, displaying an unapologetic attitude on the part of the authors. Writing and publishing these memoirs served as an act of defiance against the revolution, ensuring the existence of documentation of the perceived injustices of the Carranza regime.

Judith Butler argues that while censorship generally regulates offensive speech, it can also produce speech when “censorship precedes the text.” She adds that “to move outside of the domain of speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject,” and the act of speaking creates subjectivity only if it is done within the normative limits. The Carranza regime attempted to eliminate the subjectivity of its opponents by censoring the press, thus removing any “normative limit” through which the opposition could express itself. Despite Carranza’s efforts to do this beyond the nation’s borders, the exiles still managed to publish critiques of the First Chief and his regime. The intellectuals who formed part of the Mexican “reaction” understood that literacy equaled power, especially beyond the reach of Carrancista censorship, and they had the capability of documenting their critiques, feelings, and experiences as a way of asserting their own subjectivity. In retrospect, the written words of these exiles kept them from being erased from the historical record by the institutionalized revolution.

García Naranjo’s memoirs were written in hindsight, allowing the author to reflect on his decisions and actions. On the other hand, Moheno’s letters (published as one volume) and Gamboa’s

502 Butler, 128.

503 Ibid., 133.
diary provide insight into the process of exile as it took place. Although these texts account for only two individual experiences, they are important because they trace the immediate reactions to the conditions in which the exiles lived, particularly in Havana. These sources need to be read with the understanding that they were not meant to be private; both Moheno and Gamboa intended to publish this material as soon as possible. All three authors expressed a general frustration with their political situation, but Gamboa was careful about omitting information he deemed dangerous, such as his extensive involvement with the counter-revolutionary Pacificatory Assembly in San Antonio. García Naranjo and Moheno, on the other hand, openly criticized and insulted Carranza, Wilson, and the rest of their enemies. Despite the differences in the three accounts, the authors hoped to accomplish the same goal through their writing—to uphold their nation and defend their reputations.

García Naranjo wrote about the initial anger he felt upon arriving in New York, stating that the “rage” he felt was “the worst of all advisers…I was blind and I wanted to stay that way.” He was especially hurt by the dispersal of his family and friends. In October 1914, the Cuadrilátero met unexpectedly in New York. García Naranjo ran into José María Lozano outside of a subway station in Times Square, “in one of those coincidences that rarely occur in life.” Lozano had just returned from Spain, and García Naranjo told him that Moheno was on his way from New Orleans. The three men met at the Belmont Hotel, remembering their friend Olaguibel, who was incarcerated in Mexico City by the Carranza regime. They chatted, shared stories, and discussed their future plans. García Naranjo had accepted an offer from Rubén Valenti to move temporarily to Guatemala because New York was too expensive. Lozano “did not know what route to take” because of his difficult financial situation, and Moheno only had funds to live in New Orleans for six months. In his memoirs, García Naranjo remembered “the terrifying impression” he felt about the “provisional lifestyle” they were living.

504 García Naranjo, 8: 57.

505 Ibid., 73-75.
This feeling only intensified when he moved to Guatemala, sending his wife Angelina and their two children to Monterrey to live with her family. García Naranjo recalled feeling especially guilty for leaving his infant children and missing significant milestones in their development. The rest of his family was spread out as well; his mother lived in Laredo, and his brother Arturo in Mexico City. García Naranjo stated that “the word ‘dispersion’ squeezed [his] nerves and froze [his] blood,” and the two weeks after he left his family in Monterrey were the “most bitter of his long exile.”

Nevertheless, he moved to Guatemala with Valenti (his colleague in the Ministry of Public Instruction) in December 1914. García Naranjo worried about his dear friend, who fell into deep states of depression when he consumed alcohol and who “needed someone to force him into absolute abstinence.” In March 1915, García Naranjo earned enough money to move to Texas, but he was reluctant to leave Valenti alone, fearing for his mental well-being. García Naranjo asked Valenti to wait three months, enough time to gather enough money to relocate Valenti to the United States. García Naranjo remembered Valenti’s face “lighting up” with this possibility, giving him hope for the future. They said their goodbyes, but before García Naranjo arrived in Texas, Valenti died after jumping off of a third-floor balcony. Based on García Naranjo’s account, it seemed that Valenti suffered from bipolar disorder, and the day of his suicide, he took an excessive amount of stimulants to calm his nerves. It was a tragic end for the man García Naranjo considered the “first rebel against positivism,” an “intelligent” man and “one of the best sub-Secretaries of Public Instruction.” On a personal level, the news of Valenti’s death made García Naranjo “feel like a part of himself had been amputated.”

\[506\] Ibid., 76.

\[507\] Ibid., 67.

\[508\] Ibid., 106.

\[509\] Ibid., 108-109.
The exiled Huerta regime, though dispersed, felt a sense of solidarity through common tragedy. Moheno dedicated his collection of letters, entitled *Sobre el Ara Sangrienta*, to “all of the victims,” and more specifically to Alberto García Granados, the only Huerta cabinet member executed by the Carranza government.⁵¹⁰ The collection begins with a scathing letter to Ignacio Baeza and Carlos Fernández Benedicto, written shortly after Moheno arrived in Havana in 1915. In late 1914, Baeza and Fernández Benedicto developed a magazine of satirical caricature entitled *Semanario Humorístico de Caricaturas Moheno*, which made fun of Moheno and his colleagues. Moheno charged them with claiming his name as their “personal patrimony and happily exploiting it…without scruples, [and] without reflecting upon whether [they] had the right to do so.” The exile accused the publishers of “throwing themselves” against him “with the rapacity of a band of vultures that devour the remains of an animal, dead and forgotten in the solitude of the countryside.” Their actions demonstrated their “great mental poverty and null morality,” and Moheno felt “nothing but great pity” for them. He then called the publishers cowards who lacked “Christian charity” for attacking a fallen compatriot, and hypocrites for supporting Madero, then turning against him, and doing the same with Huerta. He asked them how it felt to sit at the dinner table with their wives and children while eating the food “acquired through the suffering of others,” and if they ever gagged in disgust over their “nauseating work.”⁵¹¹

Throughout 1915 and 1916, Moheno also expressed grievances against the aristocrats in the exile community. In a letter to García Naranjo, Moheno wrote that a nation’s elites had the capacity to “possess superior culture” and pass it to the rest of the nation. The Mexican aristocracy, however, acted as a “malignant tumor,” a “useless appendage,” “selfish and lacking virility” because of the group’s “idleness” and lack of “ideals and civic valor.” Mexico’s aristocrats had “no right to live as the superior castes” because they only sought self-preservation rather than the benefit of the nation. Moheno then

---

⁵¹⁰ Moheno, *Sobre el Ara Sangrienta*, 5.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., 14-17.
described the conditions in Havana, where “two thousand” Mexican refugees lived while “avoiding each other, hiding from one another in order to eat their slice of bread alone…without having to share with their neighbor, much less a compatriot.” The exile recalled speaking to “a young opulent Mexican man” who traveled to Mexico from Europe in order to “see if the [country] had been fixed” (which Moheno accepted as evidence of the aristocrats’ detachment from the troubles in Mexico). This young man told Moheno that he did not want to reside in Havana, because he “feared finding a large Mexican element” in the city.

In this same letter, Moheno criticized the aristocrats for not supporting the Peace-Making Assembly, and he cited all of these as examples of a “selfish” upper-class who “closed their ears and their hearts” to the homeland and to their fellow Mexicans.\(^{512}\) These were the same critiques launched against men like Limantour, who preferred being in Paris rather than attending the Mexican Centennial celebrations. From the perspective of Moheno, García Naranjo, and the many others involved in the counterrevolution, the aristocrats were traitors. They wanted to save their assets without risking their lives and without any regard for the people in Mexico facing the effects of war, or their fellow exiles struggling to make a living.

Gamboa made no direct accusations, but he did include an anecdote in his diary regarding this situation. On June 28, Lozano visited Gamboa to present a plan to “unmask the bad Mexicans [Carrancistas] to the South American republics,” which would cost $100,000. Gamboa was baffled by the cost of the plan, but most of all by Lozano’s belief that the aristocrats would contribute the money. That same day, the writer received an anonymous letter from Paris, written by a person describing himself as “an old friend who went into exile when the Administration of the grand Porfirio Díaz fell.” Gamboa deduced that it was from Limantour, and the former Finance Minister expressed that he had found “refuge in the tomb of oblivion,” where he “hoped to remain indefinitely.” Limantour sent

\(^{512}\) Ibid., 22-25.
Gamboa his “most enthusiastic applause” for an article in Havana’s *La Reforma Social* in which he gave a “well-deserved flagellation” to the “men living on the other side of the Rio Bravo… responsible for our…national misfortunes.” It is noteworthy that Limantour blamed the United States for Mexico’s problems, since the success of the Díaz regime depended on positive relations with its northern neighbor. Gamboa saved the letter, but made no comments about its content.513

Limantour’s letter revealed the considerable disconnect between the various groups of exiles. While Limantour lived in Paris, his “friend” Gamboa frequently described living in poverty in Havana, suffering the consequences for standing up to the United States and Mexican governments. Macías-González states that in Paris, the “great Mexican colony of wealth” lived in “fine homes” and “moved among the most select circles of *belle époque* society,” even during the initial stages of World War I.514 Tello Díaz writes that the Díaz family and other Parisian aristocrats left the capital when World War I began, but were able to return to their homes in early 1915 and live in relative peace. Even though Don Porfirio understood that the war would “devastate humanity,” it seemed that the aristocrats had the resources to better shield themselves from the consequences of World War I.515 Limantour’s sense of guilt was evident; he could not even directly address Gamboa, hiding instead behind a flimsy attempt at anonymity. Gamboa’s resentment was also clear. He was never an aristocrat, but from his perspective, he gave up his comfortable diplomatic life in Europe to fight for Mexico in the political realm. His colleagues in the Díaz cabinet had done the opposite.

The memoirs shed light on a perceived misconception about the exiled members of the Huerta regime. When they fled Mexico, Moheno, in particular, was charged with leaving with vast amounts of

513 Gamboa, 6: 379.

514 Macías-González, “Mexicans of the ‘Better Class,’” 108-109. The author lists the names of those who settled in Europe, including the Amor, Béisteguía, Casasús, Escandón, Mier, Rincón Gallardo, and Yturbe families, “in addition to the Porfirián court” and “numerous diplomats compromised with Porfirismo.”

515 Tello Díaz, 47.
money and stealing from the Mexican treasury. In 1914, the Veracruz newspaper *El Dictamen* called Urrutia and Moheno traitors and “villains,” accusing them of inviting U.S. troops to Mexico in order to facilitate their escape. Moreover, these men were fleeing “with their ‘acquired’ gold and their lives guaranteed after usurping power, snatching gold, and strangulating the lives of honorable citizens.” *El Dictamen* characterized Moheno as the “personification of cynicism, shamelessness, and political impunity.”  

It also assured readers that “Moheno would not die of starvation.” He would make money in the United States by selling his “stories” to U.S. businessmen and possibly a circus owner, since the ex-minister was a “great political acrobat” who “always landed on his feet in spite of the roundness of his figure.”

García Naranjo’s memoirs and Gamboa’s diary told a different story about their friend. When the Cuadrilátero met in New York City in late 1914, Moheno disclosed that he had come to the metropolis to visit an old client who had agreed to pay a debt. The money would help him survive for six months, since he had not earned “a single cent” in New Orleans. Moheno did not fare better in Havana. In late 1916, he shared the condition of his family’s poverty with Gamboa. Moheno’s “wife, sick from anxiety, [took] care of the kitchen duties, and his sister [cleaned] the house, there, in the outskirts” of Havana. Gamboa sympathized with Moheno, stating that “in this exile the sorrows of our friends become our own…Poor Moheno, like me, like many…”

That same year, as Gamboa and Moheno discussed possible amnesty from the Carranza government, Moheno exclaimed the he “did not want amnesty, only tribunals; if anyone could prove that he stole a single cent, dishonored or shed


517 Ibid., “Querido Moheno no Morirá de Hambre.”

518 García Naranjo, 8: 75.

519 Gamboa, 6: 397
anyone’s blood…he would sign his own death sentence!” He was penniless and only wanted to work to sustain his family.\textsuperscript{520}

According to the memoirs, most of the exiled members of the Huerta regime and their families struggled to survive, unlike their aristocratic counterparts. But they faced more than just financial troubles. Gamboa’s diary illustrates the physical, emotional, and psychological effects of displacement more than the other memoirs. The author was quite frank about the emotions he experienced as his world fell apart, and between 1914 and 1919, his diary focused extensively on the topic of human mortality. Before his exile, he noted the passing of family members and friends, and he remembered the anniversaries of the deaths of his parents and siblings. Beginning in 1914, however, Gamboa’s diary entries became more somber as he reflected more broadly on death, human misery, and suffering. During his time in Cuba, he and his wife María Sagaseta de Gamboa experienced a rapid decline in health, and the stress of exile and poverty contributed to Gamboa’s state of depression. Yet, despite his constant melancholy, Gamboa attempted to remain optimistic, and he frequently called upon God for assistance through all obstacles. The writer did not miss Sunday Mass or important Catholic feast days, and his religious devotion helped him to believe in a brighter future after death.

The language throughout his memoir was bleak and reflected Gamboa’s general mood. Whenever he referred to politics in Mexico he would make comments such as “so much sadness today!” or “letters and news from Mexico…heart-breaking!” On August 20, 1915, he stated that “in light of all that is happening, I have come to this…conclusion: Mexico is irretrievably lost.”\textsuperscript{521} He discussed the capacity for “social crises” to bring out the worst in everyone, since “mutual disgrace [leveled] conquerors and the conquered, intellectuals and commoners, brave people and cowards, strong and weak souls, adolescents and adults, men and women.” He added that “everyone exposed their incurable

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid, 334.

\textsuperscript{521} Gamboa, 6: 272-273.
defects, carefully hidden during normal periods…[and people were] moths…human moths worthy of little esteem.”

Gamboa’s hopelessness was evident, and in his entry for August 29, he wrote “colorless and sad day. But what day isn’t?” In September, Gamboa described a visit he and his wife made to a group of friends from Mexico in Havana, stating that “exile melancholized everything and melancholized everyone.” After the visit, Gamboa experienced a “furious” panic attack. Although he attributed the breakdown to the anniversaries of the deaths of his father and brother Pepe, the visit with his Mexican friends may have also been a factor.

Gamboa’s suffering continued through the remainder of the year, and on December 31, he wrote “another year has died, and with it many things, many hopes, many desires.”

He began 1916 at “fifty-one years of age, without a homeland, with [his] health in a precarious condition, and [his] finances in a worse state.” Nevertheless, he had the “instinctive certainty” that “if God desired to prolong [his] life,” he would return to Mexico that year and live in peace without “being followed nor harassed.” As the year progressed, Gamboa realized that his predictions would not come to pass. In February 1916, the writer chatted with Pablo López, an acquaintance who was in Havana as part of Carranza’s Secret Service. Gamboa asked if he ran any risks by returning to Mexico, and López replied that the Carrancistas “would make a banquet with him.”

This brief encounter helped Gamboa to understand the precariousness of his situation, and when Moheno proposed a trip to Mexico in June, Gamboa dissuaded him, telling his friend that “if we arrive and they sacrifice us, who

522 Ibid., 280.
523 Ibid., 279.
524 Ibid., 309.
525 Ibid., 324.
would defend us after our death?” Gamboa was prepared to defend himself and “prove his innocence,” but not until he could safely return to the homeland.526

By December 1916, Gamboa likened his situation to that of the biblical character Job. On December 7, he wrote “In a very bad mood!...Disenchantment, desperation, fears, uncertainty. The years eating away at my body internally and externally...I should exclaim with Job: -Dominius [sic] dedit, Dominus abstulit; sit nomen Domini benedictum [the Lord gave and the Lord has taken away; may the name of the Lord be praised].”527 During this time, Gamboa’s income depended on his writing, and he accepted jobs translating books and submitting articles for publication in newspapers, but it was not enough, especially since it seemed that his work was rejected because of his politics. For example, Gamboa unsuccessfully submitted an article for publication in the Saturday Evening Post, which would have paid one-thousand U.S. dollars. Gamboa believed that his “enmity” with Woodrow Wilson influenced the editor’s decision, and “as long as the puritan from Princeton inhabited the White House” no one would offer the Mexican exile even “a single drop of water.”528

Gamboa also struggled to publish enough material in Cuba to support his family, further aggravating his emotional state. As the residents of Havana celebrated the end of 1916, Gamboa experienced “an internal state of mourning,” adding that

from my bed I hear the racket on the streets; I think of my loved ones in Mexico...the three of us [Federico, Maria, and Miguel] here, my employment hanging by a thread, filled with bitterness and desperation....I feel forsaken and out of luck, my house and my homeland more distant each day, and my joy and that of my loved ones farther away than the homeland. Facing the grave risk of losing the [salary] with which we eat and live poorly, if I did not blindly believe in God’s mercy like I do, I would have to follow the example of bankrupt merchants...[and declare] FEDERICO GAMBOA IN LIQUIDATION!529

526 Ibid., 377.
527 Ibid., 423.
528 Ibid., 352.
529 Ibid., 429.
On January 1, 1917, “after seeing the failure of [his] prophecies for the previous year,” Gamboa decided not to make any more predictions for the future. He placed his fate in God’s hands and wondered if the days ahead would be better or worse.

The writer had clearly lost faith in humanity and constantly lamented his circumstances, but the belief that God would someday relieve his suffering sustained him through his trials. It seemed that his faith influenced at least one of his friends. Olaguíbel once told Gamboa that the exiles could be categorized into three groups: the rebels, dreamers, and the serene ones. According to Olaguíbel, most of the exiles fell in the second group, but Gamboa was one of the few men who belonged to the third. During this same conversation, Olaguíbel stated that he felt he was becoming a “providentialist’ who would no doubt end up a Catholic.” In his diary, Gamboa commented that “the school of suffering [was] an admirable vehicle for conversions!”

Gamboa’s faith in God was directly tied to his Catholic devotion, and in his diary, he frequently mentioned attending Mass on feast days related to the Virgin Mary. On December 8, 1916, he and his wife celebrated the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, albeit by partaking in a meal consisting of “the only luxury…[they] could permit themselves: grapes and dates.” This was also María’s “santo,” or feast day, which made her “more homesick than usual.” However, the Virgin Mary offered consolation to Federico. He wrote about the celebrations on the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe, “his Indian Virgin,” on December 12, 1916. Ángel Sánchez, an exiled Spanish priest who had served in Coatepec, Veracruz, officiated Mass. Next, the exiles sang the Mexican national anthem at the altar “at the feet of the Patroness of Mexico.” The following year, Gamboa and his son attended Mass at the church Nuestra Señora de la Merced, officiated by the exiled Archbishop of Yucatán. Gamboa recalled seeing General

530 Ibid., 424.
531 Ibid., 425.
Mondragón at the service, but provided no further details. At the end of the Mass, the organist “played the sweet and heroic” Mexican national anthem, moving many of the pilgrims to tears.\footnote{Ibid., 511.}

These recollections demonstrated the importance of this nationalist symbol in maintaining cultural unity in exile. The feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe helped its observers to feel a sense of home in spite of their nostalgia (though as María demonstrated, the opposite was also true). The Carranza regime could not force the exiles to relinquish their Mexican identity. Hence, these cultural celebrations became acts of resistance against the First Chief and everyone who labeled the exiles as traitors. Furthermore, this feast day served as an opportunity for Porfiristas to create their own sense of “home” in Havana. Catholic feast days were important in cities such as San Antonio, as well, where immigrants and Tejanos could potentially worship and celebrate together. These groups were united by common faith, language, and Mexican heritage. Porfiristas in Cuba faced a different dynamic. Although they lived with other Spanish-speakers (and it had been less than three decades since José Martí published his ideas in favor of Pan-Americanism), Porfiristas were not Cuban. Catholicism marked this difference, since Cubans venerated their patroness, the Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre (the Virgin of Charity), rather than Guadalupe.

Chicana feminist scholars have considered the Virgin of Guadalupe as a symbol of non-conformity. Ana Castillo argues that many activist Chicanas reconcile their support for the patriarchal Catholic Church by focusing on their personal spirituality and reverence for Guadalupe, rather than masculine symbols such as the Holy Trinity. Moreover, the Virgin offers a sense of motherly comfort to Chicanas rebelling against their own mothers, families, and patriarchal, heteronormative, “machista” society.\footnote{Ana Castillo, \textit{Massacre of the Dreamers: Essays on Xicanisma} (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 94, 102.} Castillo’s argument adds another dimension to the characterization of the Virgin of Guadalupe by emphasizing her motherhood as a conduit for rebelliousness. This was not the Virgin
whose image appeared on the banners of independence leaders and revolutionaries as they stormed into battle. Nor was she the passive, pious, obedient wife. Rather, she accepted and loved all of her children unconditionally and gave comfort to those who did not conform to oppressive social standards.

This characterization of the Virgin of Guadalupe coincides with Gamboa’s devotion to her. Of all of the Catholic feast days, the celebrations in honor of the Virgin Mary (particularly on December 12) were the only ones regularly mentioned in Gamboa’s diary during his exile. He was not rebelling against patriarchal Mexican society, but he was certainly a non-conformist facing rejection, homelessness, and hardships for not complying with the new status quo. The Virgin of Guadalupe acted as a good mother and validated Gamboa and accepted him unconditionally. Like Chicanas and other marginalized groups seeking comfort in Guadalupe, Gamboa’s devotion allowed him to feel at “home,” an imagined site where he had the freedom to be himself—Catholic, Mexican, and Porfirista.

In October 1919, the Carranza government granted amnesty to Gamboa and his family. María was gravely ill, and Federico asked for permission to return to Mexico in order to provide a more adequate treatment for his wife. More importantly, they believed that returning home, being close to their family, and leaving the humid Cuban climate would lift her spirits. After Gamboa’s arrival in Mexico, various newspapers published the story of his return, and he recalled the misinformation printed in these newspapers. Mexico City’s Excélsior reported that Gamboa cried once he saw his homeland, “placing tears in his eyes” that he did not actually shed. Moreover, El Demócrata published an interview in which Gamboa allegedly stated that he would “grant Carranza a courtesy visit, in order to thank him” for the amnesty. Gamboa felt insulted by this, since he had made no such remark. In his diary, he wrote “rectify? Not in my lifetime!...Give thanks [to Carranza]? I would rather leave [Mexico] again before thanking him. What did I do to him to deserve the pain of forced expatriation?” He then asked whom he should thank “first and foremost, [for his] saintly wife’s grave illness caused by poverty,
melancholy, malnourishment, and terrible climate throughout [their] prolonged exile. And [for his] son’s education, forever truncated…”

As they reintegrated into Mexican society, Gamboa and his family once again found comfort in the Virgin Mary. On December 12, 1919, he and his son attended the celebrations at the Basilica de Guadalupe (María stayed at home due to her illness). Even though the church was filled to capacity and they were unable to hear the Mass, Gamboa was moved after seeing a blind man standing in front of him with exceptional “fervor…in his sightless eyes…!” Catholicism and the belief in God and the Virgin Mary sustained Gamboa through almost five years in Cuba and the moments of blindness when he could not perceive the end of his exile. He continued to rely on his faith after María’s death in 1920, and he practiced Catholicism the rest of his life, clandestinely during the Cristero War of 1926-1929.

By writing and publishing his diary, Gamboa (like Moheno and García Naranjo) created an archive for one facet of the Porfirista exile experience. These exiles faced poverty and unemployment, and they relied on one another and on their shared cultural traditions to sustain each other through the trials that came with displacement. Although most expressed anger and frustration in their writing, a number of Porfiristas embarked on a mission to cheer up their compatriots as the world around them burned.

Using Humor to Deal with Anguish

Carranza became the primary target of Porfirista ire because they believed he unfairly expelled them from Mexico. Although Porfiristas blamed the revolution in general for Mexico’s problems, they developed a hatred for Carranza that they did not feel for Madero, Villa, Zapata, or any of the other revolutionary leaders. Carranza ruined their lives and threatened to execute them for treason, and he

534 Gamboa, 633- 634.

535 Ibid., 637.
was also destroying Mexico and its inhabitants. Consequently, beginning in 1914, the exiles projected their anger, bitterness, despair, and fears about the future onto the First Chief, who they considered their worst enemy and the cause of all of their problems.

*Revista Mexicana* and *La Prensa* and used humor and satire to insult the First Chief, though each publication took a different approach. The editorials in *Revista Mexicana* directly attacked Carrancista policies, but the other sections of the magazine relied on satire to criticize the First Chief in a spirit of arrogance and irreverence. One anonymous article, for example, described Carranza’s “ardent passion for the ‘Supreme,’” a play on his self-description as the Supreme Chief of the Revolution. The author wrote that “decidedly, that tragi-comic senescence known as Venustiano Carranza [was] terribly passionate about the word *Supreme*.” The author identified Carranza as the “supreme sleepyhead” during his tenure as a Porfirian senator, and “supreme at not doing anything good as governor” of Coahuila. The author also called Carranza the “supreme deliverer of decrees…supreme two-face…supreme traitor… [and] supreme bilimbiquero,” referring to the *Bilimbique*, the Constitutionalist currency that “squashed the country’s wealth.”

The magazine also contained articles written by various characters who discussed the triumphs and shortcomings of the Constitutionalist regime. Mexican writer Celedonio Junco de la Vega developed the character “Silverio,” a staunch Carrancista who wrote letters “from Jauja” (a fictional Mexican city) to his friend García Naranjo every week between late 1915 and 1918. He discussed topics ranging from foreign and monetary policy to the accusations of widespread hunger in Mexico, and he always argued that “Mexico [finally] began to experience joy” after Carranza took control of the government. In one letter, Silverio commented on the numerous titles given to Carranza based on his extensive achievements, including “Ex-Senator” and “Patriarch.” However, Carranza’s most recent

---


537 García Naranjo, 8: 259.
title, “Maintainer,” best described his talents. According to Silverio, the First Chief “maintained all liberties,” including the right to “occupy the property of others without paying rent.” Carranza “maintained national integrity” by only allowing U.S. soldiers into specific parts of northern Mexico. He also maintained foreign iron mines in order to send “equipment” (weapons) to Europe “destined for the reproduction of the human species.” Most importantly, Carranza held the title of “Maintainer of National Starvation,” an honor which “no one would be able to usurp.” Silverio ended his letter to García Naranjo with a poem in which he praised “Don Venus” for having mercy on hunger, and choosing to spare it rather than kill it.538

Writers for Revista Mexicana used the term “Carranclan” as a crude substitute for “Carrancista,” and the word “Carrancear” became popular across Mexico as a synonym for stealing. However, Silverio re-appropriated this language by creating a “Constitutionalist Dictionary” in which he defined important terms related to the regime. For example, “Venus” was a magnificent star “in the sky of the homeland.” “Pre-constitutional” described a “transitory political period…It could last five years or fifty, but was still transitory, nonetheless.” Moreover, the best type of government was “DE FACTO, because it had no DE FECT [sic].” Silverio also addressed the Wilson administration, defining an “invasion” as a “punishment against any Head of State who did not salute flags with stars and stripes on them.” “Neutrality” allowed nations who had not declared war to move weapons and troops to their neighbors involved in armed conflict, and “Wilsonianism” was a cult through which Carrancistas worshipped “the grand protector of liberties, loyal to neutrality, and incapable of trampling on foreign territory.” Silverio defined terms relating to other Mexican leaders, as well. He referred to the “odious” Díaz regime with the feminized nickname “La Odiosa,” and “peace” was a clay artifact “venerated during the times of ‘La Odiosa.’” “Zapatismo” represented a “glorious emancipation movement initiated [in 1911] by Generals

wearing white underwear,” and “Villismo” was a mental disorder that “threatened the life of the goddess Venus” in ancient times.\textsuperscript{539}

García Naranjo responded to Silverio’s letters using the pseudonym “Valerio,” and in his first piece, Valerio informed his friend that he was going to rob his satirical style. Valerio practiced the philosophy that “property is theft.” He did not believe he was doing anything wrong, since the revolutionary generals used this same philosophy to justify taking other peoples’ homes. The generals “invited the former property owners into their former homes to sit on their former living room furniture,” which Valerio considered a “beautiful” gesture that reflected the good manners of the revolutionaries. Thus, Valerio invited Silverio to read his letters and “see how what was yours has now become mine.”\textsuperscript{540} In his memoirs, García Naranjo wrote that the banter between Silverio and Valerio lifted his spirits immeasurably. He stated that Silverio’s contributions to \textit{Revista Mexicana} made the magazine more entertaining and popular, but they also helped García Naranjo on a personal level, since Silverio “made [him] laugh and regain [his] good mood.” Silverio’s letters encouraged García Naranjo to remain optimistic in the midst of his “monotonous and grey life.” He admitted to facing economic struggles and poverty, and often feeling “an impotence that determined his desperation.” Silverio prompted him to find humor in politics and express it in his own work; if García Naranjo “had not combined his pain with laughter, it would have been impossible to bear the prolonged exile.”\textsuperscript{541}

Silverio and Valerio were not the only characters in \textit{Revista Mexicana} to address the Carranza regime. The Mexican poet Guillermo Aguirre y Fierro also critiqued the Carranza regime on a regular basis through his character “Quasimodo.” In one poem, Quasimodo urged Carranza to leave the presidential seat and flee to Berlin before his enemies turned him into “sausage.” At the end of the

\textsuperscript{539} Ibid., “Diccionario Constitucionalista,” Jan. 23, 1916.

\textsuperscript{540} García Naranjo, 8: 272.

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid., 267.
poem, the author realized that if Carranza remained in power, he would face a similar fate as Madero. Quasimodo then changed his mind and encouraged the First Chief to remain in the presidential seat.542

In 1916, the poet wrote a series of fictional epitaphs, known as “Calaveras,” in honor of the Day of the Dead. The author addressed the principal leaders of the revolution and the various revolutionary plans and institutions. Quasimodo described the Constitutionalist army as a group “formed by evil” and comprised of “worthless, lazy...[and] dumb” ruffians who only served to make the “barbón” (Carranza, the “bearded-one”) rich. Another epitaph told the story of Lucifer, and how he had all of his slaves hide his money. When a person asked if he was hiding his wealth from the Carrancistas, Lucifer replied that he was actually hiding it from Ernesto Madero, Francisco I. Madero’s uncle.543

In 1918, Quasimodo wrote another series of “Calaveras” for Revista Mexicana in which he described how he envisioned the deaths of revolutionary leaders. Carranza’s epitaph read “here lies the bearded-one. He unjustly occupies a place in this holy ground, because he buried an independent nation in mourning, dishonor, misery, and grief. Maggots shoot from his dark corner (and you would be wise to reach for the formaldehyde).” Quasimodo also described unsavory ends for Carranza’s allies. He spelled General Francisco Murguía’s last name as “Mugría,” a play on the word “mugre” which translates to “dirt” or “filth.” Quasimodo predicted that “Mugría” would commit suicide in order avoid a confrontation with his enemy Villa, and that Finance Minister Luis Cabrera would Cabrera also killed himself out of desperation.544 Álvaro Obregón’s epitaph warned those buried around him that even though the general “lost five fingernails,” he could easily kill anyone with his remaining hand. The “Calaveras” described Villa as “an astute bandit, who wore big pants despite not having been a tailor,” and they predicted that Zapata would divide his burial plot among other Zapatistas.

543 Ibid., “Epitafios Celebres de ‘Quasimodo,’” Oct. 27, 1918. This series was reprinted in Revista Mexicana in 1918.
544 Murguía died in 1922 after being executed by Obregón’s forces.
The author also wrote Calaveras for prominent figures who opposed the revolution. Gamboa’s epitaph described a defeated man, bitter for not having won the Mexican presidency. He led the Peace-Making Assembly in San Antonio and the Mexican Casino, a social club in Cuba, and the epitaph suggested that Gamboa continued his leadership efforts by trying to take charge of the cemetery and its inhabitants. Francisco Vázquez Gómez also died of “presidentitis,” and his brother Emilio paid for his service to the revolution with seven years in exile, plus interest of “a few years and months [owed to]…the bearded-one.” Although all of these men died in a lamentable state, Quasimodo redeemed those who served Mexico honorably. For example, he described the former Huertista general and cabinet member Enrique Gorostieta as the “personification of integrity,” and he praised Blanquet for his bravery. Quasimodo also applauded Félix Díaz for “throwing out the money lenders who profaned the temple,” and “taming lions and trampling on serpents” as Christ did. Urrutia’s epitaph stated that he died knowing he elevated his nation through his medical talent, and Moheno’s tombstone read “a prophet is not without honor except in his own country.”

The Day of the Dead is a Mexican cultural celebration in which people honor their deceased loved ones. It follows the Catholic Feast of All Saints, and together, these days encompass a celebration of death and afterlife in heaven. Quasimodo showed respect to the members of the Díaz and Huerta regimes, but acted irreverently against the revolutionaries while highlighting their negative qualities. These “Calaveras” were significant because they reinforced cultural identity outside of the homeland, and it allowed the exiles to reclaim their Mexicanidad, much like they did through the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Most importantly, Quasimodo encouraged Revista Mexicana’s audience to find humor in death and their present situations.

La Prensa also relied on humor to make political statements, particularly in headlines and cartoons. Beginning in 1918, La Prensa no longer attempted to uphold its political neutrality or hide its

---

545 “Rotanda de la Revolución,” Revista Mexicana, Nov. 2, 1918.
disdain for Carranza. The newspaper now had a solid readership, and it would likely not alienate many readers if it took greater liberties in its critiques against the Mexican government. On March 19, 1918, the newspaper’s headline read “Carranza’s government is like a porcupine, but smells worse.” The headline was copied from an editorial published in the Niagara Daily Press in New York, which “attacked Mexico’s good name.” La Prensa stated that it was unfortunate that other nations maintained such a negative perception of Mexico, but that their assessment was correct because Carranza and the revolution made life in Mexico “not worth living.”

La Prensa’s headlines also called Carranza the “enemy of Mexico, the United States, and all of civilization,” and characterized him as having “the gift for offending everyone.”

By early 1920, the Carranza regime was “in agony.” García Naranjo commented in his memoirs that Carranza’s death was not surprising, and that “one did not need to be a prophet to know that the presidential succession of 1920 would be violent.” Álvaro Obregón launched the Plan of Agua Prieta against the First Chief on April 23, and in early May, Carranza decided to transfer his government to Veracruz rather than surrender. On May 11, 1920, La Prensa published a political cartoon depicting Carranza as one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. Murguía rode the “war” horse, Cabrera rode “hunger,” Carranza rode “misery,” and Minister of the Interior Manuel Aguirre Berlanga rode “plague.” Although La Prensa satirized Carranza and his associates through this and other political cartoons, the newspaper used a more serious tone to announce Carranza’s death. On May 21, the First Chief was

---

546 “El Gob. de Carranza es Como un Puerco Espín y Huele Peor,” La Prensa, Mar. 19, 1918.
548 García Naranjo, 8: 293.
assassinated in Tlaxcalantongo, Puebla, and La Prensa reported that the president died as “a victim of betrayal and perfidy, and shot with the bullets of his own partisans.”

**Becoming the “Enemy Other” in the New Homeland**

Cultural humor helped to cope with nostalgia, but it also served as a tool for combating racism. Demonstrating pride in Mexican identity, symbols, and the Spanish language proved to be one way to maneuver in a society where racial slurs and violence against non-whites were common. Porfiristas took on a leadership role in fighting discrimination, but their activism contradicted the rhetoric in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana, which frequently advertised skin bleach and other “whitening” products.

Gamboa’s diary inadvertently underscored an important difference within the Porfirista experience. The writer was considered *persona non grata* in the United States because of his hostility against the Wilson administration. He also believed that he and his family faced difficulties in Cuba for political reasons, since they were under the constant surveillance of Carrancista spies. The exiles living in the United States confronted an entirely different situation; they were perceived as enemies because of their politics *and* their race. Neither Gamboa nor Moheno mentioned experiencing any racial discrimination in Cuba, but the exiles in Texas had to contend with the reality of lynching and other racial violence against Mexicans.

Miguel A. Levario uses the framework of the “enemy other” to describe the way in which white Texans defined ethnic Mexicans. He also contextualizes “whiteness” as a racial ideal which immigrants of different ethnicities (but certain phenotypes) could attain. One result of the pursuit of whiteness was the acceptance of the lynching of racialized “others.” According to Cynthia Nevels,

---

549 “Víctima de la Traición y de la Perfidia y Atravesado por las Balas de Sus Propios Partidarios, Cayó el Presidente Carranza,” La Prensa, May 23, 1920.

550 Sax, 54.

“Texas as a whole was prone to lynching, earning the unfortunate ranking of number three in the nation for lynch victims, after Mississippi and Georgia.”\textsuperscript{552} Nevels argues that Italian, Irish, and Bohemian immigrants in East Texas held an ambiguous position in the black/white racial binary in the 1890s. They “came to realize the social and economic advantages of white skin,” and claimed whiteness by “taking advantage of, or even participating in, the South’s most brutal form of racial domination: the lynching of black men.”\textsuperscript{553} Lynching in Texas increased as the African American population rose, and “whites thus resorted to violent means to control the social and political ambitions of blacks at the turn of the twentieth century.”\textsuperscript{554}

Nevels focuses exclusively on the lynching of African Americans in Brazos County because the region did not have a significant Mexican population before the 1920s, but Mexicans also suffered from this violence. On November 4, 1910, a man named Antonio Rodríguez was lynched in Rocksprings, Texas. Rodríguez was accused of murdering a Mrs. Lem Henderson, but before he could be tried, a mob burned him at the stake.\textsuperscript{555} Anti-American protests took place across Mexico as people heard the news of the Mexican national who was violently executed in the United States without due-process.\textsuperscript{556} Newspapers reported stories of “insults…hurled against the American flag and rioters [attacking] business houses owned by Americans” in Mexico City, where a mob also threw rocks at the offices of the American-owned \textit{Mexican Herald}. Rioters injured Americans, including Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson’s son.\textsuperscript{557} Creel, Gamboa, and De la Barra worked through the Ministry of Foreign Relations to

\textsuperscript{552} Cynthia Skove Nevels, \textit{Lynching to Belong: Claiming Whiteness through Racial Violence} (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 2.

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid, 7.

\textsuperscript{554} Levario, 136.

\textsuperscript{555} Arnoldo de León, \textit{They Called them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 104-105.

\textsuperscript{556} Miscellaneous newspaper reports, Nov. 9-15, 1910, SRE, 14-19-1 (I): 31-34, 43-46.

guarantee the safety of Americans in Mexico. Creel “assured the American ambassador that prompt action would be taken to insure [sic] the punishment of the rioters guilty of insulting the American flag.” Ernesto T. Simondetti, editor of Mexico City’s El Diario, added that “the expressions of the mob” were “resented by all Mexicans of the better class.” The Díaz government cracked down on the protests, and police (under orders to “shoot to kill”) reportedly killed two medical students and a “peon.” This retaliation only intensified the anti-U.S. and anti-Díaz sentiments just days before Madero launched the revolution.

This incident made it clear that in spite of the científicos’ efforts, Mexicans were still not perceived as white by all of U.S. society, and they remained grouped with African Americans as ‘others.’ The científicos made every attempt to protect their alliance with the U.S. government by apologizing for the barbaric riots in Mexico, even though a Mexican man was executed through extralegal means on U.S. soil. The “better class” preferred to appease the United States rather than seek justice for one of its compatriots (ironic, considering Gamboa’s change of heart regarding the U.S. government in 1914). However, once the gente decente, or “decent people,” were forced into exile in the United States, that class distinction did not keep them from being perceived as stereotypical dirty and lazy “greasers.”

Dr. Joaquín González Cigarroa Jr., the nephew of Leonides González, recalls an incident told to him by his father. The González family moved to San Antonio in the 1910s, and when Joaquín Sr. first arrived, “somebody on the street called him a Mexican greaser, and he got up and knocked [the man] down.” The González family was highly influential in Mapimí, a “thriving silver mining community” in Durango during the Porfiriato. Leonides was the jefe municipal, or mayor, with close ties to Porfirio

---


Díaz. When the revolution began, he and his immediate family were forced into exile in February 1911, and many other relatives soon followed, settling in San Antonio. However, despite the family’s prominence in Mexico, their status did not shield them from racism in Texas.

The Plan de San Diego revolt in 1915 and ensuing violence worsened race relations between Mexicans, Tejanos, and Texas Rangers in South Texas. In his memoirs, García Naranjo described the Texas Rangers as the “undisciplined” force “responsible for the antipathy and friction existent” between the ethnic groups. He believed that during the “incursions [against] the so-called bandits from Mexico, the lives of many good Mexicans were sacrificed,” and the Rangers acted “more savagely” than Villa during his raid on Columbus.561 Furthermore, Revista Mexicana openly criticized the Wilson administration (and broader U.S. society) for hypocritically promoting democracy around the world while upholding segregation within its borders. Moheno also wrote extensive letters on the topic, stating that when a nation “[proclaimed] dogmas, principles, and general rules of conduct for a global public, it [exposed] itself to criticism if it [breached] these dogmas, principles, and rules.” Thus, the U.S. policy should have been applied within its borders, “protecting all people without distinction,” including “Catholics and Orthodox…whites, yellows, blacks…the strongest and weakest nationalities alike. However, this did not reflect President Wilson’s political conduct.”562

La Prensa remained neutral and disassociated itself from the revolts linked to the Plan of San Diego, perhaps to prevent any problems with the U.S. and Mexican governments. However, this reaction was reminiscent of the position taken by the “better class” in Mexico after Rodríguez’s lynching, since the Porfirista gente decente did not partake in or condone such violent retaliation. García Naranjo also wrote that the “most ignorant [Mexicans]…were induced to take revenge” against the Rangers, attributing the violent Mexican reaction to an unfortunate lack of education among the

561 García Naranjo, 8: 208, 210.

562 Moheno, Sobre el Ara Sangrienta, 49.
lower classes.\textsuperscript{563} Richard A. García argues that the \textit{ricos} (Mexican upper class) of San Antonio “worried about the discriminatory impact of [stereotypes]” as well as “the impact on the Mexicans’ self-image.” The “\textit{ricos} did not want their countrymen in the United States to become Americanized nor did they want them to learn behavioral patterns from the stereotypes. They wanted Mexicans who were educated, sophisticated, and \textit{gente decente}, not lower-class Mexicans or Americanized Mexicans.” This included speaking Spanish correctly, a “virtue” not found in “\textit{gente corriente},” or the plebian lower classes.\textsuperscript{564}

Porfiristas primarily encouraged their compatriots to become educated in spite of the obstacles, since it was the best way for the Mexican community to advance in the United States. It was an important lesson for Mexican Americans who continued to face discrimination in later decades. Cigarroa remembers taking an entrance exam at the University of Texas at Austin in 1941, stating that “fortunately, I got a very high score, probably the highest...and [the administrators] thought I had cheated. How could a Mexican American do that? They wanted me to take the test again, and my answer to that was ‘well, you just watch my progress at the University of Texas and see how I do, and then you can judge me.’” Cigarroa believed that the administrators’ attitudes towards him “changed after that.”\textsuperscript{565}

Urrutia had a different way of dealing with racism. He did not internalize the Porfirista rhetoric which privileged whiteness, or the messages in Porfirista media stating that a person needed to have light skin in order to succeed. Instead, he took pride in his indigenous heritage and encouraged his children to do the same. His grandson, Aureliano “Bud” Urrutia, recounts how “it wasn’t so easy to be a Mexican in San Antonio. Mexicans were relegated to the back of the bus, and drinking fountains were

\textsuperscript{563} García Naranjo, 8: 208, 210.
\textsuperscript{564} Richard A. García, 235.
\textsuperscript{565} Cigarroa. interview.
segregated. So, the story goes that [Aureliano’s] children arrived home one day complaining...‘they’re calling us ‘beaners’ and ‘greasers!’” Aureliano’s answer to this was to “just tell them you’re an Aztec!”

Urrutia challenged the complex racial position held by Porfiristas in the 1910s. He was born in 1872 to Pablo and Refugio Urrutia, who lived in Xochimilco. Refugio was of “náhuatl origin.” Urrutia benefitted from the expanding educational system during the Porfiriato, and he graduated from medical school in 1895. After 1900, he became a popular surgeon after saving the life of Rodolfo Gaona, a famous bullfighter. He also performed surgery on Huerta in 1900, successfully draining a ruptured liver abscess that almost killed the general, and the two became compadres shortly thereafter.

The surgeon commissioned the clinic Sanatorio Urrutia in Coyoacán in 1911, which also became “a meeting place for artists, musicians, scientists, [and] intellectuals.” The inauguration of the Sanatorio was a gala event attended by elite Mexican society, including De la Barra, Francisco I. Madero, and their wives. The poor Indian from Xochimilco had joined these elites. His talent and intelligence helped him to overcome the Porfirista racial hierarchy, though he also benefitted from marrying Luz Fernández in 1896, “the fair-haired, gray-eyed daughter of a wealthy Mexican merchant.” Bud recalls that “one of the things that I was impressed with was that [Aureliano] a poor little Indian kid goes from humble origins to appreciating ‘the very fine things in life.’ He worked his way through school, went to the national military school, served with Huerta, and then as a young man in Mexico (shortly after 1900 or 1901) was able to enjoy very fine leather shoes, fancy French shirts, and driving the finest cars that were being made.”

---

566 Ibid., Jul. 27, 2011.
567 Urrutia Martínez, 36.
569 Ibid., Jul. 27, 2011.
However, Urrutia never rejected his indigenous roots, and he embraced his identity as a dark-skinned, indigenous man active in a Eurocentric society. According to Bud, in San Antonio, Aureliano “at times he portrayed himself as a poor little Indian, wearing huaraches [sandals]...but at other times he was an extraordinarily well-dressed man with cape and top hat. So the one side of him wanted to be like Juan Diego, and the other wanted to be the aristocrat.”570 Aureliano took pride in his ancestry, and he encouraged his children to do the same by claiming an Aztec heritage. This defied the Porfirista ideals about Mexico’s indigenous roots. The científicos displayed Mexico as an exoticized Aztec nation at the world’s fairs, and Díaz claimed to be the political descendant of Cuauhtémoc. Yet the administration showed reverence to the Aztecs of the conquest period while massacring groups such as the Yaquis and Mayas. Aureliano did not conceptualize his indigenous identity as an abstract heritage. On the contrary, expressing this dual identity had personal implications. In exile, it became a way for his family to maneuver between the Mexican and Anglo worlds that often collided in Texas.

Furthermore, Aureliano discouraged his children from protesting against discrimination. Bud remembers his grandfather saying that “this land [the United States] has given us a place to live and work, and we should be appreciative of that.” Unlike a number of his counterparts in San Antonio, Aureliano did not embark on any campaign against the Wilson government. In fact, he ended his political activity once he left Mexico and focused on his medical career. He was grateful for the opportunity to start his life in San Antonio after his banishment, and for the chance to live in relative peace, work as a surgeon, and care for his family, especially after Luz died in 1917, leaving him with eleven children. Aureliano displayed a fondness for the United States, and encouraged his children to be proud of their American identity. Adolfo Urrutia (Bud’s father) served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II. Bud states that “my daddy was the only son that went to World War II. My daddy was

570 Ibid., Jun. 20, 2011.
very proud of that, and Aureliano was very proud of his son Adolfo, who had gone and participated. My
daddy landed at Normandy, and they exchanged many letters during that time.” 571

Although the exiles living in Texas embraced their national identity in the face of racism, Urrutia
demonstrated that even this strategy was not homogenous, since he was the only one who openly
expressed his indigenous heritage. Urrutia’s optimistic acceptance of life in the United States also
reflected the differences between the “rebels,” “dreamers,” and “serene” exiles. By the end of the
decade, the latter groups began to accept their circumstances and their new lives. The “rebels,”
however, stubbornly continued to fight the Constitutionalist regime, exhausting their economic
resources and risking imprisonment and death.

Porfiristas Lose the Battle against Carranza

Gamboa (one of the “serene” exiles) remained angry at Carranza for acting unjustly and
unmercifully towards his family and compatriots, but he chose not to actively partake in the counter-
revolutionary movement after 1916. The writer did not sign the petition against the Constitution of
1917, and perhaps this helped him gain amnesty in 1919. 572 On the other hand, many of his colleagues
acted on their frustration despite the increasing odds against them toward the end of the decade. Revista
Mexicana and La Prensa demonstrated the different ways in which Porfiristas dealt with this reality.
Both newspapers increased their attacks against Carranza, but La Prensa seemed more accepting of the
global political and social changes that took place between 1918 and 1920. On the contrary, the
contributors to Revista Mexicana resisted these changes as much as possible, even when they knew that
theirs was a lost cause.

571 Ibid., Jul. 27, 2011.

572 Gamboa, 6: 452. On March 20, 1917, Gamboa briefly mentioned the protest in his diary, stating that he kept the copy of
Revista Mexicana that included the petition.
Revista Mexicana did not take defeat lightly, and in this sense García Naranjo’s journalistic endeavors resembled Félix Díaz’s persistent, yet futile struggle against Carranza. One year after the exiles signed the protest against the Constitution of 1917, the magazine reprinted the petition and reiterated its commitment to defending the Constitution of 1857. Throughout 1918, Revista Mexicana continued to print images of Porfirio and Félix Díaz, odes to Juárez, and poems about the Porfiriato. On May 5, the magazine published the latest information from Díaz’s army in order to demonstrate the “active, constant, and patriotic struggle” that Díaz’s forces were undertaking.573 The magazine also included a poem entitled “Señor…A la Memoria del General Porfirio Díaz,” by M. Muzquíz Blanco. He wrote to the general that “far away from you, the good homeland that you dearly loved / whose fallen glory you restored / whom you abandoned with your soul worn out with anguish / sighs for the man with the strong arm, waits / in vain for the wise man, [for] the hero…to return and restore the old glory of the flag.”574 Olaguíbel, meanwhile, contributed an expression of almost saintly devotion to Juárez. The poet described the world as being “a confused crowd, blind and unorganized…a Dantesque procession of human tragedy.” Olaguíbel believed that the spirit of Juárez could save Mexico, and he exclaimed “you are not in the tomb, under the hard marble…you are not in the turbulent and dark past./ You are in the radiant apotheosis of the future;/ you are in the inviolate and white [parts] of our soul!... // Oh, Father, you have not left; oh Father, you are not dead!”575

These two texts exemplified the Porfirista dilemma in 1918. By this time, there was no possibility for a successful counter-revolution against Carranza. The First Chief enjoyed constitutional legitimacy and formal U.S. recognition. Villa and Zapata did not pose strong threats, and Félix Díaz continued to lack sufficient financial support to build his forces. Porfiristas such as Muzquíz Blanco and Olaguíbel “waited in vain” for a savior comparable to Juárez and Don Porfirio, or for these two leaders

574 Ibid., “Señor…A la Memoria del General Porfirio Díaz,” Jul. 21, 1918.
575 Ibid., “El Poema de Juárez.”
to help Mexico from beyond the grave. However, Juárez and Porfirio were only memories. There was no Porfirista “strong man” who could topple Carranza, and no politician savvy enough to offer an alternative to the revolution. When García Naranjo launched Revista Mexicana in 1915, Juárez and Porfirio represented a Mexico that he imagined could still be; in 1918, they were artifacts of a Mexico that no longer existed (even though the revolution appropriated Juárez’s image). Yet, Revista Mexicana continued to support Félix and publish photos and accolades pertaining to him and his uncle, and its contributors clung to the hope of somehow being rescued from Carrancismo.

On July 2, 1919, the Mexican community in Laredo organized a celebration in honor of Porfirio Díaz on the fourth anniversary of his death. The event took place at Laredo’s Strand Theatre, and García Naranjo served as the keynote speaker. He first gave an overview of Díaz’s life and achievements as a soldier, then as president, when he “constructed contemporary Mexico.” García Naranjo then spoke about Díaz’s heroic qualities, stating that “the hero of antiquity [received] his strength from the gods.” Díaz, however, was the “modern hero” who “[passed] through history as one of those complete figures whose greatness could only be limited by [himself],” because all of his actions came from “the depths of his genius.” García Naranjo ended his speech with a prediction about Díaz’s legacy in Mexico. He believed that once the civil war ended, the president’s remains would be returned to Mexico, and his “cult [would] be restored without compromise, honorably,” by the “repentant” public. García Naranjo envisioned Díaz’s glorious return, when “all of Mexico would carry his coffin and take him, amidst canticles and incense, to the altar where immortals sleep.”

By mid-1919, García Naranjo struggled to maintain Revista Mexicana in circulation. He “felt that he was going to die, morally, and like a swan, [he] wanted to prepare his last song.” The El Paso exile community invited García Naranjo to speak about the “tragedies carried out by Carrancismo in 1919.” He recalled wanting to “vent, to expel the passions [he] held inside, [and] scream out before his

fall. And before a mad audience, [he] paraded the bloody caravan of the victims” of the Carranza regime. García Naranjo gave homage to Zapata, who “crystallized…the aspirations of [Mexico’s] lower classes,” and to Blanquet, Felipe Ángeles, and the other “victims,” regardless of whether or not he had once criticized them. 577 The “object of those desperate shouts, which [García Naranjo’s] listeners heard in the midst of clamors and tears,” was to “plant in them the conviction that even if ‘Revista Mexicana’ died, [he] was not going to leave the barricade nor ask his adversaries for the slightest compromise.”578

García Naranjo stated in his memoirs that he knew that the presidential succession of 1920 would be tragic, and he could not fathom suspending his magazine during that critical period. However, he had accumulated a significant amount of debt, and despite the magazine’s initial popularity, he did not have enough money for his own offices or to pay most of the contributors. U.S. participation in World War I also impacted his business, since the price of paper increased from two cents per pound in 1915, to ten cents in 1917.579

Furthermore, circulation figures dropped from 5,000 copies per week in 1918 to 1,100 in 1919.580 García Naranjo attributed this to exile repatriation to Mexico, but perhaps the public had also grown weary of Revista Mexicana.581 For almost four years, the magazine published the same anti-Carrancista, anti-Wilsonian rhetoric. This had worked during the height of the counterrevolutionary efforts, but it no longer did. After years of the same, perhaps readers lost hope, accepted their present situation, or realized that the exiles had finally lost their battle.
García Naranjo did not publicly admit to his dire situation, despite the rumors about *Revista Mexicana’s* financial problems. On August 3, 1919, the magazine’s cover featured a photograph of Félix Díaz and an article addressing rumors in San Antonio that *Revista Mexicana* and Felicismo were in a state of “agony.” The author first denied that the magazine served as a Felicista organ, although it did applaud Díaz for never giving up in the face of continuous defeat. Next, the author proclaimed that *Revista Mexicana* “lifted the banner of the Homeland in exile,” and if the magazine was forced to shut down, it would be a result of a dwindling exile population, not Díaz’s defeat. The last comment was perhaps motivated by the accusations against García Naranjo for allegedly conspiring with Blanquet and Díaz in April 1919 (before Blanquet’s death). Although they faced insurmountable circumstances, Díaz and *Revista Mexicana* fought until the very end. Quasimodo wrote a poem for Díaz in August 1919, summarizing the position of the rebels:

My General: we continue to raise our flag,
despite the hole
in the ship’s keel…

Sir, we can still fight,
and we fight together…
We do not lack courage
for this rough combat…
though we almost find ourselves
with no sword and no shield!

No sword and no shield!
What profound grief!
But we look to heaven
for the desired redemption!...

Our ship is deserted;
we see nothing in the distance;
but hope lives on…

[the fight] is almost over,
my dear General,
and the bearded wreck

---

remains in power…
[but] within my keel-less ship
which the sea is burying,
my pen continues to vibrate
over [my] final sheet of paper!”

Revista Mexicana celebrated its fourth anniversary on September 12. The week’s editorial stated that the magazine never set out to be a successful business; rather, the exiles used the medium to defend their nation. “Certain people” believed that the magazine would fail because of its critiques of the United States, but Revista Mexicana’s editors remained unapologetic. They wrote that “our intransigent Mexican spirit, Mexican without reservations…Mexican in the face of possible catastrophe, is what…turned away subscribers, agents, and advertisers, but it is also the pedestal on which our publication stands.”

Unfortunately for García Naranjo, his tenacity was not enough to sustain Revista Mexicana, and on December 28, 1919, he finally conceded defeat. The editorial announced that from that point forward, the magazine would “comment on more general and varied issues,” since the magazine’s audience, like the immigrant community, had significantly changed and “many of the expatriates of 1915 had returned to Mexico.” Moreover, the constant critiques against Carranza now “seemed superfluous, because Don Venustiano and his men were morally dead” and it would not be long before they were ousted from power. The editor concluded by stating that “with this issue, the aggressive and intransigent Revista says goodbye in order to make way for the serene and constructive Revista.” This change came too late, and on January 25, 1920, Revista Mexicana announced its “temporary suspension.”

---

In his memoirs, García Naranjo remembered this as a “melancholic and opaque” end for his magazine. He explained that he did not expect to live in San Antonio permanently, and he never believed his magazine would be permanent either. Yet he dreamed (“with a sense of excitement”) about how he would end his publication. For four years, García Naranjo envisioned that the final issue of Revista Mexicana would proudly announce Carrancismo’s definitive defeat and the success of the efforts of his colleagues. Instead, his “newspaper was silently extinguished,” and private letters were sent to subscribers at the end of 1919, asking them not to renew. In hindsight, what hurt García Naranjo the most was that he only needed “three more months of resistance” to fulfill his desire for Revista Mexicana’s “splendid” finale. He also became deeply embittered by the reaction of the elite “conservative class” when he closed his business. García Naranjo “distributed twenty percent of Revista Mexicana’s shares among trusted friends,” to be sold within the exile community. Only four shares were sold in Havana, two in Laredo, and Aureliano Blanquet purchased five in New York City. “That was all, since the wealthy persons feared that [if they did,] the doors to Mexico would be shut” to them. García Naranjo wrote that these people “had no obligation to help him out of solidarity,” but he likened this to Moheno’s experience with the Peace-Making Assembly, when the exiled aristocrats refused to offer money for the counterrevolution out of fear of losing their possessions in Mexico. García Naranjo considered this ironic, since their homes and belongings had probably already been destroyed.

Shortly after Revista Mexicana shut down, U.S. authorities arrested García Naranjo and found him guilty of violating neutrality laws. Around the same time, Mexico’s leaders reached out to Lozano in an effort to bridge the Mexican communities on both sides of the border. In April 1919, La Prensa published a letter written to Lozano by Zapata three weeks before his assassination. Zapata wrote to Lozano with the specific intention of reaching out to the Mexican population in the United States. The

---

587 García Naranjo, 8: 297-298.

588 Ibid., 301.
general called *La Prensa* a “very important” newspaper and congratulated Lozano for its wide circulation. He then stated that “the homeland must be served by free will or by force, out of obligation;” thus, the revolutionaries had the “the right to demand the greatest sacrifices, if necessary, from its citizens.” He offered this as his reason for contacting Lozano, since his goal was to reach out to the “sovereign” public, the only group who had the right to solve Mexico’s problems. Zapata explained his own plan for Mexico and asked *el México de afuera* to consider it as a viable option. He placed his support behind Francisco Vázquez Gómez (who lived in San Antonio) for the Mexican presidency, proposed to restore the Constitution of 1857 and carry out agrarian reform, and offered amnesty to all Mexicans regardless of political affiliation. Although Zapata wrote to *La Prensa* in order to gain support for his agenda, he expressed a broader vision for Mexico, stating that “in reality, all I propose is an…indestructible union between all Mexicans, established through a civil organization or element that has not yet been considered by anyone.”

In June 1920, Obregón granted Lozano an interview in Mexico City. A presidential candidate at the time, Obregón stated that his top priority was “reconstructing the economy” and restoring the nation’s credit. He also planned to reorganize and reduce the size of the army. Lozano asked about the status of the exiles and what Obregón’s policy would be. The general responded by saying that he “considered the promulgation of an amnesty law…immoral.” Obregón did not believe that the government had the authority to legislate a citizen’s right to live in Mexico; it should be a person’s individual decision whether or not to repatriate. In fact, the nation’s “borders should be open for all Mexicans who wish to return to their Homeland, and only the Tribunals could judge those who committed crimes punishable by [Mexican] laws.”

---


Although Zapata and Obregón proposed different plans for Mexico, it is highly significant that they communicated with Lozano. They considered *el México de afuera* instrumental in the pacification and unification of Mexico as the military phase of the revolution came to an end. More importantly, they did not consider emigrants any less Mexican than their compatriots at home. *La Prensa’s* transnational scope also became clear; even though the Carranza government censored Lozano’s newspaper, it was obvious that it had an audience in Mexico and that leaders of the revolution read it and understood its popularity in the United States. The “independent” stance taken by *La Prensa* since its premier issue paid off. Now that peace was gradually being restored in Mexico, the newspaper served as a bridge in a dual sense. It connected Mexicans in the United States and in Mexico, but it also helped readers cope with the shift from the war-time 1910s to the arguably more stable 1920s. Because it was not as reactionary as *Revista Mexicana*, *La Prensa* survived the changes within the Mexican community in San Antonio and the U.S. Southwest in the immediate post-war period.

*La Prensa* increasingly focused on popular culture after the end of World War I, and it launched the “Página para el Hogar,” or “Ladies Page,” in late 1918. Lozano continued to advertise his bookstore in *La Prensa* in an effort to promote Spanish-language literacy. The newspaper also published literature for adults and children, as well as scientific experiments for young readers. Throughout the 1920s, *La Prensa* included news from Hollywood and featured Mexican actors and actresses performing at the National Theatre in San Antonio, encouraging the community to attend their functions. It also printed information about the latest in U.S. sports, particularly boxing and baseball.

Lozano and his staff did not ignore the United States’ replacement of Europe as the political and cultural center of the world and by the 1920s, Lozano and his colleagues were raising Mexican American children and had successful business ventures in the United States. However, this was not evidence of Porfirista acculturation. On the contrary, *La Prensa* continued to “face south” and act as a
strictly Mexican newspaper. When Lozano and González made the decision not to return to Mexico, they understood it as a lifelong, self-imposed exile.

In March 1920, Lozano visited García Naranjo and invited him to work as a contributor for *La Prensa*, “where he would earn less than if were selling corn and flour, but [would be] more in tune with his vocation and destiny” as a writer. García Naranjo considered this a new chance at life, an opportunity to rise after *Revista Mexicana*’s defeat. Lozano had been García Naranjo’s friend, but after that moment he “quickly became [his] brother in every sense of the word.” García Naranjo introduced Lozano to his sister-in-law Alicia Elizondo, and the two married in 1922. On their wedding day, García Naranjo welcomed his “brother” into their family, and the bond between the two “lasted until death.”

Moheno also accepted an invitation to write for *La Prensa*. He and García Naranjo, two exiles that stubbornly fought Carranza’s censorship, suddenly had a broad audience in the United States. Their articles were also featured in *El Universal* in Mexico City during the 1920s. As the new decade commenced, the exiles encountered new opportunities and different challenges. Mexico continued to change politically and culturally, and as the nation’s leaders institutionalized the revolution, their Porfirista critics became less relevant. García Naranjo, one of the last surviving Porfiristas in Mexico, wrote his memoirs in the 1950s in a final attempt to set the record straight and ensure that his experiences and those of his colleagues became a part of the historical record. In the United States, the remaining Porfiristas and their descendants continued the mission to “elevate the masses.”

---

591 García Naranjo, 8: 316.

592 Ibid., 321.
Chapter 6: Porfiristas and the Politics of Representation after 1920

In November 2010, the San Antonio community observed the centennial of the Mexican Revolution by drawing attention to the city’s place within the history of the conflict. Trinity University sponsored a symposium on “Revealing the Mexican Revolution in San Antonio,” and the Museo Alameda launched the exhibit “Revolution & Renaissance: Mexico and San Antonio 1910–2010.” These two events formed part of a larger project undertaken by scholars, artists, and other community leaders to reevaluate San Antonio’s transnational importance in the Mexican Revolution. The exhibit’s inauguration also brought together two of the most prominent Mexican American families of the twentieth century, represented by guests of honor María Alicia Brochmann (daughter of Ignacio E. Lozano) and Congressman Charles González (grandson of Leonides González and son of former Congressman Henry B. González). February 2013 will mark the centennial of La Prensa, and though the newspaper closed down in 1963, its sister publication La Opinión remains in circulation under the direction of the Lozano family. Established in 1926 by Lozano and González, La Opinión serves as a symbol of the Porfirista legacy in the United States. More importantly, it demonstrates that the Mexican Revolution could not fully crush Porfirismo.

Thomas Benjamin argues that the revolutionary regime began crafting an “updated master narrative” beginning in the 1920s. “The regime of Porfirio Díaz,” he writes, “was transformed from the apotheosis of liberal evolution to yet another dark period of reactionary ascendancy…La Revolución, naturally, took its former exalted place.” The revolución became the Revolución, appropriated and

593 The symposium was sponsored directly by Trinity University’s Mexico, The Americas, and Spain (MAS) Program.

594 After Lozano’s death in 1953, his wife Alicia continued to run the business with González’s help. She sold the newspaper after González retired in 1957. The various subsequent owners could not sustain the newspaper, and it was officially suspended in 1963.

595 Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 22.
institutionalized by the Mexican state in order to consolidate a national identity (with the government at the forefront) and by doing so enhance the legitimacy of the new regime. The revolutionary regime built monuments, declared national holidays, and rewrote the official national history. By acting as the descendants of Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and Madero, Mexico’s leaders replicated what Díaz had done decades earlier when he commissioned the statue of Cuauhtémoc on the Paseo de la Reforma. Samuel Brunk complicates Benjamin’s argument by stating that “the creation and use of nations and their heroes is both a collective endeavor and one that can be opposed…for heroes and nations to be heroes and nations, people have to accept them, and in doing so they also participate in their formation, adapting them to their personal needs or to those of the smaller communities in which they live.” This hegemonic relationship between the state and the public is based on a common identity and symbols, but maintaining hegemony is complicated because these symbols can be interpreted differently by individuals, communities, and political groups.

Porfiristas did not accept La Revolución, nor did they occupy a space within the new national identity. The revolutionary regime offered Mexicans a select group of heroes to venerate, and Díaz was not one of their options. Porfiristas could only partake in the relationship between the state and the public as counter-hegemonic subjects with little political influence. But even their status as Mexican subjects was questionable, especially when Plutarco Elías Calles revoked the amnesty of the Porfiristas who criticized his regime and supported the Cristeros. As the Mexican government worked to eradicate Porfirismo, time also worked in its favor; most Porfiristas and members of the Huerta cabinet died between 1920 and 1940. Even La Prensa began to decline in the 1940s as the children and grandchildren of immigrants assimilated into U.S. culture and became decreasingly fluent in Spanish.

---


[597] This included the científicos, Gamboa, Mondragón, De la Barra, Moheno, Olaguíbel, José María Lozano, Manuel Garza Aldape, José Elguero, and Enrique Gorostieta.
Yet Porfiristas believed that their identity would survive if they implemented their values in their homes and broader society. The “better class” maintained its cultural standards and passed them on to future generations. They also continued to engage in the politics of representation, negotiating and constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other,” and that is a process that their descendants continue today.

This chapter will examine the different ways in which Porfiristas confronted La Revolución, and how the U.S./Mexico border shaped the politics of representation. The first section will analyze the ways in which Gamboa and García Naranjo used their memoirs to help them come to terms with the new political and intellectual culture in Mexico. The second section focuses on Urrutia, who unlike Gamboa, García Naranjo, and other peers, embraced the myths surrounding his character and did not seek rectification for his participation in the Huerta regime. Nevertheless, the Urrutia family has attempted to clarify some misconceptions about the surgeon. The third and final section will trace the continuities and changes within the Porfirista community in the United States. These Porfiristas did not face the same political ramifications as their peers in Mexico. They and their descendants also increased their activist efforts throughout the twentieth century in an effort to promote education and Mexican culture while fighting discrimination. Overall, these experiences reveal the complex ways in which Porfiristas attempted to stay true to their identities after the dramatic changes of the 1910s.

Porfirista Counter-Memories and the Rejection of La Revolución

Anindyo Roy argues that “diasporic consciousness…seeks to posit its power of representing the knowledge of its own historical consciousness in ways that concretize the connections between self/identity and site/home.” However, “the history on which it relies to secure a unified authority of

---

598 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011. Urrutia was invited to Mexico by President Emilio Portes Gil (1928-1930). However, when the surgeon traveled to Mexico for a medical conference during this time period, he received an anonymous phone call that threatened his life if he did not leave Mexico right away, or if he ever set foot in the nation again. Urrutia immediately left Mexico and never returned. Based on Urrutia’s reputation across Mexico, it is certainly conceivable that he would have been assassinated had he traveled again to Mexico. Joaquín Cigarroa Jr., whose family had close connections to José Vasconcelos and other Mexican leaders, affirms that Urrutia was the only exile not allowed to return to Mexico.

247
national or transnational self is always realized in the form of a ‘counter-memory.’” Michel Foucault used the term “counter-memory” to recognize that the process of constructing “self” and “other” is unstable, since the “systems of identity and difference” are constantly shifting.599 Foucault, like his predecessor Friedrich Nietzsche, critiqued the linear analysis that produced homogenous, official versions of history (“memory”) meant to be accepted as truth. Counter-memories destabilize power structures that base their legitimacy and hegemony on a specific history. They also make the process of identity construction volatile by incorporating time, geography, politics, and personal experience into the act of remembering. Official histories tell people how and what they should remember; counter-memories present many versions of the “truth,” while recognizing the loaded and problematic nature of this concept.

Gamboa and García Naranjo exemplified the production of counter-memories by presenting different versions of the same narrative over the course of their lives. Although numerous exiles wrote memoirs related to the Mexican Revolution, this section will focus on Gamboa and García Naranjo because they provide particular insight into the plight of Porfiristas after the revolution. Their memoirs demonstrate that after 1920, Díaz remained a prominent figure for both men, but in very different ways. Gamboa took pride in his Porfirista identity, which he asserted until his death in 1939. García Naranjo, on the other hand, experienced an identity crisis in the 1920s and questioned his loyalty to the fallen general. By the time he wrote his memoirs in the 1950s, however, he had come to terms with his identity and was prepared to defend his allegiance to Díaz and Huerta.

On a basic level, these memoirs simply offer the perspective of a group defeated by the Mexican Revolution. But a closer reading of these texts demonstrates the ways in which identity politics shaped the format and content of the memoirs as well as what was absent from them. Silence is an important

part of the speech act that creates subjectivity. According to Doris Sommer, “secrecy is a safeguard to freedom...it is the inviolable core of human subjectivity that makes interaction a matter of choice rather than rational necessity.” In writing memoirs, there is always a degree of self-censorship. For Gamboa and García Naranjo, time and political circumstances determined the amount of external and internal censorship with which they contended. Gamboa became increasingly silent as time progressed, and García Naranjo wrote ten volumes of memoirs in the final decade of his life.

In 1920, Gamboa published the memoirs from his time in the Huerta regime and in exile; thereafter, he felt he had nothing left to prove. He stated his truth and explained what he considered to be his patriotic reasons for participating in the Huerta regime. He also chronicled the consequences that he and his family “unjustly” faced because of his patriotic service during the Díaz and Huerta administrations. Gamboa would not have benefitted from remaining belligerent, especially since his amnesty could be revoked. He also believed that he was too old and his health too poor to go into exile again. Gamboa continued chronicling his life in his diary, but less frequently and with fewer details. It is likely that the self-censorship served to protect himself and his son Miguel. He may have also wished to keep parts of his life private.

María Sagaseta de Gamboa died in early 1920, and Federico did not write in his diary again until the following year. From that point forward, Gamboa’s annotations were significantly shorter than in the previous decade, and he focused on his daily activities, visits from friends and colleagues, and work as the director of the Mexican Academy of Language. Two notable events are missing from

---


601 Gamboa’s chronology is confused. Throughout January 1920, he referred to “mi muerta,” or his dead wife, in several entries, writing about how much he missed her. His last entry for 1920 was written on January 27. The editor of Volume 7 notes that María died on February 22, 1920. On February 22, 1921, Federico stated that it was the one-year anniversary of María’s death.

602 Gamboa held this position from 1922 until his death in 1939.
Gamboa’s diary—the deaths of Carranza in 1920 and Woodrow Wilson in 1924. In fact, Gamboa never mentioned Carranza again, and the year 1924 is entirely absent from the memoirs. One can only speculate as to why. However, Gamboa did offer clues about how his perceptions changed regarding his two enemies. On October 31, 1922, he mentioned the execution of Francisco Murguía, one of Carranza’s most loyal generals, after he was captured inside a church in the state of Durango after rebelling against Obregón. Gamboa expressed his belief in divine providence and his hope that “God had forgiven Murguía’s soul.” By offering a prayer for Murguía, Gamboa demonstrated that he may have come to terms with at least one member of the Carrancista regime.

Gamboa’s feelings toward Wilson were more complicated. At the end of Wilson’s second term in office in March 1921, Gamboa “thought about hanging flags from the balcony of [his] home in order to express the joy [he] felt” because Wilson, “the most fatal among the fatal…[was] leaving the White House forever.” He ultimately decided against it, but he did praise the new president Warren G. Harding for lifting the spirits of the American public in his inaugural address. It is clear that Gamboa continued to harbor resentment against Wilson, but because there are no diary entries for 1924, there is no record of his reaction to Wilson’s death.

Later, however, there was a drastic shift in Gamboa’s conception of Wilson. In 1928, he penned a tribute to the late president, praising Wilson’s achievements and legacy. “Without a doubt,” Gamboa wrote, Wilson was a good president during his first term, but he excelled during his second term in office. The European conflict moved Wilson to find inspiration in “the democratic spirit” of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and he garnered enough courage “from the depths of his soul” to fight the “German military colossus.” Wilson’s Fourteen Points, “made him immortal,” a

603 Gamboa, 7: 89.
604 Ibid., 177. Gamboa did not clarify why he wrote these articles, or where they were published. He only stated that “they” asked him to write them
quality augmented by his insistence on attending the Paris Peace Conference despite his failing health.\textsuperscript{605} Gamboa believed that “when all of the inhabitants of the enslaved nations of Europe and Asia raised their voice in thanksgiving to the Almighty, they would mutter the name of President Wilson, asking heaven to bless him.”\textsuperscript{606} This homage comes as a surprise, since it is a stark contrast from Gamboa’s characterization of Wilson a decade earlier as “Lucifer” and a “delirious and egocentric ideologue.”\textsuperscript{607} It is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons for this change since Gamboa did not offer commentary or explanation for his position, nor did he mention Wilson’s involvement in U.S./Mexican affairs. However, this piece was part of a series of tributes, or “medallones,” that Gamboa began writing in 1927 for various political figures. His first tribute was to Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister who helped write the Treaty of Versailles. In his diary, Gamboa only included the tributes he penned for Clemenceau and Wilson, but perhaps this helps to explain his shift in opinion regarding the former U.S. president. It seemed that by 1927 and 1928, Gamboa had reassessed Wilson’s character and legacy, and considered him an international hero along with the other leaders who helped to end World War I. On a personal level, it also seems that he forgave him.

Self-censorship became an important issue when President Calles began his campaign against the Catholic Church in 1925. Although Carranza and Obregón had granted Gamboa and other exiles amnesty, Calles revoked it for his most vocal critics, including García Naranjo. In an effort to prevent a second exile, Gamboa retired from politics and minimized his critiques of the Mexican government. Gamboa sought to maintain a difficult balance between supporting the Church without explicitly condemning Calles for his anti-clericalism, and his diary (published nine years later) became a private

\textsuperscript{605} Ibid., 202.
\textsuperscript{606} Ibid., 207.
\textsuperscript{607} Gamboa, 6: 516.
outlet for what he could not say publicly. For example, on July 20, 1925, Gamboa wrote that Calles “made declarations that revealed his hatred of Catholicism.” A week later, Gamboa noted that “the governmental attempt against Catholics [worsened].” These were not the lengthy tirades from a decade before, nor were they attacks against the character of Calles or his officials. Gamboa was defiant, though, and in his diary he described how he and his son Miguel clandestinely observed Mass in their home “in spite of the risk.” If caught, they could have been incarcerated or executed. Gamboa also described the prayer vigils at the Basilica of Guadalupe, and the sense of solidarity he felt with other oppressed Catholics. The author had proven over the years that he was willing to sacrifice everything for Catholicism, risking death in 1913 by running for the presidency against Huerta, but he was more cautious during the Cristero War. He demonstrated that he would not give up a fundamental part of his life to appease the revolutionary regime, but he maintained a level of silence in order to protect himself and Miguel.

Gamboa had difficulty striking that balance between living in revolutionary Mexico and upholding his Porfirista identity, and he continued to face problems because of his ties to Díaz and Huerta. In December 1928, he was removed from the faculty of Philosophy and Literature at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) because he “lacked revolutionary ideology.” A year later, Gamboa felt “overwhelmed with indignation” when the Ministry of Finance denied his pension for his diplomatic service because he “was a prominent servant of the reactionary governments.” Gamboa feared he would suffer the same fate as his father, who experienced “misery” in

608 In 1934, Gamboa published a new volume of his diary, which covered the period from 1920-1934.

609 Gamboa, 7: 172-173.

610 Ibid., 187.

611 Ibid., 172.

612 Ibid., 217. Gamboa was reinstated in 1934.
his final years as punishment for having served in Maximilian’s army (though he later switched his allegiance to the liberal forces).\textsuperscript{613}

The writer decried the personal difficulties he faced because of the revolution, but he also criticized the cultural changes brought on by \textit{La Revolución}. Gamboa was particularly offended by José Vasconcelos and Diego Rivera, and his opinions of the two men illustrate the clash between the Porfirista and revolutionary aesthetics. As Rick López argues, “prior to the revolution, Mexico’s middle and upper classes along with foreign visitors and state officials dismissed popular art as embarrassing evidence of backwardness. This same art, after the revolution, emerged as proud symbol of Mexico’s authentic national identity.”\textsuperscript{614} Vasconcelos was at the forefront of the new cultural movement that celebrated “\textit{mestizaje} as the way of the future,” but as López and other scholars have pointed out, Vasconcelos actually “bemoaned Mexico’s racial mixture.” He “did not believe his own theory” about mestizos being the “cosmic race,” and only wrote \textit{La Raza Cósmica} in 1925 as “a mythology meant to boost self-confidence.” López argues that Vasconcelos “ascribed no value to existing regional traditions or specific indigenous cultures.” Vasconcelos actually had much in common with Gamboa in this regard, since both believed that “only intellectual elites like themselves were capable of evaluating and ‘fixing’ popular culture.” This sharply contrasted with the work of Manuel Gamio, director of the Department of Anthropology at the UNAM, who “argued that Mexico’s ideal should emerge from the culture of the rural popular classes.”\textsuperscript{615}

In 1922, Gamio invited Gamboa to join him and a group on an excursion to the pyramids at Teotihuacán. Gamboa noted that he had not visited the pyramids since 1910, when he traveled there with Díaz as part of the centennial celebrations. The writer seemed annoyed at how the group was

\textsuperscript{613} Ibid., 233.

\textsuperscript{614} López, 2.

\textsuperscript{615} Ibid., 133-134.
“astounded, or faked being astounded” by the ancient monuments, which “left [him] cold like a piece of ice…feeling trillions of leagues apart from those ancestors.” The trip convinced Gamboa that he “did not have the most minimal kinship with the Aztecs.” Moreover, when the group ate at a grotto named after Díaz, Gamboa lamented that the space would likely be renamed after “some ‘liberator’” of the revolution.  

Despite the similarities between Gamboa and Vasconcelos, the two antagonized each other from the onset of their time at the UNAM. In his diary, Gamboa called his colleague “arrogant” and a “Jacobin,” and during a social event the two almost engaged in a physical fight over their conflicting views on socialism (which Vasconcelos supported). On one occasion, Gamboa’s “scarce hair stood on its end” when Vasconcelos, the newly appointed Minister of Education and Fine Arts, said he was “horrified” by French theatre. These moments demonstrate that they may have had similar ideas about plebian culture and the lower classes, but their approaches to elevating the masses were very different. Vasconcelos rejected positivism, and as Minister of Public Education (1921-1924), he set the institutional framework for the proliferation of La Revolución, successfully replacing the educational system set in place by Gamboa’s friend Justo Sierra.

In his diary, Gamboa also questioned the taste of Rivera and other artists inspired by the Mexican Revolution. The writer described Rivera as a “modernist painter…made rotten in Paris, [and] supposedly Bolshevik,” whose paintings were “horrendous.” When Vasconcelos commissioned Rivera to paint the doors to the entrance of the National Preparatory School in 1922, Gamboa exclaimed “poor Preparatory!...its venerable murals, respected for so long, are being profaned, and in what manner!, by the young and wise painters. It is heartbreaking to see how [the school] will end up

616 Gamboa, 7: 73.
617 Ibid., 46, 33, 38.
618 Ibid., 81, 260.
resembling a pulquería.” Later, when Gamboa and some friends walked into the UNAM amphitheatre after its renovation in 1923, they saw that Rivera “painted it with some very strange things” that represented “the triumph of ugliness!” In 1929, Rivera visited Gamboa and “very effusively offered to paint [his] portrait.” Gamboa made no further comment about the meeting in his diary, but based on his distaste for Rivera’s work, he likely declined.

Although Gamboa believed in the 1920s that revolutionary culture defiled the remnants of Porfirista civilization, he seemed to have softened to Vasconcelos in the 1930s. Vasconcelos became increasingly critical of the revolution in the late 1920s, and he unsuccessfully ran for the presidency against National Revolutionary Party candidate Pascual Ortiz Rubio in 1929. That year, Vasconcelos published the Plan of Guaymas, in which he called for an uprising against the government, and it resulted in his incarceration and exile. In 1935, Vasconcelos published the first volume of his memoirs. Gamboa read this text, and he commented in his diary that certain parts were “poorly written,” but others, he believed, were “inspired and brilliant” (though he did not refer to specific passages). Overall, the text contained “many truths…that revealed the moral and material miseries of the revolution.” That same year, Gamboa saw Vasconcelos’ play La Mancornadora at the Palace of Fine Arts and commented that it was “very nice.” However, in spite of these admissions, Gamboa continued to see Porfiristas as the purveyors of Mexican culture and civilization, and it was a role that the writer took very seriously.

Perhaps Gamboa’s ego contributed to his conflicts with Vasconcelos, who overshadowed the Porfirista writer as one of the leaders of Mexico’s literary and intellectual elite. Gamboa’s memoirs

---

619 Ibid., 114.
620 Ibid., 260, 223.
621 Ibid., 328.
622 Ibid., 338.
reveal a self-proclaimed vain man continuously preoccupied with his image and his legacy, a quality exemplified by the fact that he began writing his memoirs for publication before turning thirty years old. The recurring theme in Gamboa’s memoirs was his refinement and elevated cultural tastes. Even in exile, the writer made annotations in his diary about attending the opera and theatre and countless social events. In Mexico, he enjoyed afternoons in Chapultepec and evenings at the Palacio de Bellas Artes, and in the 1920s and 1930s, he spent much of his spare time with other members of his (mostly Porfirista) social circle. Even though Gamboa continued to struggle financially, he maintained the cultured lifestyle that he enjoyed during the Porfiriato.

Gamboa also succeeded in maintaining his cultural relevancy despite representing the old positivist tradition. His most famous novel, Santa (1903), was the first “best seller” in Mexico. The story about a noble prostitute in Mexico City sold 60,000 copies worldwide by the time of Gamboa’s death. Numerous scenes took place in Chimalistac, the colonia in which Gamboa lived, and tourists traveled to see the plaza, also known as the “Garden of Santa” (after the novel’s protagonist). In 1924, the plaza was renamed Plaza Federico Gamboa and certain streets in the neighborhood were renamed after Gamboa and the protagonists of Santa. The writer exclaimed in his diary “finally!...No one can doubt that my humble name will forever be rooted in Chimalistac.” From that point forward, Gamboa referred to the location as “his plaza.” The novel was adapted for film and theater, and the first of four movies based on Santa premiered in 1918. A second version was filmed in 1931 and included a

---

623 Gamboa frequently mentioned spending time with his friend Carlos Díaz Dufoo, the co-founder of El Imparcial.

624 “Ubica Pacheco a Santa como el Primer Best Seller en México,” El Universal, Dec. 11, 2008. It is important to note that Pacheco also wrote the introduction to the most recent edition of Gamboa’s diary, the one cited throughout this dissertation.

625 Gamboa, 7: 139.

626 Ibid., 247. Gamboa made sure to italicize “his” in each entry referring to the plaza.
theme song by popular singer Agustín Lara. At the premier in Mexico City the following year, Gamboa basked in the glory of this achievement and the applause he received.627

The popularity and transcendence of Santa demonstrates that Porfirismo continues to have a place within mexicanidad, and that La Revolución is not the only acceptable ‘truth’ about Mexican identity. The novel and the protagonist “Santa” have been hailed as “myths” within Mexican culture, and studied by famed authors including José Emilio Pacheco, who wrote in 2008 that “the novel continued to sell because every generation could find new charms” within its pages.628 Pacheco expressed his belief that Gamboa and his Santa would remain in the popular consciousness, and he imagined the two roaming through present-day Mexico City as “shadows…as if they were riding together in a hired car along the Reforma in 1899.”629 Gamboa, Santa, and his plaza are inscriptions of the Porfirista legacy on a city where the public spaces, monuments, cultural figures, and national heroes were largely recast to honor the revolution.

Gamboa seemed never to waver in his Porfirista identity or his reverence for Díaz, attending Mass on the general’s birthday and the anniversary of his death. One poignant moment took place in 1922, when he was overcome with “deep emotion” after listening to Díaz’s voice in a phonograph recording made by Thomas Edison.630 Gamboa, always the faithful Porfirista, was happy to be in the general’s presence once again. García Naranjo had a similar overwhelming experience when he visited Díaz’s tomb in Paris in 1928, but with the opposite reaction, feeling an immense sense of guilt. He had returned to Mexico in 1923 only to be sent into exile three years later under orders from Calles. Thereafter, García Naranjo toned down his combative rhetoric, and he believed he disappointed Díaz by

627 Ibid., 267.


630 Gamboa, 7: 89.
Giving up the fight. Gamboa’s diary demonstrated that writer remained firm in his Porfirista identity, but García Naranjo’s memoirs traced an identity crisis that prompted to reevaluate his Porfirismo.

García Naranjo was sixty-eight years old when he began writing his autobiography in 1951 (publishing one volume per year for ten years), and had already outlived most of his peers. It is not clear why he waited this long to write his memoirs, but it is possible that he felt the need to speak on behalf of his colleagues one last time before he and the remaining survivors died. In the introduction to the memoirs, García Naranjo addressed the process of writing an autobiography. He believed that the best way to write a memoir was with complete frankness, without self-censorship for any political purpose, or by using “words that could be interpreted in various ways.” This would differ from a diary, where the author would express immediate (and often emotional) reactions to events. Moreover, memoirs should be written with “dignity and decorum,” void of any gossip and “trash that would not contribute in any way to clarifying the shadows of history.” His comment on self-censorship is significant for a number of reasons. García Naranjo was not known for keeping quiet, as demonstrated through his journalistic and parliamentary endeavors since 1909. There was already an extensive record of his opinions and commentary, so what did he have left to say or prove? He claimed he did not “worry about being absolved or condemned”; all he wanted was for his “compatriots to understand” him. The memoirs served to set the record straight about the events that took place in the 1910s that had “not been treated with equity” in Mexico, particularly the period of the Huerta regime, since he knew that this was what interested readers most. Now that forty years had passed, García Naranjo could claim that he had nothing to lose or gain by attempting to rectify history.

The author warned readers in his introduction that he did not have any secrets to reveal, and he would not apologize for his loyalty to Díaz and Huerta. All he intended to do was to write the story of

---

631 Ibid., 98-99.

632 Ibid., 59.
his life as he remembered it and offer the reasons for the paths in life he had chosen. García Naranjo did not explicitly affirm that his memoirs served as a political statement, but his work had always been political, and this project was not the exception. However, his memoirs differed in certain respects from those written by his colleagues. Moheno and Rodolfo Reyes wrote memoirs in the 1910s through the 1930s specifically to prove that even though they were part of Huerta’s cabinet, they had no personal affiliations with the general, nor did they like him or support his policies. Moheno claimed that he was moved by his friendship with the other members of the Cuadrilátero, and Reyes by the love for his father, who had supported Félix Díaz. Gamboa’s diary inadvertently took on this same purpose. He began writing it two decades before Madero’s revolution, but when the author became a part of the opposition, the diary served as a medium through which he justified his political actions. These three texts were written during a period in which their authors lived in danger. In the 1950s, García Naranjo wrote in an entirely different historical context. He and his family lived in peace in Mexico after the end of their second exile in 1934, and he had the freedom to express his political views without fear of repercussion.633 His contributions to Mexican literature were recognized in Mexico in spite of his political reputation, and in 1938, he was accepted into the Mexican Academy of Languages. However, even though several decades had passed since his time in the Huerta administration, like his colleagues he still felt the need to clarify misconceptions about his actions.

Mexico enjoyed significant economic growth and political stability in the 1950s under the leadership of the PRI, the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution. The official history provided one narrative of the Mexican Revolution in which all of the revolutionary leaders (who were all understood as precursors to the PRI) acted heroically and unanimously against Díaz and Huerta. García Naranjo rejected La Revolución and the PRI by presenting a counter-memory, a different version of the same narrative, describing the flaws of these heroes while humanizing the villains. His memoirs also offered

---

633 García Naranjo, 10: 63. The author credited President Lázaro Cárdenas for allowing him to write without censorship from the government.
a history of the Porfiriato that highlighted Díaz’s patriotism and the successes of the regime. In doing so, García Naranjo prompted readers to question *La Revolución* and think more critically about modern Mexican history.

García Naranjo recognized that the revolution prompted strong emotions from those who lived through it and remembered the violence. Since 1914, “of all the cabalistic words…that provoked epileptic reactions, none could compete with the name of Victoriano Huerta. Simply pronouncing his name [was] all it [took] for Revolutionaries and those that faked being so…to assume frenetic and threatening attitudes.” The author argued that Mexicans learned to associate Huerta’s name with the chaos of the revolution, whether justifiably or not, and it was “useless” to try to reason with Huerta’s most stubborn opponents. García Naranjo admitted that his memoirs would not change the minds of many readers, especially those who lived through the war. Nevertheless, he hoped to at least inspire “new generations to comprehend the group of fighters who were defeated…because they did not support Woodrow Wilson’s interference in Mexican affairs.”

This is an important comment about memory and the Mexican Revolution, since it suggests that as the years passed, it became easier for people to forget certain details about the war in favor of the collective memory. García Naranjo gave many examples in his memoirs, believing in the propensity of those involved in the revolution to change their allegiances based on convenience. He reminded readers that Carranza had been a pro-Díaz senator who did not fully commit to the Madero revolution in its initial phase, and that even Madero, the martyred apostle of the revolution, was widely unpopular in early 1913. Also, most of the members of the twenty-sixth legislature accepted Madero’s resignation and Huerta’s presidency in February 1913. These same men later paid tribute to the dead president while denouncing Huerta. García Naranjo was most adamant about the fact that Huerta and his cabinet were strictly against Wilson’s Mexican policies, even though the revolutionaries made it seem like they

---

634 Ibid., 1: 76-78.
orchestrated the intervention in Veracruz. Most importantly, García Naranjo, like his colleagues, demonstrated that the Huerta regime was much more complex than the popular perception of them as a group of puppets blindly following the orders of a bloodthirsty dictator.

García Naranjo admitted that by 1951, he was four decades older, calmer, and in a much different frame of mind than when he published *Revista Mexicana* in 1915. In explaining his “arrogant and rebellious” attitude towards Carranza and then Calles, García Naranjo “had no trouble admitting” that his fits of rage took me to the point of exaggeration, especially against the First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement, but who does not lose…equilibrium when they are forced to leave their national territory? The revolutionaries executed Alberto García Granados and would execute any other ex-member of General Huerta’s cabinet; in those circumstances I believed and continue to believe that by responding to those blows I mounted a legitimate defense. In Mexico, we were insulted [and] slandered, and the least we could do was attack the regime that shut the doors of the homeland to us. Was I…unjust at times? Of course, but…my reaction against the persecutions was human…that is why, as José María Lozano used to say, “I will not repent nor make amends.”

García Naranjo stated that his biggest relief at the time of his exile came from *Revista Mexicana*; without this emotional outlet, he “would have died of melancholy.” But “naturally, the years passed, the wounds healed, [he] aged” and no longer felt “belligerent.”

The healing process was not easy for García Naranjo, particularly after being sent into exile a second time in 1926-1934. García Naranjo’s children were visiting family in Brownsville, Texas, and Nemesio and Angelina planned to travel to the border city to pick them up. Before this trip, García Naranjo received a warning from Leonides González, stating that he would not be allowed to return to Mexico if he set foot in the United States. Leonides had obtained this information from José

635 Ibid., 81.
636 Ibid., 92.
González, who was in charge of La Prensa’s operations in Laredo and had ties to border officials in Nuevo Laredo. Not only would García Naranjo be forbidden to reenter his country, “immigration authorities” had prepared a “circus act…to humiliate” the exile through “jeers, offensive shouts” and “La Cucaracha” playing in the background.\(^{638}\) This information was factual, and the Ministry of the Interior sent orders to restrict García Naranjo’s entry into Mexico through the northern border with the United States, as well as the ports at Tampico and Veracruz. García Naranjo stated that Angelina was particularly distraught due to this news. In 1914, she and her husband only had an infant child; now they had four children ages seven to thirteen, and it would be more difficult to provide a stable life for them while living in exile. During the nine years of displacement, García Naranjo worked as a journalist, lawyer, and unofficial diplomat depending on the circumstances, and he and his family lived in New York City, Los Angeles, Quebec, Venezuela, and across Europe. García Naranjo believed that his family was most in danger in the United States, where they were closely monitored by the U.S. and Mexican governments. After publishing a series of articles in 1927 attacking Wall Street, Calles, and the U.S. government, García Naranjo received a warning from his friend and former ambassador to the U.S., Victoriano Salado Álvarez. The writer needed to tone down his critiques or risk expulsion from the United States. After the warning, García Naranjo moved his family out of the country.

The ninth volume of García Naranjo’s memoirs, which he dedicated to the second exile, includes a prologue by his eldest daughter Angelina García Naranjo de Olea. She recalled those nine years with fondness since those travels took place during her formative years (she was thirteen years of age in 1926 and twenty-four when the family returned to Mexico). What she remembered the most was the way in which her parents made sure to submerge their children in the culture of each location, whether it was Venice or New York. The children “had to be ready at nine” every morning, and the family would then walk around each city until one in the afternoon, since her father believed that “only by walking would

\(^{638}\) García Naranjo, 9: 163-164.
[they] get to know a city and appreciate its beauty.” In the evening, they would attend the theatre or opera. In retrospect, Angelina “marveled” at her parents’ “resistance…and good humor in the face of any situation…[or] discomfort.” She then directly addressed her father and wrote “climb the 400 steps to the top of the Cathedral in Milan? You and Mother led the procession. The beds in the hotel room were hard? We [the children] complained before either of you did.” 639

Angelina’s recollections show that her parents focused on their children’s well-being; for her father, this also meant distancing himself from Mexican politics. The experiences that García Naranjo shared with his family calmed his spirit, but they also detached him emotionally from Mexico. In 1928, he and his family arrived in Paris, and they visited Díaz’s tomb accompanied by Carmen Romero Rubio. García Naranjo went a second time, alone, in order to “meditate” in the presence of the general and “listen to the order” given “by the bones of the caudillo.” García Naranjo wrote

I looked again at the eagle [on] the flag, and the Aztec symbol seemed to carry the mandate to think of Mexico, always of Mexico. I examined my conscience and realized that I no longer worried about national problems with the same passion and fervor that I once had. Paris had me subjugated with its museums, its theatres, its monuments, its cultural centers…I compared exile [in Paris] with the [displacement] I suffered in San Antonio and New York, and I felt like I lived in paradise, and I risked being completely absorbed….I had stopped writing about Mexican issues in order to be delivered from the political obsession, but the Porfirista remains yelled that slavery had been the core of my existence….I missed what was essential, I was no longer [the man] I once was…and I shuddered at the possible loss of my mexicanidad… I meditated upon all of this for an hour, and when I left Montparnasse Cemetery, I resolved to be released from the loving arms of Paris and return to the barricade. 640

García Naranjo realized that he and Díaz were inextricably linked; if he turned his back on the general, he would live a more stable life but lose his identity. For men such as García Naranjo and Gamboa, becoming complacent about La Revolución and the changes in Mexico represented an act of betrayal against the general who gave his life in service to the patria. They were the last generation of Porfiristas, and for them, there was no choice but to maintain their loyalty to Díaz regardless of the cost.

639 Ibid., 17.
640 Ibid., 307, 311-312.
After that pilgrimage, García Naranjo resumed criticizing Calles in the press, contributing weekly articles to newspapers including *La Prensa* and *La Opinión*. The Callista regime ended in 1934 with the election of Lázaro Cárdenas, and the government granted García Naranjo permission to return to Mexico the following year. The author had never met or even seen Cárdenas, but he liked the president because he exiled Calles. García Naranjo noted that he felt mostly neutral about Cárdenas and his policies, but he experienced a sense of relief because for the first time in three decades, he could live in Mexico without surveillance or fear. He returned to his journalistic endeavors, writing for the Lozano newspapers and Mexico City’s *Excélsior*, but he became more diplomatic in his political commentary. García Naranjo stated that Cárdenas and “the government…placed no impediment on the expression of [his] ideas, which were often contrary to theirs,” and he felt the need to show respect for the regime that did not treat him like a criminal or traitor. Presidents Manuel Ávila Camacho, Miguel Alemán, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, and Adolfo López Mateos “also respected” García Naranjo’s freedom of expression.641 He and the revolutionary regime were finally able to peacefully coexist, a result of the dwindling number of Porfiristas, a decline in the widespread influence (and threat) of Porfirismo, and the conservatism of the presidents who followed Cárdenas.

With this, García Naranjo ended the autobiographical portion of his memoirs, but his conclusion offered a “panorama” of the Porfiriato. The now seventy-seven year old wrote the tenth volume in 1960, half a century after Madero’s revolution. He stated that since then, “thousands of speeches had been given to deplore the Hero of April 2, hundreds of pamphlets distributed with the object of proving that the greatness of the Porfiriato…was fictitious, and…the textbooks in primary schools were injected with futile hatred” so that future generations could be taught “to hate the period from 1876 to 1911.”642 García Naranjo “claimed justice for the man…who surely had many defects but set up a constructive

641 Ibid., 10: 67-68.

642 Ibid., 111.
administration,” and he believed that revisionist history would prevail and give Díaz due credit for his achievements. He stated that Porfirismo died in 1911, just as “Juarismo” and “Lerdismo” had, and although “political resurrection was impossible, historical resurrection was necessary so that [Díaz] could occupy the glorious position he deserved.” As for García Naranjo, he “blessed Providence for allowing [him] to be born in the final decades of the nineteenth-century…seeing humanity in a much happier state” than in the first half of the twentieth century. He did not care that his critics might say that he was “an old, stubborn, and retrograde man stuck in the past.” The memoirs were a final act in defense of the general and the modern Mexico that he (not La Revolución) created.

On a broader level, García Naranjo’s memoirs are significant because they traced the story of a man looking back at his life through the context of significant historical shifts. Gamboa’s diary examined these shifts as they took place. These memoirs provide only two accounts of the Porfirista experience, but they offer important insights into the act of remembering, and the impact of time and age on that process. The texts also reveal the challenges faced by these men in terms of identity as Porfirismo declined in political and cultural relevance.

The Urrutia Family, Myths, and Public Image

On June 4, 1972, the San Antonio Express News published a story commemorating Urrutia’s one-hundredth birthday. The author described the “centenarian” as “a medical pioneer in the field of surgery and living legend both in his native Mexico as well as San Antonio.” Urrutia, the last-surviving Porfirista, died in 1975 at the age of 103. Twenty years later, in 1995, Texas Monthly published an article about the “horrible secret” that Urrutia may have “carried to his grave,” referring to

643 Ibid., 114.
644 Ibid., 75.
his alleged involvement in the deaths of Belisario Domínguez and General Frederick Funston. The Urrutia family has undertaken extensive research to clarify these “myths,” but Urrutia continues to be one of Mexico and San Antonio’s most controversial figures.

Brunk defines a “myth” as a “story from which people can derive a sense of shared community and identity,” adding that myths include elements of historical narrative. The revolutionary regime found it necessary to create heroes, but it also needed to cast them against a set of villains. Peasants in Morelos may feel a special attachment to Zapata while Chihuahuenses honor Villa, but both groups can find a common enemy in Huerta. As the dictator’s compadre and right-hand man, Urrutia also occupies a place as one of Mexico’s villains, and his involvement in the Huerta regime is as well-known as his medical accomplishments. According to the popular narrative, Urrutia developed “a marked vocation as a murderer” and became known as the “genius of evil” during his three months as Minister of the Interior. The gruesome details of Urrutia’s alleged assassinations became popular knowledge before the surgeon left Mexico, adding an element of horror to the already unpopular Huerta regime while providing greater ammunition against the dictator.

Members of the Urrutia family acknowledge Aureliano’s complicity in the atrocities of the Huerta administration, but they also criticize the perception of Aureliano as a blood-thirsty killer blindly following Huerta’s orders. Cristina Urrutia Martínez contradicts the claim that the violence against Huerta’s enemies began when her grandfather became minister. She argues that Huerta rose to power “assassinating, and would continue to do so, with or without Urrutia.” Bud Urrutia suggests that Aureliano knew about Huerta’s repressive tactics when he accepted the position of minister, and the


647 Brunk, 5.


649 Urrutia Martínez, 171.
surgeon “probably authored the elimination of some of those political enemies.” He adds that Aureliano mistakenly “bet that [Huerta] would restore legal order and prosperity… he never justified himself, and instead confronted his actions and accepted his responsibility” for anything that took place during his tenure as minister.650

The most famous death attributed to Urrutia took place after his resignation from the Huerta cabinet, as he is linked to the murder of Senator Belisario Domínguez on October 7, 1913. According to popular legend, Domínguez was forced out of his hotel by Huerta’s henchmen and taken to the Sanatorio Urrutia in Coyoacán. Urrutia told the senator that his “viperous tongue would never again say stupidities,” and with “one swift movement with a sharp scalpel” the surgeon sliced it off. Urrutia then forced Domínguez to bleed into a bucket so as “not to stain the floor.” Before the senator died, Urrutia placed the tongue in a jar with formaldehyde, showed it to his victim, and commanded him to speak, and after the body was buried, Urrutia sent the tongue as a trophy to his compadre Huerta.

Cristina Urrutia Martínez states that “this version has been repeated for years and is considered historical fact,” despite the contradictory evidence available as early as 1914. Huertista agents José “Mataratas” (Rat Killer) Hernández, Gilberto Márquez, and Ismael Gómez confessed to the murder and claimed that they kidnapped Domínguez at his hotel, took him to the outskirts of Coyoacán, and Márquez shot him in the back of his head. Quiroz shot him twice more, and the assassins then buried Domínguez. The body was exhumed in August 1914 (after the fall of the Huerta regime) by orders of a judge, and the autopsy reports confirmed the agents’ version.651 Nevertheless, the myth of “Belisario’s tongue” persisted. Mexican scholars including Enrique Florescano and Carlos Monsiváis argued that this type of tale became “one of the first methods used to narrate the Revolution,” an important part of

650 Ibid., 175.
651 Urrutia Martínez, 196-197.
the process of state formation and rewriting the nation’s historical narrative that began in the 1920s.652 Mexico needed heroes and villains, and since Huerta was dead and could not be held accountable for his actions, Urrutia “inherited” the responsibility for the crimes committed during the Huerta regime.

Domínguez, on the other hand, became a martyr for the revolution and a symbol of standing up against tyranny. In 1957, surviving members of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of 1913 described Domínguez as a “chosen one” and a hero who represented the “flag” against Huertismo. They also recounted the details of his torture and execution by Urrutia. Not all of the surviving members of that legislature agreed in particular about the means of his death, and Maderista senator Aquiles Elorduy suggested that his colleagues exalted Domínguez in order to “clear their consciences” after supporting Madero’s resignation and allowing Huerta to assume the presidency.653

Despite these differences of opinion, the “black legend” involving Urrutia prevailed in Mexico as well as Texas, in part because the surgeon never cared to clear up the mystery. In fact, he seemed to bask in it. The 1995 *Texas Monthly* article featuring Urrutia noted that his “mystique never dimmed, and he did his best to preserve it.” Bud stated that he and his father Adolfo “spent hours wondering about [Domínguez’s murder]…did [Aureliano] do it or didn’t he? Finally one day my daddy got the courage and went to ask his father whether it was true or not. When he came back, he told me that the old man just sat there and [responded], ‘I will not say.’”654 Aureliano always avoided giving a straight answer, and Bud recalls that once when a San Antonio reporter asked about Domínguez’s murder, Aureliano replied that “people who talk too much frequently lose their tongues.”655

---


653 Urrutia Martínez, 200.

654 “A Tough Hombre.”

655 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27. 2011.
Although Urrutia gained the reputation for ordering executions and disappearances, he did claim to have prevented the deaths of some of the prominent opponents of the regime, including Jesús Flores Magón and Manuel Calero. In 1951, Urrutia stated that “the intrigue had multiplied against innocent people…in brief trials they were condemned to death [and] executed an hour after the fatal sentence was pronounced.” His “opposition to [these] drastic measures created serious conflicts with the president.” During his one-hundred days as Minister of the Interior, Urrutia recognized that Huerta was a “pathological personality” and chose to resign. Huerta then ordered Blanquet to execute Urrutia. Blanquet did not carry out the orders, knowing that Huerta could suddenly change his mind, but Urrutia decided to leave Mexico anyway.

In exile, Urrutia became the protagonist of another myth. As the surgeon attempted to flee Mexico in 1914, he was arrested in Veracruz by General Fredrick Funston and escorted out of Mexico. In February 1917, the two coincidentally ran into each other one night at the St. Anthony Hotel in downtown San Antonio. Urrutia allegedly “[looked] up at Funston, [said] ‘well, this bastard is following me everywhere I go,’ [looked] him directly in the eye and Funston [keeled] over dead.” The general officially died of a heart attack, but it did not stop San Antonio residents from attributing the death to Urrutia and his ability to give the mal ojo (evil eye). Bud recalled a conversation with a female patient, “a little old lady” who lived on Funston Avenue (which ends on Broadway Street, ironically at the intersection where Urrutia’s house was located). She asked Bud if he knew “the story about [how] Aureliano killed Funston with evil eye.” He responded “yes I know that story; my dad and

656 Urrutia Martínez, 176.
my uncles were always making up stories, and maybe they invented it.” The “little lady [then] looked up and said ’oh, well I was a waitress at the St. Anthony Hotel, and [I] saw [Aureliano] do it.’”

This myth only enhanced the public’s fear of Urrutia and his reputation in San Antonio as a murderer, but Urrutia did not worry about setting the record straight. In fact, he crafted a flamboyant public persona that added a mysterious quality to his image. According to Bud, his grandfather was a “showman” with a “flare for the dramatic.” For example, Aureliano owned a black opera cape that he would wear out in public, at Mass, and even at the hospital where he worked. San Antonio librarian Carmen Perry recalled in an interview in 1988 that “people used to go to the [San Fernando] cathedral for mass on Sunday at 12:00 just to watch him because he always would come in with a cape with a big red lining and a top hat…it was quite a ceremony to see him walk down the aisle” to sit at the front of the church. Charles González also remembers Urrutia, “and to us as children…he was a mysterious figure…I know there are photos out there of Dr. Urrutia walking…on Houston Street with a cape.” González attributed Urrutia’s dramatic fashion to the tradition of older generations to dress more elegantly. More likely it was Urrutia’s way of drawing attention, which he did in other ways as well. In 1940, Aureliano commissioned a bronze statue of himself in which he is wearing the cape; the statue remains on the former grounds of Urrutia’s property Miraflores. *Holiday Magazine* featured Urrutia in 1948, describing him as “the acknowledged leader of Latin society in San Antonio.” The article includes a photo of the surgeon in front of his house (the Quinta Urrutia), standing in a dignified pose in his cape.

---

659 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011.
661 Carmen Perry, interview by Patrick McGuire, tape recording, June 25, 1988, Special Collections, Institute of Texan Cultures, University of Texas at San Antonio Libraries, San Antonio, Texas.
Urrutia was certainly a one-of-a-kind character, but his children and grandchildren knew the surgeon, family man, and “strict disciplinarian” who had little to do with this public persona. In fact, Bud claims that he never actually saw his grandfather wear the opera cape. But even Bud attests to a “supernatural side” to his grandfather. Aureliano’s “mother claimed he had psychic and intuitive powers such as being able to sense a person’s presence on the other side of a wall or being able to open a door without touching it.” This supernatural quality, Bud believes, enhanced Aureliano’s diagnostic abilities, helping him to detect problems before the widespread use of x-ray technology.\(^{664}\) It also adds another layer of mystery to the complex man.

In addition to being known as a respected surgeon and possible murderer, Urrutia is remembered in San Antonio for his home Miraflores, the mansion he commissioned in 1916 on his fifteen-acre property. Mexican architect Porfirio Treviño designed the home, which was constructed on Urrutia’s property adjacent to Brackenridge Park on Broadway Street. Ironically, one street that bordered Miraflores would be named after General Funston, much to Urrutia’s chagrin. The surgeon sold the property in 1962, and the house was demolished. Today much of the property is in ruins, but the major art pieces located throughout what were the gardens at Miraflores remain standing.

Scholars Kathryn O’Rourke and William Hoar have closely examined the architecture, monuments, sculptures, and icons present throughout Miraflores, which represented elements of “Mexico’s cultural influences: the indigenous, the colonial, [and] the classical.”\(^{665}\) O’Rourke adds that Miraflores “tells the story of a homesick exile’s striving to re-invent his once-glorious life.”\(^{666}\) Urrutia wanted to feel the sense of living in Mexico City, and he purchased this property because, like Reforma boulevard, “Broadway was a long, wide street that led out of downtown at a diagonal, toward, and past

---
\(^{664}\) Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011.


\(^{666}\) Ibid., 5.
the verdant public playground [at Brackenridge Park] that served many of the same needs that Chapultepec did.”

By the time Miraflores was completed in 1930, it included “various garden environments, two sizeable buildings, several grottos, an esplanade and stage area, a fountain that emptied water into a number of shallow channels, reflecting pools, a small swimming pool, huge concrete-and-ceramic benches, and a collection of decorative pieces and statuary.” The pools and gardens were designed primarily to resemble the floating gardens in Urrutia’s homeland of Xochimilco, as well as the bodies of water in Coyoacán (where he established his sanatorium) and Chapultepec Park (a popular recreational space in Mexico City).

In the exterior gardens, Urrutia commissioned art that paid homage to important figures in Mexican history. Walking along the pathways, one can find a bust of Porfirio Díaz, a bench dedicated to Hernán Cortés, and, at the entrance to Miraflores, a tile mosaic of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Urrutia was not to be outdone by these historical characters. The gates at the entrance have a tile mosaic with the following inscription: “Hernán Cortés founded Mexico City in 1521 […] Dr. Aureliano Urrutia founded this institution [Miraflores] in 1921 [the date completed].” The artwork throughout the property also incorporates Aztec iconography; one concrete bench has a jaguar carved on the side, and one of the major arches on the property features two leopards. There is also a giant replica of the head of Coyolxauhqui (the Aztec Moon Goddess), and a statue of Cuauhtémoc. The surgeon also commissioned other grandiose pieces, including the bronze statues of himself and a replica of the Winged Victory of Samothrace (possibly inspired by the Angel of Independence on Reforma).

---

667 Ibid., 20.


669 O’Rourke., 31.
Urrutia claimed his mestizo heritage through monuments and public exhibition the way the Díaz regime did by manipulating public spaces throughout Mexico City. Urrutia’s sanatorium in Coyoacán (completed in 1911) had the same grandiosity and mixture of European and indigenous influences as Miraflores, Urrutia’s way of proving to Mexico’s elites that he had aristocratic tastes. O’Rourke suggests that Urrutia commissioned Miraflores for the same reason, to show Anglo society that he (the dark-skinned Indian) was a cultured man knowledgeable about art and history. However, this was different from the colonial mimicry performed by the científicos before Western society. Unlike Díaz, who whitened his skin, Urrutia did not deny his heritage, and he imparted this lesson to his children. They could be descendants of the Aztecs, enjoy European culture, and legitimately participate in Mexican and U.S. society in spite of the racism they encountered. Three miles from the Alamo, which represented Anglo dominance over Mexicans, Miraflores stood as a fifteen-acre monument to Mexico and heterogeneous Mexican identity.

Spanish, other European, and indigenous symbols converged in Miraflores, but Urrutia also acknowledged the Islamic influence on Mexican culture. According to one author, the Quinta Urrutia, the family’s house, “was organized around a rectangular courtyard, off of which high-ceilinged rooms opened…tall narrow windows lined the exterior and interior facades and were framed by alternating red and white voussoirs, an unmistakable reference to the arches of the Great Mosque of Córdoba.” The Quinta Urrutia exemplified “neo-Islamic” art in Mexico, which “affirmed Mexico’s special cultural status by implicitly celebrating sixteenth-century Mexican history.” Treviño, the architect of Miraflores and the Quinta Urrutia, “referenced the complex legacy of early Islamic design in colonial Mexico” and “the distinctive character of Spain and…what was unique about Mexico.”

670 Miraflores was not open to the public, but passersby could still glimpse at the various statues and the gates at the entrance to the property.

671 Ibid., 20. The most highly recognized piece of “neo-Islamic” art is the “Moorish Kiosk,” designed by José Ramón Ibarrola in 1884. The building served as the Mexican pavilion in the world’s fairs in 1886 and 1902, and is currently located in the Santa María de la Ribera neighborhood in Mexico City.
of neo-Islamic art appropriated the elements of this culture that “civilized” Spain and eventually Mexico, marking Moorish identity as desirable during a period of widespread xenophobia and violence against “oriental” groups. This is similar to the approach taken by the científicos at the world’s fairs, where they emphasized their connections with the “civilized” Aztecs, even though indigenous groups were marginalized across Mexico.

At the same time, the Quinta Urrutia and Miraflores, when considered as a whole, reflect an understanding of Mexican identity that La Revolución claimed as its own years later. The art located on the property represented a vision of mexicanidad that went beyond the indigenous/European paradigm. López argues that La Raza Cósmica “celebrated mestizaje as the wave of the future, with Mexico at the vanguard.” Urrutia (who commissioned Miraflores in 1917) defined “Mexican” as Indian, European, African, and Arab almost a decade before Vasconcelos published his seminal text in 1925. The Quinta Urrutia and Miraflores publicly showcased the cosmic Mexican race.

Today, passersby can still glimpse the major sculptures and the gates of Miraflores. Although the elaborate buildings commissioned by the surgeon are no longer a significant part of the landscape, people continue to recall the eccentric man with a taste for spectacle. Urrutia’s flamboyance displayed his sense of humor regarding his reputation. Many of his peers took their tarnished reputations seriously, and they worked to ensure that they were remembered for their patriotic contributions to Mexican society. Urrutia enjoyed being known for making dramatic entrances and wearing a cape, and he never revealed the “truth” about the deaths of Domínguez and Funston in order to keep people guessing and likely believing that he was a villain.

672 Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp, So Far from Allah, So Close to Mexico: Middle Eastern Immigrants in Modern Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 79. The worst violence was directed at Chinese and Middle Eastern groups in Chihuahua between 1917 and 1920.

673 López, 134.
Almost a century after his tenure as Minister of the Interior, people still remember the “mysterious” Dr. Urrutia, and the myths related to him remain in the popular consciousness. In 2009, for example, Mexican playwright David Olguín wrote and directed *La Lengua de los Muertos* (the Tongue of the Dead), a story centered on a confrontation between Urrutia and Domínguez. Olguín focuses on the “myth” of Domínguez’s tongue to demonstrate “two different [political] visions” for Mexico that were patriotic in very different ways. The play also serves as a commentary about how myths can be more powerful than “historical truth.”

North of the U.S./Mexico border, Lionel and Kathy Sosa produced a documentary in 2010 entitled *The Children of the Revolución*. This series traces the stories of immigrants who fled to San Antonio during the revolution. In a short segment on Urrutia, Lionel asks “was Urrutia a miracle worker or a war criminal? It depends on who you talk to.”

Like Gamboa and García Naranjo, Urrutia placed great importance on the ways in which others perceived him. He expressed his identity much differently than his peers, however, demonstrating that not all Porfiristas sought historical rectification. Moreover, a case study of Urrutia shows that historical memory can also be an ongoing public process influenced by cultural myths.

**The Legacy of Porfirismo in the United States**

Although President Obregón granted amnesty to the exiles in the early 1920s, some chose to stay in the United States. In San Antonio, Lozano, Urrutia, González, his brother Joaquín González Cigarroa, and their peers were known as the *ricos*, who Richard A. García describes as politically “conservative…politicians, generals, businesspeople, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and government officials.” The community expanded in the 1920s as the supporters of the Cristero War fled Mexico.

---


675 Sosa.
and by 1930, San Antonio’s ricos numbered at least 25,000. García argues that Lozano acted as the group’s de facto leader, and through La Prensa and La Opinión, he and other ricos promoted their Porfirista ideology to the U.S. Mexican community for generations. However, Lozano was not the only Porfirista to make a lasting impact north of the U.S./Mexico border. The Urrutia and Cigarroa families remain active in the medical field, the Cigarroas have also worked to improve the education system in the border region, and the González family has had a family member in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1961. Porfiristas in the U.S. dealt with a different set of issues compared with their counterparts in Mexico, particularly acculturation, assimilation, and racism. However, they considered themselves the gente decente of the ethnic Mexican communities in the United States, and they continued to uphold and promote their Porfirista ideals as they had in the 1910s.

Roberto Treviño argues that as the children of Mexican immigrants came of age in Texas in the 1920s, the process of “biculutration” took place, a “cultural synthesis” where Tejanos dealt with “the intellectual and social dilemma of being not quite American, yet not quite Mexican.” The Spanish language became the most important point of contention between ‘real’ Mexicans and pochos, Americanized Mexican Americans. La Prensa promoted Spanish-language literature throughout the 1910s, but it also began publishing children’s stories and comics in the 1920s in an effort to appeal to children while encouraging parents to teach their children to speak and read in Spanish. Vasconcelos applauded Lozano and his staff for this effort, stating that “La Prensa acted in a manner that was ‘pro-homeland and pro-race.’” He added that a “people that loses its tongue is a people that loses its spiritual

---

676 Richard A. García, 221-222.

quality…The Mexican will continue to be Mexican as long as he speaks Spanish…In these conditions, LA PRENSA [played] an enormous role in preserving the spirit of the race” in the United States.678 Language had “different class and racial implications” in Texas.679 For Porfiristas, speaking proper Spanish was a sign of being educated. This implied having the economic means to receive a formal education, which was a privilege attributed to the largely white upper class. García Naranjo, who spent his early years in Encinal, Texas, recalled his first day in the “North American” school at age seven in 1890. He “instantly realized the hatred with which his [Anglo] schoolmates treated” the Mexican children, but he and his sisters were not discriminated against “because their skin was white,” and because Julia had grey/green eyes and Nemesio and Aurora had blue eyes. Moreover, their mother “paid special attention” to dressing her children well and ensuring their cleanliness. “In these circumstances, the little Americans insisted on telling [them] that they could not possibly be Mexican,” so the García Naranjo children spoke Spanish to prove that they were.680 García Naranjo learned at an early age that the Spanish language was highly politicized in Texas. Retaining the native language became a way for him and his sisters to assert their cultural identity in schools that punished students for being Mexican. However, García Naranjo understood his position of privilege. He had full access to education and bilingualism because he was protected by his skin color, whereas darker-skin children might refuse to speak Spanish in order to avoid mistreatment by their peers. Other light-skinned Porfiristas in Mexico had a similar privilege (though as Urrutia demonstrated, money could help a person move beyond these racial barriers), and the most prominent were fluent in multiple languages, particularly English and French. This helped them to fully participate in the modern world, attain better jobs, interact with foreign diplomats, enjoy European operas and plays, and read literature in multiple

678 “‘La Prensa’ Avanzada del Patriotismo,” La Prensa, Feb. 13, 1923.
679 Treviño, 458.
680 García Naranjo, 1: 159.
languages. Porfiristas in the United States wanted their children and the broader ethnic Mexican community to enjoy social mobility through bilingualism, and *La Prensa* and *La Opinión* became instruments for promoting this ideal.

In 1927, *La Opinión* blamed parents for failing to understand “how important it [was] to inculcate patriotic spirit among Mexican children who [were] born” in the United States or immigrated “when they [were] very small.” This statement implied that parents who did not teach their children to be Mexican were ignorant, unlike the cultured *gente decente*. Despite their efforts, Porfiristas fought a losing battle, and the younger generations of Mexican Americans became less interested in the native language of their parents and grandparents. From the 1930s to the 1950s, the leaders of the “Mexican American Generation” embarked on a “quest for equal status in the United States,” and “aspired to integrate themselves more fully into mainstream American society.” Mexico was not their home, and *La Prensa* did not speak on their behalf.

The newspaper declined in the 1940s and 1950s as the immigrant population in San Antonio dwindled. Lozano died in 1953 and Alicia Lozano sold *La Prensa* in 1957. *La Opinión*, however, remained successful because of a stronger immigrant presence in Los Angeles. Ignacio Lozano Jr. took control of *La Opinión*, and his daughter Mónica Lozano currently acts as publisher and CEO. In a testament to its continuing popularity, *La Opinión* is still the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in the United States. It also continues to pay special attention to issues related to Mexicans in the United States. For example, *La Opinión* devoted extensive coverage to the Mexican presidential elections of 2012. *La Opinión* and the Lozano family carry on the work of Ignacio Lozano Sr., who founded *La Prensa* a century ago to serve Mexicans in the United States.

681 *La Opinión*, Jul. 31, 1927.

Although Porfiristas encouraged fluency in Spanish and a love for the homeland with mixed results after the 1920s, they successfully imparted these values within their families. Even after three or four generations of living in the United States, the Spanish language remains important for cultural and family identity.  

Dr. Francisco Cigarroa, grandson of Joaquín González Cigarroa Sr., recalled a tradition in which the paternal side of his family would gather on Sundays for a *comida*, or meal. He stated that “my paternal grandparents, [I] used to call them *abuelita* and *abuelito*…my father, his brother Leonides [González], and his sister Rebecca…all the families would get together with their spouses and all their children.”  

Cigarroa and the other small children would listen to the adult conversations (in Spanish) and learn about the history of their family’s possible ties to the Díaz administration. He added that in listening to his older relatives speak, he could tell that “there was obviously this love of Mexico and yearning” which “probably…resulted in [the younger generation] really valuing the Mexican traditions.”  

Bud Urrutia shared a similar story about his family gathering for Sunday lunch every week at the Quinta Urrutia. Bud described his grandfather’s “ability to speak continuously in a very charming way,” and the family listened to Aureliano discuss a broad range of topics in Spanish, from “Freud and *Mein Kampf*, and bullfighting” to “ballet, and opera.”  

These family gatherings were significant, for both Cigarroa and Urrutia, as moments in which they learned about their history and culture in a Mexican family setting.

Catholicism played an important role in these family dynamics as well. Francisco recalls that his grandparents were active in the Catholic Church. Joaquín Jr. states that he and two of his sons are bilingual, fluent in both English and Spanish.

---

683 All of the descendants that I spoke with throughout the research process are bilingual, fluent in both English and Spanish.

684 Francisco Cigarroa, Interview by author. Digital recording. Austin, Tx., Jul. 19, 2011. Dr. Joaquín González Cigarroa and Josefina González de la Vega were part of the first generation from the family to migrate to San Antonio. At the time, Joaquín did not go by the last name “Cigarroa.” However, there was another Dr. González in San Antonio who “wasn’t a very good doctor.” Josefina felt that he was “blurring her husband’s” reputation, so she convinced Joaquin to take on her last name “Cigarroa.” From that point forward, the family had the last name González Cigarroa. This distinguishes Leonides González (Joaquín Sr.’s brother and manager for *La Prensa*) from Leonides González Cigarroa (Joaquín Sr.’s son).

685 Ibid.

686 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011.
currently members of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre in the diocese of Laredo; his wife Bárbara (who passed away in 2008) was a Lady of the Sepulchre, Grand Cross. This group is a “Papal Order reserved solely for practicing Roman Catholics who are active in their parish, in their diocese and in their community,” and one of the primary goals of the Order is to spread the Catholic faith in the Holy Land. For Joaquín Jr. and Bárbara Cigarroa service in the church became an extension of their civic activism in Laredo.

Aureliano Urrutia also took his Catholic faith very seriously. Bud recalls that all of Aureliano’s eleven children eloped, which their father sternly disapproved of because he believed that they should be married through the church. Aureliano solved this problem in the early 1930s, when he gathered all of his children and their spouses and took them to San Fernando Cathedral to be married all at once. Although moments like these revealed the quality of “strict disciplinarian” in Urrutia, there were other instances in which he showed a much softer side. For example, on Christmas Eve 1948, Urrutia wrote a letter to his children in which he reflected upon the meaning of Christmas. He stated “‘Peace and Goodwill to all people on earth.’ Wise people can not grasp this phenomenon, but simple people with great spirits do. Our family is blessed to experience this every Christmas Eve, and in this, the year of the Lord 1948, I give you my blessing.”

These stories about Catholicism demonstrate the ways in which men took charge or participated alongside their wives in religious activities, which were generally considered part of the feminine realm in this patriarchal society. Gender roles were also blurred as Porfiristas taught their children and grandchildren the importance of education, particularly in the sciences. Joaquín Cigarroa Sr., a surgeon, and his wife Josefina González de la Vega, a pharmacist, emphasized “how important education was,


688 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011.

and…they were very, very focused on making sure that their three children (Joaquín Jr., Leonides, and Rebecca) received a higher education degree.” Francisco recalled that during Sunday meals in the 1960s, his grandmother would give him and the other children one dollar each. She would then take the money back and tell them that she would save it for their college education. They were well aware of Josefina’s expectation that they “would do well in school…and go to college.” According to Francisco, “all twenty-three grandchildren got a higher education degree; many became doctors and lawyers.” This anecdote is telling because Francisco remembers his grandmother setting aside money for his college education. All of the women in the family were expected to earn degrees in higher education, and it was acceptable for them to study the sciences. Francisco stated that he did not “remember anybody from that generation…formally discussing higher [education] in such a disciplined way” as his grandmother did.690

This represented a stark contrast from the days of the Porfiriato, where women were generally only allowed to study ‘sentimental’ subjects such as literature and the arts. However, it falls in line with the changing ideas of Porfirista women. In 1924, La Prensa’s Ladies’ Page came under the direction of Mexican journalist Beatriz Blanco, and it depicted ideals about Porfirista femininity, including domesticity, Catholic piety, and a respect for patriarchy. However, as the decade progressed, the Ladies’ Page embraced attributes of the “modern woman,” including an increasing presence in the public sphere and women’s progress through education. Porfirista women were still called to serve the homeland by raising educated and cultured Catholic children who spoke Spanish and loved Mexico. However, in supporting all of their children and grandchildren Josefina González de la Vega and Joaquín Cigarroa Sr. practiced their belief that women and men should have an equal opportunity at education and choosing a career.

690 Francisco Cigarroa, interview.
Aureliano Urrutia also supported his sons and daughters, though he geared them all towards a medical profession. Regardless of any controversies and his public persona, Urrutia served his community as a dedicated physician. He practiced at Christus-Santa Rosa, a Catholic hospital, and in 1917, he became the first in the world to successfully separate Siamese twins. Urrutia charged his patients low rates and at times offered free services, while supplementing his income with profits from his drugstore. He understood the importance and necessity of affordable medical care for the Mexican community in San Antonio, especially for immigrants with low incomes, and he felt that he could promote public health as he had during the Huerta regime. According to Bud, Aureliano “wanted everybody to be a doctor.” Of Aureliano’s eleven children with Luz Fernández, three sons became doctors, one was a dentist, and one of the daughters worked as a pharmacist and took charge of the family pharmacy. Bud is part of the third generation of Urrutia surgeons, and he states that Aureliano’s zeal for having physicians in the family extended beyond his immediate kin. Bud recalled having “some cousins that were not Urrutia’s, [and Aureliano] changed their name to Urrutia and sent them to medical school.”

The children and grandchildren of Porfiristas had the opportunity to attend prestigious universities such as Harvard, Tulane, and Notre Dame, but they were still aware of the discrimination present in the public education system in Texas. According to Joaquín Cigarroa Jr., “the border was ignored by the state of Texas for many years as far as higher education is concerned. [Administrators] were of the belief that we should have junior colleges, but not four-year universities.” As a member of the Coordinating Board of Texas Colleges and Universities, Cigarroa served as a principal witness in a lawsuit against the University of Texas in the 1960s. He stated that “they had allocated 200 million

---

691 Urrutia married Catalina Tazzer in San Antonio in 1923, two years after Luz’s death. The couple had four children but divorced soon after. Catalina then permanently moved with her children to Guadalajara, and they had minimal contact with Aureliano. In total, Urrutia married four times.

692 Urrutia, interview, Jul. 27, 2011.
dollars over a ten year period to higher education in the state of Texas; the border was to get $200,000 [and] no universities…fortunately, we won, and through a border coalition extending from El Paso to Matamoros…universities have developed…including Texas A&M International University in Laredo.”

Three decades later, Cigarroa continued to speak out against racist views of minorities. In a meeting of the Coordinating Board of Higher Education in October 1997, he “issued a public statement…taking exception to recent comments by…University of Texas law professor [Dr. Lino Graglia] about blacks and Hispanics. Cigarroa stated

Some of us have been taught not to respond to ignorance. I, however, cannot be silent in its face. As a young boy growing up in San Antonio, I was taunted by my classmates because my parents were Mexican. My father signed me up for boxing classes so that I could defend myself. He said, "never start a fight, but if someone starts one with you, then fight the fight." All of my life I have followed his counsel. I fight not with my fists, though, but with my education and through the positions, like member of the Coordinating Board of Higher Education, which I hold. So when Professor Graglia says, “Blacks and Mexican-Americans are not academically competitive with whites in selective institutions,” and when he says “they belong to a culture that seems not to encourage achievement,” he has personally affronted me; he has affronted our ethnicity, our races, our identities as Texans. I will not stand passively aside.

The Cigarroa family remains active in public education in various capacities, and though Joaquín Jr. is not longer on the Coordinating Board of Higher Education, his son Francisco is currently the Chancellor of the University of Texas System.

The González family, the cousins of the Cigarroas, have also left a lasting legacy of political activism. Enrique Barbosa Prince de González, also known as “Henry B.,” followed the footsteps of his father Leonides, the former mayor of Mapimí. He became the first Mexican American elected to the San Antonio City Council (1953) and he was elected to the State Senate in 1956. Henry B. became famous for participating in the longest filibuster at the time in the Texas State Legislature. He and Abraham Kazen carried out the thirty-six hour ordeal to keep Texas lawmakers from implementing bills

---

693 Joaquín Cigarroa, interview.

that would overturn *Brown vs. Board of Education*. In 1961, Henry B. became the first Mexican American from Texas elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he worked closely with his friend Lyndon B. Johnson on measures such as the Civil Rights Act. One photo from the period shows Henry B. with his father Leonides, standing together with Johnson and John F. Kennedy.\(^\text{695}\) This image, taken in 1963, captures a moment in which leadership passed from one generation to the next. Henry B. continued the trend, and when he retired from politics in 1998, his son Charles was elected to his seat in the House of Representatives.

These are only a few of the more well-known stories about the descendants of the Porfirista exiles, and there are many more to be research and told. Scholars, film producers, artists, museum directors, and the descendants themselves are engaging in a widespread effort to document the history of this group in the United States. The commemorations of the centennial of the Mexican Revolution were a step in that direction, but they revealed the complex politics of representation still present on a local and broader transnational level.

As the Mexican government in Mexico City organized tributes to the official heroes of *La Revolución*, San Antonio commemorated its own heroes. When the Museo Alameda inaugurated “Revolution & Renaissance: Mexico and San Antonio 1910–2010,” it was fitting that the organizers reunited the families of Lozano and his “alter ego” González.\(^\text{696}\) These Porfiristas and their peers were honored for their service to the Mexican and Mexican American communities, and for upholding the spirit of the homeland in the face of struggle. In contrast, the Urrutia family continues to deal with Aureliano’s reputation as a murderer in spite of his contributions to medicine and public health. There were no tributes to Urrutia in San Antonio in 2010, and the family was not represented among the guests of honor at the inauguration of the Museo Alameda’s exhibit. Furthermore, *The Children of La*


\(^{696}\) García Naranjo, 9: 163-164. Lozano described González as his “otro yo,” or alter ego.
Revolución includes interviews with Charles González and other prominent San Antonio leaders such as former mayor Henry Cisneros and poet Rose Catacalos. The participants shared the stories of their parents and grandparents and the obstacles they overcame as they settled in the United States. Although the series features a two-minute segment on Urrutia’s capacity to silence his victims, Bud Urrutia (who has extensively researched his family’s history) was not invited to participate. One-hundred years after the Mexican Revolution, the politics of representation continue to determine the heroes and villains within the narrative.

---

697 Sosa.
Conclusion

On November 20, 2010, Mexico City officials re-inaugurated the Monument to the Revolution after extensive renovations. This ceremony honored the heroes of the revolution on the centennial of Madero’s call to arms against Porfirio Díaz. That same day, across the street from the monument, Don Porfirio Caffe opened to the public. Patrons can see images of the elderly, stoic Díaz at the entrance to the café, on an interior wall, and on advertisements and menus. Customers familiar with the history of the Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution might find the position of these two buildings ironic. The monument is located on the Plaza of the Republic, where Díaz commissioned a grandiose Legislative Palace during the late Porfiriato, setting the first stone in September 1910. The original structure (never completed) was incorporated into the Monument to the Revolution, and what was supposed to be another architectural triumph of the Díaz regime became a tribute to his overthrow. However, Don Porfirio Caffe, also located on the Plaza of the Republic, serves as a defiant testament to Díaz’s enduring presence in the capital.

Today, remnants of the Porfiriato remain scattered across Mexico City’s urban landscape. Many buildings and public spaces crafted during the Díaz regime have been appropriated and renovated by the revolutionary government. For example, Lecumberri prison, where Madero and Pino Suárez were assassinated, now houses the national archives.\footnote{Lecumberri prison was inaugurated in 1900 and 1899, respectively.} The Moorish Kiosk, the Mexican pavilion at the 1886 and 1902 World’s Fairs, is now in the central plaza of the Santa María la Ribera neighborhood, a colonia that also features homes from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In 1904, Díaz laid the first stone in what would become the Palace of Fine Arts (Palacio de Bellas Artes), located near the monument to Benito Juárez in the Central Alameda, which was inaugurated in September 1910. Chapultepec Castle, the presidential residence during the nineteenth century, was converted into the National Museum of History in 1939. It exhibits memorabilia from the Porfiriato, including personal
belongings of Díaz and his wife Carmen. From the top of the castle, visitors can see the most famous public project of the Porfiriato—Reforma Boulevard.

Remnants of Porfirismo can also still be found in the United States. *La Opinión*, the Los Angeles newspaper that circulates daily across the United States, began as a Porfirista publication. San Antonio residents and visitors can still see the remnants of Miraflores, and in El Paso, drivers will see the Porfirio Díaz exit along Interstate-10. Porfirio Díaz Street, located within a short distance from the U.S./Mexico border, was named to commemorate the general’s meeting with President Howard Taft in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez in 1909.

These public spaces continue to reflect the tension between the Porfiriato and the revolution, memory, and official history in both Mexico and the United States. The revolution thrust Mexicans into an ambiguous position where they had to negotiate their identities in the midst of national and global violence and chaos. Porfiristas believed that the revolution represented “the most dreadful and unfruitful of all wars,” a civil conflict that disrupted Mexico’s peace and modernization.699 The revolutionaries, in turn, projected themselves as champions of democracy against the tyrannical Díaz and Huerta regimes, and they exiled the Porfiristas for betraying the liberal principles of freedom and democracy. Despite these differences, the values of the Porfiristas and the revolutionaries sometimes coincided (as demonstrated in the similarities between the 1857 and 1917 constitutions).

Every faction believed that its agenda was the best for ruling Mexico. This study does not seek to answer whether the Porfiristas were right or wrong for supporting Díaz and Huerta. Instead, I attempt to explain their complex reasons for doing so, analyzing their perceptions as the events between 1910 and 1920 unfolded, and also in hindsight. For Porfiristas, “Mexican” and Díaz were one and the same, and they believed that the successes of the dictatorship far outweighed any of the problems that had arisen in Mexico by 1910. This was not the popular view, but in demonstrating how one group

interpreted nationalism, liberalism, and Juárez’s legacy from 1910 to 1920, it had a sort of validity within the Mexican context. The exiles were most offended by the accusation that they were unpatriotic traitors, and they attempted to prove that they had an “intransigent Mexican spirit, Mexican without reservations...Mexican in the face of possible catastrophe.”

This study broadens the scholarship on the Mexican Revolution by recounting this history from the perspective of exiled members of the Huerta regime. Identity formation is the central theme of this work and it complicates the narrative on mexicanidad developed by the revolutionaries and explored by previous scholars. It also contributes to the historiography produced by Cano, Piccato, and others on media and identity during the Porfiriato, while expanding this analysis to include Porfirista media during the revolution. Porfiristas believed that it was their patriotic duty to sustain the cultural status quo of the Porfiriato, and their identity served as an important coping mechanism as they struggled with the global changes of the 1910s.

Furthermore, this project casts exile as an important part of the Mexican experience during the revolution. Scholars have examined the political and cultural impact of the U.S./Mexico border on the revolution, but this study builds on the work of historians, including Katz and Ramírez Rancaño, who have expanded the transnational analysis to include Europe and Cuba. I bridge the themes of identity and exile in order to trace the changes in the Porfirista community as it moved across political, temporal, and racial borders. Most of the work on the exiled Porfiristas focuses on their activities in the United States, and scholars, activists, and artists have undertaken the effort to recover and preserve this history. However, there is much left to be done in the United States, as well as in Havana and Mexico. I focus


701 Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History; López, Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution.


703 Katz, The Secret War in Mexico; Ramírez Rancaño, La Reacción Mexicana.
primarily on exile activity in San Antonio, and Macías-González has examined the Porfirista community in El Paso. However, there were also exiles in New York, New Orleans, and Los Angeles, and there is little scholarship on the activities of Díaz and Huerta supporters in those cities. There is also a need to examine the role of Havana as a center for exile activity in the 1910s. I argue that the exiles in the United States had a different experience than their compatriots in Havana because they faced Anglo discrimination. Though it was not clear in the memoirs of Gamboa and Moheno what these might have been, the exiles in Havana surely dealt with their own set of circumstances as a result of living in Cuba. It is necessary to explore this topic from both a political and cultural perspective for a better understanding of the transnational scope of the Mexican Revolution.

There is also a need to further examine Porfiristas in Mexico during the 1910s. This project deals with urban professionals, but a closer analysis of class might reveal tensions not only between this group and the aristocracy, but also between it and lower-class Porfiristas. Also, a comparative regional analysis of Porfirismo would complicate our understanding of the revolution. For example, members of the González family remained in Mapimí during and after the revolution, and members of the Naranjo family remained in the state of Nuevo León. What implications did this have for these families and for these regions? How did this compare to areas such as Oaxaca, where popular Porfirismo was strong and Félix Díaz maintained a great deal of support? More importantly, what has been the legacy of Porfirismo in Mexico, and how does it compare to the United States?

The issues of gender and religion also warrant greater attention from future scholars. Historians such as Kristina A. Boylan and Patience A. Schell have examined the activism of conservative women in early twentieth-century Mexico, and their participation in organizations such as the Association of Catholic Ladies (ADC), Union of Mexican Catholic Ladies (UDCM) and the Mexican Catholic
Feminine Union (UFCM). However, most of this scholarship focuses on the 1920s, particularly during the Cristero War of 1926-1929. There is also a growing historiography on conservative women in the United States, specifically in Texas. Juanita Luna Lawhn has studied the Pan American Roundtable, a charity group established in San Antonio in 1916, and the increasing participation of upper-class Mexican women in this organization in 1919. I have also examined women’s contributions to *La Prensa* during the 1910s and 1920s.

Records related to the ADC, UDCM, UFCM, and Pan American Roundtable are important in analyzing the relationship between Porfirista femininity and Catholicism in Mexico during the revolution. Catholic Church records and oral histories from the descendants of Porfiristas might be especially useful in documenting the experiences of women in the Porfirista community before 1920. Church documents would also be useful in a more thorough analysis of the role of exiled clergy in the counter-revolutionary efforts. These various primary sources would help to gauge the role of Catholicism in the public and private lives of Porfirista women and men.

In the 1910s, Porfiristas lost their hero and their homeland to a revolution that destroyed the Mexico they idealized. This group experienced various forms of displacement, but reverence for Don Porfirio inspired them to fight for the national identity he created. After 1920, Porfiristas had to find their place in a much different world than the one they celebrated ten years before. Regardless of their struggles, Porfiristas worked to sustain their vision for Mexico during their tenure in the Mexican government as well as in exile. The Porfirista experience offers important insight into the process of identity formation on individual, national, and transnational levels during a decade of extreme global turmoil and change.

---


290
Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Manuscript and Archival Collections

Archivo del Primer Jefe del Ejército Constitucionalista Venustiano Carranza. Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO, Mexico City.

Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City.


Hemeroteca Nacional de México. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City.

Henry B. González Papers, 1946-1998. The Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.

Manuscritos De Francisco León De La Barra. Centro De Estudios De Historia De México CARSO, Mexico City.

Manuscritos Del General Félix Díaz. Centro De Estudios De Historia De México CARSO, Mexico City.


Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.

Special Collections and Archives. Elizabeth Huth Coates Library, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas.

Special Collections. Institute of Texan Cultures, University of Texas at San Antonio Libraries, San Antonio, Texas.

Magazines and Newspapers

*El Dictamen* (Veracruz, Mexico), 1914.

*El Imparcial* (Mexico City), 1910-1914.

*El Universal* (Mexico City), 1919, 2008.

*Excélsior* (Mexico City), 1926.

291
*Holiday Magazine*, 1948.

*La Jornada* (Mexico City), 2009.

*La Patria* (Mexico City), 1910-1914.

*La Prensa* (San Antonio, Texas), 1913-1920.


*San Antonio Express News* (San Antonio, Texas), 1972.


*Violetas del Anáhuac* (Mexico City), 1887-1888.

**Oral History Interviews**

Cigarroa, Francisco. Interview by author, 19 July 2011, Austin, Texas. Digital recording.


**Documentaries**


**Dissertations, Theses, and Papers**


PUBLISHED MATERIALS

Directories


Memoirs


José Yves Limantour. Apuntes Sobre Mi Vida Pública.
http://www.antorcha.net/biblioteca_virtual/historia/limantour/indice.html


______. Sobre el Ara Sangrienta. México: Editoriales Andrés Botas e Hijo, 1922.


Books


Articles


Vita

Nancy A. Aguirre earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from the University of Texas of the Permian Basin in 2005, and a Master of Arts degree in Latin American Studies in 2007 from the University of Chicago. She has taught at the University of Texas of the Permian Basin and the University of Texas at El Paso. While pursuing her doctoral degree, Aguirre presented her research at various scholarly meetings. She spoke at the XIII Reunión de Historiadores MEXEUACAN, the Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage Conference, the Humanities Education and Research Association Meeting, and the Phi Alpha Theta Conference.

Permanent address: 200 N. Festival Dr.
El Paso, TX  79912

This thesis/dissertation was typed by Nancy A. Aguirre.