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Examining the Effects of Political Trust, Attribution of Responsibility, and Media Framing on Public Support for Outside Intervention in the Mexican Drug War

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EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL TRUST, ATTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITY, AND MEDIA FRAMING ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR

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2015

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my family. A special dedication to my mother and father; without their financial and emotional support I would not be able to complete my education. To my sister and my nephew, who have always been there for me when I need them and to Paulina Diaz for her invaluable emotional support. I also dedicate this thesis to my niece in heaven, Maria Gabriela, for teaching me the important things in life.

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by

RODRIGO A. BORUNDA

THESIS

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Abstract

To what extent does the Mexican society support cooperation with foreign authorities to combat the drug cartels? Who does the Mexican society trust in combating the drug cartels? Employing survey data from the Roper Center along with original experimental data, I examine the determinants of public support for foreign cooperation to combat drug cartels. Focusing on different forms of the U.S.-Mexico cooperation, I explore which type and form of foreign intervention is most acceptable to the Mexican public. Specifically, I examine public support for the following forms of cooperation: training Mexican police and military personnel, providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military, and deploying troops in Mexico. I hypothesize that the three main factors that affect the Mexican public's support to a foreign intervention are: Mexican political trust (in the state, military, and the police), attribution of responsibility, and media framing. My empirical findings generally support my hypotheses and bear important policy implications concerning the Mexican drug war.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	v
Abstract.....	vi
Table of Contents.....	vii
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Mexican Political Trust.....	5
Chapter 3: Attribution of Responsibility.....	33
Chapter 4: Media Framing.....	44
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	57
References.....	64
Appendix.....	71
Vita.....	82

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics.....	13
Table 1.2 Multicollinearity Checks - Pairwise Correlations.....	17
Table 1.3 Multicollinearity Checks - Variance Inflation Factors	18
Table 1.4 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	18
Table 1.5 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	19
Table 1.6 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	19
Table 1.7 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	20
Table 1.8 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	20
Table 1.9 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.....	21
Table 1.10 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico	21
Table 1.11 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.	22
Table 1.12 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military. ...	23
Table 1.13 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.	23
Table 1.14 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.....	24
Table 1.15 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military. ...	25
Table 1.16 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.	25
Table 1.17 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military. ...	26
Table 1.18 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions. 27	
Table 1.19 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	28
Table 1.20 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	28
Table 1.21 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	29
Table 1.22 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	29
Table 1.23 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	30
Table 1.24 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.	30
Table 2.1 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.	40
Table 2.2 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military Personnel.....	41
Table 2.3 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Providing Money and Weapons to Mexico.	42
Table 3.1 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects	51
Table 3.2. Estimated Marginal Means by Condition	55
Table 3.3. Pairwise Comparisons of the Differences in Estimated Marginal Means	56

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 People’s Perception of Insecurity.....	8
Figure 1.2 U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico	14
Figure 1.3 U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military Personnel.....	15
Figure 1.4 U.S. Proving Money to Mexican Institutions.....	16
Figure 3.1 Support for U.S. Conducting Investigations in Mexican Territory.....	52
Figure 3.2 Perceived Violation of Mexican Sovereignty by the U.S.....	53
Figure 3.3 Levels of Approval for U.S. Training Mexican Authorities.	54

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since 2006, Mexico has been involved in a drug war that seems to be difficult to win, and trapped in the middle of the war are the Mexican people. The war against drugs launched by former Mexican President Felipe Calderón has called the attention of many people to the Mexican-U.S. border area. More than 100,000 people lost their lives since the war began in 2006 (México Evalúa, 2013). The Mexican government blames the U.S. government for many of the deaths, arguing that weapons that kill Mexicans come from the U.S.; at the same time the U.S. argues that drugs are being smuggled from Mexico. Given that this is a bi-national problem, I argue that both countries must work together in order to achieve peace in Mexico. Employing survey data from the Roper Center along with original experimental data, I examine the determinants of public support for foreign cooperation in combatting drug cartels. Focusing on different forms of the U.S.-Mexico cooperation, I explore which type and form of foreign intervention are most acceptable to the Mexican public. Specifically, I examine public support for the following forms of cooperation: training Mexican police and military personnel, providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military, and deploying troops in Mexico. I hypothesize that the three main factors that affect the Mexican public's support for a foreign intervention are: Mexican political trust (in the state, military, and the police), attribution of responsibility, and media framing.

My major research questions in the study are: to what extent does the Mexican society accept foreign cooperation with Mexican authorities to combat the drug cartels? What type of cooperation is the Mexican society willing to accept from the United States? Does the Mexican society believe that the U.S. will attain a viable solution to the drug war? Who does the Mexican

society trust in combating the drug cartels? How does media framing affect the Mexican public opinion regarding U.S. cooperation with Mexican authorities to combat the drug cartels?

The second chapter of my thesis is on the role political trust plays in shaping Mexican public attitudes cooperation with the U.S. in combating the Mexican drug cartels. My hypothesis is that lower trust for Mexican institutions leads to higher support for international cooperation. My first chapter will examine political trust in Mexico and discuss why Mexican people do not believe that the Mexican government is making progress in the war on drugs. By using data from the Roper Center, I measure the level of political trust in different political institutions. This thesis will be the first to use quantitative methods to analyze how political trust in Mexico affects the Mexican public's level of support for foreign cooperation in the war against drugs. There are some qualitative studies on political trust in Mexico, but they focus on issues such as electoral frauds in Mexico and corruption in governmental institutions (Payan, 2006), and no study has focused on Mexico's political trust in various governmental institutions (Camp, 1999; Cornelius, 1999; Eisenstadt, 2003). As such, this thesis significantly contributes to the knowledge about Mexican trust in the military, the federal and local police, the judicial system, and Mexican government as a whole.

The third chapter of my thesis is on the attribution of responsibility, where I explore Mexican public opinion on who is most blamed for the violence in Mexico: the Mexican government, the U.S. government, or both governments. This factor is crucial for explaining whether people are willing to accept a foreign cooperation in the drug war. By using data from the Roper Center, I measure the levels of attribution of responsibility. In which I hypothesize that the higher attribution of responsibility to the Mexican government in the drug war, will lead to higher support for U.S. cooperation in Mexico to combat the drug cartels. The intention of this

chapter is to explore who the Mexican people blame and how no institution or government wants to take responsibility in the Mexican drug war.

The fourth chapter of my thesis is on the effects of media framing on Mexican public attitudes on U.S.-Mexico cooperation on war on drugs. The media framing of the news in Mexico may affect people's opinion about the drug war. To analyze whether the media framing regarding the issue of cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. authorities in the war on drugs will change people's support for or opposition to the binational cooperation, I conducted an experiment in which I used a mock article. Using a convenience sample, mostly Mexican students at the University of Texas at El Paso, I exposed the students to a mock news article about the binational cooperation between Mexico and U.S. One group of respondents were exposed to a positive news article that reported the successful relationship between Mexican and U.S. authorities in combating the drug cartels. The second group was exposed to the same news article but, modified to frame such cooperation between Mexican and U.S. authorities in the drug war as a failure instead of success. In the questionnaire following the exposure to the mock article, the students were asked about their opinion on the U.S.-Mexico cooperation, specifically their opinion about U.S. agents conducting investigations in Mexico and their support for the following forms of cooperation: U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel, U.S. providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military, U.S. deploying troops in Mexico, and their perception of Mexican sovereignty violation. The experimental findings demonstrate that media framing is indeed a significant factor in shaping Mexican public opinion on the drug war and support for bi-national cooperation.

In the final chapter of my thesis, I first review the results of my analyses, explaining my findings and what I found statistically significant, as long as the result of my experiment. I then

discuss the policy implications of my empirical findings, in which the Mexican government has implemented new policies to allow foreign law enforcement agents to carry weapons in Mexico. Last, I offer future avenues of research, there is a lot of issues that must be researched in the Mexican government and the cooperation with U.S. authorities, Mexico is currently living in a period of turmoil, which is going to open many avenues of research.

Chapter 2: Mexican Political Trust

Why does political trust matter in the war against drugs? It matters because any strategy implemented by the federal, state, and local governments must include the input of the citizens in it. Without the trust of the people, it is difficult to create a policy that can combat criminal organizations. When citizens fail to cooperate with authorities, it facilitates an environment of criminality, corruption, a culture of non-reporting, and ineffective policing (Sabet, 2013).

In Mexico, there is a high correlation between perceptions of corruption and trust in political institutions. As Uslaner (2010) points out, income inequality leads to low trust in governmental institutions and a higher perception of corruption. Those who do not trust Mexican politicians, institutions, police, and the judicial system tend to believe that they are corrupt, and people who believe that authorities are corrupt tend to distrust such institutions (Morris and Klesner, 2010). Transparency International (IT, 2011), in their corruption scale from 0 to 10 where 0 represents the most corrupted country and 10 as the least corrupted country, classifies Mexico as a 3. Mexico ranks 100 according to this scale, which includes 182 countries. According to this index of corruption, Mexican people do not have so much confidence in their institutions.¹

¹ Transparency International's methods for measuring corruption: the 2011 index draws on assessments and opinion surveys carried out by independent and reputable institutions. These surveys and assessments include questions related to the bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and the effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. Perceptions are used because corruption is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure.

According to Nieto (2012, 34), Mexico's campaign against drug trafficking is similar to the campaign against corruption, which is launched to create respect for the executive power, obtain international resources, gain international legitimacy and attract foreign investment, without really combating drug trafficking. There has not been much improvement in the war against cartels, and even when there are some improvements, the Mexican government gets involved in circumstances that put in doubt the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government's actions. For instance, several drug lords' bodies have disappeared at the hands of the government. To illustrate, several media sources reported the case of Heriberto Lazcano, former leader of the Zetas cartel, whose body and the DNA tests were stolen after being killed by Mexican federal police. The New York Times (2012) headline about this incidence was "Mexico Kills a Drug Kingpin, but the Body Gets Away." Discrepancies between U.S.-Mexico authorities over Lazcano's body creates uncertainty about the truth. The DEA on its official webpage states that Lazcano is 1.72 meters high, but the PGR (Mexico Federal Attorney) stated on the official autopsy that the body was 1.60 meters high (La Jornada, 2012). Such types of situations where the bodies of cartel leaders disappear, or the arrested cartel leaders do not look like the men shown in pictures, create distrust and lead to conspiracy theories, which in turn affect the credibility of governmental institutions.

Mexicans lost their faith in the capacity of the state and its institutions to restore justice (Gibler, 2011). Three out of four crimes in Mexico are not being reported and only two percent of the crimes reported result in a sentence (Shirk, 2011). Most people feel impotent to influence policy and policy makers; their protests have not been heard; their attempts to reach policy makers have not made any effect (Grayson, 2011). When people have the perception that the architects of policies are untrustworthy, people will reject the policies implemented by these


policy makers, but when people perceive that policy makers are trustworthy, people are more likely to support those policies (Hetherington, 2005). Mexican people do not feel heard by the policy makers, and it makes them lose their trust. So far, Mexican people tend to reject policies implemented, because they feel excluded from them.

For decades, Mexican police institutions had operated in collusion with criminal organizations. There have been multiple high profile cases in which federal agents from the Agencia Federal de Investigaciones (AFI, equivalent to the FBI) were found to be working for drug cartels (Ainslie, 2013). There is massive distrust in the criminal justice system and feelings of worry about police impunity by the Mexican people. Corruption is a difficult problem in any country, but in Mexico the problem is even worse; police are often involved in crimes, leading to reluctance to report such crimes (Staudt, 2009). A survey conducted by ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad) in 2010 showed that 89 percent of the population has no trust in local police, and 75 percent has no confidence in the federal police. The survey also asked about people's perceptions on police effectiveness; 57 percent found the federal police effective, 44 percent found state police had little or no effectiveness, and 63 percent found local police had little or no effectiveness. According to the Latinobarometer data, the trust in Congress remained stable in the low 30 percent during the first years of the drug war. Trust in the military institutions, by comparison, increased dramatically from 35 percent of public trust in 2006, to 56 percent of public trust in 2009. Meanwhile the trust in the police decreased by about 10 percent from 2006 to 2009 (Latinobarometer, 2011).

Ainslie (2013) interviewed former Juárez city mayor Reyes Ferriz and inquired whether the drug cartels had permitted his election. In that interview, Ferriz stated that the cartels did not care about his victory or loss. The cartels did not need him, since they had control of the

municipal police. In February 2011, the mayor of Juárez announced that he would welcome ICE agents in the city to help the local police (Gómez-Licón, 2011). The CIA began working with the Mexican military in 2011 to gather information on drug cartels and plan binational cooperation against the cartels (Thompson and Mazzetti, 2011). In collaboration with the Mexican authorities, the United States also began using drones over Mexican territory to locate and track smuggling networks in Mexico (Thompson and Mazzetti, 2011; Reece Jones, 2012).

It is thus difficult for Mexicans to trust their police since even the mayor of the city (who decided to reside in El Paso, Texas instead of the city he serves in due to safety concerns) declares that the criminal organizations control the police. Such actions hurt not only people's political trust but also their sense of existential security. Indeed, a survey conducted by ICESI in 2010 revealed that Mexican people do not feel safe. Chihuahua is the state with the highest level of perceived insecurity among people: about 88 percent of the population feels insecure. Second is Mexico City, with 85 percent, Sinaloa 83 percent, Nuevo León 82 percent and Durango at 80 percent. The Mexican states feeling most insecure are those in the northern area of the country, where the drug war has been leading to more casualties (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011).



(Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad, 2010)

Figure 1.1 People's Perception of Insecurity.

The trust in the military is likely to be somewhat higher than other institutions (Pérez, 2007). Using the military to carry out the mission of combating the drug cartels enhanced the likelihood that people would view this strategy in a more positive way (Camp, 2011, 158). This can be partly because of Mexico's history; in comparison to other Latin American countries, there has not been a military dictator in Mexico's contemporary history. The military has not been involved as an active force to maintain order in the country; with the only exception of the use of military personnel in the drug war (Pérez, 2007). Paradoxically, the Mexican army since 2006 in Ciudad Juárez has generated some 1,500 human rights violations complaints, by far more than those of the federal police. The complaints against the army include tortures and murders, but most of them comprise abuse of power and forced entry (Ainslie, 2013).

Trust has also been a problem in the electoral system in Mexico. Such lack of trust led to some electoral reforms in 1994, resulting in the creation of the IFE (Instituto Federal Electoral), an independent electoral institution to regulate the elections, which generally maintained a high percentage of approval (Morris and Klesner, 2010). However, after the election in 2006, people's support for the IFE fell from 74 percent to 56 percent, due to many allegations of corruption and electoral manipulation (Fox, 2007). In 2014, IFE changed its name to INE (Instituto Nacional Electoral) which many argue is a consequence of trust issues.

Mexico has a long history of electoral fraud in the presidential campaigns. For instance, there were fraud allegations in the presidential elections of 1988, in which Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas denounced that the presidency was stolen from him; the winner was Carlos Salinas from the PRI party (Magaloni, 2006). Similar accusations of fraud were placed in the 2006 presidential election, in which López Obrador officially lost the election by a hair. López Obrador challenged the official results by paralyzing half of Mexico's federal districts with protests for months. His

challenges to the election created awareness regarding the necessity to reinforce the electoral institutions (Eisenstadt, 2007). With the 2014 Mexico's electoral reform, as mentioned above, the IFE was replaced by the INE (Instituto Nacional Electoral) with the purpose to gain more confidence of the population by lowering the expenses of the electoral institutions (La Jornada, 2014). The electoral fraud accusations have an important impact on political trust levels; people can perceive that those holding governmental offices are not being elected by the people and thus lack accountability, which can create an environment of distrust in the government.

The connection between drug lords and high political officers is very common in Mexico, which is the case of former governor of the state of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva, who was arrested by the PGR (Procuraduría General de la República, Mexican Federal Attorney) in 2001 accused of having relations with the Juárez Cartel (Ravelo, 2011). During former Mexican President Carlos Salinas' term, drug trafficking increased dramatically. Even his brother, Raúl Salinas, was accused of money laundering for drug cartels and his assets were frozen by Swiss government (Del Ponte, 1999). The list of Mexican officials involved in the drug trafficking is long, which makes it all the more difficult for the people of Mexico to trust in their politicians. Penetration of drug cartels in governmental institutions thus creates further distrust in the society (Shelley, 2001).

In the year 2010, most of the Mexicans did not believe that the government would be able to defeat the drug cartels (Camp, 2011). GEA-ISA, one of the most prestigious web-based survey firms, reported that 16 percent of the population believes that the Mexican government is winning the war against drugs; meanwhile 35 percent of the population perceives that criminals are winning the war, and 51 percent of the population are unsure of who is winning the war. Another survey made by "Buendía and Laredo" in August 2011 shows similar results (Guerrero-

Gutiérrez, 2011). The fact that Mexican people believe that the drug cartels are winning the war against drugs suggests that people do not believe in the Mexican government's campaign to promote the image that the federal government is doing enough to combat the drug trafficking: only 16 percent trust in the government when it claims there has been progress combating the drug trafficking.

In short, political trust is essential for Mexico in the combat against the drug cartels, because without the trust of the people, it is difficult to create an effective policy that can defeat criminal organizations. When citizens fail to cooperate with authorities, it facilitates an environment of criminality, corruption, and ineffective policing. With these considerations in mind, I hypothesize that lower political trust in the Mexican government will lead to higher support for U.S. cooperation concerning the Mexican drug war. I discuss my research design to test this hypothesis and the operationalization of the variables I employ in my analytical model in the methodology section.

Political Trust Data Analysis

In order to test my hypothesis, I conduct logistic regression analyses. I employ data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, which is one of the world's leading archives of social science data, specializing in surveys of public opinion. The survey I use for my analyses is named "Pew Research Center Poll: Global Attitudes Project - Spring 2013" with a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents who are adults over 18 years old (all of the survey questions I employed to measure the variables I used in my analytical models are provided in the [appendix](#)).

My dependent variables are the levels of support for the U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel, U.S. providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military, and

U.S. deploying troops in Mexico. My independent variable is the level of approval or disapproval of the way President Peña Nieto is dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, which functions as a proxy variable for political trust.² My other proxy variables for political trust in different government institutions include the levels of approval or disapproval for the government as a whole, the military, the media, the court system, the police, and the Congress, all coded 1 as very bad, 2 somewhat bad, 3 somewhat good, and 4 very good.

In addition to my main independent variables, my model includes a control for party identification. I coded this variable as 1 for PRI versus any other parties, because President Peña Nieto is from the PRI party, and the responses can be based on partisan attitudes (rather than on political trust) about President Peña Nieto dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers. By coding party identification this way, my goal is to separate the effects of partisan support for PRI and political trust in the President. To control for gender, I coded 0 as female and 1 as male. Regarding age as a control, I expect that the younger the respondent, the more likely he or she will be to accept the U.S. cooperation with Mexican authorities. The control variable for geographical area asks for the area in which the respondents live. I coded 1 as north and 0 as all else, because I expect that people living in the northern part of Mexico will be more open to the idea of the U.S. cooperating with Mexico. This is because due to the proximity with the U.S., people in the northern part of Mexico could be more familiar with and sympathetic to American culture. The control variable of income, measures one's monthly household income; it ranges across eleven categories, from 1 as less than 1,680 Mexican pesos to 11 more than 50,400 pesos. The education variable ranges across nine categories, from 1 as no formal education to 9

² Unfortunately, there is no survey data that directly measures political trust while also inquiring about binational cooperation on the Mexican drug war.

university level education with a degree. I also control for whether the respondent uses the Internet because with Internet access, the respondent might be exposed to other media channels and not only to the free television channels.

Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for the survey data I employed in my analyses. Regarding the socio-demographic profile of my overall sample, the average respondent was 41 years old with a middle school diploma and around \$3,631-\$5,445 Mexican pesos household monthly income. Approximately 47 percent of the respondents were women, 23 percent lived in the northern part of Mexico, 44 percent had Internet access, and 26 percent identified as Priístas.

Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
-----+-----					
US Troops in Mex	922	.367679	.482435	0	1
US Training Mexico	957	.7774295	.4161897	0	1
US Providing Money	924	.6006494	.4900302	0	1
Trust in President	915	.5333333	.4991605	0	1
Trust in Gov.	969	2.755418	.8630585	1	4
-----+-----					
Trust in Military	965	2.047668	.8434562	1	4
Trust in Media	960	2.7625	.8219169	1	4
Trust in Courts	950	2.384211	.9479406	1	4
Trust in Police	957	2.273772	.9352867	1	4
Trust in Congress	915	2.398907	.95489	1	4
-----+-----					
Pol. Party ID	1000	.263	.4404827	0	1
Gender	1000	.473	.4995203	0	1
Age	1000	40.732	15.45532	18	87
Geographical Region	1000	.23	.4210431	0	1
Income	792	2.829545	1.822041	1	10
-----+-----					
Education	996	4.840361	2.180687	1	9
Internet Access	995	.4442211	.4971289	0	1

Regarding the approval that President Peña Nieto has regarding the way that he deals with the drug cartels, 53 percent of the people approve of his way of handling these criminal organizations. Regarding trust in government as a whole, 51 percent of the people express

somewhat confidence. As for the military variable, 47 percent perceive the military as somewhat bad. 52 percent of the respondents have somewhat good perception of the media whereas 52 percent have somewhat bad or very bad perception of the court system. Concerning the police variable, 56 percent display somewhat bad or very bad perception while confidence in congress is split by 50 percent good perception and 50 bad perception.

As Table 1.1 shows, not every respondent answered every question. For example, regarding household monthly income, 21 percent of the respondents refused to answer this question. This makes sense because many people do not want to disclose their personal information for security reasons. As for the trust in Congress measure, 8.5 percent of the respondents refused to answer this question; this might be because of the lack of understanding about congressional duties. As such, the numbers of observations in the statistical analyses are lower than the number of participants in the survey.




Figure 1.2 U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Figure 1.2 illustrates that 36 percent of the respondents in the survey support the idea that the U.S. should deploy troops in Mexican territory to combat the drug cartels; meanwhile, 63

percent of the respondents do not approve such cooperation. This statistic makes sense in the way that Mexican society might be afraid of being under the authority of a foreign nation and lose at least some sovereignty if they allow foreign military troops on Mexican soil.




Figure 1.3 U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military Personnel

Figure 1.3 illustrates that 77 percent of the respondents in the survey support the idea of the U.S. cooperation with Mexico by training Mexican police and military personnel to combat the drug cartels; meanwhile, 22 percent of the respondents do not approve such cooperation. Mexican authorities usually lack of quality training to combat the drug cartels. Indeed, there have been many cases when the police officers and military personnel argue that the lack of quality training is one of the main obstacles to combat the drug cartels. Mexican society has to deal with the police and military on a daily basis, in which many law enforcement personnel lack the training to deal with the people and conduct their jobs in a professional and proper manner. This could be the reason why many Mexicans approve of U.S. training to the Mexican police and military personnel.




Figure 1.4 U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions

Figure 1.4 illustrates that 60 percent of the respondents in the survey support the idea that the U.S. provide money to Mexican institutions to combat the drug cartels; meanwhile 40 percent of the respondents do not approve such cooperation. The criminal organizations have a lot of economic resources to operate, and the money that the government assigns to their combat operations usually is not enough. This could explain why most of the respondents support the idea to have more economic resources to the combat of the drug cartels. The reason that 40 percent of the respondents do not support such form of cooperation can be due to their distrust in the Mexican government, and how the money would be used, potentially for corrupt purposes. Another assumption is that some people do not believe that money is the answer to combat the drug cartels, thinking that providing money to the Mexican government would not make any difference.

One may argue that trust in one institution would be similar to the level of trust of other institutions. To put it differently, if there is a low level of trust in the government as a whole, it is probable that trust in Congress would also be similarly low. This possibility raises concerns regarding the issue of multicollinearity. One way to detect whether the sample suffers from a multicollinearity problem is to check if pair-wise correlations among the explanatory variables are extremely high—in excess of 0.8 (see Gujarati, 2003). As Table 1.2 shows, none of the pair-wise correlations among the explanatory variables reach this excess point. As an alternative method to detect multicollinearity in the data, I reassessed each of the models with variance inflation factors (VIF). Overall, the mean VIF values are less than 1.6 and individual VIF values are all smaller than 2.6 (see Table 1.3), which is well below the VIF value of 10 that scholars consider to be the excess point (see Gujarati, 2003). Nevertheless, to ensure that multicollinearity does not pose any concerns in my analyses, I run separate models for my political trust variables.

Table 1.2 Multicollinearity Checks - Pairwise Correlations

	approve1	gov	military	media	courts	police	congress
approve1	1.0000						
gov	0.2116	1.0000					
military	-0.2596	-0.1817	1.0000				
media	0.1950	0.1816	-0.2041	1.0000			
courts	0.2444	0.1912	-0.2568	0.2962	1.0000		
police	0.2056	0.3974	-0.3214	0.1842	0.3830	1.0000	
congress	0.2241	0.4529	-0.3894	0.4137	0.6389	0.6983	1.0000
pparty1	0.1753	0.1631	-0.1036	0.1240	0.1352	0.1058	0.1504
gender	-0.0225	0.0166	-0.0498	-0.0279	0.0120	-0.0616	0.0167
age	-0.0112	0.0661	-0.0435	-0.0077	-0.0273	0.0875	-0.0665
region	0.0788	0.0554	0.0347	-0.0044	-0.0065	-0.0391	-0.0304
income	-0.0029	0.0526	0.0516	-0.0309	-0.0171	-0.0218	-0.0221
education	-0.0121	-0.0334	0.0289	-0.0229	-0.0500	-0.0796	-0.0684
internet	0.0269	0.1472	0.0392	-0.0857	-0.0747	0.0328	-0.0286
pparty1		gender	age	region	income	educat~n	internet
pparty1	1.0000						
gender	-0.0246	1.0000					
age	0.0476	-0.0002	1.0000				
region	0.0675	0.0486	-0.0317	1.0000			
income	-0.0231	0.0760	-0.0714	0.2659	1.0000		
education	-0.1202	0.1183	-0.3375	0.0871	0.4939	1.0000	
internet	-0.1047	0.0628	-0.3332	0.0056	0.3004	0.5335	1.0000

Table 1.3 Multicollinearity Checks - Variance Inflation Factors

. estat vif

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
-----+-----		
police	2.51	0.398910
congress	2.28	0.438034
courts	2.21	0.452498
education	1.90	0.525246
gov	1.65	0.607772
media	1.47	0.678550
internet	1.46	0.684619
income	1.45	0.689408
military	1.44	0.695008
age	1.27	0.790022
approval	1.18	0.849220
region	1.11	0.899406
pparty1	1.10	0.907897
gender	1.03	0.971449
-----+-----		
Mean VIF	1.58	

Table 1.4 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	684
	Wald chi2(8)	=	52.82
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -407.80841	Pseudo R2	=	0.0648

U.S. Troops in Mex	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
-----+-----						
Trust in President	.2505217	.1728815	1.45	0.147	-.0338431	.5348864
Pol. Party Id	.1251028	.1932885	0.65	0.517	-.1928284	.4430341
Gender	.0526426	.1697476	0.31	0.756	-.2265674	.3318525
Age	-.0317705	.0064979	-4.89	0.000	-.0424586	-.0210825
Region	.9220286	.2056747	4.48	0.000	.5837238	1.260333
Income	.0473342	.053997	0.88	0.381	-.0414829	.1361514
Education	-.0101556	.0566289	-0.18	0.858	-.1033019	.0829907
Internet Access	-.2905033	.2029175	-1.43	0.152	-.6242728	.0432662
Cons	.1844434	.4246904	0.43	0.664	-.5141101	.8829969

Table 1.5 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	715
	Wald chi2(8)	=	50.47
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -426.71357	Pseudo R2	=	0.0590

		Robust					
U.S. Troops in Mex		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Government		.2104646	.0942983	2.23	0.026	.0553577	.3655714
Pol. Party Id		.0747113	.1899577	0.39	0.694	-.2377412	.3871639
Gender		.1303651	.1661555	0.78	0.433	-.1429363	.4036665
Age		-.0299609	.0062794	-4.77	0.000	-.0402895	-.0196322
Region		.7844644	.2027925	3.87	0.000	.4509004	1.118028
Income		.0309601	.0557617	0.56	0.579	-.0607598	.12268
Education		-.0145939	.0545929	-0.27	0.789	-.1043911	.0752034
Internet Access		-.3599508	.2004373	-1.80	0.073	-.6896409	-.0302608
Cons		-.2493384	.4841256	-0.52	0.607	-1.045654	.5469773

Table 1.6 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	714
	Wald chi2(8)	=	52.87
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -424.57927	Pseudo R2	=	0.0614

		Robust					
U.S. Troops in Mex		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Military		-.1580569	.0985638	-1.60	0.109	-.32018	.0040662
Pol. Party Id		.1255462	.1894223	0.66	0.507	-.1860257	.4371182
Gender		.1132854	.166424	0.68	0.496	-.1604578	.3870286
Age		-.0307769	.0063247	-4.87	0.000	-.0411801	-.0203738
Region		.9056747	.2008545	4.51	0.000	.5752984	1.236051
Income		.0455392	.0547818	0.83	0.406	-.0445688	.1356472
Education		-.0272804	.0543812	-0.50	0.616	-.1167294	.0621687
Internet Access		-.3217146	.1989339	-1.62	0.106	-.6489316	.0055025
Cons		.6483882	.4318891	1.50	0.133	-.0620061	1.358782

Table 1.7 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	712
	Wald chi2(8)	=	45.99
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -425.48136	Pseudo R2	=	0.0548

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
U.S. Troops in Mex		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Media		.136061	.0982283	1.39	0.166	-.0255102	.2976322
Pol. Party Id		.1294617	.1886399	0.69	0.493	-.1808233	.4397468
Gender		.1205221	.166149	0.73	0.468	-.1527686	.3938129
Age		-.0295859	.0063025	-4.69	0.000	-.0399526	-.0192193
Region		.8295004	.200453	4.14	0.000	.4997845	1.159216
Income		.0329124	.0538568	0.61	0.541	-.0556741	.1214989
Education		-.0050444	.0537973	-0.09	0.925	-.0935331	.0834444
Internet Access		-.3139088	.198292	-1.58	0.113	-.6400702	.0122526
Cons		-.1681695	.4747434	-0.35	0.723	-.9490528	.6127139

Table 1.8 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	704
	Wald chi2(8)	=	54.20
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -415.62797	Pseudo R2	=	0.0701

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
U.S. Troops in Mex		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Courts		.2678751	.0873742	3.07	0.002	.1241574	.4115929
Pol. Party Id		.0487576	.1913094	0.25	0.799	-.2659184	.3634336
Gender		.105127	.1681404	0.63	0.532	-.1714393	.3816934
Age		-.0325943	.0064692	-5.04	0.000	-.0432351	-.0219535
Region		.878726	.2052125	4.28	0.000	.5411815	1.216271
Income		.0383577	.0545566	0.70	0.482	-.0513798	.1280952
Education		-.0210095	.054841	-0.38	0.702	-.1112149	.0691958
Internet Access		-.3185472	.2012044	-1.58	0.113	-.6494989	.0124045
Cons		-.2140322	.4572076	-0.47	0.640	-.9660717	.5380073

Table 1.9 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	712
	Wald chi2(8)	=	55.50
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -421.30211	Pseudo R2	=	0.0670

		Robust				
U.S. Troops in Mex	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Police	.2596404	.0865599	3.00	0.003	.117262	.4020187
Pol. Party Id	.1273726	.1903682	0.67	0.503	-.1857553	.4405004
Gender	.0734558	.1675833	0.44	0.661	-.2021942	.3491058
Age	-.0295575	.0063744	-4.64	0.000	-.0400425	-.0190725
Region	.923887	.2029556	4.55	0.000	.5900547	1.257719
Income	.0196729	.0549128	0.36	0.720	-.0706506	.1099965
Education	-.0039743	.0552631	-0.07	0.943	-.094874	.0869254
Internet Access	-.3139674	.2027847	-1.55	0.122	-.6475185	.0195837
Cons	-.346758	.4588575	-0.76	0.450	-1.101512	.4079955

Table 1.10 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	682
	Wald chi2(8)	=	57.22
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudo likelihood = -400.98914	Pseudo R2	=	0.0713

		Robust				
U.S. Troops in Mex	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Congress	.3047613	.0872069	3.49	0.000	.1613188	.4482039
Pol. Party Id	.0323204	.1966634	0.16	0.869	-.2911621	.3558029
Gender	.0915908	.1718177	0.53	0.594	-.1910242	.3742058
Age	-.0290965	.0065076	-4.47	0.000	-.0398006	-.0183924
Region	.8782186	.2048551	4.29	0.000	.5412619	1.215175
Income	.0299097	.0555439	0.54	0.590	-.0614518	.1212712
Education	-.001478	.0561178	-0.03	0.979	-.0937835	.0908276
Internet Access	-.3784173	.2064704	-1.83	0.067	-.7180308	-.0388038
Cons	-.5113991	.4669525	-1.10	0.273	-1.279468	.2566694

The results presented Tables 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 demonstrate that higher level of trust in the government as a whole, courts, police, and the Congress lead to significantly higher support for U.S. sending troops to Mexico to combat the drug cartels ($p < .05$). That said, the coefficient signs are positive indicating that there is indeed a positive correlation (as opposed to a negative relationship that I expected) between trust in the Mexican authorities and the U.S. To put it differently, if there is trust in the Mexican government, there might be trust in the U.S. with the idea that both governments are working together and this could explain why my statistical

analyses yielded results that are in the opposite direction of my hypothesis. Concerning the null findings, the results in Tables 1.4, 1.6, and 1.7 demonstrate that the variables of political trust in the president, military, and the media are not statistically significant ($p > .10$). Therefore, I do not find empirical support for my hypothesis for these factors.

In all of the above regressions, among the control variables, age is statistically significant ($p < .001$) and the results indicate that older respondents are 39 percent less likely to support such cooperation. The control variable of region is also significant at the .001 level and the results indicate that people who reside in the northern area of Mexico are 21 percent more likely to support such cooperation. None of the other control variables, including political identification, the gender of the respondents, the income level, the education level, and the Internet access, exert a significant effect on the dependent variable in these analyses.

Table 1.11 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression		Number of obs		=	702	
		Wald chi2(8)		=	22.16	
		Prob > chi2		=	0.0046	
Log pseudo likelihood = -360.27755		Pseudo R2		=	0.0311	

		Robust				
US Training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----						
Trust in President		.5777615	.1907292	3.03	0.002	.2640399 .8914832
Pol. Party Id		.2921007	.2206616	1.32	0.186	-.0708552 .6550567
Gender		-.2466202	.1867823	-1.32	0.187	-.5538497 .0606094
Age		-.0116372	.0064422	-1.81	0.071	-.0222337 -.0010408
Region		.2803486	.240751	1.16	0.244	-.1156515 .6763488
Income		-.0146971	.0547677	-0.27	0.788	-.104782 .0753878
Education		.0554778	.0559599	0.99	0.321	-.0365681 .1475237
Internet Access		-.0549293	.2207979	-0.25	0.804	-.4181095 .3082508
Cons		1.252472	.4383943	2.86	0.004	.5313779 1.973567

Table 1.12 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	738
	Wald chi2(8)	=	22.36
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0043
Log pseudo likelihood = -387.99271	Pseudo R2	=	0.0288

		Robust				
US Training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
Trust government		.2754502	.1032595	2.67	0.008	.1056034 .445297
Pol. Party Id		.3023547	.213042	1.42	0.156	-.0480682 .6527776
Gender		-.2067434	.1784832	-1.16	0.247	-.5003221 .0868353
Age		-.0129965	.0062342	-2.08	0.037	-.0232508 -.0027422
Region		.3275774	.2279788	1.44	0.151	-.0474143 .7025691
Income		-.0573798	.0542388	-1.06	0.290	-.1465947 .0318352
Education		.0413818	.0534453	0.77	0.439	-.0465279 .1292915
Internet Access		-.0334627	.2109485	-0.16	0.874	-.3804421 .3135168
Cons		.9268068	.4976215	1.86	0.063	.1082923 1.745321

Table 1.13 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	736
	Wald chi2(8)	=	28.49
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0004
Log pseudolikelihood = -377.61322	Pseudo R2	=	0.0389

		Robust				
US Training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
Trust in Military		-.3791073	.103621	-3.66	0.000	-.5495487 -.2086658
Pol. Party Id		.3150734	.2143077	1.47	0.142	-.0374314 .6675782
Gender		-.1935158	.1813603	-1.07	0.286	-.491827 .1047954
Age		-.0137952	.0063153	-2.18	0.029	-.024183 -.0034074
Region		.4677946	.2387903	1.96	0.050	.0750195 .8605697
Income		-.0247437	.0546457	-0.45	0.651	-.1146279 .0651404
Education		.0251361	.0541242	0.46	0.642	-.0638903 .1141625
Internet Access		-.0836228	.2174689	-0.38	0.701	-.4413274 .2740818
Cons		2.508476	.4571558	5.49	0.000	1.756522 3.260431

Table 1.14 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	732
	Wald chi2(8)	=	17.49
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0254
Log pseudolikelihood = -382.89797	Pseudo R2	=	0.0229

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
US Training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Media		.1634431	.1121311	1.46	0.145	-.0209961	.3478824
Pol. Party Id		.343611	.212839	1.61	0.106	-.006478	.6936999
Gender		-.1593194	.1800949	-0.88	0.376	-.4555492	.1369103
Age		-.0157213	.0062521	-2.51	0.012	-.0260052	-.0054375
Region		.3278622	.2277732	1.44	0.150	-.0467914	.7025157
Income		-.0504751	.052242	-0.97	0.334	-.1364055	.0354553
Education		.0370978	.0546218	0.68	0.497	-.052747	.1269426
Internet Access		-.0642035	.2127737	-0.30	0.763	-.414185	.2857781
Cons		1.3453	.5155529	2.61	0.009	.497291	2.193309

Table 1.15 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	725
	Wald chi2(8)	=	23.11
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0032
Log pseudolikelihood = -374.73922	Pseudo R2	=	0.0332

		Robust				
US Training Mexico	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Courts	.3051576	.0991577	3.08	0.002	.1420578	.4682575
Pol. Party Id	.2666082	.214671	1.24	0.214	-.0864941	.6197106
Gender	-.1604169	.1816209	-0.88	0.377	-.4591566	.1383228
Age	-.0148217	.0063831	-2.32	0.020	-.0253209	-.0043225
Region	.4397018	.2380887	1.85	0.065	.0480807	.8313228
Income	-.0357538	.0530974	-0.67	0.501	-.1230914	.0515837
Education	.0270436	.0549053	0.49	0.622	-.0632675	.1173548
Internet Access	-.0692049	.21671	-0.32	0.749	-.425661	.2872513
Cons	1.071546	.4845125	2.21	0.027	.2745939	1.868498

Table 1.16 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	733
	Wald chi2(8)	=	19.37
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0130
Log pseudolikelihood = -383.23335	Pseudo R2	=	0.0257

		Robust				
US Training Mexico	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Police	.2504626	.0950396	2.64	0.008	.0941364	.4067888
Pol. Party Id	.3073571	.210424	1.46	0.144	-.0387596	.6534739
Gender	-.1745873	.1786154	-0.98	0.328	-.4683834	.1192089
Age	-.0126475	.0063504	-1.99	0.046	-.023093	-.002202
Region	.3680914	.2309359	1.59	0.111	-.0117645	.7479472
Income	-.0480039	.053565	-0.90	0.370	-.1361104	.0401027
Education	.0359642	.0547953	0.66	0.512	-.054166	.1260944
Internet Access	-.1017339	.214173	-0.48	0.635	-.4540171	.2505493
Cons	1.126959	.4837395	2.33	0.020	.3312785	1.92264

Table 1.17 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military.

Logistic regression				Number of obs	=	705
				Wald chi2(8)	=	21.29
				Prob > chi2	=	0.0064
Log pseudolikelihood = -365.98883				Pseudo R2	=	0.0275

		Robust				
US Training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----						
Trust in Congress		.2847234	.090577	3.14	0.002	.1357375 .4337093
Pol. Party Id		.2498234	.2177924	1.15	0.251	-.1084133 .6080601
Gender		-.1650828	.1851603	-0.89	0.373	-.4696444 .1394788
Age		-.0107516	.0065942	-1.63	0.103	-.0215981 .0000948
Region		.3920421	.233588	1.68	0.093	.007824 .7762603
Income		-.0424915	.0537764	-0.79	0.429	-.1309459 .0459629
Education		.0417638	.0569276	0.73	0.463	-.0518738 .1354013
Internet Access		-.0834463	.2175702	-0.38	0.701	-.4413175 .2744248
Cons		.9092951	.501629	1.81	0.070	.0841887 1.734401

The results presented in Tables 1.11, 1.12, 1.15, 1.16 and 1.17 are statistically significant at the .05 level, yet in the opposite direction of my hypothesis; the higher level of trust in the president, government as a whole, courts, police, and Congress, all lead to higher support for U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel to combat the drug cartels. As stated before, there is the possibility of a positive correlation between trust in the Mexican authorities and the U.S.; if there is trust in a government, it can lead to trust in the other. Only for the military variable, I find strong support for my hypothesis since the results indicate that lower trust in the military leads to higher support for U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel. By comparison, I do not find a statistically significant effect of trust in the media ($p > .10$) on such form of cooperation.

In most of the above regressions, except the ones presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.17, the control variable of age is statistical significant ($p < .05$)—older respondents are up to 20 percent less likely to support such cooperation. The control variable of region is only statistically

significant in the regression presented in Table 1.13. None of the other control variables are statistically significant ($p > .10$).

Table 1.18 The Effect of Presidential Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression		Number of obs = 681				
		Wald chi2(8) = 31.71				
		Prob > chi2 = 0.0001				
Log pseudolikelihood = -445.46206		Pseudo R2 = 0.0384				

		Robust				
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----						
Trust in President		.557364	.1628809	3.42	0.001	.2894488 .8252791
Pol. Party Id		.02265	.1860645	0.12	0.903	-.2833989 .3286989
Gender		.1175942	.1605908	0.73	0.464	-.1465542 .3817426
Age		-.0245003	.0058501	-4.19	0.000	-.0341229 -.0148778
Region		.2328449	.2027833	1.15	0.251	-.1007039 .5663937
Income		.0581438	.0497725	1.17	0.243	-.0237248 .1400123
Education		-.0959325	.0511937	-1.87	0.061	-.1801387 -.0117263
Internet Access		-.0862479	.1937087	-0.45	0.656	-.4048704 .2323746
Cons		1.263659	.3918926	3.22	0.001	.619053 1.908265

Table 1.19 The Effect of Governmental Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	713
	Wald chi2(8)	=	31.37
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood = -467.53409	Pseudo R2	=	0.0371

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust Government		.2838521	.0912997	3.11	0.002	.1336775	.4340267
Pol. Party Id		-.0099068	.1819414	-0.05	0.957	-.3091738	.2893602
Gender		.0643255	.1568161	0.41	0.682	-.193614	.322265
Age		-.0248545	.0056828	-4.37	0.000	-.0342019	-.0155072
Region		.1967476	.2017976	0.97	0.330	-.13518	.5286751
Income		.0329146	.0495497	0.66	0.507	-.0485874	.1144166
Education		-.1091186	.0485959	-2.25	0.025	-.1890518	-.0291854
Internet Access		-.0741852	.1898183	-0.39	0.696	-.3864084	.2380381
Cons		.9556181	.4420879	2.16	0.031	.2284482	1.682788

Table 1.20 The Effect of Military Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	712
	Wald chi2(8)	=	32.52
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood = -466.44751	Pseudo R2	=	0.0370

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Military		-.2792003	.0919131	-3.04	0.002	-.4303838	-.1280167
Pol. Party Id		.0119574	.1811851	0.07	0.947	-.2860655	.3099803
Gender		.0902652	.1574201	0.57	0.566	-.1686679	.3491983
Age		-.025	.0056615	-4.42	0.000	-.0343124	-.0156876
Region		.2245622	.1995478	1.13	0.260	-.1036647	.5527891
Income		.0611089	.0489849	1.25	0.212	-.019464	.1416819
Education		-.1225397	.0489795	-2.50	0.012	-.2031038	-.0419757
Internet Access		-.0632093	.1901116	-0.33	0.740	-.3759152	.2494965
Cons		2.267298	.4083281	5.55	0.000	1.595658	2.938938

Table 1.21 The Effect of Media Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	709
	Wald chi2(8)	=	32.72
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood = -464.07631	Pseudo R2	=	0.0373

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Media		.3077116	.0957984	3.21	0.001	.1501373	.4652859
Pol. Party Id		.0201004	.1810194	0.11	0.912	-.27765	.3178508
Gender		.1011304	.1579797	0.64	0.522	-.158723	.3609839
Age		-.0266174	.0057109	-4.66	0.000	-.036011	-.0172237
Region		.1876233	.1999306	0.94	0.348	-.1412333	.5164799
Income		.0447037	.0486678	0.92	0.358	-.0353478	.1247551
Education		-.11110079	.0486228	-2.28	0.022	-.1909852	-.0310305
Internet Access		-.0826381	.189606	-0.44	0.663	-.3945122	.229236
Cons		.9196788	.4460893	2.06	0.039	.1859272	1.65343

Table 1.22 The Effect of Court System Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	703
	Wald chi2(8)	=	37.65
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -455.59174	Pseudo R2	=	0.0465

		Robust		z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.				
Trust in Courts		.3431747	.0854637	4.02	0.000	.2025994	.4837501
Pol. Party Id		-.0355438	.1853691	-0.19	0.848	-.3404488	.2693611
Gender		.1022393	.1591495	0.64	0.521	-.1595384	.364017
Age		-.0265267	.0057553	-4.61	0.000	-.0359934	-.01706
Region		.2266666	.2023906	1.12	0.263	-.1062363	.5595695
Income		.042239	.0488278	0.87	0.387	-.0380756	.1225536
Education		-.1141236	.0489116	-2.33	0.020	-.194576	-.0336713
Internet Access		-.1005754	.1909533	-0.53	0.598	-.4146657	.2135149
Cons		1.002328	.4188379	2.39	0.017	.3134011	1.691255

Table 1.23 The Effect of Police Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	710
	Wald chi2(8)	=	32.63
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0001
Log pseudolikelihood = -464.07846	Pseudo R2	=	0.0391

		Robust				
US Providing Money	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Police	.2857073	.0840897	3.40	0.001	.147392	.4240226
Pol. Party Id	.06527	.1815587	0.36	0.719	-.2333675	.3639075
Gender	.0582736	.1576478	0.37	0.712	-.201034	.3175813
Age	-.024005	.0057009	-4.21	0.000	-.0333821	-.0146279
Region	.2645222	.1997974	1.32	0.186	-.0641153	.5931598
Income	.0358734	.049251	0.73	0.466	-.0451373	.1168841
Education	-.1046475	.0492926	-2.12	0.034	-.1857265	-.0235685
Internet Access	-.0491339	.191499	-0.26	0.798	-.3641217	.265854
Cons	.9823518	.4184868	2.35	0.019	.2940022	1.670701

Table 1.24 The Effect of Congressional Trust on U.S. Providing Money to Mexican Institutions.

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	679
	Wald chi2(8)	=	35.95
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -439.56268	Pseudo R2	=	0.0455

		Robust				
US Providing Money	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]	
Trust in Congress	.355097	.0850823	4.17	0.000	.215149	.4950449
Pol. Party Id	-.0646231	.1886467	-0.34	0.732	-.3749194	.2456732
Gender	.0476276	.162545	0.29	0.770	-.2197351	.3149902
Age	-.0229607	.0058762	-3.91	0.000	-.0326263	-.0132951
Region	.2705785	.2061542	1.31	0.189	-.068515	.609672
Income	.0370521	.0498903	0.74	0.458	-.04501	.1191143
Education	-.0996636	.0506931	-1.97	0.049	-.1830463	-.0162809
Internet	-.1382137	.195749	-0.71	0.480	-.4601922	.1837648
Cons	.8191114	.4341201	1.89	0.059	.1050474	1.533175

The results of all the dependent variables in the above tables 1.18, 1.19, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 are statistically significant at the .05 level, but once again in the opposite direction of my hypothesis; higher levels of trust in the president, government as a whole, courts, police, the media and Congress, all lead to higher support for U.S. to provide Mexico money and weapons to combat the drug cartels. This is consistent with the possibility of a positive correlation between trust in the Mexican authorities and the U.S., suggesting that if there is trust in a

government it can lead to trust in the other. Similar to the results concerning U.S. training Mexican military and police, I also find empirical support for my hypothesis for this form of cooperation as well with respect to trust in the military. The lower the level of trust in the military, the higher the level of support for the U.S. providing money to Mexico to combat the drug cartels.

In the above regressions, the control variable of age consistently exerts statistical significance ($p < .05$) and indicates that older respondents are up to 39 percent less likely to support such cooperation. The control variable of education is also statistically significant across these regression models ($p < .05$) and the results indicate that higher educated people are up to 20 percent less likely to support such form of cooperation. None of the other control variables are statistically significant ($p > .10$).

Political Trust Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined political trust in Mexico and discussed why Mexican people do not believe that the Mexican government is making progress in the war on drugs. Using data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research with proxy variables, I measured the level of political trust in different political institutions.

Regarding political trust in the country's leadership, I obtained some statistically significant results in the opposite direction of my hypothesis; higher approval for President Peña Nieto's way to handle the combat against the drug cartels leads to higher support for U.S. cooperation with Mexican authorities on the drug war by training military and police personnel. Regarding the dependent variable of U.S. providing money and weapons to Mexican authorities, the results concerning trust in President Peña Nieto are once again statistically significant ($p < .05$)

in the opposite direction. I should note that the survey collected the data in 2013, several months after President Peña Nieto took office, and can be assumed that before the massacre of 43 students in Guerrero and before the presidency corruption scandal, in which Mexico's first lady and several ministers bought houses from a governmental contractor. I expect different support levels in the following years, especially after the massacre of the 43 students.

As for the dependent variable of the U.S. sending troops to Mexico to combat the drug cartels, I did not find any statistically significant effect of political trust; I can assume this was mainly because of the fear by the Mexican people of seeing this as an intervention in a broader way that would violate Mexican sovereignty, not only in the area of the Mexican drug war but also at the national level. There is also the possibility that higher trust in Mexican authorities may reflect higher trust in bi-national cooperation. When people have a positive view of the political system, they may be more optimistic about actions like international cooperation. In this chapter the approval for Peña Nieto Presidency is high, if Mexican people trust their President; they might trust that he will procure a good relationship with U.S. authorities in the combat to the drug cartels. This hypothesis needs to be tested with more direct measures of trust, since I am using proxy variables.

Chapter 3: Attribution of Responsibility

People tend to attribute responsibility and blame to the president for deteriorating conditions and give less credit for improvements to a president of the opposing party when compared to the president of the same party (Sirin, Villalobos, 2011). Former President Calderón won in 2006 the Mexican presidential election with only 36 percent of the votes (Lawson, 2007). People who did not vote for Former President Calderón constituted 64 percent of the electorate, which means that the majority of people did not sympathize with Former President Calderón. The lack of general support for Former President Calderón can be a factor that facilitates the attribution of responsibility to him when it comes to the issue of the drug war.

Mexican President Felipe Calderón displayed an advertisement stating “No More Weapons” at the Bridge of the Americas, the international bridge that connects Ciudad Juárez to El Paso, Texas. The advertisement facing towards the U.S. clearly demands the U.S. to stop sending guns across the border. During a conference in 2010 at Las Vegas, Nevada, Former President Calderón blamed the local police institutions of doing the dirty job for the drug cartels, and he also blamed the state governors for not certifying their police agencies (Hale, 2011). President Calderón also blamed U.S. Congress for not renewing the Anti-Weapons Ban (Pastor, 2011).

Former President Felipe Calderón had blamed many foreign and domestic institutions in the drug war, but there are also some arguments about his responsibility in the war on drugs. The drug cartels have been killing each other for years, but Calderón’s military action against the drug cartels, according to Campbell (2011), was similar to throwing gasoline into the fire and making violence even a bigger problem. Many people blame Former President Calderón for the violence in Mexico, arguing that his actions of deploying the military caused the rise of murders.

After the deployment of federal and military troops in Juárez in 2008, the number of murders increased dramatically, from 301 in 2007 to 1,623 in 2008, 2,754 in 2009 and 3,622 in 2010 (Ainslie, 2013). President Calderón and Gerardo García Luna (former Mexican federal police chief) were named in a complaint at the International Criminal Court. Filled by Netzai Sandoval, a Mexican human rights lawyer, and signed by 23,000 Mexicans. The complaint urged the investigation of hundreds of civilian murders at the hands of drug traffickers and Mexican military (Grayson, 2013).

The Mérida initiative was launched in 2007 as an approach from the U.S. and Mexico governments to combat the drug cartels. It included a commitment from the U.S. to provide \$1.4 billion in equipment to Mexico. The second pillar of the Mérida Initiative talks about the rule of law and the challenges that civilian law enforcement institutions face in the combat against international criminal organizations. The idea was that the amount of resources dedicated to the institutionalization of the rule of law would be doubled (Olson and Wilson, 2010). The U.S. tries to support the Mexican government through the Merida initiative; by giving money to Mexico to combat the drug cartels. But the real problem that Mexico faces is not only the lack of resources; the lack of a strong policy to combat the drug cartels is the real problem that Mexico and the U.S. face (Campbell, 2010, 274).

While Mexico exports drugs to the U.S., the U.S. exports weapons to Mexico (Muehlmann, 2013), which, many think, further contributes to the escalation of drug violence. Many others argue that the U.S. caused the violence in Mexico with the implementation of NAFTA. NAFTA put out of business the Mexican agriculture industry, leading to the cultivation of drugs and drug trade as an alternative to the economic devastation the U.S. imposed through the global neoliberal market (Payan, 2006). In the 1990s the US-Mexico border became a

gateway for trafficking drugs from the suppliers from the south to the consumers in the north. It created that drug cartels compete each other to gain the drug routes, which dramatically increased murder rates in Mexico (Payan, 2006). The funneling of trafficking through the international ports of entry, particularly the dramatic increase in container trucks after NAFTA, also helps the cartels because it provides more work for the customs officers and increases the likelihood that shipments will not be detected (Reece Jones, 2012).

Mexican officials blame the United States for the violence that is taking place in Mexico. They argue that the drug market in the U.S. created the perfect environment for a profit market in Mexico (Lawson, 2009). The United States is the largest consumer of drugs worldwide and the largest seller of weapons (Shirk, 2011). It directly contributes to the violence that is taking place in Mexico, due to the cartels selling the drugs to the U.S. market and buying weapons (Shirk, 2011). The big drug market that exists in the U.S. has created competitiveness between the drug cartels, which fight each other in order to gain control over the drug trafficking routes.

The murders in Mexico, with a direct relationship with the drug war, are perpetrated with weapons of high caliber, especially assault rifles. The expiration of Assault Weapons Ban (AWB), which prohibited the sale of assault rifles to U.S. civilians in the U.S., has a significant impact on the homicide rate in Mexico. With more drug cartels' presence, the homicide rate rose by 24.6 percent in the Mexican states and by 16.4 percent nationwide (Chicoine, 2013). In Mexican *municipios* with neighboring ports of entry with Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, the homicide rate increased by 60 percent as compared to *municipios* 100 miles from the border. These statistics imply additional 238 homicides in the area within 100 miles from the border, following the expiration of Assault Weapons Ban in 2004 (Dube, Dube and García, 2013). Many scholars also attribute the responsibility to the U.S. in the way that most of the weapons used by

the Mexican cartels are from the United States. Assault weapons such as the AK-47s, were more accessible since the US Anti Weapons Ban expired in 2004 (Staudt, Payan and Kruszewski, 2009). When the ban expired, there were no prohibitions for American citizens to buy as many assault weapons they want (Staudt, Payan and Kruszewski, 2009).

Interestingly, contrary to the assumptions that most weapons used by Mexican drug cartels are coming from the U.S., in 2008, 3,480 guns were positively traced to the U.S., which represents only 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008. Stewart (2011) argues that most weapons arrive to Mexico from Asia and, particularly, South Korea (fragmentation grenades) and weaponry such as grenade launchers and fragmentation grenades that are highly used by the drug cartels are not from the U.S. market. There may be other weapons suppliers to the drug cartels as stated by Stewart (2011), but contrary to Stewart's assumption, gun stores in the U.S. border with Mexico sell twice as many weapons than those in other parts of the U.S. The estimated amount of weapons entering Mexico from the US is about 2,000 a day (Dooley, 2008).

In October 2009, The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Phoenix Field Division started an operation that was named Operation Fast and Furious. In this operation ATF agents allowed the smuggling of more than 2,000 fire arms to Mexico (U.S. House Of Representatives, 2012). The intention of the operation was to find the real weapons buyers and arrest them. ATF hoped that this operation would lead to the arrest of some drug lords. The official report on the Fast and Furious operation created an environment of confrontation between Congressional Republicans against Obama's administration (Ironically Operation Fast and Furious began under Bush but continued under Obama) (NY Times, 2012).

Not only have the murders been rising due to weapons availability to the drug cartels, but also the number of missing people has increased. Human Rights Watch in Mexico reports that there are more than 25,000 missing people; in 2,443 of those, there is evidence of possible participation of state agents (Human Right Watch, 2013). Authorities hesitate to declare people as missing and it is very rare to locate these people alive (Muehlmann, 2013). Twenty five thousand people missing means 25,000 families waiting for a response from the government, but the government generally does not provide them an answer and instead fails to report the disappearances. People, in turn, blame the Mexican government for its failure to respond to their demands.

Mexican officials usually attribute the responsibility of many murders to a specific drug cartel, instead of conducting a formal investigation. Criminal organizations are trying to boast their violence instead of hiding it, which facilitates the security institutions in Mexico to attribute responsibility to them (Kleiman, 2011). Drug cartels sometimes blame the other drug cartels in some mass murder cases, with the intention to portray themselves as innocent and portray their enemies as the ones to be blamed and prosecuted. Thirty six percent of all murders during Calderón's administration could be attributed the conflict between the Sinaloa Cartel and Juárez Cartel. His explains why Juárez has been ranked as one of the most dangerous cities in the world (Camp, 2011, 7).

The Mexican federal government blames the United States, the state governments, and the drug cartels. The United States government blames the Mexican government and the drug cartels, and even between drug cartels, they blame each other. No one wants to take responsibility over this issue. The current Mexican presidential administration has been trying to

create an environment of cooperation and transparency of information, in order to create an environment of trust with its citizens (Grayson, 2013).

Governments, politicians, and drug cartels can blame each other to avoid responsibility, but the ones that really have the right to attribute responsibility in the drug war are the people. The citizens of Mexico live every day with the consequences of a war that has claimed many innocent lives. The lack of quantitative research on Mexico's public opinion on the war on drugs opens the opportunity for politicians and governments to blame each other. With this in mind, I hypothesize that the more blame the Mexican people attribute to the Mexican government, the higher support for foreign intervention in Mexico. The more blame attributed to the United States government, on the other hand, will lead to less support for U.S. intervention in Mexico.

Attribution of Responsibility Data Analysis

In order to test my hypothesis, I conducted an ordered logistic regression, employing the same survey data I used for my political trust analyses. My independent variable is the blame attributed to the Mexican government.

Dependent variables

The U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel: This variable assesses if Mexican society is willing to accept help from the U.S. in the manner of training Mexican police and military personnel; I coded 1 if they support, and 0 if they do not support.

The U.S. providing money and weapons to Mexican authorities: This variable assesses if Mexican society is willing to accept help from the U.S. in the manner of providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel; I coded 1 if they support, and 0 if they do not support.

The U.S. deploying troops in Mexico to combat the drug cartels: This variable assesses if Mexican society is willing to accept an intervention from the U.S. in the form of deploying U.S. troops in Mexico; I coded 1 if they support, and 0 if they do not support. This variable differs from the other two variables in the way that it will be a direct intervention on which the help will be provided through the deployment of U.S. troops on Mexican soil to combat the drug cartels.

Control Variables

Age. This control variable measures the age of the respondent.

Gender. This control variable is for the gender of the respondent; I coded 0 as female and 1 as male.

Ideology. This control variable is for the people's ideology as left versus right. It ranges across seven categories in which 0 is the extreme left and 6 is the extreme right.

Geographical area. This control variable is for the geographical area on which the respondent live. I coded 1 as north and 0 as all else.

Income. This variable measures one's household income; it ranges across eleven categories, from 1 as less than 1,680 Mexican pesos to 11 more than 50,400 pesos.

Education. This variable measures one's education level and ranges across nine categories: from 1 as no formal education to 9 university level education with a degree.

Internet use. This control variable is for the use of the internet by the respondent; in the survey: it is asked if the respondent uses the internet at least occasionally.

The results in Table 2.1 demonstrate that attributing responsibility to the Mexican authorities increases the probability of supporting the deployment of U.S. troops to combat the drug cartels ($p < .05$). The control variable age is also statistically significant at $p < .05$, suggesting that the older the person is, the less likely the person will support such form of

cooperation. The control variable of region is statistical significant ($p < .05$) as well, which indicates that people who reside in the northern part of Mexico are more likely to support such cooperation. None of the other control variables in this regression are statistically significant. Regarding the changes in predicted probabilities, I find that the respondents who attribute responsibility to Mexico are 16 percent more likely to support U.S. intervention by deploying troops in Mexico. Regarding control variables, older people are 36 percent less likely to support U.S. intervention by deploying troops in Mexico, and the respondents who are in the northern part of Mexico are 20 percent more likely to support such cooperation.

Table 2.1 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Sending Troops to Mexico.

Ordered logistic regression				Number of obs	=	696
				Wald chi2(8)	=	54.37
				Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -411.63521				Pseudo R2	=	0.0664

		Robust				
US troops in Mex		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+						
Attribution of Resp.		.3852911	.1389379	2.77	0.006	.1567585 .6138236
Gender		.060798	.1696245	0.36	0.720	-.2182094 .3398054
Age		-.0290438	.0063893	-4.55	0.000	-.0395532 -.0185343
Region		.891195	.208031	4.28	0.000	.5490144 1.233375
Income		.0342036	.0558949	0.61	0.541	-.0577353 .1261424
Education		-.0220855	.0533977	-0.41	0.679	-.109917 .0657459
Intern Access		-.2984508	.2030288	-1.47	0.142	-.6324034 .0355018
Ideology		-.0262957	.0315706	-0.83	0.405	-.0782246 .0256333
-----+						
/cut1		.310489	.51373			-.5345216 1.1555

The results in Table 2.2 demonstrate that responsibility attributions also significantly affect of the likelihood of supporting U.S. training of Mexican police and military personnel ($p < .05$). The coefficient of the control variable age is also significant at $p < .05$ and negative, suggesting that the older the person is, the less likely the person will support such cooperation.

The control variable of region is also significant at $p < .05$, once again suggesting that people in the northern part of Mexico are more likely to support such cooperation. None of the other control variables in this regression are statistically significant. Regarding the changes in predicted probabilities, I find that the respondents who attribute responsibility to Mexico are 11 percent more likely to support U.S. intervention in the form of training Mexican police and military personnel. Regarding control variables, older people are 15 percent less likely to support U.S. intervention by deploying troops in Mexico, and the respondents who are in the northern part of Mexico are 7 percent more likely to support such cooperation.

Table 2.2 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Training Mexican Police and Military Personnel.

Ordered logistic regression				Number of obs	=	713
				Wald chi2(8)	=	14.24
				Prob > chi2	=	0.0758
Log pseudo likelihood = -371.68443				Pseudo R2	=	0.0209

		Robust				
US training Mexico		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+						
Attribution of Resp.		.3524887	.1556744	2.26	0.024	.0964271 .6085502
Gender		-.1565224	.1823356	-0.86	0.391	-.4564378 .143393
Age		-.0121609	.0065366	-1.86	0.063	-.0229126 -.0014092
Region		.4637249	.2393477	1.94	0.053	.070033 .8574168
Income		-.0280347	.0539418	-0.52	0.603	-.116761 .0606916
Education		.0194141	.0566178	0.34	0.732	-.0737139 .1125421
Internet Access		-.0597177	.2177678	-0.27	0.784	-.4179139 .2984784
Ideology		-.012337	.0335805	-0.37	0.713	-.067572 .042898
-----+						
/cut1		-1.12562	.585133			-2.088078 -.1631619

Regarding the support for U.S. providing money to Mexican authorities to combat the drug cartels, the results presented in Table 2.3 indicate that attribution of responsibility has a positive and statistically significant effect ($p < .05$). Just like the previous analyses, the coefficient for the control variable age is negative and statistically significant ($p < .05$), meaning that the older the person is, the less likely the person will support such cooperation. The

education control variable is statistically significant as well ($p < .05$), which indicates that the less educated people are, the more likely they are to support such cooperation, this could be due that the less educated people, are not aware of all the problems involved in the combat to the criminal organization, and the idea of providing money seems enough to combat the criminal organizations. None of the other variables in this regression are statistically significant.

Regarding the changes in predicted probabilities, I find that the respondents who attribute responsibility to Mexico are 16 percent more likely to support U.S. providing money to Mexican authorities. Regarding control variables, older people are 42 percent less likely to support U.S. intervention by deploying troops in Mexico. Regarding education, the less educated people are 23 percent more likely to support such cooperation.

Table 2.3 The Effect of Attribution of Responsibility and Support for U.S. Providing Money and Weapons to Mexico.

Ordered logistic regression				Number of obs	=	692
				Wald chi2(8)	=	29.36
				Prob > chi2	=	0.0003
Log pseudo likelihood = -454.18022				Pseudo R2	=	0.0348

		Robust				
US Providing Money		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[90% Conf. Interval]
-----+						
Attribution of Resp.		.2524637	.1305857	1.93	0.053	.0376693 .4672581
Gender		.0474988	.158563	0.30	0.765	-.2133141 .3083117
Age		-.026251	.005804	-4.52	0.000	-.0357978 -.0167042
Region		.1990905	.2036181	0.98	0.328	-.1358316 .5340125
Income		.0520815	.0493971	1.05	0.292	-.0291694 .1333325
Education		-.124924	.0499719	-2.50	0.012	-.2071204 -.0427276
Internet Access		-.0806914	.191282	-0.42	0.673	-.3953224 .2339395
Ideology		-.0409425	.02926	-1.40	0.162	-.0890709 .0071858
-----+						
/cut1		-1.550346	.4843806		-2.347081	-.7536107

Attribution of Responsibility Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the attribution of responsibility in the drug war, in which the Mexican Federal government blames local, state authorities, and the U.S.; drug cartels blame each other, civil society blames government, but no one takes responsibility about their role and their actions. I hypothesized that more blame attributed to the Mexican government in combating the drug cartels leads to higher support for the U.S. cooperating with Mexico by training Mexican police and military personnel, providing money and weapons to Mexican authorities, and by deploying troops to Mexico. For all of those forms of cooperation, I found that attribution of responsibility exerts a statistically significant effect, corroborating my hypothesis. When people blame the Mexican government, it is natural that they seek help from another institution or government who can combat the drug cartels. While the U.S. shares much responsibility, especially in the weapons trafficking to Mexico, people may still request the U.S. government to act and help Mexico to combat the drug cartels. Given that this is a bi-national problem, many people think that both countries must work together in order to achieve peace in Mexico.

Chapter 4: Media Framing

In Mexico, the media is not independent. The Secretariat of Communications and Transport puts the media under direct control of the government. The Mexican media has a history of cooperation with state authorities by portraying political events in a way that governmental officials desire (Costa and Brener, 1997). In 1994, a qualitative study analyzed the time of the presidential television campaign ads and found that 91 percent of the time, the candidate from the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) appeared in the first segment of the newscast (Belejack, 1997). Such biased and government-controlled journalism is unwarranted especially given the critical role the media is expected to play (particularly as the key source of information dissemination and as an extra-parliamentary check on the executive) in the process towards a real democracy in Mexico (Sarmiento, 1997).

The collusion between the press and the Mexican government leads to public distrust in the press that is parallel to public distrust in government authorities. The newspapers highly depend on state contracts and their owners generally have been associated with the political elite (Orme, 1997). In 1999, a survey about media trust in Mexico reported that only 3 percent of Mexicans have high trust in the press, 26 percent had some trust in the media, and 66 percent have low or no trust in Mexican press (Camp, 1999). Many newspapers and journalists let the government corrupt them in the way of accepting special gifts from politicians (Rodríguez-Castañeda, 1993). When a journalist rejects to portray a certain politician in a specific way, the journalist's monthly payment is placed on hold until he or she portrays the politician in a certain way (Keenan, 1997). It forces many journalists to either write in a specific manner or change their career.

The journalists have a major role in informing people of what is happening. The journalist, by analyzing and processing information, helps the citizens to create their own opinion in many issues. Unfortunately, the local media coverage of violent events in Mexico is severely constrained (Sabet, 2013). Since the war on drugs began in Mexico, the media suffered from intimidation, coercion, and co-optation; which led to public perceptions that the media do not report many events related with the organized crime. The media's "black holes" created the informal media channels and informal sources have taken the role of informing the violent events that take place during the war on drugs (Correa-Cabrera and Nava, 2013).

In April 2009, a catholic priest criticized why the Mexican government has not captured "El Chapo" Guzman, one of the most wanted drug lords in Mexico and U.S. According to *Los Angeles Times*, most local media did not cover this issue. Some suggest that the lack of coverage is understandable since Mexico is named by the International Press Institute as the deadliest country in the world for journalists (Martin, 2013). *El Mañana*, a newspaper in Nuevo Laredo, officially stated that they will stop covering the "violent disputes" because Mexico is not a safe place to exercise professional journalism (Wilkinson, 2012). Since the year 2000, the number of journalists murdered in Mexico exceeds 50, mostly due to their coverage of drug trafficking. Indeed, journalists in Ciudad Juárez from *El Diario de Juárez* and *Periódico Norte* have requested asylum in El Paso, Texas, because of the fear of reprisals for their reports on drug trafficking events (Campbell, 2010).

Among the journalists who cover the drug violence, some provide important accounts of the events taking place, which is why many academics rely heavily on media accounts (Astorga, 2007). The line between journalists and academics in Mexico sometimes blurs. Some academics work as journalist and vice versa; that is the case of Ernesto Villanueva, an academic researcher

from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), who also works as a journalist for the *Proceso* magazine. Ernesto Villanueva is one of many academics and journalists that have been subjected to violent attacks because of his professional publications.

The public feeling of insecurity in Mexico has been expanded by the media, in which media reports the violent crimes in a sensational way to gain audience. For many Mexican academics, the media has created a “bloody show” (Astorga, 2007). When the media covers violent events in Mexico, sometimes the press provides a very vivid and detailed description of the events, and many times, the press provides a totally contradictory version of the event days later, as the Mexican government sometimes denies that the event actually took place (Campbell, 2010). Contradictions of the media create doubt in people who start questioning the legitimacy of the information presented by the media.

Some press in Mexico see their jobs only as a source of profit, and portray the news that will sell newspapers and/or attract more viewers without consider the legitimacy of the information (Andrade, 2007). However, even though there are corrupt media in Mexico, there are also some Mexican presses that have the prestige of informing and depicting the news in a professional manner, such as *La Jornada*, which is one of the most prestigious and independent media sources in the country. Unfortunately, when other press is seen as biased or corrupted, it affects the media as a whole.

In 1973, the television sector in Mexico became a virtual monopoly, in which Televisa controlled the 90 percent of viewing public. The only competition that Televisa had was the Channel 13 owned by Francisco Aguirre, but the Mexican government took it over to establish a state owned enterprise called Imevisión. In 1993, Imevisión was sold and named TvAzteca (Sarmiento, 1997). The lack of competition has permitted Televisa gain political and cultural

influence. As Miller and Darling (1997, 60) puts it, “Imagine if ABC, CBS, and NBC were only one company,” which is the case for Mexico. This leaves very few options for people that lack economic resources to be informed in Mexico; if someone does not have the economic resources to access Internet service or pay for private television channels, the only options to get informed are Televisa and TvAzteca.

The number of people with an Internet subscription in 2007 (one year after the drug war in Mexico began) was only 43 per 1,000 people in Mexico. The number of active Internet users the same year was 217 per 1,000 people, which represents 21.7 percent of the Mexican population (Gutiérrez and Gamboa, 2010). As pointed out by Staudt and Méndez (2015), these numbers have been increasing with the development of technology in the last years: in 2010, 90 percent of Mexicans had cellphones and 22 percent had Internet access. Cellphones and Internet have been playing an important role in modern Mexico. Activist in Mexico employ technology to organize themselves, denounce human rights abuses, and to disseminate information.

Despite such increase in access to Internet as an alternative source of information, however, many people in Mexico are still exposed to the priming and framing of the free television channels, which have a history of being in cooperation with and under the control of the government. The lack of information sources in Mexico has created an environment where people follow the framing of the media (especially the government-controlled television channels) on the war on drugs. I conducted an experimental analysis to find out if media framing in the cooperation between Mexico and the US authorities in the war on drugs will change people’s perception to support or reject bi-national cooperation. I will now discuss the details of the experimental design and analyses.

Experimental Analysis

In order to find out if the media framing regarding the issue of cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. authorities in the war on drugs will change people's support for or opposition to the bi-national cooperation, I conducted an experiment in which I used a mock article. Using a convenience sample, mostly Mexican students at the University of Texas at El Paso, I exposed the students to a mock article about the bi-national cooperation between Mexico and U.S. One group of respondents was exposed to a positive news article that reported the successful relationship between Mexican and U.S. authorities in combating the drug cartels. The second group was exposed to the same news article but, modified to frame such cooperation between Mexican and U.S. authorities in the drug war as a failure instead of success. In the questionnaire following the exposure to the mock article, the students were asked about their opinion on the US-Mexico cooperation, specifically their opinion about U.S. agents conducting investigations in Mexico and their support for the following forms of cooperation: U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel, US providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military, U.S. deploying troops in Mexico, and their perception of Mexican sovereignty violation.

The convenience sample consists of one-hundred and thirteen undergraduate students (63 female and 50 male) at The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) taking courses in Spanish, Political Science, and History. The reason that I recruited Spanish-speaking participants is because the experiment is designed to examine Mexican public opinion. All participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions.

Experimental Treatment

The experimental treatment is the framing tone of the mock article that the participants were exposed to (Negative or Positive).

Dependent Variables

U.S. Investigations. This variable assesses if the respondents support or oppose U.S. agents conducting investigations in Mexican territory. I coded this measure using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support.”

Sovereignty. This variable assesses if the respondents perceived that U.S. agents working in Mexico violates Mexican sovereignty. I assigned a code of 0 for no sovereignty violation and 1 for perception of sovereignty violation.

Training. This variable assesses if the respondents are willing to accept help from the U.S. in the manner of training Mexican police and military personnel. I coded this measure using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support.”

Money. This variable assesses if the respondents are willing to accept help from the U.S. in the manner of providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel. I coded this measure using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support.”

Intervention. This variable assesses if the respondents are willing to accept an intervention from the U.S. in the manner of deploying U.S. troops in Mexico. I coded this measure using an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support.” This variable differs from the variables “Training” and “Money” discussed above in the way that it represents a direct intervention of U.S. troops in Mexican soil to combat the drug cartels.

Control Variables

I also included control measures such as gender, age, and socio-economic status (yearly household income, measured in U.S. Dollars), if the respondents lives or have lived in Mexico, nationality, national identity, if the respondents have been a victim of a crime in Mexico, and their voting behavior.

Hypotheses

My first hypothesis (H1) is that the media framing has a direct effect on people's opinion on U.S.-Mexico cooperation to combat the drug cartels. Specifically, when people are exposed to a news article that frames the US-Mexico cooperation as successful, people are more likely to support the U.S.-Mexico cooperation for combating the drug cartels. Hypothesis 2 (H2) is exposure to positive news reports will lead to higher support for US investigations in Mexico. My third hypothesis (H3) is that when people are exposed to positive news reports about U.S.-Mexico cooperation, they are less likely to perceive that Mexican sovereignty is violated. My fourth hypothesis (H4) is that when people are exposed to a positive news report, they are more likely to support U.S. help to Mexico in the form of training Mexican police and military. Hypothesis 5 (H5) is that when people are exposed to a positive news report, they are more likely to support U.S. help to Mexico in the form of providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel. My sixth hypothesis (H6) is that those exposed to a positive news report are more likely to support U.S. help to Mexico in the form of deploying U.S. troops in Mexico.

Experimental Findings

The results of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) indicate that my hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 are supported given the statistically significant effects in the expected direction (see Table 3.1). Specifically, the media framing has a direct effect on the support for U.S. agents conducting investigations in Mexico ($p < .001$), the perception of Mexican sovereignty violation ($p < .05$), and the support for US training Mexican military and police personnel ($p < .10$). When participants are exposed to a positive news report about the U.S. and Mexico cooperation, support for U.S. agents conducting investigations in Mexico increases, support for U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel increases, and perceived violation of Mexican sovereignty by U.S. decreases. By comparison, the effects of the experimental treatment on the dependent variables of U.S. providing money to Mexico, U.S. deploying troops in Mexico, the perception of progress in the war against drug cartels, and the support for Mexican military are not statistical significant ($p > .10$).

Table 3.1 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

<i>Source</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Type IV Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>M S</i>	<i>F-value</i>	<i>p-value.</i>
Condition	US Investigations in Mexico	17.183	1	17.183	18.407	.000
	Sovereignty	1.054	1	1.054	5.107	.026
	Training	2.285	1	2.285	2.920	.091
	Money	.081	1	.081	.076	.784
	Troops	.027	1	.027	.016	.898
	Progress	.242	1	.242	.419	.519
	Mex Military	3.666E-8	1	3.666E-8	.000	1.000

Figure 3.1 below shows the difference in attitudes based on what type of article the respondents were exposed to. Specifically, individuals who were exposed to the positively-framed mock article were more likely to support U.S. investigations in Mexico, compared to the individuals who were exposed to the negative condition.




Figure 3.1 Support for U.S. Conducting Investigations in Mexican Territory.




Figure 3.2 Perceived Violation of Mexican Sovereignty by the U.S.

Figure 3.2 above shows the difference in attitudes about the violation of Mexican sovereignty based on what type of article the respondents were exposed to. Specifically, the individuals who were exposed to the positive news article condition were less likely to see a violation of Mexican sovereignty by the U.S., compared to the individuals exposed to the negatively-framed mock article.

Figure 3.3 below shows the difference in approval of U.S. training based on what type of article the respondents were exposed to. Those individuals who were exposed to the positive frame were more likely to support the training of Mexican police and military personnel by the U.S. compared to the individuals who were exposed to the negative condition.




Figure 3.3 Levels of Approval for U.S. Training Mexican Authorities.

The estimated marginal means regarding support for U.S. investigations in Mexico (which ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support”) indicate that the participants that were exposed to the positive condition have a mean support of 4.082, which is closer to the highest level of support to U.S. investigations in Mexico, than the respondents that were exposed to the negative condition with a mean of 3.258. These results statistically support my Hypothesis (H2) that when people are exposed to positive news reports, they are more likely to support U.S investigations in Mexico, and partially support my hypothesis (H1) that media framing has a direct effect on public opinion on U.S.-Mexico relations.

The estimated marginal means for the Mexican sovereignty measure (in which 0 is no perception of Mexican sovereignty violation from U.S. and 1 is perception of violation) indicate that the respondents that were exposed to the positive condition are closer to the point 0 with an estimated marginal mean of .272, and the participants who were exposed to the negative frame are closer to 1 with a mean of .476. This result statistically supports my hypothesis (H3) that

people who are exposed to a positive news report about the U.S.-Mexico cooperation are less likely to perceive Mexican sovereignty violation, and partially support my hypothesis (H1) that media framing has a direct effect on public opinion on U.S.-Mexico relations.

Table 3.2. Estimated Marginal Means by Condition

Estimates					
Dependent Variable	condition	Mean	Std. Error	90% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
US investigations	negative	3.258 ^a	.136	3.032	3.484
	positive	4.082 ^a	.131	3.864	4.299
Sovereignty	negative	.476 ^a	.064	.370	.582
	positive	.272 ^a	.062	.170	.375
Training	negative	3.937 ^a	.125	3.730	4.144
	positive	4.237 ^a	.120	4.038	4.436
Money	negative	3.508 ^a	.145	3.266	3.749
	positive	3.564 ^a	.140	3.332	3.797
Troops	negative	3.372 ^a	.180	3.074	3.670
	positive	3.404 ^a	.173	3.117	3.692
Progress	negative	1.968 ^a	.107	1.790	2.146
	positive	2.066 ^a	.103	1.894	2.237
Mexican Military	negative	.796 ^a	.054	.706	.887
	positive	.796 ^a	.052	.709	.883

a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: gender = .44, age = 21.50, income = 2.75, liveinmex = .52, haveyou = .95, timeinmex = 17.83, nationality = .57, identity = 1.44, victims = .64, patriotic = 3.01, vote = 2.02.

Table 3.3. Pairwise Comparisons of the Differences in Estimated Marginal Means

Pairwise Comparisons							
Dependent Variable	(J)		Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig. ^b	90% Confidence Interval for Difference ^b	
	(I) condition	condition				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
US Investigations	negative	positive	-.823 [*]	.192	.000	-1.142	-.505
	positive	negative	.823 [*]	.192	.000	.505	1.142
Sovereignty	negative	positive	.204 [*]	.090	.026	.054	.354
	positive	negative	-.204 [*]	.090	.026	-.354	-.054
Training	negative	positive	-.300 [*]	.176	.091	-.592	-.008
	positive	negative	.300 [*]	.176	.091	.008	.592
Money	negative	positive	-.056	.205	.784	-.397	.284
	positive	negative	.056	.205	.784	-.284	.397
Troops	negative	positive	-.032	.253	.898	-.453	.388
	positive	negative	.032	.253	.898	-.388	.453
Progress	negative	positive	-.098	.151	.519	-.348	.153
	positive	negative	.098	.151	.519	-.153	.348
Mexican Military	negative	positive	-3.803E-5	.077	1.000	-.128	.127
	positive	negative	3.803E-5	.077	1.000	-.127	.128

Based on estimated marginal means

*. The mean difference is significant at the .1 level.

b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.

The estimated marginal means for the variable measuring support for U.S. training Mexican military and police (which ranges from 1 to 5 in which 1 is “strongly oppose” and 5 is “strongly support”) demonstrate that the participants that were exposed to the positive condition have a mean of 4.23, which is closer to the highest level of support for U.S. training Mexican police and military, compared to the respondents that were exposed to the negative condition with a mean of 3.93. These results statistically support my hypothesis (H4) that when people are exposed to a positive news report, they are more likely to support U.S. help to Mexico in the form of training Mexican police and military and also support my hypothesis (H1) that media framing has a direct effect on public opinion on U.S.-Mexico relations.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this thesis, I first discussed and analyzed the role of political trust in Mexico and the factors behind why Mexican people generally do not believe that the Mexican government is making progress in the war on drugs. Using data from the Roper Center and employing proxy variables, I examined the link between levels of political trust in different political institutions and support for U.S.-Mexico bi-national cooperation in the war on drugs. Interestingly, I found statistically significant results concerning the effects of trust in Mexican leadership that are in the opposite direction of my hypothesis: higher approval for President Peña Nieto's way to handle the combat against the drug cartels leads to higher support for U.S. cooperation with Mexican authorities on the drug war by training military and police personnel as well as for U.S. providing money and weapons to Mexican authorities. Surprisingly, I found that people do approve the way in which President Peña Nieto's administration is handling the war on drug against drug cartels. The survey data was collected in 2013, only a few months after President Peña Nieto took office and it is common that presidents during their first year in office enjoy a "honeymoon" effect. Accordingly, it may be possible that members of the opposition parties PAN, PRD and citizens give the new political leader some time to establish in office and observe whether he is capable of handling the country before evaluating his performance critically. Accordingly, this honeymoon effect could explain the high approval for President Peña Nieto. Another possible explanation is that traditional constituencies in Mexico have been relatively becoming smaller and there has been a new era of Mexican politics that is more Americanized; President Peña Nieto in his image of a young, contemporary, active politician certainly can boost his approval rating. I should also state that the survey was conducted before the massacre of 43 students in Guerrero and before the presidency corruption scandal, in which it was revealed that

Mexico's first lady and several ministers bought houses from a governmental contractor. For future research it would be interesting to collect survey data after the massacre of 43 students in Guerrero and after the presidency corruption scandal, in which I expect that approval for President Peña Nieto's administration in handling the war on drug against drug cartels has since decreased, which in turn may affect support for the U.S.-Mexico cooperation in this issue.

By comparison, I did not find strong statistically significant effects of political trust in Mexican leadership on support for the U.S. sending troops to Mexico to combat the drug cartels; I can assume this was mainly because of the fear by the Mexican people of seeing this as a violation of U.S. sovereignty in general, not only in the drug war issues. Another important aspect to be considered is the way in which the question was formulated in the survey; the word "troops" is associated immediately with soldiers. What about the U.S. sending agents of the Department of Homeland Security or agents of the Department of Justice (ICE, FBI, DEA, or ATF agents)? Mexican public may be more open to accepting the presence of U.S. law enforcement agents rather than military troops in dealing with the drug cartels.

Another empirical chapter of my thesis dealt with the attribution of responsibility. When people blame to the Mexican government, it is natural that they seek help in an institution or government who can more effectively combat the drug cartels. The U.S. shares much responsibility, especially in the weapons trafficking to Mexico; this may lead to an increased demand for the U.S. government to act and help Mexico to combat the drug cartels. Given that this is a bi-national problem, both countries must work together in order to achieve peace in Mexico. The analytical results have generally shown support for my hypothesis that higher blame for the Mexican government increases support for the U.S. involvement in various forms to deal with the drug cartels.

Last, I experimentally investigated how media framing of the news in Mexico may affect people's opinions about the drug war, particularly with respect to the issue of cooperation between Mexico and the U.S. authorities in the war on drugs. The findings from the experiment show that the media indeed have a direct impact on public opinion. In a country like Mexico in which the media is controlled by a monopoly, it is easier to manipulate public opinion by framing the news in a biased way; unfortunately, this could work in a positive and a negative way. One of the main concerns for the Mexican civil society and members of the opposition in the Mexican government is the violation of Mexican sovereignty. In this experiment, the perception of Mexican sovereignty violation decreased when the respondents were exposed to the positive article, so if the media frames this cooperation as successful, one of the main arguments against U.S. officials working in Mexico could be reduced. For future research in media framing, it would be interesting to collect data in rural areas of Mexico, where Internet access is very limited and where the only available television channels are the government-controlled Televisa channels. I would then compare the public opinion in rural areas to the urban areas where Internet access is more available, and private TV channels and some other means of communication are more accessible.

Comparing the results from all three empirical chapters—political trust, attribution of responsibility, and media framing—I found that people are generally more supportive of the U.S. cooperation with Mexico by providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel compared to other forms of cooperation. This makes sense because Mexican society is aware that criminal organizations have a lot of economic resources to operate with, and the money that the government assigns to their combat usually is not enough. With the hope that this could facilitate the arrest of drug lords, the respondents could support the idea to allocate

more economic resources to the combat of the drug cartels. Regarding the U.S. cooperation with Mexico by U.S. training Mexican police and military personnel, people were similarly supportive. As for the U.S. cooperation with Mexico by deploying troops in Mexican territory, however, the public is much less supportive of this form of cooperation. I should also note that attribution of blame and media framing appear as stronger predictors of public support for U.S. cooperation with Mexico compared to political trust.

Regarding the policy implications of my research and findings, there are several points I would like to highlight. In the last month, the Mexican government approved the use of firearms by foreign police forces in Mexican territory (La Jornada, 2014). U.S. authorities working in Mexico is not a new development; U.S. agents have a long history of working in Mexican territory combating the drug cartels. That said, in most instances, Mexican authorities have allowed U.S. agents to work and conduct investigations in Mexico without considering the public opinion. In other instances, with the intention of avoiding conflicts with the Mexican population and civil society, Mexican governmental authorities have denied that U.S. officials operate in Mexico. I do not think it is necessary to deny that U.S. officials work in Mexico; this can be publicly admitted by framing it as an effort that U.S. and Mexico have been doing to combat the drug cartels. I suggest that the Mexican government should take into consideration the input from the public when deciding whether to cooperate with the U.S. in the war on drugs rather than proceeding with non-empirical assumptions about what the public wants.

To facilitate public opinion on a possible bi-national cooperation, the U.S. and Mexico could engage in a campaign of informing the Mexican society about the benefits of having U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies working together in the combat of the drug cartels which operates in both countries. Of course, in this process, both countries should avoid baseless

propaganda and rely on the facts and also present the potential costs and risks to prevent one-sided arguments. I perceive this as one step in having a more unified North American law enforcement system in which criminals cannot easily hide from authorities in another country.

It has been proven with more than one-hundred-thousand people murdered in the last years that Mexican authorities are not capable of single-handedly combating the drug cartels. Drug cartels hide under the sovereignty of other countries and criminals who are wanted in the U.S. hide and operate in Mexico. One of the possible solutions could be the creation of an intergovernmental law enforcement agency that can freely work in the North American region for combating the drug cartels.

Regarding future avenues of research, it would be interesting to collect data in Mexico with the more direct measures of trust in several institutions, specifically in the combat against criminal organizations. There are also many other questions that could be asked in the Roper survey, such as patriotism measures, trust in the U.S., and trust in international institutions. Also important, the survey data that I used from the Roper Center did not ask any questions about possible economic solutions to the drug war; in fact, all of the questions were focused on the idea to solve the problems with militarization. The survey could include more non-military options on how to combat the drug cartels and what Mexican people think about possible solutions, such as, health initiatives to treat addicted people, marijuana legalization, educational campaigns, and investment in the social sector, and economic solutions. It would thus be useful to collect data using measures to explore some other forms of cooperation between U.S. and Mexico. Not all people see the drug war as a problem that must be solely tackled using force. Both countries could cooperate to treat the drug war as an economic problem, from a supply-demand perspective, if the demand for drugs decreases the profit for the drug cartels will decrease. With

educational campaigns, and health policies to treat drug addicts in the U.S. the demand for drugs could decrease. As any other business the drug cartels operate based on profit, and if they make less money due to the reduction of demand, it could lower the drug cartels' power.

It would also be highly useful to do some qualitative research on why people trust some institutions and not others, and how their personal experiences have shaped their trust in institutions with in-depth interviews and focus groups. Regarding the attribution of responsibility, it would be interesting to collect data on not only about who people blame, but depending on who people blame, how public opinion shifts regarding the way the drug cartels must be combated, and if a bi-national law enforcement agency is a good approach to combat the drug cartels or if each country should remain combating the drug cartels with their own strategy. With respect to future research on media framing, it would be interesting to conduct another experiment using with a national sample, with members of all ethnicities across different socio-economic, and education levels. Sadly, Mexico is currently going through a period of turmoil, which calls for various avenues of scholarly research, hopefully, with the potential to engender sound policy prescriptions.

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Appendix

Questions from the Roper Center Survey used in My Thesis

Independent Variable

ASK ALL IN MEXICO ONLY

Q39 Please tell me if you approve or disapprove of the way President Peña Nieto is handling each of the following areas. (*READ*) (*SHOW CARD*)

b. Dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers

- 1 Approve
- 2 Disapprove
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Dependent Variables

ASK ALL IN MEXICO ONLY

Q158 Now I'm going to read you a list of things the United States might do to help the Mexican government combat drug traffickers in our country. For each one, please tell me whether you would support or oppose it.

- a.** Training Mexican police and military personnel
 - b.** Providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel
 - c.** Deploying U.S. troops in Mexico
- 1 Support
 - 2 Oppose
 - 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
 - 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Other Dependent Variables

Q34 As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in **Mexico**. Is the influence of (INSERT) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in Mexico?

- a.** our national government [Mexico]
 - c.** the military
 - d.** the media—such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines
 - f.** court system
 - g.** the police [Mexico]
 - l.** The Congress [Mexico]
- 1 Very good
 - 2 Somewhat good
 - 3 Somewhat bad
 - 4 Very bad
 - 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
 - 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Control Variables

ASK ALL

Q165 How old were you at your last birthday?

_____ years (RECORD AGE IN YEARS)

97 97 or older

98 Don't know (DO NOT READ)

99 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Q164 *Gender (RECORD BY OBSERVATION)*

1 Male

2 Female

Q183MEX . On this card are letters and quantities in pesos. Adding together the incomes of all the people who work in your household, which letter corresponds with the monthly income of this household?

Measurement Level: Nominal

Value Label

1 [A] 0-1 Sal. Mín. (0 to 1,815 pesos)

2 [B] 1-2 Sal. Mín. (1,816-3,630 pesos)

3 [C] 2-3 Sal. Mín. (3,631-5,445 pesos)

4 [D] 3-4 Sal. Mín. (5,446-7,260 pesos)

5 [E] 4-5 Sal. Mín. (7,261-9,075 pesos)

6 [F] 5-6 Sal. Mín. (9,076-10,890 pesos)

7 [G] 6-7 Sal. Mín. (10,891-12,705 pesos)

8 [H] 7-8 Sal. Mín. (12,706-14,520 pesos)

9 [I] 8-10 Sal. Mín. (14,521-18,150 pesos)

10 [J] 10-30 Sal. Mín. (18,151-54,450 pesos)

11 [K] 30+ Sal. Mín. (more than 54,450 pesos)

98 Don't know

99 Refused

Q180MEX. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Value Label

1 No formal education

2 Incomplete primary school

3 Complete primary school

4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type

5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

6 Incomplete preparatory

7 Complete preparatory

8 Some university-level education, without a degree

9 University-level education, with degree

98 Don't know

99 Refused

Q190MEX. Independent of the party that you vote for, do you normally consider yourself a PANist, PRlist, PRDist, or other?

Print Format: F2

Write Format: F2

Value Label

- 1 Very panista
- 2 Somewhat panista
- 3 Very priista
- 4 Somewhat priista
- 5 Very perredista
- 6 Somewhat perredista
- 96 Other (Volunteered)
- 97 No party (Volunteered)
- 98 Don't know
- 99 Refused

Q66 Do you use the internet, at least occasionally?3

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 Don't know (DO NOT READ)
- 9 Refused (DO NOT READ)

Q207MEX. Region

Measurement Level: Scale

Value Label

- 1 North
- 2 Central
- 3 Conurbada
- 4 South

Experimental Materials [Originally conducted in Spanish and translated to English]

Carefully read the news report on the next page, please then answer the questions according to their reactions to the news report. It is very important that you read the news report carefully; your answers are based on your opinion after reading the news report. Thank you for your participation, thank you very much!

Experimental Scenarios

Positive News Report

The war against drugs launched by former Mexican President Felipe Calderon has called the attention of many people to the Mexican-US border area. More than 100,000 people lost their lives since the war began in 2006 (México Evalúa, 2013). For many people the cooperation between Mexican and American law enforcement agencies can be the solution to overcome the drug cartels.

Officials from the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) stated that the US government has deployed about 500 officers from various departments in Mexico.

The objective of these officers, who are in Mexico legally, is to obtain information on criminal organizations. The American officers share the information with Mexican authorities to investigate and prosecute criminal organizations, so that their activities do not endanger the safety of the United States and Mexico.

According to officials of the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR), in 2005 only 60 US agents were deployed south of the border. In March, it was reported that the United States planned to double the number of ICE agents on the border with Mexico with the consent of the Mexican authorities, which is considered an important factor of the cooperation. This was after the murder of Jaime Zapata, an agent from Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Currently, Mexican authorities are working with approximately 500 members of the Drug Enforcement agency (DEA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Control of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

The DEA provides valuable information to the Mexican authorities. The Mexican Attorney General's Office reports successful results from the bilateral cooperation between US and Mexico combating criminal organizations. For instance the cooperation has been highly successful that one of the most wanted drug lords was captured by Mexican federal police at a residence in La Paz, Baja California Sur, after a follow-up by DEA agents.

The American cooperation with Mexican authorities in the combat of the drug cartels has been very successful in arresting many drug cartel leaders and by seizing millions of dollars. The drug cartels have been losing power because of the many seizures of money conducted by US authorities in Mexico, after been tracked from the U.S.

Negative News Report

The war against drugs launched by former Mexican President Felipe Calderon has called the attention of many people to the Mexican-US border area. More than 100,000 people lost their lives since the war began in 2006 (México Evalúa, 2013). For many people the cooperation between Mexican and American law enforcement agencies can be the solution to overcome the drug cartels.

Officials from the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) stated that the US government has deployed about 500 officers from various departments in Mexico.

The objective of these officers, who many perceive as they are in Mexico illegally, is to obtain information on criminal organizations, but the American officers do not share the information with Mexican authorities. US agents investigate and prosecute criminal organizations, so that their activities do not endanger the safety of the United States and Mexico.

According to officials of the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR), in 2005 only 60 US agents were deployed south of the border, and are now more than 500. In March, it was reported that the United States planned to double the number of ICE agents on the border with Mexico with the consent of the Mexican authorities, which is considered as a violation of the Mexican sovereignty. This was after the murder of Jaime Zapata, an agent from Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Currently there are working around 500 members of the Drug Enforcement agency (DEA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Control of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

The DEA does not provide valuable information to the Mexican authorities. The Mexican Attorney General's Office reports unsuccessful results from the bilateral cooperation in Mexico on combating criminal organizations. One of the most wanted drug lords escaped from Mexican federal police at a residence in La Paz, Baja California Sur, after the intervention from DEA agents.

The American cooperation with Mexican authorities in the combat of the drug cartels has been unsuccessful in arresting drug cartel leaders and by seizing only few amount of money of the drug cartels. The drug cartels have been gaining power because of the millions of dollars that has been entering Mexico untraceable from the US.

Please circle the answer to each question.

What do you think about the U.S. agents carried out investigations and operations in Mexico?

1. Very good
2. Something good
3. Neither good nor bad
4. A bad thing
5. Very bad

Do you think that American agents working in Mexico violate Mexican sovereignty?

1. Yes, they violate the sovereignty of Mexico
2. No, they just do their work against drug cartels

For each of the following ideas, please tell me how strongly you support or oppose the following:

US training Mexican police agents and military personnel

1. Strongly Support
2. Something support
3. Neither support nor opposition
4. In opposition
5. Strongly opposed

The U.S. providing money and weapons to the Mexican police and military personnel

1. Strongly Support
2. Something support
3. Neither support nor opposition
4. In opposition
5. Strongly opposed

The United States sent troops to Mexico

1. Strongly Support
2. Something support
3. Neither support nor opposition
4. Opposed
5. Strongly opposed

Do you think that the Mexican government is making progress in its campaign against drug traffickers, worse, or as in the past?

1. Advance
2. Worsen
3. Same as in the past

Now some questions about yourself:

What is your gender?

- 0 Female
1 Male

Age:

Which of the following income ranges does it closer to the net household income including wages, salaries, pensions and other income of all members living in your home? (In an approximate US Dollars):

- \$ 1 1 to 20,000
2 \$ 20.001 to 40,000

- 3 \$ 40,001 to 60,000
- 4 \$ 60,001 to 80,000
- 5 \$ 80,001 to 100,000

Do you support or oppose using the Mexican army to fight drug traffickers?

- 1 Support
- 2 Oppose

Do you live in Mexico?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

Have you ever lived in Mexico?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

How many years? ____

Nationality:

- 1. Mexican
- 2. American

How do you identify yourself?

- 1. Mexican
- 2 American
- 3 Mexican-American

Have you or a member of your family have been victims of a crime in Mexico?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the minimum and 5 is the maximum, how patriotic do you consider yourself?

- 1 Not at all
- 2 Not Very Patriotic
- 3 Somewhat Patriotic
- 4 Very Patriotic
- 5 Extremely Patriotic

When was the last time you voted?

- 1. 1 year ago
- 2. Two / three years ago
- 3. More than three years ago
- 4. Never voted

Original Experiment in Spanish

En la siguiente página por favor lea cuidadosamente el reporte de noticias, después conteste las preguntas de acuerdo a sus reacciones con el reporte de noticias. Es muy importante que lea el reporte de noticias cuidadosamente, sus respuestas son en base a su opinión después de leer el reporte de noticias. Muchísimas gracias por su participación, se lo agradezco mucho!

Reporte de Noticias Positivo

La guerra contra las drogas lanzada por el ex presidente de México, Felipe Calderón, ha llamado la atención de muchas personas a la frontera México-Estados Unidos zona fronteriza. Más de 100,000 personas perdieron la vida desde que comenzó la guerra en 2006 (México Evalúa, 2013). Para muchas personas la cooperación entre los organismos encargados de hacer cumplir la ley mexicana y estadounidense puede ser la solución para superar los cárteles de la droga. Funcionarios de la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) afirmaron que el gobierno de Estados Unidos tiene desplegados alrededor de 500 agentes de diversas dependencias en México. El objetivo de estos elementos -que se encuentran en México legalmente- es obtener información y compartirla con las agencias de seguridad Mexicanas sobre las organizaciones criminales. Para investigarlas y perseguirlas, a fin de que sus actividades no pongan en peligro la seguridad de Estados Unidos y México.

Según los funcionarios de la PGR, en 2005 sólo 60 agentes estadounidenses estaban desplegados al sur de su frontera.

En marzo pasado se informó que Estados Unidos planeaba duplicar la cifra de agentes del ICE en la frontera con México. Lo anterior después del asesinato de Jaime Zapata, agente del Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas.

Actualmente, las autoridades mexicanas colaboran con alrededor de 500 integrantes de las agencias Antidrogas (DEA), Central de Inteligencia (CIA) y para el Control de Alcohol, Tabaco, Armas de Fuego y Explosivos (ATF), además del Buró Federal de Investigación (FBI), y del Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas (ICE).

La DEA proporciona información valiosa a las autoridades Mexicanas. La Procuraduría General de la República precisa en sus informes de resultados que una muestra de la cooperación binacional en territorio mexicano en materia de combate a las organizaciones criminales y al narcotráfico fue la detención de un importante Capo del narcotráfico en octubre pasado. Éste fue capturado por policías federales en una residencia de La Paz, Baja California Sur, luego de un seguimiento por parte de agentes de la DEA.

La cooperación de los Estados Unidos con las autoridades mexicanas en el combate de los cárteles de la droga ha tenido mucho éxito en la detención de muchos líderes de los cárteles de las drogas y al decomisar millones de dólares. Los cárteles de la droga han ido perdiendo poder a causa de las muchas incautaciones de dinero realizada por las autoridades de Estados Unidos en México, después de un seguimiento desde los EE.UU.

Reporte de Noticias Negativo

La guerra contra las drogas lanzada por el ex presidente de México, Felipe Calderón, ha llamado la atención de muchas personas a la frontera México-Estados Unidos. Más de 100,000 personas perdieron la vida desde que comenzó la guerra en 2006 (México Evalúa, 2013). Para muchas personas la cooperación entre los organismos encargados de hacer cumplir la ley mexicana y estadounidense puede ser la solución para superar los cárteles de la droga.

Funcionarios de la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) afirmaron que el gobierno de Estados Unidos tiene desplegados alrededor de 500 agentes de diversas dependencias en México. El objetivo de estos elementos -que se encuentran en México el cual muchos consideran ilegales- es obtener información sin compartirla con las agencias de seguridad Mexicanas sobre las organizaciones criminales, investigarlas y perseguirlas, a fin de que sus actividades no pongan en peligro la seguridad de la Los Estados Unidos sin importarles la seguridad Mexicana.

Según los funcionarios de la PGR, en 2005 sólo 60 agentes estadounidenses estaban desplegados al sur de su frontera, hoy ya son más de 500.

En marzo pasado se informó que Estados Unidos planeaba duplicar la cifra de agentes del ICE en la frontera con México. El cual es visto como un violatorio a la soberanía de México. Lo anterior después del asesinato de Jaime Zapata, agente del Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas.

Actualmente, se encuentran alrededor de 500 integrantes de las agencias Antidrogas (DEA), Central de Inteligencia (CIA) y para el Control de Alcohol, Tabaco, Armas de Fuego y Explosivos (ATF), además del Buró Federal de Investigación (FBI), y del Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas (ICE).

La DEA no proporciona información valiosa a las autoridades Mexicanas. La Procuraduría General de la República precisa en sus informes de resultados que una muestra de la falta de cooperación binacional en territorio mexicano en materia de combate a las organizaciones criminales y al narcotráfico. Uno de los casos fue el escape de un importante Capo del narcotráfico en octubre pasado cuando la DEA no compartió su información.

La cooperación de los Estados Unidos con las autoridades mexicanas en el combate de los cárteles de la droga no ha tenido éxito en la detención de líderes de los cárteles de drogas y decomisando muy poca cantidad de dinero de los cárteles de la droga. Los cárteles de la droga han ido ganando poder a causa de los millones de dólares que ha estado introduciéndose en México ilocalizable desde los EE.UU.

Por favor encierre la respuesta a cada pregunta.

¿Qué piensa usted acerca de los agentes estadounidenses que llevan a cabo investigaciones y operaciones en territorio mexicano?

1. Muy bueno
2. Algo bueno
3. Ni bueno o malo
4. Algo malo
5. Muy malo

¿Cree usted que los agentes estadounidenses trabajando en México violan la soberanía mexicana?

1. Sí, violan la soberanía de México
2. No, ellos solo hacen su trabajo contra los cárteles de la droga

Para cada una de las siguientes ideas, por favor dígame ¿Con qué firmeza usted apoya o se opone a lo siguiente:

El entrenamiento de agentes estadounidense a la policía mexicana y personal militar

1. Apoyar enérgicamente
2. Algo de apoyo
3. Ni apoyo ni oposición
4. En oposición
5. Se opone fuertemente

Los EE.UU. proporcionando dinero y armas a la policía mexicana y personal militar

1. Apoyo enérgicamente
2. Algo de apoyo
3. Ni apoyo ni oposición
4. En oposición
5. Se opone fuertemente

Los Estados Unidos envíen tropas a México

1. Apoyo enérgicamente
2. Algo de apoyo
3. Ni apoyo ni oposición
4. En oposición
5. Se opone fuertemente

¿Crees que el gobierno mexicano está haciendo progresos en su campaña contra los narcotraficantes, empeorando, o igual que en el pasado?

1. Avanzar
2. Empeorar
3. Igual que en el pasado

Ahora, algunas preguntas sobre tu persona:

¿Cuál es su género?

- 0 Femenino
1 Masculino

Edad:

¿Cuál de los siguientes rangos de ingresos se acerca más al ingreso neto en su hogar incluyendo los salarios, sueldos, pensiones y otros ingresos de todos los miembros que viven en su hogar? (En un aproximado a Dólares Americanos):

- 1 \$1 to 20,000
- 2 \$20,001 to 40,000

- 3 \$40,001 to 60,000
- 4 \$60,001 to 80,000
- 5 \$80,001 to 100,000

¿Usted apoya o se opone a utilizar el ejército mexicano para combatir a los narcotraficantes?

- 1 Apoyo
- 2 Oponerse

¿Vive usted en México?

- 1 Sí
- 2 No

¿Alguna vez ha vivido en México?

- 1 Sí
- 2 No

Cuantos años? ____

Nacionalidad:

- 1 Mexicana
- 2 Americana

Como te identificas?

- 1 Mexicano
- 2 Americano
- 3 Mexico-Americano

¿Usted o un miembro de su familia han sido víctimas de un delito en México?

- 1 Sí
- 2 No

¿En una escala de 1 a 5, en la que 1 es el mínimo y 5 como máximo, que tan patriótico se considera usted?

- 1 No Patriótico en absoluto
- 2 No muy Patriótico
- 3 Algo Patrió
- 4 Muy Patriótico
- 5 Extremadamente Patriótico

Cuando fue la última vez que votaste?

- 1 Hace 1 año
- 2 Hace Dos/tres años
- 3 Hace más de tres años
- 4 Nunca eh votado

Vita

Born in El Paso, TX and raised in Ciudad Juárez, México, Rodrigo Alberto Borunda began his education at El Paso Community College in 2008; two years later he completed his Associate's Degree in Criminal Justice. In 2013, he completed his Bachelor's Degree with a double major in Political Science and Criminal Justice at the University of Texas at El Paso. After graduation, Borunda enrolled in the Political Science Master's Program, where he served as a teaching assistant. While attending school, Borunda worked as an intern for the Texas Attorney General and also completed a summer internship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the National Center of Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI). Furthermore, Borunda presented his research project "Mexican Drug War: Losing Faith in Mexican Government" at the annual meeting of the Association of Borderland Studies (ABS) in Albuquerque, NM. He also presented this thesis "Examining the Effects of Political Trust, Attribution of Responsibility, and Media Framing on Public Support for Outside Intervention in the Mexican Drug War" at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) in Chicago, IL.

This thesis was typed by Rodrigo A. Borunda