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Mahdokhat Afravi  
*The University of Texas at El Paso*, mafra@miners.utep.edu

Vladik Kreinovich  
*The University of Texas at El Paso*, vladik@utep.edu

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What If We Use Different “And”-Operations in the Same Expert System

Mahdokht Afravi and Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
500 W. University
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
mafravi@miners.utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu

Abstract—In expert systems, we often face a problem of estimating the expert’s degree of confidence in a composite statement $A \& B$ based on the known expert’s degrees of confidence $a = d(A)$ and $b = d(B)$ in individual statements $A$ and $B$. The corresponding estimate $f_{\&}(a, b)$ is sometimes called an “and”-operation. Traditional fuzzy logic assumes that the same “and”-operation is applied to all pairs of statements. In this case, it is reasonable to justify that the “and”-operation be associative; such “and”-operations are known as t-norms. In practice, however, in different areas, different “and”-operations provide a good description of expert reasoning. As a result, when we combine expert knowledge from different areas into a single expert system, it is reasonable to use different “and”-operations to combine different statements. In this case, associativity is no longer a natural requirement. We show, however, that in such situations, under some reasonable conditions, associativity of each “and”-operation can still be deduced. Thus, in this case, we can still use associative t-norms.

I. “AND”-OPERATIONS WHY AND HOW: A BRIEF REMINDER

Need for expert systems. In many practical situations, we reply on expert knowledge:

- we ask medical experts to help cure patients,
- we ask human expert in piloting to pilot planes, etc.

Ideally, everyone should have access to the top experts: top experts in medicine should cure all the patients, top pilots should pilot every plane, etc. However, there are very few best experts, and it is not realistic to expect these top experts to satisfy all the demands.

It is therefore desirable to describe the knowledge of the top experts inside a computer, so that other experts can use this knowledge. These descriptions are known as expert systems.

Need for degrees of certainty. Experts are usually not 100% certain about their statements. For example, a medical expert may indicate some visible signs of a heart attack, but the experts understand that there is no way, based only on the visible signs, to know with absolute certainty whether a patient is experiencing a heart attack.

To make adequate decisions, the expert system must not only store the experts’ statement, it must also adequately store the experts’ degrees of certainty in these statements; see, e.g., [12], [18], [26].

How degrees of certainty are usually represented. In the absence of uncertainty, an expert either knows that a given statement is true, or knows that this statement is false. In the computer, “true” is usually represented as 1, and “false” as 0.

It is therefore reasonable to describe intermediate degrees of certainty by numbers intermediate between 0 and 1.

Need for “and”-operations. One of the main objectives of an expert system is to help decision maker make decisions. Decisions are rarely based on a single expert statement; usually, two or more statements are used to argue for the proper decision.

For example, in the medical case, what we want is, given the symptoms (and test results, if available), to come up with an appropriate cure. However, medical rules rarely go from symptoms directly to cure. Usually, some rules describe a diagnosis based on the symptoms, and other rules describe a cure based on the diagnosis. So, to decide on an appropriate cure based on given symptoms, we must use at least two rules: a rule describing the diagnosis, and a rule selecting a cure based on the diagnosis.

It is desirable not just to make a recommendation, but also to estimate the degree of our certainty in this recommendation. For a recommendation based on several statements, we are certain in this recommendation if we are certain in all the statements used in deriving this recommendation. Thus, the degree to which we are confident is a given recommendation is the degree to which all these statements hold, i.e., to which the first statement holds and the second statement holds, etc.

Thus, not only we need to know the degrees to which each statement hold, we also need to know the degrees to which each possible “and”-combination of these statement hold. Ideally, we should elicit, from the experts, the degrees to which each such combination holds. However, this is not practically possible: for $n$ statements, we can have $2^n - (n + 1)$ possible combinations, so even for a reasonable value $n \approx 100$, we have an astronomical number of combinations.

Since we cannot elicit the degrees for all “and”-combinations directly from the experts, we must therefore estimate these degrees based on the known expert’s degrees of confidence in the component statements. In other words, we need to be able, given the expert’s degrees $a = d(A)$ and
In two statements A and B, to come up with an estimate for the expert’s degree of confidence in the “and”-combination A & B. This estimate – depending on a and b – will be denoted by \( f_k(a, b) \); it is known as an “and”-operation.

**t-norms.** Usually, we assume that the same “and”-operation can be used for all possible pairs of statements \((A, B)\). Under this assumption, we get reasonable requirements on the “and”-operation.

For example, since \( A \& B \) means the same as \( B \& A \), it is reasonable to require that the “and”-operation should be commutative.

Similarly, since \( A \& (B \& C) \) means the same as \((A \& B) \& C\), we should get the same estimate if we apply the “and”-operation to both expressions, i.e., we should have

\[
f_k(a, f_k(b, c)) = f_k(f_k(a, b), c).
\]

In mathematical terms, this means that the “and”-operation should be associative.

If \( A \) or \( B \) is absolutely true (e.g., if \( a = d(A) = 1 \)), then our degree of belief in \( A \& B \) should be equal to our degree of belief in the remaining statement:

\[
f_k(1, b) = b \quad \text{and} \quad f_k(a, 1) = a.
\]

If \( A \) or \( B \) is absolutely false, i.e., either \( a = 0 \) or \( b = 0 \), then, of course, the “and”-combination \( A \& B \) should be false too, so we must have

\[
f_k(a, 0) = f_k(0, b) = 0
\]

for all \( a \) and \( b \).

It is also reasonable to require that small changes in the degrees \( a \) and \( b \) only lead to small changes in the estimate, i.e., in mathematical terms, that the function \( f_k(a, b) \) be continuous.

Finally, if we increase our degree of confidence in \( A \) and/or \( B \), this should either increase our degree of confidence in \( A \& B \) or at least keep it the same. Thus, if \( a \leq a’ \) and \( b \leq b’ \), we should have \( f_k(a, b) \leq f_k(a’, b’) \). In mathematical terms, this means that the “and”-operation should be monotonic.

“And”-operations that satisfy these requirements are known as **t-norms.**

**Additional requirement and Archimedean t-norms.** If one of the degrees is 0 (e.g., if \( a = d(A) = 0 \)), then increasing our degree of confidence in another statement does not change the estimate for \( A \& B \): even if \( b < b’ \), we still have \( f_k(a, b) = f_k(a, b’) \), since both these values are equal to 0.

However, if none of the degree is equal to 0, then it is reasonable to require that an increase in degrees in \( A \) or \( B \) will increase our degree of confidence in \( A \& B \): if \( a > 0 \) and \( b < b’ \), then \( f_k(a, b) < f_k(a, b’) \).

**Archimedean t-norms are universal approximators.** Not all t-norms are Archimedean: e.g., \( f_k(a, b) = \min(a, b) \) is not an Archimedean t-norm, but it can be proven that every t-norm can be approximated, with any given accuracy, by an Archimedean one; see, e.g., [17].

Since in practice, the degrees are known with some accuracy anyway, this universal approximation result means that without losing any generality, we can always assume that our t-norms are Archimedean.

**General form an Archimedean t-norm.** It is known that a general Archimedean t-norm can be obtained form

\[
f_k(a, b) = a \cdot b
\]

by an appropriate re-scaling, i.e., it has the form

\[
f_k(a, b) = g^{-1}(g(a) \cdot g(b))
\]

for some 1-1 continuous function \( g : [0, 1] \to [0, 1] \).

**Possibility of an inverse operation.** When \( a \leq b \), then, for a multiplication t-norm \( f_k(a, b) = a \cdot b \), there exists a unique degree \( c \) for which \( a = f_k(b, c) \); namely, \( c = a/b \). This inverse operation corresponds to implication \( \supset \); \( B \supset A \) is such a statement that, when we combine it with \( B \), we get \( A \).

When \( a > b \), then such an inverse operation is not defined on the interval \([0, 1]\), but, since we have assumed strict monotonicity (i.e., the Archimedean property), we can naturally extend multiplication to the whole set of possible numbers. In this case, the inverse operation \( a/b \) is always uniquely defined for non-zero degrees.

Likewise, for all other Archimedean t-norms, we can get a similar extension if we extend the function \( g(a) \) to the set of all real numbers.

**II. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM**

**Need for different “and”-operations.** There are many different “and”-operations. In each area, we should select the one which is the best fit for the reasoning for experts from this area.

The first experience of selecting the appropriate “and”-operation came when researchers designed the world’s first expert system MYCIN that collected expertise about rare blood diseases [7]. At first, the authors of MYCIN thought that their “and”-operations reflect the general features of human reasoning. However, when they tried to apply the same formulas to geophysical experts, it turned out that expertise of geophysicists corresponds to completely different “and”-operations.

It is now well known that in different control situations, different “and”-operations are most adequate – this depends, e.g., on whether we are interested in making smooth transitions or in the fastest way to achieve the goal; see, e.g., [16], [21].
Do we have instead of associativity? Suppose that we have four different types of statements in general, each with its own set of possible degrees $V_1$, $V_2$, and $V_3$. We want to use the fact that for these two statements, we get the same estimate. The difference in the case when we use a single operation $f$ is that now, in general, we have one "and" and one "or" operation. These operations are drawn from $V_1$ and $V_2$. We also do not necessarily assume that the degree of confidence from different areas are described by the same set of degrees. In general, these sets $V_1$, $V_2$, and $V_3$ can be all different.

What do we have instead of associativity? Suppose that we have four different types of statements in general, each with its own set of possible degrees $V_1$, $V_2$, and $V_3$. We want to use the fact that for these two statements, we get the same estimate. The difference in the case when we use a single operation $f$ is that now, in general, we have one "and" and one "or" operation. These operations are drawn from $V_1$ and $V_2$. We also do not necessarily assume that the degree of confidence from different areas are described by the same set of degrees. In general, these sets $V_1$, $V_2$, and $V_3$ can be all different.

**Proposition.** For every set of invertible operations that satisfy the associative requirement, there exists an Abelian group $G$ and $1$ mappings $r : V_a \to G$ and $r : V_b \to G$ such that for all $a \in V_a$ and $b \in V_b$, we have:

- $f_{r(a), r(b)}(x) = r^{-1}(g_{r(a)(x), r(b)}(r(x)))$.

**Definition 1.** A function $f : V_x \times V_y \to V_z$ is called invertible if for every $a \in V_x$ and $b \in V_y$, there exists a unique value $c \in V_z$ such that $f(a, b) = c$.

**Definition 2.** Let $V_x$, $V_y$, and $V_z$ be sets. We say that $V_x$ is invertible if for every $a \in V_x$ and $b \in V_y$, we have:

- $f_{r(a), r(b)}(x) = r^{-1}(g_{r(a)(x), r(b)}(r(x)))$.

**Discussion.** The main result of this section is as follows: When we combine $A$ and $B$ in any problem, we need to recall that a set $G$ with an associative operation $g$ is called an Abelian group if $g$ is commutative. A group in which the operation $g(a, b)$ is commutative is called an Abelian group $G$. In Abelian groups, the operation is associative and the inverse of each element exists. The proof of this statement is in effect, contained in [2], [3], [4], [23], [24], [25].

**Proof.** The proof of this statement is in effect, contained in [2], [3], [4], [23], [24], [25].

**Inverse operations.** In the general case, it is no longer reasonable to require strict monotonicity. Thus, it is still reasonable to require that each "and"-operation can be extended to a large domain so that it becomes reversible after we exclude the degree 0. In this case, this corresponds to the definition of a function $f$.

**Towards solving the problem.** In such situations, associativity is no longer a reasonable requirement. Since we may use different "and"-operations to combine degrees corresponding to statements from different disciplines.

**Question.** So what can we conclude in such a situation?
Discussion. Thus, after appropriate re-scalings \( r_i \), all the “and”-operations reduce to associative operation \( g(a, b) \).

Conclusion. So, even if we have several different “and”-operations, and we can no longer directly justify associativity, associativity can still be deduced from the natural generalized associativity requirement.

IV. POSSIBLE APPLICATION TO COPULAS: AN ARGUMENT FOR USING ASSOCIATIVE COPULAS

What is a copula. Similar “and”-operations are used in the probabilistic case. Specifically, a 1-D probability distribution of a random variable \( X \) can be described by its cumulative distribution function (cdf) \( F_X(x) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{Prob}(X \leq x) \).

A 2-D distribution of a random vector \( (X, Y) \) can be similarly described by its 2-D cdf \( F_{XY}(x, y) = \text{Prob}(X \leq x & Y \leq y) \).

It turns out that we can always describe \( F(x, y) \) as

\[
F_{XY}(x, y) = C_{XY}(F_X(x), F_Y(y))
\]

for an appropriate function \( C_{XY} : [0, 1] \times [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \) known as a copula; see, e.g., [15], [20].

For a joint distribution of several random variables \( X, Y, \ldots, Z \), we can similarly write

\[
F_{XYZ}(x, y, z) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \text{Prob}(X \leq x \& Y \leq y \& \ldots \& Z \leq z) = C_{XYZ}(F_X(x), F_Y(y), \ldots, F_Z(z))
\]

for an appropriate multi-D copula \( C_{XYZ} \).

Vine copulas. When we have many \( n \geq 1 \) random variables, then to exactly describe their joint distribution, we need to describe a general function of \( n \) variables. Even if we use two values for each variable, we get \( 2^n \) combinations, which for large \( n \) can be astronomically large. Thus, a reasonable idea is to approximate the multi-D distribution.

A reasonable way to approximate is to use 2-D copulas. For example, to describe a joint distribution of three variables \( X, Y, \) and \( Z \), we first describe the joint distribution of \( X \) and \( Y \) as \( F_{XY}(x, y) = C_{XY}(F_X(x), F_Y(y)) \), and then use an appropriate copula \( C_{XY,Z} \) to combine it with \( F_Z(z) \): \( F_{XYZ}(x, y, z) \approx C_{XY,Z}(F_{XY}(x, y), F_Z(z)) = C_{XY,Z}(C_{XY}(F_X(x), F_Y(y)), F_Z(z)) \).

Such an approximation, when copulas are applied to one another like a vine, are known as vine copulas; see, e.g., [1], [5], [6], [8], [9], [10], [11], [13], [14], [19], [22].

Natural analogue of associativity. It is reasonable to require that the result of the vine copula approximation should not depend on the order in which we combine the variables. In particular, for four random variables \( X, Y, Z, \) and \( T \), we should get the same result in the following two situations:

- if we first combine \( X \) with \( Y, Z \) with \( T \), and then combine the two results; or

- if we first combine \( X \) with \( Z, Y \) with \( T \), and then combine the two results.

Thus, we require that for all possible real numbers \( x, y, z, \) and \( t \), we get

\[
C_{XY, ZT}(C_{XY}(F_X(x), F_Y(y)), C_{ZT}(F_Z(z), F_T(t))) = C_{XZ, YT}(C_{XZ}(F_X(x), F_Z(z)), C_{YT}(F_Y(y), F_T(t))).
\]

If we denote \( a = F_X(x), b = F_Y(y), c = F_Z(z), \) and \( d = F_T(t) \), we conclude that for every \( a, b, c, \) and \( d \), we have

\[
C_{XY, ZT}(C_{XY}(a, b), C_{ZT}(c, d)) = C_{XZ, YT}(C_{XZ}(a, c), C_{YT}(b, d)).
\]

This is exactly our generalized associativity requirement. Thus, if we assume that the copulas are invertible, we conclude that they can be re-scaled to associative operations – in the sense of the above Theorem.

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