Shakespeare and the Interhuman: The Mimetic Chrysalis of Buber's Between

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SHAKESPEARE AND THE INTERHUMAN:
THE MIMETIC CHRYSALIS OF BUBER’S BETWEEN

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The question of the connection between the essence of man
and the essence of art must be posed anew. That means that art
must be regarded as the image-work of man, the peculiar image-
work of his peculiarity.

Martin Buber

This project is dedicated with gratitude to the English faculty of the University of Texas
at El Paso, with special thanks to those specialists in British Literature through whose
generosity of intellect and spirit words and thoughts are conveyed in equal parts of awe,
kinship, and empathy. Your students know that the text contains an essence of humanity that
will not be obscured by theory.

Thanks and love also go to my family: to John and Russell, who only rarely complained
about distraction and canned soup for dinner, and to Susan, who insisted that I return to higher
education for the specific purpose of enrolling in Dr. David Ruiter’s Shakespeare classes.

Thank you, David, for having the patience of the saints, for sharing your insights, and for
jerking the reins as required – not to mention for bringing me to Shakespeare.

To Dr. John Dick and Dr. Ron Weber: thanks for being thoughtful, encouraging,
forgiving, and generous.
SHAKESPEARE AND THE INTERHUMAN:
THE MIMETIC CHRYSALIS OF BUBER’S BETWEEN

by

ELIZABETH BURFORD LANG

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Shakespeare and the Interhuman:
The Mimetic Chrysalis of Buber’s Between

Introduction

In early 2004, when I returned to academe (a word with which I was as yet unfamiliar) with a nearly three-decades-old bachelor’s degree in an unrelated field and a hope, even older, of finding Answers in Literature (capital “A,” capital “L”), I encountered Shakespeare as I never had before, in an undergraduate “Major Plays” class. Dr. David Ruiter, director of this MA thesis and a generous mentor to any interested and attentive student, was mindful, even when leading fledgling scholars into the thickets of Shakespeare criticism, of the treacherous theoretical footing and ideological trip hazards awaiting the uninitiated. “Be careful not to claim universals,” he warned.

Having discovered in Shakespeare a virtual universe of universals, at least as I saw them, I dumbly nodded and learned to add a lot of qualifying phrases to my tentative assertions about Shakespeare and his work. Still, I recognized that the eternal appeal of his characters in folly and failure, as in triumph and tragedy, was their inescapable familiarity. I knew their likeness to “us,” to everyone, was relevant in some essential way, and could not be satisfied with answers suggested within the current critical environment, in which anti-essentialist “new” historicism and cultural materialism remain dominant and still, especially for the student or professional with spurs still to win, severely limit within the discourse most contrarian humanist conversation about Renaissance and early modern—or any other, for that matter—English literature. Granted in the thesis the luxury of a project large enough to accommodate an upstream survey of the territory, I set out to document and navigate the theoretical dendrites with the hope of
discovering the return passage. The effort, I feel, has been rewarded, and a return to conversation that welcomes an essentialist humanism is possible herein.

The work of Martin Buber contributes a means of moderating that conversation. Buber, a self-described “believing” humanist, sought and achieved a semantic framework capable of describing the intersection of man, fellow man, and spirit while obviating insofar as possible the complication of any specific religious or ideological identification. Such a system opens a channel for the examination of dramatized humanity in Shakespeare. While many scholars and critics have presumed or pretended to “know” the meanings of the plays, have practiced exegesis on a character, a play, or the full canon, this paper is concerned with applying Buber’s terms and their implications toward a useful understanding of the actions, speeches, and implied human “being” represented in Shakespeare’s dramatic characters.

However, the use, even extensively, of a particular set of philosophical and/or psychological constructs and terminologies should in no way be taken to suggest that it is possible, or even desirable, to draw definitive conclusions about imaginative literature in the same ways that conclusions might be drawn about real human beings. Othello is a character in a play; four hundred years later, that created character cannot be subjected to a psycho-spiritual or behavioral analysis. He never existed. Yet through Shakespeare’s mimetic gift, a likeness so resonantly human does exist, and it may be examined as a mirror’s image may, as representative of that which is reflected. Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationship model, then, offers a way of recognizing the indefinable substance of relationships as they certainly exist in human life, and as they exist in mimetic reproduction in literature.

It should be noted that the superimposition of Buber’s construct upon characters in Shakespeare is here effected in a more general way than it might be done in a full, book-length
An Extratextual Between

What’s really “up with” Othello? Many of the most enduring questions in the study of Shakespeare concern instances of unheralded, often odd or “uncharacteristic” “behavior” among certain major characters. Critics, students, and audiences ponder such inconsistencies and seemingly illogical action or resolution as that portrayed, in this example, in the powerful and fearless general, Othello, who crumbles far too easily under the attentions of the vengeful psychopath Iago, takes what looks like precipitous revenge on an innocent, and rushes to unbearable awareness and regret. Unaccountably, in other dramatic instances, one duke — Vincentio in Measure for Measure — abandons his people to the hard justice of a pompous hypocrite, but is moved rather mysteriously to involvement, after all. Another, The Tempest’s Prospero, is in the end motivated to abjure in favor of community the practiced power of solitary, scientific “magic,” the heedlessly oblivious pursuit which had long ago cost him his dukedom, left in neglect to his brother’s arrogation.

Can the question of why Othello must fall and Desdemona die be answered? What reality exists for the “much changed” (4.1.275) Othello between his fond “But I do love thee!” (3.3.51) and his disintegration into the beast who strikes Desdemona (4.1.245), and makes murder the revenge for her supposed betrayal? Until nearly the very moment of the murder, the
scripted movement comprises Iago’s unrelenting psychological assault, Othello’s unembellished responses and incoherent musings, and Desdemona’s discomposed, resigned obedience. Moments but not the precise loci of response, motivation, and confirmation may be found in the text of the play.

There are other patterns of action that seem illogical and demand inquiry. Duke Vincentio, a ruler of reason and virtuous intent, moves perhaps unwillingly from solitary, purposefully detached observer of a web of virtue and vice to its very center, addressing no fewer than seven other persons in his final speech. Between the duke’s detached aloofness at the play’s opening and his subtle, extraordinary shift to magisterial mastery of persons and events at the play’s conclusion lies the liminality of awareness and human connection. Prospero, also duke, so negligent of the government of his Milan, so removed from all human involvement as to be in consequence usurped and exiled by the brother into whose care he had all but abdicated coronet and duchy, re-enters humanity in some relational imminence between contrivance and consummation.

Beyond the creation of the lines and actions of discrete character-selves who have been dissected for centuries, aside from arranging plot and movement into stories which entertain and intrigue audiences, Shakespeare represents in his plays the power, the necessity of human connectedness, ranging from relationship with kingdom and community, and with family and lover, to the ultimate relationship: that with self in the infinite. There is an awareness, a relevance that occupies a space between his characters, in a dimension separate from their words and actions. It is the artist’s image of a relational dimension, this Between, that is not dependent on causation.
This awareness of relationship is the essential difference that brings Shakespeare’s fictions into a transcendent contact with his audiences: the “familiar problem” of “accounting for resistance to history” (Fernie, Introduction *Spiritual* 10), of acceding to the orientations and requirements of the critical community, whether historical, historicist, materialist, subversive, generically postmodern or post-“phallogocentric” (Carroll 66) by any other controlling designation, is *not*, in fact, a problem for the Shakespearean audience. The resonance of character and relationship as given image in the plays begs a forum that, like its delighted, often avid gallery, permits examination of the physics of the reflected human image.

As briefly noted above, the aim of this thesis is to introduce into the conversation about Shakespeare’s work the notion of a figuratively spatial *range* of reciprocity in human relationship, employing concepts constructed by the twentieth century humanist philosopher Martin Buber, particularly in *I and Thou* (1923), and as augmented by essays both early and late presented in *A Believing Humanism* (1965) and the collection *The Knowledge of Man*, which includes several of Buber’s “philosophical anthropology” essays written between 1951 and 1963. To ground this conversation, I propose to establish for it a position within the changing critical spectrum, which, as I will discuss, seems in recent years more hospitable than at the height of postmodernist dominance to discourse that includes “humanist,” “human nature,” and perhaps even in specific discussions of “spirit” in its conceptual and philosophical language. Following Buber, then, I hope to construct a working platform that remains flexible for the scholar who recognizes the existence of the essential human as reflected in literature, even one who rejects the imputation, stated or otherwise, of a soul or spiritual component in man’s essence.

Buber has spoken of the “primal demands of the human heart which at any moment [. . .] will break through to actualization and become self-evident” (*ABH* 94) and a dialogue which
“shall continue into silent being with one another,” only wherein it will “first properly culminate” (102). Housing these silences and occurring only in relationship, and through which emerge of each individual his human self, as a butterfly emerges from its chrysalis (I 69), is the shared “Between.” “Man,” says Buber, “becomes an I through a You” (80).

Shakespeare, by representing humanity in characters who are changed in relationship, seems also to be saying that one’s self is resolved through others. While this interhuman component in self-resolution is most obviously portrayed in comedies such as Twelfth Night and As You Like It, for example, in casts of characters who engage, relate, and emerge from the uncertainty of the action to achieve a positive resolution in the courses of the plays, it is more intense and dramatic, certainly, elsewhere. In The Winter’s Tale Hermione’s metamorphosis from stone to flesh is patent, potent, and profound; Macbeth’s is subtle but evident and Lear’s heart-rendingly plain. Others, however, including those of the dukes Vincentio and Prospero and the great general Othello, are problematic. Audiences wonder at these characters, actors and directors struggle, and critics interrogate. Martin Buber’s concept of the Between, the locus of relationship or the overlap of individuals’ potential for relation, their You, concerned with the non-causative nature of human encounter and its fruits, adds not just meaning but a grasp of the inimitable I, the butterfly that ultimately emerges.

*****

6
Chapter 1

Anti-Essentialism, Humanism, and Human Nature

Suit the action to the word,

and the word to the action, with this special observance,

that you o’erstep not the modesty of nature. For

anything so o’erdone is from the purpose of playing,

whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to

hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue

her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age

and body of the time his form and pressure. (Hamlet 3.2.17-24)

As Hamlet reminds his hired players of their purpose, so is Horace’s pupil reminded, in

the Ars Poetica, that “poets wish to either benefit or delight us, or, at one and the same time, to

speak words that are both pleasing and useful for our lives,” and “poetic fictions should

approximate reality” (333-36). Sidney’s reader is informed, also, that the end of poetry is “to

teach and delight” (958). A half-century beyond Shakespeare, John Dryden’s Essay of

Dramatick Poesie defines a play as “the imitation of nature” (para. 99), providing “a just and

lively Image of human nature, in its Actions, passions, and traverses of Fortune: so is the end,

namely for the delight and benefit of Mankind” (para. 113). These are high ambitions. Perhaps

Shakespeare does fulfill them; rational modern critics, those able to turn cultural politics aside,

even temporarily, in favor of art, must surely agree. Dryden “loves” him for it (para. 84).
In modern Shakespeare criticism, however, the imputation of serious validity to the concepts of “mankind” and “human nature” carries a certain risk of ridicule. So discredited in cultural criticism and by unlimited extension in recent literary criticism — except, possibly, within that segment which self-identifies as Marxist and speaks to a “common humanity” that itself is conceived as a cultural construction (Ryan, Shakespeare 27) — is the idea and substance of humanism that even to discuss Shakespeare’s work in terms which were culturally definitive in his own early modern England has long been all but circumscribed. Yet the idea of human nature — a term usually undefined but generally, it is supposed, understood among most socially definable groups — seems to be a “universal” concept of the universal. A government functionary cites “human nature” as the basis for a militaristic defensiveness, and a grandmother’s “faith” in it is “restored” by the return of her stolen purse by altruistic strangers; bread riots, unintentional racial profiling, good parenting and an abhorrence of incest are all, unscientifically, ascribed to an ineffable essential state colloquially understood to be natural to homo sapiens. Cicero begins De Officiis by listing human universals, the understanding of which he considered of paramount importance to his audience, his son (11-14); the Renaissance humanists embraced both text and context in the usual program of classical instruction (Wells, Shakespeare’s Humanism 9). Steven Pinker, whose work in cognitive science figures more prominently later in this study, finds these tangible, observable features of universal human nature so important relative to the construction of an essentialist model that he reproduces anthropologist Donald E. Brown’s empirically compiled “List of Human Universals” as an appendix in The Blank Slate (435-39). In current literary theory, however, one approaches the use of the term “human nature” with considerable caution.
The human, nonetheless and undeniably, is central in Shakespeare. Humanism and humanist values have been traditionally and appropriately summoned in Shakespearean studies, usually as cultural tradition requiring no justification or qualification, but also, in recent decades, frequently in deliberate, even imperiously dismissive preface to various critical modes. Critical currents toward the reinstatement of “man” and “mankind” as requisite to the consideration of determinate meaning in Western literature have centered on the reconsideration of humanism as intellectual matrix. Some parsing of terms and concepts is necessary to that purpose.

“Humanism Lost” in Literary Criticism

Proclaiming in 1995 that Cultural Materialism had supplanted previous modes of inquiry and traditional approaches so completely that it now constituted “the new academic order” (viii), Scott Wilson in Cultural Materialism: Theory and Practice claims to bear the standard for the spectrum of anti-essentialists, many of whom, it is clear, constitute themselves politically as well as critically (15-16). Wilson avers that “human nature” as a concept is “aristocratic,” “slavish,” and/or calculatedly “bourgeois” (185), although he does not explore the meanings of “humanism.” Neither does Joanna Martindale, editor of The Cambridge Guide to Renaissance Humanism, whose essayists endeavor to treat humanism in its various interactions with the culture as if it (the new learning) were separate from the people. The critical environment that brought about this “new order” and consequently replaced, if temporarily, criticism with ideological critique, as succinctly stated by Graham Bradshaw (Misrepresentations 3-6, emphasis by the author), arose through a combination of factors, some literary and some not.

So overwhelmed were traditional, mostly character-based (Sinfield “From Bradley” 25) threads in literary criticism by the sweep of Derrida and Foucault and those who followed them
in the mid-to-late twentieth century that in the last two decades the very idea of an essential or universal human nature became practically heretical in the literary profession. There was a concerted and transparent effort, as M. H. Abrams expressed it, to dismantle “the interrelated concepts of ‘humanity,’ ‘human,’ ‘man,’ ‘the subject,’ ‘subjectivity,’ ‘the person,’ and ‘the self’” (14). Nonetheless, early modern works, including the Shakespeare canon, that are culturally and intellectually based in what is commonly called “Renaissance humanism” have seemed increasingly to require the establishment of a critical “space” within which their attributes and meanings may be considered. The dilemma for Shakespeareans interested in character and the dramatization of common human attributes seems to have been primarily located in the practical requirement that to engage in conversation about a work’s humanistic meanings may actually require some empathy with the moral, ethical, or spiritual themes to be admitted as evident in the work under critical examination. A scholar suggesting, for example, that the way in which the tension of dichotomy between internal and external moral factors is depicted in a certain Shakespeare character is an interesting example of an early modern blending of classical, Christian, and vernacular views of human nature would have been, at minimum, heavily criticized for the reference to “human nature,” such a concept having been thoroughly discredited in favor of a fully constructed personhood. Further, any failure to condemn, at least indirectly, the oppressive patriarchal system that created early modern humanism has been seen as omission and weakness of argument.

Ironically, the initial opening for the onslaught of the ideologically charged anti-essentialist new historicist or cultural materialist domination of literary criticism in general and Shakespeare criticism in particular may have been prepared by the relatively polite and still (at
least on its face) fraternal disagreement among Shakespeareans concerning the legitimacy of E. M. W. Tillyard’s conception of Shakespeare as adherent to, if not instrument of, Tudor political orthodoxy, as a wearer of Don Cameron Allen’s “golden collar” (435). Tillyard in *The Elizabethan World Picture* (1944) establishes at the very least the reduction of an already well-examined historical environment to “one corner of” its surveyed expanse. Allen wryly points out that perhaps “Tillyard has done an immense service in [. . .] clearing out the learned fungi with which so many editions of the principal Elizabethans are overgrown” (435). It may have been that unqualified reduction to Tillyard’s *own specific* corner of historiography that precipitated, after a drawn out incubation, more than two decades of historicist and anti-historicist dialogue that is distilled by Robin Headlam Wells to reveal a sustained controversy between Tillyardian orthodoxy and a richly diverse opposing faction arguing for heterodoxy (“Historicism” 39) from a variety of perspectives. The detractors of the orthodoxy theory, which enjoyed a tenuous academic acceptance as *status quo*, were making the same mistake, says Robert Merrix, as the incumbents: “they literalize the broader outlines of the scholarly theory and generalize or ignore the more specific individual analyses of the plays” (187). A reading of Tillyard (*EWP*, “The Cosmic Background”) suggests that his and his contemporaries’ emphatic, unequivocal, and on the whole perhaps arrogant assessment of the early modern world view and its implications, delivered in the eminently self-satisfied tone of remote, unchallengeable authority, may also have been much to blame for the eventual brick-by-brick dismantling of their own critical structure. Indeed, their primary sin, according Graham Bradshaw, was their insistence that there could be (and was) a “single, authentic and authoritative meaning” (*Misrepresentations* 3). “After all, only by maintaining our right to make statements that we call ‘historical’ can we avoid handing over the very notion of history to *those people* who are only
too willing to tell us ‘what really happened,’” declare Francis Barker and Peter Hulme in 1985, in support of subversive readings of historical criticism (128, emphasis added).

While a tedious chronology of postmodern criticism, itself a term which Jonathan Chaves insists should be read as if placed in quotation marks (829), but which both he and Wells (SH, ix), among others, allow as a “catch-all” label for the various anti-essentialist and determinedly political variations of late twentieth century criticism, would de-rail the purpose of this project and would beg for a thesis of its own, it does seem important to note foundational and definitive sources, as well as dissension, and the progress of both. Dwight Eddins ironically characterizes the dominance of a materialist mandate as having proceeded “from the ‘marginalized’ to the ‘hegemonic’” (1) in two decades. Although that mandate may be waning at this writing, the power of its dominance demands of an undertaking at this level both an acknowledgement of the theoretical status quo and a thorough justification of my dissenting position relative to elements of the currently institutionalized paradigm. At the same time, no disrespect should be construed in this project toward any enterprise that illuminates through the identification and examination of culturally derived patterns of thought and behavior, or of the power and social structures jointly constructed by human individuals and the cultures within which they act. Further, all of the disciplines affected by and/or embodying the intense scrutiny of postmodernist criticism, including anthropology, linguistics, historiography, sociology, psychology, and most others, including literature, will certainly prove to have benefitted in the longer term: the next generation of scholars may avoid having to work within the complacency of a traditionally unquestioned order. Many necessary questions have been asked, old barriers demolished, new ideas brought forth. Perhaps we can look forward to a freer and more creative era in scholarship, absent
prescription. Those among critics who perceive humanity and individual agency in literary text may re-enter the conversation.

The “founder” of new historicism, Stephen Greenblatt, in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980) explains that it must be his “anthropological” criticism that illuminates literature, because its theoretical goal is to interpret literary expression as complex manifestation of the system that created it. Describing traditional critical approaches in a dismissively narrow manner, Greenblatt claims that to entertain them would be to “drift back toward a conception of art as addressed to a timeless, cultureless, universal human essence or, alternatively as a self-regarding, autonomous, closed system — in either case, art as opposed to social life” (4). Humans are “in Clifford Geertz’s phrase, cultural artifacts” (3). Geertz is also Greenblatt’s guide in denying the existence of “‘a human nature independent of culture;’” the essence of man is instead a “‘set of control mechanisms’” (qtd., 3). Still, if a mid-century acceptance of the “Tudor myth” of Tillyard was limiting, then certainly placing the human, subject of Shakespeare’s drama as surely as it was the subject of early modern learning and inquiry, outside the limits of criticism leaves little to the discourse beyond theory and ideology, and plenty of both were available.

Jonathan Dollimore’s 1984 *Radical Tragedy* self-consciously establishes many of the parameters that have guided a long and obstructive era of what Graham Bradshaw calls “‘ismic’ cockfights” (*Misrepresentations* 2). In 1985, Dollimore edited *Political Shakespeare* with Alan Sinfield, a colleague whose openly political agenda matched the fervor of *Radical Tragedy*. The essays in this collection include work by a number of like-minded scholars, and represent the ideology which effectively pre-empted any human-centered consideration of Shakespeare. The
human had become lost in the melee of cultural criticism, a “postmodernism” that encompasses American new historicism and British cultural materialism, and moves to exclude all else.

The place of politics and current ideology in literary (as well as in historical) criticism may be argued at length without agreement between factions. “Old” historicist literary critics extolled the importance of context and unashamedly (and unavoidably) applied their own culturally determined and hegemonic values to the consideration of texts. “New” historicists recognized the bias created by the critic’s removal from his object’s context and began identifying various ways in which one’s cultural episteme acts to invalidate virtually any and all sense to be made of the historical and cultural environment from which a text emerges. There were in fact many misconstructions of historical fact as well as much cultural bias evident in “old” historicist work, particularly identified among “Tillyardians.” However, new historicism quickly moved beyond its cause as iterated by Greenblatt and explained above, beyond the initial critical assault, to share in an ideological critique that, Bradshaw claims, became an “alternative to criticism, not an advancement on it” (7), and actually theologized humanist essentialism and made man as subject, in any guise, a demon to be eradicated. In the words of Joseph Carroll — in “Literature and Education,” an essay included in a successfully dialogic collection, *Human Nature: Fact or Fiction*, edited by Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden — criticism had become “the effort to process any given text through some particular theoretical or critical idiom” (66). The supposed radicals proselytized this quasi-theology to a dominance that, by 1996, Kiernan Ryan suggests has left its practitioners “hamstrung by their invulnerability to the work’s enigmas and mutations,” casting the literature itself as “the genetically doomed creation of a preconceived time and culture” (*New Historicism and Cultural Materialism* xvii), and
therefore of no moment. The insistent focus on culture over text has often resulted in the denial of literary aesthetics, inherent meaning, and poetics.

In their 2001 apologist retrospective, *Practicing New Historicism*, Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher invoke the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder and his “principle of diversification,” which argues against the idea of any “optimal” society as well as against such nationalistic claims of literary or enlightenment vanguardism as most post-classical European countries and traditions embrace, as support for the new historicist agenda of deconstructing the cultural text according to the anti-essentialist rules of today’s mainstream political and cultural criticism (5). Reading cultures themselves as texts, for these critics, allows them to “occupy a position from which one can discover meanings that those who left traces of themselves could not have articulated” or “would not have had sufficient distance upon themselves [. . .] to grasp” (8). Gallagher and Greenblatt set this omniscient position as binary to “explication and paraphrase,” with no mention of other possible critical functions; other binaries — and they do seem to perceive a field comprised of binaries — include “interpretation” (by their rules) and worship: traditional close readings are characterized as mindless celebration of genius and “wondering admiration,” while new historicist readings are “demystifying” and “critical” (8-9).

Certainly a contextual framework broadened by critical recognition of the various dominant, subversive, and heterogeneous social and political forces at play in the culture within which a writer, a work or set of works, or a literary movement creates or is created must add to critics’ as well as the reader’s understanding and enjoyment of the literature. It is the purview, as well, of critic and reader to establish a perspective from which to seek those unarticulated and possibly unintentional meanings that are undeniably enmeshed in the text, but how, without committing the egregious error of imputing authorial intent, would even the most erudite critic know for sure
which meanings have been consciously placed there, or on what levels the author is conscious of them? It seems that new historicism, albeit less self-consciously than the transparently activist cultural materialism, views itself as the arbiter of that perspective, which it portrays as inclusive although it clearly rejects any critical vocabularies not limited by its really quite narrow conceptual parameters.

The notion of an essential “human nature” stands clearly outside those parameters. While the most pertinent reference to von Herder’s work might seem to be the aforementioned diversification principle by reason of its assertion for cultural/historical relativism, Greenblatt and Gallagher go on to cite his opinion that man is “‘born almost without instinct’” and “formed ‘only through lifelong training toward humanity’” (5) as evidence of his rejection of the idea of an essential human nature. In apparent disagreement with the purpose of this citation, they further quote his comments on man’s “very nature” (6). Perhaps they do not recognize this as the contradiction it seems: these pre-eminent new historicists also consider the “nature/culture distinction” to have been “rendered obsolete” by the work in which they and their co-practitioners are engaged (8). The anti-humanist basis of postmodernism is so institutionalized, so well-established in the mainstream of literary criticism, that the politically correct critic need not even consider the question of a universal essence of the human. Dollimore, representing at the time the more radical and more polemical British cultural materialists, goes to lengths in *Radical Tragedy* to elaborate upon the materialist insistence on an anti-humanist stance: the individual, if allowed recognition, becomes “centred,” and “decentring” man is necessary to the materialist agenda to expose all behavior as socially determined (250-251). For the generation dominated first by deconstruction and then by its forming and re-forming descendents, the new
historicists and cultural materialists, it is not the author who is dead; it is the author’s most common subject, man.

In the critical discourse as it has evolved since the mid-1980’s, man’s — the character’s — action on or off stage or page has become, as Ewan Fernie concludes, so conditioned by cultural forces that he has no agency of his own. The “‘masters of suspicion,’” Freud, Althusser, Foucault, Derrida, et al are manipulated to combine in the creation of an “‘agentless’ agency” that negates any individuality or self (“Terrible” 97). Although current published criticism, as I have noted previously, begins to accept a return to some consideration of the human — as notably described by Fernie in 2007, in a response to Jonathan Dollimore’s recent work (“Dollimore’s Challenge”) — such acceptance is occurring over objection. Voicing that resistance to moderation, Alan Sinfield’s 2006 recapitulation of the project of cultural materialism in an article in *Shakespeare Studies* speaks for the unreconstructed deconstructionists in its insistent, even strident, reiteration of the now questionable contention that “early modern people did not have the same kinds of identity and consciousness as ourselves” (“From Bradley” 27). Postmodernity thrives, in fact, on the tenet that “no one really has a consistent inner core of being; any identity is, and should be decentered — unstable, provisional, occupied only through processes of anxious iteration” (28). This assertion sets up his contention, in case any critic might consider reverting to an outmoded, likely morality-tainted consideration of character in Shakespeare, that such a concept as “imagined by the character critic” must actually be nothing more than “character effect” (27). Although Sinfield has already noted the error of assuming a core consciousness (either in real or imagined people), he adds, with regard to “character effect,” that to become characters, the personae would have to be supplied by the text with “a continuous or developing interiority” (29) which would “indicate a
sense of themselves as continuous selves, as creatures set in time, able to look forward in self-predication and backward in self-correction” (29). Further and finally, says Sinfield, these personae would “be able to signal a consistent sense of their own purposes and motives” (29). In short, Sinfield would accept as characters only fictive creations who can indicate via the text that they are by far more stable and consistent that living individuals, and those creations must also, unlike living people, reflect continuous development. Perhaps the real purpose of these impossible criteria may be that, as he later affirms, “[a] cultural materialist […] will have other priorities”: “character is an unsatisfactory category because it fails to meet crucial questions about power, ideology, agency, and social construction” (30). Paraphrasing Althusser, Sinfield adds that “there is no essential core of irrepressible humanity in the individual” (30). In the field of Shakespeare criticism, still in what Fernie calls an “agency-aversive phase” (“Terrible” 98), any questions the critic may have of Shakespeare’s characters and the moral basis imputed to their actions are, in the mainstream view, moot. It may be, however, that Sinfield’s recent apology signals a parochial extreme, or perhaps a swan song, foreshadows the end of a phase of literary criticism that was recognized by most as radical, and by many as obstructively so.

The absolutist stance taken by Sinfield and others confirms early rumblings as more portentous than was recognized by traditional critics, yet an anticipatory sense of the changes to be wrought by deconstruction and the more specific literary versions of materialism did exist within the critical community itself. Jonathan Cullers, who early applied structuralist principles to literature, notes in *On Deconstruction* (1982) that the the effects of deconstruction are, at that point, uncertain. He enumerates institutional concepts of and about literature, its hierarchies and those of philosophy and linguistics, in a sense laying out a manifesto calling for the continued application of deconstructive theory to literature in the interest of challenging existing
assumptions (180-225). The banner of new historicism had already been raised by Greenblatt with the publication of Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980), and Dollimore, drawing on Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson (5-7) was fashioning Radical Tragedy.

A study of the causative and historiographic specifics of the growth of deconstructionist/materialist-fueled postmodernism in literary criticism is not the work of this thesis, but it is important to note that the movement enveloped the field rapidly and not without comment. Protests began early on: among a number of cogent dissenting works, John Ellis’s 1989 Against Deconstruction and Graham Bradshaw’s Misrepresentations: Shakespeare and the Materialists in 1993 are thorough, consistent, and relevant. Ellis reminds the academic reader that criticism of literature “has long insisted on pluralism, on the value of different critical viewpoints, and on criticism’s lacking the character of science” (155). He might have been looking into a future that included the effective discrediting of both pluralism and variety of viewpoints, and an undercurrent of quasi-scientific anti-essentialism as a basis for their exclusion. Bradshaw, four years further into the morass, is wittier (with an epilogue entitled “The New Historicist as Iago”) and more emphatic in his condemnation of the postmodern disinheritance of character and meaning in literary text as “manipulation” (245-256). Both of these critiques of the direction literary criticism had taken, however, were far more gentlemanly than the generally more polemical material that they were protesting; neither their voices nor other early protests seemed to lessen the preeminence of new historicist and cultural materialist critical schools.

Since then, dissenters have become more and more frequent, including some specialist scholars who had previously sat out the battle, and others long immersed. The formidable M. H. Abrams headlined a 1993 panel, chaired by Dwight Eddins, on cultural criticism and its place in
the field of literary study. The papers presented became the 1995 *The Emperor reDressed*. In 1996, an exasperated protestation against the abuse and misconstruction of the term and concept of “humanism” wryly added to the record (Battersby). A few years later, in *Renaissance Quarterly*, Ronald Knowles effectively examines humanist rhetorics and values in *Hamlet*, without apology (“Hamlet and Counter-Humanism”). Certainly the predominance of new historicism and cultural materialism had never precluded such work, but it had been scarce.

In 2002, Chinese and Oriental poetry specialist Jonathan Chaves published “Soul and Reason in Literary Criticism: Deconstructing the Deconstructionists,” an almost excessively polemical but certainly well-reasoned and heartfelt protest against postmodernism in literary criticism, which he opened with a poem:

_Sonnet to a Postmodernist_

-- variation on the 43rd *Sonnet from the Portuguese*

How do I hate thee? Let me count the ways.

I hate thee to the depth and breadth and height

My soul can reach — and yes, you heard me right,

I said my soul, the part of me that prays —

I hate thee for denying words of praise

To Words, to language, wasting day and night

Denying meaning, claiming wrong is right,

That Brilliant colors melt to murky grays.

I hate thee for insulting Milton’s muse,

For sentencing our Shakespeare to a death

Of sick perversion — but his shade now sues
Your empty mind for slander, and his wrath

Shall force you in the end to pay your dues:

You’ll realize that you’ve just wasted breath. (828)

This poem’s format and voice give humanist thumb to subjective nose at the ideological project of anti-essentialism as applied to literature. In much more strident language than Eddins, Abrams, and associates probably would have allowed almost a decade earlier, Chaves calls the body of writing comprising postmodern linguistic/cultural/literary criticism “a nearly classic example of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes,’” perhaps in recognition of Eddins’s title from the previous decade. He repeats the accusation of sophistry, notably calling Derrida’s prose “fantastically turgid, ugly,” and his rhetorical approach “the intellectual equivalent of a vanity license plate” (830); Chaves’s most effective addition to the conversation, however, is his analysis of the posited linguistic relationship between word and meaning, an aspect with which Martin Buber is concerned, and the profoundly — and largely unrecognized — anti-teleological character of arguments against ontological reality.

Acknowledging the views of the “hard-core” materialists and, as usual, resisting the competitive pettiness and acerbity of some scholars, Ewan Fernie reminds the critical community of the obvious, that Shakespeare “must have something to say about action in the world” (“Terrible” 98), if one considers that human actions are the sum-total of the causes and consequences of all of his plays’ words and movement. In fact, the rendering of matters of character and agency ineligible for discourse in the face of the obvious fact that dramatic action among the individual personae in Shakespeare must yet have some recoverable relevance may be an important failure of postmodern and materialist criticism; it does seem to be the point upon which Jonathan Dollimore with obvious awareness pivoted toward a more congenial coexistence
with the idea of an essential humanity that for him coincides with the social. As Fernie, responding to *Sex, Literature and Censorship* (2001), glosses this changed position, Dollimore’s “recent work could be characterized as expanded humanism, one that entails a fuller accounting both of humanity and of the energy and authority that humanism derives from the challenge of the inhumane (“Dollimore’s” 145). Certainly if an anti-humanist Dollimore might concede some essence of humanity, there is room to reevaluate meaning in literature with respect to human consciousness and the imperatives that comprise it.

Even Terry Eagleton in *After Theory* (2003) concedes that an important wasteland of unfinished business for postmodernists concerns the matter of morality, particularly what constitutes morality and why. “It seemed,” he admits, “preachy, unhistoric, priggish and heavy-handed[,]” ethics were “for suburbanites” (140). For a movement whose trajectory had been from its earliest days subversive to the institutions of “power,” tacitly when not openly Marxist in America and overtly so in Britain, this statement reveals a motivational undercurrent. To be new, current, and unlike what had gone before, postmodernists had to reject central traditional assumptions. As the culmination of what Eagleton calls a “Kantian” sort of approach to morality, although his construction seems contradictory to Kant’s respect for the potential for a divine entity, the idea emerged of “a mysterious, unknowable moral law, embodied for us in some Other” (152-153). Eagleton avoids the mention of the word “God,” but that word in fact may well be accurate shorthand for what the mainstream of cultural criticism variously describes as oppression, authority, bourgeoisie, power, hegemony. The concept of a higher power or an entity representing the highest good was replaced in the discourse by “the Other.” Attempts to justify and codify “unknowable” morality, without any Kantian discipline in favor of the preservation of “faith,” simply reinforce the resistance of such nonexistent (constructed) truths to
serve as substitutes for ideologically inconsistent concepts. After all, austerity and serious consideration of ethics, not to mention a potential for metaphysical truth that might impute boundaries not of the critic’s own invention, in the words again of Eagleton, “hardly consorts well with the hedonistic playfulness of postmodern thought” (153).

In the way, then, of most human endeavor taken so far, so fast, the dominance of postmodernist ideological critique seems on a pendulum swing away from its extreme. Robin Headlam Wells in Shakespeare’s Humanism quotes Eagleton, whom many, including Wilson, have claimed as a leading cultural materialist, as asking,

What if the left were suddenly to find itself . . . simply washed up, speaking a discourse so quaintly out of tune with the modern era that, as with the language of Gnosticism or courtly love, nobody bothered any longer to enquire into its truth value? What if the vanguard were to become the remnant, its arguments still dimly intelligible but spinning rapidly off into some metaphysical outer space? There is, of course, no need to imagine such a period at all. It is the one we are living in, and its name is postmodernism. (qtd. 202)

Wells’s point in presenting this quotation is to suggest that Neo-Darwinism might suffice as an antidote to anti-humanism. He makes the key inference that, while evolutionary psychology might not be the answer, it would at least offer a challenge to current limiting orthodoxies, as it does “provide a sounder basis for thinking about human behavior” (203). Buber’s dialogic construct provides another basis; its understanding of the human psyche as consisting of a potentially relational “Between” anchored by theoretically opposite, but never wholly one-or-the-other, I-It and I-You extremes admits the inscrutable, ever-present longing for the relation that develops self. In embracing the mysterious and refuting the necessity of obtaining a
knowable causality for the relationship with self and others of which behavior is a manifestation, Buber’s model is of a manifold and therefore more genuine humanity, and thus offers rich potential for the study of the human whose diversely combined natural attributes are so effectively mirrored in Shakespeare’s dramatic characters.

Reconceiving Early Modern Humanism

Given that the descriptive “humanist” and the concept of human nature, never precise, have been so warped — or so trampled — by the materialist agenda, their reconsideration, which post-modernists are likely to find assailable unless fully examined, requires a survey of their use both in Shakespeare’s milieu and in more recent frameworks. In just such a survey concerned with clarifying the use of the term by Elizabethan writers, Michael Pincombe, citing the sixteenth-century translator John Florio’s English dictionary, A World of Words, asserts that there “was no general consensus on the matter” (2). He provides a limited catalogue of various uses of the word humanitian and its parallel, humanist. The idea that Elizabethans would not even recognize the word is dispelled, although it is possible that, rather than missing these references, modern academic humanists instead do not recognize archaic spellings and forms that do not comply with their unique project.

Although he quotes Lyly in Eupheues (1578) as distinguishing humanity as “‘all learninge which is not spronge from the bowels of the holy Bible’” (2), Pincombe finds Abraham Fleming, in his 1589 translation of Virgil’s Georgics, begging pardon of sophisticated readers as he explains that his translation is without the distortion of rhyme, which might have been expected by “‘courtly Humanists’” (5). The author cites George Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy, a primer for the courtly embellishment of verse, as evidence that Fleming would have
considered belletristic accomplishment a feature of the humanist. Through several examples, then, Pincombe (5-12) demonstrates that the words humanist and humanitian in Elizabethan and early modern parlance came to be used most frequently to indicate a pedantic grammarian — even, perhaps, a “self-wise-seeming schoolemaster” (Sidney, qtd. 11) — the antithesis of humanism as defined by today’s . . . schoolmen?

Robin Headlam Wells, establishing his thesis in *Shakespeare’s Humanism*, acknowledges the Fleming reference, then concedes that the “ruling ambition of the humanists was to recover the values of classical civilisation” (7), before expanding via Latin etymology the definition of humanism into useful meaning for the purposes of literary discourse. The Italian umanista, he explains, is derived from the classical Latin humanitas, which had a trio of meanings illustrated by English humanist Thomas Cooper in his 1565 dictionary: “‘the state of human nature common to us all’; ‘liberal knowledge, learning, humanity’; and ‘courtesy, gentleness, humanity’” (qtd. 8). Wells further emphasizes the inclusion of “human nature” as an essential element of any discussion of humanism in citing the poet Robert Aylett’s Jacobean explanation, with its similar prioritization of human nature: “‘Humanity may have a threefold sense, / man’s nature, virtue, and his education / In humane arts’” (qtd. 8). It seems clear that, while modern scholars in the humanities consider Renaissance humanism as a secular educational movement in the revival of the historical arts and sciences, its practitioners were pursuing, through the “natural sciences” and classical texts, a knowledge of mankind.

In fact, English humanists, according to Joanna Martindale in her introduction to *English Humanism: Wyatt to Cowley*, were engaged in efforts to “fuse Christian and classical” (21). Spenser is the most obvious example of the interests of Elizabethan humanists, whose central emphasis was literary and whose piety was obvious in the literature they created. And this piety
was by no means characteristically English; Erasmus and other Reformers on the continent, as well as Petrarch, who thought that knowledge of man was the pathway to knowing God, in no way limited the utility of classical knowledge to education for its own sake (21). Expanding on the growing accessibility of, for example, Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle as mediated by Erasmus, More and others, Tudor and Elizabethan scholars, in relationship with their turbulent material culture, created a distinctly English humanism.

If Shakespeare and the early modern writers, notably Sidney, are to be considered humanists, the basis of their apparent commonalities must be considered. Certainly, there is no single “source text” for either the classical or Italian Renaissance origins of the movement that became Elizabethan humanism. The curricula of English grammar schools, since their establishment in the reign of Henry VIII and nurture under Edward VI and Elizabeth, were based on classical Latin and some Greek texts enhanced by instructive material — more Latin — much of it interpreted or explicated and tempered by Erasmus’s body of work. Martindale locates the importance of Erasmus to the rise of English humanism and the growth of the new emphasis on classical heritage in his early contacts with Colet and More, the former for his pedagogical advances and the latter for his example (23-24). Privately educated aristocrats such as Sir Philip Sidney would have followed a program of study similar to and undoubtedly as wide-ranging as that described for grammar schools, although perhaps their training might have been directed toward “higher” aspirations of purpose. Pincombe quotes Abraham Fleming, in his 1589 translation of Virgil’s *Georgics* (as much a textbook intended to provide direct glosses for schoolboys as a scholarly translation) as eschewing “‘foolish rime,’” and flatly stating that his work was in no way “‘attempting [. . .] to content courtly Humanists’” (qtd. 5).
Besides the educational movement to which it is often limited by the modern materialist influence, Pincombe, citing Gabriel Harvey’s 1593 polemic *Pierce’s Supererogation*, finds indications of commentary on personal and behavioral characteristics. Harvey refers to himself as a “‘humanitian,’” and claims Cheeke, Ascham, and Sidney as among the best representatives of the “eloquence in speech, and civility in manners” to which he aspires (qtd. 7). Holding himself superior to the “‘barbarians’” Lyly, Greene, and Nashe (qtd. 7), Harvey provides for Pincombe a notion of humanity as containing an implication of “‘a standard of polite behaviour based on goodwill towards one’s fellow-men’” (qtd. 13). The concept of such standards is not a point of contention in the matter of essence versus cultural construction; behaviors within and beyond the standards are as important to Shakespeare as they are to Tillyard, Greenblatt, or Sinfield.

As construed by Robert Linder in a study of the humanist characteristics of the work of Calvin, educational or “particular” humanism, the *studia humanitatis*, by the Renaissance had acquired “a broader meaning than a cultural, philological and rhetorical preoccupation with the classics” (168). Linder calls this “general” humanism, which, with its “concern for the potentials and actions of men as men,” was the predominant theme in contemporary arts and letters (168-169). Calvin himself, whose vast instructive output could probably have used an infusion of “poesy,” is quoted by Linder as having declared of secular writers and their work that men should

> let that admirable light of truth shining in them teach us that the mind of man, though fallen and perverted from its wholeness, is nevertheless clothed and ornamented with God’s excellent gifts. [...] Let us, accordingly, learn by their
example how many gifts the Lord left to human nature even after it was despoiled of its true good. (*Institutes* 1:273-275, qtd in Linder 176-177)

This notion of responsibility to teach on behalf of the faith is echoed and elaborated upon in Sidney’s “The Defense of Poesy,” which itself may be considered the fore-conceit of the *Arcadia* and of many successful poetic efforts of other early modern writers, including surely the also undeniably well-read Shakespeare (*Gillespie Books* 459-465). In the “Defense,” Sidney praises in turn each of a series of the classical disciplines of learning, demonstrating that the heights of attainment in any of them is but an isolated glory, whereas only the poet, with his art, his ability to imitate to “teach and delight” (958), is able to consolidate the humanities and “move men to take that goodness in hand [. . .] to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved — which being the noblest scope to which ever learning was directed.” Men who embrace the heights of learning, says Sidney, may exalt therein, yet will be incomplete without the *architectonike*, the “chief art” of self-knowledge (960), with a purpose beyond “well-knowing,” that of “well-doing” (960).

This classical call for learning to support virtue does not for Sidney, as it does not for Calvin, stand alone: it is enlightened by and given firmness of purpose in the further end of “purifying the wit” (957), infected by the Fall. As Thelma Greenfield asserts, the “Defense” shows Sidney’s view of “the stunted and illiberal mind as the great enemy to virtue” (179). No essayist himself, Shakespeare certainly wrote no such manifesto, yet, as Alwin Thaler famously pointed out in 1947, the Ciceronian commonplace that found drama to be a mirror of human” nature, echoed above by Hamlet, is the “central thought of the *Defense*” (17). Further, as Stuart Gillespie notes, the text of ideas in the mainstream European humanist tradition, while pervasive in the work of Shakespeare, is neither as obvious or as universally recognized as the influences
of individual imaginative works, because there are few if any lexical or other apparent parallels ("Reading" 113). The influence of classical and developing contemporary humanist “tradition” is probably not separable, as classical ideas had by Shakespeare’s maturity become embedded in the intellectual life of a culturally Christian Europe.

Efforts to derive a qualified working definition of “humanism” for use in twenty-first century literary criticism that is concerned with Renaissance and early modern work ultimately do not result in the hoped-for simplicity of expression. As Wells concludes, “[t]hough humanists argued about the nature of ‘man,’ they agreed both that there was an irreducible essence of human nature, and that it was important to understand what that essence consisted of” (SH 7). Man was rational, yet flawed, thus perpetually imperiling the very existence of civilization; awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of both individual and humanity in general might be mankind’s only hope. The mirror provided by the arts improved the odds. Wells succinctly (though still incompletely) articulates a well-deliberated and supportable view of Renaissance humanism as requisite to the study of Shakespeare: it was “a literary culture that concerned itself with the question of how to promote civilised values and at the same time guard against the barbarism to which the baser side of human nature always threatened to lead us” (7). The anti-essentialist critic’s political focus and intolerance of historically factual cultural hegemony notwithstanding, Shakespeare’s plays are profitably considered in terms of the literary and philosophical culture, as well as the “material culture” that produced them, and also of the early modern concern with human nature. A need is obvious, then, to re-admit the manifold languages of humanism, in its varieties, to literary discourse.
“Humanism Regained” in Critical Theory

Borrowing, with intentional irony, a bit of technique from the postmodernists, it could be stated that this developing recognition by critical theorists of the necessity to reclaim the territory rendered unsuitable for human(ist) life by fallout from the Culture War’s nuclear option has resulted in new efforts by some materialist critics, as well as by some who may be somewhat less committed to the non-essentialist cause, to resurvey and prepare for the reclamation of some less radical territory. The current potential for the reinstatement of “humanism” as a useful concept in literary criticism seems to depend on the successful separation of the designations “humanist” and “humanism” from the institutions which have diverted their history and meaning to ideological ends, capitalized them (Humanism, rather than humanism), redefined them according to their own “non-theistic life stance” (“About” n.pag.), and, for many decades, confused the study of historically important concepts of humanism with political and cultural movements. Most of this nascent movement does remain firmly anti-essentialist, possibly because an openly contrarian emphasis on “human nature” may still be discounted in the critical marketplace, and seems to arise in response to the impracticability, noted above, of studying Shakespeare while disclaiming the validity of his historical environment.

Much of the progress toward the critical reinstatement of man as subject of literature may be through the use of what Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley call “questioning humanisms” (45), the application and interrogatory acceptance of various “versions” of humanism, which still, after Sartre, questions established historiographies and assumptions, yet does not allow the thinker to “hide in abstraction” (45). Halliwell and Mousley present a survey and critique of a thorough cross-section of humanist and anti-humanist thought, omitting or minimizing attention to the more contentious and self-celebrating (there is no Derrida, and little of Foucault here), and
successfully maintaining authorial neutrality in the matter of essentialism. The project seems to be focused on providing dialogic possibilities and perhaps ways into a return to critical consideration of man as subject, both in literature and the humanities at large. The authors’ insights into the contrasting or dichotomous natures of various ways of viewing man and traditionally perceived culture are of truly constructive application to the matter of the reconciliation of culture, art, and the human. It is possible, they demonstrate, to celebrate the gains of a half-century of rigorous questioning of static assumptions while accepting the primacy, in the affairs of the individual human, of a self. The enterprise or purpose of that self may be to fulfill a primary responsibility to the Other, as Levinas insists (73), to secure the Aristotelian “good life” in citizenship (79), to live “embodied free will,” according to William James (141) or, as Sartre maintains, to experience and realize itself toward becoming “fully human” (45), which Richard Rorty emphasizes may not include homogenous philosophical content, but rather (and more positively) lead to “exciting and fruitful disagreement” (qtd. in Halliwell and Mousley 154). A common theme, stated in many different ways, is that in fashioning himself, as Sartre (and, one supposes, Greenblatt) would have it, the humanist seeks to develop or transform himself, and to foster the development within his civic sphere, his community, culture or tribe by any Other name, of the highest manifestation of good, as he or they understand it. It must be axiomatic, then, to any and all of Halliwell and Mousley’s Humanisms — Existential, Civic, Spiritual, Pragmatic, Technological, even Pagan and Romantic — that pursuit of knowledge of the human and humankind is fundamental to achieving the height of virtue. Martin Davies (60) finds humanism defined in the Renaissance conviction that “good letters lead, under God’s guidance, to good men;” “Well-knowing,” in Sir Philip Sidney’s words, is of great value toward “well-doing;” the “end of all earthly learning being virtuous
action” (960); with or without metaphysical interference, the pursuit of actualization in and of the highest good is as truly humanist, as humanism begs to be reinstated in the twenty-first century, as for Shakespeare and the early moderns. The poet is mediator, through the creative representation of man as agent, of “well-knowing.”

For the adamant post-modern anti-essentialist who finds it impossible to compromise the demands of an absolute denial of human nature, who cannot, as Rorty suggests, rely upon a provisional or fluid definition of “self” and “human” (Halliwell and Mousley 156), a reconsideration of the “nature-nurture” debate may be in order. Notwithstanding that the still-current orthodoxy hardly recognizes the need for further inquiry, researchers in the biological and social sciences continue to investigate empirical evidence of human universals, their manifestations, and their source(s). Steven Pinker, whose research encompasses psychology, language and the cognitive sciences, presents convincing evidence that the human mind is far more than a “blank slate.” He maintains that materialists who would insist that empirical evidence supports that theory are not simply mistaken according to the tenets of social and biological science: pushing beyond the sciences, Pinker also advocates a “consilient” or knowledge-unification approach to the study of literature. Such a perspective, reclaiming human nature, would also rescind the banishment of “the deeper resonances of fiction that transcend time and place” (“Toward” 163). He notes that an unavoidable and constitutional fact of literature itself is that it implicitly utilizes a shared concept of universal, individually subjective and sentient, human nature as a frame of reference which allows readers, characters, and author to find [or mimetically represent finding] meaning in human interaction (166).
Cognitive Science and a “Biologically Informed Human Nature”

The material-culture partisans’ anti-humanist conventions insist, at least in general and as a basic feature of materialist theories, that the human being is fully created by his culture; Alan Sinfield’s flat denial of a human “inner core” represents this hard line. The question for Pinker, however, is not whether there is a human universality that can be called “human nature,” but what that nature is and how it interacts in each individual with cultural factors. He has written *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* to break ground on a “realistic, biologically informed humanism” (xi). Pinker presents in his work cultural and intellectual conclusions derived from decades of experimental and observational research in the field of psychology and supported by equally exhaustive use of biological, neuro-biological, and linguistic/bio-linguistic research. His previous major work, *How the Mind Works*, presents and explains the computational theory of mind, the concept of the human as a “thinking machine,” with awareness defined by its biologically established features of access, or limiters of access-consciousness. Sentience remains undefined, but not unconsidered: Pinker concedes that there is no “scientific purchase” upon the origins of *qualia* — sentient experiences — or of the features of sentience itself, and suggests that hard science may never define sentience-consciousness and its workings at all. However, he does not dismiss its existence: “I refuse to believe that I am just confused when I think I am sentient at all!” (145-47). He further suggests that the factors that combine to produce human sentience may be ultimately beyond human capability to understand — but the set of thinkable thoughts may be infinite nonetheless (562-63). Religious, spiritual, and cultural beliefs, he posits, are likely constructs fabricated in response to the human need for meaning and explanations for phenomena, including sentience and its sources, that human brains are not equipped to grasp (556-57). “The mechanistic stance
[toward behavior and thought] allows us to understand what makes us tick and how we fit into the physical universe,” Pinker offers. “When those discussions wind down for the day, we go back to talking about each other as free and dignified human beings” (56). But scientific psychology continues to be confused with and appropriated by critics and pundits, people with moral and political goals.

Arguments concerned with cultural politics, which often pivot on the point of human universality or essentiality, prompted *The Blank Slate*, published in 2002. “Nothing comes out of nothing,” Pinker points out, “and the complexity of the brain has to come from somewhere” (75). That “somewhere,” however, he assures us, is not from culture alone. A theory of a fully constructed human “quasi-self” relies on an understanding of the brain as having almost infinite plasticity. Nonetheless, various specific locations or reasoning centers in the brain have been identified; even such functions as moral reasoning have been found to be associated with clearly particular areas of the brain. Materialists claim that behavior and, in fact, the individual’s understanding of ethical behavior, are wholly determined and created by culture. Pinker cites anecdotal evidence to the contrary in the amoral development of two separate individuals who sustained similar brain injuries in early childhood, were raised in very similar cultural circumstances by families of similar background, lifestyle and intellectual identification, including IQ range. In addition to exhibiting “bad behavior,” both individuals were unable, in testing, to solve simple moral-reasoning tests (99-100). These cases and others like them, says Pinker, serve not only to refute the idea of extreme plasticity of brain tissue and function upon which could be imposed infinitely varied cultural paradigms, but also to challenge science to discover the full range of operational differentiation and how it is developed through innate specialization under genetic control (100-02).
In general, Pinker challenges any “all-nature” or “all-nurture” suppositions, making a strong case for combined influence on the individual, although he does consider culture to be part of the human phenotype, rather than the opposite. Human beings are made for the interaction that creates culture, not the other way around. He says, “the phenomena we call ‘culture’ arise as people pool and accumulate their discoveries, and as they institute conventions to coordinate their labors and adjudicate their conflicts” (60). Differentiation comes from separation and separate accumulations of discoveries and experiences. Both nature — the capabilities that the human mind has evolved — and nurture are essential in human individuals as in human societies (60-61).

Cultural materialism and other structuralisms, including most versions of new historicism, begin their arguments against character in literature with an assumption, as Sinfield curtly reiterates, that there is no such thing as “human nature,” that all is culturally created. Pinker explodes this statement handily. However, he refuses to equate the certain existence of common humanity, “biologically informed,” as an affirmation of that against which materialists, under the banner of “anti-essentialism,” are at basis arguing: a spiritual essence common to humanity. Although Pinker, himself an atheist, believes man is certainly sentient, he does not consider that to be evidence of spirituality, which materialists, in their insistence that sentience and perhaps even selfhood are illusory, do. One sophistic argument against character criticism in literature charges that a character cannot be mimetic because that which it would mirror, man as individual, is illusory and irrelevant, at best, and therefore invalid; Pinker’s work dispels this contention, yet does not really answer the question of essence.

To explain the materialist notion that cultures indoctrinate children to perceive a “consciousness or self that does not exist,” neuroscientist Mario Beauregard comments thus:
“materialism cannot account for mind, consciousness, or self” (115). In Pinker’s willingness to allow the question of sentience and its basis to remain unanswered, Beauregard finds a certain difficulty: to Beauregard, an accounting of human nature must unite science and ethics. Although Pinker clearly demonstrates his recognition that ethics are essential to human endeavor, he stops short of that reconciliation (116), and Beauregard suggests that a continued lack of theoretical or empirical unity of biology and ethics both perpetuates and is based on the materialists’ “interim strategy” of banishing terminology that refers to mind, consciousness, and self, with a goal of preserving the movement at the cost of potentially revelatory research and scientific direction (118-121). Beauregard’s own goal, he declares in *The Spiritual Brain*, has been to seek, through controlled neurological experimentation, empirical data of value toward finding neural correlates to reported spiritual experiences (ix-x). His extended study of serious mystics and their subjective experiences, with neurological activity measured by magnetic imaging technology, reportedly demonstrates mediation by numerous areas and systems of the brain, not just in one so-called God spot, as might be suggested by such brain-injury research as Pinker cites in reference to moral judgment. The results of their own research are interpreted by Beauregard and his associates as supporting an irreducible theory of consciousness, which holds that the brain “cannot be understood apart from the mind that it substantiates” (277). While this Canadian study, well-documented as it is, though perhaps conducted with a particular religion-associated agenda, does not (and does not purport to) “prove” the existence of a spiritual self, it presents to neuroscience a complication in the task of explaining phenomena of the mind as distinct from yet involving the brain.

Steven Pinker accepts cultural and biological foundations for human behavior and thought, believes he has sentience but admits it remains a mystery to him and to science. Mario
Beauregard submits an “irreducible” mind whose subjects report a communion beyond self which activates complex neurological activity. Richard Rorty concludes “post-philosophy” that there is no final vocabulary (154-56) and that the commentator may hypothesize without constraint. It seems that the critical field has evolved to a point from which any factionalist may contemplate character and human nature.

The “decentring of the human” left the idea of mimesis moot, yet literature, especially dramatic literature, unquestionably does represent the human. Shakespeare’s plays survive because his serious representations of the human and his or her actions were so imbued with complexity, conflicted wholeness, subjective paradox, grace and ugliness that they have always been able to “become real” for the audience; the best of them — and most of the rest — remain standing through countless costume changes, paradigm shifts, cultural revolutions and critical breakdowns. They are almost boundlessly examinable, for whom and what they may have represented to Shakespeare’s courtly audience and to his law students, merchants, tradesmen, whores, thieves, and perhaps even to himself, as well as for whom and what they represent to audiences and to literary scholars in 1968, 1988 and 2008. This uncanny universality of character derives from the nuanced yet unanalyzed imitation, the truly mirrored, exactly — as exactly as actors can mimic what audiences will receive — human imprecision and changeability of being and living life in inevitable association and encounter, as Buber would have it, with the rest of the species.
Chapter 2

Martin Buber’s Believing Humanism: Man’s *I and Thou*

But the It-humanity that some imagine, postulate, and advertise has nothing in common with the bodily humanity to which a human being can truly say You.

-- Martin Buber

With human nature and perhaps a “fluidly” defined and biologically informed humanism sanctified (or sanitized) for use in an increasingly less absolutely materialist “post-postmodernism,” a reconsideration of character as representation of man becomes possible. Martin Buber’s “dialogic” model of interpersonal relation, the I-Thou or I-You paradigm, is practicably flexible in its approach to shedding light on the nature of humankind. However, Buber is specific in differentiating his understanding of “the humanum, what is peculiar to man, what sets him apart distinctively from all the rest of nature” (“Believing” 118) from the definition of “human” as derived in antiquity and in the Renaissance (for example, as Christian humanism). Even for Erasmus, Buber suggests, unfolding the nature of the human was an empirical exercise, a cultivation of observable phenomena, and was held in separation from faith, through which each man was to strive to raise himself toward God. In contrast, Buber considers natural humanity and faith to be mutually foundational, spheres which penetrate and define each other in central relationship. Further, he submits (in 1963, before postmodernism became dogma in critical circles) that only in the modern age, with freedom to explore consciousness itself apart from any religion’s claim to exclusive revelation, can man regard in the *humanum* his ability to enter into relation with all that exists, including all that is beyond his interests. Through that
relation, acknowledging the other as a whole, one may know both humankind and the ineffable. This turning of soul and self toward mankind, instead of perceiving encountered beings from an It-perspective of observation and use, is his “believing humanism” (117-121).

In I and Thou, which was first published relatively early in his career, in 1923, but remained the basis of his expanding work in philosophical anthropology and its extension into psychoanalysis, Buber describes the essential opposition between knowledge and relationship: man, he says, is in continual movement between an “It-world” of the perceivable, measurable, and surveyable, and the immeasurable, cosmically present present, his “You-world” of relationship and reciprocity. Humanity, or the state of being capable of and available for reciprocal relationship, is fundamentally frustrated by its own absolute imperative, empirical knowledge.

As a preface to the applications of Buber’s dialogic system to the mirrored humans in Shakespeare, an establishment of the holistic nature of that dialogue as it describes both human and humankind (or in Buber’s culturally allowable and intellectually innocent pre-1970’s terminology, “man” and “mankind”) is important. As Buber says, the quantifiable and quantified world of an individual in a “civilized” society, such as Prospero’s Milan, is built on the knowledge and achievements — the indirect experience — bestowed by successive cultural masteries, from the primal to the civilized (I 88). The foundation of this civilized It-world is the earth that fed and sheltered the body of the primal human, where the wolf waited at the mouth of the cave. To observe the ways of the wolf to outwit him and control the hunt, to survive to master the seasons, fill the granary, and build merchant ships for the surplus, was to launch man’s quest for humanity, or relationship. Experience of the wolf, the hunt, the grasses and fruits and soil and water of the earth is the prerequisite to quantification and mastery of the
primal world, for, in Buber's terms, the object of the primal human must be to preserve and equip himself to live in it (88). Without the It-world of experience, "a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human" (85). Attainment of humanity demands more than the survival of the discrete being.

An advancing culture — like its participating individual — seeks to improve the capacity for experience in books, formulae, education and experiment. As the human race and its technologies and structures have become ever more complicated, "use" of the world becomes indirect as man acquires information through "stored" textual agency. Nonetheless, as Buber expresses it, this acceleration of the individual’s accumulation of knowledge “generally involves a decrease in man’s power to relate — that power which alone can enable man to live in the spirit” (I 89).

To the child as to the primal human, says Buber, “relation vibrates in the dark and remains below language” (I 57). The child has no tools with which to reduce that relation; it simply is. He or she lives in a You-world by default: self remains undefined, so the world cannot be defined in relation to it (73). The act of definition begins the reduction of the world to an It; each person must invent ways to describe it, then to manipulate it. Before this moment, human or child is of the world and the world is of him or her and not something of itself; all is in relation.

As humankind becomes civilized so an individual person grows in knowledge and creates her It-world, a world of objects, whose progressively greater “capacity for experience” (I 89) brings a progressively greater alienation or powerlessness to relate, she also achieves the ability to recognize a mystery deeper than any found in observable, tractable nature: the You, “soul of my soul” (84), eternally in the present, reciprocal, and essential to relationship, which is a
requirement for humanity. The You-world “comes even when not called and vanishes even when you cling to it. It cannot be surveyed: if you try to make it surveyable, you lose it” (83). Civilized humanity speaks of the “progressive development of the life of the spirit” (88) as the goal of an ever-improved capacity for acquiring and utilizing knowledge. To Buber, however, this magnification of the It-world is the spirit’s obstacle rather than its life (88-89). It is also, paradoxically, the very *basis* in its detachment of the I: man may now recognize himself as being in relation (73).

The longing for relation, which is primary, “the cupped hand into which the being that confronts us nestles,” is a readiness, an innately tuned pattern or preparedness for the You (I 78), or an essential predisposition, as has been widely substantiated in specific matters of empirical interest in cognitive science, such as the acquisition of language. While computational evolutionary biologists following Richard Dawkins’s *The Selfish Gene* consider genetic bases for behaviors simply adaptational in a Darwinian sense, Steven Pinker points out that natural selection in scientific terms applies to replicators, not to conscious beings (How 397-398). “DNA,” he observes, “has no feelings” (399). Human beings, as observed and represented mimetically, clearly do.

Feelings, however, according to Buber, are present in human relationship, yet are neither the cause of relationship nor its main component: in relationship, humans must stand in living, reciprocal relationship to one another. The You of each must be revealed to the other, and it is received in the present. The “feelings” of love or friendship or even disdain or disgust are the accompaniment, not the source (I 94-95). The innate drive for contact, though, aims at reciprocity, at a sort of “tenderness” which allows two individuals to “happen to each other,” producing an “essential remainder” which exists in and for both, and beyond each (Friedman,
“Introductory” 17). That essence is the basis of relationship, of the reality of man-with-man, which Buber called the “sphere of the between” (17), which for uniformity in this project hereafter will be capitalized and referenced as the Between, except in instances of direct quotation. He called the unfolding process which produces the Between and provides the basis for direct intercourse between humans the “dialogical” (25-26), and considered it the location of both separation and relation. The “essential problematic,” of the Between, explains Friedman, Buber’s translator and perhaps most efficient theoretical interpreter, is the duality of “being” and “seeming” (27). The “being man” presents himself to the other just as he is, spontaneously, without calculating how he will be received (27). The “seeming man,” on the other hand, presents the image of himself as he wishes it to appear to win the approval of the other (27). He might calculatedly appear sincerely friendly, as, for an extreme example, in Shakespeare’s Iago (27). Being and seeming appear together in any individual and in any interaction between people; the meaning in the relationship is governed by which of the two elements predominates. Within the Between, in the abstract as well as in the particular relationship and even in the individual person, the balance of being and seeming varies between impossible extremes of all-being and all-seeming.

Genuine dialogue occurs when one human being “turns to the other” in truth, makes the other being “present,” and confirms the other being (“Elements” 85). This turning, “to the fullest degree possible,” creates a Between that consists of the fullest degree of truth that is possible for both, determined by the truth or being-ness of both (85). Within that dialogue which is genuine enters the “eternal You,” called God in many traditions, rejected by some because of its Name and the It structures that humans have built for it, but identified by Buber as “the eternal revelation which is present in the here and now” (I 160). While this culmination of his dialogic
principles is not necessary to the utility of Buber’s I-You, it serves as witness to the integrity of
the structure as envisioned and also as elaborated within the larger scope of his work over a
period of more than sixty years.

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Art and the representational artist, including the literary artist, transcend, for Buber, the
ordinary limits of “filter construction” within which the attainment of self (I) occur. Beyond
those limits, “in order to partake of a ground that otherwise would not be grasped,” art produces
that “unity of unities,” and renews it in each work (“Man” 160). While humanity in its work of
learning the world objectifies it and all of his being, the artist makes of it an image. From the
universe of possible representations and meanings, “the whole possible world-sphere,” the artist
exercises the power of formation, a unifying power holistically greater than imagination,
bringing forth images discovered through figuration (161). Reaching beyond man’s senses, art
transcends the natural, and establishes the human as a unique realm of being.

“People tell stories,” declares Steven Pinker, as he addresses the question of why and to
what avail the representation of characters and their exploits is such a large part of human
activity (“Toward” 162). He provides neither theoretical nor even speculative answers, instead
offering suggestions for further contemplation and the pronouncement that this is a “big puzzle”
for the student of human nature (162-3). Martin Buber reframes the question in terms of the
needs of the person becoming human: “Why has the species man not contented itself with
allowing the formed world of the senses to proceed out of its meetings with x [It]?” (“Man” 162).
Likening primal man — man as yet more connected to his It-world than his You — to the
animals, Buber sees the primitive movement beyond mere subsistence as “play,” which, he
suggests, ultimately fails to satisfy “man as man” — in relationship to his You (163). In
becoming human, a person encounters new characteristics in him- or herself: a dissatisfaction
with being limited to needs, and a longing for perfected relation. “He wants through his knowing
of the object,” Buber says, “to get to the bottom” (“Man” 163), and he wants the perfection of
relation. Art “is the realm of ‘the between’ which has become a form” (“Distance” 66). Art, torn
“out of the nature in which it is hidden,” is man’s way of holding up for himself the image of the
Between; the mimetic image of man in the Between corresponds to the drive to “get to the
bottom” of his completed I, fully aware of his You. “We ourselves are the dialogue,” Buber
reiterates (“Since” 85). Emphasizing that the primal You of nature, including human nature,
accosts man, demanding to be given form, “to do which, however, only poets, and even they
only at times, are suited” (“Spirits” 52), Buber echoes Sidney and his predecessors.

The rehabilitation of the human in literary scholarship carries with it a freer consideration
of mimesis and representation. Indeed, A.D. Nuttall confirms that his “new” mimesis is “neither
more nor less than the “old” mimesis, newly theorized to examine evolving forms through which
the artist is ever finding new ways of imitating “the indefinite richness of reality” (A New
Mimesis 181). Until the formalist movement led by E.E. Stoll in the 1930’s — before
structuralism, but similarly skeptical of representational veracity (99) — Shakespeare’s
characters were unquestioned as uncanny representations of the “real.” Within the framework
provided by Martin Buber’s I and Thou, indeed by the body of his work on relationship and
humanity, a return to that ever-acknowledged mimetic penetration of the realm of the Between
provides new contexts and dialogic unfoldings through character and action. “The It is the
chrysalis, the You the butterfly. Only it is not always as if these states took turns so neatly; often
it is an intricately entangled series of events that is tortuously dual” (I 69). The reality so valued
in Shakespeare resides in the frankly messy metamorphoses through which his characters are
represented in their self-creation, and Buber provides a text alongside which realism’s “indefinite richness” may be received, of itself, as without any separable, definable, or essential causality.

Although the work of Martin Buber over a long and productive life of writing witness to his “humanism of ‘the life of dialogue’” (“Martin” 23) evolved considerably, especially with regard to the terms used in his dialogic construct, and although purpose and thematic elements in his writings varied as he addressed world events and as he contributed to the currents in psychology and anthropology in turn, his essential content remains remarkably consistent at its core. For the purpose of borrowing his I-You concepts and elaborations to shed light on problematic character representations in Shakespeare, a certain amount of streamlining of terms and content, though not without risk, is necessary. Humanity’s “two-fold” nature is not really to be taken as a claim of simple binaries, and relationship as conceived in Buber is not simple social intercourse or outward connection.

Buber early described humanity—the individual and humankind, but the subject here is the individual as representable in art—as creating for itself two aspects of confrontation vis-à-vis the world. He develops an I-it stance, or an It-world in which to dwell, and an I-You stance, for his meetings within the You-world. Each of these aspects has been characterized by both Buber and his scholars in multiple ways. The It, for example, may be considered the world of experience and empirical knowledge, the “seeming” world (seeming self), the mechanical, even the false as opposed to the genuineness of You, which is “being,” pure, spontaneous, uncalculated and unanalyzed relation of being. Although described and developed by Buber as dialogic or two-fold, and by scholars who respect the need for preserving Buber’s binary model, the more useful understanding of the structure is as manifold, with the two opposites It and You placed at either end of a spectrum of variable manifestations (Kaufmann 9). Thus, no individual
dwells exclusively in an It-world or a You-world; no individual is all “seeming” or all “being” (Friedman “Introductory” 27). In general, says Buber, the two are found in combination, and “we must be content to distinguish by which predominates” at any given relational meeting (“Elements” 75-76). A new and richly profitable insight into human behaviors as mimetically reproduced is available through a critical interrogation of the position each relating character inhabits, at the moment of relation, along the I-it/seeming — I-You/being continuum. In modern terms, getting a handle on where a character is coming from is a key to understanding why he or she behaves as he or she does. If Shakespeare might be said to have perfected, particularly in certain major characters of later plays, ever more faithful (and consequently more confounding) mimesis — that is, a manifold mimesis—then Buber’s work holds an enormous potential in the ongoing work of explaining the perpetual and often perplexing relevance of Shakespeare to his audience.

The imputation of authorial intent — an important side-issue in the use of Buber’s philosophical anthropology and the concept of the interpersonal Between to augment the critical examination of Shakespeare’s plays and characters, particularly where mimesis is concerned — is likely to be found in any traditionalist or emerging post-postmodern analysis. It might be accurate if oversimplified to say, however, that unless one denies the possibility of individual creative art in favor of the absolute cultural construction of all phenomena, including art and literature, it is impossible not to consider the author as producer of text(s) for which he or she must have had some purpose. In the case of Shakespeare, as with any creator of text or art, purpose (like his characters and his dramatic theory) was manifold. Plays were written for production before audiences both courtly and commercial, and characters were written with mimetic aims but also to accommodate the particular talents and personae of certain actors;
cultural, political and contextual factors of concern to either playwright or audience or both were always present in the creative process, both consciously or unconsciously, as they certainly have been in dramatic works from ancient Greece to London, from Hollywood and Bollywood. The intentions of the author or authors are never simple, binary, or fully transparent. To suggest that Shakespeare writes a line or a play because of his Catholic roots, or that he writes any play or poem only for court presentation, or to illustrate a political hypocrisy; to suggest that he is saying life is meaningless or meaningful is to discount the complexity of his work and of the world of the inter-human, which he represents in the fulfillment of his artistic (and politically, philosophically, or religiously charged) purposes. The presence of intent is certain; just as certain is the impossibility of the reader’s or critic’s ability to discern it in its fullness. While they can only ever be inferred as incompletely understood, any author’s multidimensional intentions and the influences upon him or her, like the many tools and techniques he or she uses, inform any discussion of the work. The Buberian frame, embracing as it does the complexities of man, addresses the mimetic representation of character within larger contexts of intention and poetic or dramatic theory. Its application does not nor could any interpretive technique ever address the full extent of Shakespeare’s design for either the characters or the plays discussed. Whatever that might be or have been, the element under discussion here is the resolution of the sometimes mysteriously effective mimesis in the representations he creates as part of that design.
Chapter 3

Measure for Measure:
Encounter, Relationship, Change

The It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly.

-- Martin Buber

*Measure for Measure* must certainly be in the running for consideration as the most problematic of those Shakespeare works called “problem plays.” Its moral and ethical conclusions — if such can be claimed — were no more clear to its early audiences than they are to us. A long line of critics beginning with John Dryden (“meanly written,” “grounded on impossibilities”) and proceeding through Dr. Johnson, who found it frustratingly peculiar, Coleridge, for whom it was painful, Hazlitt, whose sympathies its characters “defeated,” could find little or no reconciliation in the play (Miles 15-23), and it was significantly resurrected in the twentieth century for the most part on the merits of its numerous allusions and, according to some, almost parable-like referentialism to the New Testament (Miles 49-70; Schleiner 228-29). Modern criticism of the play seems to consist largely on the one hand of detailed identification and classification of biblical material, accompanied at times by speculation about the manner in which said Christian structure reveals or does not reveal the author’s religious convictions, and on the other of the materialist/anti-essentialist’s recoil against anything to do with character, mimesis, human nature, individual ethics, or any other manifestation of the human self. In fact, Alan Sinfield rapidly escalates Angelo’s proposition of Isabella to full-blown hate-crime status within a culture hostile to women who prefer the company of other women, citing (as he has
previously, with other points in mind) gay male internet chat lines to substantiate the notion of retaliation against the “sexual dissident” she represents (“Rape” 143-44). Any serious consideration of the characters, of how their behaviors may actually if stylistically represent aspects of human nature, is largely absent, perhaps because psychological or spiritual analysis could hardly be thought useful in characters soundly judged to be lacking.

But the main characters in Measure for Measure may be less lacking or despicable than they are complicated and therefore illustrative of human nature. The preponderance of critical dissatisfaction considers the moral or ethical “meaning” of the play to be a relatively clear admonition according to the biblical reference to Luke 6:38, in which man is advised that “with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again” (KJV). The main sources, the tale of Epitia in Cinthio’s Hecatommithi and its subsequent revision by the author (both, 1565) (Roberts para. 4) and George Whetstone’s 1578 play, “The History of Promos and Cassandra” (Hampton-Reeves 92-93) present successively less clear-cut moral scenarios: Cinthio’s original condemned man is a murderer, husband of the supplicant Epitia, but is revised as a rapist whose sister pleads his case; the petition of Whetstone’s Andrugio, convicted of “incontinency,” is brought by his chaste sister Cassandra to the treacherous Lord Promos, who, without the expedient bed-trick, ruins her and reneges on his promises. The King orders marriage, whereupon Cassandra begs and obtains her husband’s pardon of the King, who also pardons her brother, who was saved by his jailer. Measure for Measure recycles many of the particulars in Whetstone, with very close parallels in some of the dialogue and plot machinations.

Yet Shakespeare’s version adds sufficient layers of complexity to the plot and overlapping double relationships, as elaborated by Brian Vickers in his preface to George Geckle’s compendium of Measure for Measure criticism, to complicate the moral aspects of the play far beyond the reaches of a gospel sermon (xxxii). In the London of Philip Stubbes, the question of sexual mores and their
magisterial disposition was perhaps more current than a modern audience might immediately recognize, but the idea of fornication as a capital crime enhances both the urgency of the pleading and the hypocrisy of the magistrate. The actual judiciary fitness of both Angelo, the value of whose reputation is inflated by the inhumanity required for spotlessness, and Duke Vincentio, whose abdication carries with it the appearance of weakness or negligent contrariety of attitude toward his responsibility, is cast in a shadow that adumbrates all the play’s questions. The guilt of the fornicating couple, Claudio and Juliet, which should be effectively mitigated by their betrothed state, is yet supported by the rather lame technicality that has prevented their marriage: what determination by Juliet’s “friends” was Claudio waiting for: was it a settlement of more suitable assets, a complicated resolution in negotiation, a richer dowry? If so, his greed is not wholly unlike Angelo’s in his termination of negotiations for Mariana’s hand, and the self-indulgence of his acts of fornication — notwithstanding its “most mutual” (1.2.147-52) nature — is less supportable. Angelo is appalled and anguished as he succumbs to the temptation to abuse the very rectitude in whose fullness he has prospered; he chides himself, “O fie, fie, fie! / What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?” (2.2.209-10). Aware of his hypocrisy and the sinfulness of his inability to control his base lust, he is no psychopathic Iago, who in contrast is easily condemned and clearly recognizes no wrong in himself. Isabella and the Duke both seem sincerely yet insupportably certain of their respective exaltedness: she has “spirit to do anything that appears not foul in the truth of my spirit” (3.1.229-30), while he refers with confidence to his “complete bosom,” invulnerable to “the dribbling dart of love” (1.3.2-3). The lewdly obnoxious Lucio, about whom the audience can hardly be ambivalent, nonetheless makes a few observations that perhaps need to be made: just before dropping unwarranted slurs and nasty innuendos, he declares in seeming sincerity, “It was a mad fantastical trick of him to steal from the state and usurp the beggary he was never born to” (3.2.93-95), yet he later backs off with, “the greater file of the subject held the Duke to be wise” 3.2.138-39). Mistress Overdone and Pompey, in their turn, seem honestly lewd, ethical on levels that vary from
those on which we would judge their betters. No character, in sum, is unequivocally written; conventional coloring is absent.

The oddly unsympathetic gathering of individual characters alone establishes the play’s representation of humanity and its actions as at least unsettling. The apparently unnatural reconciliation in Act 5 adds to the discomfort and begs an array of questions. If the play is “about” just deserts, about receiving in equal measure what one gives out, then why — it is not inappropriate to ask even though dramatic convention does require the resolution — would Duke Vincentio pardon and retain Angelo, excuse Lucio’s slander, stay the execution of the legally convicted fornicator Claudio, and, most surprisingly, declare his intention to marry Isabella?

Even absent any attempt to assign a finite set of meanings to Measure for Measure, the richness of its complexity is revealed by the examination of the mimetic humanity in its cast of characters. As Shakespeare represents them and as Buber reveals them, Duke Vincentio and Isabella, Angelo, Mariana, Claudio and Juliet, Lucio and the bawds are human enough to account for their attitudes and actions as they move through the play. Vickers finds extreme the “dynamics of character-change” in Measure for Measure, notably in Angelo, Claudio, and Isabella (xxii-xxiv), but the Duke may be more changed than any.

There is much of Buber’s I-It extreme, man outside relation, represented in the character of the Duke. Vincentio is, as Buber’s construct considers the human in extreme absence of relation, one of a kind of persons who “would study without experience: they have no time for experience, which would smack of subjectivity if not frivolity” (I 12). This Duke is, it is to be recalled, impervious to “the dribbling dart of love” (MM 1.3.2). Such a person, in Buber’s dialogic view of mankind in relationship, is “objective and immensely serious” (I 12); people at this extreme “experience but do not participate in the world. For the experience is ‘in them’ and not between them and the world” (5-6). Buber would view Vincentio, a man of obvious (and self-consciously held) high ethical standards, one of a “community of solid scholars — so solid that there is no room at the center” (13)
for actual relationship. At the center of Duke Vincentio’s being, it is to be recalled, declared as if in confirmation of his stance in Buberian I-It isolation, is the imperforable and perfected — “complete” — bosom with which he perhaps somewhat priggishly reassures Friar Thomas (1.3.3).

One of the fundamental tenets of any ideology which ascribes all human thought and behavior to be culturally constructed is that the concept of a stable self is false, that what the individual perceives as self is a culturally constructed, “discontinuous identity” (Dollimore 30-36). Buber’s work contradicts this soundly. Self is fixed; it is “the other partner [of It and You] that always remains the same” (I 71). Within the continuum between the (uninhabitable) extremes of It and You, the self moves and actualizes, but I remains the same I as it emerged. Therefore, when a person — or a dramatic character, if he or she effectively represents personhood — “changes,” he or she is not becoming something different but is, in common terms, growing. For Buber, the individual is actualizing his or her I (I 113). In this process, Buber says, “[W]hat confronts us comes and vanishes, relational events take shape and scatter, and through these changes crystallizes, more and more each time, the consciousness of the constant partner, the I-consciousness. [. . .] then it takes possession of itself and henceforth enters into relations in full consciousness” (“Elements 80). The difference in behavior or attitude that is notable to an observer or audience is the manifestation of movement toward maturation.

Buber’s elaborations on his dialogic principle, particularly in the insistent I and Thou, are problematized to some degree, even in their definitiveness, by his use of such apparently absolute concepts as that of an individual’s achievement of what might be understood as a fully conscious actualization of his or her I; it seems implied that the ideal of completeness (as in Vincentio’s bosom) is attainable. Yet he retreats from the suggestion of a perfectible human, qualifying the metamorphic figure: he adds to “[t]he It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly” the clarification that “it is not always as if these states took turns so neatly; often it is an intricately entangled series of events that is tortuously dual” (I 69). Life in the world of the human, says Buber, is “an oscillation between You
and It” (I 100); this is more powerfully evident as the person who has acquired full competence in experience, like the Duke, begins to respond to the primary longing for relation, begins to recognize the “cupped hand” which resides within him. For Duke Vincentio, as seen also for Prospero in the chapter that follows here, the intensification of immersion in the It-world is accompanied as if by natural law by an intensified readiness for You (78). At the outset of the play, although the audience is not apprised of how he arrived at his apparent state of wisdom and dedication to his subjects (and has no urgent reason to wonder, as the focus moves quickly to Angelo), the Duke’s stance relative to the continuum between It and You seems to be one that is intensely involved in the scholar’s or contemplative’s I-It, and in readiness for the encounter that becomes an event of relation, an entrance into relation with You.

These fruitful encounters are those which one may recognize later as events of unexpected engagement that result in change by demanding relationship. Buber calls them moments which “appear as queer dramatic episodes” (84) capable of pulling one “dangerously to extremes” (84). Whether inter- or inter-personal, the connection that answers encounter’s demand is the catalyst that actualizes the I and makes reciprocity possible. In Measure for Measure, an episode of this kind occurs as the Duke/Friar requests concealment for the purpose of eavesdropping on Claudio and Isabella, and hears the facts of Angelo’s lecherous proposition and the despair which it visits upon his victims (for Claudio must also be recognized as such) (3.1.56-170). In keeping with his stated purpose for disguise, “to behold [Angelo’s] sway” and “[v]isit both prince and people” (3.1.47-49), the Duke has taken advantage of a convenient opportunity, Isabella’s coincident visit, to begin his observations. Buber’s construct would find that the Duke/Friar, as he listens to Isabella’s story, has been met by his You, and entered a relational Between in the essence created of the encounter and junction of his You and Isabella’s. Duke Vincentio has but briefly met, heard, and been silent and concealed in the presence of Isabella, but he has encountered her nonetheless; the encounter is not in
verbal interaction, but in the confrontation of his whole being by all that is hers, as conveyed by her speech. And speech, according to Buber, is essentially human and essential to humanity certainly as a means of self-expression but, just as important, as the means of establishing the independent otherness that is requisite to relationship (“Distance” 68-69). In Isabella’s spoken intelligence, words as signals, as “calls” (68), set the ideas which they signify at a distance, as the I sets its experiences apart, and gives them independence (68); as signs of independent selfhood, as otherness in the perception of the listener/encounterer, Isabella’s words individuate her, create for Vincentio an Isabella who, in Buber’s terms, can be “made present” (70):

So called fellow feeling may serve as a familiar illustration of [full “making present”] if we leave vague sympathy out of consideration and limit the concept to that event in which I experience, let us say, the specific pain of another in such a way that I feel what is specific in it, not, therefore, a general discomfort of state of suffering, but this particular pain as the pain of the other. This making present increases until it is a paradox in the soul when I and the other are embraced by a common living situation, and (let us say) the pain which I inflict upon him surges up in myself, revealing the abyss of the contradictoriness of life between man and man. A such a moment something can come into being which cannot be built up in any other way. (70)

Going far beyond eliciting that vague sympathy, Isabella’s spoken words reveling her situation give shape to the Between experienced by the Duke as relationship: her first words resonate as the restatement of his own, as she seems to echo to Claudio the simple godly admonition to a reconciliation with the fact of his impending death. However, the reality shifts and progressively darkens as she answers her brother’s impatient questions about her interview with Angelo with ever more bitter intimations of Angelo’s terms, which are as tragic and morally unsupportable to Duke Vincentio as to Isabella herself, until the utter ignominy is finally, crushingly, revealed:
CLAUDIO. Is there no remedy?

ISABELLA. None but such remedy as, to save a head,

To cleave a heart in twain.

CLAUDIO. But is there any?

ISABELLA. Yes, brother, you may live.

There is a devilish Mercy in the judge,

If you’ll implore it, that will free your life

But fetter you till death.

CLAUDIO. Perpetual durance?

ISABELLA. Ay, just; perpetual durance, a restraint,

Though all the world’s vastidity you had,

To a determined scope.

CLAUDIO. But in what nature?

ISABELLA. In such a one as, you consenting to’t,

Would bark your honor from that trunk you bear

And leave you naked.

CLAUDIO. Let me know the point.

[. . .]

ISABELLA. [. . .]Thou art too noble to conserve a life

In base appliances. This outward-sainted deputy —

Whose settled visage and deliberate word

Nips youth I’th head, and follies doth enew

As falcon doth the fowl — is yet a devil.

His filth within being cast, he would appear

A pond as deep as hell.
CLAUDIO. The prenzie Angelo?

ISABELLA. O, ‘tis the cunning livery of hell
The damned’st body to invest and cover
In prenzie guards. Dost thou think, Claudio,
If I would yield him my virginity
Thou mightst be freed? (3.1.66-110)

At the end of the encounter, the end of Isabella’s disturbing tale with its ugly potency, the Duke has resolved to relationship, drawn in his readiness by the ever-present longing for relation, to confirmation of Isabella’s being. Although speech here belongs to Isabella alone, the “turning of the being to the other” is “genuine dialogue,” according to Buber, which confirms the other being (“Elements” 82). To resolve matters, Vincentio will act not as the humanistic though contemplative and uninvolved Duke Vincentio, on behalf of Vienna’s “biting laws, / The needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds” (1.3.22), but as a human in relation, in the interest of justice, spread as widely as possible, integrated in community.

Accepting encounter with You does not mean that an individual must lose or give up one’s competence in the It-world of experience, such as scholarship or professional accomplishment. Although, as Buber notes, growing awareness and competence in the world of experience does signify a progressive increase in the It-world (I 87), a human being cannot simply cease all activities in the “common world;” one does need It and will continue to even as he or she develops the relational self. In the person for whom I-It has been the predominant position, the opening toward You, and toward the ability to experience the Between of relationship, is that “lyric-dramatic” moment. A person cannot remain there; she cannot remain within the event of relation indefinitely. However, “whatever thus has been changed [back] into It and frozen into a thing among things is still endowed with the meaning and the destiny to change back ever again” (90); the event, though it has ended, exists in the memory, and although changed, may yet become present again. And an
actualized human, who confronts You freely, is satisfied with the knowledge that “again and again he may set foot on the threshold of the sanctuary in which he could never tarry” (1 101-102) — the Between — and carry its remainder into the necessary It-world “to prove itself” (102). The person is changed, ready, able to return to You instead of fleeing, as predominantly I-It oriented people are compelled to do, from the “unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredictable, dangerous world of relation” (126). Thus, confirmed by his encounter with Isabella, The Duke/Friar must step back into the world of things and ordering and activity, and he does so with a newly-tempered utility to his worthy stock of scholarly and philosophical knowledge. His “bosom,” which he had earlier declared “complete,” was not, but now is open to relationship, and he faces completion in humanity.

Isabella may be less recognizably mimetic, or at least less sympathetically drawn in her complexity, than her counterpart, Duke Vincentio. However, the variations represented in her relational stance add important threads in the increasingly tangled moral conundrum the play presents, and are perhaps a bit obscure. As she is introduced to the action, she stands on the very threshold of sequestration within a convent, and her dedication to the simplicity and discipline of such a life is clear as she avers herself to be “wishing a more strict restraint” (1.4.4). Martin Buber describes the whole human being in terms reminiscent of the Tao, as “closed in its wholeness, at rest in its wholeness,” as having become “an active whole [. . .] ready to venture forth toward the supreme encounter” (125). Certainly preparation to dedicate oneself to a life of religious contemplation may be an indication of longing, of readiness for a consecrated life in encounter with the eternal You, but it may also, in one not fully actualized through genuine dialogue in human relationship — thus not in recognition of the human other as You, or of I as requisite to all relationship, even (and especially) that which awaits with the “wholly other” (127), God. Isabella, in hopes of fulfilling her primary longing for relation by becoming a bride of Christ, may be in fact attempting to yield her I — a move Buber surmises “most mystics suppose” to be essential (126) — in compliance with a “false drive for self-affirmation which impels man to flee from the unreliable,
unsolid, unlasting, unpredictable, dangerous world of relation” (127). Buber’s purpose in defining this vain and impossible renunciation of the I (including its You and It components) is to illustrate the seeming opposite of Isabella’s intent to repudiate the profane world: he is warning of the human’s flight toward the secular in search of self (126). Yet Isabella’s hope for fewer privileges and stricter restraints reflects a similar vain, mistaken drive. She, as though by design very like the Duke’s, has determined to flee the world of relation and live in contemplation of the experienced It component of her being, as though so doing could silence the calling of the world of relation. In the convent where “if you speak, you must not show your face; / Or if you show your face, you must not speak;” (1.4.13-14), Isabella piously retreats to “leave the basic word [I-You] unspoken” (I 65); pitiful enough, in Buber’s elaboration of the dialogic nature of man, yet made even more “wretched” by her intention to address her spiritual needs “with a concept or a slogan as if that were their name!” for “reassurance in the face of nothingness,” as Buber would have it (65). This is roughly parallel to the Duke’s rather pompous assertion of his own completeness, his armor against untidy interpersonal relationship. As Isabella delivers the news of Angelo’s stipulation for Claudio’s pardon, the siblings establish a dialogue made genuine in the awareness of encountering each other’s “seeming” and contrasting “being” selves (Friedman, “Introductory” 27); there is a Between shared by the two, and it works a change in Isabella. This same maiden who in pious sincerity offered her own penance on Angelo’s behalf should he agree to pardon her brother unlawfully — “Please you to do ‘t / I’ll take it as a peril to my soul” (2.4.69-70) — now turns, unforgiving, on that brother with “O, you beast! / O faithless coward, O dishonest wretch” (3.1.153-4), calls him “a warped slip of wilderness ne’er issued from [their father’s] blood” (159-60), and angrily condemns him, swearing to pray “a thousand prayers for thy death” (163). Encounter, so yearned for by the self, is not always pleasant.

Unpleasantly or not, Isabella is dragged into encounter through the “lyric-dramatic episode,” the same yet not the same as the Between in which the Duke/Friar is at the same moment immersed in relation. As Buber describes these episodes, they “loosen the well-tried structure” — here the
structure within which Isabella lives as well the the structure within which she has determined to hide from You — and “shake up our security” (I 84). Through the uninvited and altogether odious relational episodes with Angelo, in which he delivers his villainous proposition, and Claudio, in which he rejects and erodes her pious certainty and estimation of her chastity as well as the aspect (“seeming”) of charity she so thoroughly cultivates, Isabella is certainly changed. From the carefully religious young lady of humble comportment whose greeting is “Peace and prosperity!” (1.4.16), who doubts her power to assist her brother — “Alas, what poor ability’s in me / To do him good?” (1.4.82) — and is quite sincerely at war with her beliefs in pleading mercy for one who has committed fornication, a vice that she can only abhor and hope will “meet the blow of justice” (2.2.42-43), Isabella is transformed to an actualized human capable of stalwart participation in the Duke’s righteous manipulations. Interrupted in her transformative moment with Claudio, in which she has unwillingly stepped away from her retirement in an It-world of unproductive avoidance to an altered stance in the liminal space between It and You, she encounters the Duke as Friar Ludovick, and moves from one Between to another, from one queerly genuine human awareness to another.

Meeting the Duke both in full and ready encounter and in his words, words that reveal his “basic word I-You” (Buber, I 65) is an altered Isabella. With no lack of self-possession, no apparent maidenly qualm, she needs no convincing to agree to the Duke/Friar’s plot to deceive Angelo and commit Mariana to exactly the same vice which she had just the previous day so soundly condemned: “The image of it gives me content already, and I trust it will grow to a most prosperous perfection” (3.2.284-85). As a result of all this intensive genuine dialogue, Her It-world has been pushed aside, and more room is available for You; her capacity for relationship and humanity and been tried and made ready. In her newly honed readiness to “make present,” in Buber’s idiom, her fellow humans, she can recognize the specific affective realities of the others; she is not limited to addressing their vices and such matters as the value of her virtue through mores, laws, and religiosity devised in the It-world. She feels “the specific pain of another” (“Distance” 70) and can act with
humanity toward it and them. So heightened is her relation to truth, as Buber constructs it, by “the other[s’] different relation to the same truth, in fact, that in the end she must plead for Angelo, recognizing as present even in him the humanity that, in non-relational attendance to her agenda of retreat into I-It, she could not:

I partly think

A due sincerity governed his deeds
Till he did look on me. Since it is so,
Let him not die. My brother had but justice,
In that he did the thing for which he died.

For Angelo,
His act did not o’ertake his bad intent,
And must be buried but as an intent
That perished by the way. Thoughts are not subjects,

Intents but merely thoughts. (5.1.510-19)

And it is not as though the character of Isabella, the represented human drawn by Shakespeare, has become less realistic; she has in fact become more like the human she portrays: complex, self-contradictory, sensing meaning yet struggling, as Buber describes it, in an “oscillation between You and It” (I 101). Isabella has liberated her You, and hereafter “the good and the evil, the clever and the foolish, the beautiful and the ugly, one after another become actual and a You” for her (66), in Buber’s construct. Isabella herself confirms it: “I have spirit to do anything that appears not foul in the truth of my spirit” (3.1.229-30), she responds to the Duke, when as Friar Ludovick he offers to supply a remedy to her plight. Only by means of human relationship could this have occurred.

Claudio, whose “collapse” (Vickers xxii) into pleading for life at the expense of his sister’s exalted chastity, is possibly not so “changed” as Vickers and others believe. In Buber’s terms,
Claudio seems representative of the “primitive” stage of being, in which primal You has been abandoned but It has not been fully developed, so he remains less capable than his sister and Duke Vincentio of entering into the Between of a reciprocal encounter of beings (74-75). Although he is represented to be a nobleman, the positive reputation he seems to enjoy and the reluctance of Escalus and others to see him executed may have more to do with social status than with noble behavior. He may regret his fornication; it has placed him on the executioner Abhorson’s schedule, after all, yet rather than express contrition, he addresses the “seeming” aspects of the situation: blame is placed upon the law and its apparatus, including the “new deputy” (1.2.155) and upon those withholding Juliet’s dowry. His conviction to accept his execution turns out to be quite shallow, as he very rapidly reverts to a pleading unwillingness to embrace responsibility when Isabella informs him of Angelo’s terms (3.1.149-50). He is not in genuine relationship with her; if he were, he might be found more willing to respect her decision to retain her chastity.

If the ability, in the Between that is created in encounter whether full or incomplete, to affirm the manifold nature of the other is absent, one may be said to be predominantly in an I-It stance, still building experience to develop the It for the I in order to be ready to accept the genuine dialogue of relationship. In common terms, this person, here Claudio, is immature. Regardless of idiom, Claudio represents an individual of shallow or undeveloped personality; mimetically he might be the prototypical image of any youth of highly-placed family (an example of institutionalized “seeming” in Buber’s dialogic model), indulged and self-indulgent, accustomed to the gratification that has never been denied him, resistant to accepting such unforeseen obstacles as the sudden enforcement of the fornication law, able to articulate expected values as platitudes — “I humbly thank you. / To sue to live, I find I seek to die” (3.1.45) in response to the Duke/Friar’s holy counsel, on the eve of his execution — yet minutes later begging his steadfastly chaste sister, in his inability to face his statutory punishment, to “sin [...] to save a brother’s life” (3.1.150). Claudio’s interactions with others give the appearance of a person who regards others as It, as things to experience and use: as
questioned above, his behavior with regard to his betrothed, Juliet, speaks to this position. While this couple are characters in a play and not real human beings with actual histories, it would be assumed for the real or the represented human that betrothal and sexual relationship certainly indicate encounter; to what extent true dialogue has occurred between them cannot be known, but Claudio’s interactive I-It stance would at least limit it. He has abused the law and, technically, the virtue of Juliet in fornicating with her. He proposes to sacrifice the virtue of his sister to avoid execution and, as she points out, live to fornicate again: “Mercy to thee would prove itself a bawd” (168); and clearly, he cannot in any sense of relational making-presence feel the agony of her shame, so fearful of death is he (133-146). The “collapse” that so disappoints many critics is a non-event; Claudio’s character remains unrelational and unactualized.

While Claudio remains underdeveloped in his relational ability in part by class-defined “seeming,” a more complete and deliberate practitioner of seeming is Angelo. The Duke’s appointed deputy is in Buber’s construct a predominantly “seeming” man, “primarily concerned with what the other thinks of him” (Friedman “Introductory” 27), for whom, ever failing to enter into relation, “the distance thickens and solidifies” (22). Angelo may be the most “changed” (or moved toward actualization) of the realistically drawn main characters in Measure for Measure. He has constructed of his uprightness and his reputation a well-fortified I-It self; for one such as he the acknowledgment of You often involves moments that are in themselves far from positive. The Duke applauds the provost’s seeming-self: “Angelo, / There is a kind of character in thy life / That to th’ observer doth thy history / Fully unfold” (1.1.29-32). Angelo’s rectitude is not a lie: he is not posturing, although he may certainly be standing behind the shield of that solidified distance, when he lectures on the necessity of upholding the letter of the law, declaring, “We must not make a scarecrow of the law” (2.1.1), or when he admits judicial fallibility yet holds himself up as exemplar subject to its absolute authority: “When I that censure him do so offend, / Let mine own judgment pattern out my death, /
And nothing come in partial” (2.1.29-33). Shakespeare focuses the mirror of humanity onto the stage only briefly; the audience sees only moments of the characters’ mimetic selves; it is impossible to impute clear history to any. However, Angelo’s care to maintain the appearance of perfect propriety suggests that he may represent what Martin Buber calls a “genuine-seeming” character. In the act of “seeming” — of producing the “look” or “reflection of a life of [Angelo’s seeming] kind” (“Elements 76) — a being is seized by the actuality of the image he has produced, and as a man who models himself after a hero, genuinely plays the part. The mask becomes a mask, “and no deceit” (76). However, the product, by its very existence originating in a lie and permeated by it, threatens the interhuman, and therefore the human itself, by forfeiting, for the sake of self-preservation, “the great chance of a true happening between I and Thou” (77). The requirement to preserve the actualized lie further solidifies the protective distance that surrounds Angelo, rendering his encounter with You abrupt and painful.

At his first brief encounter with Isabella, Angelo’s solid shell begins to crack. “She speaks, and ‘tis such sense / That my sense breeds with it” (2.2.172-73), he mutters in an aside, in doubled recognition of her rhetorical skill and her sensual appeal, which itself may in part be, for Angelo, a by-product of her skillful argument. He is possibly further titillated by her next speech, of “sicles of the tested gold” and “stones” (2.2.181-82). This speech, though feminist critics may wish to locate in it a suppressed sexual invitation, is more likely, in my view and in this reading, to represent a coincidentally suggestive combination of words uttered in true innocence by a chaste character, as well as a subtle joke directed to the audience. She is bid return, and Angelo enters a Between with his own shriveled You and in abstract, the devil: “O fie, fie, fie!” (210) and “O cunning enemy that, to catch a saint, / With saints dost bait thy hook” (217-18). Remaining by habit the puritan he has so carefully “seemed,” he truly, angrily chastises both himself and the devil, and he curses the irony that places him — a godly man, still clinging to his saintly persona — in encounter with another whose steadfast virtue arouses in him a lust which he knows he will not overcome. You moments, again, as
“queer lyric-dramatic episodes,” seduce one to dangerous extremes, “leaving behind more doubt than satisfaction, shaking up our security” (I 84). Thus shaken, Angelo muses, “Ever till now / When men were fond, I smiled and wondered how(2.2.193-94.” In a brief encounter without much apparent reciprocity — two beings attempting to convince each other in opposition — the rigid deputy has encountered the longing for relation.

This initial meeting with Isabella, while painful enough, yields minor change when compared to the next. Angelo, with premeditation or not, at first pulls against his awakened drive for relation by snarling another justification of the law’s harsh sentence upon Claudio, “Ha! Fie, these filthy vices! It were as good / To pardon him that hath from nature stolen / A man already made” (2.4.44-46); he then goes straight to the point of proposing to trade her brother’s life for Isabella’s virtue:

Then I shall pose you quickly:
Which had you rather, that the most just law
Now took your brother’s life, or, to redeem him,
Give up your body to such sweet uncleanness
As she that he hath stained? (2.4.53-57)

Just as there can be no question of Angelo’s truly upright, lawfully unassailable history, the break with it is clear, as well. His response is to the You which has encountered him by grace — which cannot be found by seeking and is required in becoming relational (I 62) — and it is an ugly response; the You, however, “knows no system of coordinates” (81). “Plainly conceive I love you” (2.4.152), submits Angelo, and in the chaotic Between in which he stands, he may actually mean it. The authentic truth of it, of course, is suspect: Angelo may be motivated to offer this pretty declaration as a means of mitigating to himself the extent of his sin, or, perhaps more likely, he may be acting as Buber’s “propagandist [. . .] who imposes himself, [and] is not the least concerned with the person whom he desires to influence, as a person” (“Elements” 82), simply attempting to coerce
Isabella’s surrender. The truth of Angelo’s “love” may even be a combination of the two: a trick to coerce them both into believing in a worthy motivation for his lecherous manipulation.

Yet perhaps there may be something higher than lust involved. Encounter of necessity contains mystery and unexpected “lyric-dramatic,” seductive forces (I.85); “Love occurs. Love is a cosmic force,” Buber reminds (I.66), and it exists in this moment for Angelo, although certainly not for Isabella. Her “Ha! Little honor to be much believed” (161) ends his entreaty. Individual encounter “must become an It when the event to relation has run its course” (83); the residue of this relational moment becomes for Angelo an It to be managed. His I-You in retreat, “leaving more doubt than satisfaction” (I.84), he turns to threats, making it clear that her public denouncement of his lecherous intent will only be crushed by the power of his stature and reputation: “Who will believe thee, Isabel?” (2.4.168). He acknowledges his movement from that which he has carefully “seemed” — honorable, continent nobleman — to lewd, corrupt manipulator, saying “I have begun, / And now I give my sensual race the rein” (2.4.173-74). Reiterating his offer to spare her brother in return for her acquiescence, he leaves her to her despair. For Angelo, the trauma of the unsolicited encounter with You is filled with grief and bitterness. The chrysalis has none of the beauty of the butterfly; its appearance bears no promise, and it is dark, close, and confining within.

Proof that there can be realism even in a comic foil placed throughout a convoluted plot comes in the form of Lucio, identified by Shakespeare as a “fantastique” (MM, Dramatis Personae). His personality seems incidental, beyond his use in facilitating Isabella’s involvement in Claudio’s pleading; after accomplishing that, he seems to weave his way through the play appearing as though for little reason beyond confounding the Duke/Friar and finally, perhaps, to be one partner in yet a fourth couple in the formulaic marriage conclusion of the play. Closer looks have been taken at his purpose; speculation as to how much of the Duke’s business he actually knew, and how he might have come by that knowledge, as well as questions about the rationale behind his slanderous
denunciations of the Duke (Lawrence 449-50) are quite interesting and, renewed, might add to the discourse about the play.

Views of Lucio as an incidental and merely comical character still prevail, and he is certainly not drawn with the depth or seductively human qualities of the major characters. In the dark ages of Tillyardian character study, one critic felt free to say, “As we all know, Shakespeare’s extraordinary power in creating characters that seem like living human beings has often led critics to treat them as if they were historical personages” (Lawrence 447). It is safe to suppose that virtually no one would have ever felt compelled to say anything like this about Lucio, yet he like Claudio is a version of Buber’s unactualized youth (although we do not know that he is necessarily very young) existing in the It-world awaiting — in the vernacular of Buber, longing for — relation, which can only be found with You. The successful subtlety of his unbalancing comments throughout most of the play is, perhaps, an issue aside from the so-recognizable representation of the “fantastique.” But he is not “ready;” his detached manner and light, usually flippant address even in the presence of his “friend’s” tragedy indicate how fully he is directed away from reciprocity on any level: Claudio is in custody, and Lucio jokes about his own creditors (1.2.128). Hearing the bitter story, he makes light of Claudio’s imminent punishment: “And thy head stands so tickle on thy shoulders that a milkmaid, if she be in love, may sigh it off” (170-71). Obviously, he is not experiencing a You moment.

In his audience with Isabella, Lucio’s address bears none of the gravity or sympathy that might be expected to accompany the delivery of such terrible news: he seems to toy with Isabella, alluding to her “unhappy brother” (1.4.21), who, “[n]ot to be weary with you, [is] in prison” (26), but should instead, thinks Lucio, be given thanks for getting his friend with child (29). When he finally gets down to the business of his tidings, his verbosity — it takes him twenty-one lines of meandering, gossipy over-explanation between “This is the point” (53) and “[a]nd that’s the pith of my business”
is pure monologue. There is no reciprocity, just encounter with It. Like the child as Buber describes him, living “in the lightning and counter-lightning of encounter” (I 77), using and discarding things of experience, his intellect a “parasite of nature” (76), Lucio bounces from moment to moment, posture to posture. He attends Isabella in her first interview with Angelo, goading her to the task with uniformly lame advice and comments, supplying no more than distraction; he remains outside the event of their unpleasant relation, not present to the limited Between that exists for Angelo and to some extent Isabella. He is not, in fact, reciprocal in any of his encounters. He is all “seeming,” largely useless after his task is done for Claudio, and so true to life that audiences in any generation recognize him as the familiar sort of youth who appears to be without respect for others or society, who breezes past social and personal ills with a sneer, treats his social inferiors as inhuman, refuses to live up to responsibility, who gossips and slanders and actually does, in fact, know much about who is doing what with whom, and who, himself discounted for his idle vanity, is oddly present and even more oddly of unheeded relevance. Mimetics and imputed realism aside, however, Lucio may be an instrument in what Huston Diehl calls “an enabling kind of dissatisfaction” (397), designed to stir confusion into the plot and distance Shakespeare’s dramatic representations from the polemics of anti-theatrical politicians and reformers. If so, his discounted, unrelational, unlikeable persona is slyly effective.

The other rough characters as a group, including Mistress Overdone, Pompey, and Froth, bawds all in the larger sense of the word, represent the dregs of a society that would behead a citizen for making his “betrothed wife” pregnant. Consideration of mimetic authenticity and therefore humanity in Martin Buber’s terms is hardly possible in such thinly sketched characterizations, yet it is noteworthy that throughout, the low comedic characters are represented as more natural, engaged, open: they may be taken as, on some primitive level, truly human, living and feeling, whereas the characters who are bound either in seeming or being “moral” according to
traditional/classical ethics, are drawn as non-relational, often cold. There is an innocent
politeness that speaks of openness to real dialogue, to “being” rather than “seeming” among the
low characters: as prisoner of the constable and verbal bumbler Elbow, Pompey the tapster
courteously facilitates the explanation of the circumstances that have culminated in his arrest,
showing a respect and personal consideration for the others — Froth, a bawd’s customer, and the
inept Elbow — that would do honor to a fine gentleman: “[. . .] I beseech you, look into Master
Froth here, sir, a man of fourscore pound a year, whose father died at Hallowmas — was ‘t not at
Hallowas, Master Froth?” (2.1.129-32). “I hope here be truths” (134), he asserts, and then
repeats verbatim (140). Although there is a knowing, parodic aspect to his gallant coordination of
the verbal intercourse among his party and the magistrates — he sounds rather more like the
mock barrister than the accused — Pompey’s manner is one of recognition of the others as
beings in the present. This carries forward to his revised role as assistant executioner; he is
similarly and humorously courteous to the uncooperative convict: “Master Barnardine, you must
rise and be hanged, Master Barnardine” (4.3.22-3). Among thieves and murderers at the jail, “all
great doers” in Pompey’s trade (4.3.19), he retains an awareness of each as another being,
without regard to any ethical judgment. In implicit contrast to the stance of his betters, he recalls
and recognizes these others (4-18) as You, as more than objects, prisoners, ill-doers, and is more
human for it.

If Shakespeare’s superior mimetic skills yield characters so realistic that it is tempting to
treat them as if they were “historical personages,” then it follows that it is equally compelling to
speculate on their histories, on what events and experiences might be imputed in the creation of
their “presents.” As Buber describes the process both in primitive man and in the child toward
creating an I, the developing person “gains his world by seeing, listening, feeling, forming” (*I* 77); this experiencing is necessary not just to survival but to preparing a self, a being, that is capable of reciprocal relation. Certainly experiencing does not stop, nor is the intensity and focus always the same; this is also true of a man’s relationships with You. The two, as previously noted, are found together, “mixed” (“Elements” 72), but the mix is no more static or homogenous than, say, the Elizabethan “world picture” that has been so soundly debunked in the past several decades, or the Shakespearean audience. In reality, “being” and “seeming” fluctuate, influenced over the course of a person’s lifetime by experience, encounter, and reciprocal relationship. One may remain deeply involved in one experiential effort — for example scholarship, intense professional development or contemplation or even dedicated partying — for a protracted period of time, increasing her It-world, as is necessary for progress, busily ignoring the longing for relation, avoiding encounter. But when encounter occurs, the longing is rekindled, and she finds herself in relationship with another being or even a group or thing. One is changed in relationship, alters one’s focus, and then “set[s] himself at a distance” (Friedman, “Introductory” 21) once again to seek and perfect experience which may or may not be very closely related to any previous venue(s) or interest(s), as when one makes a career change, finds oneself devoted to a new vocation, or pursues a consuming dedication to a previously undeveloped talent or pastime. This unevenness of development occurs for a person in both her I-It concerns — she cannot experience and utilize everything in the world at once, so one interest may have to diminish to accommodate another — and her I-You development in pursuit of actualization, which depends on encounter as it occurs.
Returning to the Duke, it is clear that his early speeches, in the concerns and values espoused, evince his wisdom and exalted authority. He properly ensures that the “nature of our people, / Our city’s institutions, and the terms / For common justice” (1.1.9-11) are overseen by the most learned, experienced minister known to him, Escalus, and that justice is in the hands of his “leavened and prepared choice” (56), Angelo. He appears nobly humble, avoiding “applause and aves vehement” (76), and the audience is assured that his unnamed mission is important. Further, his “complete bosom” and “grave and wrinkled” purpose (1.3.3-5), and claims to have “ever loved the life removed, / And held in idle price to haunt assemblies” (9-10) — he “seems” a man on a mission who has never liked crowds or parties — engender respect. Escalus avers the Duke to be “One that, above all other strifes, contended especially to know himself” (3.2.233-34), more interested in the well-being of others than himself, and “a gentleman of all temperance” (236-38). Duke Vincentio considers it his fault that disobedience has become the norm, for he has given evil deeds “permissive pass” (41), and knows that he would lose his people’s regard if he suddenly began to punish them (37-43); his appointment of Angelo should attract their gall elsewhere, yet there are “more reasons for this action” (1.3.52). By the end of the play it has been revealed that the Duke intended more than simply to revitalize the enforcement of Vienna’s laws and to effect that revitalization without losing the good opinion of his people; an obvious speculation is that he likely wished to observe the behavior of his ministers Angelo and Escalus, as well as that of his people, in his absence.

But Lucio invites questions that might best be addressed with some knowledge of the Duke’s prior stance as regards his worlds of It and You, or his balance of “seeming” and “being.” As in the case of a real person, his actions would be much easier to understand with some clues about the relation/non-relation path that might have brought Vincentio, at an age not
advanced but apparently somewhat past youth, to create this venerable yet cryptic wise
Duke/false Friar persona. Lucio in knowing tones paints an unexpectedly different picture of the
Duke as one who “had some feeling of the sport [fornication], he knew the service” (3.2.120-21),
would make such use of a woman as “to put a ducat in her clack-dish” (128), “had crotchets in
him” and “would be drunk” (129). Further, he calls him a “very superficial, ignorant,
unweighing fellow” (141), and later, vows the Duke to be “a better woodman than thou tak’st
him for” (4.3.175). Given Lucio’s frivolous demeanor, these defamatory remarks are easily
dismissed as wanton gossip, as lies, especially when balanced against his equally freely offered
vilification of Vincentio’s alter-ego, Friar Ludovick. The Duke / Friar, he charges, “spoke most
villainous speeches of the Duke” (5.1.193), libeling him(self) as “a fleshmonger, a fool, and a
coward” (5.1.375), accusations the text proves false. On the other hand, Lucio’s references to
the Duke have not always been slanderous: after making the Duke out to be a sexually
“crotcheted” drunk, he reports that “the greater file of the subject held the Duke to be wise”
(3.2.139), and that “I know him, and I love him” (151). Further, Vincentio “would mouth with a
beggar though she smelt brown bread and garlic” (145), which might place him either as so
sexually depraved that he would kiss even the most repulsive of low whores or as a man of the
people not above conversing with such a beggar. Lucio is lying some of the time, of course, but
it is not altogether clear, in the end, when. Contradictory allegations about the Duke’s character
aside, Shakespeare has given it to his fantastique to lob some unquestionably enigmatic
assertions and indications onto the stage: how can Lucio know — and does he really know —
that instead of the diplomatic mission he claims, the Duke has plotted to “usurp the beggary he
was never born to” (3.2.94-95)? From whom, or from what “dark corner” — when the
Duke/Friar has only just informed Isabella that “The Duke comes home tomorrow” (4.3.138) and
given her the letter for Friar Peter — has Lucio heard that “they say the Duke will be here tomorrow” (168)?

The Duke has long been, it is implied, seriously engaged in the study of good government and his laudably humanist enterprise of seeking to know himself, yet set before Buber’s construct of man learning through It to become an I capable of reciprocal relationship with You it may also be assumed possible that, like many a young person, the Duke before his dedication to the virtuous life encountered experiences the knowing of which would call into question the carefully protected image that “shall appear to the envious a scholar, statesman, and a soldier” (3.2.147-48, emphasis added). It is given that, presumably in his reign, a number of years have passed since the fornication laws were last enforced: “nineteen zodiacs” (1.2.166) according to Claudio, or “this fourteen years we have let slip” (1.3.22) by the Duke’s own reckoning. It seems conceivable that Duke Vincentio, whom Lucio says “would eat mutton on Fridays” but is “now past it” (182-83), might be a Duke who “would have dark deeds darkly answered,” and “would never bring them to light” (178-79). This would indeed be a Duke who well understands the irony of his own exclamation, “O what may man within him hide, / Though angel on the outward side!” (271-72), who goes to great lengths and deceptions to avoid the piercing “[s]hame to him whose cruel striking / Kills for faults of his own liking” (267-68). Lucio brings, perhaps, a dim light to the Duke’s dark corners; his “Come, sir, I know what I know” (3.2.154) and “Thou art deceived in me, friar” (169) have something in them of the ring of truth, another level of encounter in the Duke’s reawakened capacity to enter into relational Between with another being. He appears as one who, as Buber phrases it, “shrouds himself in clean garments” as he contemplates what “ought to be” (I 65), still refusing to engage with I-You as his whole being. And he is certainly aware of his isolation, likening himself to “an o’ergrown lion in a cave / That

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goes not out to prey” (1.3.23-24), yet remains throughout the play reluctant to stipulate the extent of his motivation. The audience is left to hope that perhaps fullest relation is to come at the palace, “where we’ll show / What’s yet behind that’s meet you all should know” (5.1.612-13), but the hope is disappointed. While the masterful Duke unravels his manipulations and concludes the action with three marriages and a proposed fourth — his own, to Isabella, with an implication also of relationship — unchallengeable secrets remain, as they often do in human reality.

The extra-textual speculations and conjectures made possible through consideration of Martin Buber’s dialogics, an exercise in some ways similar to psychoanalytic criticism in its dependence on mimetic realism, do add new angles and “dark corners” to the critical contemplation of characters and the purposes for which they may be represented as they are. It is a profitable exercise in the study of Measure for Measure, which has ever confounded and delighted scholars and demanded added insights — or in a sense, longed for encounter, for confrontation, in Buber’s idiom (I 28). As signified by its title, Measure for Measure is burdened by overt reference to scriptural content, and this continues to be an obstacle to the study of it as a complicated, character-driven work. Of far more interest than the exposure of the beam in Angelo’s eye in contrast to the mote in Claudio’s is the complexity of each represented human being as presented in the play. Angelo, the focus of the obvious morality theme, is not simply evil, nor Claudio simply sinful; neither are Isabella, Duke Vincentio, Lucio, or even the bawdy and low characters as simple as a focus on the Sermon on the Mount and Shakespeare’s religious beliefs, or even on Puritan hypocrisy, assumes them to be.
Shakespeare’s mimetic representations in *Measure for Measure*, particularly of the main characters, appear from afar as apparently prosaically one-dimensional as he perhaps meant them to be, confounding at middle distance, but revealed as humanly complex upon interrogation of their respective stances as relational beings. When the character of Duke Vincentio is encountered as a developing person, dimensions of his professed piety and concern for humanity take on shades and colors. He becomes more than a wily ruler disguised in an effort to observe and correct his subjects; he is a man changed in mid-course through encounter and relationship that propel his I toward You and move him toward actualization, toward being present in full. Isabella, experienced by the Duke and then, in a kind of reciprocity with him through the grace and power of different but no less dramatic You-moments, may be seen as both less than the paragon she seems at the beginning of the play and more than that one-dimensional, self-limiting young woman constraining her spirit by excluding relationship in an ironic effort, perhaps, to obtain it. Buber’s concept of the “genuine seeming” person (“Elements” 76), who becomes what at the outset he constructs as a seeming self, brings elements of Angelo’s infamy into clearer focus; he is not merely evil in any simplistic sense but is a man of created piety whose hypocrisy is both more and less damnable than plain judgment will discern.

Secondary and lesser characters are also revealed as unique others in the context of Buber’s humanist I-You construct. Frivolous Lucio and irresponsible Claudio take on unexpectedly recognizable aspects of developing selfhood when their words and behaviors are examined as evidence of the existence or lack of relationship or genuine engagement with others. Rough characters, such as Pompey, Mistress Overdone, and Froth, are discovered to be in some ways more present to each other and even to more highly-placed characters than they first appear to be, and as such may contribute more than comic dressing to the enterprise of the play. The
relevance of the present Buberian examination of the “beings” mimetically created in Shakespeare obviously has limits, yet asking questions of the characters’ imputed lives and humanity, including of their imaginary histories, yields profitable speculation beyond the text, and in turn suggests additional interpretations. There is much in such a study of Measure for Measure beyond the present scope; further critical encounters with its characters as representations of the human, particularly within the Buberian structure, promise to widen the scope of the play’s acceptance, address its status as problematic, and contribute to Shakespearean discourse as a whole.
Chapter 4

The Tempest:

I, Thou, and Prospero: Shakespeare’s Magician as Buber’s Developing Man

But whatever has thus been changed into It and frozen into a thing among things is still endowed with the meaning and the destiny to change back ever again.

-- Martin Buber

Despite the now-inescapable post-colonial readings of Prospero as imperialist and imperialism, the frequent and not implausible identification of the learned Prospero with Shakespeare himself, and numerous more esoteric readings of both magician and play derived variously from etymological allusions, speculative literary ancestry, and the mythological hybridity (Garber 856) of the entire play, the character of the vengeful sorcerer and usurped ruler remains representative of man’s struggle to become fully human.

A reading of The Tempest and its magus is enriched by consideration of Martin Buber’s comprehensive examination of the distance between knowledge and humanity (I 83-92). One of his most accessible conclusions is that the expansion of knowledge, that very essence of the progress of both human culture and the individual human being, constricts the power to relate that alone allows growth of the life of the spirit (88-89). In a Buberian reading of The Tempest, Prospero emerges as a scholar-magician whose detachment from human relationship is parallel to his dominion of the “liberal arts” (1.2.73). He embodies Buber’s theoretical man as master of knowledge and its application, in command of sun, wind, sea and earth (5.1.42-45) yet incapable of human relationship. The dialogic construct described in I and Thou adds depth to the reader’s
understanding of one of Shakespeare’s most disparately interpreted characters, who in turn gives face and feature to Buber’s philosophical abstract.

Prospero, sovereign of his own wild island and late Duke of Milan, is made known to the reader as a man positioned firmly in the It-realm of Buber’s dichotomy. A man of culture and its elite product, Prospero dwells apart from others in complete mastery over all aspects, seen and unseen, of his island domain. He has, in his dedication to learning and the creation of the “book” of the refined stuff of his ego, “moved away from being,” in Buber’s terms (I 114). And his self-imposed exile from humanity began long before the usurpation of his title and state.

Prospero tells his daughter Miranda that prior to the action in The Tempest he was so “rapt in his secret studies” (1.2.77) — so fully invested in the expansion of his knowledge — that he recruited his brother to rule in his stead. Because its nature is mysterious to any but those possessed of its secrets, this “magic” in which Prospero is immersed might be mistaken for mystical activity in pursuit of what Buber terms life “in the spirit” (I 89). Magic was a pursuit, declares Prospero, “all dedicated / To [. . .] the bettering of my mind” (1.2.190-91). However, his mastery and controlled utilization of its power defines Prospero’s “art” instead as It, the successful captivity of the natural world. Confronted, nature’s being may be disclosed to Prospero as the knower. The “magic” thus created is an object for comprehension and analysis, not mystical in origin. Buber explains that the act of beholding, a relationship, takes place in the You-world, but its description and absorption into the store of knowledge make an object of it (I 89-90). Prospero was once in relationship with the natural science of which he developed his knowledge and sorcery, but it has long since become experience, recorded and mastered for manipulation, according to Buber’s I-You construct, and “locked into the It-form of conceptual knowledge” (I 90). A further reading against Prospero’s practice as possible mysticism is his
own reference to magic, as noted above, as his “secret studies.” Ironically, this knowledge which places him in power over “airy spirits” is not spiritual in terms of relationship. It is empirical, and the spirits are objects. Stated differently, this magician’s power is technological skill (Hobson 40), residing in the It-world.

Further evidence that Prospero’s initial stance in the play’s action is directed toward the extreme of It is found in the way he holds his power over the inhabitants of his realm, and in his objectification of them. His captives are reminded of his ownership and power over them, which he wields in the most effective fashion for each. With Ariel, he employs a doting, patronizing parody of the paternal, calling, “Approach, my Ariel, come” (1.2.189); “My brave spirit!” (207) he exclaims; he fawns, “Why, that’s my spirit!” (217). Yet the gentle spirit, tugging against his bonds, must be kept in line with threats, reinforced promises of reward; Ariel responds with a flattering compliance that mimics his master:

PROSPERO. If thou more murmur’st, I will rend an oak
And peg thee in his knotty entrails till
Thou hast howled away twelve winters.

ARIEL. Pardon, master
I will be correspondent to command
And do my spriting gently.

PROSPERO. Do so, and after two days
I will discharge thee.

ARIEL. That’s my noble master!
What shall I do? Say what? What shall I do? (1.2.296-304)
Each knows his role in mutual manipulation; each is It to the other’s I. As Prospero moves
toward a relational stance, however, the seeming interaction will become more significant, more
genuine for both, in an example of Buber’s concept of “genuine seeming” (“Elements” 76).

Prospero’s I-It relationship with Caliban is far different from that in which he deals with
Ariel. He calls the misshapen creature to him harshly, saying, “What ho! Slave! Caliban! / Thou
earth, thou! Speak” (3.1.316-17). Ignored, Prospero follows up with, “Thou poisonous slave, got
by the devil himself / Upon thy wicked dam, come forth!” (322-23). At Caliban’s subsequent
curse, Prospero promises physical punishment, cramps, stings, stitches and pinches, delivered by
magical means (328-333). Caliban must be coerced, not flattered. Answering Caliban’s ugly
resentment of Prospero’s cruel mastery, the magician returns venomously,

    Thou most lying slave,
    Whom stripes may move, not kindness! I have used thee,
    Filth as thou art, with humane care, and lodged thee
    In mine own cell, till thou didst seek to violate
    The honor of my child. (347-49)

The shocking reply, that Caliban regrets his failure to rape Miranda and people the island with
his issue (352-55), establishes the degree of hatred between the two. There is only distance,
ever genuine dialogue, mutual refusal to stand in the present, ever. The entities under his
control, corporeal an otherwise, are not beings at all to Prospero, not others with whom
relationship may develop, but tools manipulated to utility.

In one of the queer lyric-dramatic episodes, the You-moments that Buber says “loosen
the well-tried structure” (I 84), Prospero encounters his daughter Miranda as if anew, and is
pulled into genuine dialogue, into relation. He is found at the height of his powerful machinations of nature and fate, the successful foundering of King Alonso’s ship, triumphant in the utilization of the It-world that is his domain. Miranda, however, is devastated at the terror and destruction wrought by his magic. She cries,

If by your art, my dearest father, you have
Put the wild waters in this roar, ally them.
The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch,
But that the sea, mounting to th’ welkin’s cheek,
Dashes the fire out. Oh, I have suffered
With those that I saw suffer! A brave vessel,
Who had, no doubt, some noble creature in her,
Dashed all to pieces. Oh, the cry did knock
Againt my very heart! Poor souls, they perished.
Had I been any god of power, I would
Have sunk the sea within the earth or ere
It should the good ship so have swallowed and
The freighting souls within her. (1.2.1-12)

In this speech, Miranda has expressed such personal pain — the pain of presence with the other, whom she has not even encountered in reciprocity — that a father cannot be unmoved. Taken aback, he is pulled in the event of relation to an extreme of communication that heretofore, in twelve years, he has not approached: he relates to her, in one compressed telling, of his purposes and the circumstances of their exile (1.2.16-169).
Genuine dialogue, fully present with another, does not come easily to Prospero. As he sits in the Between, in the presence of his You and hers, he speaks to his Miranda, telling to her rapt interest the story of their betrayal and exile; Prospero is finally conscious of his daughter’s human awareness of him, but he is not accustomed to encounter. Unused to the requirements of relationship, unsure of connection, he repeatedly questions or demands Miranda’s attention: “Dost thou attend me?” (1.2.78); “Thou attend’st not” (87); “I pray thee, mark me” (89); “Dost thou hear?” (106). It is as though his absorption in magical pursuits and manipulations has stripped him of relational ability so far as to disable his reciprocity even in conversation, in spoken dialogue. When he finishes his story, encounter ends at his sole discretion; he dons his cloak (1.2.170) and charms her to sleep (186-87). Prospero has signified his genuine self, however, for the first time in many years, and the moment has had its impact.

As remembered experience, the magician claims love. As he tells his daughter of his fall from the ducal throne, he calls his brother Antonio “he whom next thyself / Of all the world I loved” (1.2.86—87). That he cares for Miranda seems evident when he declares later that she, “a cherubin” (182), had been his child-savior at the time of his loss. His very casual, patronizingly possessive attitude toward the spirit Ariel, cited above, seems in a way affectionate, and to Ariel’s “Do you love me, master?” (4.1.52), Prospero responds, though perhaps the reader wonders at his casual tone, “Dearly, my delicate Ariel”(53). When he finally reveals himself to his noble guests, he praises Gonzalo’s honor and calls him “friend” (5.1.134—135). Although Prospero’s magic and its power isolate him and his manner is imperious and uninviting of relationship, he does seem to have known, or yet to harbor, positive and available feelings toward some others. Circumstances, in any event, require him now to enter into relation with others.
However, his possibly genuine “love” may at first be something that in fact exists outside the You-world: says Buber, “The individual You must become an It when the event of relation has run its course” (I 84). Of Shakespeare’s magician, this suggests that there might have once been a You-relation; Prospero may at one time have engaged directly in his love for Miranda — as perhaps even his love for Antonio — marked it as truth, then catalogued her as “loved,” and objectified her. In a similar way, he may indeed have felt youthful kinship and affection for — in other words, experienced You-relationship with — Antonio, perceived it as the culturally prescribed “love,” and converted the emotion and the brother to It. Buber explains the recognition of another as a living being outside true relationship thus: “When one cannot get around saying You, perhaps to one’s father, wife, companion — why not say You and mean It?” (I 85). In spite of Prospero’s apparently blind dedication to his arts and his manipulative use of the power he derives from his developed genius, the magician can still reflect on that which he has named “love” and “frozen into a thing among things” (I 90), that is, experienced, used, and placed in the It-world. So, Prospero’s immersion in his It-world may not be absolute.

In I and Thou, however, the separate I-It and I-You indeed are portrayed as being doomed to an absolute mutual exclusivity. W. Taylor Stevenson calls such an extreme separation “unnecessary,” suggesting that Buber’s body of work tempers the disjunction between the two relational conditions (193). Malcomb Diamond, quoted in Stevenson, argues that “there is implied in Buber ‘the possibility of gradations in the I-Thou encounters’” (196); this is borne out in the essays of Buber’s Knowledge of Man. Shakespeare’s major characters are certainly expressive of gradations; they are, in the words of Harold Bloom, “rich in multiform qualities” (729). Prospero may be in many ways unsympathetic, even cold in his pursuit of revenge — if
revenge is his project — and in his detached position among other beings, but he is well endowed with complex, flawed humanness and volition toward humanity.

Humanity — the You-world — is indeed recoverable in Martin Buber’s dialogic structure: he insists, here almost as though on Prospero’s behalf, that the spirit’s response, even when changed into It, “is still endowed with the meaning and the destiny to change back ever again” (I 90). The magician, allowing relationship once again, can be transformed, regenerated, to humanity. This he does appear to have accomplished when he abjures his “rough magic” (5.1.51), but the process by which he arrives at this point has puzzled readers and critics alike. Harold Bloom regrets Prospero’s “ironic loss” (670), which he presupposes leads to despair (666); Barbara Mowat sees “a man’s personal growth from vengeance to mercy, and from rough magic to deep spirituality” (“Music” 187). In a very thorough but quite speculative article, Cosmo Corfield argues that Prospero’s entire project has failed, his magic has become tainted to “roughness” (42) and a “return to the fold” is his only recourse following a humiliating fall likened to Lear’s (48). Corfield (40) and Marjorie Garber (872) seem to agree that Ariel’s appeal to Prospero’s “tender affections” (5.1.18-19) transforms the great magus, although the former favors material vengeance as the sorcerer’s unfulfilled motive (41), while the latter subscribes to the more plausible theory that Prospero’s project unfolds much as he had foreseen at its inception, yielding a revenge of a finer sort (871-872). Among these and other readings, including consideration alongside Buber’s I-You structure, lie innumerable possibilities for interpretation of Prospero’s apparently free choice to “change back” (I 90).

Martin Buber in I and Thou describes the moment in which the need to make that choice may be recognized: “At times when man is overcome by the horror of the alienation between I and world, it occurs to him that something might be done” (120). Such a realization would
certainly be unmistakable, cataclysmic, recognizable. Shakespeare has given Prospero no such melodramatic leap to awareness. He seems instead to move, as ordinary human beings move, at times imperceptibly in a gray dawn of acceptance, at times with ambiguous abruptness, inevitably turning his person, his I, toward You. Whether Prospero’s arrival at forgiveness and apparent repudiation of his magic followed a well-wrought and successfully executed plan, resulted from a failed project yielding an unscripted loss, represents an unplanned change of heart, or was written to elicit speculative interpretation or forever remain a mystery, the inevitability is apparent, particularly in retrospect, throughout. The near-imperceptible movement begins with Miranda’s confrontation, which precipitates Prospero’s long-delayed revelation of his tragic betrayal and usurpation. As foreground, it should be noted that his failure to share this information with her earlier further emphasizes absence of relationship; the telling of it as the play opens may be read to signal the opposite: a move toward relationship, toward humanity. Indeed, Miranda points out that Prospero has “often / Begun to tell me what I am, but stopped [. . .] / Concluding ‘Stay. Not yet.’” (1.2.34-36). Prior to this moment, he has “stayed” himself from moving into the You-world, but “The hour’s now come” (37). Four times he urges his daughter to “attend,” although she has shown no signs of disengagement. His urging seems from a Buberian perspective to have been made on his own behalf, to enforce the encounter for which he has longed and which has now met him by grace.

The door to relationship now unlocked, Prospero seems to become incrementally and progressively more engaged with the You-world, except as regards the cretinous Caliban. His subsequent encounter with Ariel is cordial, even sympathetic, though of course he remains condescending and the spirit is yet more object than being. Perhaps in response to positive address, Ariel issues a reminder of his master’s promise of freedom, eliciting Prospero’s
relatively mild annoyance, which dissipates quickly at the spirit’s next job well done. From this point through the end of the play, his treatment of Ariel seems progressively more akin to kindness and approval, or even relational possibility, than to the manipulative, falsely sweet management described above.

Prospero meets Ferdinand with harsh words, calling him a usurper (457), a spy (459), and a traitor (464); this is simple manipulation of his objects, for the declared purpose of making him “uneasy” (1.2.455) and to prompt Miranda to defend the newcomer — “Beseech you, father!” (478), she begs on Ferdinand’s behalf — as Prospero carries out plans made prior to his reciprocal encounter with Miranda. In their second encounter he comes near to apologizing, “If I have too austerely punished you, / Your compensation makes amends” (4.1.1-2), and engages the young prince in normal human discourse. Though Prospero has issued a stern warning to Ferdinand, he does not place him under further magical spell, and their conversation seems to indicate relationship. He gives Miranda to Ferdinand in a very civil manner, albeit according to his own design (4.1.13-32). An I-You connection of sorts appears to be growing with his son-in-law to be.

Issuing Ferdinand another, sterner warning that yet sounds almost fatherly — “[D]o not give dalliance / Too much rein” (51-54) —, Prospero subsides and the masque begins. His sudden awareness (4.1.137-40) that he has forgotten the rabble’s seditious plot seems to indicate a lessening of his controlled adherence to the It-world and the prescience It-immersion had conferred, and Miranda notices the difference: he is “distempered” (145). And here he almost generously relates his often-quoted “vexation” with the transience of being — and of magic: “We are such stuff / As dreams are made on, and our little life / Is rounded with a sleep” (156-
This moment may mark the real point of Prospero’s turn toward humanity, though its relational encounters have been occurring throughout the play.

The passage in which Prospero declares his affections tender and his reason nobler than fury, and orders his captives’ release (5.1.18-32) is, as suggested earlier, often seen as the moment in which he changes from a plan of vengeance to one of mercy. In contrast to his earlier “vexation” and given the tone of the exchange, it appears more likely that his move toward humanity has already taken place, his decision made in I-You reciprocity. The dramatics that follow — the abjuring of Prospero’s “rough magic” and its attendant call for the violent deaths of both staff and book, the magician’s act of forgiveness, his addresses to the noblemen and finally to the audience — are anticlimactic. Prospero has fulfilled his “destiny to change back ever again” (Buber, 190), however the reader interprets the occasion of his awareness of You.

As Buber’s use of primal man and the accretion of cultural knowledge to give shape to his word-figures, I-You and I-It, is an effective tool to describe the development of inter-human relationships and therefore humanity, so also does his assessment of the development of historical humanity apply to the individual:

There are times of ripening when the true element of the human spirit, held down and buried, grows ready underground with such pressure and such tension that it merely waits to be touched by one who will touch it — and then erupts. The revelation that then appears seizes the whole ready element in all its suchness, recasts it and produces a form, a new form of God in the world. (166)

The ripening in the story of Prospero was two-fold: the culmination of his long-planned arrangements for Miranda’s future and a return to Milan opens him to the unexpected eruption of
genuine dialogue and ripening of relationship in a Between kept underground by the forces of magic and experience.

“The individual It can become a You by entering into the event of relation,” declares Martin Buber (I 84). Prospero, it would seem, by intent or accident, entered into various events of relation on the island that last day. His world was affected by relation, his I renewed in relationship, and his progress toward full humanity inevitable.
Conclusion
An Essential Reassessment

The question of the connection between the essence of man and the essence of art must be posed anew. That means that art must be regarded as the image-work of man, the peculiar image-work of his peculiarity. We ask about the connection between what is essentially peculiar to man and what is essentially characteristic of art. [. . .] What can be said about art as about a being that springs from the being of man?

-- Martin Buber

“People tell stories” (Pinker, “Toward” 162). Steven Pinker, as earlier discussed, advocates a “consilient” (164) approach to the study of literature, one which would consolidate the scientific and humanist disciplines into a greater coherency to be applied toward understanding why people tell stories (169). I believe that understanding the adaptive evolutionary mechanism, however interesting, cannot go much further than a confirmation of the humanist purpose of “knowing man,” both individually and collectively; the debates about purposeful application of that knowledge will and must continue. There can be no absolute assessment of the purity of humanist knowledge as sought for self-actualization and improvement of spiritual and physical life, or of the degree to which such knowledge by design or accident acts to promulgate or to perpetuate cultural values to the advantage of some and the detriment of others. Art, literature, science, education, and indeed inseparable culture itself
accomplish both and all shades between the extremes of autonomous, observable nature and culturally defined materialist construction. Arguments insistent on defining and concretizing cause, essence, phenomena, and effect are doomed to self-limitation and eventually supersedence, the more demanding their parameters the more complete their eventual irrelevance. And the more rigid the demands of an ideological or cultural mindset, the less successful it is ultimately likely to be in its purpose. If Pinker’s consilient theory of literary criticism were placed in practice, who would establish its tenets, its limits, its language? If practice has shown that rigid anti-essentialism’s determination to exclude human nature from its conversation for many years effectively excluded also the study of characters and mimetics in imaginative literature, it may be concluded, I think, that any self-defined and catechized set of rules would settle into exclusion and limitation in various areas, as well. Cultural critics correctly point to the damage done by oppressive cultural forces that “other” certain people and ideas, limiting human expression, progress, and well-being on multiple levels; much of this damage derives in human history from the efforts of some who would decide wisdom for all, in the name of survival, faith, ideology, or economics. Exclusion in every case is a collateral condition. The legitimization of a way of thinking about the world, or about art or literature, should not demand its exclusive or even primary status. An inclusive approach to literary criticism, I suggest, is surely more productive, and indeed more potentially conciliatory than “consilience,” which itself implies a value judgment as to what should be considered among the “best” theories for inclusion (OED).

Martin Buber’s approach to humanist knowledge, to an understanding of the nature of human interaction, which is the nature of humanity, is one approach to the study of art and literature that supposes access to the interhuman is available regardless of the individual’s
cultural, religious, or spiritual background or orientation. Over a lifetime of scholarship and philosophy, Buber created a sometimes difficult structure that, when penetrated, is revealed as an extremely flexible basis for the study of mankind, accommodating the prehistorical and historical realities extant in human life, both individual and universal. The only real predication inherent in his philosophical anthropology is an acceptance of an essential humanity, but Buber does not presume to define it. For this reason alone, and because he takes such care from the 1923 original *I and Thou* through the essays collected in the 1950s and ‘60s, in such published works as *A Believing Humanism* and *The Knowledge of Man*, to maintain an independence from an exclusionary concretization of any prejudicial spiritual terms, the dialogic construct he offers provides an open and elucidating means of studying literary meaning.

Still, Buber is difficult to penetrate. He often seems self-contradictory: separation from the primal You is necessary to actualization of self, or I, but encounter and relationship with You, with others as separate beings, is just as necessary to it. And every You must return to its prior status as It (*I* 69-79). A person is described as either “being,” or standing in presence with the other, or “seeming,” appearing to “be,” yet Buber allows that being and seeming are dual, and that, while we may distinguish between them as two types of human existence, we must also settle for considering an individual as predominantly one or the other (“Elements” 75-78). These examples show that Buber is not only confusing at times, but that much more explication and at least some loose codification of his idiom are needed to render his work accessible to a wider field of scholars and therefore useful to the general discourse. Yet I believe such is possible, and may contribute a great deal to the study of literatures, particularly in the areas of character representation and mimetics. And as a Shakespearean, I find that possibility full of potential for advancing the interpretation of dramatic characters and the human realities they mirror.
Clearly Shakespeare’s characters were no Greek-masked suggestions of pure comedic or tragic representation. The depths and breadths of authorial intention on his part are not only obscure, they are as unknowable in their entirety at any time, for any author, in any medium. Yet the placing of characters on the stage, the bestowal upon them of speeches and movements and quirks and representations of both simple and complicated emotion, reason, and aspiration means, undoubtedly, that he meant them — at least most of them, the ones not trooping across the stage for a laugh or painted as outrageous symbols of vice, virtue, or hypocrisy — to mirror as truly as might be the real essence of being human. The de facto prohibition against viewing them as such — because ideologies and cultures exist, but “real” and essential humans do not, or because no critic or scholar can know the definitive meaning of a text, which cannot exist in any event — has inhibited for long enough the retrieval, reception, enjoyment, and contemplation of literature and its subject, humanity.

In this project I have sought to make meaningful observations about some Shakespearean characters often considered difficult or obscure, about others rarely considered at all, and about the significance of relationship when it is acknowledged between characters as representatives of humanity. Measure for Measure is a particularly fruitful venue for Buberian analysis, mostly because it has been, as noted in the chapter which discusses it, largely examined in terms of its assumed overarching scriptural and political implications. I believe that some important observations and questions have been posed supporting the manifold, multicolored, natures of Duke Vincentio, Isabella, Angelo, and even neglected Lucio. Relationship and encounter are the keys to this play, as they are to The Tempest, about which this work has made only cursory commentary.
Much more could be learned about both of the plays that this project examines through Buber’s lens, and certainly any Shakespearean drama would reveal much through a study of relationship and the presence of You. *Othello*, for example, confounds and disturbs many readers and scholars: it is as difficult to witness the deterioration of a hero as it is to empathize with a man who would murder his wife. Yet it fascinates, and interpretations abound. In the end, however, Desdemona is dead, and so is Othello, and almost no one pretends to understand why. Buber provides an idiom for the mysterious, the “queer lyric-dramatic” (84) episodes that are You-moments, that, unarticulated, occur in being-to-being confrontation and change people. Othello has encountered and met Desdemona, he stands as It to Iago, and he ultimately meets and knows himself. For him, as for *Measure for Measure*’s Angelo, not all experiences in the interhuman Between are pleasant, although they do result in change.

Buber has rarely been enlisted in the study of other plays, especially by scholars in a non-religious context, but the few instances have employed his structure to excellent effect in extending awareness of character mimesis. To moderate effect, Pat Boni follows Lear in well-elucidated Buberian terms toward a “redemption” (245) that is seen as connected more to religion than to the mystery of human encounter. Of literary character study, little has been done.

Perhaps setting a precedent for the use of Buber’s work in criticism centered in literary scholarship is David Ruiter’s persuasive study of “‘Harry, Prince Hal, Henry V’” (50), which provides an examination of one of Shakespeare’s most complicated characters. Hal is a character whose conflicting behaviors leave the audience perplexed; he seems almost likeable, but falls short. In question is which of the positions along Buber’s I-You/I-It continuum Hal is occupying; Ruiter examines the prince as “convincingly, ambiguously human” (60), pulled
toward both the experiential and intentional It and the You of relationship. The questions raised
about the pull toward “lived actuality” (qtd. in Ruiter 64) and the individual’s ability to turn
away from his I-It extreme to acknowledge it are, I think, important ones that Buber’s work
enables. Whether Hal achieves genuine relationship and full humanity or not, he cannot, after
such inquiry, yet be seen as wholly seeming or utilizing, as wholly oriented toward It.
Actualized or not, he is undeniably human, and Buber makes that visible. Ruiter’s application of
Martin Buber’s I-Thou idiom to Harry goes far toward establishing a new Shakespearean
dialogue.

Conversation about any number of enigmatic characters in Shakespeare might be
facilitated by a Buberian structure made generally accessible. From the most daunting, including
Hamlet and Lear, to others who lie dismissed, as for example Lucio does, Shakespeare’s mimetic
creations await Buber. As You Like It’s Oliver, with his complete and unelaborated change of
heart, and King Leontes, whose unfathomable jealousy drives The Winter’s Tale, are also
inexplicable using causal methods, and so might be better studied on Buber’s terms. The
interactions, both enchanted and natural, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, may reveal interesting
subtexts in the examination of an encounter between workman and fairy queen, the multiplied
pursuit of unwilling lovers, and the mystery — the lyric-dramatic liminality — of enchantment.
Martin Buber’s work is rich in promise as an adjunct to the study of Shakespeare.

Audiences, critics, and scholars have for millennia sought varying angles and frames of
reference from and through which to enhance the meanings of texts of all kinds. The work of the
poet’s imagination has been examined through the matrices of classical, neo-classical, romantic,
Victorian, modernist, Marxian, Freudian, postmodernist, historicist, materialist,
psychoanalytical, post-colonial, post-post-colonial, queer, indefinable political, ideological, cultural, hegemonic, qualified, unqualified, and every other kind and hybrid kind of thought or absence thereof. Even views which attempt to preclude or exclude the others make honest contributions to the conversation. In imposing the odd and often convoluted semantics and binaries-but-not-binaries of Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology upon Shakespeare’s texts, this project has been focused on contributing, and aware that the final Answers in Literature, while present in the quest, only exist in the Between of the audience’s relationship with the images in the text. If the actualized possibility of a saucy past for Duke Vincentio, a yearning leaping forth in Prospero to bridge his losses, an Othello finally in full relationship, a Hal not entirely damned as pure user, or a Lear acknowledged and acknowledging himself add freshness to Shakespearean discourse, then I, You, and the dialogue of the interhuman have a fresh relevance.
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Curriculum Vita

Elizabeth Burford Lang was born January 24, 1955 in Del Rio, Texas, to Benton and Virginia Hinton Burford. She graduated with honors in 1972 from Mount Pleasant High School in Mount Pleasant, Texas, and in 1976 received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration with a minor in Anthropology from Stephens College in Columbia, Missouri. She enjoyed a career in corporate and private business until 2005, when she enrolled in the Graduate School at the University of Texas at El Paso to study English and American Literature. Lang has presented critical papers and participated in symposia at various venues including the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association, the UTEP Graduate Student Conference, and the Shakespeare Association of America. In 2008, she was honored as the Outstanding Graduate Student in English and American Literature. She is a member of Phi Kappa Phi and Sigma Tau Delta honorary fraternities. Lang has worked as a Teaching Assistant in the University of Texas at El Paso’s English Department, teaching composition and rhetoric, and is currently an Instructor in the composition program.