Interview no. 842

J. Samuel Moore
G: Mr. Moore, before we discuss your recollections of the Chamizal settlement, I'd like to begin our interview by asking you to share with us a bit of biographical information. Perhaps if you could please tell us when and where you were born.

M: Okay. I'm James Samuel Moore, Jr. And I also go under the name of J. Sam Moore, Jr. I was born in 1930 in Kansas City, Missouri. I attended the public schools of Lawrence, Kansas. I graduated from the University of Kansas with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration in 1952. I served in the United States Army in Korea in 1952 through 1954. And after I left the Army, I came to Texas and enrolled in the School of Law at the University of Texas in Austin where I
received my L.L.B. degree in December of 1956 with honors.

In January of 1957, I came to El Paso, Texas and joined the law firm of what was then Burges, Scott, Rasberry, and Hulse and is now known as Scott, Hulse, Marshall, Feuille, Finger, and Thurmond with offices in the Texas Commerce Bank Building, formerly the El Paso National Bank Building. I've practiced law continuously with that firm from January of 1957 through the end of 1993 and retired from the practice of law on January 1, 1994 with that firm after almost thirty-seven years of the private practice of law here in El Paso.

G: Okay. You had mentioned to me previously that the law firm that you're working with now was involved in the Chamizal issue itself at the turn of the century. Could you, perhaps, share with us the role that the law firm played?

M: This law firm has and its predecessors has been in El Paso since 1889 when William A. Henry Burges came here and started the practice of law and founded this firm. His brother, Richard F. Burges, subsequently came to El Paso and engaged in the practice of law here. Both the Burges brothers passed away in 1945 or 1946. Richard F. Burges was Associate Counsel for the United States in the Chamizal arbitration which was held here in El Paso in 1911. And that is the connection that this firm has with the arbitration hearing that was held back in 1911.

G: Okay. And where was the arbitration meeting held?

M: The meeting, for the most part, was held in the federal court
The meeting, for the most part, was held in the federal court room in the federal courthouse in El Paso, Texas which is no longer in existence. But it was situated on the south side of the San Jacinto Plaza where the present Kress store is located, right across from the Plaza Hotel, formerly the Hilton Hotel. But the hearings were held in the federal court room here in El Paso.

And could you, perhaps, give us a bit of background about the Chamizal issue and, perhaps, why the arbitration meeting was held in 1911?

The Chamizal, very briefly stated....The Chamizal dispute was a boundary dispute between the United States and Mexico and arose because the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was signed at the conclusion of the Mexican War, stated that the international boundary- shorthanding it- would be the Rio Grande. The Rio Grande, like many rivers, changes its course and, hence, moves north and south and did so after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [was signed]. And there was also subsequent conventions to the treaty which stated that the boundary would move [under certain circumstances]. You know, if the river moved slowly, the boundary would move with it. If the river moved quickly or through avulsion, then the boundary would not move with it. And those subsequent conventions, also, were the basis for forming our present International Boundary [and Water] Commission which handles matters concerning the boundary between the United States and
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the river had moved quite a bit, mostly south. And the Mexican Commissioner entertained and filed claims of Mexican citizens who claimed to own property on the north bank of the Rio Grande after it moved, taking the position that the river had moved quickly, which it had done in some cases. The river had moved quickly; hence, the boundary had not moved with it. And [claims were also filed which stated] that the Mexicans that had had their property formerly on the south bank, but now on the north bank, still owned their property on the north bank.

There were hearings held in 1896 which did not come to any satisfactory conclusion from the standpoint of either of the countries. And thereupon in 1911, and shortly before, a convention was reached whereby the question of the Chamizal was submitted to an international arbitration commission composed of three people: one, the American Commissioner, Colonel [Anson] Mills, the other, the Mexican Commissioner, Licenciado [Fernando] Beltran y Puga- or engineer Beltran y Puga- and the third, Dr. [Eugene] Lafluer, who was a Canadian jurist and chosen as the third arbitrator. And it commenced its hearings here in El Paso in 1911. It....

G: Okay. And what was the outcome of that arbitration meeting?
M: The outcome was unsatisfactory, really, to both parties although the Mexican Commissioner and Mexico assented to the
finding of the arbitration commission. The Mexican Commissioner, joined by Dr. Lafluer, the independent arbitrator, on being presented initially with the arbitration question [of], namely, "Who does the Chamizal tract belong to, what country...." As, unfortunately, all too often happens in arbitration proceedings, they kind of split the difference. They said, "Some of it belongs to the United States. Some of it belongs to Mexico." Colonel Mills, as the American Commissioner, after seeking advice from his government declined to approve or recognize the arbitration finding on the grounds that the arbitrators' sole jurisdiction and the sole question was, "Who owns the entire tract?" And [the American Commissioner opined] that the Mexican Commissioner and Dr. Lafluer, having on a two-to-one vote, in essence, divided the tract of land. [Mills] said that they were acting outside their jurisdiction and, hence, he recommended that the government of the United States not recognize or honor that arbitration finding. And our government did not recognize it. And that provided a very sore and diplomatic point between the United States and Mexico up until the 1960s when it was settled.

G: Okay. So when President [John F.] Kennedy went to Mexico City to meet with President [Adolfo] López Mateos in...

M: In 1962.

G: ...1962 and decided to approach the issue and settle it, you were still with this law firm, correct?
M: I was with the law firm at that time. And the Presidents of both countries instructed their diplomatic representatives to initiate steps and conventions that would lead to a settlement of the Chamizal boundary dispute.

G: What were your sentiments during that time? Did you think that the issue would finally be settled between the two countries or did you think that it would be an ongoing thing as it had been in the past?

M: I really had no substantial knowledge, initially, concerning the Chamizal dispute other than I shared the opinion of many people in town that it had been going on for so long that there was very little chance that something was going to happen very quickly to result in its settlement.

G: Why do you think the American government had sort of put the issue on the back burner for so long? Why wasn't it settled at the turn of the century or soon after, for example, during the arbitration meetings?

M: A variety of reasons. And, I think, one of the most important was that one has to remember that in May of 1911 and the time that the arbitration hearing in El Paso was coming to a conclusion, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 had started and had reached a very crucial point. In fact, while the arbitrators were sitting here in El Paso the Villista forces and the revolutionary forces were attacking Juárez. It was a very unusual international arbitration hearing because here one of the participating countries was undergoing a revolution which
wasn't happening far off but was happening right across the Rio Grande. And during the time when the arbitration hearing came down, almost contemporaneous with that, General [Porfirio] Díaz, the President of Mexico, resigned and went to France and the revolutionary forces succeeded to the government of Mexico. So there wasn't anything done right at that time for the very simple reason that one of the participating countries, Mexico, had just seen its government change through revolutionary means.

Following that- you don't have to be a very detailed student of Mexican history to know that- for the remainder of the 1910s and the 1920s [in] Mexico the governments were not what you would call stable and were changing quite frequently. So to try and settle a diplomatic dispute with many other diplomatic problems coming up, such as the Pershing Expedition into Mexico in 1916, you didn't have what you would call, perhaps, a very good atmosphere to try to approach Mexico for settlement of this because you were never quite sure, perhaps, who you would be talking to.

You bring it into the 1930s and you have, for instance, the oil expropriation in 1938. That offered enough problems that the Chamizal was put on the back burner, both here and in Mexico. You get into the 1940s and you've got World War II to occupy the attention of both countries. You get into the 1950s with the postwar recovery and [other occurrences] like that. The Chamizal, while it was an open diplomatic sore
between the two countries, nobody, at least the American administrations, didn't approach a settlement of it. It was only after John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 that somebody took enough interest, either he or some of his diplomatic advisors, to say, "Why don't we try to do something about the Chamizal?" And for that reason [Kennedy], in 1962, with a visit with the President of Mexico, an agreement was reached [and both Presidents decided], "Let's try and do something about it." So that is in answer to your question, "Why wasn't something done through all of these decades?" That's my short answer.

G: Okay. So Kennedy and López Mateos met and agreed to settle the issue. What happened soon after that, once they decided...

M: Well, things moved fairly quickly. Things moved rather quickly after that. In 1962 the Presidents instructed their representatives to, you know, to secure a convention and a treaty, if possible, to set up a mechanism to settle the Chamizal border dispute. And that was done. The Presidents in mid-[19]62 said, "Do something about it." And 1963 was occupied with both countries, and primarily the United States, trying to secure both a national and local consensus that this was something that should be settled. And it all culminated, then, with the formal treaty and convention setting up the mechanism for settling it in 1964.

G: And who was put in charge in the United States of putting
together this proposal for the treaty?

M: Okay. With regard to getting, particularly local, state and national support- and let's take it local, state, and national support- the primary moving official was Ambassador Thomas Mann of the United States, a native of Laredo, Texas. Ambassador Mann and the Department of State, of course, were the ones to, you know, do the negotiations and put together the convention and the treaty. And to that effect, Ambassador Mann came to El Paso in the latter part of 1962 and continued [coming to the city] into 1963 and had a series of informal, private meetings with both governmental, business, and private citizens in this city in which he and those accompanying him laid out what the problem was and their suggestions with regard to settlement of the Chamizal. And he, also, did the same thing, you know, at the state level [with] the [officials of the] State of Texas.

The national level of approval was pretty well taken care of. The President of the United States had initiated this. And, essentially, what was proposed by the United States and, also, as part of the negotiations with Mexico, was that a line would be agreed upon which would be the new border. And very little attention....There was a lot of lip service given to the prior award, but very little attention was given to the prior award in 1911, which the United States did not recognize. Simply, there was a effort made to redraw the boundary. And, again, Mexico didn't get all that it wanted.
The United States didn't get all that it wanted. But [there was an effort made] to redraw the boundary line and then it was up to both countries to secure title to that land so that they would be able to convey it to the other country.

G: I'd like to ask you about the tract of land, the Chamizal tract. Do you remember the neighborhood [and] what it was like?

M: It was South El Paso. It was essentially South El Paso and then proceeding to the east, again, with some property going toward the west. That is the property that was on the American side of the river as it existed then. The Mexican side....It was heavily developed, for the most part, on the American side.

G: And on the Mexican side was there any...

M: Remember, the Mexican side came up to the river as it existed so it was heavily developed, too, by the City of Juárez. So all of the Chamizal tract lay north of the river with one exception. And that was a kind of a U-shaped piece of property down in the Bowie High School district where the river, at one time, had made a big U or oxbow and got cut off. And that stuck into the United States and was part of Mexico. But that also constituted, you know, a part of the Chamizal problem.

G: Did the area consist mostly of residential homes? Did it consist of commercial buildings?

M: It consisted of everything. It consisted of residences,
commercial buildings, governmental facilities, immigration headquarters. You name it, it was in the Chamizal.

G: And most of the people that were living in the Chamizal did not have clear titles to their homes?

M: Property traded on the American side. Property traded quite easily. But with regard to any title insurance, there was always an exception taken that, "We do not insure against any claims arising out of the Chamizal." While property traded, the Chamizal dispute acted as a chiller insofar as active sales and purchases of land in the Chamizal. And what that resulted in was a very low level of improvement, both residential and commercial.

G: Okay. So before the Chamizal Convention was formally signed or formally approved by the governments of both countries, federal officials were coming to El Paso and discussing what would happen with city officials?

M: You bet they were. [Federal officials met with] not only city officials, [but they also met with] businessmen, private citizens, parties, both private individuals and [others] like that, [and] residential and commercial [property owners] who had property in the Chamizal. Because remember, the basis of any settlement would be that, "We're going to acquire your property either voluntarily or through condemnation"- this is the United States government- "and acquire title to your property, pay you for it, and then that's going to be conveyed to Mexico."
G: And what was the general feeling?

M: There wasn't any general feeling. A lot of people were saying, "Oh, the Chamizal is ours. It's a giveaway to Mexico. We're knuckling under to Mexico." The usual objections that you find to this sort of thing were said. Look, private individuals as neighbors involved in disagreements on fence lines and boundaries and situations like that, they can get into a hell of a squabble about it. And when you have that type of squabble being between two nations it's much more complicated, but it's just as adverse. So the general feeling was by some people, "No. We ought to keep it even though it is a diplomatic"—you know—"sore on our relations with Mexico." It was a big diplomatic thing in Mexico. It was a minor one with us but it was big in Mexico. And that's why it deserved a settlement on our part.

G: And city officials, if the Chamizal Convention was approved, I would think they would think that they would lose this tax base that they had, correct?

M: It wasn't that big a tax base. The city officials were absolutely delighted with the proposal because here's what was going to happen. As far as some of the city property was concerned, [which included] an outmoded sewage plant and properties like that, they were going to be able to sell that to the United States government and get enough money to where they could build a modern plant. The El Paso Independent School District, with a very old Bowie High School
down here, saw the opportunity to sell that property to the United States government and get enough money to where they could build the present very splendid Bowie High School facility. So on the part of governmental units in this city, they were all for it. In so far as the State of Texas, the State kind of said—"Well, look"—they didn't quite put it this way but—"what was okay with El Paso is okay with us."

It was for the smaller holders, residential and commercial, that a lot of the work had to be done. And some of them are still unhappy about what happened. After all, their property was condemned. They were paid quite well for it, but some of them thought that they still were not paid enough. Others said, "Look, we don't want to move even if we're paid for it." So a lot of the work that Ambassador Mann [carried out], assisted very ably by local officials and [others] like that, was directed toward those people who were going to have to move out of their homes and their businesses and move somewhere else.

G: What role did the International Boundary and Water Commission play in these days?

M: Absolutely substantial. They furnished all of the, of course, the technical support [and addressed], namely, [such as], "What tract of land are we dealing with? Let's look at where, perhaps, the line has to be drawn. Let's look at what type of improvements are going to have to be [included in] the convention because if we redraw the boundary line, we're going
to have to reroute the Rio Grande. And we're going to have to put it in a definite channel. How do we do it?" So [they provided] both technical and engineering support but, also, tremendous diplomatic support in the negotiations here locally. Ambassador [Joseph F.] Friedkin and his staff could not have done a finer job. It just couldn't have been better.

G: I can just imagine the logistics that were involved in planning the relocation and everything.

M: That's right. But they paled next to the human element in the negotiations because, granted, you can't get everybody's approval. But if there had been a vast number of people, both private, governmental, and, you know, commercial, that would object to the treaty, there might have been some doubt that it would have gotten settled because then the national government would have been shoving something down the throats of a local, you know, city to settle an international problem on their part.

G: And I would add, too, that the mutual cooperation and understanding helped to grease the wheels of the settlement itself because if officials in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso didn't get along, I imagine things would have been much more difficult.

M: That's right. And never sell the Mexicans short in this. They had just as many problems as we did. Remember, they had an arbitration award in 1911 that gave them a fair part of the tract. So they had to back off of insisting on the
enforcement of a 1911 arbitration award that was in their favor.

G: Correct. Correct. Okay. So when was the Chamizal Convention ratified officially by both governments?

M: It was finally ratified by Public Law 88-300, which was passed on April 29, 1964 and which set up the mechanism for settling the Chamizal dispute. [The law stipulated], namely, that-at least with regard to the United States- that they would acquire title to certain properties and convey to Mexico. And also, then, as the new boundary line was drawn [agreement was made] as to [carrying out] certain improvements that were going to be made on this side.

G: And what was the acreage involved? Do you remember?

M: The acreage involved was approximately- oh, let's see....Mexico obtained about over 500 acres and the United States acquired about 200 acres. But that was a very important 200 acres for the United States because that was that big oxbow down in the Bowie area. I mean [that acreage was] stuck into the United States in between....Where it stuck in in the Franklin Mountains, there wasn't that much room. So that almost 200 acres that we got down there enabled us to widen a bottleneck in the City of El Paso.

G: Okay. Could you, perhaps, share with us your recollections of the resettlement of the residents that were living in the Chamizal area?

M: Some of them....As I said, there were very few contested
valuation or payment awards. This is, again, largely due, I think, to the [efforts of the] staff of the International Boundary and Water Commission. A lot of them took their money and moved elsewhere in town.

G: Did they tend to settle in one area or were they scattered throughout the city?

M: I have no idea as to [where they relocated]. But they were resettled because their properties were taken. I will say this, that after all was done, you didn't hear very many people or businesses that had their properties taken and had to relocate [complaining]. Very few, if any, [were] still complaining about that they had to move or if they weren't paid enough. The general overall treatment of all concerned was fair valuation and fair payment.

G: Well, from what I recall, many of the residents were paid moving expenses.

M: They not only paid for the property but paid for moving expenses. That's correct.

G: And, for example, if a resident felt that he wasn't given a correct amount of money for his home what options did he have?

M: Well, he had the options to go to court. Very few, if any, did. Most of it was worked out by agreement. Also, with regard to commercial properties, they not only got the fair market value, but if they could show loss of profits and [other stipulated circumstances] like that, [they were compensated]. In other words, the way the Chamizal settlement
generous. It wasn't just, "We're going to give you "X" dollars for your land and move out." There were other expenses compensated for, such as moving expenses, loss of profits, things like that.

G: And, also, I've heard that many of the dwellings were substandard. So they were given above that amount in order to allow them to relocate to an area...

M: As a practical matter, that was the result. It was not stated in the convention or the treaty, but what happened was that the appraisers were very generous in looking at, say, a substandard house and in coming up with a value that would equal what you might call not what it was worth in place, but what the replacement value in some other area was.

G: Okay. Do you recall some of the names of the companies that had businesses located in the Chamizal?

M: Right offhand, I don't. But they were, for the most part, smaller businesses. Peyton Packing Company, though, was a large one which had to be taken care of because their packing company sat, you know, right up against the old border. They were, perhaps, the largest commercial property involved.

G: And were there any utilities in the Chamizal area?

M: Oh, you bet. Because, see, all the utilities.... Any time you move that border- and what it was was moving it north- you were going to disrupt the utilities. So part and parcel of this was complete relocation of railroads, utilities, highways, streets.
G: International bridges.

M: International bridges. For instance, the old U.S. Immigration [building], the entry place coming back from Juárez on the Santa Fe Bridge, that's now in Mexico.

G: Did...

M: So...

G: Did the Mexican government choose to use that building or did they raze it?

M: It's still standing down there. As you walk over the Santa Fe Bridge, if you look to your right you can still see the building and the escalators there. And they're making, I think, just minimal use of it.

G: Did the buildings that passed over to Mexico....Did the Mexican government pay the United States government for those buildings?

M: No. No, they did not. See, that was the beauty of the settlement procedure here is that to the extent that each country had to acquire...

End of Side A
G: You were talking about the buildings that passed over to Mexico.

M: That's right. It was a difficult situation. And to bring the payment of money into it would have made it even more difficult. In fact, perhaps, you know, [it would have made it] almost impossible to settle. So the method of settlement was, "We will agree on the new line. And that new line is going to be, for the most part, north of where the old river was. Hence, the United States is going to have to acquire the property using its own funds and transfer it to Mexico." So no money changed hands. I think that could be an accurate statement. And then Mexico had to acquire the top end. They, really, already owned it. But they had to convey to the United States the top end of that oxbow that is down in the Bowie area. So it was literally a transfer of property. And [this transfer was] accompanied by each of the countries, then, measuring the cost of what they then were going to have to do on their side of the new boundary.

G: Did the federal government give itself- or themselves- a time frame in which to complete the relocation of people, the moving of the international bridges?

M: The convention that was signed did not put a time limit on doing this. But if the law took effect in April of 1964 and
in 1967 the two Presidents, Lyndon Johnson and [Gustavo] Díaz Ordaz, met here on the new boundary and [other events] like that, it shows that things moved rather quickly.

G: Did you attend that meeting?
M: I did.
G: Do you recall any particular incidences or any outstanding moment during that meeting that...
M: No, other than it was pleasant. It was friendly. I can't recall any significant protests. And it's one of those things that, I think, both parties were glad to be rid of.
G: Okay. You had mentioned to me that you had presented a paper at a meeting for the International Association of...
M: In 1962, after the two Presidents had instructed their diplomatic representatives to start working toward a convention to settle the Chamizal, the American Society of International Law held a regional meeting in October of 1962 in Dallas, Texas and I was invited. It was sponsored by the University of Texas School of Law, and the Southern Methodist University School of Law, and the American Society of International Law. And I was invited, together with Dr. César Sepulveda, who was Dean of the National University of Mexico's Law School, to present- I, on behalf of the American position, and he, on behalf of the Mexican position- a speech and a paper outlining the Chamizal dispute. I appeared. Dr. Sepulveda, due to a scheduling problem couldn't, but his paper was read. And both of our presentations were subsequently
written up and presented in the *Southwestern Law Journal* in March of 1963. In fact, it's Volume 17, Number 1, *Southwestern Law Journal*, the Southern Methodist University School of Law's law review. And it appears, as I said, in Volume 17, Number 1.

And you can kind of see the way things moved. [In] June, [19]62, the two Presidents meet in Mexico City [and decide to] do something about the Chamizal. In October of [19]62, just a few months later here, Dr. Sepulveda and I are making a presentation. In the spring of [19]63, of course, here, you know, many things are happening here locally attracting [attention and] getting local and state support. And then in April of [19]64, hardly two years later, here's a signed convention giving the mechanism to settle the Chamizal dispute.

G: Okay. Okay.

M: I might add, also, there's also another excellent presentation about the Chamizal appearing in UTEP's [The University of Texas at El Paso] *Southwestern Studies*, Volume 1, Number 2, called "The Chamizal Settlement: A View From El Paso," by Dr. Gladys Gregory, who served on the faculty out at UTEP.

There's a whole bunch been written. The records of the International Boundary and Water Commission, from the time of its formation in the 1880s, [refer to the Chamizal issue. The records also include material] touching on hearings concerning the Chamizal. Excellent records there [at the IBWC's archives
chronicle the Chamizal dispute and settlement]. The arbitration proceeding, of course, with both the proceedings, the testimony, the cases, the arguments, and the findings are all a matter of record. There's a considerable literature on the Chamizal and it's not obscure. Anybody interested in it can get into it and find it.

G: Okay. Who's idea was it to create the Chamizal Memorial Park? In other words, both governments created parks on each side of the border.

M: Of course, each government made its own decision. But the United States said, "Look, as long as we're acquiring title to the property, some of its going to be conveyed to, like, Bowie High School and like that. Property, you know, that we're going to acquire from Mexico, we've got to do something with it." And the Mexicans were way ahead of us on this. They announced that they were going to have a national park across on their part of it. So we could, quite frankly, do no less. So we ended up with the Chamizal National Memorial down here which is administered by the National Park Service. So my view of it is that the Mexicans said, "Hey, we're going to do it." And we had very little choice, then, to say, "Well, if the Mexicans are going to have a lovely park—" which they do over there— "We can do no less." It's keeping up with the Joneses on an international scale.

G: Okay. Would you care to add anything else, Mr. Moore, to the Chamizal settlement? [Is there] anything that you can think
of or would care to...

M: Other...

G: ...talk about?

M: Other than that I was strictly on the fringes of it, but I can suggest to anybody that if they're interested in the history of this area, they could do worse than to get back into some of the literature and some of the official records concerning the Chamizal because it offers a fascinating look into this area in this city from the latter part of the last century up to the present time. In some of the proceedings you can read testimony given by people back then who would start their testimony [by stating] that they came to El Paso in the 1850s. That's a long time ago. And [the testimony includes] their descriptions of what the area was like then, where the river was, how it moved—fascinating reading. The Chamizal dispute also offers the settling of a very delicate boundary dispute between two nations with very, very different backgrounds. And it is a credit to both the countries that the matter was settled.

G: Okay. Well, I'd like to thank you for your time, Mr. Moore. I'm very appreciative. You've added quite a bit to my knowledge of the Chamizal.

M: My pleasure. Thank you for coming.

G: Thank you very much. This is the end of the interview.
M: I would like to offer a kind of supplemental comment. It would be very interesting for people interested in the Chamizal matter for them to review the terms of Public Law 88-300, which set up the mechanism for settlement of it and which constituted the International Boundary and Water Commission, the American Section, to represent the United States and to carry out the American portion of it. You run across such things as, "No money changes hands...." Because neither the United States does not pay Mexico nor does Mexico pay the United States because it would have been impossible to settle this on the basis that either side would be selling what they considered to be their national territory. And, especially, it would have been very impossible for any Mexican official or any Mexican government to agree to buy or sell using property to settle the Chamizal dispute. So that's why Public Law 88-300 and the entire mechanism for settlement was [created. These measurements would ensure] that each government would acquire properties and then a new boundary line would be agreed upon and any proper conveyances of property would be made to settle the dispute- not dollars, but property.

As a further inducement to aid any settlement and, particularly, if the government was going to be acquiring private and commercial and governmental properties here in this city by paying our own citizens, the Public Law 88-300
provides that no amount received by any of our citizens would be subject to income tax. That makes it a little bit easier for people to agree to a settlement.

It was the method of settlement— the what you might call just excellent diplomacy on the part of everybody concerned, American and Mexican— that made this go through. And as one party that I heard say, he said, "The Chamizal is the best kind of foreign aid because we aren't giving any money to another country. What we're doing is giving it to our own citizens and then conveying the property to the other country."

So I can say that quite a bit of thought went into the Chamizal settlement mechanism and it is deserving of study together with all other elements of the dispute and its settlement. Thanks.

G: Thank you, Mr. Moore.

End of Interview