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Rents, Loyalty, and the Economy: How an Unstable Economy Plays a Role in the Occurrence of Coups d'état

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RENTS, LOYALTY, AND THE ECONOMY: HOW AN UNSTABLE
ECONOMY PLAYS A ROLE IN THE OCCURRENCE
OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

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Dedication

To Lieutenant Colonel Philip Sheridan, for without whom I would not have found the passion for Political Science and the desire to pursue my career in academia.

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ROLE IN THE OCCURRENCE
OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

by

ALEXANDRA ELIZABETH INFANZON, B.A.

THESIS

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Abstract

This thesis examines why coups d'état still occur, regardless of institution type, in some states but not others. Building off Wintrobe's and Hiroi and Omori's observations, an elite theory is presented that attributes the success of avoiding coups lies in both the stability of economic growth and a system of internal incentives that create a direct link between the government and the people. Without either present, the elite in government are not constrained from engaging in undemocratic behavior and usurping power, ultimately resulting in coups. Using a zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression, indicators of economic stability and internal loyalty systems are quantitatively analyzed with the occurrence of coups in several states during the period between 1946 and 2008. These findings may provide a new perspective on the dynamics and triggers of coups d'état.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The importance of studying the internal forces that can set the stage for a coup d'état has recently been a rapidly growing area of study. In this study, a coup d'état only refers to moments in time in which a country's ruling or political elites engage in a forceful seizure of executive power (Marshall and Marshall, 2013). Extant research on political institutions constantly questions whether certain institutional constructs can lead to an ineffective government, an angry population, and a future of unconstitutional intervention by the elites. Understanding these possible weaknesses in the system allows for states to adapt and curtail such disruptive events, especially when dealing with the threat of a potential coup. Building off the studies of Wintrobe's (2012) and Hiroi and Omori's (2013), I conclude that there are two important relationships that must be balanced in order to avoid coups: a direct relationship between the government and its people through a system of loyalty and the importance of stable economic growth.

Some states appear more susceptible to coups d'état whereas others appear to be insulated from such events. Comparativists often look at the relevance institutions may play in the occurrence of coups. Since the Second World War, democratization has come in waves in the international system, according to Huntington (1991). Churchill's explanation on the preference for democracy, as the lesser of all evils, appears to have been matched by the number of states that have undergone institutional change from non-democracies to democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century (Churchill and James, 1980). This movement away from less developed to highly evolved political institutions may not be as simple as writing a constitution and mobilizing people to vote; a democratic government may not necessarily be 'coup proofed' just by creating structures within the government that appear democratic. The idea that democracy circumvents the issue of un-democratic regime change through the establishment of electoral systems seems to have become a fallacy of those who choose to believe that democracy is the 'cure-all' for every state. Despite the desirability of democratic institutions, Huntington

(1991) notes these waves of democratization are often followed by ebbs of states failing to maintain democracy. Regardless of any wave of democratization, even the one towards the end of the twentieth century, coups d'état still occur; as recently as the twenty-first century within states that have only just started to be considered a democracy, such as Venezuela (1992, 2002), Thailand (2013), and Iraq (2010). Thus, there must be more involved in such occurrences than a state's classification of democracy or non-democracy; the question then becomes why are coups d'état still considered a viable political tactic?

The topic of a state's prior history with prior coups is often brought up in the research involving coups d'état in newly democratic states. The idea that a political practice from the previous institution (authoritarian) could potentially carry over into the new institution (democracy) is predictable, especially when that practice is deemed more effective by the people of that state. In the minds of those who wish to achieve certain policy agendas, the choice to resort to a coup d'état seems optimal because of its perceived effectiveness, if the system appears to be either impeding or slowing down their political agenda. However, the historical argument is limiting in that it does not explain why only some democracies experience issues with coups while others do not. The research question then becomes not why coups occur in democracies but why coups occur only in certain states.

If simply applying democratic processes within the state does not solve the problem, what other forces are more effective at keeping the undemocratic forces at bay? Wintrobe (2012) attributes the unique relationship between the leader, the masses and economic growth with explaining why coups occur in some authoritarian regimes but not others. While economic growth is an important area of study to consider, this thesis focuses instead on the concept of economic stability, which is by definition distinctly different. Unlike economic growth, which focuses more on the sign change between each given year, economic stability is more focused on the shifts in the growth rate of the economy. The instabilities within the market could ultimately provide an opportune moment for elites to engage in undemocratic behavior in those democratic states dealing with the occurrence of coups.

In order to understand the dynamics of these relationships, let us consider Venezuela as an enlightening case. Venezuela viewed itself as one of the pinnacles of democracy in Latin America during the twentieth century, due to their development of long-standing democratic institutions and successful oil industry (McCoy, 1999; Parker 2006). However, this may not have been the case, as they have been plagued with coups throughout most of the twentieth century. Some might attribute Venezuela's choice of a presidential system as responsible for explaining the susceptibility, as presidential systems are often cited as short-lived and highly unstable (Linz, 1990; Przeworski et al., 1996). Others would make the argument that having a history of bouncing back and forth between a functioning democracy and periods of autocratic rule may better explain the occurrence of coups in Venezuela. However, both arguments appear to give too much credit to the institutions and not enough to the incentives the elites may have to engage. Thus, when looking from the perspective of how the internal relationship between the government and the masses works and the economy itself, the answer may become clearer as to why coups d'état happen in the first place.

Venezuela's experience with democracy appears to be marked with small intervals of time where the system was more autocratic than democratic. However, after the removal of the Marcos Pérez Jiménez and his military junta in January of 1958 through mass protest and, ultimately, the help of the military, Venezuela entered into a 'stable' two-party system. By 'stable', I mean that there was a consistent switch between the two major parties, the center-left Acción Democrática (AD) and the center-right Social Christian Party (COPEI), directly attributed to a pact made upon the removal of Pérez known as the pact of Punto Fijo (McCoy 1999; Blake, 2008). This pact, signed by the AD, COPEI and a third major party, the Democratic Republican Union (URD), required that each party would willingly accept the outcome of the national elections and work together to support a minimum winning coalition in the legislature (Blake, 2008). Thus, from the period of 1958 to 1998, Venezuela did seem to exemplify democracy at its finest unlike the rest of its counterparts in Latin America (McCoy, 1999).

This period of democracy remained dominated by two major parties, the AD and COPEI, that chose to heavily tie the country to the oil industry and its success (McCoy, 1999; Parker, 2005; Blake, 2008). Despite their success, like most other oil producers across the world, the recession of the 1980s affected the industry greatly. Prior to this, the Venezuelan government had nationalized the oil industry and was taxing it heavily, since this sector had been growing at a rapid rate (Blake, 2008). At the expense of the decision to nationalize the industry, most other economic sectors began to stagnate, therefore increasing the levels of inequality and impoverishment within the country. The final blow came in the 1990s when the president of the Board of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Luis Giusti, proposed a plan to increase production that would essentially flood the markets with oil, which runs counter to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) goal of maintaining stable oil prices through the limiting production (Parker, 2005). During the times of stable economic growth, Venezuela was able to function as a democracy with little to no internal disruptions at the hands of the masses or the elites. However, this changed towards the latter half of this period of two-party domination when the oil industry became unstable in the 1980s and 1990s.

Venezuela has faced multiple coups d'état from various types of elite factions; however, the ones examined here are those that occurred after the Pérez dictatorship of the 1950s - the military coups in 1992 and the one at the hands of the elites in 2002. As previously mentioned, the oil industry was not that same as it was before the recession of the 1980s, where it was growing at an annual rate of six percent at its height of growth (Blake, 2008). Due to the increase in the poverty gap and radical institutional changes proposed by President Carlos Andrés Pérez, many of the masses were no longer supporters of the two major parties that had become 'responsible' for the problems in Venezuela. On February 4th, 1992, Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez Frias, with the help of other army officers, attempted and failed at leading a coup d'état against Pérez that was popularly supported by the people of Venezuela. Although unsuccessful, the coup did manage to encourage more civic unrest amongst the masses and further encouraged a subsequent coup on November 27, 1992 that was also unsuccessful. However, the second coup

attempt was much more violent than the first, resulting in being less popular among the masses (McCoy, 1999). Faced with political unrest and an unraveling economy, a surprising change came in the national elections of 1998; the leader of the first coup attempt in 1992 was elected President of Venezuela, which can help explain why the coup of 2002 even occurred at all.

The 1998 elections marked the end of the two-party dominance as support for the AD and COPEI declined and a third party was able to garner those votes: the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) (McCoy, 1999; Ramírez, 2005). Learning from his mistakes, Chávez supported the popular belief that the elite were corrupt and responsible for the increased poverty in Venezuela in order to garner popular support through democratic means (Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003). Upon being elected as President, Chávez was instrumental in proposing new oil reforms that would stabilize the market, thereby strengthening the OPEC, and encouraging foreign direct investment (Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003; Parker, 2005). Chávez created several programs designed to help the impoverished, including utilizing the military to build houses and such for the poor (McCoy, 1999; Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003). Essentially, Chávez attempted to isolate the government from the elites. Arguably in doing so, along with his personal affinity for Simon Bolívar, Chávez became more imperialistic than democratic in nature as his tenure in the executive continued.

However in 2002, as the economy continued to weaken and, after angering members of PDVSA by attempting to place loyal supporters on the board, mass protests began. On April 12, 2002, a successful short-lived coup d'état occurred. President Chávez was arrested and Pedro Carmona stepped in as the interim President. Within forty-eight hours, Chávez returned to the Presidency as direct result of the help of the poor rioting around all of Venezuela and the threat of armed resistance from a section of the military that refused to support the coup (Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003). The outcome of this coup d'état becomes the most important point in the case of Venezuela: without the support of the people, the elites hands can become tied if they attempt to engage in a coup. In this case, Chávez's charisma had garnered support from his coup that carried enough popular support to gain him the Presidency in 1998; this support also

protected him from the elite driven coup of 2002 from being successful. However, while the popular support is the final nod to the elite that could potentially dictate the success of the coup d'état, it is the stability of the economy that becomes the trigger for the elites to engage in a coup in the first place. The unstable state of the oil industry becomes the driving force for the elites in Venezuela to choose to engage in all of the aforementioned coups, as when the economy was stable and growing during the period between 1958 and 1978 there were no coups occurring.

As can be witnessed in the popular media, Chavez's charisma was no longer garnering the support of the masses towards the later years of his life. Arguably both of the dynamics, i.e. a direct system of loyalty between the masses and the government along with stable economic growth, were no longer present towards the end of Chavez's Presidency, resulting in a second coup d'état attempt in 2008. Since his passing, controversy has surrounded his successor, the current President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. This study expands on Wintrobe's consideration of economic growth, putting an emphasis on stable economic growth and the responses triggered by these changes in the economy. It also builds on the loyalty aspect of the relationship between the people and the leadership, as often times this is assumed to be associated with the levels of democratic institutions present. Furthermore, the proposed relationship between social instability, as observed by Hiroi and Omori (2013), is further investigated with regards to triggering coups.

In the following chapter, a review of the literature for this thesis will be addressed with three major topical focuses. First, the dynamics of coups d'état will be explained in order to explain why it is an elite tactic and not indicative of mass political behavior. Second, the relationship between the leader and the people will be discussed based on Wintrobe's (2012) analysis of authoritarian regimes and the occurrence of coups, specifically that of loyalty amongst the masses and rents with the elites. Third, the role of the economy will be addressed with regards to the confusion it can create among the masses when unstable and the window of opportunity this creates for elites to engage in undemocratic. Based upon the analysis of the literature, two hypotheses will be presented. The third chapter will address the method of

hypothesis testing, i.e. the use of a count model, and the operationalization of the dependent, proposed theoretical independent, and control variables. Following, the fourth chapter will discuss the findings based on the outcome of the empirical tests of the hypotheses. The fifth, and final, chapter will summarize the conclusions that can be drawn from the study, as well as reflect on suggestions and improvement for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

While the case of the Punto Fijo system and the democracy of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela present unique insight to the importance of the economy and the relationship between the government and the masses can be, the purpose of this thesis is to expand this perspective to all coups d'état. Building on the work of past scholars, a general conclusion has been drawn that adverse macroeconomic performance and social stability are key to understanding the triggers of coups (Hiroi and Omori, 2013). However, this study presents an argument that attributes macroeconomic stability with triggering coups, while social instability may be more attributed to the outcome of the coup, and other social factors may be more correlated with these occurrences than demonstrations and riots.

In order to establish the proposed relationship, coups d'état must be differentiated from another important factor: domestic protest. Domestic protest, by its nature, is not a tactic elites would utilize when attempting to gain control of the government. This does not bar elites from taking advantage of civil unrest, much like Chávez did after the failed coup of April 1992, making some arguable forms of mass revolution beneficial to coup d'état but not necessarily a trigger. As previously alluded to, domestic protest in the form of riots, strikes, and demonstrations could potentially affect the outcome of the coup, i.e. success or failure, as demonstrated by the successful coup that was swiftly ended as a result of mass uprising that occurred in 2002 in Venezuela.

Once reaching these generalizations, the role of loyalty and rents will be addressed, as these are arguably critical in constraining the behavior of elites. For loyalty, I am referring to the relationship fostered between the members of government and the people usually through creating a system of incentives; rents generally applies to those incentives the elites have to not remove the current government from power. To better understand the constraint factor, the logic of selectorate theory will provide more insight, as this theory looks at how risk aversion and acceptance in state behavior changes as the number of people who become involved in the

process increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). When a government creates a direct connection with the people, the people in turn begin to carry weight in the decisions the government makes, as it is to those members of the government's interest to foster that connection with the people in the long run.

Although the social factors are important, the state of the economy is arguably the more relevant to predicting what triggers the behavior of the elites. Scholars often focus more on economic development as it both captures economic and social factors, such as the disparity between overall economic growth and distribution of said wealth. However, as this theory focuses on why elites choose to engage in coups, the argument is made that the actual nature of the economic growth is more relevant to understanding their behavior than economic development. The elites are more directly affected by the state of the economy overall, rather than the distribution of wealth; an unstable economy can create an aura of discomfort for the elites, ultimately leading to their choice to engage in undemocratic behavior, regardless of the type of institutions present.

2.1 THE DYNAMICS OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

Svolik (2012) and Wintrobe (2012) find the threat of a coup d'état to be more of an internal than an external issue, as it is the elites who have the private incentives and benefit of ousting the prior executive. Wintrobe specifically associates this differentiation with the idea of costs and benefits in the case of autocracies where only the elite truly can afford the costs to privately benefit from a coup; the masses cannot, as their benefit is minimal with high cost. Mass revolution is not synonymous with a coup d'état (Brinton, 1965). Wintrobe's analysis of the utility of mass revolution versus a coup d'état is based on Olson's (1971) rationale on group behavior and the free rider aspect of the collective action issue, with the latter being the most efficient choice in changing regimes for the elites. Wintrobe argues that the masses have no private incentives to revolt as the benefits of a new government, i.e. filling the vacant positions in the government, are not easily spread across the multitudes of people necessary for a

revolution to be meaningfully successful. Thus, coups become more of a practice beneficial solely to the elites as a new set of elites simply replaces the former set of elites (Brinton, 1965).

Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) and Hiroi and Omori (2013) find that the elites will more likely engage in coups during periods of high social instability. The argument rests on the idea that elites are more likely to have support from the masses after the coup occurs because the latter have already expressed discontent with the current regime. Thus, when the elites move into power, their actions are less likely to be disapproved of by the people. This does not mean that civil unrest needs to be present in order for a coup to happen. The Arab Spring in 2011 involved several demonstrations with varying degrees of violence in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which resulted in the ousting of longstanding dictators and a movement towards more democratic systems (Khondker, 2011; Weyland, 2012). However, the social instability of these countries, along with the surrounding states affected by their citizens' behavior, did not result in the elites engaging in coups in any of the states involved. Moreover, Hiroi and Omori's study does not allow us to distinguish between the social instability that precedes or follows the coups.

Furthermore, in the case of Venezuela, only the coup of February 1992 was met with popular support rather than popular backlash, like the coups of November 1992 and April 2002. Although social instability provide a solid excuse for the elites to engage in undemocratic behavior in some cases, not all coups are preceded by episodes of domestic protest. This idea correlates with the statistics provided by Svobik (2012), which show that sixty-eight percent of non-constitutional exits from office are related to coup d'états while only eleven percent are related to popular uprisings in dictatorships. Therefore, the continued focus on the dynamics between the authoritarian leader, their inner circle, and the masses by Wintrobe (2012) and Svobik (2012) lends to the very distinction between the types of relationships encouraging coups and those that do not.

2.2 LOYALTY AND RENTS

An important aspect of understanding coups d'état is how the type of institution affects the occurrence of coups. Coups were often associated with authoritarian regimes, as there are no built-in means of removing the current leaders of the government if the people are unhappy. However, there are still cases in which democratic states do experience a coup d'état; in 1992 President Alberto Fujimori engaged in a 'self-coup' by dissolving the legislature and began enacting direct laws to combat terrorism. President Fujimori often sites his overwhelming public support for why such actions were deemed good for Peru's democracy, even if they were less than democratic in nature. In this instance, it was the democratic institutions that were impeding the President's attempts to handle issues with terrorism by blocking harsher policy that was deemed necessary in order to crackdown on these security threats (Cameron, 1998). This inability to act gave the appearance that the government was ineffective and weak, which is not conducive to fostering a culture of democracy in this former autocracy. Much like the Venezuelan case, resorting to these undemocratic forms of regime change are viewed as more effective than those provided by the democratic institutions to constituents and such an acceptance gives weight to arguments like President Fujimori's.

With regards to these types of democratic outliers, some political scientists point to the relevance history plays on such occurrences. What scholars find is that this psychology goes deeper than presumed; to change a political institution, like from a non-democracy to a democracy, does not suddenly change the way in which people think to solve their problems. Neundorf (2010) finds lingering effects of the previous authoritarian regime tend to make acceptance of the new democratic institutions much more difficult for the masses, as they are usually taught to believe their former autocratic regime type is preferable and good. If the autocratic regime is the only type they know, their previous experience in handling unfavorable governments will most likely have been through non-democratic means. This becomes intuitive with our understanding of the nature of the 'coup trap', as once a successful coup d'état as happened the propensity for another to occur increases (Londregan and Poole, 1990; McGowan

and Johnson, 1984; O’Kane, 1983). Thus, if in that autocratic institution a coup d’état was utilized to successfully depose a government, a coup will more likely occur again at the hands of some other faction of elites regardless of whether the institution has become more democratic or not.

Others associate the plague of coups on democracies with the level of control within the institutions. Unlike democracies, where legitimacy is clearly established in the hands of the electorate, and autocracies, where legitimacy becomes considerably less relevant, these hybrid or mixed regimes are faced with the unique issue of establishing legitimacy for the government with little ability to retaliate or censor the actions of those opposed to the current regime like autocracies would (Hiroi and Omori, 2013). However, Wintrobe (2012) finds that in the case of post-World War II, Communist China the creation of a direct link between the people and the government, or the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ as he refers to them, through reward and punishment, rather than simply punishment in the form of retaliation or censorship, has been integral in their avoidance of coups. Thus, the balance of legitimacy and reward over credible threats of retaliation and censorship may be more relevant to understanding why coups happen rather than the type of institutions present.

Based on the observations of Wintrobe (2012) and Pilster and Böhmelt’s, this balance may better be explained by the two dynamics important to ‘coup-proofing’ democracies: loyalty of the masses and a decrease in rent-seeking opportunities for the elites. Pilster and Böhmelt find that democracies are less likely to engage in coup-proofing; however, this may have more to do with the nature of the democratic institutions. Wintrobe finds that loyalty must exist between the ‘younger’ generation, i.e. the people, and the ‘older’ generation, i.e. the leadership, in authoritarian regimes; the same can be said of all government and electorate relations. Although democracies do not actively coup-proof, the electoral system by design creates a sense of loyalty directly between the government and the people, as the voters are able to constrain members of the government through the threat of removal in the next election. Thus, once the electorate in a newly formed democracy or mixed regime understands the nature of this relationship, the masses

may be less accepting of elites engaging in undemocratic behavior, as the voters hold some power over the government.

This relationship better matches the logic of selectorate theory in international relations. Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) correlate the size of the winning coalition with the level of risk aversion a leader is willing to have in the case of foreign policy; the smaller the winning coalition the more risk acceptant the leader becomes, as there are fewer people they foster loyalty with in order to maintain power. The theory finds that while the number of resources committed to the coalition does increase as the size of the coalition increases, the value of the public good in the eyes of the individual member stays the same (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003/2004). In the case of mixed and democratic regimes, this value can be placed in the vote. As the government increases the number of people they are beholden to in these regimes, through increased public involvement, the threat of removal begins to matter more and can constrain them in the long run. However, if the people themselves do not see the value of the vote or become disillusioned, the elite have the opportunity to take advantage by engaging in undemocratic behavior. Looking back at the case of Venezuela, it is worth mentioning that part of the legitimacy given to the Presidential election of 1998 rests in the presence of a newly formed election commission, known as the National Election Council (CNE) that was designed to decrease electoral fraud and create a sense of transparency (McCoy, 1999). Therefore, as long as the value of the perceived public good is in place, a direct loyalty system is created through the citizens' ability to cast a vote that may remove an official from government.

The increased number of citizens involved in the decision-making process does not necessarily eliminate the issue of rent payments to the elites. Rents, by their nature, are any sort of payment above the minimum, whereas rent-seeking behavior refers to the person's demand for special treatment (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1967). When looking at elite behavior, elites are likely to engage in rent-seeking behavior in the form of lobbying for policies that are financially beneficial to them or for direct payments from the government. Mbaku (1991) finds that while democracies may engage in rent-seeking tradeoffs, it is not to the degree as dictatorships. By the

design of the institution, the rents still exist in the form of lobbying, bribery through such tactics as earmarks, and the nature of political campaigns, but not to the degree in dictatorships where the promise of security or the threat of the removal comes from the elites rather than the electorate.¹ Thus, once the new forms of loyalty and rent-seeking opportunities become established in newly formed hybrid or democratic regimes, the elites may not feel the incentive to engage in a coup d'état or lose their ability to do so without fear of lack of public support. Thus, their inclination to engage in a coup may rest less with the fear of losing rents due to institutional change and more with the fear of losing rents because of reasons that directly affect them, such as the stagnation or depression of the economy.

2.3 THE WINDOW OF ECONOMIC INSTABILITY

Understanding why some people could or would support undemocratic regime change is only half the issue; often times the main cause of public unrest stems from the government's inability to properly address the issues at hand in a timely enough manner. The idea that people tend to be angrier with the government when the economy is struggling is well known (Gellens and Anderson, 2000). In Fossum's (1967) early research, he focuses specifically on the difference between the current year and the year prior's economic factors, categorizing clusters of years into either 'deterioration' years or 'improvement' years. Within this context, he then analyzes the number of coups d'état that occur within the respective types of year. Fossum finds coups d'état are more common during years of economic deterioration. This agrees with both Lipset's (1959) and Neundorf's (2010) observation that support for the institution is higher when people are 'better off' financially, which can be integral in fostering a system of direct loyalty.

Fossum (1967) finds that during the twentieth century world wars, coups d'état were less likely to occur in Latin America, arguably because the people were more distracted with international issues than domestic issues and their domestic exports had increased. On the flipside, during the times of post-war, economic backlash coups were more likely to happen.

¹ The term bribery is kept here, as it is the source's original terminology.

With Fossum's focus specifically examining the region of Latin America, his study remains solely economic as most of these countries, with the exclusion of Brazil, did not directly participate in the war beyond supplying those countries who were actively engaged in combat; thus, only their markets were effected. In Zimmerman's (1979) early attempt to find a causal relationship, economic growth and economic decline are treated as separate forces affecting the occurrence of military coups d'état. Zimmerman posits that there is a negative relationship with military coups d'état and economic growth, but never tests his theory based on statistical analysis. Therefore, based on this line of thinking, as the economy grows the people are less likely to resent the government due to their increasing wealth, constraining the elites from deposing the executive due to a lack of artificial public support.

Understanding the overall relationship between economics and institutions becomes important with regards to explaining why economics may have a distinct effect the occurrence of coups d'état, regardless of institution type. Some would argue that democracy does have a systemic effect on the economy (Barro, 1989/1990; de Scheweinitz, 1959; Galenson, 1959; Huntington, 1968; Huntington and Dominguez, 1975; North, 1990; Olsen, 1991). Others argue that democracy has no effect on economic growth (Przeworski and Limongini, 1993; Przeworski et al., 2000; Rodrik, 2000; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1991). However, there are those who argue the relationship may be flipped – that economic growth may have an effect on the levels of democratic institutions present within the state experiences. Glaeser et al. yielded inconclusive results to support or disprove their tentative argument – economic growth may possibly encourage democratization – and conclude with the comment that this relationship should be more widely studied by institutionalists.

These observations do not disprove the fact that institutions can affect the economy. Persson (2002) finds that political institutions do have an effect on the way economic policy is shaped. He argues the type of regime, as well as the shape and size of the legislature, can have an effect how policies develop, which matches the logic of Bueno de Mesquita, et al.'s (2003) observations on how dynamics change as the winning coalitions increase. Quinn and Woolley

(2012) find that the nature of constraint affects the economic stability of democracies and may contribute to the instability within states governed by authoritarian regimes, as the elites are more likely to engage in risky behavior when no threat to their position exists. This could prove problematic for those hybrid regimes where the lines are not clear and the economy may already be unstable to begin with.

The arguable inconclusiveness of Gleaser et al.'s work may rest in the same issues faced by many who try to study the relationship between economic development and democracy's ability to survive in newly formulated hybrid or democratic regimes – the focus on economic development. During the earlier years of the new institutions, the implementation of economic policy can be a bit of a struggle, especially with regard to party politics. The institutionalization of political parties, as well as party institutions, is heavily affected by disruptions during the transition (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Policy formulation may become time consuming, as the parties struggle to consolidate, and the repercussions could ultimately be substantial in creating a reputation of ineffectiveness. If the government is faced with an unstable economy, the success of the regime may be decreased, as the government may not be versed enough in addressing these types of issues upon implementing the new institutions.

In contrast, this thesis does not focus simply on economic growth; rather the focus is on how stable economic growth hinders the occurrence of coups d'état. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) cite another explanation for the occurrence of violence – which includes instances of coups d'état – that has more to do with stable economic fluctuations. Contrary to popular belief, the richest countries are not indicated by higher positive growth rates but rather by smaller growth rates over a longer period of time. These smaller, annual fluctuations may better represent the stability in the economy rather than then annual growth in the long run or the economic development indicators. These annual fluctuations are more visible because people feel the impact relatively sooner, ultimately responding by making decisions about their future investments. This matches with the idea presented by Tesson and Chan (2004) with regards to how states' behavior is affected by the change in trajectory of the economic long cycle; it is not

the direction in which the cycle is changing, i.e. negative or positive, but rather a change in the speed at which the curve is going, i.e. from faster rates of growth or decline to slower rates of growth or decline, that results in a change in expected behavior.

Based on this theory of power cycles in international relations, the visible changes within the Kondratieff long-wave elicit some change in a state's response from either being risk acceptant or risk adverse towards interstate conflict in response to the shift in trajectory (Goldstein, 1985; Pollins and Schweller, 1999; Tessman and Chan, 2004). This logic can be applied to the nature of the individual members of the electorate, who may begin to resent the current regime, and the elites, who choose to engage in a coup, as the theory of power cycles generally treats states as unitary actors. Thus, people may either be more accepting or more adverse towards elites engaging in undemocratic behavior based on their response to the perceived trajectory change in economic growth. However, it is the small shifts in growth rate change that are more visible, leaving overall market growth less relevant to the occurrence of coups than the recent fluctuations of the market for the individual. Ultimately, these shifts potentially endanger the fostering of a direct system of loyalty amongst people, as they begin to doubt the government's ability to maintain the stability of the economy, potentially leading to lower popular support for the current government and providing the elites with an opportunity to utilize such undemocratic regime change practices as a coup d'état.

2.4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

As derived from the literature, there are clear elements that play a role in the occurrence of coups d'état. An early indicator is often the type of institutions present; however, three distinct elements, whose presence, or lack thereof, may be more associated with coups than the institutions. First, there appears to be only one element that triggers coups – economic instability. While a system of direct loyalty and social instability are related to coups, an unstable economy appears to be the real trigger, as it can increase the levels of frustration in the elites and has a direct impact on their ability to collect the rents they seek. The role of a direct

system of loyalty has more to do with how the masses handle that frustration. The system of loyalty refers to the relationship in which the people have some power over the government's decision-making process through the freedom to maneuver and/or the ability to hold them accountable. If the masses cannot seemingly express their irritation in a healthy manner, such as removing government officials deemed responsible for these economic issues from office or the freedom to organize and become members of opposition organizations, then the propensity for such social movements as riots, demonstrations, and strikes goes up. Thus, systems that created a direct link of accountability between the government and the people by increasing the size of the winning coalition may effectively help 'coup-proof' the state. While social instability seems like a trigger, the argument is made that it becomes the elite's excuse for the legitimacy of their actions, just like President Fujimori's citing his popular support as to why it was appropriate to engage in a self-coup in 1992, but does not necessarily need to be present for a coup to happen, as was witnessed in 2002 for the case of Venezuela.

The hypotheses derived from the theory are as follows:

Hypothesis #1: States with less direct loyalty established between the masses and government officials are more likely to experience a coup d'état.

This hypothesis focuses on the establishment of a sense of loyalty between the members in government and the masses. In states where the winning coalition size increases, regardless of the institution type, more players are involved in the decision-making process. When those players include the people, politicians are provided with a long-term incentive to not leech from the masses – regime stability. Thus, in systems where direct loyalty is established, the people feel their needs will be considered by members of the government when the latter are making policy decisions. The argument is made that without a sense of loyalty fostered by the government and instilled into the people, the more likely the masses will support the elites in engaging in a coup d'état, in order to remove the current regime.

Hypothesis #2: States experiencing higher levels of economic instability are more likely to experience one or more coups d'état.

This hypothesis focuses on the relationship between the economy and the occurrence of coups d'état. The argument is made that without stable economic growth, the elite's sensitivity to the trajectory changes creates enough of an air of unease that they will choose to engage in undemocratic behavior in order to protect their assets. Once the elites engage in a coup, the new regime faces the possibility of experiencing instances of countercoups from other elite factions who wish to depose the new regime. Thus, an escalation in political instability can occur as one coup is met by a countercoup, and possibly a countercoup to the countercoup. In the following section, the operationalization of the variables proposed in the hypotheses, as well as the necessary controls, and a breakdown of the hypothesis tests will be presented.

Chapter 3: Research Design

This study will focus on the years between 1946 and 2008 to test the effects of economic instability and the existence of direct loyalty between the government and the people on the occurrence of coups d'état in 164 states. The research will utilize a cross-sectional, time series analysis of several states with the unit of analysis being the country year and the dependent variable being a count of the number of attempted successful and unsuccessful coups d'état in that country year. The dataset will consist of a compilation of the following: the University of Gothenburg's "Quality of Government" dataset, which is a compilation of several major datasets designed to make public cross-national comparative data, Marshall & Marshall's (2012) "Coups d'État" dataset on coups, Bank's (2009) "Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive" dataset for social instability measures, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo's (Gleditsch, et al., 2009) "Armed Conflict Dataset" dataset on internal and interstate conflict, and Boehmer and Reuveny's (2015) GDP data based on the Penn World Tables dataset. In order to quantifiably test the proposed hypotheses, at least one form of a count model may be used to analyze the relationship between the occurrence of coups, the economy and the direct loyalty system present.

3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

For the dependent variable in the study, *Coups d'État*, a simple count of the number of coups that occur in a given year. The choice to use a count is based a phenomenon referred to as countercoups. In the case of Venezuela, the coups of February 1992 and November 1992 the argument could be made that lack of success of Chávez's attempted coup resulted in the Venezuelan air force's attempt at a coup later in the year. However, this does not qualify as a countercoup. Once a successful coup occurs, the propensity for another coup to occur increases immediately, but slowly dissipates over time, as the new regime has time to establish order (Londregan and Poole, 1990; McGowan and Johnson, 1984; O'Kane, 1983). Thus, once the coup happens, there is an opportunity that the next set of coups within a given year are related to

the first coup of the year, creating a chain reaction within different factions of the elites. The working definition of a coup d'état will be based on the definition provided by the 'Coups d'État Events, 1964-2012 Codebook':

“A forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance).” (Marshall & Marshall, 2013, 1)

Marshall and Marshall's dataset includes both a description about the individual coups d'état by state, as well as the success level of the coups, which are defined as 1 'alleged coup plot', 2 'plotted coup', 3 'attempted (failed) coup', and 4 'successful coup'. As Marshall and Marshall's (2012) "Coups d'État Events, 1964-2012 Codebook" notes the recorded alleged plots and plotted coups can be considered unreliable, due to their questionable sources, and they will not be included within the context of this study. The observations of attempted, unsuccessful coups d'état will be included based on the premise that leaders in a government who experience a coup attempt may be affected by the attempt and respond in policy changes due to a lack of trust with the elites. Thus, the failed coup could have a broader impact on the government and the society as a whole (Kebuschull, 1994). As previously mentioned, this variable Coups d'État will be treated as a count variable created by adding the total number of coups successfully attempted and failed in each year of observation for each state in existence between 1946 to 2008.

3.2 THEORETICAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The first theoretical independent variable of focus in this study is *Loyalty*. In order to fully capture the dimension of an established system of direct loyalty between the masses and the government, I use of Polity IV's measure of the competitiveness of participation. This measure is coded on a five-point, categorical scale that increases from little or no civil interaction to high levels of civil interaction. Based on Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr's (2013) "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012: Dataset Users' Manual", observations assigned the value 0 'not applicable' refer to those polities coded as 'Unregulated' in the Polity IV variable

Regulation of Political Participation. Those assigned 1 'repressed' refer to states where oppositional activity is either not permitted or actively oppressed by the current incumbent. Those assigned 2 'suppressed' refer to states where some political competition occurs but the regime strongly limit its participation, such as allowing a far-Leftist party to organize but prohibiting its ability to compete in elections. Those assigned 3 'factional' refer to states where parochial or ethnic-based political factions are allowed to compete, whose particularist agendas marginalize other parties' interest and the common agenda for the state. Those assigned 4 'transitional' refer to states where sectarian and secular interest groups coexist, accommodating competing interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader interests. Finally, those assigned 5 'competitive' refer to states where free, stable, enduring groups are eligible to compete with little coercion or disruption involved. The relationship between Loyalty and the number coups that occur is expected to be negative, as increased civilian interaction should theoretically decrease the states susceptibility to coups in the first place.

The choice of the competitiveness of participation to act as a proxy of Loyalty rests in the observations of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) on the importance of expanding organizations from closed restricted to open access in the avoidance of violence. This, along with the understanding of Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2003/2004) logic of selectorate theory lend to the argument that this variable captures the dimensions of the Loyalty variable. The larger the population allowed to participate and the more freedom of those participating to organize in the manner they choose, the more direct the system of loyalty created between the masses and the government. If any group is marginalized or an organization's freedom to coordinate is prohibited, the more power placed in the hands of the government. This shift diminishes the value of the public good in the hands of the masses – the ability to have a say in the government's decision – and distances the masses from the current regime leaving little incentive for them to protect it from the elites.

The second theoretical independent variable of focus in this study is *Economic Stability*. In order to measure this, the annual percent rate of change in the gross domestic product, or

GDP, of the state will be used. This variable captures the stability in the state's market in a standardized format rather than as a function of economic size. Using data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Development Indicators, and Penn World Tables, several variables are created to measure varying lag effects of growth, ranging from one year to moving averages at two-, three-, five-, seven- and ten-year ranges. These year ranges allow for the effect of several years to be considered; for example, the five-year range takes into account the effect the previous five years' growth rates have had on the occurrence of a coup within the given year. This may help better capture the degree of economic stability enjoyed instead of a simple one-year lag could (Boehmer, 2007). The percent changes show the stability of the state's economy, as lower, regular percent changes implies fewer shocks to the economy, therefore implying there are less critical economic issues being faced by the government (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009). This relates directly with the trajectory argument for economic stability – the smaller the percent change on a regular basis, the less unstable the change in the trajectory of the economy. A secondary form of the Economic Stability variable will be included based on Fossum's (1967) observations on 'deterioration' years. However, rather than simply utilizing his dichotomous coding of each year as either 0 'growth' or 1 'decline', the format of peace years will be used, creating a count of the years a state is faced with declining growth rates. This allows for the effect of long-standing economic decline to be observed through the count of years where negative economic growth is present.

3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES

The first control variable included in the model will be that of *Social Instability*. As previously mentioned, Hiroi and Omori (2013) find that instances of social instability not only increase the probability of coup but also the propensity of a coup occurring again. In agreement with these findings, their social instability indicators are included, but are treated differently on a theoretical level. Hiroi and Omori aggregate the number of strikes, riots, and demonstrations present in a given state for a given year from Bank's data and log it in order to decrease the skew

of the variable itself. However, the concept of strikes may arguably be distinctly different from riots and demonstrations, which appear more indicative of frustration with a range of political issues, as the previous may be more related to labor (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Thus, Social Instability will be defined in the fashion of Hiroi and Omori, i.e. added and logged, with the exclusion of the strikes variable. *Strikes* will be treated as a separated variable and logged for skew.

Another control variable will be *Institutions*; controlling for the type of institution present is a standard practice in the study of coups d'état. Often times, Polity IV's -10 to 10-point scale is used to indicate the institution type with -10 to -6 representing 'autocracies', -6 to 6 'anocracies' and 6 to 10 'democracies' (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2013). However, in an attempt to avoid issues with collinearity between Institutions and Loyalty, as the measure of Loyalty is a component of the assigned polity score, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) six-point category scale will be used instead. This scale moves ordinally from the smallest winning coalition with the government, i.e. the leader, him or herself, at minimum, to the largest winning coalition, i.e. full participation of the masses with no separation of the head of government and the legislature. Observations assigned the value of 1 refer to states with a 'royal dictatorship', 2 'military dictatorship', 3 'civilian dictatorship', 4 'presidential democracy', 5 'mixed (semi-presidential) democracy', and 6 'parliamentary democracy'. However, in anticipation of skepticism of the theoretical treatment of these variables as ordinal, in this study values 2 through 6 will be treated and read as dummy variables in the model, with 1 becoming the baseline.


Ethnic Fractionalization will be included as this can potentially result in civil unrest, which may be highly detrimental to the fostering a direct system of loyalty amongst the electorate and the members of government. The more fractionalized the population, the more civil unrest may occur that could potentially culminate in non-democratic actions being taken if the political institutions fail to remedy the issues. In states with lower civilian interaction, the built in groups in society created by ethnic identity can potentially act as a breeding ground for

social instability (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007). For Ethnic Fractionalization, the variable is a continuous measure from 0 to 1, with 0 being ‘perfectly homogenous’ and 1 being ‘highly fractionalized’ (Fearon, 2003).

Often times, when internal issues are not improving, external conflict can be a healthy distraction and an effective tool of making the government appear responsive rather than stagnant. This rests on the idea that the executive will be perceived as strong, as they have taken decisive action against a perceived enemy, which could result in bolstering more support for the executive and, by default, the government (Mayer, 1971; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983). Thus, the opportunity for the elite to engage in the coup becomes constrained due the perceived effectiveness of the executive by the masses. However, if the conflict is internalized when the new institutions are put into place, the conflict escalation could ultimately result in creating the prime climate for the elites to engage in undemocratic behavior. For both the variable *Internal Conflict* and *Interstate Conflict*, a peace years measure will be used to indicate not only if the state is engaged in conflict but also the number of years it has not been engaged in conflict. When the count is at 0 there is conflict present, while every subsequent number is reflective of the years it has been since the most recent conflict has ended, giving the count of years of peace. For both Interstate Conflict and Internal Conflict, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo’s “Armed Conflict Dataset” dataset will be used to indicate the start, presence, and end of both civil conflict and interstate conflict. In the case of Interstate Conflict, both states will be coded individually, as the data is set up dyadically. It is important to note that a dummy variable, *Cold War*, will be included as at least the Soviet Union may have been directly influential to the occurrence of coups in ‘Third World’ countries during the Cold War (David, 1986). For the operationalization, 1 will demarcate those years during the Cold War and 0 for those years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The final control variable will be *Military Rents* which will be based on the percent of government expenditure on the military per year provided by the World Bank Dataset, as this

Figure 3.1: Distribution of the Count of Coups d'État Per Year



signals a choice by the government to enhance its security. With the rent-seeking nature of the military, both in dictatorships and democracy, Mbaku (1991) finds that military groups benefit greatly in more politically unstable states regardless of institution type. The purpose of investing in the military for individually powerful dictators may be the result of dictator's investing in protection against developing competing interest groups that could threaten the dictator's power in exchange for rents or the military itself. When states transitioning away from autocracy to consolidated democracy, the state of vulnerability the new democratic institutions exist in could be susceptible to this rent-seeking behavior of the elites while the culture of democracy is still developing.

3.4 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE

The proposed method of hypothesis testing will be through the use of a zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression. As can be seen in Figure 3.1 the dependent variable, Coups d'État, consist of a count between zero coups d'état occurring up to five coups occurring in a given year. The figure on the left shows both the frequency of occurrences of each individual observation of the count of coups per year in a bar graph, with the distribution shown as a line. The distribution of the observations of coups in states during the time frame included in the data is not normal and more closely resembles a negative binomial distribution. The figure on the right shows the same information but only shows the distribution of occurrences within

states that have coups at all; thus all observations of zero are excluded. While the distribution is an important consideration, it is the nature of the zeros creates the preference for a zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression over a binary logit or negative binomial logistic regression. Unlike the Poisson regression model or a simple negative binomial regression model, zero-inflated models do not place the assumption that all observations of zero have the same probability of coup d'état occurring in the given state (Long and Freese, 2006). Zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regressions assume that some observations of zero, referred to as the latent group, are due to an inability of the outcome occurring at all by using a two-step process. First, the model includes a negative binomial model to model the count process; then a binary logit model is used to indicate with what the zeros are associated. Thus, those states that have a probability of a coup d'état occurring but never experience one are differentiated from those that theoretically have no probability of a coup occurring at all.² These states that are found to be part of this 'certain zero' group, where the probability of a coup happening is non-existent, are theoretically deemed to be coup-proofed.

In the following section, the findings of the proposed hypothesis test will be discussed. Several iterations of the zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression will be run in order test the effects of lagging the Social Instability indicators, as well as the difference between the proposed Social Instability and Strikes variables to the Hiroi and Omori (2013) version of Social Instability, on the outcome. The variables Economic Stability, Loyalty, Ethnic Fractionalization, Interstate Conflict and Internal Conflict will all be lagged regardless of the model for theoretical reasons. After analyzing the statistical significance of variables within the model and characteristics of some distinct variables, conclusions will be drawn with regard to the support of the proposed hypotheses.

² Considering the distribution of the count, the argument can be made to use a simple binary logit, as there are only 68 observations of states with years experiencing more than one coup. For a list of those states and years refer to the Appendix.

Chapter 4: Findings

To begin, the output of the zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression models will be analyzed.³ Although several models were run, each with a distinct variation on the lag structure of Economic Stability, from the moving averages for two-years to ten-years and decline years, Table 4.1 presents all of the findings for the four regression tests using the two-year moving average, which captures the effect of the two previous years growth rate changes.⁴ Unlike all other moving average variables and the decline years count, the two-year moving average was the only Economic Stability variable of statistical significance. Model 1 and Model 2 utilize the Social Instability measure that separates strikes from demonstrations and riots, with the latter model lagging Social Instability measure and strikes. Model 3 and Model 4 utilize the Hiroi Omori measure of Social Instability with strikes, demonstrations and riots treated together, with the latter model lagging Social Instability.

As previously mentioned in the prior section, a zero-inflated binomial logistic regression model is a two-equation model. First, a prediction is made based on a binary logit as to whether or not a state is one of those where no probability of coup d'état exists, i.e. a 'certain zero'. This allows for those variables that theoretically coup-proof states to be analyzed, as variables that increase the probability that a state is a certain zero are directly associated with the states ability to avoid the occurrence of coups by design. In this particular test, a positive signed coefficient indicates an increased probability that the state is part of the 'certain zero' group. In Table 4.1, this is what is referred to as the 'Full Model'. The second step is a normal negative binomial logistic regression that predicts the counts for those that are not part of the certain zero group. This count model predicts how the variables affect the number of coups that happen within a given state during a given year. In Table 4.1, this is what is referred to as the 'Constant-

³ The models analyzed exclude the variable for Economic Stability, which is a common control in the study of coups. Tables A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.7 run all of the same models with the inclusion of GDP per Capita. Counter the significance often found in other coup studies, this variable is statistically insignificant in the negative binomial logistic regression and competing for zeros against the dummy variables for Institutions in the binary logit.

⁴ For all model outputs for all Economic Stability Variables, refer to Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4.

Table 4.1: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Logistic Regression Model Of Economic Stability, Loyalty, Social Instability And Strikes On Coups d'État

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	
Constant-Only Model	<i>Economic Stability (2 Year)</i>	-0.031 (0.015)*	-0.032 (0.015)*	-0.031 (0.015)*	-0.032 (0.015)*
	<i>Loyalty</i> *	0.395 (0.099)***	0.395 (0.098)***	0.383 (0.101)***	0.390 (0.101)***
	<i>Social Instability</i>	0.227 (0.108)*	0.080 (0.105)	0.332 (0.106)**	0.194 (0.114)
	<i>Strikes</i>	0.461 (0.215)*	0.480 (0.296)	---	---
	<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i> *	1.094 (0.393)**	1.013 (0.386)**	1.096 (0.399)**	1.012 (0.397)*
	<i>Interstate Conflict</i> *	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)
	<i>Internal Conflict</i> *	-0.016 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.008)	-0.16 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.008)
	<i>Cold War</i>	0.459 (0.238)	0.362 (0.230)	0.345 (0.267)	0.365 (0.229)
	<i>Institutions:</i>				
	Military Dictatorship	2.570 (0.462)***	2.577 (0.464)***	2.561 (0.465)***	2.581 (0.469)***
	Civilian Dictatorship	1.359 (0.523)**	1.341 (0.518)**	1.337 (0.526)*	1.333 (0.523)*
	Presidential Democracy	2.944 (1.015)***	2.930 (0.610)***	2.980 (0.604)***	3.008 (0.560)***
	Mixed Democracy	1.473 (1.015)	1.336 (0.984)	1.493 (1.043)	1.372 (1.011)
	Parliamentary Democracy	0.684 (0.605)	0.680 (0.632)	0.722 (0.593)	0.773 (0.607)
Full Model	<i>Economic Stability</i>	0.004 (0.036)	0.002 (0.041)	0.009 (0.036)	0.005 (0.040)
	<i>Loyalty</i> *	2.130 (0.491)***	2.202 (0.521)***	2.114 (0.473)***	2.177 (0.502)***
	<i>Social Instability</i>	-0.029 (0.274)	-0.381 (0.302)	-0.119 (0.280)	-0.454 (0.341)
	<i>Strikes</i>	-0.352 (0.536)	-0.363 (0.684)	---	---
	<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i> *	2.506 (1.107)*	2.378 (1.120)*	2.489 (1.116)*	2.350 (1.107)*
	<i>Interstate Conflict</i> *	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.026)
	<i>Internal Conflict</i> *	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.017)
	<i>Cold War</i>	0.075 (0.879)	0.021 (0.850)	-0.006 (0.896)	0.000 (0.842)
	<i>Institutions:</i>				
	Military Dictatorship	-3.015 (1.646)	-3.006 (1.799)	-2.367 (1.599)	-7.464 (1.849)***
	Civilian Dictatorship	14.979 (1.862)***	14.399 (1.983)***	15.580 (1.864)***	12.878 (2.023)***
	Presidential Democracy	17.753 (1.585)***	17.439 (1.675)***	18.385 (1.543)***	15.961 (1.680)***
	Mixed Democracy	15.885 (1.741)***	15.173 (1.812)***	16.518 (1.709)***	13.668 (1.914)***
	Parliamentary Democracy	15.216 (1.551)***	14.802 (1.672)***	15.883 (1.439)***	13.399 (1.665)***
Observations:	6450	6425	6450	6425	
Wald Chi2:	232.44	175.00	210.65	162.49	

Table includes the coefficients with standard errors in italics. All observations of the Wald Chi2 test were statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

* indicates a lagged variable

* = statistically significant at 0.05 in a two-tail test

** = statistically significant at 0.01 in a two-tail test

*** = statistically significant at 0.001 in a two-tail test

Only Model'. While all variables are included in both equations, significance in one is not read the same as the significance in the other. Based on Long and Freese's (2006) summarization of

how to properly interpret the model, all coefficients are read by taking the natural log of their values. However, the Full model predicts the probability that a state is within the ‘certain zero’ group while the Constant Only Model predicts the actual increase in the count of expected coups given a change in the variable.

When looking at Economic Stability, the significance of only the two-year moving averages is quite telling. As it is only significant in the Constant-Only Model, this means that high levels of GDP growth for the previous two years is not a factor with regards to probability that the states is a certain zero, i.e. having no chance of experiencing a coup. However, it is a factor when predicting the number of coups a state can experience within a given year. Based on Model 1, for every one percent decrease in GDP growth over the two-year moving average, holding all other variables constant, the number of coups per year increases by a factor of 0.969; for Models 2 through 4 the factor increases are 0.968, 0.969, and 0.0969, respectively. Theoretically, the argument was made that changes in the trajectory can trigger a response from the elites, as the masses and the elites are sensitive to these short-term changes. As Economic Stability is not a predictor of whether a state is coup-proofed, but is a predictor of the number coups a state can experience, arguably economic factors are a trigger for coups.

Unlike Economic Stability, the variable Loyalty was found to be significant in both models. For the Full model of Model 1, as the level of civilian interaction increases by one, the probability of the state being in the certain zero group increases by a factor of 1.484; for Models 2 through 4 the factor increases are 1.484, 1.467, and 1.477 respectively. Thus, increasing the direct relationship between the people and the government can potentially coup-proof the state, the probability of the state never having the possibility of experiencing a coup increases. However, based on the Constant-Only model for Model 1, increased civilian interaction is shown to increase the number of coups per year by a factor of 1.255; for Models 2 through 4 the factor increases are 1.083, 1.394, and 1.214, respectively. Thus, counter to the theorized outcome, increased civilian interaction is shown to be helpful, rather than hindering, to the occurrence of coups.

Table 4.2: Frequency of the Occurrence of Coups d'État During Years of Social Instability (i.e. Strikes, Riots & Demonstrations)

<i>Coups per Year</i>	<i>Social Instability</i>		<i>Demonstrations</i>		<i>Riots</i>		<i>Strikes</i>	
	Without	With	Without	With	Without	With	Without	With
1	246 (64.91)	133 (35.09)	291 (76.78)	88 (23.22)	288 (75.99)	91 (24.01)	340 (89.71)	39 (10.29)
2	18 (36.73)	31 (63.27)	29 (59.18)	20 (40.82)	28 (57.14)	21 (42.86)	37 (75.51)	12 (24.49)
3	4 (50.00)	4 (50.00)	6 (75.00)	2 (25.00)	4 (50.00)	4 (50.00)	6 (75.00)	2 (25.00)
4	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)
5	1 (100.00)	0 (0.00)	1 (100.00)	0 (0.00)	1 (100.00)	0 (0.00)	1 (100.00)	0 (0.00)
Total:	271 (61.59)	169 (38.41)	329 (74.77)	111 (25.23)	323 (73.41)	117 (26.59)	386 (87.73)	54 (12.27)

Percentages are in parentheses. Data comes from Banks (2009) and Marshall & Marshall (2012).

Although not part of the theoretical independent variables, as there is no hypothesis associated with it, the variable Social Instability yielded interesting results. As mentioned earlier, Models 1 and 2 on Table 4.1 refer to models with the proposed Social Instability measure that combines the count for riots and demonstrations but excludes riots, unlike like the Social Instability measure used by Hiroi and Omori in Models 3 and 4. The choice to do so was based on the premise that riots and demonstrations appear more similar in nature than strikes, which are usually directed towards industrial sector policy. Table 4.2 looks at the frequency coups present at the time of the coup. For states experiencing coups, as the number of coups d'état that occur with demonstrations, riots, strikes, and all three forms of protest increased from one to two, the observation of years with any and all three forms of social instability increases from 35.09% of the time to 63.27% of the time; however the years with three or more coups see a decrease in the presence of social instability from 50.00%, 33.00% and 0.00% of the time, respectively.

Based on Table 4.2, the presence of strikes appear to not be as common in the occurrence of coups as demonstrations and riots, as the latter two have similar percentages for the years present during a coup except for observations of states experiencing three coups in a single year. For the cases where three coups occurred, riots were present 50.00% of the time while demonstrations were only present 25.00% of the time.⁵ Thus, there are clearly differences

⁵ Although appearing to be a dramatic difference, this extreme difference may be more associated with the fact there were only 8 observations of three coups d'état in a single year.

between the relationship between strikes, demonstrations and riots, and their relationship with occurrence of coups d'état with regards to how often they coincide in the same year.

However, the observations from Table 4.2 do not indicate how the social instability indicators are related to the probability of a coup d'état occurring. For Table 4.1 Models 1 and 3 includes the Social Instability and Strikes variables in real time while Models 2 and 4 have them lagged, as there may be a temporal relationship between social instability and the elites choice to engage in a coup. In the Full model, Social Instability and Strikes were not found to be statistically across all four Models, making the presence of strikes, demonstrations, and riots not related to a state's probability of being part of the group of states that will never experience a coup d'état. However, Social Instability and Strikes were found statistically significant in the cases where the variables were not lagged; thus, the presence of social instability is related to the occurrence of coups.

For Model 1, with regards to Social Instability as defined in this paper, an increase in the number of riots and demonstrations present increases the number of coups that occur in a given year by a factor of 1.255; strikes, on the other hand, increase the number of coups by a factor of 1.586. The observations on Strikes matches with the percentage increases found on Table 4.2, where 10.29% of the time strikes were present when one coup occurred, 24.49% when two coups occurred, 25.00% when three coups occurred, and 33.33% when four coups occurred. Thus, strikes appear to have a different effect on the occurrence of coups than riots and demonstrations. For Model 3, using the Hiroi and Omori Social Instability variable, an increase in the number of riots, demonstrations, and strikes present increased the number of coups that occur in a given year by a factor of 1.394. Thus, the presence of social instability appears to be correlated with the occurrence of coups. However, those demonstrations, riots, and strikes in response to a coup d'état are not differentiated from those directed towards the previous administration, begging the question if these social instability indicators are really triggers of coups or simply byproducts of the coups themselves. There appears to be a positive correlation between the timing of coups

and the presence of domestic protest, but in order to fully understand this relationship further investigation into the nuances of this relationship need to be made.

With regards to other control variables, Ethnic Fractionalization was one of two controls that yielded statistical significance. Ethnic Fractionalization was found to be statistically significant for both the Full and Constant-Only models. For Model 1, in the Full model, as the fractionalization increases in heterogeneity, the probability the state is part of the certain zero group increases by a factor of 12.256; for Models 2 through 4, the factor increases are 10.783, 12.049, and 10.486, respectively. Thus, the more heterogeneity present in the state increases the probability that they may never experience a coup. However, in the Constant-Only model, as the fractionalization increases in those states not part of the certain zero group, the number of coups occurring goes up by a factor of 2.982; for Models 2 through 4, the factor increases are 2.754, 2.992, and 2.751, respectively. Therefore, while increased heterogeneity may decrease the possibility of a coup d'état occurring at all, as the elite may not have a clear enough majority in the population supporting the regime change, in those states not part of the certain zero group ethnic fractionalization can increase the number of coups that do occur.

The last control of statistical significance was the variable Institutions. Within the Models, Institutions was treated as a nominal variable, creating five dummy variables out of the six-point scale of the size of winning coalition; Royal Dictatorships became the baseline, as it theoretically has the smallest winning coalition. For the Full model, Civilian Dictatorship, Presidential Democracy, Mixed Democracy and Parliamentary Democracy were statistically significant. Based on their coefficients, for all four variables, the presence of one of those four types of institutions in a state increases the probability that the state is part of the certain zero group, implying that these institutions effectively coup-proof the state. This intuitively makes sense, as these four types institutions have larger winning coalitions than a Royal Dictatorship and a Military Dictatorship. For the Constant-Only model, Military Dictatorship, Civilian Dictatorship, and Presidentially Democracy were found to be statistically significant. Based on

Table 4.3: Government Budget Expenditures on the Military and Frequency of Coups d'État per State by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>States (N)</i>	<i>Military Rents</i>		<i>Coups d'État</i>		<i>Total Coups d'État</i>
		Mean	Variance	Mean	Variance	
Western Europe	19	3.948	3.057	0.000	0.000	0 (0.00)
Central America & Caribbean	9	4.863	4.502	0.333	0.250	3 (3.15)
Australasia & Oceania	4	5.529	4.89	1.000	2.000	4 (4.21)
Eastern Europe	12	5.662	7.543	0.083	0.083	4 (0.76)
North America	3	9.566	54.854	0.00	0.000	0 (0.00)
South America	10	9.743	16.517	0.900	1.211	9 (9.47)
Russia & Newly Independent States	9	10.74	36.643	0.778	1.944	7 (7.37)
Southeast Asia	7	11.662	78.439	1.000	1.667	7 (7.37)
Sub-Saharan Africa	31	12.231	69.393	1.710	4.213	53 (55.79)
South Asia	8	12.233	71.374	0.875	1.268	7 (7.37)
East Asia	4	12.267	35.713	0.000	0.000	0 (0.00)
Central Asia	3	12.907	28.164	0.667	0.333	2 (2.11)
Middle East & North Africa	15	17.309	104.676	0.133	0.267	2 (2.11)
Total:	134	9.983	58.119	0.709	1.817	95

Percentages are in parentheses. Data comes from Quality of Government (2011) and Marshall & Marshall (2012).

their coefficients, for all three variables, the presence of one of those three types of institutions in a state increases the number of coups that occur within a given year. Thus, the presence of smaller winning coalitions increases the number of coups a state will experience within a given year. As for all the other control variables included within the Models, i.e. Interstate Conflict, Internal Conflict, and Cold War, no significance was found.

Although originally proposed to be included within the zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression, Military Rents could not be predicted, as there were only observations for 134 states over the span of time between 1990 and 2011. However, Military Rents appears to have a correlation with the occurrence of coups when looking at the average spending along with the aggregate and average number of coups d'état that occur by region, as shown in Table. 4.3. Although regions are often associated with explaining why coups happen in some states and not others, the choice to look at rents regionally in this study was for the sake of ease of interpretation. The regions are defined by the University of Maryland's regional coding for their

Terrorism Dataset, as the regional code from the Correlates of War only specifies five regions, whereas the previous specifies the thirteen regions listed on Table 4.3.⁶ As Table 4.3 shows, for regions whose average spending on the military from the government budget was below the overall average, 9.98% of the government budget, experienced fewer occurrences of coups. However, the region South America has a slightly higher frequency of coups than all other regions below the average. This may be more related to the issue of the types of coups they are experiencing, as Latin American coups may be more often than not perpetrated by the military (Needler, 1966). Thus, with such low spending, the rents may not be enough to satisfy the elites in the military and avoid coups occurring in the first place. For regions above the average, there is a higher frequency of coups occurring in only one region, Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, this spending could be indicative of states attempting to stave off the threat of coups by investing in the military to either appease the elites in the military or insulate the government from non-military elites.

Overall, both proposed hypotheses appear to be supported in different ways. The first hypothesis, which proposes the idea that more loyalty between the people and the government decreases the probability a coup d'état will occur, is supported from the Full model findings for Loyalty, as increased civilian interaction increases the likelihood that a state will be coup-proof, or part of the certain zero group. However, the findings for Loyalty in the Constant-Only model, which show that increased civilian interaction also increases the number of coups a state will experience, begs the question of whether the proposed Loyalty measure is capturing all aspects of direct relationship between the government and the people. In the following section, solutions to this issue for future research will be proposed. As for the second hypothesis, which proposes the idea that economic instability increases the probability a coup d'état will occur, is supported from the Constant-Only model. While a stable economy is not necessarily associated with coup-proofing, short-term economic changes were found to have an effect on the number of coups a

⁶ For a list of states specified within each region, please refer to the Appendix.

state will experiencing, as a decrease in the GDP growth results in an increase in the number coups a state will experience with a given year. However, as in most research, in the process of attempting to answer some research questions new questions have arisen, which will be addressed in the following section.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

With regards to the empirical findings, this thesis finds evidence to support the hypotheses and lends to the theory. According to the theory, economic instability is largely associated with triggering the occurrence of coups d'état while a more direct system of loyalty between the government and the people acts as more of a coup-proofing mechanism than a trigger. As seen with the hypothesis tests, there was evidence to support that direct systems of loyalty helps to the coup-proof of states. However, the tests also found significance for increased Loyalty in the Constant-Only Model, thus increasing the number of coups occurring within a state. Thus, direct systems of loyalty appear to help coup-proof some states, but for other cases it is associated with backsliding away from democracy through coups. As was seen with the hypothesis tests, there is support that economic instability has a role in triggering coups and is not related to coup-proofing a state. Also, the results show that social instability has a positive effect on the number of coups within a state; it is not a feature that distinguishes between those states that can experience a coup and those that do not. While some would argue that this also makes it a trigger, Social Instability was only found to be significant in the years a coup happened but not when this variable was lagged, which begs the question as to why so. Also, the exclusion of Military Rents from the models made the interpretation of rents on the occurrence of coups limited, as no predictions could be made based on the observed frequencies. Thus, when searching for answers to one research question, new questions emerge that need to be addressed in future research, each of which will be addressed.

The first area of improvement deals with the operationalization of the concept of Loyalty. Although the variable used here, the competitiveness of participation variable from Polity IV, captures some aspects of the concept of a direct relationship between the government in the people, it does not fully capture all of the aspects associated with this relationship in the theory and would need to be further expanded in future studies. In Wintrobe's analysis of China, another element of loyalty had to do with the nature of the market system present in the state,

which was not addressed in the variable Loyalty in this study. For future research, other measures would need to be included to fully capture the nature of the economic relationship. Some of these proposed measures would capture how much freedom people enjoy in the business sector from the involvement of the government. Levels of economic integration with other states and the freedom for foreign entities to directly invest could potentially have a positive influence on the people. By allowing the young to invest in their business at their own risk, it becomes in the best interest of the old to help facilitate the economic growth through policies that are beneficial to both the people and the government, as the politicians continue to foster the loyalty these policies create. Thus, there appears to be an economic component that was not included in the proxy for Loyalty used in this study. Proposed measures would probably be an economic competitiveness variable, designed in the same vane as the competitiveness of participation variable, that ranges from increased civilian involvement to no civilian involvement, along with measures that capture the level of fixed and fluid assets the states economy depends upon, as these may play a role in explaining the nature of rents and loyalty. This might also help eliminate an issue of the Loyalty variable appearing to be correlated with the institutions variables, as the competitiveness of participation measure is an element of the polity measures of a given state.

Another area of improvement would be to further investigate the relationship between social instability and coups. As previously mentioned, both this study's operationalization of social instability, which distinguishes strikes from riots and demonstrations, and Hiroi and Omori's operationalization, which subsumes all three into one measure, were both statistically significant in a year where coups did occur but did not have an effect on coups occurring in the following year. In order to really understand the relationship between the occurrence of coups and social instability, a deeper study would need to be implemented with regards to the timing of these domestic protests. Arguably, there is no separation from those forms of protest that occur prior to the coup and those that occur in response to the coup in the Bank's data, as his is just an aggregate total of the number of occurrences within a single year. This differentiation is

important, as the model is relating all forms of protest with increasing the number of coups in the first place. Thus, in future research there would be two steps to understanding this relationship better. First, the differentiation between those forms of protest that come before a coup and those that are in response to a coup occurring needs to be made. Second, for those forms of protest that are in response to the coup need to be coded based on whether they supported the coup, much like in the case of Venezuela where Chávez's coup of 1992 actually increased the riots and demonstrations after it failed because the people supported it, or they did not support it, like the coup later in 2002 where the demonstrations actually deposed the elites who led a successful coup. Finally, once these forms of protest are properly separated, it would be interesting to look at how the cases where riots, strikes, and demonstrations occurring before a coup affect the outcome of the coup, i.e. whether it was successful or not. Thus, for future research there needs to be more sensitivity placed on the timing of the forms of protest and their affect on the outcomes of coups in order to fully explain whether they are related to the occurrence of coups.

Finally, one more area of improvement needs to be addressed, which is the link between military rents and coups d'état. When attempting to run this variable in the models, no output could be reached due to the lack of the availability of the data. All other variables in the models had observations for almost every state included in the Quality of Government dataset, which covered all the years in which the states existed during the 1946 to 2008 time period. However, the variable for Military Rents, i.e. the percentage of the government's budget spent on the military, was much more limited both on which states and which years the data were available, as the time period available was between 1990 and 2010. Thus, this may have affected the estimates lack of convergence, as too many observations were excluded because of the limited timespan and the limited number of states observed. For future research, filling in those gaps in time and space or a new proxy variable would need to be used in order to get a better predictive interpretation of this relationship on the occurrence of coups.

Ultimately, this thesis has presented a new perspective for the understanding of why coups d'état occur in some states but not others. Often times, the association is made between the types of institutions present and the past history of undemocratic regime change are cited with being responsible for the occurrence of coups. However, building off Wintrobe's observations from his case study of Communist China and pre-World War I Japan and the logic of Hiroi and Omori in their study of the triggers of coups, two distinct relationships are cited as being relevant to the study of coups: economic growth and social stability. However, this study finds that economic instability plays a role in triggering coups, as the elites are more sensitive to short-term changes in the overall economic growth trajectories, and a direct system of loyalty, which can theoretically dispel forms of protest by providing people more of an effect in the government's decision-making process, has more to do with coup-proofing a state rather than triggering coups.

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Appendix

1. List of states and years with more than one coup d'état observed in a single year:

2 Coups d'État:

Argentina 1971
Azerbaijan 1995
Bangladesh 1975
Benin 1972
Bolivia 1970, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1981
Burundi 1966, 1993, 2001
Cambodia 1976
Chad 1992
Chile 1973
Cote d'Ivoire 1995
Democratic Republic of Congo 1992
Dominican Republic 1965
Ethiopia 1974, 1977
Fiji 2000
Gambia 1994
Ghana 1979
Greece 1967
Guinea-Bissau 2008
Haiti 1988, 1989, 1991
Iran 1953, 1980
Iraq 1963, 1968, 1991
Liberia 1994
Nigeria 1966
Peru 1948
Philippines 1987

Portugal 1974, 1975
Sierra Leone 1992, 1996
South Vietnam 1964
Sudan 1959, 1985
Syria 1949, 1963, 1966
Thailand 1951, 1977
Venezuela 1992

3 Coups d'État:

Afghanistan 1979
Argentina 1955
Guatemala 1982
Liberia 1980
Nepal 1960
Paraguay 1948
South Vietnam 1965
Suriname 1980

4 Coups d'État:

Afghanistan 1973
Congo 1968
Togo 1991

5 Coups d'État:

Iraq 1965

2. University of Maryland's regional codes based off the Terrorism Database Codebook (pg. 19-20):

North America (1):

Canada, Mexico, United States

Central America & Caribbean (2):

Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bonaire (Netherlands Antilles), Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao (Netherlands Antilles), Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Saba (Netherlands Antilles), Sint Eustatius (Netherlands Antilles), Sint Maarten (Netherlands Antilles), St. Barthelemy, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, Virgin Islands (British) , Virgin Islands (U.S.)

South America (3):

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

East Asia (4):

China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Tibet

Southeast Asia (5):

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

South Asia (6):

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka

Central Asia (7):

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Western Europe (8):

Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Isle of Man, Monaco, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican City, West Germany (FRG)

Eastern Europe (9):

Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia

Middle East & North Africa (10):

Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen

Sub-Saharan Africa (11):

Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS) (12):

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Soviet Union, Ukraine

Australasia & Oceania (13):

Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa (Western Samoa), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna